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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h | 172 |
1 files changed, 172 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..59a2c7dbc --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/pkeys.h @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * PowerPC Memory Protection Keys management + * + * Copyright 2017, Ram Pai, IBM Corporation. + */ + +#ifndef _ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H +#define _ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H + +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <asm/firmware.h> + +extern int num_pkey; +extern u32 reserved_allocation_mask; /* bits set for reserved keys */ + +#define ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS (VM_PKEY_BIT0 | VM_PKEY_BIT1 | VM_PKEY_BIT2 | \ + VM_PKEY_BIT3 | VM_PKEY_BIT4) + +/* Override any generic PKEY permission defines */ +#define PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE 0x4 +#define PKEY_ACCESS_MASK (PKEY_DISABLE_ACCESS | \ + PKEY_DISABLE_WRITE | \ + PKEY_DISABLE_EXECUTE) + +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 +#include <asm/book3s/64/pkeys.h> +#else +#error "Not supported" +#endif + + +static inline u64 pkey_to_vmflag_bits(u16 pkey) +{ + return (((u64)pkey << VM_PKEY_SHIFT) & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS); +} + +static inline int vma_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) + return 0; + return (vma->vm_flags & ARCH_VM_PKEY_FLAGS) >> VM_PKEY_SHIFT; +} + +static inline int arch_max_pkey(void) +{ + return num_pkey; +} + +#define pkey_alloc_mask(pkey) (0x1 << pkey) + +#define mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) (mm->context.pkey_allocation_map) + +#define __mm_pkey_allocated(mm, pkey) { \ + mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) |= pkey_alloc_mask(pkey); \ +} + +#define __mm_pkey_free(mm, pkey) { \ + mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) &= ~pkey_alloc_mask(pkey); \ +} + +#define __mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey) \ + (mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) & pkey_alloc_mask(pkey)) + +#define __mm_pkey_is_reserved(pkey) (reserved_allocation_mask & \ + pkey_alloc_mask(pkey)) + +static inline bool mm_pkey_is_allocated(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey) +{ + if (pkey < 0 || pkey >= arch_max_pkey()) + return false; + + /* Reserved keys are never allocated. */ + if (__mm_pkey_is_reserved(pkey)) + return false; + + return __mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey); +} + +/* + * Returns a positive, 5-bit key on success, or -1 on failure. + * Relies on the mmap_lock to protect against concurrency in mm_pkey_alloc() and + * mm_pkey_free(). + */ +static inline int mm_pkey_alloc(struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + /* + * Note: this is the one and only place we make sure that the pkey is + * valid as far as the hardware is concerned. The rest of the kernel + * trusts that only good, valid pkeys come out of here. + */ + u32 all_pkeys_mask = (u32)(~(0x0)); + int ret; + + if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) + return -1; + /* + * Are we out of pkeys? We must handle this specially because ffz() + * behavior is undefined if there are no zeros. + */ + if (mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm) == all_pkeys_mask) + return -1; + + ret = ffz((u32)mm_pkey_allocation_map(mm)); + __mm_pkey_allocated(mm, ret); + + return ret; +} + +static inline int mm_pkey_free(struct mm_struct *mm, int pkey) +{ + if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) + return -1; + + if (!mm_pkey_is_allocated(mm, pkey)) + return -EINVAL; + + __mm_pkey_free(mm, pkey); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Try to dedicate one of the protection keys to be used as an + * execute-only protection key. + */ +extern int execute_only_pkey(struct mm_struct *mm); +extern int __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + int prot, int pkey); +static inline int arch_override_mprotect_pkey(struct vm_area_struct *vma, + int prot, int pkey) +{ + if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) + return 0; + + /* + * Is this an mprotect_pkey() call? If so, never override the value that + * came from the user. + */ + if (pkey != -1) + return pkey; + + return __arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey); +} + +extern int __arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, + unsigned long init_val); +static inline int arch_set_user_pkey_access(struct task_struct *tsk, int pkey, + unsigned long init_val) +{ + if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * userspace should not change pkey-0 permissions. + * pkey-0 is associated with every page in the kernel. + * If userspace denies any permission on pkey-0, the + * kernel cannot operate. + */ + if (pkey == 0) + return init_val ? -EINVAL : 0; + + return __arch_set_user_pkey_access(tsk, pkey, init_val); +} + +static inline bool arch_pkeys_enabled(void) +{ + return mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_PKEY); +} + +extern void pkey_mm_init(struct mm_struct *mm); +#endif /*_ASM_POWERPC_KEYS_H */ |