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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-17 08:06:26 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-17 08:06:26 +0000 |
commit | 1660d4b7a65d9ad2ce0deaa19d35579ca4084ac5 (patch) | |
tree | 6cf8220b628ebd2ccfc1375dd6516c6996e9abcc /src/utils_password.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | cryptsetup-1660d4b7a65d9ad2ce0deaa19d35579ca4084ac5.tar.xz cryptsetup-1660d4b7a65d9ad2ce0deaa19d35579ca4084ac5.zip |
Adding upstream version 2:2.6.1.upstream/2%2.6.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/utils_password.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/utils_password.c | 331 |
1 files changed, 331 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/utils_password.c b/src/utils_password.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3374e18 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/utils_password.c @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +/* + * Password quality check wrapper + * + * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2012-2023 Milan Broz + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License + * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 + * of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + */ + +#include "cryptsetup.h" +#include <termios.h> + +#if defined ENABLE_PWQUALITY +#include <pwquality.h> + +static int tools_check_pwquality(const char *password) +{ + int r; + void *auxerror; + pwquality_settings_t *pwq; + + log_dbg("Checking new password using default pwquality settings."); + pwq = pwquality_default_settings(); + if (!pwq) + return -EINVAL; + + r = pwquality_read_config(pwq, NULL, &auxerror); + if (r) { + log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"), + pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror)); + pwquality_free_settings(pwq); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = pwquality_check(pwq, password, NULL, NULL, &auxerror); + if (r < 0) { + log_err(_("Password quality check failed:\n %s"), + pwquality_strerror(NULL, 0, r, auxerror)); + r = -EPERM; + } else + r = 0; + + pwquality_free_settings(pwq); + return r; +} +#elif defined ENABLE_PASSWDQC +#include <passwdqc.h> + +static int tools_check_passwdqc(const char *password) +{ + passwdqc_params_t params; + char *parse_reason = NULL; + const char *check_reason; + const char *config = PASSWDQC_CONFIG_FILE; + int r = -EINVAL; + + passwdqc_params_reset(¶ms); + + if (*config && passwdqc_params_load(¶ms, &parse_reason, config)) { + log_err(_("Cannot check password quality: %s"), + (parse_reason ? parse_reason : "Out of memory")); + goto out; + } + + check_reason = passwdqc_check(¶ms.qc, password, NULL, NULL); + if (check_reason) { + log_err(_("Password quality check failed: Bad passphrase (%s)"), + check_reason); + r = -EPERM; + } else + r = 0; +out: +#if HAVE_PASSWDQC_PARAMS_FREE + passwdqc_params_free(¶ms); +#endif + free(parse_reason); + return r; +} +#endif /* ENABLE_PWQUALITY || ENABLE_PASSWDQC */ + +/* coverity[ +tainted_string_sanitize_content : arg-0 ] */ +static int tools_check_password(const char *password) +{ +#if defined ENABLE_PWQUALITY + return tools_check_pwquality(password); +#elif defined ENABLE_PASSWDQC + return tools_check_passwdqc(password); +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +/* Password reading helpers */ + +/* coverity[ -taint_source : arg-1 ] */ +static ssize_t read_tty_eol(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen) +{ + bool eol = false; + size_t read_size = 0; + ssize_t r; + + do { + r = read(fd, pass, maxlen - read_size); + if ((r == -1 && errno != EINTR) || quit) + return -1; + if (r >= 0) { + if (!r || pass[r-1] == '\n') + eol = true; + read_size += (size_t)r; + pass = pass + r; + } + } while (!eol && read_size != maxlen); + + return (ssize_t)read_size; +} + +/* The pass buffer is zeroed and has trailing \0 already " */ +static int untimed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, size_t *realsize) +{ + ssize_t i; + + i = read_tty_eol(fd, pass, maxlen); + if (i > 0) { + if (pass[i-1] == '\n') { + pass[i-1] = '\0'; + *realsize = i - 1; + } else + *realsize = i; + i = 0; + } else if (i == 0) /* empty input */ + i = -1; + + return i; +} + +static int timed_read(int fd, char *pass, size_t maxlen, size_t *realsize, long timeout) +{ + struct timeval t; + fd_set fds = {}; /* Just to avoid scan-build false report for FD_SET */ + int failed = -1; + + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(fd, &fds); + t.tv_sec = timeout; + t.tv_usec = 0; + + if (select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &t) > 0) + failed = untimed_read(fd, pass, maxlen, realsize); + + return failed; +} + +static int interactive_pass(const char *prompt, char *pass, size_t maxlen, + long timeout) +{ + struct termios orig, tmp; + int failed = -1; + int infd, outfd; + size_t realsize = 0; + + if (maxlen < 1) + return failed; + + /* Read and write to /dev/tty if available */ + infd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); + if (infd == -1) { + infd = STDIN_FILENO; + outfd = STDERR_FILENO; + } else + outfd = infd; + + if (tcgetattr(infd, &orig)) + goto out; + + memcpy(&tmp, &orig, sizeof(tmp)); + tmp.c_lflag &= ~ECHO; + + if (prompt && write(outfd, prompt, strlen(prompt)) < 0) + goto out; + + tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &tmp); + if (timeout) + failed = timed_read(infd, pass, maxlen, &realsize, timeout); + else + failed = untimed_read(infd, pass, maxlen, &realsize); + tcsetattr(infd, TCSAFLUSH, &orig); +out: + if (!failed && write(outfd, "\n", 1)) {}; + + if (realsize == maxlen) + log_dbg("Read stopped at maximal interactive input length, passphrase can be trimmed."); + + if (infd != STDIN_FILENO) + close(infd); + return failed; +} + +static int crypt_get_key_tty(const char *prompt, + char **key, size_t *key_size, + int timeout, int verify) +{ + int key_size_max = DEFAULT_PASSPHRASE_SIZE_MAX; + int r = -EINVAL; + char *pass = NULL, *pass_verify = NULL; + + *key = NULL; + *key_size = 0; + + log_dbg("Interactive passphrase entry requested."); + + pass = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max + 1); + if (!pass) { + log_err( _("Out of memory while reading passphrase.")); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + if (interactive_pass(prompt, pass, key_size_max, timeout)) { + log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal.")); + goto out; + } + + if (verify) { + pass_verify = crypt_safe_alloc(key_size_max + 1); + if (!pass_verify) { + log_err(_("Out of memory while reading passphrase.")); + r = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + if (interactive_pass(_("Verify passphrase: "), + pass_verify, key_size_max, timeout)) { + log_err(_("Error reading passphrase from terminal.")); + goto out; + } + + if (strncmp(pass, pass_verify, key_size_max)) { + log_err(_("Passphrases do not match.")); + r = -EPERM; + goto out; + } + } + + *key = pass; + /* coverity[string_null] (crypt_safe_alloc wipes string with additional \0) */ + *key_size = strlen(pass); + r = 0; +out: + crypt_safe_free(pass_verify); + if (r) + crypt_safe_free(pass); + return r; +} + +/* + * Note: --key-file=- is interpreted as a read from a binary file (stdin) + * key_size_max == 0 means detect maximum according to input type (tty/file) + */ +int tools_get_key(const char *prompt, + char **key, size_t *key_size, + uint64_t keyfile_offset, size_t keyfile_size_max, + const char *key_file, + int timeout, int verify, int pwquality, + struct crypt_device *cd) +{ + char tmp[PATH_MAX], *backing_file; + int r = -EINVAL, block; + + block = tools_signals_blocked(); + if (block) + set_int_block(0); + + if (tools_is_stdin(key_file)) { + if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { + if (keyfile_offset) { + log_err(_("Cannot use offset with terminal input.")); + } else { + r = 0; + if (!prompt && !crypt_get_device_name(cd)) + r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase: ")); + else if (!prompt) { + backing_file = crypt_loop_backing_file(crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), _("Enter passphrase for %s: "), backing_file ?: crypt_get_device_name(cd)); + free(backing_file); + } + if (r >= 0) + r = crypt_get_key_tty(prompt ?: tmp, key, key_size, timeout, verify); + else + r = -EINVAL; + } + } else { + log_dbg("STDIN descriptor passphrase entry requested."); + /* No keyfile means STDIN with EOL handling (\n will end input)). */ + r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, NULL, key, key_size, + keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max, + key_file ? 0 : CRYPT_KEYFILE_STOP_EOL); + } + } else { + log_dbg("File descriptor passphrase entry requested."); + r = crypt_keyfile_device_read(cd, key_file, key, key_size, + keyfile_offset, keyfile_size_max, 0); + } + + if (block && !quit) + set_int_block(1); + + /* Check pwquality for password (not keyfile) */ + if (pwquality && !key_file && !r) + r = tools_check_password(*key); + + return r; +} + +void tools_passphrase_msg(int r) +{ + if (r == -EPERM) + log_err(_("No key available with this passphrase.")); + else if (r == -ENOENT) + log_err(_("No usable keyslot is available.")); +} |