Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1993 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9820b3809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1993 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*  Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL;
+static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL;
+vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
+
+/*
+ * Security Information (SECINFO) data structure needed by a few SGX
+ * instructions (eg. ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EMODPE]) holds meta-data
+ * about an enclave page. &enum sgx_secinfo_page_state specifies the
+ * secinfo flags used for page state.
+ */
+enum sgx_secinfo_page_state {
+	SGX_SECINFO_PENDING = (1 << 3),
+	SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED = (1 << 4),
+	SGX_SECINFO_PR = (1 << 5),
+};
+
+struct vdso_symtab {
+	Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab;
+	const char *elf_symstrtab;
+	Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab;
+};
+
+static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr)
+{
+	Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
+	Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++)
+		if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC)
+			return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++)
+		if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag)
+			return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab)
+{
+	Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr);
+
+	symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB);
+	if (!symtab->elf_symtab)
+		return false;
+
+	symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB);
+	if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab)
+		return false;
+
+	symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH);
+	if (!symtab->elf_hashtab)
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline int sgx2_supported(void)
+{
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+	__cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+	return eax & 0x2;
+}
+
+static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name)
+{
+	unsigned long h = 0, high;
+
+	while (*name) {
+		h = (h << 4) + *name++;
+		high = h & 0xf0000000;
+
+		if (high)
+			h ^= high >> 24;
+
+		h &= ~high;
+	}
+
+	return h;
+}
+
+static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
+{
+	Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0];
+	Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2];
+	Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum];
+	Elf64_Sym *sym;
+	Elf64_Word i;
+
+	for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF;
+	     i = chaintab[i]) {
+		sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i];
+		if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name]))
+			return sym;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+		if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+			return seg->offset;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
+ * data segment.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_data_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+		if (seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+			return seg->offset;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+FIXTURE(enclave) {
+	struct encl encl;
+	struct sgx_enclave_run run;
+};
+
+static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl,
+			    struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+	Elf64_Sym *sgx_enter_enclave_sym = NULL;
+	struct vdso_symtab symtab;
+	struct encl_segment *seg;
+	char maps_line[256];
+	FILE *maps_file;
+	unsigned int i;
+	void *addr;
+
+	if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size)) {
+		encl_delete(encl);
+		TH_LOG("Failed to load the test enclave.");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (!encl_measure(encl))
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!encl_build(encl))
+		goto err;
+
+	/*
+	 * An enclave consumer only must do this.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+		addr = mmap((void *)encl->encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
+			    seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl->fd, 0);
+		EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+		if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	/* Get vDSO base address */
+	addr = (void *)getauxval(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR);
+	if (!addr)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab))
+		goto err;
+
+	sgx_enter_enclave_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave");
+	if (!sgx_enter_enclave_sym)
+		goto err;
+
+	vdso_sgx_enter_enclave = addr + sgx_enter_enclave_sym->st_value;
+
+	return true;
+
+err:
+	for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+		seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+		TH_LOG("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x", seg->offset, seg->size, seg->prot);
+	}
+
+	maps_file = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+	if (maps_file != NULL)  {
+		while (fgets(maps_line, sizeof(maps_line), maps_file) != NULL) {
+			maps_line[strlen(maps_line) - 1] = '\0';
+
+			if (strstr(maps_line, "/dev/sgx_enclave"))
+				TH_LOG("%s", maps_line);
+		}
+
+		fclose(maps_file);
+	}
+
+	TH_LOG("Failed to initialize the test enclave.");
+
+	encl_delete(encl);
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(enclave)
+{
+	encl_delete(&self->encl);
+}
+
+#define ENCL_CALL(op, run, clobbered) \
+	({ \
+		int ret; \
+		if ((clobbered)) \
+			ret = vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)(op), 0, 0, \
+						     EENTER, 0, 0, (run)); \
+		else \
+			ret = sgx_enter_enclave((void *)(op), NULL, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL, \
+						(run)); \
+		ret; \
+	})
+
+#define EXPECT_EEXIT(run) \
+	do { \
+		EXPECT_EQ((run)->function, EEXIT); \
+		if ((run)->function != EEXIT) \
+			TH_LOG("0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%016llx", (run)->exception_vector, \
+			       (run)->exception_error_code, (run)->exception_addr); \
+	} while (0)
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
+ * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
+ * metric.
