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-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile57
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S44
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h79
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c370
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c1993
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h46
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.S12
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.pem39
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c391
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c141
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds41
-rw-r--r--tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S102
13 files changed, 3317 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fbaf0bda9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+test_sgx
+test_encl.elf
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..04ee17d3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+top_srcdir = ../../../..
+
+include ../lib.mk
+
+.PHONY: all clean
+
+CAN_BUILD_X86_64 := $(shell ../x86/check_cc.sh "$(CC)" \
+ ../x86/trivial_64bit_program.c)
+
+ifndef OBJCOPY
+OBJCOPY := $(CROSS_COMPILE)objcopy
+endif
+
+INCLUDES := -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include
+HOST_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -g $(INCLUDES) -fPIC -z noexecstack
+ENCL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror -static -nostdlib -nostartfiles -fPIC \
+ -fno-stack-protector -mrdrnd $(INCLUDES)
+
+ifeq ($(CAN_BUILD_X86_64), 1)
+TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS := $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx
+
+all: $(TEST_CUSTOM_PROGS) $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf
+endif
+
+$(OUTPUT)/test_sgx: $(OUTPUT)/main.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/load.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/call.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/sign_key.o
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -o $@ $^ -lcrypto
+
+$(OUTPUT)/main.o: main.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/load.o: load.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o: sigstruct.c
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/call.o: call.S
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/sign_key.o: sign_key.S
+ $(CC) $(HOST_CFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+$(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf: test_encl.lds test_encl.c test_encl_bootstrap.S
+ $(CC) $(ENCL_CFLAGS) -T $^ -o $@ -Wl,--build-id=none
+
+EXTRA_CLEAN := \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_encl.elf \
+ $(OUTPUT)/load.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/call.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/main.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/sigstruct.o \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx \
+ $(OUTPUT)/test_sgx.o \
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b09a25890
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/call.S
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/**
+* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+*/
+
+ .text
+
+ .global sgx_enter_enclave
+sgx_enter_enclave:
+ .cfi_startproc
+ push %r15
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r15, 0
+ push %r14
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r14, 0
+ push %r13
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r13, 0
+ push %r12
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %r12, 0
+ push %rbx
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ .cfi_rel_offset %rbx, 0
+ push $0
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ push 0x38(%rsp)
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 8
+ call *vdso_sgx_enter_enclave(%rip)
+ add $0x10, %rsp
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -0x10
+ pop %rbx
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r12
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r13
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r14
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ pop %r15
+ .cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
+ ret
+ .cfi_endproc
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d8587c971
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DEFINES_H
+#define DEFINES_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define PAGE_SIZE 4096
+#define PAGE_MASK (~(PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+
+#define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
+#define __packed __attribute__((packed))
+
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
+
+enum encl_op_type {
+ ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER,
+ ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER,
+ ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS,
+ ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS,
+ ENCL_OP_NOP,
+ ENCL_OP_EACCEPT,
+ ENCL_OP_EMODPE,
+ ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE,
+ ENCL_OP_MAX,
+};
+
+struct encl_op_header {
+ uint64_t type;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_put_to_buf {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t value;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_get_from_buf {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t value;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_put_to_addr {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t value;
+ uint64_t addr;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_get_from_addr {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t value;
+ uint64_t addr;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_eaccept {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t epc_addr;
+ uint64_t flags;
+ uint64_t ret;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_emodpe {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t epc_addr;
+ uint64_t flags;
+};
+
+struct encl_op_init_tcs_page {
+ struct encl_op_header header;
+ uint64_t tcs_page;
+ uint64_t ssa;
+ uint64_t entry;
+};
+
+#endif /* DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c9f658e44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/load.c
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+void encl_delete(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct encl_segment *heap_seg;
+
+ if (encl->encl_base)
+ munmap((void *)encl->encl_base, encl->encl_size);
+
+ if (encl->bin)
+ munmap(encl->bin, encl->bin_size);
+
+ if (encl->fd)
+ close(encl->fd);
+
+ if (encl->segment_tbl) {
+ heap_seg = &encl->segment_tbl[encl->nr_segments - 1];
+ munmap(heap_seg->src, heap_seg->size);
+ free(encl->segment_tbl);
+ }
+
+ memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl));
+}
+
+static bool encl_map_bin(const char *path, struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct stat sb;
+ void *bin;
+ int ret;
+ int fd;
+
+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ perror("enclave executable open()");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = stat(path, &sb);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("enclave executable stat()");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ bin = mmap(NULL, sb.st_size, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE, fd, 0);
+ if (bin == MAP_FAILED) {
+ perror("enclave executable mmap()");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ encl->bin = bin;
+ encl->bin_size = sb.st_size;
+
+ close(fd);
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ close(fd);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool encl_ioc_create(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_secs *secs = &encl->secs;
+ struct sgx_enclave_create ioc;
+ int rc;
+
+ assert(encl->encl_base != 0);
+
+ memset(secs, 0, sizeof(*secs));
+ secs->ssa_frame_size = 1;
+ secs->attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT;
+ secs->xfrm = 3;
+ secs->base = encl->encl_base;
+ secs->size = encl->encl_size;
+
+ ioc.src = (unsigned long)secs;
+ rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE, &ioc);
+ if (rc) {
