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@@ -0,0 +1,1018 @@ +SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1) + +NAME + ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client + +SYNOPSIS + ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address] + [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] + [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] + [-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] + [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address] + [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination + [command [argument ...]] + +DESCRIPTION + ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for + executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure + encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure + network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets + can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + + ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be + specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form + ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove their identity to the + remote machine using one of several methods (see below). + + If a command is specified, it will be executed on the remote host instead + of a login shell. A complete command line may be specified as command, + or it may have additional arguments. If supplied, the arguments will be + appended to the command, separated by spaces, before it is sent to the + server to be executed. + + The options are as follows: + + -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. + + -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. + + -A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent + such as ssh-agent(1). This can also be specified on a per-host + basis in a configuration file. + + Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through + the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material + from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys + that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into + the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see + -J). + + -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. + + -B bind_interface + Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to + connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems + with more than one address. + + -b bind_address + Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of + the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one + address. + + -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, + stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain + connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by + gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow + connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. + The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the + configuration files; see the Compression option in ssh_config(5). + + -c cipher_spec + Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. + cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order + of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more + information. + + -D [bind_address:]port + Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding. + This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local + side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a + connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over + the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to + determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently + the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act + as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. + Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the + configuration file. + + IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in + square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged + ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with + the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may + be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The + bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be + bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates + that the port should be available from all interfaces. + + -E log_file + Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error. + + -e escape_char + Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). + The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a + line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the + connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and + followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the + character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session + fully transparent. + + -F configfile + Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a + configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide + configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The + default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. If + set to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], no configuration files will be read. + + -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution. + This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or + passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This + implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a + remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm. + + If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], + then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port + forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in + the background. Refer to the description of + ForkAfterAuthentication in ssh_config(5) for details. + + -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and + Match blocks and exit. + + -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used + on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified + on the master process. + + -I pkcs11 + Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate + with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication. + + -i identity_file + Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public + key authentication is read. You can also specify a public key + file to use the corresponding private key that is loaded in + ssh-agent(1) when the private key file is not present locally. + The default is ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and + ~/.ssh/id_dsa. Identity files may also be specified on a per- + host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have + multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in + configuration files). If no certificates have been explicitly + specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to + load certificate information from the filename obtained by + appending -cert.pub to identity filenames. + + -J destination + Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to + the jump host described by destination and then establishing a + TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple + jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This + is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive. + Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line + generally apply to the destination host and not any specified + jump hosts. Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump + hosts. + + -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) + of GSSAPI credentials to the server. + + -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the + server. + + -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport + -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket + -L local_socket:host:hostport + -L local_socket:remote_socket + Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket + on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host + and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by + allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local + side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a + Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or + socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and + a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix + socket remote_socket, from the remote machine. + + Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. + Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses + can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. + + By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the + GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be + used to bind the connection to a specific address. The + bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be + bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates + that the port should be available from all interfaces. + + -l login_name + Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also + may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. + + -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing. + Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with + confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation + that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session). + Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for + details. + + -m mac_spec + A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) + algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs + keyword in ssh_config(5) for more information. + + -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just + forwarding ports. Refer to the description of SessionType in + ssh_config(5) for details. + + -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from + stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A + common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote + machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will + start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will + be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh + program will be put in the background. (This does not work if + ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f + option.) Refer to the description of StdinNull in ssh_config(5) + for details. + + -O ctl_cmd + Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When + the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted + and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^] + (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request + forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel + forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^] + (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing + requests). + + -o option + Can be used to give options in the format used in the + configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for + which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details + of the options listed below, and their possible values, see + ssh_config(5). + + AddKeysToAgent + AddressFamily + BatchMode + BindAddress + CanonicalDomains + CanonicalizeFallbackLocal + CanonicalizeHostname + CanonicalizeMaxDots + CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs + CASignatureAlgorithms + CertificateFile + CheckHostIP + Ciphers + ClearAllForwardings + Compression + ConnectionAttempts + ConnectTimeout + ControlMaster + ControlPath + ControlPersist + DynamicForward + EnableEscapeCommandline + EscapeChar + ExitOnForwardFailure + FingerprintHash + ForkAfterAuthentication + ForwardAgent + ForwardX11 + ForwardX11Timeout + ForwardX11Trusted + GatewayPorts + GlobalKnownHostsFile + GSSAPIAuthentication + GSSAPIDelegateCredentials + HashKnownHosts + Host + HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms + HostbasedAuthentication + HostKeyAlgorithms + HostKeyAlias + Hostname + IdentitiesOnly + IdentityAgent + IdentityFile + IPQoS + KbdInteractiveAuthentication + KbdInteractiveDevices + KexAlgorithms + KnownHostsCommand + LocalCommand + LocalForward + LogLevel + MACs + Match + NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost + NumberOfPasswordPrompts + PasswordAuthentication + PermitLocalCommand + PermitRemoteOpen + PKCS11Provider + Port + PreferredAuthentications + ProxyCommand + ProxyJump + ProxyUseFdpass + PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms + PubkeyAuthentication + RekeyLimit + RemoteCommand + RemoteForward + RequestTTY + RequiredRSASize + SendEnv + ServerAliveInterval + ServerAliveCountMax + SessionType + SetEnv + StdinNull + StreamLocalBindMask + StreamLocalBindUnlink + StrictHostKeyChecking + TCPKeepAlive + Tunnel + TunnelDevice + UpdateHostKeys + User + UserKnownHostsFile + VerifyHostKeyDNS + VisualHostKey + XAuthLocation + + -p port + Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on + a per-host basis in the configuration file. + + -Q query_option + Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following + features: cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth + (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated + encryption), help (supported query terms for use with the -Q + flag), mac (supported message integrity codes), kex (key exchange + algorithms), key (key types), key-cert (certificate key types), + key-plain (non-certificate key types), key-sig (all key types and + signature algorithms), protocol-version (supported SSH protocol + versions), and sig (supported signature algorithms). + Alternatively, any keyword from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5) + that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the + corresponding query_option. + + -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be + suppressed. + + -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport + -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket + -R remote_socket:host:hostport + -R remote_socket:local_socket + -R [bind_address:]port + Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket + on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local + side. + + This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port + or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is + made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded + over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local + machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port + hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was + specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward + connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS + client. + + Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. + Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on + the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing + the address in square brackets. + + By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to + the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by + specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address + M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all + interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed + if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see + sshd_config(5)). + + If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically + allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. + When used together with -O forward, the allocated port will be + printed to the standard output. + + -S ctl_path + Specifies the location of a control socket for connection + sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. + Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in + ssh_config(5) for details. + + -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote + system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure + transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem + is specified as the remote command. Refer to the description of + SessionType in ssh_config(5) for details. + + -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. + + -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute + arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be + very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t + options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. + + -V Display the version number and exit. + + -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its + progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, + authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options + increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. + + -W host:port + Requests that standard input and output on the client be + forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, + -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these + can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command + line options. + + -w local_tun[:remote_tun] + Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) + devices between the client (local_tun) and the server + (remote_tun). + + The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword + M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If + remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the + Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). + + If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default + tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel + forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before + -w. + + -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host + basis in a configuration file. + + X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the + ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the + user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display + through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able + to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. + + For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY + extension restrictions by default. Refer to the ssh -Y option + and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more + information. + + -x Disables X11 forwarding. + + -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not + subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. + + -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By + default this information is sent to stderr. + + ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user + configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format + and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). + +AUTHENTICATION + The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2. + + The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based + authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, + keyboard-interactive authentication, and password authentication. + Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though + PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order. + + Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs + in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote + machine, the user is non-root and the user names are the same on both + sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home + directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of + the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is + considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify + the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This + authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS + spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: + /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are + inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] + + Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on + public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and + decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive + the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user + creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The + server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. + ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using + one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of + ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. + + The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted + for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server + which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client + proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that + the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. + + The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key + authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a + different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to + DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag). + + The user creates their key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores + the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA), + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 + (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or + ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted + ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub + (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's + home directory. The user should then copy the public key to + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in their home directory on the remote machine. + The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, + and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, + the user can log in without giving the password. + + A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of + certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, + signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single + trusted certification authority can be used in place of many + public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for + more information. + + The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication + may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally) + the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. + + Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows: The server sends an + arbitrary "challenge" text and prompts for a response, possibly multiple + times. Examples of keyboard-interactive authentication include BSD + Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems). + + Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a + password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, + since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by + someone listening on the network. + + ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing + identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are + stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, + the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known + hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a + host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables + password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle + attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The + StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines + whose host key is not known or has changed. + + When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server + either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no + command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a + normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the + remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. + + If an interactive session is requested, ssh by default will only request + a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. + The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour. + + If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the user may use the escape + characters noted below. + + If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and + can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting + the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent + even if a tty is used. + + The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine + exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. + +ESCAPE CHARACTERS + When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of + functions through the use of an escape character. + + A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a + character other than those described below. The escape character must + always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape + character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar + configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option. + + The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are: + + ~. Disconnect. + + ~^Z Background ssh. + + ~# List forwarded connections. + + ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / + X11 sessions to terminate. + + ~? Display a list of escape characters. + + ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer + supports it). + + ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port + forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also + allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with + -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for + remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings. + !command allows the user to execute a local command if the + PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic + help is available, using the -h option. + + ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer + supports it). + + ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written + to stderr. + + ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written + to stderr. + +TCP FORWARDING + Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be + specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One + possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail + server; another is going through firewalls. + + In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC + client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly + support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user + connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to + forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program + locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote + server. + + The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC + server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname + M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667: + + $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 + $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1 + + The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is + specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to + start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections + are made within the time specified, ssh will exit. + +X11 FORWARDING + If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the + -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY + environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is + automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 + programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the + encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made + from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. + Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in + configuration files. + + The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a + display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because + ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the + connections over the encrypted channel. + + ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. + For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store + it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections + carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection + is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server + machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). + + If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of + the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication + agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the + remote side. + +VERIFYING HOST KEYS + When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the + server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option + StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined + using ssh-keygen(1): + + $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + + If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be + accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server + are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the + fingerprint algorithm to match. + + Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at + fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, + using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small + ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the + session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known + server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed + when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns + are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern + remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, + not guaranteed proof. + + To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all + known hosts, the following command line can be used: + + $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts + + If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is + available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource + record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is + able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. + + In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, + M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to + the zonefile for host.example.com: + + $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. + + The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that + the zone is answering fingerprint queries: + + $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com + + Finally the client connects: + + $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com + [...] + Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. + Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? + + See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information. + +SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS + ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using + the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined + securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls + whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 + traffic). + + The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with + remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from + 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway + to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. + + On the client: + + # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true + # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 + # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 + + On the server: + + # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 + # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 + + Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys + file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following + entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on + tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to + M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]: + + tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane + tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john + + Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be + more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More + permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and + isakmpd(8). + +ENVIRONMENT + ssh will normally set the following environment variables: + + DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the + X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to + point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where + M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs, + and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special + value to forward X11 connections over the secure + channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY + explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection + insecure (and will require the user to manually + copy any required authorization cookies). + + HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. + + LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with + systems that use this variable. + + MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. + + PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when + compiling ssh. + + SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the + passphrase from the current terminal if it was run + from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal + associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are + set, it will execute the program specified by + SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the + passphrase. This is particularly useful when + calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. + (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to + redirect the input from /dev/null to make this + work.) + + SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE Allows further control over the use of an askpass + program. If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then + ssh will never attempt to use one. If it is set to + M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then ssh will prefer to use the askpass + program instead of the TTY when requesting + passwords. Finally, if the variable is set to + M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for + all passphrase input regardless of whether DISPLAY + is set. + + SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to + communicate with the agent. + + SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the + connection. The variable contains four space- + separated values: client IP address, client port + number, server IP address, and server port number. + + SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if + a forced command is executed. It can be used to + extract the original arguments. + + SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the + device) associated with the current shell or + command. If the current session has no tty, this + variable is not set. + + SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface + names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested + by the client. + + SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may + contain a pathname to a file that lists the + authentication methods successfully used when the + session was established, including any public keys + that were used. + + TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time + zone if it was set when the daemon was started + (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new + connections). + + USER Set to the name of the user logging in. + + Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format + M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are + allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the + PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). + +FILES + ~/.rhosts + This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On + some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the + user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) + reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the + user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The + recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the + user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.shosts + This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows + host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + ~/.ssh/ + This directory is the default location for all user-specific + configuration and authentication information. There is no + general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory + secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute + for the user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.ssh/authorized_keys + Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used + for logging in as this user. The format of this file is + described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly + sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the + user, and not accessible by others. + + ~/.ssh/config + This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and + configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of + the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: + read/write for the user, and not writable by others. + + ~/.ssh/environment + Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see + ENVIRONMENT, above. + + ~/.ssh/id_dsa + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk + ~/.ssh/id_rsa + Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain + sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not + accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply + ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is + possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which + will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using + AES-128. + + ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub + ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub + ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub + Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not + sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. + + ~/.ssh/known_hosts + Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged + into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host + keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this + file. + + ~/.ssh/rc + Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, + just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the + sshd(8) manual page for more information. + + /etc/hosts.equiv + This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It + should only be writable by root. + + /etc/shosts.equiv + This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but + allows host-based authentication without permitting login with + rlogin/rsh. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_config + Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration + options are described in ssh_config(5). + + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key + /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key + These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are + used for host-based authentication. + + /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts + Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared + by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of + all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. + See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. + + /etc/ssh/sshrc + Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, + just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the + sshd(8) manual page for more information. + +EXIT STATUS + ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an + error occurred. + +SEE ALSO + scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), + tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) + +STANDARDS + S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned + Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, + RFC 4251, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, + RFC 4252, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer + Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006. + + T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC + 4254, January 2006. + + J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell + (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006. + + F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the + Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006. + + J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break + Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006. + + M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport + Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006. + + B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport + Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006. + + M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for + the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006. + + J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File + Format, RFC 4716, November 2006. + + D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the + Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009. + + A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve + Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic + Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99). + +AUTHORS + OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by + Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo + de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and + created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol + versions 1.5 and 2.0. + +OpenBSD 7.2 November 28, 2022 OpenBSD 7.2 |