Adding debian version 1:9.2p1-2+deb12u2.debian/1%9.2p1-2+deb12u2

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 523 insertions, 0 deletions

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+openssh (1:9.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 9.2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1): add a new EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) option that
+     controls whether the client-side ~C escape sequence that provides a
+     command-line is available. Among other things, the ~C command-line
+     could be used to add additional port-forwards at runtime.
+
+     This option defaults to "no", disabling the ~C command-line that was
+     previously enabled by default. Turning off the command-line allows
+     platforms that support sandboxing of the ssh(1) client (currently only
+     OpenBSD) to use a stricter default sandbox policy.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Wed, 08 Feb 2023 10:36:06 +0000
+
+openssh (1:9.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 9.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): SetEnv directives in ssh_config and sshd_config are
+     now first-match-wins to match other directives. Previously if an
+     environment variable was multiply specified the last set value would
+     have been used.
+
+   * ssh-keygen(8): ssh-keygen -A (generate all default host key types) will
+     no longer generate DSA keys, as these are insecure and have not been
+     used by default for some years.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon, 14 Nov 2022 16:35:59 +0000
+
+openssh (1:9.0p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 9.0 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * This release switches scp(1) from using the legacy scp/rcp protocol to
+     using the SFTP protocol by default.
+
+     Legacy scp/rcp performs wildcard expansion of remote filenames (e.g.
+     "scp host:* .") through the remote shell. This has the side effect of
+     requiring double quoting of shell meta-characters in file names
+     included on scp(1) command-lines, otherwise they could be interpreted
+     as shell commands on the remote side.
+
+     This creates one area of potential incompatibility: scp(1) when using
+     the SFTP protocol no longer requires this finicky and brittle quoting,
+     and attempts to use it may cause transfers to fail. We consider the
+     removal of the need for double-quoting shell characters in file names
+     to be a benefit and do not intend to introduce bug-compatibility for
+     legacy scp/rcp in scp(1) when using the SFTP protocol.
+
+     Another area of potential incompatibility relates to the use of remote
+     paths relative to other user's home directories, for example - "scp
+     host:~user/file /tmp". The SFTP protocol has no native way to expand a
+     ~user path. However, sftp-server(8) in OpenSSH 8.7 and later support a
+     protocol extension "expand-path@openssh.com" to support this.
+
+     In case of incompatibility, the scp(1) client may be instructed to use
+     the legacy scp/rcp using the -O flag.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 09 Apr 2022 14:14:10 +0100
+
+openssh (1:8.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.8 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * This release disables RSA signatures using the SHA-1 hash algorithm by
+     default. This change has been made as the SHA-1 hash algorithm is
+     cryptographically broken, and it is possible to create chosen-prefix
+     hash collisions for <USD$50K.
+
+     For most users, this change should be invisible and there is no need to
+     replace ssh-rsa keys. OpenSSH has supported RFC8332 RSA/SHA-256/512
+     signatures since release 7.2 and existing ssh-rsa keys will
+     automatically use the stronger algorithm where possible.
+
+     Incompatibility is more likely when connecting to older SSH
+     implementations that have not been upgraded or have not closely tracked
+     improvements in the SSH protocol. For these cases, it may be necessary
+     to selectively re-enable RSA/SHA1 to allow connection and/or user
+     authentication via the HostkeyAlgorithms and PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+     options. For example, the following stanza in ~/.ssh/config will enable
+     RSA/SHA1 for host and user authentication for a single destination
+     host:
+
+         Host old-host
+             HostkeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa
+             PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-rsa
+
+     We recommend enabling RSA/SHA1 only as a stopgap measure until legacy
+     implementations can be upgraded or reconfigured with another key type
+     (such as ECDSA or Ed25519).
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 15 Feb 2022 19:20:21 +0000
+
+openssh (1:8.7p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.7 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * scp(1): this release changes the behaviour of remote to remote copies
+     (e.g. "scp host-a:/path host-b:") to transfer through the local host by
+     default. This was previously available via the -3 flag. This mode
+     avoids the need to expose credentials on the origin hop, avoids
+     triplicate interpretation of filenames by the shell (by the local
+     system, the copy origin and the destination) and, in conjunction with
+     the SFTP support for scp(1) mentioned below, allows use of all
+     authentication methods to the remote hosts (previously, only
+     non-interactive methods could be used). A -R flag has been added to
+     select the old behaviour.
