Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1443 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..54482193e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1443 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/ptrace.c
+ *
+ * (C) Copyright 1999 Linus Torvalds
+ *
+ * Common interfaces for "ptrace()" which we do not want
+ * to continually duplicate across every architecture.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/regset.h>
+#include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
+#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/minmax.h>
+
+#include <asm/syscall.h>	/* for syscall_get_* */
+
+/*
+ * Access another process' address space via ptrace.
+ * Source/target buffer must be kernel space,
+ * Do not walk the page table directly, use get_user_pages
+ */
+int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
+		     void *buf, int len, unsigned int gup_flags)
+{
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	int ret;
+
+	mm = get_task_mm(tsk);
+	if (!mm)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!tsk->ptrace ||
+	    (current != tsk->parent) ||
+	    ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+	     !ptracer_capable(tsk, mm->user_ns))) {
+		mmput(mm);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	ret = __access_remote_vm(mm, addr, buf, len, gup_flags);
+	mmput(mm);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+void __ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent,
+		   const struct cred *ptracer_cred)
+{
+	BUG_ON(!list_empty(&child->ptrace_entry));
+	list_add(&child->ptrace_entry, &new_parent->ptraced);
+	child->parent = new_parent;
+	child->ptracer_cred = get_cred(ptracer_cred);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ptrace a task: make the debugger its new parent and
+ * move it to the ptrace list.
+ *
+ * Must be called with the tasklist lock write-held.
+ */
+static void ptrace_link(struct task_struct *child, struct task_struct *new_parent)
+{
+	__ptrace_link(child, new_parent, current_cred());
+}
+
+/**
+ * __ptrace_unlink - unlink ptracee and restore its execution state
+ * @child: ptracee to be unlinked
+ *
+ * Remove @child from the ptrace list, move it back to the original parent,
+ * and restore the execution state so that it conforms to the group stop
+ * state.
+ *
+ * Unlinking can happen via two paths - explicit PTRACE_DETACH or ptracer
+ * exiting.  For PTRACE_DETACH, unless the ptracee has been killed between
+ * ptrace_check_attach() and here, it's guaranteed to be in TASK_TRACED.
+ * If the ptracer is exiting, the ptracee can be in any state.
+ *
+ * After detach, the ptracee should be in a state which conforms to the
+ * group stop.  If the group is stopped or in the process of stopping, the
+ * ptracee should be put into TASK_STOPPED; otherwise, it should be woken
+ * up from TASK_TRACED.
+ *
+ * If the ptracee is in TASK_TRACED and needs to be moved to TASK_STOPPED,
+ * it goes through TRACED -> RUNNING -> STOPPED transition which is similar
+ * to but in the opposite direction of what happens while attaching to a
+ * stopped task.  However, in this direction, the intermediate RUNNING
+ * state is not hidden even from the current ptracer and if it immediately
+ * re-attaches and performs a WNOHANG wait(2), it may fail.
+ *
+ * CONTEXT:
+ * write_lock_irq(tasklist_lock)
+ */
+void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
+{
+	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	BUG_ON(!child->ptrace);
+
+	clear_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_TRACE);
+#if defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY) || defined(TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
+	clear_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_EMU);
+#endif
+
+	child->parent = child->real_parent;
+	list_del_init(&child->ptrace_entry);
+	old_cred = child->ptracer_cred;
+	child->ptracer_cred = NULL;
+	put_cred(old_cred);
+
+	spin_lock(&child->sighand->siglock);
+	child->ptrace = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Clear all pending traps and TRAPPING.  TRAPPING should be
+	 * cleared regardless of JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING.  Do it explicitly.
+	 */
+	task_clear_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_MASK);
+	task_clear_jobctl_trapping(child);
+
+	/*
+	 * Reinstate JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING if group stop is in effect and
+	 * @child isn't dead.
+	 */
+	if (!(child->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
+	    (child->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED ||
+	     child->signal->group_stop_count)) {
+		child->jobctl |= JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING;
+
+		/*
+		 * This is only possible if this thread was cloned by the
+		 * traced task running in the stopped group, set the signal
+		 * for the future reports.
+		 * FIXME: we should change ptrace_init_task() to handle this
+		 * case.
+		 */
+		if (!(child->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_SIGMASK))
+			child->jobctl |= SIGSTOP;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If transition to TASK_STOPPED is pending or in TASK_TRACED, kick
+	 * @child in the butt.  Note that @resume should be used iff @child
+	 * is in TASK_TRACED; otherwise, we might unduly disrupt
+	 * TASK_KILLABLE sleeps.
+	 */
+	if (child->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING || task_is_traced(child))
+		ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, true);
+
+	spin_unlock(&child->sighand->siglock);
+}
+
+static bool looks_like_a_spurious_pid(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	if (task->exit_code != ((PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC << 8) | SIGTRAP))
+		return false;
+
+	if (task_pid_vnr(task) == task->ptrace_message)
+		return false;
+	/*
+	 * The tracee changed its pid but the PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC event
+	 * was not wait()'ed, most probably debugger targets the old
+	 * leader which was destroyed in de_thread().
