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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 1116 |
1 files changed, 1116 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1f4f5e703 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h @@ -0,0 +1,1116 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux + * + * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual + * machines without emulation or binary translation. + * + * MMU support + * + * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc. + * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates. + * + * Authors: + * Yaniv Kamay <yaniv@qumranet.com> + * Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com> + */ + +/* + * The MMU needs to be able to access/walk 32-bit and 64-bit guest page tables, + * as well as guest EPT tables, so the code in this file is compiled thrice, + * once per guest PTE type. The per-type defines are #undef'd at the end. + */ + +#if PTTYPE == 64 + #define pt_element_t u64 + #define guest_walker guest_walker64 + #define FNAME(name) paging##64_##name + #define PT_LEVEL_BITS 9 + #define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT PT_DIRTY_SHIFT + #define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT + #define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true + #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 + #define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL + #else + #define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 2 + #endif +#elif PTTYPE == 32 + #define pt_element_t u32 + #define guest_walker guest_walker32 + #define FNAME(name) paging##32_##name + #define PT_LEVEL_BITS 10 + #define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS 2 + #define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT PT_DIRTY_SHIFT + #define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT PT_ACCESSED_SHIFT + #define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) true + + #define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE 4 + #define PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT 13 + #define PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK \ + (((1ULL << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SIZE) - 1) << PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT) +#elif PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT + #define pt_element_t u64 + #define guest_walker guest_walkerEPT + #define FNAME(name) ept_##name + #define PT_LEVEL_BITS 9 + #define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT 9 + #define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT 8 + #define PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu) (!(mmu)->cpu_role.base.ad_disabled) + #define PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS PT64_ROOT_MAX_LEVEL +#else + #error Invalid PTTYPE value +#endif + +/* Common logic, but per-type values. These also need to be undefined. */ +#define PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK ((pt_element_t)(((1ULL << 52) - 1) & ~(u64)(PAGE_SIZE-1))) +#define PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl) __PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS) +#define PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(lvl) __PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS) +#define PT_INDEX(addr, lvl) __PT_INDEX(addr, lvl, PT_LEVEL_BITS) + +#define PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK (1 << PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT) +#define PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK (1 << PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT) + +#define gpte_to_gfn_lvl FNAME(gpte_to_gfn_lvl) +#define gpte_to_gfn(pte) gpte_to_gfn_lvl((pte), PG_LEVEL_4K) + +/* + * The guest_walker structure emulates the behavior of the hardware page + * table walker. + */ +struct guest_walker { + int level; + unsigned max_level; + gfn_t table_gfn[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + pt_element_t ptes[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + pt_element_t prefetch_ptes[PTE_PREFETCH_NUM]; + gpa_t pte_gpa[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + pt_element_t __user *ptep_user[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + bool pte_writable[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + unsigned int pt_access[PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS]; + unsigned int pte_access; + gfn_t gfn; + struct x86_exception fault; +}; + +#if PTTYPE == 32 +static inline gfn_t pse36_gfn_delta(u32 gpte) +{ + int shift = 32 - PT32_DIR_PSE36_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT; + + return (gpte & PT32_DIR_PSE36_MASK) << shift; +} +#endif + +static gfn_t gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pt_element_t gpte, int lvl) +{ + return (gpte & PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK(lvl)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; +} + +static inline void FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, unsigned *access, + unsigned gpte) +{ + unsigned mask; + + /* dirty bit is not supported, so no need to track it */ + if (!PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu)) + return; + + BUILD_BUG_ON(PT_WRITABLE_MASK != ACC_WRITE_MASK); + + mask = (unsigned)~ACC_WRITE_MASK; + /* Allow write access to dirty gptes */ + mask |= (gpte >> (PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT - PT_WRITABLE_SHIFT)) & + PT_WRITABLE_MASK; + *access &= mask; +} + +static inline int FNAME(is_present_gpte)(unsigned long pte) +{ +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT + return pte & PT_PRESENT_MASK; +#else + return pte & 7; +#endif +} + +static bool FNAME(is_bad_mt_xwr)(struct rsvd_bits_validate *rsvd_check, u64 gpte) +{ +#if PTTYPE != PTTYPE_EPT + return false; +#else + return __is_bad_mt_xwr(rsvd_check, gpte); +#endif +} + +static bool FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, u64 gpte, int level) +{ + return __is_rsvd_bits_set(&mmu->guest_rsvd_check, gpte, level) || + FNAME(is_bad_mt_xwr)(&mmu->guest_rsvd_check, gpte); +} + +static bool FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, u64 *spte, + u64 gpte) +{ + if (!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(gpte)) + goto no_present; + + /* Prefetch only accessed entries (unless A/D bits are disabled). */ + if (PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(vcpu->arch.mmu) && + !(gpte & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK)) + goto no_present; + + if (FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(vcpu->arch.mmu, gpte, PG_LEVEL_4K)) + goto no_present; + + return false; + +no_present: + drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, spte); + return true; +} + +/* + * For PTTYPE_EPT, a page table can be executable but not readable + * on supported processors. Therefore, set_spte does not automatically + * set bit 0 if execute only is supported. Here, we repurpose ACC_USER_MASK + * to signify readability since it isn't used in the EPT case + */ +static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte) +{ + unsigned access; +#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT + access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) | + ((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) | + ((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0); +#else + BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK); + BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1); + access = gpte & (PT_WRITABLE_MASK | PT_USER_MASK | PT_PRESENT_MASK); + /* Combine NX with P (which is set here) to get ACC_EXEC_MASK. */ + access ^= (gpte >> PT64_NX_SHIFT); +#endif + + return access; +} + +static int FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + struct guest_walker *walker, + gpa_t addr, int write_fault) +{ + unsigned level, index; + pt_element_t pte, orig_pte; + pt_element_t __user *ptep_user; + gfn_t table_gfn; + int ret; + + /* dirty/accessed bits are not supported, so no need to update them */ + if (!PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu)) + return 0; + + for (level = walker->max_level; level >= walker->level; --level) { + pte = orig_pte = walker->ptes[level - 1]; + table_gfn = walker->table_gfn[level - 1]; + ptep_user = walker->ptep_user[level - 1]; + index = offset_in_page(ptep_user) / sizeof(pt_element_t); + if (!(pte & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK)) { + trace_kvm_mmu_set_accessed_bit(table_gfn, index, sizeof(pte)); + pte |= PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK; + } + if (level == walker->level && write_fault && + !