Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esrupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 2158 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c b/security/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e742279f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/certhigh/certvfy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2158 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+#include "nspr.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "secport.h"
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "genname.h"
+#include "keyhi.h"
+#include "cert.h"
+#include "certdb.h"
+#include "certi.h"
+#include "cryptohi.h"
+
+#ifndef NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX
+#include "pkix.h"
+#include "pkix_pl_cert.h"
+#else
+#include "nss.h"
+#endif /* NSS_DISABLE_LIBPKIX */
+
+#include "nsspki.h"
+#include "pkitm.h"
+#include "pkim.h"
+#include "pki3hack.h"
+#include "base.h"
+#include "keyi.h"
+
+/*
+ * Check the validity times of a certificate
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_CertTimesValid(CERTCertificate *c)
+{
+    SECCertTimeValidity valid = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(c, PR_Now(), PR_TRUE);
+    return (valid == secCertTimeValid) ? SECSuccess : SECFailure;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+checkKeyParams(const SECAlgorithmID *sigAlgorithm, const SECKEYPublicKey *key)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECOidTag sigAlg;
+    SECOidTag curve;
+    PRUint32 policyFlags = 0;
+    PRInt32 minLen, len;
+
+    sigAlg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(sigAlgorithm);
+
+    switch (sigAlg) {
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA1_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA224_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA256_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA384_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX962_ECDSA_SHA512_SIGNATURE:
+            if (key->keyType != ecKey) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            curve = SECKEY_GetECCOid(&key->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
+            if (curve != 0) {
+                if (NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(curve, &policyFlags) == SECFailure ||
+                    !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+                    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+                    return SECFailure;
+                }
+                return SECSuccess;
+            }
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
+            return SECFailure;
+
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE: {
+            PORTCheapArenaPool tmpArena;
+            SECOidTag hashAlg;
+            SECOidTag maskHashAlg;
+
+            PORT_InitCheapArena(&tmpArena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+            rv = sec_DecodeRSAPSSParams(&tmpArena.arena,
+                                        &sigAlgorithm->parameters,
+                                        &hashAlg, &maskHashAlg, NULL);
+            PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&tmpArena);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            if (NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashAlg, &policyFlags) == SECSuccess &&
+                !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+            if (NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(maskHashAlg, &policyFlags) == SECSuccess &&
+                !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+        }
+        /* fall through to RSA key checking */
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_MD5_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA1_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA256_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA384_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_PKCS1_SHA512_WITH_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+        case SEC_OID_ISO_SHA_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ISO_SHA1_WITH_RSA_SIGNATURE:
+            if (key->keyType != rsaKey && key->keyType != rsaPssKey) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            len = 8 * key->u.rsa.modulus.len;
+
+            rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minLen);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            if (len < minLen) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            return SECSuccess;
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST:
+        case SEC_OID_BOGUS_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA1_DIGEST:
+        case SEC_OID_SDN702_DSA_SIGNATURE:
+        case SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA224_DIGEST:
+        case SEC_OID_NIST_DSA_SIGNATURE_WITH_SHA256_DIGEST:
+            if (key->keyType != dsaKey) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            len = 8 * key->u.dsa.params.prime.len;
+
+            rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE, &minLen);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            if (len < minLen) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+