+ perror("SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE failed");
+ munmap((void *)secs->base, encl->encl_size);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool encl_ioc_add_pages(struct encl *encl, struct encl_segment *seg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages ioc;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = seg->flags;
+
+ ioc.src = (uint64_t)seg->src;
+ ioc.offset = seg->offset;
+ ioc.length = seg->size;
+ ioc.secinfo = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+ if (seg->measure)
+ ioc.flags = SGX_PAGE_MEASURE;
+ else
+ ioc.flags = 0;
+
+ rc = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES, &ioc);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ perror("SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES failed");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse the enclave code's symbol table to locate and return address of
+ * the provided symbol
+ */
+uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol)
+{
+ Elf64_Sym *symtab = NULL;
+ char *sym_names = NULL;
+ Elf64_Shdr *sections;
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ int num_sym = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ ehdr = encl->bin;
+ sections = encl->bin + ehdr->e_shoff;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
+ if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_SYMTAB) {
+ symtab = (Elf64_Sym *)((char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset);
+ num_sym = sections[i].sh_size / sections[i].sh_entsize;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_shnum; i++) {
+ if (sections[i].sh_type == SHT_STRTAB) {
+ sym_names = (char *)encl->bin + sections[i].sh_offset;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!symtab || !sym_names)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_sym; i++) {
+ Elf64_Sym *sym = &symtab[i];
+
+ if (!strcmp(symbol, sym_names + sym->st_name))
+ return (uint64_t)sym->st_value;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size)
+{
+ const char device_path[] = "/dev/sgx_enclave";
+ struct encl_segment *seg;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr_tbl;
+ off_t src_offset;
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr;
+ struct stat sb;
+ void *ptr;
+ int i, j;
+ int ret;
+ int fd = -1;
+
+ memset(encl, 0, sizeof(*encl));
+
+ fd = open(device_path, O_RDWR);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ perror("Unable to open /dev/sgx_enclave");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = stat(device_path, &sb);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("device file stat()");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ if (ptr == (void *)-1) {
+ perror("mmap for read");
+ goto err;
+ }
+ munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+#define ERR_MSG \
+"mmap() succeeded for PROT_READ, but failed for PROT_EXEC.\n" \
+" Check that /dev does not have noexec set:\n" \
+" \tmount | grep \"/dev .*noexec\"\n" \
+" If so, remount it executable: mount -o remount,exec /dev\n\n"
+
+ ptr = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED, fd, 0);
+ if (ptr == (void *)-1) {
+ fprintf(stderr, ERR_MSG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ munmap(ptr, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ encl->fd = fd;
+
+ if (!encl_map_bin(path, encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ ehdr = encl->bin;
+ phdr_tbl = encl->bin + ehdr->e_phoff;
+
+ encl->nr_segments = 1; /* one for the heap */
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
+
+ if (phdr->p_type == PT_LOAD)
+ encl->nr_segments++;
+ }
+
+ encl->segment_tbl = calloc(encl->nr_segments,
+ sizeof(struct encl_segment));
+ if (!encl->segment_tbl)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++) {
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdr = &phdr_tbl[i];
+ unsigned int flags = phdr->p_flags;
+
+ if (phdr->p_type != PT_LOAD)
+ continue;
+
+ seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j];
+
+ if (!!(flags & ~(PF_R | PF_W | PF_X))) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "%d has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n", i,
+ phdr->p_flags);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (j == 0 && flags != (PF_R | PF_W)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "TCS has invalid segment flags 0x%02x.\n",
+ phdr->p_flags);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (j == 0) {
+ src_offset = phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK;
+ encl->src = encl->bin + src_offset;
+
+ seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ seg->flags = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS << 8;
+ } else {
+ seg->prot = (phdr->p_flags & PF_R) ? PROT_READ : 0;
+ seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_W) ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
+ seg->prot |= (phdr->p_flags & PF_X) ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
+ seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot;
+ }
+
+ seg->offset = (phdr->p_offset & PAGE_MASK) - src_offset;
+ seg->size = (phdr->p_filesz + PAGE_SIZE - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
+ seg->src = encl->src + seg->offset;
+ seg->measure = true;
+
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ assert(j == encl->nr_segments - 1);
+
+ seg = &encl->segment_tbl[j];
+ seg->offset = encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].offset + encl->segment_tbl[j - 1].size;
+ seg->size = heap_size;
+ seg->src = mmap(NULL, heap_size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
+ MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0);
+ seg->prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ seg->flags = (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG << 8) | seg->prot;
+ seg->measure = false;
+
+ if (seg->src == MAP_FAILED)
+ goto err;
+
+ encl->src_size = encl->segment_tbl[j].offset + encl->segment_tbl[j].size;
+
+ for (encl->encl_size = 4096; encl->encl_size < encl->src_size; )
+ encl->encl_size <<= 1;
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ encl_delete(encl);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool encl_map_area(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ size_t encl_size = encl->encl_size;
+ void *area;
+
+ area = mmap(NULL, encl_size * 2, PROT_NONE,
+ MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+ if (area == MAP_FAILED) {
+ perror("reservation mmap()");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ encl->encl_base = ((uint64_t)area + encl_size - 1) & ~(encl_size - 1);
+
+ munmap(area, encl->encl_base - (uint64_t)area);
+ munmap((void *)(encl->encl_base + encl_size),
+ (uint64_t)area + encl_size - encl->encl_base);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool encl_build(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_init ioc;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!encl_map_area(encl))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!encl_ioc_create(encl))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Pages must be added before mapping VMAs because their permissions
+ * cap the VMA permissions.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (!encl_ioc_add_pages(encl, seg))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ioc.sigstruct = (uint64_t)&encl->sigstruct;
+ ret = ioctl(encl->fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT, &ioc);
+ if (ret) {
+ perror("SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT failed");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9820b3809
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1993 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <cpuid.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "../kselftest_harness.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+static const uint64_t MAGIC = 0x1122334455667788ULL;
+static const uint64_t MAGIC2 = 0x8877665544332211ULL;
+vdso_sgx_enter_enclave_t vdso_sgx_enter_enclave;
+
+/*
+ * Security Information (SECINFO) data structure needed by a few SGX
+ * instructions (eg. ENCLU[EACCEPT] and ENCLU[EMODPE]) holds meta-data
+ * about an enclave page. &enum sgx_secinfo_page_state specifies the
+ * secinfo flags used for page state.
