Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 306 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/mac80211/wep.c b/net/mac80211/wep.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a6e11d7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/mac80211/wep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Software WEP encryption implementation
+ * Copyright 2002, Jouni Malinen <jkmaline@cc.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright 2003, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/crc32.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include <net/mac80211.h>
+#include "ieee80211_i.h"
+#include "wep.h"
+
+
+void ieee80211_wep_init(struct ieee80211_local *local)
+{
+	/* start WEP IV from a random value */
+	get_random_bytes(&local->wep_iv, IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN);
+}
+
+static inline bool ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(u32 iv, int keylen)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir have reported weaknesses in the
+	 * key scheduling algorithm of RC4. At least IVs (KeyByte + 3,
+	 * 0xff, N) can be used to speedup attacks, so avoid using them.
+	 */
+	if ((iv & 0xff00) == 0xff00) {
+		u8 B = (iv >> 16) & 0xff;
+		if (B >= 3 && B < 3 + keylen)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+
+static void ieee80211_wep_get_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+				 int keylen, int keyidx, u8 *iv)
+{
+	local->wep_iv++;
+	if (ieee80211_wep_weak_iv(local->wep_iv, keylen))
+		local->wep_iv += 0x0100;
+
+	if (!iv)
+		return;
+
+	*iv++ = (local->wep_iv >> 16) & 0xff;
+	*iv++ = (local->wep_iv >> 8) & 0xff;
+	*iv++ = local->wep_iv & 0xff;
+	*iv++ = keyidx << 6;
+}
+
+
+static u8 *ieee80211_wep_add_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+				struct sk_buff *skb,
+				int keylen, int keyidx)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	u8 *newhdr;
+
+	hdr->frame_control |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN))
+		return NULL;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	newhdr = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN);
+	memmove(newhdr, newhdr + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
+
+	/* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
+	if (info->control.hw_key &&
+	    (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
+		return newhdr + hdrlen;
+
+	ieee80211_wep_get_iv(local, keylen, keyidx, newhdr + hdrlen);
+	return newhdr + hdrlen;
+}
+
+
+static void ieee80211_wep_remove_iv(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+				    struct sk_buff *skb,
+				    struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN);
+}
+
+
+/* Perform WEP encryption using given key. data buffer must have tailroom
+ * for 4-byte ICV. data_len must not include this ICV. Note: this function
+ * does _not_ add IV. data = RC4(data | CRC32(data)) */
+int ieee80211_wep_encrypt_data(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *rc4key,
+			       size_t klen, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+	__le32 icv;
+
+	icv = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, data, data_len));
+	put_unaligned(icv, (__le32 *)(data + data_len));
+
+	arc4_setkey(ctx, rc4key, klen);
+	arc4_crypt(ctx, data, data, data_len + IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN);
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Perform WEP encryption on given skb. 4 bytes of extra space (IV) in the
+ * beginning of the buffer 4 bytes of extra space (ICV) in the end of the
+ * buffer will be added. Both IV and ICV will be transmitted, so the
+ * payload length increases with 8 bytes.
+ *
+ * WEP frame payload: IV + TX key idx, RC4(data), ICV = RC4(CRC32(data))
+ */
+int ieee80211_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+			  struct sk_buff *skb,
+			  const u8 *key, int keylen, int keyidx)
+{
+	u8 *iv;
+	size_t len;
+	u8 rc4key[3 + WLAN_KEY_LEN_WEP104];
+
+	if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN))
+		return -1;
+
+	iv = ieee80211_wep_add_iv(local, skb, keylen, keyidx);
+	if (!iv)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = skb->len - (iv + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN - skb->data);
+
+	/* Prepend 24-bit IV to RC4 key */
+	memcpy(rc4key, iv, 3);
+
+	/* Copy rest of the WEP key (the secret part) */
+	memcpy(rc4key + 3, key, keylen);
+
+	/* Add room for ICV */
+	skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	return ieee80211_wep_encrypt_data(&local->wep_tx_ctx, rc4key, keylen + 3,
+					  iv + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN, len);
+}
+
+
+/* Perform WEP decryption using given key. data buffer includes encrypted
+ * payload, including 4-byte ICV, but _not_ IV. data_len must not include ICV.