+            return SECSuccess;
+        default:
+            return SECSuccess;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the signature of a signed data object with the given DER publickey
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifySignedDataWithPublicKey(const CERTSignedData *sd,
+                                   SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+                                   void *wincx)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECItem sig;
+    SECOidTag sigAlg;
+    SECOidTag encAlg;
+    SECOidTag hashAlg;
+    PRUint32 policyFlags;
+
+    if (!pubKey || !sd) {
+        PORT_SetError(PR_INVALID_ARGUMENT_ERROR);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Can we use this algorithm for signature verification?  */
+    sigAlg = SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(&sd->signatureAlgorithm);
+    rv = sec_DecodeSigAlg(pubKey, sigAlg,
+                          &sd->signatureAlgorithm.parameters,
+                          &encAlg, &hashAlg);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure; /* error is set */
+    }
+    rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(encAlg, &policyFlags);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess &&
+        !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashAlg, &policyFlags);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess &&
+        !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    rv = checkKeyParams(&sd->signatureAlgorithm, pubKey);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* check the signature */
+    sig = sd->signature;
+    /* convert sig->len from bit counts to byte count. */
+    DER_ConvertBitString(&sig);
+
+    rv = VFY_VerifyDataWithAlgorithmID(sd->data.data, sd->data.len, pubKey,
+                                       &sig, &sd->signatureAlgorithm,
+                                       &hashAlg, wincx);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure; /* error is set */
+    }
+
+    /* for some algorithms, hash algorithm is only known after verification */
+    rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(hashAlg, &policyFlags);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess &&
+        !(policyFlags & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the signature of a signed data object with the given DER publickey
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifySignedDataWithPublicKeyInfo(CERTSignedData *sd,
+                                       CERTSubjectPublicKeyInfo *pubKeyInfo,
+                                       void *wincx)
+{
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey;
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+    /* get cert's public key */
+    pubKey = SECKEY_ExtractPublicKey(pubKeyInfo);
+    if (pubKey) {
+        rv = CERT_VerifySignedDataWithPublicKey(sd, pubKey, wincx);
+        SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the signature of a signed data object with the given certificate
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifySignedData(CERTSignedData *sd, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                      PRTime t, void *wincx)
+{
+    SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey = 0;
+    SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+    SECCertTimeValidity validity;
+
+    /* check the certificate's validity */
+    validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(cert, t, PR_FALSE);
+    if (validity != secCertTimeValid) {
+        return rv;
+    }
+
+    /* get cert's public key */
+    pubKey = CERT_ExtractPublicKey(cert);
+    if (pubKey) {
+        rv = CERT_VerifySignedDataWithPublicKey(sd, pubKey, wincx);
+        SECKEY_DestroyPublicKey(pubKey);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SEC_CheckCRL(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+             CERTCertificate *caCert, PRTime t, void *wincx)
+{
+    return CERT_CheckCRL(cert, caCert, NULL, t, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the issuer of a cert.  Use the authorityKeyID if it exists.
+ */
+CERTCertificate *
+CERT_FindCertIssuer(CERTCertificate *cert, PRTime validTime, SECCertUsage usage)
+{
+    NSSCertificate *me;
+    NSSTime *nssTime;
+    NSSTrustDomain *td;
+    NSSCryptoContext *cc;
+    NSSCertificate *chain[3];
+    NSSUsage nssUsage;
+    PRStatus status;
+
+    me = STAN_GetNSSCertificate(cert);
+    if (!me) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    nssTime = NSSTime_SetPRTime(NULL, validTime);
+    nssUsage.anyUsage = PR_FALSE;
+    nssUsage.nss3usage = usage;
+    nssUsage.nss3lookingForCA = PR_TRUE;
+    memset(chain, 0, 3 * sizeof(NSSCertificate *));
+    td = STAN_GetDefaultTrustDomain();
+    cc = STAN_GetDefaultCryptoContext();
+    (void)NSSCertificate_BuildChain(me, nssTime, &nssUsage, NULL,
+                                    chain, 2, NULL, &status, td, cc);
+    nss_ZFreeIf(nssTime);
+    if (status == PR_SUCCESS) {
+        PORT_Assert(me == chain[0]);
+        /* if it's a root, the chain will only have one cert */