+	 */
+	return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that nothing can wake it up, even SIGKILL
+ *
+ * A task is switched to this state while a ptrace operation is in progress;
+ * such that the ptrace operation is uninterruptible.
+ */
+static bool ptrace_freeze_traced(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	bool ret = false;
+
+	/* Lockless, nobody but us can set this flag */
+	if (task->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING)
+		return ret;
+
+	spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
+	if (task_is_traced(task) && !looks_like_a_spurious_pid(task) &&
+	    !__fatal_signal_pending(task)) {
+		task->jobctl |= JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN;
+		ret = true;
+	}
+	spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void ptrace_unfreeze_traced(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	/*
+	 * The child may be awake and may have cleared
+	 * JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN (see ptrace_resume).  The child will
+	 * not set JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN or enter __TASK_TRACED anew.
+	 */
+	if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
+		task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_PTRACE_FROZEN;
+		if (__fatal_signal_pending(task)) {
+			task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED;
+			wake_up_state(task, __TASK_TRACED);
+		}
+		unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * ptrace_check_attach - check whether ptracee is ready for ptrace operation
+ * @child: ptracee to check for
+ * @ignore_state: don't check whether @child is currently %TASK_TRACED
+ *
+ * Check whether @child is being ptraced by %current and ready for further
+ * ptrace operations.  If @ignore_state is %false, @child also should be in
+ * %TASK_TRACED state and on return the child is guaranteed to be traced
+ * and not executing.  If @ignore_state is %true, @child can be in any
+ * state.
+ *
+ * CONTEXT:
+ * Grabs and releases tasklist_lock and @child->sighand->siglock.
+ *
+ * RETURNS:
+ * 0 on success, -ESRCH if %child is not ready.
+ */
+static int ptrace_check_attach(struct task_struct *child, bool ignore_state)
+{
+	int ret = -ESRCH;
+
+	/*
+	 * We take the read lock around doing both checks to close a
+	 * possible race where someone else was tracing our child and
+	 * detached between these two checks.  After this locked check,
+	 * we are sure that this is our traced child and that can only
+	 * be changed by us so it's not changing right after this.
+	 */
+	read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+	if (child->ptrace && child->parent == current) {
+		/*
+		 * child->sighand can't be NULL, release_task()
+		 * does ptrace_unlink() before __exit_signal().
+		 */
+		if (ignore_state || ptrace_freeze_traced(child))
+			ret = 0;
+	}
+	read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	if (!ret && !ignore_state &&
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(!wait_task_inactive(child, __TASK_TRACED|TASK_FROZEN)))
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static bool ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
+		return ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+	return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 on success, -errno on denial. */
+static int __ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred(), *tcred;
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	kuid_t caller_uid;
+	kgid_t caller_gid;
+
+	if (!(mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) == !(mode & PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)) {
+		WARN(1, "denying ptrace access check without PTRACE_MODE_*CREDS\n");
+		return -EPERM;
+	}
+
+	/* May we inspect the given task?
+	 * This check is used both for attaching with ptrace
+	 * and for allowing access to sensitive information in /proc.
+	 *
+	 * ptrace_attach denies several cases that /proc allows
+	 * because setting up the necessary parent/child relationship
+	 * or halting the specified task is impossible.
+	 */
+
+	/* Don't let security modules deny introspection */
+	if (same_thread_group(task, current))
+		return 0;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS) {
+		caller_uid = cred->fsuid;
+		caller_gid = cred->fsgid;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Using the euid would make more sense here, but something
+		 * in userland might rely on the old behavior, and this
+		 * shouldn't be a security problem since
+		 * PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS implies that the caller explicitly
+		 * used a syscall that requests access to another process
+		 * (and not a filesystem syscall to procfs).
+		 */
+		caller_uid = cred->uid;
+		caller_gid = cred->gid;
+	}
+	tcred = __task_cred(task);
+	if (uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->euid) &&
+	    uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->suid) &&
+	    uid_eq(caller_uid, tcred->uid)  &&
+	    gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->egid) &&
+	    gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->sgid) &&
+	    gid_eq(caller_gid, tcred->gid))
+		goto ok;
+	if (ptrace_has_cap(tcred->user_ns, mode))
+		goto ok;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return -EPERM;
+ok:
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	/*
+	 * If a task drops privileges and becomes nondumpable (through a syscall
+	 * like setresuid()) while we are trying to access it, we must ensure
+	 * that the dumpability is read after the credentials; otherwise,
+	 * we may be able to attach to a task that we shouldn't be able to
+	 * attach to (as if the task had dropped privileges without becoming
+	 * nondumpable).
+	 * Pairs with a write barrier in commit_creds().