(pte & PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK)) { + trace_kvm_mmu_set_dirty_bit(table_gfn, index, sizeof(pte)); +#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT + if (kvm_x86_ops.nested_ops->write_log_dirty(vcpu, addr)) + return -EINVAL; +#endif + pte |= PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK; + } + if (pte == orig_pte) + continue; + + /* + * If the slot is read-only, simply do not process the accessed + * and dirty bits. This is the correct thing to do if the slot + * is ROM, and page tables in read-as-ROM/write-as-MMIO slots + * are only supported if the accessed and dirty bits are already + * set in the ROM (so that MMIO writes are never needed). + * + * Note that NPT does not allow this at all and faults, since + * it always wants nested page table entries for the guest + * page tables to be writable. And EPT works but will simply + * overwrite the read-only memory to set the accessed and dirty + * bits. + */ + if (unlikely(!walker->pte_writable[level - 1])) + continue; + + ret = __try_cmpxchg_user(ptep_user, &orig_pte, pte, fault); + if (ret) + return ret; + + kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, table_gfn); + walker->ptes[level - 1] = pte; + } + return 0; +} + +static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 gpte) +{ + unsigned pkeys = 0; +#if PTTYPE == 64 + pte_t pte = {.pte = gpte}; + + pkeys = pte_flags_pkey(pte_flags(pte)); +#endif + return pkeys; +} + +static inline bool FNAME(is_last_gpte)(struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + unsigned int level, unsigned int gpte) +{ + /* + * For EPT and PAE paging (both variants), bit 7 is either reserved at + * all level or indicates a huge page (ignoring CR3/EPTP). In either + * case, bit 7 being set terminates the walk. + */ +#if PTTYPE == 32 + /* + * 32-bit paging requires special handling because bit 7 is ignored if + * CR4.PSE=0, not reserved. Clear bit 7 in the gpte if the level is + * greater than the last level for which bit 7 is the PAGE_SIZE bit. + * + * The RHS has bit 7 set iff level < (2 + PSE). If it is clear, bit 7 + * is not reserved and does not indicate a large page at this level, + * so clear PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte if that is the case. + */ + gpte &= level - (PT32_ROOT_LEVEL + mmu->cpu_role.ext.cr4_pse); +#endif + /* + * PG_LEVEL_4K always terminates. The RHS has bit 7 set + * iff level <= PG_LEVEL_4K, which for our purpose means + * level == PG_LEVEL_4K; set PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK in gpte then. + */ + gpte |= level - PG_LEVEL_4K - 1; + + return gpte & PT_PAGE_SIZE_MASK; +} +/* + * Fetch a guest pte for a guest virtual address, or for an L2's GPA. + */ +static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + gpa_t addr, u64 access) +{ + int ret; + pt_element_t pte; + pt_element_t __user *ptep_user; + gfn_t table_gfn; + u64 pt_access, pte_access; + unsigned index, accessed_dirty, pte_pkey; + u64 nested_access; + gpa_t pte_gpa; + bool have_ad; + int offset; + u64 walk_nx_mask = 0; + const int write_fault = access & PFERR_WRITE_MASK; + const int user_fault = access & PFERR_USER_MASK; + const int fetch_fault = access & PFERR_FETCH_MASK; + u16 errcode = 0; + gpa_t real_gpa; + gfn_t gfn; + + trace_kvm_mmu_pagetable_walk(addr, access); +retry_walk: + walker->level = mmu->cpu_role.base.level; + pte = kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(vcpu, mmu); + have_ad = PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY(mmu); + +#if PTTYPE == 64 + walk_nx_mask = 1ULL << PT64_NX_SHIFT; + if (walker->level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) { + pte = mmu->get_pdptr(vcpu, (addr >> 30) & 3); + trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level); + if (!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(pte)) + goto error; + --walker->level; + } +#endif + walker->max_level = walker->level; + ASSERT(!(is_long_mode(vcpu) && !is_pae(vcpu))); + + /* + * FIXME: on Intel processors, loads of the PDPTE registers for PAE paging + * by the MOV to CR instruction are treated as reads and do not cause the + * processor to set the dirty flag in any EPT paging-structure entry. + */ + nested_access = (have_ad ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0) | PFERR_USER_MASK; + + pte_access = ~0; + ++walker->level; + + do { + unsigned long host_addr; + + pt_access = pte_access; + --walker->level; + + index = PT_INDEX(addr, walker->level); + table_gfn = gpte_to_gfn(pte); + offset = index * sizeof(pt_element_t); + pte_gpa = gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn) + offset; + + BUG_ON(walker->level < 1); + walker->table_gfn[walker->level - 1] = table_gfn; + walker->pte_gpa[walker->level - 1] = pte_gpa; + + real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(table_gfn), + nested_access, &walker->fault); + + /* + * FIXME: This can happen if emulation (for of an INS/OUTS + * instruction) triggers a nested page fault. The exit + * qualification / exit info field will incorrectly have + * "guest page access" as the nested page fault's cause, + * instead of "guest page structure access". To fix