Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1.upstream/1%9.2p1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2388 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87454b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2388 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.584 2023/01/17 18:52:44 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Ssh client program.  This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+static char **saved_av;
+#endif
+
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on.  May be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
+int tty_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
+ * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
+ */
+int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
+
+/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */
+int ostdin_null_flag, osession_type, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
+
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files.  See readconf.h.
+ */
+Options options;
+
+/* optional user configfile */
+char *config = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+char *host;
+
+/*
+ * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is
+ * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead.
+ */
+char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
+
+/* socket address the host resolves to */
+struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
+
+/* Private host keys. */
+Sensitive sensitive_data;
+
+/* command to be executed */
+struct sshbuf *command;
+
+/* # of replies received for global requests */
+static int forward_confirms_pending = -1;
+
+/* mux.c */
+extern int muxserver_sock;
+extern u_int muxclient_command;
+
+/* Prints a help message to the user.  This function never returns. */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n"
+"           [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n"
+"           [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n"
+"           [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n"
+"           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
+"           [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
+"           [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command [argument ...]]\n"
+	);
+	exit(255);
+}
+
+static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
+
+/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
+static void
+tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	char *cp;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid());
+		free(paths[i]);
+		paths[i] = cp;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * in the client that support percent expansion.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_expand(const char *str,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	return percent_expand(str,
+	    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+	    (char *)NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * AND perform environment variable substitution.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *ret;
+
+	ret = percent_dollar_expand(str,
+	    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+	    (char *)NULL);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		fatal("invalid environment variable expansion");
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
+ * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
+{
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	int gaierr;
+	LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
+	if (port <= 0)
+		port = default_ssh_port();
+	if (cname != NULL)
+		*cname = '\0';
+	debug3_f("lookup %s:%d", name, port);
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (cname != NULL)
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+		if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
+			loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
+		    __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
+		if (!valid_domain(res->ai_canonname, 0, &errstr)) {
+			error("ignoring bad CNAME \"%s\" for host \"%s\": %s",
+			    res->ai_canonname, name, errstr);
+		} else if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
+			error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+			    name,  res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
+			if (clen > 0)
+				*cname = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */
+static int
+is_addr_fast(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL ||
+	    strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name));
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */
+static int
+is_addr(const char *name)
+{
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	if (is_addr_fast(name))
+		return 1;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port());
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
+ * Returns a canonical address string.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
+{
+	char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	int gaierr;
+
+	if (port <= 0)
+		port = default_ssh_port();
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
+		    name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (res == NULL) {
+		debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", name);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
+		debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", name);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
+	    addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
+		debug_f("Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
+		    name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
+		error_f("host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+		    name,  addr, (u_long)clen);
+		if (clen > 0)
+			*caddr = '\0';
+ fail:
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
+ * and perform the replacement if it is.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static int
+check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct allowed_cname *rule;
+
+	if (*cname == '\0' || !config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) ||
+	    strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	if (!direct &&
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return 0;
+	debug3_f("check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+		rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
+		if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
+			continue;
+		verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
+		    "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+		free(*namep);
+		*namep = xstrdup(cname);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
+ * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
+ * if no name was found after canonicalization.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
+{
+	int i, direct, ndots;
+	char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo *addrs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of
+	 * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested
+	 */
+	if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
+	    newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
+		debug2_f("hostname %.100s is address", *hostp);
+		if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
+			debug2_f("canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+			    *hostp, newname);
+			free(*hostp);
+			*hostp = xstrdup(newname);
+		}
+		return addrs;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might
+	 * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further
+	 * attempts at canonicalisation.
+	 */
+	if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) {
+		debug_f("hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", *hostp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+	    options.jump_host == NULL;
+	if (!direct &&
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
+	if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
+		debug3_f("name is fully qualified");
+		fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+		    newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
+			goto found;
+		free(fullhost);
+		goto notfound;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
+	ndots = 0;
+	for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		if (*cp == '.')
