From 25505898530a333011f4fd5cbc841ad6b26c089c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 16:40:04 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 460 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 460 insertions(+) create mode 100644 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (limited to 'sandbox-seccomp-filter.c') diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ab49eb --- /dev/null +++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c @@ -0,0 +1,460 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* + * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose + * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, + * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. + * + * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. + * E.g. + * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= + */ +/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ + +#if 0 +/* + * For older toolchains, it may be necessary to use the kernel + * headers directly. + */ +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +# include +# define __have_siginfo_t 1 +# define __have_sigval_t 1 +# define __have_sigevent_t 1 +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ +#endif + +#include "includes.h" + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef __s390__ +#include +#endif + +#include +#include +#include +#include /* for offsetof */ +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "log.h" +#include "ssh-sandbox.h" +#include "xmalloc.h" + +/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ +#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL + +/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL +# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + +#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN +# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0 +# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) +#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN +# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t) +# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0 +#else +#error "Unknown endianness" +#endif + +/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ +#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) +#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) +#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \ + /* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ + ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \ + /* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \ + (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) +/* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */ +#define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \ + /* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \ + /* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \ + ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) + +/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ +static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { + /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), + /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + + /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ +#ifdef __NR_lstat + SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_lstat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat + SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstatat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_open + SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_newfstatat + SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat + SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shmget + SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shmat + SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shmdt + SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_ipc + SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_statx + SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES), +#endif + + /* Syscalls to permit */ +#ifdef __NR_brk + SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_close + SC_ALLOW(__NR_close), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_exit + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_futex + SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_futex_time64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_geteuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_geteuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpgid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getrandom + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_gettid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getuid + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getuid32 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_madvise + SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mmap + SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 + SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mprotect + SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mremap + SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_munmap + SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_nanosleep + SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR__newselect + SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_ppoll + SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_ppoll_time64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll_time64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_poll + SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_pselect6 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64 + SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_read + SC_ALLOW(__NR_read), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask + SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_select + SC_ALLOW(__NR_select), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shutdown + SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask + SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_time + SC_ALLOW(__NR_time), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_write + SC_ALLOW(__NR_write), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_writev + SC_ALLOW(__NR_writev), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_socketcall + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), + SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES), +#endif +#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__) + /* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */ + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT), + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB), + /* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */ + SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB), +#endif +#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT) + /* + * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the + * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g. + * https://bugs.debian.org/849923 + */ + SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT), +#endif + + /* Default deny */ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), +}; + +static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { + .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), + .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox { + pid_t child_pid; +}; + +struct ssh_sandbox * +ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) +{ + struct ssh_sandbox *box; + + /* + * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need + * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. + */ + debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); + box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); + box->child_pid = 0; + + return box; +} + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG +extern struct monitor *pmonitor; +void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx); + +static void +ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) +{ + char msg[256]; + + snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), + "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", + __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); + mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, 0, msg, pmonitor); + _exit(1); +} + +static void +ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) +{ + struct sigaction act; + sigset_t mask; + + debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); + memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); + sigemptyset(&mask); + sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); + + act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; + act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; + if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) + fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); +} +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + +void +ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + struct rlimit rl_zero, rl_one = {.rlim_cur = 1, .rlim_max = 1}; + int nnp_failed = 0; + + /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ + rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + /* + * Cannot use zero for nfds, because poll(2) will fail with + * errno=EINVAL if npfds>RLIMIT_NOFILE. + */ + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_one) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) + fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + +#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG + ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ + + debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); + if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { + debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + nnp_failed = 1; + } + debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); + if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) + debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", + __func__, strerror(errno)); + else if (nnp_failed) + fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " + "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) +{ + free(box); + debug3("%s: finished", __func__); +} + +void +ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) +{ + box->child_pid = child_pid; +} + +#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ -- cgit v1.2.3