+	 */
+	smp_rmb();
+	mm = task->mm;
+	if (mm &&
+	    ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+	     !ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode)))
+	    return -EPERM;
+
+	return security_ptrace_access_check(task, mode);
+}
+
+bool ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	int err;
+	task_lock(task);
+	err = __ptrace_may_access(task, mode);
+	task_unlock(task);
+	return !err;
+}
+
+static int check_ptrace_options(unsigned long data)
+{
+	if (data & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (unlikely(data & PTRACE_O_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) ||
+		    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+			return -EPERM;
+
+		if (seccomp_mode(&current->seccomp) != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+		    current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP)
+			return -EPERM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_attach(struct task_struct *task, long request,
+			 unsigned long addr,
+			 unsigned long flags)
+{
+	bool seize = (request == PTRACE_SEIZE);
+	int retval;
+
+	retval = -EIO;
+	if (seize) {
+		if (addr != 0)
+			goto out;
+		/*
+		 * This duplicates the check in check_ptrace_options() because
+		 * ptrace_attach() and ptrace_setoptions() have historically
+		 * used different error codes for unknown ptrace options.
+		 */
+		if (flags & ~(unsigned long)PTRACE_O_MASK)
+			goto out;
+		retval = check_ptrace_options(flags);
+		if (retval)
+			return retval;
+		flags = PT_PTRACED | PT_SEIZED | (flags << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
+	} else {
+		flags = PT_PTRACED;
+	}
+
+	audit_ptrace(task);
+
+	retval = -EPERM;
+	if (unlikely(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+		goto out;
+	if (same_thread_group(task, current))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Protect exec's credential calculations against our interference;
+	 * SUID, SGID and LSM creds get determined differently
+	 * under ptrace.
+	 */
+	retval = -ERESTARTNOINTR;
+	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+		goto out;
+
+	task_lock(task);
+	retval = __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS);
+	task_unlock(task);
+	if (retval)
+		goto unlock_creds;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	retval = -EPERM;
+	if (unlikely(task->exit_state))
+		goto unlock_tasklist;
+	if (task->ptrace)
+		goto unlock_tasklist;
+
+	task->ptrace = flags;
+
+	ptrace_link(task, current);
+
+	/* SEIZE doesn't trap tracee on attach */
+	if (!seize)
+		send_sig_info(SIGSTOP, SEND_SIG_PRIV, task);
+
+	spin_lock(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the task is already STOPPED, set JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP and
+	 * TRAPPING, and kick it so that it transits to TRACED.  TRAPPING
+	 * will be cleared if the child completes the transition or any
+	 * event which clears the group stop states happens.  We'll wait
+	 * for the transition to complete before returning from this
+	 * function.
+	 *
+	 * This hides STOPPED -> RUNNING -> TRACED transition from the
+	 * attaching thread but a different thread in the same group can
+	 * still observe the transient RUNNING state.  IOW, if another
+	 * thread's WNOHANG wait(2) on the stopped tracee races against
+	 * ATTACH, the wait(2) may fail due to the transient RUNNING.
+	 *
+	 * The following task_is_stopped() test is safe as both transitions
+	 * in and out of STOPPED are protected by siglock.
+	 */
+	if (task_is_stopped(task) &&
+	    task_set_jobctl_pending(task, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP | JOBCTL_TRAPPING)) {
+		task->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_STOPPED;
+		signal_wake_up_state(task, __TASK_STOPPED);
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+	retval = 0;
+unlock_tasklist:
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+unlock_creds:
+	mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+out:
+	if (!retval) {
+		/*
+		 * We do not bother to change retval or clear JOBCTL_TRAPPING
+		 * if wait_on_bit() was interrupted by SIGKILL. The tracer will
+		 * not return to user-mode, it will exit and clear this bit in
+		 * __ptrace_unlink() if it wasn't already cleared by the tracee;
+		 * and until then nobody can ptrace this task.
+		 */
+		wait_on_bit(&task->jobctl, JOBCTL_TRAPPING_BIT, TASK_KILLABLE);
+		proc_ptrace_connector(task, PTRACE_ATTACH);
+	}
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ptrace_traceme  --  helper for PTRACE_TRACEME
+ *
+ * Performs checks and sets PT_PTRACED.
+ * Should be used by all ptrace implementations for PTRACE_TRACEME.
+ */
+static int ptrace_traceme(void)
+{
+	int ret = -EPERM;
+
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	/* Are we already being traced? */
+	if (!current->ptrace) {
+		ret = security_ptrace_traceme(current->parent);
+		/*
+		 * Check PF_EXITING to ensure ->real_parent has not passed
+		 * exit_ptrace(). Otherwise we don't report the error but
+		 * pretend ->real_parent untraces us right after return.
+		 */
+		if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+			current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
+			ptrace_link(current, current->real_parent);
+		}
+	}
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called with irqs disabled, returns true if childs should reap themselves.