+ */
+static unsigned long sgx_calc_section_metric(unsigned int low,
+					     unsigned int high)
+{
+	return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
+	       ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sum total available physical SGX memory across all EPC sections
+ *
+ * Return: total available physical SGX memory available on system
+ */
+static unsigned long get_total_epc_mem(void)
+{
+	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+	unsigned long total_size = 0;
+	unsigned int type;
+	int section = 0;
+
+	while (true) {
+		__cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, section + SGX_CPUID_EPC, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+		type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK;
+		if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID)
+			break;
+
+		if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION)
+			break;
+
+		total_size += sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
+
+		section++;
+	}
+
+	return total_size;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+	unsigned long total_mem;
+
+	total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+	ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+	struct encl_segment *heap;
+	unsigned long total_mem;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+	unsigned long addr;
+	unsigned long i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Create enclave with additional heap that is as big as all
+	 * available physical SGX memory.
+	 */
+	total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+	ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+	TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...",
+	       total_mem);
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	heap = &self->encl.segment_tbl[self->encl.nr_segments - 1];
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	/* Trim entire heap. */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+	modt_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+	modt_ioc.length = heap->size;
+	modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+	TH_LOG("Changing type of %zd bytes to trimmed may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, heap->size);
+
+	/* EACCEPT all removed pages. */
+	addr = self->encl.encl_base + heap->offset;
+
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	TH_LOG("Entering enclave to run EACCEPT for each page of %zd bytes may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	for (i = 0; i < heap->size; i += 4096) {
+		eaccept_op.epc_addr = addr + i;
+		eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+		EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+		ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT);
+	}
+
+	/* Complete page removal. */
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+	remove_ioc.length = heap->size;
+
+	TH_LOG("Removing %zd bytes from enclave may take a while ...",
+	       heap->size);
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, heap->size);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+static int test_handler(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, long ursp, long r8, long r9,
+			struct sgx_enclave_run *run)
+{
+	run->user_data = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso_and_user_function)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	self->run.user_handler = (__u64)test_handler;
+	self->run.user_data = 0xdeadbeef;
+
+	put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+	get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity check that it is possible to enter either of the two hardcoded TCS
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_entry)
+{
+	struct encl_op_header op;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	op.type = ENCL_OP_NOP;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Move to the next TCS. */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Second page of .data segment is used to test changing PTE permissions.
+ * This spans the local encl_buffer within the test enclave.
+ *
+ * 1) Start with a sanity check: a value is written to the target page within
+ *    the enclave and read back to ensure target page can be written to.
+ * 2) Change PTE permissions (RW -> RO) of target page within enclave.
+ * 3) Repeat (1) - this time expecting a regular #PF communicated via the
+ *    vDSO.
+ * 4) Change PTE permissions of target page within enclave back to be RW.
+ * 5) Repeat (1) by resuming enclave, now expected to be possible to write to
+ *    and read from target page within enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) +
+		     PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check to ensure it is possible to write to page that will
+	 * have its permissions manipulated.
+	 */
+
+	/* Write MAGIC to page */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that it is the
+	 * value previously written (MAGIC).
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Change PTE permissions of target page within the enclave */
+	ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ);
+	if (ret)
+		perror("mprotect");
+
+	/*
+	 * PTE permissions of target page changed to read-only, EPCM
+	 * permissions unchanged (EPCM permissions are RW), attempt to
+	 * write to the page, expecting a regular #PF.
