Adding upstream version 252.22.upstream/252.22

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2134 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..268ea28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2134 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <mntent.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sd-device.h"
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "ask-password-api.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-fido2.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h"
+#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
+#include "device-util.h"
+#include "efi-api.h"
+#include "env-util.h"
+#include "escape.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "fstab-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "libfido2-util.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "main-func.h"
+#include "memory-util.h"
+#include "mount-util.h"
+#include "nulstr-util.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "pkcs11-util.h"
+#include "pretty-print.h"
+#include "process-util.h"
+#include "random-util.h"
+#include "string-table.h"
+#include "strv.h"
+#include "tpm2-util.h"
+
+/* internal helper */
+#define ANY_LUKS "LUKS"
+/* as in src/cryptsetup.h */
+#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U
+#define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U
+
+typedef enum PassphraseType {
+        PASSPHRASE_NONE,
+        PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0,
+        PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1,
+        PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY,
+        _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX,
+        _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1,
+} PassphraseType;
+
+static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */
+static char *arg_cipher = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_key_size = 0;
+static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE;
+static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT;
+static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0;
+static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false;
+static bool arg_try_empty_password = false;
+static char *arg_hash = NULL;
+static char *arg_header = NULL;
+static unsigned arg_tries = 3;
+static bool arg_readonly = false;
+static bool arg_verify = false;
+static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = 0;
+static bool arg_discards = false;
+static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false;
+static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false;
+static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false;
+static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false;
+static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL;
+static uint64_t arg_offset = 0;
+static uint64_t arg_skip = 0;
+static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY;
+static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL;
+static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
+static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
+static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
+static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL;
+static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0;
+static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL;
+static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
+static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL;
+static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
+static bool arg_headless = false;
+static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC;
+
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
+
+static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = {
+        [PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase",
+        [PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key",
+        [PASSPHRASE_BOTH] = "passphrase or recovery key",
+};
+
+const char* passphrase_type_to_string(PassphraseType t);
+PassphraseType passphrase_type_from_string(const char *s);
+
+DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(passphrase_type, PassphraseType);
+
+/* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't:
+
+    check=
+    checkargs=
+    noearly
+    loud
+    quiet
+    keyscript=
+    initramfs
+*/
+
+static int parse_one_option(const char *option) {
+        const char *val;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(option);
+
+        /* Handled outside of this tool */
+        if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout"))
+                return 0;
+
+        if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout="))
+                return 0;
+
+        if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) {
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_key_size % 8) {
+                        log_error("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring.");
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_key_size /= 8;
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_sector_size % 2) {
+                        log_error("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring.");
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) {
+                        log_error("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) ||
+                   (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) {
+
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+                r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) {
+
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                if (path_is_absolute(val)) {
+                        if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+                } else
+                        log_error("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute. Ignoring.", val);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_keyfile_erase = r;
+
+        } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase"))
+                arg_keyfile_erase = true;
+
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) {
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) {
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+
+                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
+
+                if (arg_header)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "Duplicate header= option, refusing.");
+
+                arg_header = strdup(val);
+                if (!arg_header)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only"))
+                arg_readonly = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "verify"))
+                arg_verify = true;
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) {
+                if (streq(val, "masked"))
+                        arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT);
+                else {
+                        r = parse_boolean(val);
+                        if (r < 0) {
+                                log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val);
+                                return 0;
+                        }
+
+                        SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r);
+                        SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r);
+                }
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard"))
+                arg_discards = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt"))
+                arg_same_cpu_crypt = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus"))
+                arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue"))
+                arg_no_read_workqueue = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue"))
+                arg_no_write_workqueue = true;
+        else if (streq(option, "luks"))
+                arg_type = ANY_LUKS;
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+        else if (streq(option, "bitlk"))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK;
+#endif
+        else if (streq(option, "tcrypt"))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+        else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_hidden = true;
+        } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_system = true;
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) {
+                arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT;
+                arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true;
+        } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") ||
+                   startswith(option, "tmp="))
+                arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN;
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) {
+
+                r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) {
+
+                r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option);
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) {
+
+                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true;
+                } else {
+                        if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val))
+                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing");
+
+                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) {
+
+                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
+                        arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
+                        arg_fido2_device_auto = true;
+                } else {
+                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) {
+
+                if (streq(val, "auto"))
+                        arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid);
+                else {