this, + * the x86_exception struct should be augmented with enough + * information to fix the exit_qualification or exit_info_1 + * fields. + */ + if (unlikely(real_gpa == INVALID_GPA)) + return 0; + + host_addr = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_hva_prot(vcpu, gpa_to_gfn(real_gpa), + &walker->pte_writable[walker->level - 1]); + if (unlikely(kvm_is_error_hva(host_addr))) + goto error; + + ptep_user = (pt_element_t __user *)((void *)host_addr + offset); + if (unlikely(__get_user(pte, ptep_user))) + goto error; + walker->ptep_user[walker->level - 1] = ptep_user; + + trace_kvm_mmu_paging_element(pte, walker->level); + + /* + * Inverting the NX it lets us AND it like other + * permission bits. + */ + pte_access = pt_access & (pte ^ walk_nx_mask); + + if (unlikely(!FNAME(is_present_gpte)(pte))) + goto error; + + if (unlikely(FNAME(is_rsvd_bits_set)(mmu, pte, walker->level))) { + errcode = PFERR_RSVD_MASK | PFERR_PRESENT_MASK; + goto error; + } + + walker->ptes[walker->level - 1] = pte; + + /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1] = FNAME(gpte_access)(pt_access ^ walk_nx_mask); + } while (!FNAME(is_last_gpte)(mmu, walker->level, pte)); + + pte_pkey = FNAME(gpte_pkeys)(vcpu, pte); + accessed_dirty = have_ad ? pte_access & PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK : 0; + + /* Convert to ACC_*_MASK flags for struct guest_walker. */ + walker->pte_access = FNAME(gpte_access)(pte_access ^ walk_nx_mask); + errcode = permission_fault(vcpu, mmu, walker->pte_access, pte_pkey, access); + if (unlikely(errcode)) + goto error; + + gfn = gpte_to_gfn_lvl(pte, walker->level); + gfn += (addr & PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK(walker->level)) >> PAGE_SHIFT; + +#if PTTYPE == 32 + if (walker->level > PG_LEVEL_4K && is_cpuid_PSE36()) + gfn += pse36_gfn_delta(pte); +#endif + + real_gpa = kvm_translate_gpa(vcpu, mmu, gfn_to_gpa(gfn), access, &walker->fault); + if (real_gpa == INVALID_GPA) + return 0; + + walker->gfn = real_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT; + + if (!write_fault) + FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(mmu, &walker->pte_access, pte); + else + /* + * On a write fault, fold the dirty bit into accessed_dirty. + * For modes without A/D bits support accessed_dirty will be + * always clear. + */ + accessed_dirty &= pte >> + (PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT - PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT); + + if (unlikely(!accessed_dirty)) { + ret = FNAME(update_accessed_dirty_bits)(vcpu, mmu, walker, + addr, write_fault); + if (unlikely(ret < 0)) + goto error; + else if (ret) + goto retry_walk; + } + + pgprintk("%s: pte %llx pte_access %x pt_access %x\n", + __func__, (u64)pte, walker->pte_access, + walker->pt_access[walker->level - 1]); + return 1; + +error: + errcode |= write_fault | user_fault; + if (fetch_fault && (is_efer_nx(mmu) || is_cr4_smep(mmu))) + errcode |= PFERR_FETCH_MASK; + + walker->fault.vector = PF_VECTOR; + walker->fault.error_code_valid = true; + walker->fault.error_code = errcode; + +#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT + /* + * Use PFERR_RSVD_MASK in error_code to tell if EPT + * misconfiguration requires to be injected. The detection is + * done by is_rsvd_bits_set() above. + * + * We set up the value of exit_qualification to inject: + * [2:0] - Derive from the access bits. The exit_qualification might be + * out of date if it is serving an EPT misconfiguration. + * [5:3] - Calculated by the page walk of the guest EPT page tables + * [7:8] - Derived from [7:8] of real exit_qualification + * + * The other bits are set to 0. + */ + if (!(errcode & PFERR_RSVD_MASK)) { + vcpu->arch.exit_qualification &= (EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID | + EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_TRANSLATED); + if (write_fault) + vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE; + if (user_fault) + vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ; + if (fetch_fault) + vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR; + + /* + * Note, pte_access holds the raw RWX bits from the EPTE, not + * ACC_*_MASK flags! + */ + vcpu->arch.exit_qualification |= (pte_access & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) << + EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_SHIFT; + } +#endif + walker->fault.address = addr; + walker->fault.nested_page_fault = mmu != vcpu->arch.walk_mmu; + walker->fault.async_page_fault = false; + + trace_kvm_mmu_walker_error(walker->fault.error_code); + return 0; +} + +static