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-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c93
1 files changed, 93 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..325455d16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/kaslr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Linaro Ltd <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cache.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/libfdt.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/kernel-pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/memory.h>
+#include <asm/mmu.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+
+u64 __ro_after_init module_alloc_base;
+u16 __initdata memstart_offset_seed;
+
+struct arm64_ftr_override kaslr_feature_override __initdata;
+
+static int __init kaslr_init(void)
+{
+ u64 module_range;
+ u32 seed;
+
+ /*
+ * Set a reasonable default for module_alloc_base in case
+ * we end up running with module randomization disabled.
+ */
+ module_alloc_base = (u64)_etext - MODULES_VSIZE;
+
+ if (kaslr_feature_override.val & kaslr_feature_override.mask & 0xf) {
+ pr_info("KASLR disabled on command line\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!kaslr_offset()) {
+ pr_warn("KASLR disabled due to lack of seed\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("KASLR enabled\n");
+
+ /*
+ * KASAN without KASAN_VMALLOC does not expect the module region to
+ * intersect the vmalloc region, since shadow memory is allocated for
+ * each module at load time, whereas the vmalloc region will already be
+ * shadowed by KASAN zero pages.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC) ||
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS)) &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN_VMALLOC));
+
+ seed = get_random_u32();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MODULE_REGION_FULL)) {
+ /*
+ * Randomize the module region over a 2 GB window covering the
+ * kernel. This reduces the risk of modules leaking information
+ * about the address of the kernel itself, but results in
+ * branches between modules and the core kernel that are
+ * resolved via PLTs. (Branches between modules will be
+ * resolved normally.)
+ */
+ module_range = SZ_2G - (u64)(_end - _stext);
+ module_alloc_base = max((u64)_end - SZ_2G, (u64)MODULES_VADDR);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Randomize the module region by setting module_alloc_base to
+ * a PAGE_SIZE multiple in the range [_etext - MODULES_VSIZE,
+ * _stext) . This guarantees that the resulting region still
+ * covers [_stext, _etext], and that all relative branches can
+ * be resolved without veneers unless this region is exhausted
+ * and we fall back to a larger 2GB window in module_alloc()
+ * when ARM64_MODULE_PLTS is enabled.
+ */
+ module_range = MODULES_VSIZE - (u64)(_etext - _stext);
+ }
+
+ /* use the lower 21 bits to randomize the base of the module region */
+ module_alloc_base += (module_range * (seed & ((1 << 21) - 1))) >> 21;
+ module_alloc_base &= PAGE_MASK;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(kaslr_init)