+                        _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL;
+                        size_t cid_size;
+
+                        r = unbase64mem(val, SIZE_MAX, &cid, &cid_size);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m");
+
+                        free(arg_fido2_cid);
+                        arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid);
+                        arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size;
+                }
+
+                /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */
+                if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto)
+                        arg_fido2_device_auto = true;
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) {
+
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) {
+
+                if (streq(val, "auto")) {
+                        arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
+                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = true;
+                } else {
+                        r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
+                }
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) {
+
+                r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) {
+
+                if (!path_is_absolute(val))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val);
+
+                r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_tpm2_pin = r;
+
+        } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_try_empty_password = r;
+
+        } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password"))
+                arg_try_empty_password = true;
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) {
+
+                r = parse_boolean(val);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                arg_headless = r;
+        } else if (streq(option, "headless"))
+                arg_headless = true;
+
+        else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) {
+
+                r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+        } else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach"))
+                log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int parse_options(const char *options) {
+        assert(options);
+
+        for (;;) {
+                _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL;
+                int r;
+
+                r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m");
+                if (r == 0)
+                        break;
+
+                r = parse_one_option(word);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        /* sanity-check options */
+        if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+                if (arg_offset != 0)
+                      log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+                if (arg_skip != 0)
+                      log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type);
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static char* disk_description(const char *path) {
+        static const char name_fields[] =
+                "DM_NAME\0"
+                "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0"
+                "ID_MODEL\0";
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL;
+        const char *i, *name;
+        struct stat st;
+
+        assert(path);
+
+        if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode))
+                return NULL;
+
+        if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) {
+                _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL;
+                ssize_t l;
+
+                /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's
+                 * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or
+                 * other weird stuff. */
+
+                l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped);
+                if (l < 0) {
+                        log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m");
+                        return NULL;
+                }
+
+                if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL))
+                        return TAKE_PTR(unescaped);
+        }
+
+        /* These need no unescaping. */
+        NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields)
+                if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 &&
+                    !isempty(name))
+                        return strdup(name);
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *disk_mount_point(const char *label) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL;
+        _cleanup_endmntent_ FILE *f = NULL;
+        struct mntent *m;
+
+        /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */
+
+        device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label);
+        if (!device)
+                return NULL;
+
+        f = setmntent(fstab_path(), "re");
+        if (!f)
+                return NULL;
+
+        while ((m = getmntent(f)))
+                if (path_equal(m->mnt_fsname, device))
+                        return strdup(m->mnt_dir);
+
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL;
+        char *name_buffer = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(src);
+        assert(vol);
+
+        description = disk_description(src);
+        mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol);
+
+        /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */
+        if (description && streq(vol, description))
+                description = mfree(description);
+
+        if (mount_point && description)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point);
+        else if (mount_point)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point);
+        else if (description)
+                r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol);
+        else
+                return strdup(vol);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        return name_buffer;
+}
+
+static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) {
+        _cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL;
+        int slot_max;
+        PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;
+
+        assert(cd);
+
+        if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+                log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+                return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
+        }
+
+        /* Search all used slots */
+        assert_se((slot_max = crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0);
+        slots = new(bool, slot_max);
+        if (!slots)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
+                slots[slot] = IN_SET(crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST);
+
+        /* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */
+        for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) {
+                _cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL;
+                const char *type;
+                JsonVariant *w, *z;
+                int tk;
+
+                tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v);
+                if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL))
+                        continue;
+                if (tk < 0) {
+                        log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m");
+                        continue;
+                }
+
+                w = json_variant_by_key(v, "type");
+                if (!w || !json_variant_is_string(w)) {
+                        log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring.");
+                        continue;
+                }
+
+                type = json_variant_string(w);
+                if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) {
+
+                        /* At least exists one recovery key */
+                        if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery"))
+                                passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY;
+
+                        w = json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots");
+                        if (!w || !json_variant_is_array(w)) {
+                                log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring.");
+                                continue;
+                        }
+
+                        JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) {
+                                unsigned u;
+                                int at;
+
+                                if (!json_variant_is_string(z)) {
+                                        log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring.");
+                                        continue;
+                                }
+
+                                at = safe_atou(json_variant_string(z), &u);
+                                if (at < 0) {
+                                        log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring.");
+                                        continue;
+                                }
+
+                                if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) {
+                                        log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring.");
+                                        continue;
+                                }
+
+                                slots[u] = false;
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+
+        /* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */
+        for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++)