+ */
+enum sgx_secinfo_page_state {
+ SGX_SECINFO_PENDING = (1 << 3),
+ SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED = (1 << 4),
+ SGX_SECINFO_PR = (1 << 5),
+};
+
+struct vdso_symtab {
+ Elf64_Sym *elf_symtab;
+ const char *elf_symstrtab;
+ Elf64_Word *elf_hashtab;
+};
+
+static Elf64_Dyn *vdso_get_dyntab(void *addr)
+{
+ Elf64_Ehdr *ehdr = addr;
+ Elf64_Phdr *phdrtab = addr + ehdr->e_phoff;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ehdr->e_phnum; i++)
+ if (phdrtab[i].p_type == PT_DYNAMIC)
+ return addr + phdrtab[i].p_offset;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *vdso_get_dyn(void *addr, Elf64_Dyn *dyntab, Elf64_Sxword tag)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; dyntab[i].d_tag != DT_NULL; i++)
+ if (dyntab[i].d_tag == tag)
+ return addr + dyntab[i].d_un.d_ptr;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static bool vdso_get_symtab(void *addr, struct vdso_symtab *symtab)
+{
+ Elf64_Dyn *dyntab = vdso_get_dyntab(addr);
+
+ symtab->elf_symtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_SYMTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_symstrtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_STRTAB);
+ if (!symtab->elf_symstrtab)
+ return false;
+
+ symtab->elf_hashtab = vdso_get_dyn(addr, dyntab, DT_HASH);
+ if (!symtab->elf_hashtab)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static inline int sgx2_supported(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0x0, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+ return eax & 0x2;
+}
+
+static unsigned long elf_sym_hash(const char *name)
+{
+ unsigned long h = 0, high;
+
+ while (*name) {
+ h = (h << 4) + *name++;
+ high = h & 0xf0000000;
+
+ if (high)
+ h ^= high >> 24;
+
+ h &= ~high;
+ }
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+static Elf64_Sym *vdso_symtab_get(struct vdso_symtab *symtab, const char *name)
+{
+ Elf64_Word bucketnum = symtab->elf_hashtab[0];
+ Elf64_Word *buckettab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2];
+ Elf64_Word *chaintab = &symtab->elf_hashtab[2 + bucketnum];
+ Elf64_Sym *sym;
+ Elf64_Word i;
+
+ for (i = buckettab[elf_sym_hash(name) % bucketnum]; i != STN_UNDEF;
+ i = chaintab[i]) {
+ sym = &symtab->elf_symtab[i];
+ if (!strcmp(name, &symtab->elf_symstrtab[sym->st_name]))
+ return sym;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the TCS segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_tcs_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (i == 0 && seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+ return seg->offset;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the offset in the enclave where the data segment can be found.
+ * The first RW segment loaded is the TCS, skip that to get info on the
+ * data segment.
+ */
+static off_t encl_get_data_offset(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (seg->prot == (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE))
+ return seg->offset;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+FIXTURE(enclave) {
+ struct encl encl;
+ struct sgx_enclave_run run;
+};
+
+static bool setup_test_encl(unsigned long heap_size, struct encl *encl,
+ struct __test_metadata *_metadata)
+{
+ Elf64_Sym *sgx_enter_enclave_sym = NULL;
+ struct vdso_symtab symtab;
+ struct encl_segment *seg;
+ char maps_line[256];
+ FILE *maps_file;
+ unsigned int i;
+ void *addr;
+
+ if (!encl_load("test_encl.elf", encl, heap_size)) {
+ encl_delete(encl);
+ TH_LOG("Failed to load the test enclave.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!encl_measure(encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!encl_build(encl))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * An enclave consumer only must do this.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ addr = mmap((void *)encl->encl_base + seg->offset, seg->size,
+ seg->prot, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, encl->fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+ if (addr == MAP_FAILED)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Get vDSO base address */
+ addr = (void *)getauxval(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR);
+ if (!addr)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!vdso_get_symtab(addr, &symtab))
+ goto err;
+
+ sgx_enter_enclave_sym = vdso_symtab_get(&symtab, "__vdso_sgx_enter_enclave");
+ if (!sgx_enter_enclave_sym)
+ goto err;
+
+ vdso_sgx_enter_enclave = addr + sgx_enter_enclave_sym->st_value;
+
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ TH_LOG("0x%016lx 0x%016lx 0x%02x", seg->offset, seg->size, seg->prot);
+ }
+
+ maps_file = fopen("/proc/self/maps", "r");
+ if (maps_file != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(maps_line, sizeof(maps_line), maps_file) != NULL) {
+ maps_line[strlen(maps_line) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ if (strstr(maps_line, "/dev/sgx_enclave"))
+ TH_LOG("%s", maps_line);
+ }
+
+ fclose(maps_file);
+ }
+
+ TH_LOG("Failed to initialize the test enclave.");
+
+ encl_delete(encl);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(enclave)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(enclave)
+{
+ encl_delete(&self->encl);
+}
+
+#define ENCL_CALL(op, run, clobbered) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ if ((clobbered)) \
+ ret = vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)(op), 0, 0, \
+ EENTER, 0, 0, (run)); \
+ else \
+ ret = sgx_enter_enclave((void *)(op), NULL, 0, EENTER, NULL, NULL, \
+ (run)); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define EXPECT_EEXIT(run) \
+ do { \
+ EXPECT_EQ((run)->function, EEXIT); \
+ if ((run)->function != EEXIT) \
+ TH_LOG("0x%02x 0x%02x 0x%016llx", (run)->exception_vector, \
+ (run)->exception_error_code, (run)->exception_addr); \
+ } while (0)
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
+ * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
+ * metric.
+ */
+static unsigned long sgx_calc_section_metric(unsigned int low,
+ unsigned int high)
+{
+ return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
+ ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sum total available physical SGX memory across all EPC sections
+ *
+ * Return: total available physical SGX memory available on system
+ */
+static unsigned long get_total_epc_mem(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ unsigned long total_size = 0;
+ unsigned int type;
+ int section = 0;
+
+ while (true) {
+ __cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, section + SGX_CPUID_EPC, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+ type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK;
+ if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID)
+ break;
+
+ if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION)
+ break;
+
+ total_size += sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
+
+ section++;
+ }
+
+ return total_size;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+ unsigned long total_mem;
+
+ total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+ ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F_TIMEOUT(enclave, unclobbered_vdso_oversubscribed_remove, 900)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+ struct encl_segment *heap;
+ unsigned long total_mem;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ /*
+ * Create enclave with additional heap that is as big as all
+ * available physical SGX memory.
+ */
+ total_mem = get_total_epc_mem();
+ ASSERT_NE(total_mem, 0);
+ TH_LOG("Creating an enclave with %lu bytes heap may take a while ...",
+ total_mem);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(total_mem, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ heap = &self->encl.segment_tbl[self->encl.nr_segments - 1];
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, false), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ /* Trim entire heap. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+ modt_ioc.length = heap->size;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ TH_LOG("Changing type of %zd bytes to trimmed may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, heap->size);
+
+ /* EACCEPT all removed pages. */
+ addr = self->encl.encl_base + heap->offset;
+
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ TH_LOG("Entering enclave to run EACCEPT for each page of %zd bytes may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ for (i = 0; i < heap->size; i += 4096) {
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = addr + i;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(self->run.function, EEXIT);
+ }
+
+ /* Complete page removal. */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = heap->offset;
+ remove_ioc.length = heap->size;
+
+ TH_LOG("Removing %zd bytes from enclave may take a while ...",
+ heap->size);
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, heap->size);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+static int test_handler(long rdi, long rsi, long rdx, long ursp, long r8, long r9,
+ struct sgx_enclave_run *run)
+{
+ run->user_data = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, clobbered_vdso_and_user_function)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ self->run.user_handler = (__u64)test_handler;
+ self->run.user_data = 0xdeadbeef;
+
+ put_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+
+ get_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sanity check that it is possible to enter either of the two hardcoded TCS
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_entry)
+{
+ struct encl_op_header op;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ op.type = ENCL_OP_NOP;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Move to the next TCS. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Second page of .data segment is used to test changing PTE permissions.