int FNAME(walk_addr)(struct guest_walker *walker, + struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t addr, u64 access) +{ + return FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(walker, vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu, addr, + access); +} + +static bool +FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp, + u64 *spte, pt_element_t gpte, bool no_dirty_log) +{ + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; + unsigned pte_access; + gfn_t gfn; + kvm_pfn_t pfn; + + if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gpte)) + return false; + + pgprintk("%s: gpte %llx spte %p\n", __func__, (u64)gpte, spte); + + gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); + pte_access = sp->role.access & FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); + FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); + + slot = gfn_to_memslot_dirty_bitmap(vcpu, gfn, + no_dirty_log && (pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK)); + if (!slot) + return false; + + pfn = gfn_to_pfn_memslot_atomic(slot, gfn); + if (is_error_pfn(pfn)) + return false; + + mmu_set_spte(vcpu, slot, spte, pte_access, gfn, pfn, NULL); + kvm_release_pfn_clean(pfn); + return true; +} + +static bool FNAME(gpte_changed)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct guest_walker *gw, int level) +{ + pt_element_t curr_pte; + gpa_t base_gpa, pte_gpa = gw->pte_gpa[level - 1]; + u64 mask; + int r, index; + + if (level == PG_LEVEL_4K) { + mask = PTE_PREFETCH_NUM * sizeof(pt_element_t) - 1; + base_gpa = pte_gpa & ~mask; + index = (pte_gpa - base_gpa) / sizeof(pt_element_t); + + r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, base_gpa, + gw->prefetch_ptes, sizeof(gw->prefetch_ptes)); + curr_pte = gw->prefetch_ptes[index]; + } else + r = kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, + &curr_pte, sizeof(curr_pte)); + + return r || curr_pte != gw->ptes[level - 1]; +} + +static void FNAME(pte_prefetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct guest_walker *gw, + u64 *sptep) +{ + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; + pt_element_t *gptep = gw->prefetch_ptes; + u64 *spte; + int i; + + sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep); + + if (sp->role.level > PG_LEVEL_4K) + return; + + /* + * If addresses are being invalidated, skip prefetching to avoid + * accidentally prefetching those addresses. + */ + if (unlikely(vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_in_progress)) + return; + + if (sp->role.direct) + return __direct_pte_prefetch(vcpu, sp, sptep); + + i = spte_index(sptep) & ~(PTE_PREFETCH_NUM - 1); + spte = sp->spt + i; + + for (i = 0; i < PTE_PREFETCH_NUM; i++, spte++) { + if (spte == sptep) + continue; + + if (is_shadow_present_pte(*spte)) + continue; + + if (!FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(vcpu, sp, spte, gptep[i], true)) + break; + } +} + +/* + * Fetch a shadow pte for a specific level in the paging hierarchy. + * If the guest tries to write a write-protected page, we need to + * emulate this operation, return 1 to indicate this case. + */ +static int FNAME(fetch)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault, + struct guest_walker *gw) +{ + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp = NULL; + struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator it; + unsigned int direct_access, access; + int top_level, ret; + gfn_t base_gfn = fault->gfn; + + WARN_ON_ONCE(gw->gfn != base_gfn); + direct_access = gw->pte_access; + + top_level = vcpu->arch.mmu->cpu_role.base.level; + if (top_level == PT32E_ROOT_LEVEL) + top_level = PT32_ROOT_LEVEL; + /* + * Verify that the top-level gpte is still there. Since the page + * is a root page, it is either write protected (and cannot be + * changed from now on) or it is invalid (in which case, we don't + * really care if it changes underneath us after this point). + */ + if (FNAME(gpte_changed)(vcpu, gw, top_level)) + goto out_gpte_changed; + + if (WARN_ON(!VALID_PAGE(vcpu->arch.mmu->root.hpa))) + goto out_gpte_changed; + + for (shadow_walk_init(&it, vcpu, fault->addr); + shadow_walk_okay(&it) && it.level > gw->level; + shadow_walk_next(&it)) { + gfn_t table_gfn; + + clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep); + + table_gfn = gw->table_gfn[it.level - 2]; + access = gw->pt_access[it.level - 2]; + sp = kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(vcpu, it.sptep, table_gfn, + false, access); + + if (sp != ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)) { + /* + * We must synchronize the pagetable