+                if (slots[slot]) {
+                        passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR;
+                        break;
+                }
+
+        /* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled,
+         * we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */
+        return passphrase_type;
+}
+
+static int get_password(
+                const char *vol,
+                const char *src,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool accept_cached,
+                PassphraseType passphrase_type,
+                char ***ret) {
+
+        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL;
+        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+        char *id;
+        int r = 0;
+        AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE;
+
+        assert(vol);
+        assert(src);
+        assert(ret);
+
+        if (arg_headless)
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option.");
+
+        friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol);
+        if (!friendly)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        disk_path = cescape(src);
+        if (!disk_path)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        id = strjoina("cryptsetup:", disk_path);
+
+        r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until,
+                              flags | (accept_cached*ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED),
+                              &passwords);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m");
+
+        if (arg_verify) {
+                _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL;
+
+                assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1);
+
+                if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                id = strjoina("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path);
+
+                r = ask_password_auto(text, "drive-harddisk", id, "cryptsetup", "cryptsetup.passphrase", until, flags, &passwords2);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m");
+
+                assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1);
+
+                if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0]))
+                        return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                 "Passwords did not match, retrying.");
+        }
+
+        strv_uniq(passwords);
+
+        STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+                char *c;
+
+                if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size)
+                        continue;
+
+                /* Pad password if necessary */
+                c = new(char, arg_key_size);
+                if (!c)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size);
+                erase_and_free(*p);
+                *p = TAKE_PTR(c);
+        }
+
+        *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_tcrypt(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                char **passwords,
+                uint32_t flags) {
+
+        int r = 0;
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL;
+        struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = {
+                .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES,
+                .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles,
+                .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles)
+        };
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords));
+
+        if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto || arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto || arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
+                /* Ask for a regular password */
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                       "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support.");
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_hidden)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER;
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_system)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER;
+
+        if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt)
+                params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES;
+
+        if (key_data) {
+                params.passphrase = key_data;
+                params.passphrase_size = key_data_size;
+                r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+        } else if (key_file) {
+                r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file);
+                        return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+                }
+                params.passphrase = passphrase;
+                params.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase);
+                r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+        } else {
+                r = -EINVAL;
+                STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords){
+                        params.passphrase = *p;
+                        params.passphrase_size = strlen(*p);
+                        r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, &params);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                }
+        }
+
+        if (r < 0) {
+                if (r == -EPERM) {
+                        if (key_data)
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)");
+                        else if (key_file)
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file);
+                        else
+                                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using supplied passwords.");
+
+                        return r;
+                }
+
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+        }
+
+        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, NULL, 0, flags);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static char *make_bindname(const char *volume) {
+        char *s;
+
+        if (asprintf(&s, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup/%s", random_u64(), volume) < 0)
+                return NULL;
+
+        return s;
+}
+
+static int make_security_device_monitor(
+                sd_event **ret_event,
+                sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(ret_event);
+        assert(ret_monitor);
+
+        /* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */
+
+        r = sd_event_default(&event);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
+
+        r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
+
+        (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device");
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
+
+        *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
+        *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int run_security_device_monitor(
+                sd_event *event,
+                sd_device_monitor *monitor) {
+        bool processed = false;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(event);
+        assert(monitor);
+
+        /* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the time-out is
+         * hit. */
+
+        for (;;) {
+                int x;
+
+                r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x);
+                if (r < 0) {
+                        if (r != -ENODATA)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m");
+
+                        /* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */
+                } else {
+                        assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT);
+                        return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                "Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt.");
+                }
+
+                /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */
+                r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m");
+                if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */
+                        return 0;
+
+                processed = true;
+        }
+}
+
+static bool libcryptsetup_plugins_support(void) {
+#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
+        int r;
+
+        /* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */
+        r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE");
+        if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO)
+                log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m");
+        if (r == 0)
+                return false;
+
+        return crypt_token_external_path();
+#else
+        return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
+static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) {
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL;
+        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(ret_pins);
+
+        r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m");
+        if (r > 0) {
+                pins = strv_new(envpin);
+                if (!pins)
+                        return log_oom();
+        }
+
+        *ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *type,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool headless,
+                void *usrptr,
+                uint32_t activation_flags,
+                const char *message,
+                const char *key_name,
+                const char *credential_name) {
+
+#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
+        AskPasswordFlags flags = ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE | ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
+        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, usrptr, activation_flags);
