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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
commit2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch)
tree848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /security/keys/big_key.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz
linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/big_key.c')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c290
1 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c3367622c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* Large capacity key type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2020 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "big_key: "fmt
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <keys/user-type.h>
+#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
+#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
+
+/*
+ * Layout of key payload words.
+ */
+struct big_key_payload {
+ u8 *data;
+ struct path path;
+ size_t length;
+};
+#define to_big_key_payload(payload) \
+ (struct big_key_payload *)((payload).data)
+
+/*
+ * If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
+ * hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
+ * least as large as the data.
+ */
+#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
+
+/*
+ * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
+ * arbitrary blob of data as the payload
+ */
+struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
+ .name = "big_key",
+ .preparse = big_key_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
+ .revoke = big_key_revoke,
+ .destroy = big_key_destroy,
+ .describe = big_key_describe,
+ .read = big_key_read,
+ .update = big_key_update,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Preparse a big key
+ */
+int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
+ struct file *file;
+ u8 *buf, *enckey;
+ ssize_t written;
+ size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
+ size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+ int ret;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*payload) != sizeof(prep->payload.data));
+
+ if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Set an arbitrary quota */
+ prep->quotalen = 16;
+
+ payload->length = datalen;
+
+ if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ /* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
+ * to be swapped out if needed.
+ *
+ * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
+ * Since the key is random for each file, we can set the nonce
+ * to zero, provided we never define a ->update() call.
+ */
+ loff_t pos = 0;
+
+ buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* generate random key */
+ enckey = kmalloc(CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!enckey) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ goto err_enckey;
+
+ /* encrypt data */
+ chacha20poly1305_encrypt(buf, prep->data, datalen, NULL, 0,
+ 0, enckey);
+
+ /* save aligned data to file */
+ file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto err_enckey;
+ }
+
+ written = kernel_write(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+ if (written != enclen) {
+ ret = written;
+ if (written >= 0)
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_fput;
+ }
+
+ /* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
+ * later
+ */
+ payload->data = enckey;
+ payload->path = file->f_path;
+ path_get(&payload->path);
+ fput(file);
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+ } else {
+ /* Just store the data in a buffer */
+ void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ payload->data = data;
+ memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+err_fput:
+ fput(file);
+err_enckey:
+ kfree_sensitive(enckey);
+error:
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear preparsement.
+ */
+void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(prep->payload);
+
+ if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+ path_put(&payload->path);
+ kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
+ * - called with the key sem write-locked
+ */
+void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+ /* clear the quota */
+ key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
+ if (key_is_positive(key) && payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+ vfs_truncate(&payload->path, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+ if (payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ path_put(&payload->path);
+ payload->path.mnt = NULL;
+ payload->path.dentry = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree_sensitive(payload->data);
+ payload->data = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update a big key
+ */
+int big_key_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->datalen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
+ big_key_destroy(key);
+
+ return generic_key_instantiate(key, prep);
+}
+
+/*
+ * describe the big_key key
+ */
+void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+
+ seq_puts(m, key->description);
+
+ if (key_is_positive(key))
+ seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
+ payload->length,
+ payload->length > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
+}
+
+/*
+ * read the key data
+ * - the key's semaphore is read-locked
+ */
+long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, size_t buflen)
+{
+ struct big_key_payload *payload = to_big_key_payload(key->payload);
+ size_t datalen = payload->length;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
+ return datalen;
+
+ if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ struct file *file;
+ u8 *buf, *enckey = payload->data;
+ size_t enclen = datalen + CHACHA20POLY1305_AUTHTAG_SIZE;
+ loff_t pos = 0;
+
+ buf = kvmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!buf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ file = dentry_open(&payload->path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(file);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /* read file to kernel and decrypt */
+ ret = kernel_read(file, buf, enclen, &pos);
+ if (ret != enclen) {
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_fput;
+ }
+
+ ret = chacha20poly1305_decrypt(buf, buf, enclen, NULL, 0, 0,
+ enckey) ? 0 : -EBADMSG;
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ goto err_fput;
+
+ ret = datalen;
+
+ /* copy out decrypted data */
+ memcpy(buffer, buf, datalen);
+
+err_fput:
+ fput(file);
+error:
+ kvfree_sensitive(buf, enclen);
+ } else {
+ ret = datalen;
+ memcpy(buffer, payload->data, datalen);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register key type
+ */
+static int __init big_key_init(void)
+{
+ return register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
+}
+
+late_initcall(big_key_init);