before linking it + * because the guest doesn't need to flush tlb when + * the gpte is changed from non-present to present. + * Otherwise, the guest may use the wrong mapping. + * + * For PG_LEVEL_4K, kvm_mmu_get_page() has already + * synchronized it transiently via kvm_sync_page(). + * + * For higher level pagetable, we synchronize it via + * the slower mmu_sync_children(). If it needs to + * break, some progress has been made; return + * RET_PF_RETRY and retry on the next #PF. + * KVM_REQ_MMU_SYNC is not necessary but it + * expedites the process. + */ + if (sp->unsync_children && + mmu_sync_children(vcpu, sp, false)) + return RET_PF_RETRY; + } + + /* + * Verify that the gpte in the page we've just write + * protected is still there. + */ + if (FNAME(gpte_changed)(vcpu, gw, it.level - 1)) + goto out_gpte_changed; + + if (sp != ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)) + link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp); + } + + kvm_mmu_hugepage_adjust(vcpu, fault); + + trace_kvm_mmu_spte_requested(fault); + + for (; shadow_walk_okay(&it); shadow_walk_next(&it)) { + clear_sp_write_flooding_count(it.sptep); + + /* + * We cannot overwrite existing page tables with an NX + * large page, as the leaf could be executable. + */ + if (fault->nx_huge_page_workaround_enabled) + disallowed_hugepage_adjust(fault, *it.sptep, it.level); + + base_gfn = fault->gfn & ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(it.level) - 1); + if (it.level == fault->goal_level) + break; + + validate_direct_spte(vcpu, it.sptep, direct_access); + + sp = kvm_mmu_get_child_sp(vcpu, it.sptep, base_gfn, + true, direct_access); + if (sp == ERR_PTR(-EEXIST)) + continue; + + link_shadow_page(vcpu, it.sptep, sp); + if (fault->huge_page_disallowed && + fault->req_level >= it.level) + account_huge_nx_page(vcpu->kvm, sp); + } + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(it.level != fault->goal_level)) + return -EFAULT; + + ret = mmu_set_spte(vcpu, fault->slot, it.sptep, gw->pte_access, + base_gfn, fault->pfn, fault); + if (ret == RET_PF_SPURIOUS) + return ret; + + FNAME(pte_prefetch)(vcpu, gw, it.sptep); + return ret; + +out_gpte_changed: + return RET_PF_RETRY; +} + + /* + * To see whether the mapped gfn can write its page table in the current + * mapping. + * + * It is the helper function of FNAME(page_fault). When guest uses large page + * size to map the writable gfn which is used as current page table, we should + * force kvm to use small page size to map it because new shadow page will be + * created when kvm establishes shadow page table that stop kvm using large + * page size. Do it early can avoid unnecessary #PF and emulation. + * + * @write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable will return true if the fault gfn is + * currently used as its page table. + * + * Note: the PDPT page table is not checked for PAE-32 bit guest. It is ok + * since the PDPT is always shadowed, that means, we can not use large page + * size to map the gfn which is used as PDPT. + */ +static bool +FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct guest_walker *walker, bool user_fault, + bool *write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable) +{ + int level; + gfn_t mask = ~(KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(walker->level) - 1); + bool self_changed = false; + + if (!(walker->pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK || + (!is_cr0_wp(vcpu->arch.mmu) && !user_fault))) + return false; + + for (level = walker->level; level <= walker->max_level; level++) { + gfn_t gfn = walker->gfn ^ walker->table_gfn[level - 1]; + + self_changed |= !(gfn & mask); + *write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable |= !gfn; + } + + return self_changed; +} + +/* + * Page fault handler. There are several causes for a page fault: + * - there is no shadow pte for the guest pte + * - write access through a shadow pte marked read only so that we can set + * the dirty bit + * - write access to a shadow pte marked read only so we can update the page + * dirty bitmap, when userspace requests it + * - mmio access; in this case we will never install a present shadow pte + * - normal guest page fault due to the guest pte marked not present, not + * writable, or not executable + * + * Returns: 1 if we need to emulate the instruction, 0 otherwise, or + * a negative value on error. + */ +static int FNAME(page_fault)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_page_fault *fault) +{ + struct guest_walker walker; + int r; + unsigned long mmu_seq; + bool