+
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): both the client and server are now using a stricter
+     configuration file parser. The new parser uses more shell-like rules
+     for quotes, space and escape characters. It is also more strict in
+     rejecting configurations that include options lacking arguments.
+     Previously some options (e.g. DenyUsers) could appear on a line with no
+     subsequent arguments. This release will reject such configurations. The
+     new parser will also reject configurations with unterminated quotes and
+     multiple '=' characters after the option name.
+
+   * ssh(1): when using SSHFP DNS records for host key verification, ssh(1)
+     will verify all matching records instead of just those with the
+     specific signature type requested. This may cause host key verification
+     problems if stale SSHFP records of a different or legacy signature type
+     exist alongside other records for a particular host. bz#3322
+
+   * ssh-keygen(1): when generating a FIDO key and specifying an explicit
+     attestation challenge (using -Ochallenge), the challenge will now be
+     hashed by the builtin security key middleware. This removes the
+     (undocumented) requirement that challenges be exactly 32 bytes in
+     length and matches the expectations of libfido2.
+
+   * sshd(8): environment="..." directives in authorized_keys files are now
+     first-match-wins and limited to 1024 discrete environment variable
+     names.
+
+  OpenSSH 8.5 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): this release changes the first-preference signature
+     algorithm from ECDSA to ED25519.
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): set the TOS/DSCP specified in the configuration for
+     interactive use prior to TCP connect. The connection phase of the SSH
+     session is time-sensitive and often explicitly interactive.  The
+     ultimate interactive/bulk TOS/DSCP will be set after authentication
+     completes.
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): remove the pre-standardization cipher
+     rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se. It is an alias for aes256-cbc before it
+     was standardized in RFC4253 (2006), has been deprecated and disabled by
+     default since OpenSSH 7.2 (2016) and was only briefly documented in
+     ssh.1 in 2001.
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): update/replace the experimental post-quantum hybrid
+     key exchange method based on Streamlined NTRU Prime coupled with
+     X25519.
+
+     The previous sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org method is replaced
+     with sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com. Per its designers, the
+     sntrup4591761 algorithm was superseded almost two years ago by
+     sntrup761.
+
+     (note this both the updated method and the one that it replaced are
+     disabled by default)
+
+   * ssh(1): disable CheckHostIP by default. It provides insignificant
+     benefits while making key rotation significantly more difficult,
+     especially for hosts behind IP-based load-balancers.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 06 Nov 2021 12:23:47 +0000
+
+openssh (1:8.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.4 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh-keygen(1): the format of the attestation information optionally
+     recorded when a FIDO key is generated has changed. It now includes the
+     authenticator data needed to validate attestation signatures. 
+
+   * The API between OpenSSH and the FIDO token middleware has changed and
+     the SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR version has been incremented as a result.
+     Third-party middleware libraries must support the current API version
+     (7) to work with OpenSSH 8.4.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 18 Oct 2020 12:07:48 +0100
+
+openssh (1:8.3p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.3 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+  * sftp(1): reject an argument of "-1" in the same way as ssh(1) and scp(1)
+    do instead of accepting and silently ignoring it.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 07 Jun 2020 13:44:04 +0100
+
+openssh (1:8.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.2 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8), ssh-keygen(1): This release removes the "ssh-rsa"
+     (RSA/SHA1) algorithm from those accepted for certificate signatures
+     (i.e.  the client and server CASignatureAlgorithms option) and will use
+     the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm by default when the ssh-keygen(1)
+     CA signs new certificates.
+
+     Certificates are at special risk to SHA1 collision vulnerabilities as
+     an attacker has effectively unlimited time in which to craft a
+     collision that yields them a valid certificate, far more than the
+     relatively brief LoginGraceTime window that they have to forge a host
+     key signature.