+			ndots++;
+	}
+	if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
+		debug3_f("not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
+		    *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.canonical_domains[i], "none") == 0)
+			break;
+		xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
+		    options.canonical_domains[i]);
+		debug3_f("attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+		    newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
+			free(fullhost);
+			continue;
+		}
+ found:
+		/* Remove trailing '.' */
+		fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
+		/* Follow CNAME if requested */
+		if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
+			debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+			    *hostp, fullhost);
+		}
+		free(*hostp);
+		*hostp = fullhost;
+		return addrs;
+	}
+ notfound:
+	if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
+		fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
+	debug2_f("host %s not found in any suffix", *hostp);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
+ */
+static void
+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
+{
+	switch (r) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
+		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
+		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+			free(*k);
+			*k = NULL;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+		fatal_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+		/* Ignore missing files */
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			break;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
+ * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+ */
+static void
+process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass,
+    int *want_final_pass)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+
+	if (config != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
+		    !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options,
+		    SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0),
+		    want_final_pass))
+			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
+			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
+			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
+
+		/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
+		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
+		    host, host_name, &options,
+		    final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
+static void
+set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *addr;
+
+	for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
+		switch (addr->ai_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
+			    sin_port = htons(port);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
+			    sin6_port = htons(port);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	if (cinfo == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
+	free(cinfo->shorthost);
+	free(cinfo->uidstr);
+	free(cinfo->keyalias);
+	free(cinfo->thishost);
+	free(cinfo->host_arg);
+	free(cinfo->portstr);
+	free(cinfo->remhost);
+	free(cinfo->remuser);
+	free(cinfo->homedir);
+	free(cinfo->locuser);
+	free(cinfo);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
+	int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
+	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile;
+	char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct stat st;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	extern int optind, optreset;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	struct Forward fwd;
+	struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
+	size_t n, len;
+	u_int j;
+	struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo = NULL;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/*
+	 * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
+	 * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
+	 */
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+	/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
+	saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+	saved_av[i] = NULL;
+	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+	av = saved_av;
+#endif
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	/* Get user data. */
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (!pw) {
+		logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+		exit(255);
+	}
+	/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+	 * with the default umask.  This will make them world-readable but
+	 * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+	 * don't set the modes explicitly.
+	 */
+	umask(022 | umask(077));
+
+	msetlocale();
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
+	 * set.
+	 */
+	initialize_options(&options);
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures
+	 */
+	if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't allocate session state");
+	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+
+	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
+	host = NULL;
+	use_syslog = 0;
+	logfile = NULL;
+	argv0 = av[0];
+
+ again:
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+	    "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { /* HUZdhjruz */
+		switch (opt) {
+		case '1':
+			fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
+			break;
+		case '2':
+			/* Ignored */
+			break;
+		case '4':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			options.stdin_null = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
+			options.stdin_null = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			options.forward_x11 = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+			use_syslog = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'E':
+			logfile = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'G':
+			config_test = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'Y':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+				fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
+				    "command with -W");
+			else if (muxclient_command != 0)
+				fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY;
+			else
+				fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
+			break;
+		case 'P':	/* deprecated */
+			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			cp = NULL;
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0)
+				cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
+				cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0)
+				cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
+				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0)
+				cp = xstrdup("2");
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) {
+				cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0));
+				len = strlen(cp);
+				for (n = 0; n < len; n++)
+					if (cp[n] == ',')
+						cp[n] = '\n';
+			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
+				cp = xstrdup(
+				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
+				    "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
+				    "protocol-version\nsig");
+			}
+			if (cp == NULL)
+				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
+			printf("%s\n", cp);
+			free(cp);
+			exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'A':
+			options.forward_agent = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			options.gss_authentication = 1;
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
+			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
+				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+				    "not accessible: %s.\n", p,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else
+				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
+			free(p);
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+			free(options.pkcs11_provider);
+			options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
+#else
+			fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 'J':
+			if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+				fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted "
+				    "(use commas to separate multiple "
+				    "jump hops)");
+			}
+			if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
+			if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
+				fatal("Invalid -J argument");
+			options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
+				options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
+			else
+				options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			} else {
+				if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+					debug_flag++;
+					options.log_level++;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'V':
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+			    SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+			exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			if (options.tun_open == -1)
+				options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
+			options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
+			if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'W':
+			if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+				fatal("stdio forward already specified");
+			if (muxclient_command != 0)
+				fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
+				options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
+				free(fwd.connect_host);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
+			else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+				options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ?