+ */
+static int ignoring_children(struct sighand_struct *sigh)
+{
+	int ret;
+	spin_lock(&sigh->siglock);
+	ret = (sigh->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN) ||
+	      (sigh->action[SIGCHLD-1].sa.sa_flags & SA_NOCLDWAIT);
+	spin_unlock(&sigh->siglock);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called with tasklist_lock held for writing.
+ * Unlink a traced task, and clean it up if it was a traced zombie.
+ * Return true if it needs to be reaped with release_task().
+ * (We can't call release_task() here because we already hold tasklist_lock.)
+ *
+ * If it's a zombie, our attachedness prevented normal parent notification
+ * or self-reaping.  Do notification now if it would have happened earlier.
+ * If it should reap itself, return true.
+ *
+ * If it's our own child, there is no notification to do. But if our normal
+ * children self-reap, then this child was prevented by ptrace and we must
+ * reap it now, in that case we must also wake up sub-threads sleeping in
+ * do_wait().
+ */
+static bool __ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *tracer, struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	bool dead;
+
+	__ptrace_unlink(p);
+
+	if (p->exit_state != EXIT_ZOMBIE)
+		return false;
+
+	dead = !thread_group_leader(p);
+
+	if (!dead && thread_group_empty(p)) {
+		if (!same_thread_group(p->real_parent, tracer))
+			dead = do_notify_parent(p, p->exit_signal);
+		else if (ignoring_children(tracer->sighand)) {
+			__wake_up_parent(p, tracer);
+			dead = true;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Mark it as in the process of being reaped. */
+	if (dead)
+		p->exit_state = EXIT_DEAD;
+	return dead;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_detach(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int data)
+{
+	if (!valid_signal(data))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	/* Architecture-specific hardware disable .. */
+	ptrace_disable(child);
+
+	write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+	/*
+	 * We rely on ptrace_freeze_traced(). It can't be killed and
+	 * untraced by another thread, it can't be a zombie.
+	 */
+	WARN_ON(!child->ptrace || child->exit_state);
+	/*
+	 * tasklist_lock avoids the race with wait_task_stopped(), see
+	 * the comment in ptrace_resume().
+	 */
+	child->exit_code = data;
+	__ptrace_detach(current, child);
+	write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
+
+	proc_ptrace_connector(child, PTRACE_DETACH);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Detach all tasks we were using ptrace on. Called with tasklist held
+ * for writing.
+ */
+void exit_ptrace(struct task_struct *tracer, struct list_head *dead)
+{
+	struct task_struct *p, *n;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_safe(p, n, &tracer->ptraced, ptrace_entry) {
+		if (unlikely(p->ptrace & PT_EXITKILL))
+			send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_PRIV, p);
+
+		if (__ptrace_detach(tracer, p))
+			list_add(&p->ptrace_entry, dead);
+	}
+}
+
+int ptrace_readdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long src, char __user *dst, int len)
+{
+	int copied = 0;
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		char buf[128];
+		int this_len, retval;
+
+		this_len = (len > sizeof(buf)) ? sizeof(buf) : len;
+		retval = ptrace_access_vm(tsk, src, buf, this_len, FOLL_FORCE);
+
+		if (!retval) {
+			if (copied)
+				break;
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		if (copy_to_user(dst, buf, retval))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		copied += retval;
+		src += retval;
+		dst += retval;
+		len -= retval;
+	}
+	return copied;
+}
+
+int ptrace_writedata(struct task_struct *tsk, char __user *src, unsigned long dst, int len)
+{
+	int copied = 0;
+
+	while (len > 0) {
+		char buf[128];
+		int this_len, retval;
+
+		this_len = (len > sizeof(buf)) ? sizeof(buf) : len;
+		if (copy_from_user(buf, src, this_len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+		retval = ptrace_access_vm(tsk, dst, buf, this_len,
+				FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE);
+		if (!retval) {
+			if (copied)
+				break;
+			return -EIO;
+		}
+		copied += retval;
+		src += retval;
+		dst += retval;
+		len -= retval;
+	}
+	return copied;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_setoptions(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long data)
+{
+	unsigned flags;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = check_ptrace_options(data);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Avoid intermediate state when all opts are cleared */
+	flags = child->ptrace;
+	flags &= ~(PTRACE_O_MASK << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
+	flags |= (data << PT_OPT_FLAG_SHIFT);
+	child->ptrace = flags;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_getsiginfo(struct task_struct *child, kernel_siginfo_t *info)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int error = -ESRCH;
+
+	if (lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)) {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		if (likely(child->last_siginfo != NULL)) {
+			copy_siginfo(info, child->last_siginfo);
+			error = 0;
+		}
+		unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_setsiginfo(struct task_struct *child, const kernel_siginfo_t *info)
+{
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int error = -ESRCH;
+
+	if (lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)) {
+		error = -EINVAL;
+		if (likely(child->last_siginfo != NULL)) {
+			copy_siginfo(child->last_siginfo, info);
+			error = 0;
+		}
+		unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
+	}
+	return error;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_peek_siginfo(struct task_struct *child,
+				unsigned long addr,
+				unsigned long data)
+{