+	 */
+
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Change PTE permissions back to enable enclave to write to the
+	 * target page and resume enclave - do not expect any exceptions this
+	 * time.
+	 */
+	ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+	if (ret)
+		perror("mprotect");
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0,
+					 0, ERESUME, 0, 0, &self->run),
+		 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions ioc;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+	 * commands.
+	 */
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* ret == -1 */
+	if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+		SKIP(return,
+		     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+	else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+		SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and
+	 * should be prevented by the kernel.
+	 */
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl);
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enclave page permission test.
+ *
+ * Modify and restore enclave page's EPCM (enclave) permissions from
+ * outside enclave (ENCLS[EMODPR] via kernel) as well as from within
+ * enclave (via ENCLU[EMODPE]). Check for page fault if
+ * VMA allows access but EPCM permissions do not.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions restrict_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	struct encl_op_emodpe emodpe_op;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+	 * commands.
+	 */
+	memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+		    &restrict_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* ret == -1 */
+	if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+		SKIP(return,
+		     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+	else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+		SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will have its permissions changed is the second data
+	 * page in the .data segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer
+	 * within the enclave.
+	 *
+	 * At start of test @data_start should have EPCM as well as PTE and
+	 * VMA permissions of RW.
+	 */
+
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before making
+	 * any changes to page permissions.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that
+	 * page is writable.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Change EPCM permissions to read-only. Kernel still considers
+	 * the page writable.
+	 */
+	memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+	restrict_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	restrict_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	restrict_ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+		    &restrict_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/*
+	 * EPCM permissions changed from kernel, need to EACCEPT from enclave.
+	 */
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PR;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * EPCM permissions of page is now read-only, expect #PF
+	 * on EPCM when attempting to write to page from within enclave.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Received AEX but cannot return to enclave at same entrypoint,
+	 * need different TCS from where EPCM permission can be made writable
+	 * again.
+	 */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter enclave at new TCS to change EPCM permissions to be
+	 * writable again and thus fix the page fault that triggered the
+	 * AEX.
+	 */
+
+	emodpe_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+	emodpe_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W;
+	emodpe_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EMODPE;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&emodpe_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to return to main TCS to resume execution at faulting
+	 * instruction, PTE should continue to allow writing to the page.
+	 */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Wrong page permissions that caused original fault has
+	 * now been fixed via EPCM permissions.
+	 * Resume execution in main TCS to re-attempt the memory access.
+	 */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+					 ERESUME, 0, 0,
+					 &self->run),
+		  0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to
+ * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added
+ * during enclave creation.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	void *addr;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!sgx2_supported())
+		SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+		total_size += seg->size;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+	 * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes
+	 * and test_encl does not consume it all.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New
+	 * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing
+	 * mappings.
+	 * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+	 * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+	 * by existing enclave pages.
+	 */
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+		    MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave.
+	 * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave.
+	 * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the
+	 * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the
+	 * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible
+	 * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the
+	 * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set,
+	 * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr);
+
+	if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) {
+		munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+					 ERESUME, 0, 0,
+					 &self->run),
+		  0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+	 * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a
+ * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	void *addr;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!sgx2_supported())
+		SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+		total_size += seg->size;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+	 * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+	 * test_encl does not consume it all.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic
+	 * EPC page.
+	 *
+	 * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+	 * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+	 * by existing enclave pages.
+	 */
+
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+		    self->encl.fd, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again
+	 * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace.
+	 */
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+	    self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+	    self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) {
+		munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+		SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to
+	 * write to it.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+	 * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases:
+ * Phase 1:
+ * Create a new TCS, consisting out of three new pages (stack page with regular
+ * page type, SSA page with regular page type, and TCS page with TCS page
+ * type) in an initialized enclave and run a simple workload within it.