+
+     The OpenSSH certificate format includes a CA-specified (typically
+     random) nonce value near the start of the certificate that should make
+     exploitation of chosen-prefix collisions in this context challenging,
+     as the attacker does not have full control over the prefix that
+     actually gets signed. Nonetheless, SHA1 is now a demonstrably broken
+     algorithm and further improvements in attacks are highly likely.
+
+     OpenSSH releases prior to 7.2 do not support the newer RSA/SHA2
+     algorithms and will refuse to accept certificates signed by an OpenSSH
+     8.2+ CA using RSA keys unless the unsafe algorithm is explicitly
+     selected during signing ("ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa").  Older
+     clients/servers may use another CA key type such as ssh-ed25519
+     (supported since OpenSSH 6.5) or one of the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256/384/521
+     types (supported since OpenSSH 5.7) instead if they cannot be upgraded.
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): Remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from the default
+     key exchange proposal for both the client and server.
+
+   * ssh-keygen(1): The command-line options related to the generation and
+     screening of safe prime numbers used by the
+     diffie-hellman-group-exchange-* key exchange algorithms have changed.
+     Most options have been folded under the -O flag.
+
+   * sshd(8): The sshd listener process title visible to ps(1) has changed
+     to include information about the number of connections that are
+     currently attempting authentication and the limits configured by
+     MaxStartups.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 21 Feb 2020 16:36:37 +0000
+
+openssh (1:8.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.1 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh-keygen(1): when acting as a CA and signing certificates with an RSA
+     key, default to using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm.
+     Certificates signed by RSA keys will therefore be incompatible with
+     OpenSSH versions prior to 7.2 unless the default is overridden (using
+     "ssh-keygen -t ssh-rsa -s ...").
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 10 Oct 2019 10:23:19 +0100
+
+openssh (1:8.0p1-1) experimental; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 8.0 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * sshd(8): Remove support for obsolete "host/port" syntax.
+     Slash-separated host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to
+     host:port syntax for the benefit of IPv6 users.  These days there are
+     established standards for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is
+     easily mistaken for CIDR notation, which OpenSSH supports for some
+     things.  Remove the slash notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 09 Jun 2019 22:47:27 +0100
+
+openssh (1:7.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.9 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1), sshd(8): the setting of the new CASignatureAlgorithms option
+     bans the use of DSA keys as certificate authorities.
+   * sshd(8): the authentication success/failure log message has changed
+     format slightly.  It now includes the certificate fingerprint
+     (previously it included only key ID and CA key fingerprint).
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 21 Oct 2018 10:39:24 +0100
+
+openssh (1:7.8p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.8 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh-keygen(1): Write OpenSSH format private keys by default instead of
+     using OpenSSL's PEM format.  The OpenSSH format, supported in OpenSSH
+     releases since 2014 and described in the PROTOCOL.key file in the
+     source distribution, offers substantially better protection against
+     offline password guessing and supports key comments in private keys.
+     If necessary, it is possible to write old PEM-style keys by adding "-m
+     PEM" to ssh-keygen's arguments when generating or updating a key.
+   * sshd(8): Remove internal support for S/Key multiple factor
+     authentication.  S/Key may still be used via PAM or BSD auth.
+   * ssh(1): Remove vestigial support for running ssh(1) as setuid.  This
+     used to be required for hostbased authentication and the (long gone)
+     rhosts-style authentication, but has not been necessary for a long
+     time.  Attempting to execute ssh as a setuid binary, or with uid !=
+     effective uid will now yield a fatal error at runtime.
+   * sshd(8): The semantics of PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and the similar
+     HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options have changed.  These now specify
+     signature algorithms that are accepted for their respective
+     authentication mechanism, where previously they specified accepted key
+     types.  This distinction matters when using the RSA/SHA2 signature
+     algorithms "rsa-sha2-256", "rsa-sha2-512" and their certificate
+     counterparts.  Configurations that override these options but omit
+     these algorithm names may cause unexpected authentication failures (no
+     action is required for configurations that accept the default for these
+     options).
+   * sshd(8): The precedence of session environment variables has changed.