+        if (!chain[1]) {
+            /* already has a reference from the call to BuildChain */
+            return cert;
+        }
+        NSSCertificate_Destroy(chain[0]);         /* the first cert in the chain */
+        return STAN_GetCERTCertificate(chain[1]); /* return the 2nd */
+    }
+    if (chain[0]) {
+        PORT_Assert(me == chain[0]);
+        NSSCertificate_Destroy(chain[0]); /* the first cert in the chain */
+    }
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return required trust flags for various cert usages for CAs
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_TrustFlagsForCACertUsage(SECCertUsage usage,
+                              unsigned int *retFlags,
+                              SECTrustType *retTrustType)
+{
+    unsigned int requiredFlags;
+    SECTrustType trustType;
+
+    switch (usage) {
+        case certUsageSSLClient:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CLIENT_CA;
+            trustType = trustSSL;
+            break;
+        case certUsageSSLServer:
+        case certUsageSSLCA:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA;
+            trustType = trustSSL;
+            break;
+        case certUsageIPsec:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA;
+            trustType = trustSSL;
+            break;
+        case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA | CERTDB_GOVT_APPROVED_CA;
+            trustType = trustSSL;
+            break;
+        case certUsageEmailSigner:
+        case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA;
+            trustType = trustEmail;
+            break;
+        case certUsageObjectSigner:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA;
+            trustType = trustObjectSigning;
+            break;
+        case certUsageVerifyCA:
+        case certUsageAnyCA:
+        case certUsageStatusResponder:
+            requiredFlags = CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA;
+            trustType = trustTypeNone;
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            goto loser;
+    }
+    if (retFlags != NULL) {
+        *retFlags = requiredFlags;
+    }
+    if (retTrustType != NULL) {
+        *retTrustType = trustType;
+    }
+
+    return (SECSuccess);
+loser:
+    return (SECFailure);
+}
+
+void
+cert_AddToVerifyLog(CERTVerifyLog *log, CERTCertificate *cert, long error,
+                    unsigned int depth, void *arg)
+{
+    CERTVerifyLogNode *node, *tnode;
+
+    PORT_Assert(log != NULL);
+
+    node = (CERTVerifyLogNode *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(log->arena,
+                                                sizeof(CERTVerifyLogNode));
+    if (node != NULL) {
+        node->cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+        node->error = error;
+        node->depth = depth;
+        node->arg = arg;
+
+        if (log->tail == NULL) {
+            /* empty list */
+            log->head = log->tail = node;
+            node->prev = NULL;
+            node->next = NULL;
+        } else if (depth >= log->tail->depth) {
+            /* add to tail */
+            node->prev = log->tail;
+            log->tail->next = node;
+            log->tail = node;
+            node->next = NULL;
+        } else if (depth < log->head->depth) {
+            /* add at head */
+            node->prev = NULL;
+            node->next = log->head;
+            log->head->prev = node;
+            log->head = node;
+        } else {
+            /* add in middle */
+            tnode = log->tail;
+            while (tnode != NULL) {
+                if (depth >= tnode->depth) {
+                    /* insert after tnode */
+                    node->prev = tnode;
+                    node->next = tnode->next;
+                    tnode->next->prev = node;
+                    tnode->next = node;
+                    break;
+                }
+
+                tnode = tnode->prev;
+            }
+        }
+
+        log->count++;
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+#define EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log) \
+    if (log == NULL) {           \
+        goto loser;              \
+    }
+
+#define LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, depth, arg)               \
+    if (log != NULL) {                                         \
+        cert_AddToVerifyLog(log, cert, PORT_GetError(), depth, \
+                            (void *)(PRWord)arg);              \
+    } else {                                                   \
+        goto loser;                                            \
+    }
+
+#define LOG_ERROR(log, cert, depth, arg)                       \
+    if (log != NULL) {                                         \
+        cert_AddToVerifyLog(log, cert, PORT_GetError(), depth, \
+                            (void *)(PRWord)arg);              \
+    }
+
+/* /C=CN/O=WoSign CA Limited/CN=CA \xE6\xB2\x83\xE9\x80\x9A\xE6\xA0\xB9\xE8\xAF\x81\xE4\xB9\xA6
+ * Using a consistent naming convention, this would actually be called
+ * 'CA沃通根证书DN', but since GCC 6.2.1 apparently can't handle UTF-8
+ * identifiers, this will have to do.