+        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
+                r = 0;
+        if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
+                return r;
+
+        r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
+                r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), usrptr, activation_flags);
+                if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
+                        r = 0;
+                if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
+                        return r;
+        }
+
+        if (headless)
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable.");
+
+        for (;;) {
+                pins = strv_free_erase(pins);
+                r = ask_password_auto(message, "drive-harddisk", NULL, key_name, credential_name, until, flags, &pins);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+                STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) {
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), usrptr, activation_flags);
+                        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
+                                r = 0;
+                        if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */
+                                return r;
+                }
+
+                flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED;
+        }
+        return r;
+#else
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool headless,
+                void *usrptr,
+                uint32_t activation_flags) {
+
+        return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
+                        cd,
+                        name,
+                        "systemd-fido2",
+                        until,
+                        headless,
+                        usrptr,
+                        activation_flags,
+                        "Please enter security token PIN:",
+                        "fido2-pin",
+                        "cryptsetup.fido2-pin");
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                usec_t until,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+        size_t decrypted_key_size, cid_size = 0;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
+        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
+        const char *rp_id = NULL;
+        const void *cid = NULL;
+        Fido2EnrollFlags required;
+        bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support();
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto);
+
+        if (arg_fido2_cid) {
+                if (!key_file && !key_data)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                               "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing.");
+
+                rp_id = arg_fido2_rp_id;
+                cid = arg_fido2_cid;
+                cid_size = arg_fido2_cid_size;
+
+                /* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do
+                 * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we
+                 * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. Eventually, we should make this
+                 * explicitly configurable. */
+                required = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT;
+        }
+
+        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+        if (!friendly)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) {
+                        r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, arg_fido2_device, flags);
+                        if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT))
+                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                       "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+
+                } else {
+                        if (cid)
+                                r = acquire_fido2_key(
+                                                name,
+                                                friendly,
+                                                arg_fido2_device,
+                                                rp_id,
+                                                cid, cid_size,
+                                                key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+                                                key_data, key_data_size,
+                                                until,
+                                                arg_headless,
+                                                required,
+                                                &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size,
+                                                arg_ask_password_flags);
+                        else
+                                r = acquire_fido2_key_auto(
+                                                cd,
+                                                name,
+                                                friendly,
+                                                arg_fido2_device,
+                                                key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+                                                until,
+                                                arg_headless,
+                                                &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size,
+                                                arg_ask_password_flags);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                }
+
+                if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
+                        return r;
+
+                if (!monitor) {
+                        /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
+                         * create an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+                        assert(!event);
+
+                        r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+
+                        log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly);
+
+                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
+                         * to create and configure the monitor */
+                        continue;
+                }
+
+                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2...");
+        }
+
+        if (pass_volume_key)
+                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+        else {
+                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */
+
+                r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+        }
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m");
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *friendly_name,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool headless,
+                uint32_t flags) {
+
+#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
+        int r;
+
+        if (!streq_ptr(crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2))
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device.");
+
+        systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = {
+                .friendly_name = friendly_name,
+                .until = until,
+                .headless = headless,
+                .askpw_flags = arg_ask_password_flags,
+        };
+
+        r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, &params, flags);
+        if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */
+                r = 0;
+
+        return r;
+#else
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                usec_t until,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL;
+        size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0;
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+        _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL;
+        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
+        const char *uri = NULL;
+        bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = libcryptsetup_plugins_support();
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto);
+
+        if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) {
+                if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) {
+                        r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &keyslot);
+                        if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO))
+                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                       "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+
+                        uri = discovered_uri;
+                        key_data = discovered_key;
+                        key_data_size = discovered_key_size;
+                }
+        } else {
+                uri = arg_pkcs11_uri;
+
+                if (!key_file && !key_data)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing.");
+        }
+
+        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+        if (!friendly)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
+                        r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin(cd, name, friendly, until, arg_headless, flags);
+                else {
+                        r = decrypt_pkcs11_key(
+                                        name,
+                                        friendly,
+                                        uri,
+                                        key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+                                        key_data, key_data_size,
+                                        until,
+                                        arg_headless,
+                                        &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                }