+			    optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			free(options.ciphers);
+			options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
+				free(options.macs);
+				options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+			else
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			if (options.port == -1) {
+				options.port = a2port(optarg);
+				if (options.port <= 0) {
+					fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n",
+					    optarg);
+					exit(255);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			if (options.user == NULL)
+				options.user = optarg;
+			break;
+
+		case 'L':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'R':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) ||
+			    parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) {
+				add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad remote forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'D':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'C':
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+			options.compression = 1;
+#else
+			error("Compression not supported, disabling.");
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+			    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -N with -s/SessionType");
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+			if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
+			    host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
+				exit(255);
+			free(line);
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+			    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -s with -N/SessionType");
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			free(options.control_path);
+			options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			options.bind_address = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			options.bind_interface = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			config = optarg;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0)
+		opt_terminated = 1;
+
+	ac -= optind;
+	av += optind;
+
+	if (ac > 0 && !host) {
+		int tport;
+		char *tuser;
+		switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) {
+		case -1:
+			usage();
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (options.user == NULL) {
+				options.user = tuser;
+				tuser = NULL;
+			}
+			free(tuser);
+			if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
+				options.port = tport;
+			break;
+		default:
+			p = xstrdup(*av);
+			cp = strrchr(p, '@');
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				if (cp == p)
+					usage();
+				if (options.user == NULL) {
+					options.user = p;
+					p = NULL;
+				}
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+				host = xstrdup(cp);
+				free(p);
+			} else
+				host = p;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) {
+			optind = optreset = 1;
+			goto again;
+		}
+		ac--, av++;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that we got a host name. */
+	if (!host)
+		usage();
+
+	options.host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+
+	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+	if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+	 * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+	 * packet size.  Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+	 */
+	if (!ac) {
+		/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+		if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
+			usage();
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* A command has been specified.  Store it into the buffer. */
+		for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s",
+			    i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		}
+	}
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
+	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
+	 */
+	if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
+		fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
+	if (logfile != NULL)
+		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+	log_init(argv0,
+	    options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility,
+	    !use_syslog);
+
+	if (debug_flag)
+		logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+	/* Parse the configuration files */
+	process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass);
+	if (want_final_pass)
+		debug("configuration requests final Match pass");
+
+	/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
+	fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
+
+	/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
+	if (options.hostname != NULL) {
+		/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
+		cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
+		    "h", host, (char *)NULL);
+		free(host);
+		host = cp;
+		free(options.hostname);
+		options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+	}
+
+	/* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */
+	if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0)
+		lowercase(host);
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the
+	 * hostname is an address.
+	 */
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr)
+		addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
+	 * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
+	 * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
+	 * as a result of CNAME following.
+	 *
+	 * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
+	 * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
+	 *
+	 * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
+	 * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
+	 * CanonicalizeHostname=always
+	 */
+	direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+	    options.jump_host == NULL;
+	if (addrs == NULL && config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) && (direct ||
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
+		    direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
+			/* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
+			if (direct)
+				cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
+		} else
+			check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
+	 * files as new stanzas may match.
+	 */
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) {
+		debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, "
+		    "will re-parse configuration");
+		want_final_pass = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (want_final_pass) {
+		debug("re-parsing configuration");
+		free(options.hostname);
+		options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+		process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 1, NULL);
+		/*
+		 * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
+		 * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
+		 * reset it in address list
+		 */
+		if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
+			set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
+	}
+
+	/* Fill configuration defaults. */
+	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+
+	if (options.user == NULL)
+		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	/*
+	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
+	 */
+	if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+		char port_s[8];
+		const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0;
+		int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
+
+		if (port <= 0)
+			port = default_ssh_port();
+		if (jumpport <= 0)
+			jumpport = default_ssh_port();
+		if (jumpuser == NULL)
+			jumpuser = options.user;
+		if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport &&
+		    strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0)
+			fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
+
+		/*
+		 * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
+		 * "ssh" if it appears unavailable.
+		 */
+		if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0)
+			sshbin = "ssh";
+
+		/* Consistency check */
+		if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+			fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
+		/* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
+		options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+		snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
+		xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
+		    "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
+		    sshbin,
+		    /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
+		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
+		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
+		    /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
+		    options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
+		    options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
+		    /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
+		    options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
+		    options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
+		    /* Optional "-F" argument if -F specified */
+		    config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
+		    config == NULL ? "" : config,
+		    /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
+		    debug_flag ? " -" : "",
+		    debug_flag, "vvv",
+		    /* Mandatory hostname */
+		    options.jump_host);
+		debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
+		    options.proxy_command);
+	}
+
+	if (options.port == 0)
+		options.port = default_ssh_port();
+	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+
+	/* Tidy and check options */
+	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
+		lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
+	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
+	    options.proxy_use_fdpass)
+		fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+		if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) {
+			debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+			    "ControlPersist; disabling");
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		} else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 ||
+		    options.remote_command != NULL ||
+		    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) {
+			debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+			    "remote command execution; disabling");
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+			/* no point logging anything; user won't see it */
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL)
+		fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command.");
+
+	/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+	if (options.fork_after_authentication && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
+	    options.remote_command == NULL &&
+	    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
+		    "to execute.");
+
+	/* reinit */
+	log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog);
+	for (j = 0; j < options.num_log_verbose; j++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.log_verbose[j], "none") == 0)
+			break;
+		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[j]);
+	}
+
+	if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
+	    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
+		tty_flag = 1;
+
+	/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL)
+		tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+
+	/* Force no tty */
+	if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO ||
+	    (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY) ||
+	    options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+	if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || options.stdin_null) &&
+	    options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
+		if (tty_flag)
+			logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+			    "stdin is not a terminal.");
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */
+	cinfo = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cinfo));
+	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+		fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+	cinfo->thishost = xstrdup(thishost);
+	thishost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+	cinfo->shorthost = xstrdup(thishost);
+	xasprintf(&cinfo->portstr, "%d", options.port);
+	xasprintf(&cinfo->uidstr, "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+	cinfo->keyalias = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias ?
