diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c | 573 |
1 files changed, 573 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e974aa8 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/crypto_backend/crypto_gcrypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,573 @@ +/* + * GCRYPT crypto backend implementation + * + * Copyright (C) 2010-2023 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (C) 2010-2023 Milan Broz + * + * This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either + * version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this file; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. + */ + +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <gcrypt.h> +#include "crypto_backend_internal.h" + +static int crypto_backend_initialised = 0; +static int crypto_backend_secmem = 1; +static int crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = -1; +static char version[64]; + +struct crypt_hash { + gcry_md_hd_t hd; + int hash_id; + int hash_len; +}; + +struct crypt_hmac { + gcry_md_hd_t hd; + int hash_id; + int hash_len; +}; + +struct crypt_cipher { + bool use_kernel; + union { + struct crypt_cipher_kernel kernel; + gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; + } u; +}; + +struct hash_alg { + const char *name; + const char *gcrypt_name; +}; + +/* + * Test for wrong Whirlpool variant, + * Ref: https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gcrypt-devel/2014-January/002889.html + */ +static void crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(void) +{ + struct crypt_hash *h; + char buf[2] = "\0\0", hash_out1[64], hash_out2[64]; + int r; + + if (crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug >= 0) + return; + + crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 0; + if (crypt_hash_init(&h, "whirlpool")) + return; + + /* One shot */ + if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 2)) || + (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out1, 64))) { + crypt_hash_destroy(h); + return; + } + + /* Split buf (crypt_hash_final resets hash state) */ + if ((r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[0], 1)) || + (r = crypt_hash_write(h, &buf[1], 1)) || + (r = crypt_hash_final(h, hash_out2, 64))) { + crypt_hash_destroy(h); + return; + } + + crypt_hash_destroy(h); + + if (memcmp(hash_out1, hash_out2, 64)) + crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug = 1; +} + +int crypt_backend_init(bool fips __attribute__((unused))) +{ + int r; + + if (crypto_backend_initialised) + return 0; + + if (!gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED_P)) { + if (!gcry_check_version (GCRYPT_REQ_VERSION)) { + return -ENOSYS; + } + +/* If gcrypt compiled to support POSIX 1003.1e capabilities, + * it drops all privileges during secure memory initialisation. + * For now, the only workaround is to disable secure memory in gcrypt. + * cryptsetup always need at least cap_sys_admin privilege for dm-ioctl + * and it locks its memory space anyway. + */ +#if 0 + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_DISABLE_SECMEM); + crypto_backend_secmem = 0; +#else + + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_SUSPEND_SECMEM_WARN); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INIT_SECMEM, 16384, 0); + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_RESUME_SECMEM_WARN); +#endif + gcry_control (GCRYCTL_INITIALIZATION_FINISHED, 0); + } + + crypto_backend_initialised = 1; + crypt_hash_test_whirlpool_bug(); + + r = snprintf(version, sizeof(version), "gcrypt %s%s%s", + gcry_check_version(NULL), + crypto_backend_secmem ? "" : ", secmem disabled", + crypto_backend_whirlpool_bug > 0 ? ", flawed whirlpool" : ""); + if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(version)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +void crypt_backend_destroy(void) +{ + if (crypto_backend_initialised) + gcry_control(GCRYCTL_TERM_SECMEM); + + crypto_backend_initialised = 0; +} + +const char *crypt_backend_version(void) +{ + return crypto_backend_initialised ? version : ""; +} + +uint32_t crypt_backend_flags(void) +{ + return 0; +} + +static const char *crypt_hash_compat_name(const char *name, unsigned int *flags) +{ + const char *hash_name = name; + int i; + static struct hash_alg hash_algs[] = { + { "blake2b-160", "blake2b_160" }, + { "blake2b-256", "blake2b_256" }, + { "blake2b-384", "blake2b_384" }, + { "blake2b-512", "blake2b_512" }, + { "blake2s-128", "blake2s_128" }, + { "blake2s-160", "blake2s_160" }, + { "blake2s-224", "blake2s_224" }, + { "blake2s-256", "blake2s_256" }, + { NULL, NULL, }}; + + if (!name) + return NULL; + + /* "whirlpool_gcryptbug" is out shortcut to flawed whirlpool + * in libgcrypt < 1.6.0 */ + if (!strcasecmp(name, "whirlpool_gcryptbug")) { +#if GCRYPT_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x010601 + if (flags) + *flags |= GCRY_MD_FLAG_BUGEMU1; +#endif + hash_name = "whirlpool"; + } + + i = 0; + while (hash_algs[i].name) { + if (!strcasecmp(name, hash_algs[i].name)) { + hash_name = hash_algs[i].gcrypt_name; + break; + } + i++; + } + + return hash_name; +} + +/* HASH */ +int crypt_hash_size(const char *name) +{ + int hash_id; + + assert(crypto_backend_initialised); + + hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, NULL)); + if (!hash_id) + return -EINVAL; + + return gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(hash_id); +} + +int crypt_hash_init(struct crypt_hash **ctx, const char *name) +{ + struct crypt_hash *h; + unsigned int flags = 0; + + assert(crypto_backend_initialised); + + h = malloc(sizeof(*h)); + if (!h) + return -ENOMEM; + + h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags)); + if (!h->hash_id) { + free(h); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) { + free(h); + return -EINVAL; + } + + h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id); + *ctx = h; + return 0; +} + +static void crypt_hash_restart(struct crypt_hash *ctx) +{ + gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd); +} + +int crypt_hash_write(struct crypt_hash *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length) +{ + gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length); + return 0; +} + +int crypt_hash_final(struct crypt_hash *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length) +{ + unsigned char *hash; + + if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len) + return -EINVAL; + + hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id); + if (!hash) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(buffer, hash, length); + crypt_hash_restart(ctx); + + return 0; +} + +void crypt_hash_destroy(struct crypt_hash *ctx) +{ + gcry_md_close(ctx->hd); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + free(ctx); +} + +/* HMAC */ +int crypt_hmac_size(const char *name) +{ + return crypt_hash_size(name); +} + +int crypt_hmac_init(struct crypt_hmac **ctx, const char *name, + const void *key, size_t key_length) +{ + struct crypt_hmac *h; + unsigned int flags = GCRY_MD_FLAG_HMAC; + + assert(crypto_backend_initialised); + + h = malloc(sizeof(*h)); + if (!h) + return -ENOMEM; + + h->hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(crypt_hash_compat_name(name, &flags)); + if (!h->hash_id) { + free(h); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (gcry_md_open(&h->hd, h->hash_id, flags)) { + free(h); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (gcry_md_setkey(h->hd, key, key_length)) { + gcry_md_close(h->hd); + free(h); + return -EINVAL; + } + + h->hash_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen(h->hash_id); + *ctx = h; + return 0; +} + +static void crypt_hmac_restart(struct crypt_hmac *ctx) +{ + gcry_md_reset(ctx->hd); +} + +int crypt_hmac_write(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, const char *buffer, size_t length) +{ + gcry_md_write(ctx->hd, buffer, length); + return 0; +} + +int crypt_hmac_final(struct crypt_hmac *ctx, char *buffer, size_t length) +{ + unsigned char *hash; + + if (length > (size_t)ctx->hash_len) + return -EINVAL; + + hash = gcry_md_read(ctx->hd, ctx->hash_id); + if (!hash) + return -EINVAL; + + memcpy(buffer, hash, length); + crypt_hmac_restart(ctx); + + return 0; +} + +void crypt_hmac_destroy(struct crypt_hmac *ctx) +{ + gcry_md_close(ctx->hd); + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + free(ctx); +} + +/* RNG */ +int crypt_backend_rng(char *buffer, size_t length, int quality, int fips __attribute__((unused))) +{ + switch(quality) { + case CRYPT_RND_NORMAL: + gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_STRONG_RANDOM); + break; + case CRYPT_RND_SALT: + case CRYPT_RND_KEY: + default: + gcry_randomize(buffer, length, GCRY_VERY_STRONG_RANDOM); + break; + } + return 0; +} + +static int pbkdf2(const char *hash, + const char *password, size_t password_length, + const char *salt, size_t salt_length, + char *key, size_t key_length, + uint32_t iterations) +{ + const char *hash_name = crypt_hash_compat_name(hash, NULL); + +#if USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 + return pkcs5_pbkdf2(hash_name, password, password_length, salt, salt_length, + iterations, key_length, key, 0); +#else /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */ + int hash_id = gcry_md_map_name(hash_name); + + if (!hash_id) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_kdf_derive(password, password_length, GCRY_KDF_PBKDF2, hash_id, + salt, salt_length, iterations, key_length, key)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +#endif /* USE_INTERNAL_PBKDF2 */ +} + +/* PBKDF */ +int crypt_pbkdf(const char *kdf, const char *hash, + const char *password, size_t password_length, + const char *salt, size_t salt_length, + char *key, size_t key_length, + uint32_t iterations, uint32_t memory, uint32_t parallel) +{ + if (!kdf) + return -EINVAL; + + if (!strcmp(kdf, "pbkdf2")) + return pbkdf2(hash, password, password_length, salt, salt_length, + key, key_length, iterations); + else if (!strncmp(kdf, "argon2", 6)) + return argon2(kdf, password, password_length, salt, salt_length, + key, key_length, iterations, memory, parallel); + return -EINVAL; +} + +/* Block ciphers */ +static int _cipher_init(gcry_cipher_hd_t *hd, const char *name, + const char *mode, const void *buffer, size_t length) +{ + int cipher_id, mode_id; + + cipher_id = gcry_cipher_map_name(name); + if (cipher_id == GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_NONE) + return -ENOENT; + + if (!strcmp(mode, "ecb")) + mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_ECB; + else if (!strcmp(mode, "cbc")) + mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CBC; +#if HAVE_DECL_GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS + else if (!strcmp(mode, "xts")) + mode_id = GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_XTS; +#endif + else + return -ENOENT; + + if (gcry_cipher_open(hd, cipher_id, mode_id, 0)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_setkey(*hd, buffer, length)) { + gcry_cipher_close(*hd); + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int crypt_cipher_init(struct crypt_cipher **ctx, const char *name, + const char *mode, const void *key, size_t key_length) +{ + struct crypt_cipher *h; + int r; + + h = malloc(sizeof(*h)); + if (!h) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (!_cipher_init(&h->u.hd, name, mode, key, key_length)) { + h->use_kernel = false; + *ctx = h; + return 0; + } + + r = crypt_cipher_init_kernel(&h->u.kernel, name, mode, key, key_length); + if (r < 0) { + free(h); + return r; + } + + h->use_kernel = true; + *ctx = h; + return 0; +} + +void crypt_cipher_destroy(struct crypt_cipher *ctx) +{ + if (ctx->use_kernel) + crypt_cipher_destroy_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel); + else + gcry_cipher_close(ctx->u.hd); + free(ctx); +} + +int crypt_cipher_encrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx, + const char *in, char *out, size_t length, + const char *iv, size_t iv_length) +{ + if (ctx->use_kernel) + return crypt_cipher_encrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length); + + if (iv && gcry_cipher_setiv(ctx->u.hd, iv, iv_length)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_encrypt(ctx->u.hd, out, length, in, length)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +int crypt_cipher_decrypt(struct crypt_cipher *ctx, + const char *in, char *out, size_t length, + const char *iv, size_t iv_length) +{ + if (ctx->use_kernel) + return crypt_cipher_decrypt_kernel(&ctx->u.kernel, in, out, length, iv, iv_length); + + if (iv && gcry_cipher_setiv(ctx->u.hd, iv, iv_length)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(ctx->u.hd, out, length, in, length)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +bool crypt_cipher_kernel_only(struct crypt_cipher *ctx) +{ + return ctx->use_kernel; +} + +int crypt_bitlk_decrypt_key(const void *key, size_t key_length, + const char *in, char *out, size_t length, + const char *iv, size_t iv_length, + const char *tag, size_t tag_length) +{ +#ifdef GCRY_CCM_BLOCK_LEN + gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; + uint64_t l[3]; + int r = -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_open(&hd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES256, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CCM, 0)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (gcry_cipher_setkey(hd, key, key_length)) + goto out; + + if (gcry_cipher_setiv(hd, iv, iv_length)) + goto out; + + l[0] = length; + l[1] = 0; + l[2] = tag_length; + if (gcry_cipher_ctl(hd, GCRYCTL_SET_CCM_LENGTHS, l, sizeof(l))) + goto out; + + if (gcry_cipher_decrypt(hd, out, length, in, length)) + goto out; + + if (gcry_cipher_checktag(hd, tag, tag_length)) + goto out; + + r = 0; +out: + gcry_cipher_close(hd); + return r; +#else + return -ENOTSUP; +#endif +} + +int crypt_backend_memeq(const void *m1, const void *m2, size_t n) +{ + return crypt_internal_memeq(m1, m2, n); +} + +#if !ENABLE_FIPS +bool crypt_fips_mode(void) { return false; } +#else +bool crypt_fips_mode(void) +{ + static bool fips_mode = false, fips_checked = false; + + if (fips_checked) + return fips_mode; + + fips_mode = gcry_fips_mode_active(); + fips_checked = true; + + return fips_mode; +} +#endif /* ENABLE FIPS */ |