+
+                if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */
+                        return r;
+
+                if (!monitor) {
+                        /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's
+                         * create an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+                        assert(!event);
+
+                        r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+
+                        log_notice("Security token%s%s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.",
+                                   uri ? " " : "", strempty(uri), friendly);
+
+                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed
+                         * to create and configure the monitor */
+                        continue;
+                }
+
+                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11...");
+        }
+        assert(decrypted_key);
+
+        if (pass_volume_key)
+                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+        else {
+                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility
+                 * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through
+                 * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do
+                 * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most
+                 * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string
+                 * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob
+                 * via base64 encoding. */
+
+                r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+        }
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m");
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int make_tpm2_device_monitor(
+                sd_event **ret_event,
+                sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) {
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(ret_event);
+        assert(ret_monitor);
+
+        r = sd_event_default(&event);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m");
+
+        r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT));
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m");
+
+        (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m");
+
+        r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m");
+
+        *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event);
+        *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor);
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                usec_t until,
+                bool headless,
+                uint32_t flags) {
+
+#if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS
+        systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = {
+                .search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
+                .device = arg_tpm2_device,
+                .signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature,
+        };
+
+        if (!libcryptsetup_plugins_support())
+                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
+                                       "Libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled.");
+
+        return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
+                        cd,
+                        name,
+                        "systemd-tpm2",
+                        until,
+                        headless,
+                        &params,
+                        flags,
+                        "Please enter TPM2 PIN:",
+                        "tpm2-pin",
+                        "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin");
+#else
+        return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                usec_t until,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL;
+        _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL;
+        int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r;
+        size_t decrypted_key_size;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto);
+
+        friendly = friendly_disk_name(crypt_get_device_name(cd), name);
+        if (!friendly)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        for (;;) {
+                if (key_file || key_data) {
+                        /* If key data is specified, use that */
+
+                        r = acquire_tpm2_key(
+                                        name,
+                                        arg_tpm2_device,
+                                        arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
+                                        UINT16_MAX,
+                                        /* pubkey= */ NULL, /* pubkey_size= */ 0,
+                                        /* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0,
+                                        /* signature_path= */ NULL,
+                                        /* primary_alg= */ 0,
+                                        key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset,
+                                        key_data, key_data_size,
+                                        /* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* policy_hash_size= */ 0, /* we don't know the policy hash */
+                                        arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0,
+                                        until,
+                                        arg_headless,
+                                        arg_ask_password_flags,
+                                        &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                        if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
+                                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                        if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
+                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                        /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
+                        if (r != -EAGAIN) {
+                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
+                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
+                        }
+                } else {
+                        r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_headless, flags);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                return 0;
+                        /* EAGAIN     means: no tpm2 chip found
+                         * EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */
+                        if (r == -ENXIO)
+                                return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                        "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                        if (r == -ENOENT)
+                                return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                       "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                        if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) {
+                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
+                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
+                        }
+                }
+
+                if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */
+                        _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL;
+                        size_t blob_size, policy_hash_size;
+                        bool found_some = false;
+                        int token = 0; /* first token to look at */
+
+                        /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support
+                         * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them
+                         * works. */
+
+                        for (;;) {
+                                _cleanup_free_ void *pubkey = NULL;
+                                size_t pubkey_size = 0;
+                                uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask;
+                                uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
+                                TPM2Flags tpm2_flags;
+
+                                r = find_tpm2_auto_data(
+                                                cd,
+                                                arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */
+                                                token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */
+                                                &hash_pcr_mask,
+                                                &pcr_bank,
+                                                &pubkey, &pubkey_size,
+                                                &pubkey_pcr_mask,
+                                                &primary_alg,
+                                                &blob, &blob_size,
+                                                &policy_hash, &policy_hash_size,
+                                                &tpm2_flags,
+                                                &keyslot,
+                                                &token);
+                                if (r == -ENXIO)
+                                        /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */
+                                        return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG,
+                                                              SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                              found_some
+                                                              ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."