+ * This spans the local encl_buffer within the test enclave.
+ *
+ * 1) Start with a sanity check: a value is written to the target page within
+ * the enclave and read back to ensure target page can be written to.
+ * 2) Change PTE permissions (RW -> RO) of target page within enclave.
+ * 3) Repeat (1) - this time expecting a regular #PF communicated via the
+ * vDSO.
+ * 4) Change PTE permissions of target page within enclave back to be RW.
+ * 5) Repeat (1) by resuming enclave, now expected to be possible to write to
+ * and read from target page within enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, pte_permissions)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) +
+ PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check to ensure it is possible to write to page that will
+ * have its permissions manipulated.
+ */
+
+ /* Write MAGIC to page */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that it is the
+ * value previously written (MAGIC).
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Change PTE permissions of target page within the enclave */
+ ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("mprotect");
+
+ /*
+ * PTE permissions of target page changed to read-only, EPCM
+ * permissions unchanged (EPCM permissions are RW), attempt to
+ * write to the page, expecting a regular #PF.
+ */
+
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Change PTE permissions back to enable enclave to write to the
+ * target page and resume enclave - do not expect any exceptions this
+ * time.
+ */
+ ret = mprotect((void *)data_start, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE);
+ if (ret)
+ perror("mprotect");
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0,
+ 0, ERESUME, 0, 0, &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Modifying permissions of TCS page should not be possible.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_permissions)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions ioc;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+ * commands.
+ */
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* ret == -1 */
+ if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+ else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to make TCS page read-only. This is not allowed and
+ * should be prevented by the kernel.
+ */
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_tcs_offset(&self->encl);
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EINVAL);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enclave page permission test.
+ *
+ * Modify and restore enclave page's EPCM (enclave) permissions from
+ * outside enclave (ENCLS[EMODPR] via kernel) as well as from within
+ * enclave (via ENCLU[EMODPE]). Check for page fault if
+ * VMA allows access but EPCM permissions do not.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, epcm_permissions)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions restrict_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ struct encl_op_emodpe emodpe_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure kernel supports needed ioctl() and system supports needed
+ * commands.
+ */
+ memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+ &restrict_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* ret == -1 */
+ if (errno_save == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS ioctl()");
+ else if (errno_save == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will have its permissions changed is the second data
+ * page in the .data segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer
+ * within the enclave.
+ *
+ * At start of test @data_start should have EPCM as well as PTE and
+ * VMA permissions of RW.
+ */
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before making
+ * any changes to page permissions.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that
+ * page is writable.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Change EPCM permissions to read-only. Kernel still considers
+ * the page writable.
+ */
+ memset(&restrict_ioc, 0, sizeof(restrict_ioc));
+
+ restrict_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ restrict_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ restrict_ioc.permissions = SGX_SECINFO_R;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS,
+ &restrict_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(restrict_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * EPCM permissions changed from kernel, need to EACCEPT from enclave.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PR;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * EPCM permissions of page is now read-only, expect #PF
+ * on EPCM when attempting to write to page from within enclave.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC2;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Received AEX but cannot return to enclave at same entrypoint,
+ * need different TCS from where EPCM permission can be made writable
+ * again.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave at new TCS to change EPCM permissions to be
+ * writable again and thus fix the page fault that triggered the
+ * AEX.
+ */
+
+ emodpe_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ emodpe_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W;
+ emodpe_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EMODPE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&emodpe_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to return to main TCS to resume execution at faulting
+ * instruction, PTE should continue to allow writing to the page.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Wrong page permissions that caused original fault has
+ * now been fixed via EPCM permissions.
+ * Resume execution in main TCS to re-attempt the memory access.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+ ERESUME, 0, 0,
+ &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC2);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.user_data, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via writing to
+ * a page belonging to the enclave's address space but was not added
+ * during enclave creation.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ void *addr;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!sgx2_supported())
+ SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes
+ * and test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * Create memory mapping for the page that will be added. New
+ * memory mapping is for one page right after all existing
+ * mappings.
+ * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+ * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+ * by existing enclave pages.
+ */
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
+ MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED, self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Attempt to write to the new page from within enclave.
+ * Expected to fail since page is not (yet) part of the enclave.
+ * The first #PF will trigger the addition of the page to the
+ * enclave, but since the new page needs an EACCEPT from within the
+ * enclave before it can be used it would not be possible
+ * to successfully return to the failing instruction. This is the
+ * cause of the second #PF captured here having the SGX bit set,
+ * it is from hardware preventing the page from being used.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, (unsigned long)addr);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_error_code == 0x6) {
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8007);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /* Handle AEX by running EACCEPT from new entry point. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Can now return to main TCS to resume execution. */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(vdso_sgx_enter_enclave((unsigned long)&put_addr_op, 0, 0,
+ ERESUME, 0, 0,
+ &self->run),
+ 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test for the addition of pages to an initialized enclave via a
+ * pre-emptive run of EACCEPT on page to be added.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, augment_via_eaccept)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ void *addr;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!sgx2_supported())
+ SKIP(return, "SGX2 not supported");
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+ * test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * mmap() a page at end of existing enclave to be used for dynamic
+ * EPC page.
+ *
+ * Kernel will allow new mapping using any permissions if it
+ * falls into the enclave's address range but not backed
+ * by existing enclave pages.
+ */
+
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+ self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Run EACCEPT on new page to trigger the #PF->EAUG->EACCEPT(again
+ * without a #PF). All should be transparent to userspace.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+ self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+ self->run.exception_addr == self->encl.encl_base + total_size) {
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * New page should be accessible from within enclave - attempt to
+ * write to it.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)addr;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * SGX2 page type modification test in two phases:
+ * Phase 1:
+ * Create a new TCS, consisting out of three new pages (stack page with regular
+ * page type, SSA page with regular page type, and TCS page with TCS page
+ * type) in an initialized enclave and run a simple workload within it.