+	    options.host_key_alias : options.host_arg);
+	cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost, host,
+	    cinfo->portstr, options.user);
+	cinfo->host_arg = xstrdup(options.host_arg);
+	cinfo->remhost = xstrdup(host);
+	cinfo->remuser = xstrdup(options.user);
+	cinfo->homedir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	/*
+	 * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later,
+	 * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local
+	 * tunnel interface name allocated.
+	 */
+	if (options.remote_command != NULL) {
+		debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
+		cp = options.remote_command;
+		options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+		    cinfo);
+		debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
+		free(cp);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command,
+		    strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid());
+		free(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
+		    cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+	}
+
+	if (options.identity_agent != NULL) {
+		p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid());
+		cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+		free(p);
+		free(options.identity_agent);
+		options.identity_agent = cp;
+	}
+
+	if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+		p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path,
+		    getuid());
+		cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+		free(p);
+		free(options.forward_agent_sock_path);
+		options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+		if (stat(options.forward_agent_sock_path, &st) != 0) {
+			error("Cannot forward agent socket path \"%s\": %s",
+			    options.forward_agent_sock_path, strerror(errno));
+			if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 0 &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.system_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+		if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 1)
+			fatal("Invalid GlobalKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+			    "appears with other entries");
+		free(options.system_hostfiles[0]);
+		options.system_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+		options.num_system_hostfiles = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 0 &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.user_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+		if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 1)
+			fatal("Invalid UserKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+			    "appears with other entries");
+		free(options.user_hostfiles[0]);
+		options.user_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+		options.num_user_hostfiles = 0;
+	}
+	for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) {
+		if (options.user_hostfiles[j] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j], getuid());
+		p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0)
+			debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> "
+			    "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p);
+		free(options.user_hostfiles[j]);
+		free(cp);
+		options.user_hostfiles[j] = p;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path;
+			p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+		if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path;
+			p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path;
+			p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+		if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path;
+			p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (config_test) {
+		dump_client_config(&options, host);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+		if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) {
+			debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; "
+			    "disabling", options.sk_provider);
+			free(options.sk_provider);
+			options.sk_provider = NULL;
+		} else {
+			debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s",
+			    options.sk_provider, cp);
+			free(options.sk_provider);
+			options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		int sock;
+		if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) {
+			ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock);
+			ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh);
+			goto skip_connect;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
+	 * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
+	 */
+	if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+	}
+
+	if (options.connection_timeout >= INT_MAX/1000)
+		timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+	else
+		timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+
+	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+	if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr,
+	    options.port, options.connection_attempts,
+	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
+		exit(255);
+
+	if (addrs != NULL)
+		freeaddrinfo(addrs);
+
+	ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval,
+	    options.server_alive_count_max);
+
+	if (timeout_ms > 0)
+		debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth
+	 * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign
+	 * helper to sign challenges.