+	struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args arg;
+	struct sigpending *pending;
+	struct sigqueue *q;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	ret = copy_from_user(&arg, (void __user *) addr,
+				sizeof(struct ptrace_peeksiginfo_args));
+	if (ret)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (arg.flags & ~PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED)
+		return -EINVAL; /* unknown flags */
+
+	if (arg.nr < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Ensure arg.off fits in an unsigned long */
+	if (arg.off > ULONG_MAX)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (arg.flags & PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO_SHARED)
+		pending = &child->signal->shared_pending;
+	else
+		pending = &child->pending;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < arg.nr; ) {
+		kernel_siginfo_t info;
+		unsigned long off = arg.off + i;
+		bool found = false;
+
+		spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+		list_for_each_entry(q, &pending->list, list) {
+			if (!off--) {
+				found = true;
+				copy_siginfo(&info, &q->info);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+
+		if (!found) /* beyond the end of the list */
+			break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+		if (unlikely(in_compat_syscall())) {
+			compat_siginfo_t __user *uinfo = compat_ptr(data);
+
+			if (copy_siginfo_to_user32(uinfo, &info)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				break;
+			}
+
+		} else
+#endif
+		{
+			siginfo_t __user *uinfo = (siginfo_t __user *) data;
+
+			if (copy_siginfo_to_user(uinfo, &info)) {
+				ret = -EFAULT;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		data += sizeof(siginfo_t);
+		i++;
+
+		if (signal_pending(current))
+			break;
+
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+
+	if (i > 0)
+		return i;
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RSEQ
+static long ptrace_get_rseq_configuration(struct task_struct *task,
+					  unsigned long size, void __user *data)
+{
+	struct ptrace_rseq_configuration conf = {
+		.rseq_abi_pointer = (u64)(uintptr_t)task->rseq,
+		.rseq_abi_size = sizeof(*task->rseq),
+		.signature = task->rseq_sig,
+		.flags = 0,
+	};
+
+	size = min_t(unsigned long, size, sizeof(conf));
+	if (copy_to_user(data, &conf, size))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return sizeof(conf);
+}
+#endif
+
+#define is_singlestep(request)		((request) == PTRACE_SINGLESTEP)
+
+#ifdef PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK
+#define is_singleblock(request)		((request) == PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK)
+#else
+#define is_singleblock(request)		0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef PTRACE_SYSEMU
+#define is_sysemu_singlestep(request)	((request) == PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP)
+#else
+#define is_sysemu_singlestep(request)	0
+#endif
+
+static int ptrace_resume(struct task_struct *child, long request,
+			 unsigned long data)
+{
+	if (!valid_signal(data))
+		return -EIO;
+
+	if (request == PTRACE_SYSCALL)
+		set_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_TRACE);
+	else
+		clear_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_TRACE);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_GENERIC_ENTRY) || defined(TIF_SYSCALL_EMU)
+	if (request == PTRACE_SYSEMU || request == PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP)
+		set_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_EMU);
+	else
+		clear_task_syscall_work(child, SYSCALL_EMU);
+#endif
+
+	if (is_singleblock(request)) {
+		if (unlikely(!arch_has_block_step()))
+			return -EIO;
+		user_enable_block_step(child);
+	} else if (is_singlestep(request) || is_sysemu_singlestep(request)) {
+		if (unlikely(!arch_has_single_step()))
+			return -EIO;
+		user_enable_single_step(child);
+	} else {
+		user_disable_single_step(child);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Change ->exit_code and ->state under siglock to avoid the race
+	 * with wait_task_stopped() in between; a non-zero ->exit_code will
+	 * wrongly look like another report from tracee.
+	 *
+	 * Note that we need siglock even if ->exit_code == data and/or this
+	 * status was not reported yet, the new status must not be cleared by
+	 * wait_task_stopped() after resume.
+	 */
+	spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+	child->exit_code = data;
+	child->jobctl &= ~JOBCTL_TRACED;
+	wake_up_state(child, __TASK_TRACED);
+	spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+
+static const struct user_regset *
+find_regset(const struct user_regset_view *view, unsigned int type)
+{
+	const struct user_regset *regset;
+	int n;
+
+	for (n = 0; n < view->n; ++n) {
+		regset = view->regsets + n;
+		if (regset->core_note_type == type)
+			return regset;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int ptrace_regset(struct task_struct *task, int req, unsigned int type,
+			 struct iovec *kiov)
+{
+	const struct user_regset_view *view = task_user_regset_view(task);
+	const struct user_regset *regset = find_regset(view, type);
+	int regset_no;
+
+	if (!regset || (kiov->iov_len % regset->size) != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	regset_no = regset - view->regsets;
+	kiov->iov_len = min(kiov->iov_len,
+			    (__kernel_size_t) (regset->n * regset->size));
+
+	if (req == PTRACE_GETREGSET)
+		return copy_regset_to_user(task, view, regset_no, 0,
+					   kiov->iov_len, kiov->iov_base);
+	else
+		return copy_regset_from_user(task, view, regset_no, 0,
+					     kiov->iov_len, kiov->iov_base);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is declared in linux/regset.h and defined in machine-dependent
+ * code.  We put the export here, near the primary machine-neutral use,
+ * to ensure no machine forgets it.