is_self_change_mapping; + + pgprintk("%s: addr %lx err %x\n", __func__, fault->addr, fault->error_code); + WARN_ON_ONCE(fault->is_tdp); + + /* + * Look up the guest pte for the faulting address. + * If PFEC.RSVD is set, this is a shadow page fault. + * The bit needs to be cleared before walking guest page tables. + */ + r = FNAME(walk_addr)(&walker, vcpu, fault->addr, + fault->error_code & ~PFERR_RSVD_MASK); + + /* + * The page is not mapped by the guest. Let the guest handle it. + */ + if (!r) { + pgprintk("%s: guest page fault\n", __func__); + if (!fault->prefetch) + kvm_inject_emulated_page_fault(vcpu, &walker.fault); + + return RET_PF_RETRY; + } + + fault->gfn = walker.gfn; + fault->slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, fault->gfn); + + if (page_fault_handle_page_track(vcpu, fault)) { + shadow_page_table_clear_flood(vcpu, fault->addr); + return RET_PF_EMULATE; + } + + r = mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, true); + if (r) + return r; + + vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable = false; + + is_self_change_mapping = FNAME(is_self_change_mapping)(vcpu, + &walker, fault->user, &vcpu->arch.write_fault_to_shadow_pgtable); + + if (is_self_change_mapping) + fault->max_level = PG_LEVEL_4K; + else + fault->max_level = walker.level; + + mmu_seq = vcpu->kvm->mmu_invalidate_seq; + smp_rmb(); + + r = kvm_faultin_pfn(vcpu, fault); + if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE) + return r; + + r = handle_abnormal_pfn(vcpu, fault, walker.pte_access); + if (r != RET_PF_CONTINUE) + return r; + + /* + * Do not change pte_access if the pfn is a mmio page, otherwise + * we will cache the incorrect access into mmio spte. + */ + if (fault->write && !(walker.pte_access & ACC_WRITE_MASK) && + !is_cr0_wp(vcpu->arch.mmu) && !fault->user && fault->slot) { + walker.pte_access |= ACC_WRITE_MASK; + walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_USER_MASK; + + /* + * If we converted a user page to a kernel page, + * so that the kernel can write to it when cr0.wp=0, + * then we should prevent the kernel from executing it + * if SMEP is enabled. + */ + if (is_cr4_smep(vcpu->arch.mmu)) + walker.pte_access &= ~ACC_EXEC_MASK; + } + + r = RET_PF_RETRY; + write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); + + if (is_page_fault_stale(vcpu, fault, mmu_seq)) + goto out_unlock; + + r = make_mmu_pages_available(vcpu); + if (r) + goto out_unlock; + r = FNAME(fetch)(vcpu, fault, &walker); + +out_unlock: + write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); + kvm_release_pfn_clean(fault->pfn); + return r; +} + +static gpa_t FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) +{ + int offset = 0; + + WARN_ON(sp->role.level != PG_LEVEL_4K); + + if (PTTYPE == 32) + offset = sp->role.quadrant << SPTE_LEVEL_BITS; + + return gfn_to_gpa(sp->gfn) + offset * sizeof(pt_element_t); +} + +static void FNAME(invlpg)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, hpa_t root_hpa) +{ + struct kvm_shadow_walk_iterator iterator; + struct kvm_mmu_page *sp; + u64 old_spte; + int level; + u64 *sptep; + + vcpu_clear_mmio_info(vcpu, gva); + + /* + * No need to check return value here, rmap_can_add() can + * help us to skip pte prefetch later. + */ + mmu_topup_memory_caches(vcpu, true); + + if (!VALID_PAGE(root_hpa)) { + WARN_ON(1); + return; + } + + write_lock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); + for_each_shadow_entry_using_root(vcpu, root_hpa, gva, iterator) { + level = iterator.level; + sptep = iterator.sptep; + + sp = sptep_to_sp(sptep); + old_spte = *sptep; + if (is_last_spte(old_spte, level)) { + pt_element_t gpte; + gpa_t pte_gpa; + + if (!sp->unsync) + break; + + pte_gpa = FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(sp); + pte_gpa += spte_index(sptep) * sizeof(pt_element_t); + + mmu_page_zap_pte(vcpu->kvm, sp, sptep, NULL); + if (is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte)) + kvm_flush_remote_tlbs_with_address(vcpu->kvm, + sp->gfn, KVM_PAGES_PER_HPAGE(sp->role.level)); + + if (!rmap_can_add(vcpu)) + break; + + if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, &gpte, + sizeof(pt_element_t))) + break; + + FNAME(prefetch_gpte)(vcpu, sp, sptep, gpte, false); + } + + if (!sp->unsync_children) + break; + } + write_unlock(&vcpu->kvm->mmu_lock); +} + +/* Note, @addr is a GPA when gva_to_gpa() translates an L2 GPA to an L1 GPA. */ +static gpa_t FNAME(gva_to_gpa)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, + gpa_t addr, u64 access, + struct x86_exception *exception) +{ + struct guest_walker walker; + gpa_t gpa = INVALID_GPA; + int