+ * Phase 2:
+ * Remove the three pages added in phase 1, add a new regular page at the
+ * same address that previously hosted the TCS page and verify that it can
+ * be modified.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, tcs_create)
+{
+ struct encl_op_init_tcs_page init_tcs_page_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf get_buf_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf put_buf_op;
+ void *addr, *tcs, *stack_end, *ssa;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ size_t total_size = 0;
+ uint64_t val_64;
+ int errno_save;
+ int ret, i;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl,
+ _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Add three regular pages via EAUG: one will be the TCS stack, one
+ * will be the TCS SSA, and one will be the new TCS. The stack and
+ * SSA will remain as regular pages, the TCS page will need its
+ * type changed after populated with needed data.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < self->encl.nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &self->encl.segment_tbl[i];
+
+ total_size += seg->size;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Actual enclave size is expected to be larger than the loaded
+ * test enclave since enclave size must be a power of 2 in bytes while
+ * test_encl does not consume it all.
+ */
+ EXPECT_LT(total_size + 3 * PAGE_SIZE, self->encl.encl_size);
+
+ /*
+ * mmap() three pages at end of existing enclave to be used for the
+ * three new pages.
+ */
+ addr = mmap((void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size, 3 * PAGE_SIZE,
+ PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED,
+ self->encl.fd, 0);
+ EXPECT_NE(addr, MAP_FAILED);
+
+ self->run.exception_vector = 0;
+ self->run.exception_error_code = 0;
+ self->run.exception_addr = 0;
+
+ stack_end = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size;
+ tcs = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ssa = (void *)self->encl.encl_base + total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Run EACCEPT on each new page to trigger the
+ * EACCEPT->(#PF)->EAUG->EACCEPT(again without a #PF) flow.
+ */
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ if (self->run.exception_vector == 14 &&
+ self->run.exception_error_code == 4 &&
+ self->run.exception_addr == (unsigned long)stack_end) {
+ munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+ SKIP(return, "Kernel does not support adding pages to initialized enclave");
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Three new pages added to enclave. Now populate the TCS page with
+ * needed data. This should be done from within enclave. Provide
+ * the function that will do the actual data population with needed
+ * data.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * New TCS will use the "encl_dyn_entry" entrypoint that expects
+ * stack to begin in page before TCS page.
+ */
+ val_64 = encl_get_entry(&self->encl, "encl_dyn_entry");
+ EXPECT_NE(val_64, 0);
+
+ init_tcs_page_op.tcs_page = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ init_tcs_page_op.ssa = (unsigned long)total_size + 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ init_tcs_page_op.entry = val_64;
+ init_tcs_page_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_INIT_TCS_PAGE;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&init_tcs_page_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Change TCS page type to TCS. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = total_size + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /* EACCEPT new TCS page from enclave. */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TCS | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Run workload from new TCS. */
+ self->run.tcs = (unsigned long)tcs;
+
+ /*
+ * Simple workload to write to data buffer and read value back.
+ */
+ put_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_BUFFER;
+ put_buf_op.value = MAGIC;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ get_buf_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_BUFFER;
+ get_buf_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_buf_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_buf_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Phase 2 of test:
+ * Remove pages associated with new TCS, create a regular page
+ * where TCS page used to be and verify it can be used as a regular
+ * page.
+ */
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = total_size;
+ modt_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+ * EACCEPT for each of three removed pages.
+ */
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)stack_end;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)ssa;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal. */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = total_size;
+ remove_ioc.length = 3 * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and access location where TCS #3 was to
+ * trigger dynamic add of regular page at that location.
+ */
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_REG | SGX_SECINFO_PENDING;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * New page should be accessible from within enclave - write to it.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory from newly added page that was just written to,
+ * confirming that data previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = (unsigned long)tcs;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ munmap(addr, 3 * PAGE_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure sane behavior if user requests page removal, does not run
+ * EACCEPT from within enclave but still attempts to finalize page removal
+ * with the SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl(). The latter should fail
+ * because the removal was not EACCEPTed from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_no_eaccept)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /* Skip EACCEPT */
+
+ /* Send final ioctl() to complete page removal */
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ /* Operation not permitted since EACCEPT was omitted. */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, EPERM);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal but instead of correctly following with
+ * EACCEPT a read attempt to page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * Read from page that was just removed.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+ * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+ * expected.
+ */
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request enclave page removal and correctly follow with
+ * EACCEPT but do not follow with removal ioctl() but instead a read attempt
+ * to removed page is made from within the enclave.
+ */
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_added_page_invalid_access_after_eaccept)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr get_addr_op;
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr put_addr_op;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types ioc;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /*
+ * Page that will be removed is the second data page in the .data
+ * segment. This forms part of the local encl_buffer within the
+ * enclave.
+ */
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Sanity check that page at @data_start is writable before
+ * removing it.
+ *
+ * Start by writing MAGIC to test page.
+ */
+ put_addr_op.value = MAGIC;
+ put_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ put_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_PUT_TO_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&put_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Read memory that was just written to, confirming that data
+ * previously written (MAGIC) is present.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+ get_addr_op.addr = data_start;
+ get_addr_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_GET_FROM_ADDRESS;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(get_addr_op.value, MAGIC);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+
+ /* Start page removal by requesting change of page type to PT_TRIM. */
+ memset(&ioc, 0, sizeof(ioc));
+
+ ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = (unsigned long)data_start;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ /* Skip ioctl() to remove page. */
+
+ /*
+ * Read from page that was just removed.
+ */
+ get_addr_op.value = 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&get_addr_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+
+ /*
+ * From kernel perspective the page is present but according to SGX the
+ * page should not be accessible so a #PF with SGX bit set is
+ * expected.
+ */
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.function, ERESUME);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 14);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0x8005);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, data_start);
+}
+
+TEST_F(enclave, remove_untouched_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages remove_ioc;
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types modt_ioc;
+ struct encl_op_eaccept eaccept_op;
+ unsigned long data_start;
+ int ret, errno_save;
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(setup_test_encl(ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT, &self->encl, _metadata));
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware (SGX2) and kernel support is needed for this test. Start
+ * with check that test has a chance of succeeding.
+ */
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ if (errno == ENOTTY)
+ SKIP(return,
+ "Kernel does not support SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl()");
+ else if (errno == ENODEV)
+ SKIP(return, "System does not support SGX2");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Invalid parameters were provided during sanity check,
+ * expect command to fail.
+ */
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+
+ /* SGX2 is supported by kernel and hardware, test can proceed. */
+ memset(&self->run, 0, sizeof(self->run));
+ self->run.tcs = self->encl.encl_base;
+
+ data_start = self->encl.encl_base +
+ encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ memset(&modt_ioc, 0, sizeof(modt_ioc));
+
+ modt_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ modt_ioc.page_type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM;
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES, &modt_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.result, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(modt_ioc.count, 4096);
+
+ /*
+ * Enter enclave via TCS #1 and approve page removal by sending
+ * EACCEPT for removed page.
+ */
+
+ eaccept_op.epc_addr = data_start;
+ eaccept_op.flags = SGX_SECINFO_TRIM | SGX_SECINFO_MODIFIED;
+ eaccept_op.ret = 0;
+ eaccept_op.header.type = ENCL_OP_EACCEPT;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ENCL_CALL(&eaccept_op, &self->run, true), 0);
+ EXPECT_EEXIT(&self->run);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_vector, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_error_code, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(self->run.exception_addr, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(eaccept_op.ret, 0);
+
+ memset(&remove_ioc, 0, sizeof(remove_ioc));
+
+ remove_ioc.offset = encl_get_data_offset(&self->encl) + PAGE_SIZE;
+ remove_ioc.length = PAGE_SIZE;
+ ret = ioctl(self->encl.fd, SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES, &remove_ioc);
+ errno_save = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno_save, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(remove_ioc.count, 4096);
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc585be97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/main.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#ifndef MAIN_H
+#define MAIN_H
+
+#define ENCL_HEAP_SIZE_DEFAULT 4096
+
+struct encl_segment {
+ void *src;
+ off_t offset;
+ size_t size;
+ unsigned int prot;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ bool measure;
+};
+
+struct encl {
+ int fd;
+ void *bin;
+ off_t bin_size;
+ void *src;
+ size_t src_size;
+ size_t encl_size;
+ off_t encl_base;
+ unsigned int nr_segments;
+ struct encl_segment *segment_tbl;
+ struct sgx_secs secs;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct sigstruct;
+};
+
+extern unsigned char sign_key[];
+extern unsigned char sign_key_end[];
+
+void encl_delete(struct encl *ctx);
+bool encl_load(const char *path, struct encl *encl, unsigned long heap_size);
+bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl);
+bool encl_build(struct encl *encl);
+uint64_t encl_get_entry(struct encl *encl, const char *symbol);
+
+int sgx_enter_enclave(void *rdi, void *rsi, long rdx, u32 function, void *r8, void *r9,
+ struct sgx_enclave_run *run);
+
+#endif /* MAIN_H */
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e4fbe9484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.S
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/**
+* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+*/
+
+ .section ".rodata", "a"
+
+sign_key:
+ .globl sign_key
+ .incbin "sign_key.pem"
+sign_key_end:
+ .globl sign_key_end
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.pem b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.pem
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d76f21f19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sign_key.pem
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d73b29bec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/sigstruct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+#include "main.h"
+
+/*
+ * FIXME: OpenSSL 3.0 has deprecated some functions. For now just ignore
+ * the warnings.
+ */
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wdeprecated-declarations"
+
+struct q1q2_ctx {
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
+ BIGNUM *m;
+ BIGNUM *s;
+ BIGNUM *q1;
+ BIGNUM *qr;
+ BIGNUM *q2;
+};
+
+static void free_q1q2_ctx(struct q1q2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx->bn_ctx);
+ BN_free(ctx->m);
+ BN_free(ctx->s);
+ BN_free(ctx->q1);
+ BN_free(ctx->qr);
+ BN_free(ctx->q2);
+}
+
+static bool alloc_q1q2_ctx(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m,
+ struct q1q2_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ ctx->s = BN_bin2bn(s, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL);
+ ctx->m = BN_bin2bn(m, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, NULL);
+ ctx->q1 = BN_new();
+ ctx->qr = BN_new();
+ ctx->q2 = BN_new();
+
+ if (!ctx->bn_ctx || !ctx->s || !ctx->m || !ctx->q1 || !ctx->qr ||
+ !ctx->q2) {
+ free_q1q2_ctx(ctx);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void reverse_bytes(void *data, int length)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ int j = length - 1;
+ uint8_t temp;
+ uint8_t *ptr = data;
+
+ while (i < j) {
+ temp = ptr[i];
+ ptr[i] = ptr[j];
+ ptr[j] = temp;
+ i++;
+ j--;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool calc_q1q2(const uint8_t *s, const uint8_t *m, uint8_t *q1,
+ uint8_t *q2)
+{
+ struct q1q2_ctx ctx;
+ int len;
+
+ if (!alloc_q1q2_ctx(s, m, &ctx)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Not enough memory for Q1Q2 calculation\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(ctx.q1, ctx.s, ctx.s, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!BN_div(ctx.q1, ctx.qr, ctx.q1, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q1 %d bytes\n",
+ BN_num_bytes(ctx.q1));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!BN_mul(ctx.q2, ctx.s, ctx.qr, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!BN_div(ctx.q2, NULL, ctx.q2, ctx.m, ctx.bn_ctx))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2) > SGX_MODULUS_SIZE) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Too large Q2 %d bytes\n",
+ BN_num_bytes(ctx.q2));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ len = BN_bn2bin(ctx.q1, q1);
+ reverse_bytes(q1, len);
+ len = BN_bn2bin(ctx.q2, q2);
+ reverse_bytes(q2, len);
+
+ free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx);
+ return true;
+out:
+ free_q1q2_ctx(&ctx);
+ return false;
+}
+
+struct sgx_sigstruct_payload {
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_header header;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_body body;
+};
+
+static bool check_crypto_errors(void)
+{
+ int err;
+ bool had_errors = false;
+ const char *filename;
+ int line;
+ char str[256];
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
+ break;
+
+ had_errors = true;
+ err = ERR_get_error_line(&filename, &line);
+ ERR_error_string_n(err, str, sizeof(str));
+ fprintf(stderr, "crypto: %s: %s:%d\n", str, filename, line);
+ }
+
+ return had_errors;
+}
+
+static inline const BIGNUM *get_modulus(RSA *key)
+{
+ const BIGNUM *n;
+
+ RSA_get0_key(key, &n, NULL, NULL);
+ return n;
+}
+
+static RSA *gen_sign_key(void)
+{
+ unsigned long sign_key_length;
+ BIO *bio;
+ RSA *key;
+
+ sign_key_length = (unsigned long)&sign_key_end -
+ (unsigned long)&sign_key;
+
+ bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(&sign_key, sign_key_length);
+ if (!bio)
+ return NULL;
+
+ key = PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ return key;
+}
+
+enum mrtags {
+ MRECREATE = 0x0045544145524345,
+ MREADD = 0x0000000044444145,
+ MREEXTEND = 0x00444E4554584545,
+};
+
+static bool mrenclave_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data)
+{
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, 64)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "digest update failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mrenclave_commit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *mrenclave)
+{
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, (unsigned char *)mrenclave, &size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "digest commit failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (size != 32) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "invalid digest size = %u\n", size);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+struct mrecreate {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint32_t ssaframesize;
+ uint64_t size;
+ uint8_t reserved[44];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+
+static bool mrenclave_ecreate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t blob_size)
+{
+ struct mrecreate mrecreate;
+ uint64_t encl_size;
+
+ for (encl_size = 0x1000; encl_size < blob_size; )
+ encl_size <<= 1;
+
+ memset(&mrecreate, 0, sizeof(mrecreate));
+ mrecreate.tag = MRECREATE;
+ mrecreate.ssaframesize = 1;
+ mrecreate.size = encl_size;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+ return false;
+
+ return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mrecreate);
+}
+
+struct mreadd {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint64_t flags; /* SECINFO flags */
+ uint8_t reserved[40];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+static bool mrenclave_eadd(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset, uint64_t flags)
+{
+ struct mreadd mreadd;
+
+ memset(&mreadd, 0, sizeof(mreadd));
+ mreadd.tag = MREADD;
+ mreadd.offset = offset;
+ mreadd.flags = flags;
+
+ return mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreadd);
+}
+
+struct mreextend {
+ uint64_t tag;
+ uint64_t offset;
+ uint8_t reserved[48];
+} __attribute__((__packed__));
+
+static bool mrenclave_eextend(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, uint64_t offset,
+ const uint8_t *data)
+{
+ struct mreextend mreextend;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 0x1000; i += 0x100) {
+ memset(&mreextend, 0, sizeof(mreextend));
+ mreextend.tag = MREEXTEND;
+ mreextend.offset = offset + i;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &mreextend))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x00]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x40]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0x80]))
+ return false;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_update(ctx, &data[i + 0xC0]))
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool mrenclave_segment(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, struct encl *encl,
+ struct encl_segment *seg)
+{
+ uint64_t end = seg->size;
+ uint64_t offset;
+
+ for (offset = 0; offset < end; offset += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (!mrenclave_eadd(ctx, seg->offset + offset, seg->flags))
+ return false;
+
+ if (seg->measure) {
+ if (!mrenclave_eextend(ctx, seg->offset + offset, seg->src + offset))
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool encl_measure(struct encl *encl)
+{
+ uint64_t header1[2] = {0x000000E100000006, 0x0000000000010000};
+ uint64_t header2[2] = {0x0000006000000101, 0x0000000100000060};
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct = &encl->sigstruct;
+ struct sgx_sigstruct_payload payload;
+ uint8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ unsigned int siglen;
+ RSA *key = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ memset(sigstruct, 0, sizeof(*sigstruct));
+
+ sigstruct->header.header1[0] = header1[0];
+ sigstruct->header.header1[1] = header1[1];
+ sigstruct->header.header2[0] = header2[0];
+ sigstruct->header.header2[1] = header2[1];
+ sigstruct->exponent = 3;
+ sigstruct->body.attributes = SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT;
+ sigstruct->body.xfrm = 3;
+
+ /* sanity check */
+ if (check_crypto_errors())
+ goto err;
+
+ key = gen_sign_key();
+ if (!key) {
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stdout);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_bn2bin(get_modulus(key), sigstruct->modulus);
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (!ctx)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!mrenclave_ecreate(ctx, encl->src_size))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < encl->nr_segments; i++) {
+ struct encl_segment *seg = &encl->segment_tbl[i];
+
+ if (!mrenclave_segment(ctx, encl, seg))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!mrenclave_commit(ctx, sigstruct->body.mrenclave))
+ goto err;
+
+ memcpy(&payload.header, &sigstruct->header, sizeof(sigstruct->header));
+ memcpy(&payload.body, &sigstruct->body, sizeof(sigstruct->body));
+
+ SHA256((unsigned char *)&payload, sizeof(payload), digest);
+
+ if (!RSA_sign(NID_sha256, digest, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ sigstruct->signature, &siglen, key))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!calc_q1q2(sigstruct->signature, sigstruct->modulus, sigstruct->q1,
+ sigstruct->q2))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* BE -> LE */
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->signature, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+ reverse_bytes(sigstruct->modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ RSA_free(key);
+ return true;
+
+err:
+ if (ctx)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
+ RSA_free(key);
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ae791df3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include "defines.h"
+
+/*
+ * Data buffer spanning two pages that will be placed first in .data
+ * segment. Even if not used internally the second page is needed by
+ * external test manipulating page permissions.