+ */
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(task_user_regset_view);
+
+static unsigned long
+ptrace_get_syscall_info_entry(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs,
+			      struct ptrace_syscall_info *info)
+{
+	unsigned long args[ARRAY_SIZE(info->entry.args)];
+	int i;
+
+	info->op = PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_ENTRY;
+	info->entry.nr = syscall_get_nr(child, regs);
+	syscall_get_arguments(child, regs, args);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(args); i++)
+		info->entry.args[i] = args[i];
+
+	/* args is the last field in struct ptrace_syscall_info.entry */
+	return offsetofend(struct ptrace_syscall_info, entry.args);
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+ptrace_get_syscall_info_seccomp(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs,
+				struct ptrace_syscall_info *info)
+{
+	/*
+	 * As struct ptrace_syscall_info.entry is currently a subset
+	 * of struct ptrace_syscall_info.seccomp, it makes sense to
+	 * initialize that subset using ptrace_get_syscall_info_entry().
+	 * This can be reconsidered in the future if these structures
+	 * diverge significantly enough.
+	 */
+	ptrace_get_syscall_info_entry(child, regs, info);
+	info->op = PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_SECCOMP;
+	info->seccomp.ret_data = child->ptrace_message;
+
+	/* ret_data is the last field in struct ptrace_syscall_info.seccomp */
+	return offsetofend(struct ptrace_syscall_info, seccomp.ret_data);
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+ptrace_get_syscall_info_exit(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs,
+			     struct ptrace_syscall_info *info)
+{
+	info->op = PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_EXIT;
+	info->exit.rval = syscall_get_error(child, regs);
+	info->exit.is_error = !!info->exit.rval;
+	if (!info->exit.is_error)
+		info->exit.rval = syscall_get_return_value(child, regs);
+
+	/* is_error is the last field in struct ptrace_syscall_info.exit */
+	return offsetofend(struct ptrace_syscall_info, exit.is_error);
+}
+
+static int
+ptrace_get_syscall_info(struct task_struct *child, unsigned long user_size,
+			void __user *datavp)
+{
+	struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(child);
+	struct ptrace_syscall_info info = {
+		.op = PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_NONE,
+		.arch = syscall_get_arch(child),
+		.instruction_pointer = instruction_pointer(regs),
+		.stack_pointer = user_stack_pointer(regs),
+	};
+	unsigned long actual_size = offsetof(struct ptrace_syscall_info, entry);
+	unsigned long write_size;
+
+	/*
+	 * This does not need lock_task_sighand() to access
+	 * child->last_siginfo because ptrace_freeze_traced()
+	 * called earlier by ptrace_check_attach() ensures that
+	 * the tracee cannot go away and clear its last_siginfo.
+	 */
+	switch (child->last_siginfo ? child->last_siginfo->si_code : 0) {
+	case SIGTRAP | 0x80:
+		switch (child->ptrace_message) {
+		case PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_ENTRY:
+			actual_size = ptrace_get_syscall_info_entry(child, regs,
+								    &info);
+			break;
+		case PTRACE_EVENTMSG_SYSCALL_EXIT:
+			actual_size = ptrace_get_syscall_info_exit(child, regs,
+								   &info);
+			break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP << 8):
+		actual_size = ptrace_get_syscall_info_seccomp(child, regs,
+							      &info);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	write_size = min(actual_size, user_size);
+	return copy_to_user(datavp, &info, write_size) ? -EFAULT : actual_size;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK */
+
+int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
+		   unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
+{
+	bool seized = child->ptrace & PT_SEIZED;
+	int ret = -EIO;
+	kernel_siginfo_t siginfo, *si;
+	void __user *datavp = (void __user *) data;
+	unsigned long __user *datalp = datavp;
+	unsigned long flags;
+
+	switch (request) {
+	case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
+	case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
+		return generic_ptrace_peekdata(child, addr, data);
+	case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
+	case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
+		return generic_ptrace_pokedata(child, addr, data);
+
+#ifdef PTRACE_OLDSETOPTIONS
+	case PTRACE_OLDSETOPTIONS:
+#endif
+	case PTRACE_SETOPTIONS:
+		ret = ptrace_setoptions(child, data);
+		break;
+	case PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG:
+		ret = put_user(child->ptrace_message, datalp);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_PEEKSIGINFO:
+		ret = ptrace_peek_siginfo(child, addr, data);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_GETSIGINFO:
+		ret = ptrace_getsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = copy_siginfo_to_user(datavp, &siginfo);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_SETSIGINFO:
+		ret = copy_siginfo_from_user(&siginfo, datavp);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = ptrace_setsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_GETSIGMASK: {
+		sigset_t *mask;
+
+		if (addr != sizeof(sigset_t)) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (test_tsk_restore_sigmask(child))
+			mask = &child->saved_sigmask;
+		else
+			mask = &child->blocked;
+
+		if (copy_to_user(datavp, mask, sizeof(sigset_t)))
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+		else
+			ret = 0;
+
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case PTRACE_SETSIGMASK: {
+		sigset_t new_set;
+
+		if (addr != sizeof(sigset_t)) {
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (copy_from_user(&new_set, datavp, sizeof(sigset_t))) {
+			ret = -EFAULT;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		sigdelsetmask(&new_set, sigmask(SIGKILL)|sigmask(SIGSTOP));
+
+		/*
+		 * Every thread does recalc_sigpending() after resume, so
+		 * retarget_shared_pending() and recalc_sigpending() are not
+		 * called here.