r; + +#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64 + /* A 64-bit GVA should be impossible on 32-bit KVM. */ + WARN_ON_ONCE((addr >> 32) && mmu == vcpu->arch.walk_mmu); +#endif + + r = FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(&walker, vcpu, mmu, addr, access); + + if (r) { + gpa = gfn_to_gpa(walker.gfn); + gpa |= addr & ~PAGE_MASK; + } else if (exception) + *exception = walker.fault; + + return gpa; +} + +/* + * Using the information in sp->shadowed_translation (kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn()) is + * safe because: + * - The spte has a reference to the struct page, so the pfn for a given gfn + * can't change unless all sptes pointing to it are nuked first. + * + * Returns + * < 0: the sp should be zapped + * 0: the sp is synced and no tlb flushing is required + * > 0: the sp is synced and tlb flushing is required + */ +static int FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) +{ + union kvm_mmu_page_role root_role = vcpu->arch.mmu->root_role; + int i; + bool host_writable; + gpa_t first_pte_gpa; + bool flush = false; + + /* + * Ignore various flags when verifying that it's safe to sync a shadow + * page using the current MMU context. + * + * - level: not part of the overall MMU role and will never match as the MMU's + * level tracks the root level + * - access: updated based on the new guest PTE + * - quadrant: not part of the overall MMU role (similar to level) + */ + const union kvm_mmu_page_role sync_role_ign = { + .level = 0xf, + .access = 0x7, + .quadrant = 0x3, + .passthrough = 0x1, + }; + + /* + * Direct pages can never be unsync, and KVM should never attempt to + * sync a shadow page for a different MMU context, e.g. if the role + * differs then the memslot lookup (SMM vs. non-SMM) will be bogus, the + * reserved bits checks will be wrong, etc... + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(sp->role.direct || + (sp->role.word ^ root_role.word) & ~sync_role_ign.word)) + return -1; + + first_pte_gpa = FNAME(get_level1_sp_gpa)(sp); + + for (i = 0; i < SPTE_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) { + u64 *sptep, spte; + struct kvm_memory_slot *slot; + unsigned pte_access; + pt_element_t gpte; + gpa_t pte_gpa; + gfn_t gfn; + + if (!sp->spt[i]) + continue; + + pte_gpa = first_pte_gpa + i * sizeof(pt_element_t); + + if (kvm_vcpu_read_guest_atomic(vcpu, pte_gpa, &gpte, + sizeof(pt_element_t))) + return -1; + + if (FNAME(prefetch_invalid_gpte)(vcpu, sp, &sp->spt[i], gpte)) { + flush = true; + continue; + } + + gfn = gpte_to_gfn(gpte); + pte_access = sp->role.access; + pte_access &= FNAME(gpte_access)(gpte); + FNAME(protect_clean_gpte)(vcpu->arch.mmu, &pte_access, gpte); + + if (sync_mmio_spte(vcpu, &sp->spt[i], gfn, pte_access)) + continue; + + /* + * Drop the SPTE if the new protections would result in a RWX=0 + * SPTE or if the gfn is changing. The RWX=0 case only affects + * EPT with execute-only support, i.e. EPT without an effective + * "present" bit, as all other paging modes will create a + * read-only SPTE if pte_access is zero. + */ + if ((!pte_access && !shadow_present_mask) || + gfn != kvm_mmu_page_get_gfn(sp, i)) { + drop_spte(vcpu->kvm, &sp->spt[i]); + flush = true; + continue; + } + + /* Update the shadowed access bits in case they changed. */ + kvm_mmu_page_set_access(sp, i, pte_access); + + sptep = &sp->spt[i]; + spte = *sptep; + host_writable = spte & shadow_host_writable_mask; + slot = kvm_vcpu_gfn_to_memslot(vcpu, gfn); + make_spte(vcpu, sp, slot, pte_access, gfn, + spte_to_pfn(spte), spte, true, false, + host_writable, &spte); + + flush |= mmu_spte_update(sptep, spte); + } + + /* + * Note, any flush is purely for KVM's correctness, e.g. when dropping + * an existing SPTE or clearing W/A/D bits to ensure an mmu_notifier + * unmap or dirty logging event doesn't fail to flush. The guest is + * responsible for flushing the TLB to ensure any changes in protection + * bits are recognized, i.e. until the guest flushes or page faults on + * a relevant address, KVM is architecturally allowed to let vCPUs use + * cached translations with the old protection bits. + */ + return flush; +} + +#undef pt_element_t +#undef guest_walker +#undef FNAME +#undef PT_BASE_ADDR_MASK +#undef PT_INDEX +#undef PT_LVL_ADDR_MASK +#undef PT_LVL_OFFSET_MASK +#undef PT_LEVEL_BITS +#undef PT_MAX_FULL_LEVELS +#undef gpte_to_gfn +#undef gpte_to_gfn_lvl +#undef PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_MASK +#undef PT_GUEST_DIRTY_MASK +#undef PT_GUEST_DIRTY_SHIFT +#undef PT_GUEST_ACCESSED_SHIFT +#undef PT_HAVE_ACCESSED_DIRTY |