+ */
+static const unsigned char CAWoSignRootDN[72] = {
+    0x30, 0x46, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x43, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x11,
+    0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6D,
+    0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x19, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+    0x0C, 0x12, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0xE6, 0xB2, 0x83, 0xE9, 0x80, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0xA0,
+    0xB9, 0xE8, 0xAF, 0x81, 0xE4, 0xB9, 0xA6
+};
+
+/* /C=CN/O=WoSign CA Limited/CN=CA WoSign ECC Root */
+static const unsigned char CAWoSignECCRootDN[72] = {
+    0x30, 0x46, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x43, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x11,
+    0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6D,
+    0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x19, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+    0x13, 0x12, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x45,
+    0x43, 0x43, 0x20, 0x52, 0x6F, 0x6F, 0x74
+};
+
+/* /C=CN/O=WoSign CA Limited/CN=Certification Authority of WoSign */
+static const unsigned char CertificationAuthorityofWoSignDN[87] = {
+    0x30, 0x55, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x43, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x11,
+    0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6D,
+    0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x31, 0x2A, 0x30, 0x28, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+    0x13, 0x21, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69,
+    0x6F, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20,
+    0x6F, 0x66, 0x20, 0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E
+};
+
+/* /C=CN/O=WoSign CA Limited/CN=Certification Authority of WoSign G2 */
+static const unsigned char CertificationAuthorityofWoSignG2DN[90] = {
+    0x30, 0x58, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x43, 0x4E, 0x31, 0x1A, 0x30, 0x18, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x11,
+    0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x43, 0x41, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x69, 0x6D,
+    0x69, 0x74, 0x65, 0x64, 0x31, 0x2D, 0x30, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03,
+    0x13, 0x24, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69,
+    0x6F, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20,
+    0x6F, 0x66, 0x20, 0x57, 0x6F, 0x53, 0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x47, 0x32
+};
+
+/* /C=IL/O=StartCom Ltd./OU=Secure Digital Certificate Signing/CN=StartCom Certification Authority */
+static const unsigned char StartComCertificationAuthorityDN[127] = {
+    0x30, 0x7D, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x49, 0x4C, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x0D,
+    0x53, 0x74, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x43, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x74, 0x64, 0x2E,
+    0x31, 0x2B, 0x30, 0x29, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0B, 0x13, 0x22, 0x53, 0x65,
+    0x63, 0x75, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x44, 0x69, 0x67, 0x69, 0x74, 0x61, 0x6C, 0x20,
+    0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x20, 0x53,
+    0x69, 0x67, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x31, 0x29, 0x30, 0x27, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55,
+    0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x20, 0x53, 0x74, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x43, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20,
+    0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E,
+    0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79
+};
+
+/* /C=IL/O=StartCom Ltd./CN=StartCom Certification Authority G2 */
+static const unsigned char StartComCertificationAuthorityG2DN[85] = {
+    0x30, 0x53, 0x31, 0x0B, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06, 0x13, 0x02,
+    0x49, 0x4C, 0x31, 0x16, 0x30, 0x14, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0A, 0x13, 0x0D,
+    0x53, 0x74, 0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x43, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20, 0x4C, 0x74, 0x64, 0x2E,
+    0x31, 0x2C, 0x30, 0x2A, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x23, 0x53, 0x74,
+    0x61, 0x72, 0x74, 0x43, 0x6F, 0x6D, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66,
+    0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x6E, 0x20, 0x41, 0x75, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6F,
+    0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x79, 0x20, 0x47, 0x32
+};
+
+struct DataAndLength {
+    const unsigned char *data;
+    PRUint32 len;
+};
+
+static const struct DataAndLength StartComAndWoSignDNs[] = {
+    { CAWoSignRootDN,
+      sizeof(CAWoSignRootDN) },
+    { CAWoSignECCRootDN,
+      sizeof(CAWoSignECCRootDN) },
+    { CertificationAuthorityofWoSignDN,
+      sizeof(CertificationAuthorityofWoSignDN) },
+    { CertificationAuthorityofWoSignG2DN,
+      sizeof(CertificationAuthorityofWoSignG2DN) },
+    { StartComCertificationAuthorityDN,
+      sizeof(StartComCertificationAuthorityDN) },
+    { StartComCertificationAuthorityG2DN,
+      sizeof(StartComCertificationAuthorityG2DN) },
+};
+
+static PRBool
+CertIsStartComOrWoSign(const CERTCertificate *cert)
+{
+    int i;
+    const struct DataAndLength *dn = StartComAndWoSignDNs;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(StartComAndWoSignDNs) / sizeof(struct DataAndLength); ++i, dn++) {
+        if (cert->derSubject.len == dn->len &&
+            memcmp(cert->derSubject.data, dn->data, dn->len) == 0) {
+            return PR_TRUE;
+        }
+    }
+    return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+isIssuerCertAllowedAtCertIssuanceTime(CERTCertificate *issuerCert,
+                                      CERTCertificate *referenceCert)
+{
+    if (!issuerCert || !referenceCert) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (CertIsStartComOrWoSign(issuerCert)) {
+        /* PRTime is microseconds since the epoch, whereas JS time is milliseconds.