+                                                              : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                                if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r))  /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */
+                                        return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return r;
+
+                                found_some = true;
+
+                                r = acquire_tpm2_key(
+                                                name,
+                                                arg_tpm2_device,
+                                                hash_pcr_mask,
+                                                pcr_bank,
+                                                pubkey, pubkey_size,
+                                                pubkey_pcr_mask,
+                                                arg_tpm2_signature,
+                                                primary_alg,
+                                                /* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */
+                                                blob, blob_size,
+                                                policy_hash, policy_hash_size,
+                                                tpm2_flags,
+                                                until,
+                                                arg_headless,
+                                                arg_ask_password_flags,
+                                                &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size);
+                                if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK))
+                                        return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+                                if (r != -EPERM)
+                                        break;
+
+                                token++; /* try a different token next time */
+                        }
+
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                        /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */
+                        if (r != -EAGAIN) {
+                                log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m");
+                                return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */
+                        }
+                }
+
+                if (!monitor) {
+                        /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create
+                         * an event loop and monitor first. */
+
+                        assert(!event);
+
+                        if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2())
+                                return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
+                                                        "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking.");
+
+                        r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+
+                        log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly);
+
+                        /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed
+                         * to create and configure the monitor */
+                        continue;
+                }
+
+                r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return r;
+
+                log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2...");
+        }
+        assert(decrypted_key);
+
+        if (pass_volume_key)
+                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags);
+        else {
+                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
+
+                /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */
+
+                r = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_oom();
+
+                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, base64_encoded, strlen(base64_encoded), flags);
+        }
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)");
+                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m");
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        int r;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(key_data);
+
+        if (pass_volume_key)
+                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+        else
+                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, key_data, key_data_size, flags);
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)");
+                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m");
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL;
+        _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
+        size_t kfsize;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+        assert(key_file);
+
+        /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */
+        bindname = make_bindname(name);
+        if (!bindname)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        r = read_full_file_full(
+                        AT_FDCWD, key_file,
+                        arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset,
+                        arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size,
+                        READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET,
+                        bindname,
+                        &kfdata, &kfsize);
+        if (r == -E2BIG) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file);
+                return -EAGAIN;
+        }
+        if (r == -ENOENT) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file);
+                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file);
+
+        if (pass_volume_key)
+                r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
+        else
+                r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags);
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file);
+                return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                char **passwords,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                bool pass_volume_key) {
+
+        int r;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+
+        r = -EINVAL;
+        STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) {
+                if (pass_volume_key)
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, *p, arg_key_size, flags);
+                else
+                        r = crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags);
+                if (r >= 0)
+                        break;
+        }
+        if (r == -EPERM) {
+                log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)");
+                return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */
+        }
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m");
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(
+                struct crypt_device *cd,
+                const char *name,
+                const char *key_file,
+                const void *key_data,
+                size_t key_data_size,
+                char **passwords,
+                uint32_t flags,
+                usec_t until) {
+
+        bool pass_volume_key = false;
+        int r;
+
+        assert(cd);
+        assert(name);
+
+        if ((!arg_type && !crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) {
+                struct crypt_params_plain params = {
+                        .offset = arg_offset,
+                        .skip = arg_skip,
+                        .sector_size = arg_sector_size,
+                };
+                const char *cipher, *cipher_mode;
+                _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL;
+
+                if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain"))
+                        /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */
+                        params.hash = NULL;
+                else if (arg_hash)
+                        params.hash = arg_hash;
+                else if (!key_file)
+                        /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key
+                         * file is provided */
+                        params.hash = "ripemd160";
+
+                if (arg_cipher) {
+                        size_t l;
+
+                        l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-");
+                        truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l);
+                        if (!truncated_cipher)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        cipher = truncated_cipher;
+                        cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain";
+                } else {
+                        cipher = "aes";
+                        cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256";
+                }
+
+                /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */
+                arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size;
+
+                /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format
+                 * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */
+                r = crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, &params);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m");
+
+                /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */
+                pass_volume_key = !params.hash;
+        }
+
+        log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.",
+                 crypt_get_cipher(cd),
+                 crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd),
+                 crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8,
+                 crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+        if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto)
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
+        if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto)
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
+        if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto)
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, until, flags, pass_volume_key);
+        if (key_data)
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, key_data_size, flags, pass_volume_key);
+        if (key_file)
+                return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key);
+
+        return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key);
+}
+
+static int help(void) {
+        _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
+        int r;
+
+        r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup@.service", "8", &link);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_oom();
+
+        printf("%s attach VOLUME SOURCEDEVICE [KEY-FILE] [OPTIONS]\n"
+               "%s detach VOLUME\n\n"
+               "Attaches or detaches an encrypted block device.\n"
+               "\nSee the %s for details.\n",
+               program_invocation_short_name,
+               program_invocation_short_name,
+               link);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static uint32_t determine_flags(void) {
+        uint32_t flags = 0;
+
+        if (arg_readonly)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY;
+
+        if (arg_discards)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS;
+
+        if (arg_same_cpu_crypt)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT;
+
+        if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS;
+
+        if (arg_no_read_workqueue)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE;
+
+        if (arg_no_write_workqueue)
+                flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE;
+
+#ifdef CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF
+        /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */
+        /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */
+        flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF;
+#endif
+
+        return flags;
+}
+
+static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) {
+        int r;
+
+        if (!*p)
+                return;
+
+        r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE);
+        if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT)
+                log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p);
+}
+
+static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+        _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL;
+        const char *verb;
+        int r;
+
+        if (argv_looks_like_help(argc, argv))
+                return help();
+
+        if (argc < 3)
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+                                       "This program requires at least two arguments.");
+
+        log_setup();
+
+        cryptsetup_enable_logging(NULL);
+
+        umask(0022);
+
+        verb = argv[1];
+
+        if (streq(verb, "attach")) {
+                _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL;
+                _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *key_data = NULL;
+                const char *volume, *source, *key_file, *options;
+                crypt_status_info status;
+                size_t key_data_size = 0;
+                uint32_t flags = 0;
+                unsigned tries;
+                usec_t until;
+                PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE;
+
+                /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [OPTIONS] */
+
+                if (argc < 4)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "attach requires at least two arguments.");
+
+                volume = argv[2];
+                source = argv[3];
+                key_file = mangle_none(argc >= 5 ? argv[4] : NULL);
+                options = mangle_none(argc >= 6 ? argv[5] : NULL);
+
+                if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);
+
+                if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) {
+                        log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file);
+                        key_file = NULL;
+                }
+
+                if (options) {
+                        r = parse_options(options);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                }
+
+                log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__,
+                          volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher));
+
+                /* A delicious drop of snake oil */
+                (void) mlockall(MCL_FUTURE);
+
+                if (!key_file) {
+                        _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL;
+                        const char *fn;
+
+                        bindname = make_bindname(volume);
+                        if (!bindname)
+                                return log_oom();
+
+                        /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined
+                         * search path, and load it. */
+
+                        fn = strjoina(volume, ".key");
+                        r = find_key_file(
+                                        fn,
+                                        STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"),
+                                        bindname,
+                                        &key_data, &key_data_size);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return r;
+                        if (r > 0)
+                                log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume);
+                } else if (arg_keyfile_erase)
+                        destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */
+
+                if (arg_header) {
+                        log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header);