+	 */
+	sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+	sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+	if (options.hostbased_authentication) {
+		int loaded = 0;
+
+		sensitive_data.nkeys = 10;
+		sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
+		    sizeof(*sensitive_data.keys));
+
+		/* XXX check errors? */
+#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \
+	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
+	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
+	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \
+		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s key from \"%s\"", o, \
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
+		loaded++; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
+	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
+	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \
+		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s cert from \"%s\"", o, \
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
+		loaded++; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9);
+			if (loaded == 0)
+				debug("HostbasedAuthentication enabled but no "
+				   "local public host keys could be loaded.");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* load options.identity_files */
+	load_public_identity_files(cinfo);
+
+	/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
+	if (options.identity_agent &&
+	    strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
+		if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
+			unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		} else {
+			cp = options.identity_agent;
+			/* legacy (limited) format */
+			if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') {
+				if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+					fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent "
+					    "environment variable name %s", cp);
+				}
+				if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL)
+					unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+				else
+					setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1);
+			} else {
+				/* identity_agent specifies a path directly */
+				setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+		cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path;
+		if (cp[0] == '$') {
+			if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+				fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp);
+			}
+			if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL)
+				forward_agent_sock_path = xstrdup(p);
+			else
+				options.forward_agent = 0;
+			free(cp);
+		} else {
+			forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+	tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
+	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
+	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
+	ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+	    options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo);
+
+	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
+	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+				/* Destroys contents safely */
+				debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+				sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+				sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		free(sensitive_data.keys);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+		options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+		if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
+			sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
+			options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+		options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
+
+ skip_connect:
+	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
+	ssh_conn_info_free(cinfo);
+	ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+
+	/* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
+	ssh_kill_proxy_command();
+
+	return exit_status;
+}
+
+static void
+control_persist_detach(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	debug_f("backgrounding master process");
+
+	/*
+	 * master (current process) into the background, and make the
+	 * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
+	 */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		fatal_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	case 0:
+		/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */
+		debug2_f("background process is %ld", (long)pid);
+		options.stdin_null = ostdin_null_flag;
+		options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
+		tty_flag = otty_flag;
+		options.session_type = osession_type;
+		close(muxserver_sock);
+		muxserver_sock = -1;
+		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		muxclient(options.control_path);
+		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
+	}
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+	daemon(1, 1);
+	setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
+}
+
+/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
+static void
+fork_postauth(void)
+{
+	if (need_controlpersist_detach)
+		control_persist_detach();
+	debug("forking to background");
+	options.fork_after_authentication = 0;
+	if (daemon(1, 1) == -1)
+		fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+}
+
+static void
+forwarding_success(void)
+{
+	if (forward_confirms_pending == -1)
+		return;
+	if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) {
+		debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received");
+		if (options.fork_after_authentication)
+			fork_postauth();
+	} else {
+		debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining",
+		    forward_confirms_pending);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+static void
+ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
+	u_int port;
+	int r;
+
+	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
+	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+	    rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
+	    rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
+	    (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
+	    rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+	    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+		if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+			if (port > 65535) {
+				error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote "
+				    "forward to %s:%d", port,
+				    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+				/* Ensure failure processing runs below */
+				type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE;
+				channel_update_permission(ssh,
+				    rfwd->handle, -1);
+			} else {
+				rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
+				logit("Allocated port %u for remote "
+				    "forward to %s:%d",
+				    rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_path ?
+				    rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host,
+				    rfwd->connect_port);
+				channel_update_permission(ssh,
+				    rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
+			}
+		} else {
+			channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
+			if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+				fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+			else
+				fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+		} else {
+			if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+				logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+			else
+				logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+		}
+	}
+	forwarding_success();
+}
+
+static void
+client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+	debug("stdio forwarding: done");
+	cleanup_exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	if (!success)
+		fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	if (!success) {
+		error("Tunnel forwarding failed");
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id);
+	forwarding_success();
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int in, out;
+
+	if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	debug3_f("%s:%d", options.stdio_forward_host,
+	    options.stdio_forward_port);
+
+	if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
+	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("dup() in/out failed");
+	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
+	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed");
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
+	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forward_permissions(struct ssh *ssh, const char *what, char **opens,
+    u_int num_opens)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int port;
+	char *addr, *arg, *oarg;
+	int where = FORWARD_LOCAL;
+
+	channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+	if (num_opens == 0)
+		return; /* permit any */
+
+	/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
+		return;
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
+		channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
+		oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
+		addr = hpdelim(&arg);
+		if (addr == NULL)
+			fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
+		addr = cleanhostname(addr);
+		if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+			fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
+		/* Send it to channels layer */
+		channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
+		    where, addr, port);
+		free(oarg);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	ssh_init_forward_permissions(ssh, "permitremoteopen",
+	    options.permitted_remote_opens,
+	    options.num_permitted_remote_opens);
+
+	if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */
+	/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
+		    "address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh,
+		    &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
+	}
+	if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
+	if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+		error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+		    "local address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+		    channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
+		    &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
+			client_register_global_confirm(
+			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+			    &options.remote_forwards[i]);