+         * (new Date("2016-10-21T00:00:00Z")).getTime() * 1000
+         */
+        static const PRTime OCTOBER_21_2016 = 1477008000000000;
+
+        PRTime notBefore, notAfter;
+        SECStatus rv;
+
+        rv = CERT_GetCertTimes(referenceCert, &notBefore, &notAfter);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+
+        if (notBefore > OCTOBER_21_2016) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+cert_VerifyCertChainOld(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                        PRBool checkSig, PRBool *sigerror,
+                        SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t, void *wincx,
+                        CERTVerifyLog *log, PRBool *revoked)
+{
+    SECTrustType trustType;
+    CERTBasicConstraints basicConstraint;
+    CERTCertificate *issuerCert = NULL;
+    CERTCertificate *subjectCert = NULL;
+    CERTCertificate *badCert = NULL;
+    PRBool isca;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECStatus rvFinal = SECSuccess;
+    int count;
+    int currentPathLen = 0;
+    int pathLengthLimit = CERT_UNLIMITED_PATH_CONSTRAINT;
+    unsigned int caCertType;
+    unsigned int requiredCAKeyUsage;
+    unsigned int requiredFlags;
+    PLArenaPool *arena = NULL;
+    CERTGeneralName *namesList = NULL;
+    CERTCertificate **certsList = NULL;
+    int certsListLen = 16;
+    int namesCount = 0;
+    PRBool subjectCertIsSelfIssued;
+    CERTCertTrust issuerTrust;
+
+    if (revoked) {
+        *revoked = PR_FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (CERT_KeyUsageAndTypeForCertUsage(certUsage, PR_TRUE,
+                                         &requiredCAKeyUsage,
+                                         &caCertType) !=
+        SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_Assert(0);
+        EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+        requiredCAKeyUsage = 0;
+        caCertType = 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (certUsage) {
+        case certUsageSSLClient:
+        case certUsageSSLServer:
+        case certUsageIPsec:
+        case certUsageSSLCA:
+        case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+        case certUsageEmailSigner:
+        case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+        case certUsageObjectSigner:
+        case certUsageVerifyCA:
+        case certUsageAnyCA:
+        case certUsageStatusResponder:
+            if (CERT_TrustFlagsForCACertUsage(certUsage, &requiredFlags,
+                                              &trustType) != SECSuccess) {
+                PORT_Assert(0);
+                EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+                /* XXX continuing with requiredFlags = 0 seems wrong.  It'll
+                 * cause the following test to be true incorrectly:
+                 *   flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(issuerCert->trust, trustType);
+                 *   if (( flags & requiredFlags ) == requiredFlags) {
+                 *       rv = rvFinal;
+                 *       goto done;
+                 *   }
+                 * There are three other instances of this problem.
+                 */
+                requiredFlags = 0;
+                trustType = trustSSL;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+            requiredFlags = 0;
+            trustType = trustSSL; /* This used to be 0, but we need something
+                                   * that matches the enumeration type.
+                                   */
+            caCertType = 0;
+    }
+
+    subjectCert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+    if (subjectCert == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    certsList = PORT_ZNewArray(CERTCertificate *, certsListLen);
+    if (certsList == NULL)
+        goto loser;
+
+    /* RFC 3280 says that the name constraints will apply to the names
+    ** in the leaf (EE) cert, whether it is self issued or not, so
+    ** we pretend that it is not.