+     ~/.ssh/environment and environment="..." options in authorized_keys
+     files can no longer override SSH_* variables set implicitly by sshd.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): The default IPQoS used by ssh/sshd has changed.  They
+     will now use DSCP AF21 for interactive traffic and CS1 for bulk.  For a
+     detailed rationale, please see the commit message:
+     https://cvsweb.openbsd.org/src/usr.bin/ssh/readconf.c#rev1.284
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 30 Aug 2018 15:35:27 +0100
+
+openssh (1:7.6p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.6 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1): Delete SSH protocol version 1 support, associated configuration
+     options and documentation.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the hmac-ripemd160 MAC.
+   * ssh(1)/sshd(8): Remove support for the arcfour, blowfish and CAST
+     ciphers.
+   * Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length and improve reporting for keys
+     that do not meet this requirement.
+   * ssh(1): Do not offer CBC ciphers by default.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Fri, 06 Oct 2017 12:36:48 +0100
+
+openssh (1:7.5p1-1) experimental; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.5 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * This release deprecates the sshd_config UsePrivilegeSeparation option,
+     thereby making privilege separation mandatory.
+
+   * The format of several log messages emitted by the packet code has
+     changed to include additional information about the user and their
+     authentication state. Software that monitors ssh/sshd logs may need to
+     account for these changes. For example:
+
+       Connection closed by user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+       Connection closed by authenticating user x 10.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+       Connection closed by invalid user x 1.1.1.1 port 1234 [preauth]
+
+     Affected messages include connection closure, timeout, remote
+     disconnection, negotiation failure and some other fatal messages
+     generated by the packet code.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 02 Apr 2017 02:58:01 +0100
+
+openssh (1:7.4p1-7) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  This version restores the default for AuthorizedKeysFile to search both
+  ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2, as was the case in
+  Debian configurations before 1:7.4p1-1.  Upstream intends to phase out
+  searching ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 by default, so you should ensure that
+  you are only using ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, at least for critical
+  administrative access; do not assume that the current default will remain
+  in place forever.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 05 Mar 2017 02:12:42 +0000
+
+openssh (1:7.4p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.4 includes a number of changes that may affect existing
+  configurations:
+
+   * ssh(1): Remove 3des-cbc from the client's default proposal.  64-bit
+     block ciphers are not safe in 2016 and we don't want to wait until
+     attacks like SWEET32 are extended to SSH.  As 3des-cbc was the only
+     mandatory cipher in the SSH RFCs, this may cause problems connecting to
+     older devices using the default configuration, but it's highly likely
+     that such devices already need explicit configuration for key exchange
+     and hostkey algorithms already anyway.
+   * sshd(8): Remove support for pre-authentication compression.  Doing
+     compression early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the
+     1990s, but today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography
+     (cf. multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
+     Pre-auth compression support has been disabled by default for >10
+     years.  Support remains in the client.
+   * ssh-agent will refuse to load PKCS#11 modules outside a whitelist of
+     trusted paths by default.  The path whitelist may be specified at
+     run-time.
+   * sshd(8): When a forced-command appears in both a certificate and an
+     authorized keys/principals command= restriction, sshd will now refuse
+     to accept the certificate unless they are identical.  The previous
+     (documented) behaviour of having the certificate forced-command
+     override the other could be a bit confusing and error-prone.
+   * sshd(8): Remove the UseLogin configuration directive and support for
+     having /bin/login manage login sessions.
+
+  The unprivileged sshd process that deals with pre-authentication network
+  traffic is now subject to additional sandboxing restrictions by default:
+  that is, the default sshd_config now sets UsePrivilegeSeparation to
+  "sandbox" rather than "yes".  This has been the case upstream for a while,
+  but until now the Debian configuration diverged unnecessarily.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 27 Dec 2016 18:01:46 +0000
+
+openssh (1:7.2p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.2 disables a number of legacy cryptographic algorithms by
+  default in ssh:
+
+   * Several ciphers blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc, all arcfour variants and the
+     rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+   * MD5-based and truncated HMAC algorithms.
+
+  These algorithms are already disabled by default in sshd.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Mar 2016 11:47:20 +0000
+
+openssh (1:7.1p1-2) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  OpenSSH 7.0 disables several pieces of weak, legacy, and/or unsafe
+  cryptography.