+		 */
+		spin_lock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+		child->blocked = new_set;
+		spin_unlock_irq(&child->sighand->siglock);
+
+		clear_tsk_restore_sigmask(child);
+
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case PTRACE_INTERRUPT:
+		/*
+		 * Stop tracee without any side-effect on signal or job
+		 * control.  At least one trap is guaranteed to happen
+		 * after this request.  If @child is already trapped, the
+		 * current trap is not disturbed and another trap will
+		 * happen after the current trap is ended with PTRACE_CONT.
+		 *
+		 * The actual trap might not be PTRACE_EVENT_STOP trap but
+		 * the pending condition is cleared regardless.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!seized || !lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)))
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * INTERRUPT doesn't disturb existing trap sans one
+		 * exception.  If ptracer issued LISTEN for the current
+		 * STOP, this INTERRUPT should clear LISTEN and re-trap
+		 * tracee into STOP.
+		 */
+		if (likely(task_set_jobctl_pending(child, JOBCTL_TRAP_STOP)))
+			ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, child->jobctl & JOBCTL_LISTENING);
+
+		unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_LISTEN:
+		/*
+		 * Listen for events.  Tracee must be in STOP.  It's not
+		 * resumed per-se but is not considered to be in TRACED by
+		 * wait(2) or ptrace(2).  If an async event (e.g. group
+		 * stop state change) happens, tracee will enter STOP trap
+		 * again.  Alternatively, ptracer can issue INTERRUPT to
+		 * finish listening and re-trap tracee into STOP.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!seized || !lock_task_sighand(child, &flags)))
+			break;
+
+		si = child->last_siginfo;
+		if (likely(si && (si->si_code >> 8) == PTRACE_EVENT_STOP)) {
+			child->jobctl |= JOBCTL_LISTENING;
+			/*
+			 * If NOTIFY is set, it means event happened between
+			 * start of this trap and now.  Trigger re-trap.
+			 */
+			if (child->jobctl & JOBCTL_TRAP_NOTIFY)
+				ptrace_signal_wake_up(child, true);
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+		unlock_task_sighand(child, &flags);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_DETACH:	 /* detach a process that was attached. */
+		ret = ptrace_detach(child, data);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF_FDPIC
+	case PTRACE_GETFDPIC: {
+		struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(child);
+		unsigned long tmp = 0;
+
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+		if (!mm)
+			break;
+
+		switch (addr) {
+		case PTRACE_GETFDPIC_EXEC:
+			tmp = mm->context.exec_fdpic_loadmap;
+			break;
+		case PTRACE_GETFDPIC_INTERP:
+			tmp = mm->context.interp_fdpic_loadmap;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		mmput(mm);
+
+		ret = put_user(tmp, datalp);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	case PTRACE_SINGLESTEP:
+#ifdef PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK
+	case PTRACE_SINGLEBLOCK:
+#endif
+#ifdef PTRACE_SYSEMU
+	case PTRACE_SYSEMU:
+	case PTRACE_SYSEMU_SINGLESTEP:
+#endif
+	case PTRACE_SYSCALL:
+	case PTRACE_CONT:
+		return ptrace_resume(child, request, data);
+
+	case PTRACE_KILL:
+		send_sig_info(SIGKILL, SEND_SIG_NOINFO, child);
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+	case PTRACE_GETREGSET:
+	case PTRACE_SETREGSET: {
+		struct iovec kiov;
+		struct iovec __user *uiov = datavp;
+
+		if (!access_ok(uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (__get_user(kiov.iov_base, &uiov->iov_base) ||
+		    __get_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		ret = ptrace_regset(child, request, addr, &kiov);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = __put_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	case PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO:
+		ret = ptrace_get_syscall_info(child, addr, datavp);
+		break;
+#endif
+
+	case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER:
+		ret = seccomp_get_filter(child, addr, datavp);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_METADATA:
+		ret = seccomp_get_metadata(child, addr, datavp);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RSEQ
+	case PTRACE_GET_RSEQ_CONFIGURATION:
+		ret = ptrace_get_rseq_configuration(child, addr, datavp);
+		break;
+#endif
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, long, request, long, pid, unsigned long, addr,
+		unsigned long, data)
+{
+	struct task_struct *child;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
+		ret = ptrace_traceme();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	child = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
+	if (!child) {
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
+		ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
+		goto out_put_task_struct;
+	}
+
+	ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
+				  request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_put_task_struct;
+
+	ret = arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
+	if (ret || request != PTRACE_DETACH)
+		ptrace_unfreeze_traced(child);
+
+ out_put_task_struct:
+	put_task_struct(child);
+ out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int generic_ptrace_peekdata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
+			    unsigned long data)
+{
+	unsigned long tmp;
+	int copied;
+
+	copied = ptrace_access_vm(tsk, addr, &tmp, sizeof(tmp), FOLL_FORCE);
+	if (copied != sizeof(tmp))
+		return -EIO;
+	return put_user(tmp, (unsigned long __user *)data);
+}
+
+int generic_ptrace_pokedata(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
+			    unsigned long data)
+{
+	int copied;
+
+	copied = ptrace_access_vm(tsk, addr, &data, sizeof(data),
+			FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE);
+	return (copied == sizeof(data)) ? 0 : -EIO;
+}
+
+#if defined CONFIG_COMPAT
+
+int compat_ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
+			  compat_ulong_t addr, compat_ulong_t data)
+{
+	compat_ulong_t __user *datap = compat_ptr(data);
+	compat_ulong_t word;
+	kernel_siginfo_t siginfo;
+	int ret;
+
+	switch (request) {
+	case PTRACE_PEEKTEXT:
+	case PTRACE_PEEKDATA:
+		ret = ptrace_access_vm(child, addr, &word, sizeof(word),
+				FOLL_FORCE);
+		if (ret != sizeof(word))
+			ret = -EIO;
+		else
+			ret = put_user(word, datap);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_POKETEXT:
+	case PTRACE_POKEDATA:
+		ret = ptrace_access_vm(child, addr, &data, sizeof(data),
+				FOLL_FORCE | FOLL_WRITE);
+		ret = (ret != sizeof(data) ? -EIO : 0);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG:
+		ret = put_user((compat_ulong_t) child->ptrace_message, datap);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_GETSIGINFO:
+		ret = ptrace_getsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = copy_siginfo_to_user32(
+				(struct compat_siginfo __user *) datap,
+				&siginfo);
+		break;
+
+	case PTRACE_SETSIGINFO:
+		ret = copy_siginfo_from_user32(
+			&siginfo, (struct compat_siginfo __user *) datap);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = ptrace_setsiginfo(child, &siginfo);
+		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+	case PTRACE_GETREGSET:
+	case PTRACE_SETREGSET:
+	{
+		struct iovec kiov;
+		struct compat_iovec __user *uiov =
+			(struct compat_iovec __user *) datap;
+		compat_uptr_t ptr;
+		compat_size_t len;
+
+		if (!access_ok(uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		if (__get_user(ptr, &uiov->iov_base) ||
+		    __get_user(len, &uiov->iov_len))
+			return -EFAULT;
+
+		kiov.iov_base = compat_ptr(ptr);
+		kiov.iov_len = len;
+
+		ret = ptrace_regset(child, request, addr, &kiov);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = __put_user(kiov.iov_len, &uiov->iov_len);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	default:
+		ret = ptrace_request(child, request, addr, data);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(ptrace, compat_long_t, request, compat_long_t, pid,
+		       compat_long_t, addr, compat_long_t, data)
+{
+	struct task_struct *child;
+	long ret;
+
+	if (request == PTRACE_TRACEME) {
+		ret = ptrace_traceme();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	child = find_get_task_by_vpid(pid);
+	if (!child) {
+		ret = -ESRCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (request == PTRACE_ATTACH || request == PTRACE_SEIZE) {
+		ret = ptrace_attach(child, request, addr, data);
+		goto out_put_task_struct;
+	}
+
+	ret = ptrace_check_attach(child, request == PTRACE_KILL ||
+				  request == PTRACE_INTERRUPT);
+	if (!ret) {
+		ret = compat_arch_ptrace(child, request, addr, data);
+		if (ret || request != PTRACE_DETACH)
+			ptrace_unfreeze_traced(child);
+	}
+
+ out_put_task_struct:
+	put_task_struct(child);
+ out:
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif	/* CONFIG_COMPAT */