+    */
+    subjectCertIsSelfIssued = PR_FALSE;
+    for (count = 0; count < CERT_MAX_CERT_CHAIN; count++) {
+        PRBool validCAOverride = PR_FALSE;
+
+        /* Construct a list of names for the current and all previous
+         * certifcates (except leaf (EE) certs, root CAs, and self-issued
+         * intermediate CAs) to be verified against the name constraints
+         * extension of the issuer certificate.
+         */
+        if (subjectCertIsSelfIssued == PR_FALSE) {
+            CERTGeneralName *subjectNameList;
+            int subjectNameListLen;
+            int i;
+            PRBool getSubjectCN = (!count &&
+                                   (certUsage == certUsageSSLServer || certUsage == certUsageIPsec));
+            subjectNameList =
+                CERT_GetConstrainedCertificateNames(subjectCert, arena,
+                                                    getSubjectCN);
+            if (!subjectNameList)
+                goto loser;
+            subjectNameListLen = CERT_GetNamesLength(subjectNameList);
+            if (!subjectNameListLen)
+                goto loser;
+            if (certsListLen <= namesCount + subjectNameListLen) {
+                CERTCertificate **tmpCertsList;
+                certsListLen = (namesCount + subjectNameListLen) * 2;
+                tmpCertsList =
+                    (CERTCertificate **)PORT_Realloc(certsList,
+                                                     certsListLen *
+                                                         sizeof(CERTCertificate *));
+                if (tmpCertsList == NULL) {
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                certsList = tmpCertsList;
+            }
+            for (i = 0; i < subjectNameListLen; i++) {
+                certsList[namesCount + i] = subjectCert;
+            }
+            namesCount += subjectNameListLen;
+            namesList = cert_CombineNamesLists(namesList, subjectNameList);
+        }
+
+        /* check if the cert has an unsupported critical extension */
+        if (subjectCert->options.bits.hasUnsupportedCriticalExt) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_CRITICAL_EXTENSION);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+        }
+
+        /* check that the signatureAlgorithm field of the certificate
+         * matches the signature field of the tbsCertificate */
+        if (SECOID_CompareAlgorithmID(
+                &subjectCert->signatureWrap.signatureAlgorithm,
+                &subjectCert->signature)) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH);
+            LOG_ERROR(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        /* find the certificate of the issuer */
+        issuerCert = CERT_FindCertIssuer(subjectCert, t, certUsage);
+        if (!issuerCert) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
+            LOG_ERROR(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        /* verify the signature on the cert */
+        if (checkSig) {
+            rv = CERT_VerifySignedData(&subjectCert->signatureWrap,
+                                       issuerCert, t, wincx);
+
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                if (sigerror) {
+                    *sigerror = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                if (PORT_GetError() == SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_CERTIFICATE) {
+                    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_EXPIRED_ISSUER_CERTIFICATE);
+                    LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+                } else {
+                    if (PORT_GetError() !=
+                        SEC_ERROR_CERT_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_DISABLED) {
+                        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE);
+                    }
+                    LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* If the basicConstraint extension is included in an immediate CA
+         * certificate, make sure that the isCA flag is on.  If the
+         * pathLenConstraint component exists, it must be greater than the
+         * number of CA certificates we have seen so far.  If the extension
+         * is omitted, we will assume that this is a CA certificate with
+         * an unlimited pathLenConstraint (since it already passes the
+         * netscape-cert-type extension checking).
+         */
+
+        rv = CERT_FindBasicConstraintExten(issuerCert, &basicConstraint);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) {
+                LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+            }
+            pathLengthLimit = CERT_UNLIMITED_PATH_CONSTRAINT;
+            /* no basic constraints found, we aren't (yet) a CA. */
+            isca = PR_FALSE;
+        } else {
+            if (basicConstraint.isCA == PR_FALSE) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID);
+                LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+            }
+            pathLengthLimit = basicConstraint.pathLenConstraint;
+            isca = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+        /* make sure that the path len constraint is properly set.*/
+        if (pathLengthLimit >= 0 && currentPathLen > pathLengthLimit) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_PATH_LEN_CONSTRAINT_INVALID);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, pathLengthLimit);
+        }
+
+        /* make sure that the entire chain is within the name space of the
+         * current issuer certificate.