+ * Phase 2:
+ * Remove the three pages added in phase 1, add a new regular page at the
+ * same address that previously hosted the TCS page and verify that it can
+ * be modified.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create)
+{
+	struct encl_op_init_tcs_page init_tcs_page_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_buf_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_buf_op;
+	void *addr, *tcs, *stack_end, *ssa;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	size_t total_size = 0;
+	uint64_t val_64;
+	int errno_save;
+	int ret, i;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl,
+				    _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Add three regular pages via EAUG: one will be the TCS stack, one
+	 * will be the TCS SSA, and one will be the new TCS. The stack and
+	 * SSA will remain as regular pages, the TCS page will need its
+	 * type changed after populated with needed data.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+		struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+		total_size += seg->size;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+	 * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+	 * test_encl does not consume it all.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_LT(total_size + 3 * PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+	/*
+	 * mmap() three pages at end of existing enclave to be used for the
+	 * three new pages.
+	 */
+	addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, 3 * PAGE_SIZE,
+		    PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+		    self->encl.fd, 0);
+	EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+	self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+	self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+	self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+	stack_end = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+	tcs = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+	ssa = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Run EACCEPT on each new page to trigger the
+	 * EACCEPT->(#PF)->EAUG->EACCEPT(again without a #PF) flow.
+	 */
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+	    self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+	    self->run.exception_addr == (unsigned long)stack_end) {
+		munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+		SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+	}
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Three new pages added to enclave. Now populate the TCS page with
+	 * needed data. This should be done from within enclave. Provide
+	 * the function that will do the actual data population with needed
+	 * data.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * New TCS will use the "encl_dyn_entry" entrypoint that expects
+	 * stack to begin in page before TCS page.
+	 */
+	val_64 = encl_get_entry(&self->encl, "encl_dyn_entry");
+	EXPECT_NE(val_64, 0);
+
+	init_tcs_page_op.tcs_page = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	init_tcs_page_op.ssa = (unsigned long)total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+	init_tcs_page_op.entry = val_64;
+	init_tcs_page_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&init_tcs_page_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Change TCS page type to TCS. */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+	modt_ioc.offset = total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/* EACCEPT new TCS page from enclave. */
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Run workload from new TCS. */
+	self->run.tcs = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Simple workload to write to data buffer and read value back.
+	 */
+	put_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+	put_buf_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	get_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+	get_buf_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_buf_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Phase 2 of test:
+	 * Remove pages associated with new TCS, create a regular page
+	 * where TCS page used to be and verify it can be used as a regular
+	 * page.
+	 */
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+	modt_ioc.offset = total_size;
+	modt_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+	 * EACCEPT for each of three removed pages.
+	 */
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal. */
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = total_size;
+	remove_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and access location where TCS #3 was to
+	 * trigger dynamic add of regular page at that location.
+	 */
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * New page should be accessible from within enclave - write to it.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+	 * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run
+ * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal
+ * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail
+ * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+	modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/* Skip EACCEPT */
+
+	/* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	/* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with
+ * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read from page that was just removed.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+	 * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+	 * expected.
+	 */
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with
+ * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt
+ * to removed page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept)
+{
+	struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+	struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+	 * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+	 * enclave.
+	 */
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+		     encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+	 * removing it.
+	 *
+	 * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+	 */
+	put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+	put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+	 * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+	get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+	get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+	/* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+	memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+	ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	/* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Read from page that was just removed.
+	 */
+	get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+	 * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+	 * expected.
+	 */
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page)
+{
+	struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+	struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+	struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+	unsigned long data_start;
+	int ret, errno_save;
+
+	ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+	/*
+	 * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+	 * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+	 */
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOTTY)
+			SKIP(return,
+			     "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+		else if (errno == ENODEV)
+			SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+	 * expect command to fail.
+	 */
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+	/* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+	memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+	self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+	data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+			 encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+	memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+	modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+	 * EACCEPT for removed page.
+	 */
+
+	eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+	eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+	eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+	eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+	EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+	memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+	remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+	ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+	errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+	EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN