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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /kernel/stackleak.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/stackleak.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/stackleak.c | 168 |
1 files changed, 168 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/stackleak.c b/kernel/stackleak.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c2c33d220 --- /dev/null +++ b/kernel/stackleak.c @@ -0,0 +1,168 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value + * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature + * ported from grsecurity/PaX. + * + * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> + * + * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can + * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks. + */ + +#include <linux/stackleak.h> +#include <linux/kprobes.h> + +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE +#include <linux/jump_label.h> +#include <linux/sysctl.h> +#include <linux/init.h> + +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass); + +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL +static int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret = 0; + int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass); + int prev_state = state; + + table->data = &state; + table->maxlen = sizeof(int); + ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + state = !!state; + if (ret || !write || state == prev_state) + return ret; + + if (state) + static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass); + else + static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass); + + pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n", + state ? "enabled" : "disabled"); + return ret; +} +static struct ctl_table stackleak_sysctls[] = { + { + .procname = "stack_erasing", + .data = NULL, + .maxlen = sizeof(int), + .mode = 0600, + .proc_handler = stack_erasing_sysctl, + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, + }, + {} +}; + +static int __init stackleak_sysctls_init(void) +{ + register_sysctl_init("kernel", stackleak_sysctls); + return 0; +} +late_initcall(stackleak_sysctls_init); +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */ + +#define skip_erasing() static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass) +#else +#define skip_erasing() false +#endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */ + +static __always_inline void __stackleak_erase(bool on_task_stack) +{ + const unsigned long task_stack_low = stackleak_task_low_bound(current); + const unsigned long task_stack_high = stackleak_task_high_bound(current); + unsigned long erase_low, erase_high; + + erase_low = stackleak_find_top_of_poison(task_stack_low, + current->lowest_stack); + +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS + current->prev_lowest_stack = erase_low; +#endif + + /* + * Write poison to the task's stack between 'erase_low' and + * 'erase_high'. + * + * If we're running on a different stack (e.g. an entry trampoline + * stack) we can erase everything below the pt_regs at the top of the + * task stack. + * + * If we're running on the task stack itself, we must not clobber any + * stack used by this function and its caller. We assume that this + * function has a fixed-size stack frame, and the current stack pointer + * doesn't change while we write poison. + */ + if (on_task_stack) + erase_high = current_stack_pointer; + else + erase_high = task_stack_high; + + while (erase_low < erase_high) { + *(unsigned long *)erase_low = STACKLEAK_POISON; + erase_low += sizeof(unsigned long); + } + + /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */ + current->lowest_stack = task_stack_high; +} + +/* + * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase. + * Can be called from the task stack or an entry stack when the task stack is + * no longer in use. + */ +asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase(void) +{ + if (skip_erasing()) + return; + + __stackleak_erase(on_thread_stack()); +} + +/* + * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase. + * Can only be called from the task stack. + */ +asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_on_task_stack(void) +{ + if (skip_erasing()) + return; + + __stackleak_erase(true); +} + +/* + * Erase and poison the portion of the task stack used since the last erase. + * Can only be called from a stack other than the task stack. + */ +asmlinkage void noinstr stackleak_erase_off_task_stack(void) +{ + if (skip_erasing()) + return; + + __stackleak_erase(false); +} + +void __used __no_caller_saved_registers noinstr stackleak_track_stack(void) +{ + unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer; + + /* + * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than + * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in + * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that. + */ + BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH); + + /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */ + sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long)); + if (sp < current->lowest_stack && + sp >= stackleak_task_low_bound(current)) { + current->lowest_stack = sp; + } +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack); |