+ */
+static uint8_t encl_buffer[8192] = { 1 };
+
+enum sgx_enclu_function {
+ EACCEPT = 0x5,
+ EMODPE = 0x6,
+};
+
+static void do_encl_emodpe(void *_op)
+{
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
+ struct encl_op_emodpe *op = _op;
+
+ secinfo.flags = op->flags;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
+ : /* no outputs */
+ : "a" (EMODPE),
+ "b" (&secinfo),
+ "c" (op->epc_addr)
+ : "memory" /* read from secinfo pointer */);
+}
+
+static void do_encl_eaccept(void *_op)
+{
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo __aligned(sizeof(struct sgx_secinfo)) = {0};
+ struct encl_op_eaccept *op = _op;
+ int rax;
+
+ secinfo.flags = op->flags;
+
+ asm volatile(".byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7"
+ : "=a" (rax)
+ : "a" (EACCEPT),
+ "b" (&secinfo),
+ "c" (op->epc_addr)
+ : "memory" /* read from secinfo pointer */);
+
+ op->ret = rax;
+}
+
+static void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ((char *)dest)[i] = ((char *)src)[i];
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+static void *memset(void *dest, int c, size_t n)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ ((char *)dest)[i] = c;
+
+ return dest;
+}
+
+static void do_encl_init_tcs_page(void *_op)
+{
+ struct encl_op_init_tcs_page *op = _op;
+ void *tcs = (void *)op->tcs_page;
+ uint32_t val_32;
+
+ memset(tcs, 0, 16); /* STATE and FLAGS */
+ memcpy(tcs + 16, &op->ssa, 8); /* OSSA */
+ memset(tcs + 24, 0, 4); /* CSSA */
+ val_32 = 1;
+ memcpy(tcs + 28, &val_32, 4); /* NSSA */
+ memcpy(tcs + 32, &op->entry, 8); /* OENTRY */
+ memset(tcs + 40, 0, 24); /* AEP, OFSBASE, OGSBASE */
+ val_32 = 0xFFFFFFFF;
+ memcpy(tcs + 64, &val_32, 4); /* FSLIMIT */
+ memcpy(tcs + 68, &val_32, 4); /* GSLIMIT */
+ memset(tcs + 72, 0, 4024); /* Reserved */
+}
+
+static void do_encl_op_put_to_buf(void *op)
+{
+ struct encl_op_put_to_buf *op2 = op;
+
+ memcpy(&encl_buffer[0], &op2->value, 8);
+}
+
+static void do_encl_op_get_from_buf(void *op)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_buf *op2 = op;
+
+ memcpy(&op2->value, &encl_buffer[0], 8);
+}
+
+static void do_encl_op_put_to_addr(void *_op)
+{
+ struct encl_op_put_to_addr *op = _op;
+
+ memcpy((void *)op->addr, &op->value, 8);
+}
+
+static void do_encl_op_get_from_addr(void *_op)
+{
+ struct encl_op_get_from_addr *op = _op;
+
+ memcpy(&op->value, (void *)op->addr, 8);
+}
+
+static void do_encl_op_nop(void *_op)
+{
+
+}
+
+void encl_body(void *rdi, void *rsi)
+{
+ const void (*encl_op_array[ENCL_OP_MAX])(void *) = {
+ do_encl_op_put_to_buf,
+ do_encl_op_get_from_buf,
+ do_encl_op_put_to_addr,
+ do_encl_op_get_from_addr,
+ do_encl_op_nop,
+ do_encl_eaccept,
+ do_encl_emodpe,
+ do_encl_init_tcs_page,
+ };
+
+ struct encl_op_header *op = (struct encl_op_header *)rdi;
+
+ if (op->type < ENCL_OP_MAX)
+ (*encl_op_array[op->type])(op);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a1ec64f7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl.lds
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+OUTPUT_FORMAT(elf64-x86-64)
+
+PHDRS
+{
+ tcs PT_LOAD;
+ text PT_LOAD;
+ data PT_LOAD;
+}
+
+SECTIONS
+{
+ . = 0;
+ .tcs : {
+ *(.tcs*)
+ } : tcs
+
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ .text : {
+ *(.text*)
+ *(.rodata*)
+ FILL(0xDEADBEEF);
+ . = ALIGN(4096);
+ } : text
+
+ .data : {
+ *(.data*)
+ } : data
+
+ /DISCARD/ : {
+ *(.comment*)
+ *(.note*)
+ *(.debug*)
+ *(.eh_frame*)
+ }
+}
+
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstructions), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.altinstr_replacement), "ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.retpoline_safe), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.discard.nospec), "RETPOLINE ALTERNATIVES are not supported in enclaves")
+ASSERT(!DEFINED(.got.plt), "Libcalls are not supported in enclaves")
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..03ae0f57e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/sgx/test_encl_bootstrap.S
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+ .macro ENCLU
+ .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xd7
+ .endm
+
+ .section ".tcs", "aw"
+ .balign 4096
+
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
+ .quad encl_ssa_tcs1 # OSSA
+ .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
+ .quad encl_entry # OENTRY
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT
+ .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved
+
+ # TCS2
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # STATE (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # FLAGS
+ .quad encl_ssa_tcs2 # OSSA
+ .fill 1, 4, 0 # CSSA (set by CPU)
+ .fill 1, 4, 1 # NSSA
+ .quad encl_entry # OENTRY
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # AEP (set by EENTER and ERESUME)
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OFSBASE
+ .fill 1, 8, 0 # OGSBASE
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # FSLIMIT
+ .fill 1, 4, 0xFFFFFFFF # GSLIMIT
+ .fill 4024, 1, 0 # Reserved
+
+ .text
+
+encl_entry:
+ # RBX contains the base address for TCS, which is the first address
+ # inside the enclave for TCS #1 and one page into the enclave for
+ # TCS #2. By adding the value of encl_stack to it, we get
+ # the absolute address for the stack.
+ lea (encl_stack)(%rbx), %rax
+ jmp encl_entry_core
+encl_dyn_entry:
+ # Entry point for dynamically created TCS page expected to follow
+ # its stack directly.
+ lea -1(%rbx), %rax
+encl_entry_core:
+ xchg %rsp, %rax
+ push %rax
+
+ push %rcx # push the address after EENTER
+ push %rbx # push the enclave base address
+
+ call encl_body
+
+ pop %rbx # pop the enclave base address
+
+ /* Clear volatile GPRs, except RAX (EEXIT function). */
+ xor %rcx, %rcx
+ xor %rdx, %rdx
+ xor %rdi, %rdi
+ xor %rsi, %rsi
+ xor %r8, %r8
+ xor %r9, %r9
+ xor %r10, %r10
+ xor %r11, %r11
+
+ # Reset status flags.
+ add %rdx, %rdx # OF = SF = AF = CF = 0; ZF = PF = 1
+
+ # Prepare EEXIT target by popping the address of the instruction after
+ # EENTER to RBX.
+ pop %rbx
+
+ # Restore the caller stack.
+ pop %rax
+ mov %rax, %rsp
+
+ # EEXIT
+ mov $4, %rax
+ enclu
+
+ .section ".data", "aw"
+
+encl_ssa_tcs1:
+ .space 4096
+encl_ssa_tcs2:
+ .space 4096
+
+ .balign 4096
+ # Stack of TCS #1
+ .space 4096
+encl_stack:
+ .balign 4096
+ # Stack of TCS #2
+ .space 4096