+ * Return 0 on success and -1 on ICV mismatch. */
+int ieee80211_wep_decrypt_data(struct arc4_ctx *ctx, u8 *rc4key,
+			       size_t klen, u8 *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+	__le32 crc;
+
+	arc4_setkey(ctx, rc4key, klen);
+	arc4_crypt(ctx, data, data, data_len + IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN);
+	memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+	crc = cpu_to_le32(~crc32_le(~0, data, data_len));
+	if (memcmp(&crc, data + data_len, IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN) != 0)
+		/* ICV mismatch */
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Perform WEP decryption on given skb. Buffer includes whole WEP part of
+ * the frame: IV (4 bytes), encrypted payload (including SNAP header),
+ * ICV (4 bytes). skb->len includes both IV and ICV.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if frame was decrypted successfully and ICV was correct and -1 on
+ * failure. If frame is OK, IV and ICV will be removed, i.e., decrypted payload
+ * is moved to the beginning of the skb and skb length will be reduced.
+ */
+static int ieee80211_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_local *local,
+				 struct sk_buff *skb,
+				 struct ieee80211_key *key)
+{
+	u32 klen;
+	u8 rc4key[3 + WLAN_KEY_LEN_WEP104];
+	u8 keyidx;
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	unsigned int hdrlen;
+	size_t len;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_has_protected(hdr->frame_control))
+		return -1;
+
+	hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
+	if (skb->len < hdrlen + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN + IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN)
+		return -1;
+
+	len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN - IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN;
+
+	keyidx = skb->data[hdrlen + 3] >> 6;
+
+	if (!key || keyidx != key->conf.keyidx)
+		return -1;
+
+	klen = 3 + key->conf.keylen;
+
+	/* Prepend 24-bit IV to RC4 key */
+	memcpy(rc4key, skb->data + hdrlen, 3);
+
+	/* Copy rest of the WEP key (the secret part) */
+	memcpy(rc4key + 3, key->conf.key, key->conf.keylen);
+
+	if (ieee80211_wep_decrypt_data(&local->wep_rx_ctx, rc4key, klen,
+				       skb->data + hdrlen +
+				       IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN, len))
+		ret = -1;
+
+	/* Trim ICV */
+	skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN);
+
+	/* Remove IV */
+	memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
+	skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+ieee80211_rx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
+	struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
+	__le16 fc = hdr->frame_control;
+
+	if (!ieee80211_is_data(fc) && !ieee80211_is_auth(fc))
+		return RX_CONTINUE;
+
+	if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
+		if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		if (ieee80211_wep_decrypt(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	} else if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
+		if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, ieee80211_hdrlen(fc) +
+					    IEEE80211_WEP_IV_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+		ieee80211_wep_remove_iv(rx->local, rx->skb, rx->key);
+		/* remove ICV */
+		if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_ICV_STRIPPED) &&
+		    pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - IEEE80211_WEP_ICV_LEN))
+			return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
+	}
+
+	return RX_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+static int wep_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
+	struct ieee80211_key_conf *hw_key = info->control.hw_key;
+
+	if (!hw_key) {
+		if (ieee80211_wep_encrypt(tx->local, skb, tx->key->conf.key,
+					  tx->key->conf.keylen,
+					  tx->key->conf.keyidx))
+			return -1;
+	} else if ((hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) ||
+		   (hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
+		if (!ieee80211_wep_add_iv(tx->local, skb,
+					  tx->key->conf.keylen,
+					  tx->key->conf.keyidx))
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+ieee80211_tx_result
+ieee80211_crypto_wep_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
+
+	ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
+
+	skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
+		if (wep_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0) {
+			I802_DEBUG_INC(tx->local->tx_handlers_drop_wep);
+			return TX_DROP;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return TX_CONTINUE;
+}