+
+   * Support for the legacy SSH version 1 protocol is disabled by default at
+     compile time.  Note that this also means that the Cipher keyword in
+     ssh_config(5) is effectively no longer usable; use Ciphers instead for
+     protocol 2.  The openssh-client-ssh1 package includes "ssh1", "scp1",
+     and "ssh-keygen1" binaries which you can use if you have no alternative
+     way to connect to an outdated SSH1-only server; please contact the
+     server administrator or system vendor in such cases and ask them to
+     upgrade.
+   * Support for the 1024-bit diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange is
+     disabled by default at run-time.  It may be re-enabled using the
+     instructions at http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+   * Support for ssh-dss, ssh-dss-cert-* host and user keys is disabled by
+     default at run-time.  These may be re-enabled using the instructions at
+     http://www.openssh.com/legacy.html
+   * Support for the legacy v00 cert format has been removed.
+
+  Future releases will retire more legacy cryptography, including:
+
+   * Refusing all RSA keys smaller than 1024 bits (the current minimum is
+     768 bits).
+   * Several ciphers will be disabled by default: blowfish-cbc, cast128-cbc,
+     all arcfour variants, and the rijndael-cbc aliases for AES.
+   * MD5-based HMAC algorithms will be disabled by default.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Tue, 08 Dec 2015 15:33:08 +0000
+
+openssh (1:6.9p1-1) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  UseDNS now defaults to 'no'.  Configurations that match against the client
+  host name (via sshd_config or authorized_keys) may need to re-enable it or
+  convert to matching against addresses.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Thu, 20 Aug 2015 10:38:58 +0100
+
+openssh (1:6.7p1-5) unstable; urgency=medium
+
+  openssh-server 1:6.7p1-4 changed the default setting of AcceptEnv to list
+  a number of specific LC_FOO variables rather than the wildcard LC_*.  I
+  have since been persuaded that this was a bad idea and have reverted it,
+  but it is difficult to automatically undo the change to
+  /etc/ssh/sshd_config without compounding the problem (that of modifying
+  configuration that some users did not want to be modified) further.  Most
+  users who upgraded via version 1:6.7p1-4 should restore the previous value
+  of "AcceptEnv LANG LC_*" in /etc/ssh/sshd_config.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sun, 22 Mar 2015 23:09:32 +0000
+
+openssh (1:5.4p1-2) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  Smartcard support is now available using PKCS#11 tokens.  If you were
+  previously using an unofficial build of Debian's OpenSSH package with
+  OpenSC-based smartcard support added, then note that commands like
+  'ssh-add -s 0' will no longer work; you need to use 'ssh-add -s
+  /usr/lib/opensc-pkcs11.so' instead.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 10 Apr 2010 01:08:59 +0100
+
+openssh (1:3.8.1p1-9) experimental; urgency=low
+
+  The ssh package has been split into openssh-client and openssh-server. If
+  you had previously requested that the sshd server should not be run, then
+  that request will still be honoured. However, the recommended approach is
+  now to remove the openssh-server package if you do not want to run sshd.
+  You can remove the old /etc/ssh/sshd_not_to_be_run marker file after doing
+  that.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Mon,  2 Aug 2004 20:48:54 +0100
+
+openssh (1:3.5p1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  This version of OpenSSH disables the environment option for public keys by
+  default, in order to avoid certain attacks (for example, LD_PRELOAD). If
+  you are using this option in an authorized_keys file, beware that the keys
+  in question will no longer work until the option is removed.
+
+  To re-enable this option, set "PermitUserEnvironment yes" in
+  /etc/ssh/sshd_config after the upgrade is complete, taking note of the
+  warning in the sshd_config(5) manual page.
+
+ -- Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>  Sat, 26 Oct 2002 19:41:51 +0100
+
+openssh (1:3.0.1p1-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  As of version 3, OpenSSH no longer uses separate files for ssh1 and ssh2
+  keys. This means the authorized_keys2 and known_hosts2 files are no longer
+  needed. They will still be read in order to maintain backward
+  compatibility.
+
+ -- Matthew Vernon <matthew@debian.org>  Thu, 28 Nov 2001 17:43:01 +0000