+			forward_confirms_pending++;
+		} else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+		else
+			logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding.");
+	}
+
+	/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
+	if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+		if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh,
+		    options.tun_open, options.tun_local,
+		    options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL)
+			forward_confirms_pending++;
+		else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+		else
+			error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+	}
+	if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) {
+		debug_f("expecting replies for %d forwards",
+		    forward_confirms_pending);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
+		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+				debug_r(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	const char *display, *term;
+	int r, interactive = tty_flag;
+	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+	if (!success)
+		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sends one */
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display,
+	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+		    "spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto,
+		    data, 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+		/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+		interactive = 1;
+	}
+
+	check_agent_present();
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	}
+
+	/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive,
+	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+	if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv,
+	    options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0')
+		term = getenv("TERM");
+	client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag,
+	    options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM, term,
+	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
+}
+
+/* open new channel for a session */
+static int
+ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
+
+	if (options.stdin_null) {
+		in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+	} else {
+		in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+	}
+	out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
+		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+	if (tty_flag) {
+		window >>= 1;
+		packetmax >>= 1;
+	}
+	c = channel_new(ssh,
+	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
+
+	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
+	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
+		    ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
+
+	return c->self;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	int r, id = -1;
+	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
+
+	/* XXX should be pre-session */
+	if (!options.control_persist)
+		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+
+	ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname);
+
+	if (options.local_command != NULL) {
+		debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		cp = options.local_command;
+		options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
+		    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+		    "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		free(cp);
+	}
+
+	/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
+	if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh))
+		muxserver_listen(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
+	 * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
+	 * client attach as a control client.
+	 * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
+	 * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until
+	 * after the connection is fully established (in particular,
+	 * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
+	 */
+	if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
+		ostdin_null_flag = options.stdin_null;
+		osession_type = options.session_type;
+		orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
+		otty_flag = tty_flag;
+		options.stdin_null = 1;
+		options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+		tty_flag = 0;
+		if (!options.fork_after_authentication &&
+		    (osession_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE ||
+		    options.stdio_forward_host != NULL))
+			need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
+		options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
+	 * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
+	 */
+	if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
+		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+
+	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		id = ssh_session2_open(ssh);
+	else {
+		ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh,
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
+		    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+	}
+
+	/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
+	    (ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
+		debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	}
+
+	/* Execute a local command */
+	if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+	    options.permit_local_command)
+		ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+	/*
+	 * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here
+	 * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd.
+	 * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed,
+	 * as it may want to write to stdout.
+	 */
+	if (!need_controlpersist_detach && stdfd_devnull(0, 1, 0) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
+	 * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
+	 */
+	if (options.fork_after_authentication) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
+		    options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+			debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
+			    "confirmation received");
+		} else
+			fork_postauth();
+	}
+
+	return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+}
+
+/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
+static void
+load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *filename, *cp;
+	struct sshkey *public;
+	int i;
+	u_int n_ids, n_certs;
+	char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+	char **comments = NULL;
+	int nkeys;
+#endif /* PKCS11 */
+
+	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
+	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+	memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
+	memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0,
+	    sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
+	memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
+	memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
+	memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0,
+	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
+	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
+	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
+	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+				free(comments[i]);
+				continue;
+			}
+			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
+			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
+			n_ids++;
+		}
+		free(keys);
+		free(comments);
+	}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
+		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
+			free(options.identity_files[i]);
+			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+			continue;
+		}
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
+		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+		identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
+		identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+		identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
+		    options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+		if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
+		 * to add the default certificate variant too.
+		 */
+		if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
+			continue;
+		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		if (public == NULL) {
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
+			debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+			    cp, sshkey_type(public));
+			sshkey_free(public);
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */
+		identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
+		identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+		identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
+		    options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+		n_ids++;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
+		fatal_f("too many certificates");
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
+		    getuid());
+		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "certificate");
+		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+		options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+		if (public == NULL) {
+			free(filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
+			debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+			    filename, sshkey_type(public));
+			sshkey_free(public);
+			free(filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
+		certificates[n_certs] = public;
+		certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] =
+		    options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
+		++n_certs;
+	}
+
+	options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
+	memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
+	memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
+	memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided,
+	    identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
+
+	options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
+	memcpy(options.certificate_files,
+	    certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
+	memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
+	memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided,
+	    certificate_file_userprovided,
+	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+}
+
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+	    (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
+		;
+	errno = save_errno;
+}