+                        r = crypt_init(&cd, arg_header);
+                } else
+                        r = crypt_init(&cd, source);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m");
+
+                cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+                status = crypt_status(cd, volume);
+                if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) {
+                        log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                flags = determine_flags();
+
+                until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout);
+                if (until == USEC_INFINITY)
+                        until = 0;
+
+                if (arg_key_size == 0)
+                        arg_key_size = 256U / 8U;
+
+                if (key_file) {
+                        struct stat st;
+
+                        /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a
+                         * warning it's OK to do this in two steps. */
+                        if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005))
+                                log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file);
+                }
+
+                if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) {
+                        r = crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+
+                        if (arg_header) {
+                                r = crypt_set_data_device(cd, source);
+                                if (r < 0)
+                                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source);
+                        }
+
+                        /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */
+                        if (!key_file && !key_data && getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE") != 0) {
+                                r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password(
+                                                cd,
+                                                volume,
+                                                NULL,
+                                                until,
+                                                arg_headless,
+                                                NULL,
+                                                flags,
+                                                "Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:",
+                                                "luks2-pin",
+                                                "cryptsetup.luks2-pin");
+                                if (r >= 0) {
+                                        log_debug("Volume %s activated with LUKS token id %i.", volume, r);
+                                        return 0;
+                                }
+
+                                log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+                        }
+                }
+
+/* since cryptsetup 2.3.0 (Feb 2020) */
+#ifdef CRYPT_BITLK
+                if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) {
+                        r = crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", crypt_get_device_name(cd));
+                }
+#endif
+
+                for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) {
+                        _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
+
+                        /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order:
+                         *
+                         *    1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip
+                         *    2. The discovered key: i.e. key_data + key_data_size
+                         *    3. The configured key: i.e. key_file + arg_keyfile_offset + arg_keyfile_size
+                         *    4. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set
+                         *    5. We enquire the user for a password
+                         */
+
+                        if (!key_file && !key_data && !arg_pkcs11_uri && !arg_pkcs11_uri_auto && !arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto && !arg_tpm2_device && !arg_tpm2_device_auto) {
+
+                                if (arg_try_empty_password) {
+                                        /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */
+                                        arg_try_empty_password = false;
+
+                                        key_data = strdup("");
+                                        if (!key_data)
+                                                return log_oom();
+
+                                        key_data_size = 0;
+                                } else {
+                                        /* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we have
+                                         * nothing else to check for */
+                                        if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) {
+                                                passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd);
+                                                if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE)
+                                                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered.");
+                                        }
+
+                                        r = get_password(volume, source, until, tries == 0 && !arg_verify, passphrase_type, &passwords);
+                                        if (r == -EAGAIN)
+                                                continue;
+                                        if (r < 0)
+                                                return r;
+                                }
+                        }
+
+                        if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT))
+                                r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags);
+                        else
+                                r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, key_file, key_data, key_data_size, passwords, flags, until);
+                        if (r >= 0)
+                                break;
+                        if (r != -EAGAIN)
+                                return r;
+
+                        /* Key not correct? Let's try again! */
+
+                        key_file = NULL;
+                        key_data = erase_and_free(key_data);
+                        key_data_size = 0;
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri);
+                        arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false;
+                        arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device);
+                        arg_fido2_device_auto = false;
+                        arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device);
+                        arg_tpm2_device_auto = false;
+                }
+
+                if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries)
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up.");
+
+        } else if (streq(verb, "detach")) {
+                const char *volume;
+
+                volume = argv[2];
+
+                if (!filename_is_valid(volume))
+                        return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume);
+
+                r = crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume);
+                if (r == -ENODEV) {
+                        log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() failed: %m");
+
+                cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd);
+
+                r = crypt_deactivate(cd, volume);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate: %m");
+
+        } else
+                return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown verb %s.", verb);
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);