+         */
+        rv = CERT_CompareNameSpace(issuerCert, namesList, certsList,
+                                   arena, &badCert);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess || badCert != NULL) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CERT_NOT_IN_NAME_SPACE);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, badCert, count + 1, 0);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        rv = isIssuerCertAllowedAtCertIssuanceTime(issuerCert, cert);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER);
+            LOG_ERROR(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        /* XXX - the error logging may need to go down into CRL stuff at some
+         * point
+         */
+        /* check revoked list (issuer) */
+        rv = SEC_CheckCRL(handle, subjectCert, issuerCert, t, wincx);
+        if (rv == SECFailure) {
+            if (revoked) {
+                *revoked = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+        } else if (rv == SECWouldBlock) {
+            /* We found something fishy, so we intend to issue an
+             * error to the user, but the user may wish to continue
+             * processing, in which case we better make sure nothing
+             * worse has happened... so keep cranking the loop */
+            rvFinal = SECFailure;
+            if (revoked) {
+                *revoked = PR_TRUE;
+            }
+            LOG_ERROR(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+        }
+
+        if (CERT_GetCertTrust(issuerCert, &issuerTrust) == SECSuccess) {
+            /* we have some trust info, but this does NOT imply that this
+             * cert is actually trusted for any purpose.  The cert may be
+             * explicitly UNtrusted.  We won't know until we examine the
+             * trust bits.
+             */
+            unsigned int flags;
+
+            if (certUsage != certUsageAnyCA &&
+                certUsage != certUsageStatusResponder) {
+
+                /*
+                 * XXX This choice of trustType seems arbitrary.
+                 */
+                if (certUsage == certUsageVerifyCA) {
+                    if (subjectCert->nsCertType & NS_CERT_TYPE_EMAIL_CA) {
+                        trustType = trustEmail;
+                    } else if (subjectCert->nsCertType & NS_CERT_TYPE_SSL_CA) {
+                        trustType = trustSSL;
+                    } else {
+                        trustType = trustObjectSigning;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&issuerTrust, trustType);
+                if ((flags & requiredFlags) == requiredFlags) {
+                    /* we found a trusted one, so return */
+                    rv = rvFinal;
+                    goto done;
+                }
+                if (flags & CERTDB_VALID_CA) {
+                    validCAOverride = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                /* is it explicitly distrusted? */
+                if ((flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) &&
+                    ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0)) {
+                    /* untrusted -- the cert is explicitly untrusted, not
+                     * just that it doesn't chain to a trusted cert */
+                    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER);
+                    LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, flags);
+                }
+            } else {
+                /* Check if we have any valid trust when cheching for
+                 * certUsageAnyCA or certUsageStatusResponder. */
+                for (trustType = trustSSL; trustType < trustTypeNone;
+                     trustType++) {
+                    flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&issuerTrust, trustType);
+                    if ((flags & requiredFlags) == requiredFlags) {
+                        rv = rvFinal;
+                        goto done;
+                    }
+                    if (flags & CERTDB_VALID_CA)
+                        validCAOverride = PR_TRUE;
+                }
+                /* We have 2 separate loops because we want any single trust
+                 * bit to allow this usage to return trusted. Only if none of
+                 * the trust bits are on do we check to see if the cert is
+                 * untrusted */
+                for (trustType = trustSSL; trustType < trustTypeNone;
+                     trustType++) {
+                    flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&issuerTrust, trustType);
+                    /* is it explicitly distrusted? */
+                    if ((flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) &&
+                        ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0)) {
+                        /* untrusted -- the cert is explicitly untrusted, not
+                         * just that it doesn't chain to a trusted cert */
+                        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER);
+                        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, flags);
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        if (!validCAOverride) {
+            /*
+             * Make sure that if this is an intermediate CA in the chain that
+             * it was given permission by its signer to be a CA.
+             */
+            /*
+             * if basicConstraints says it is a ca, then we check the
+             * nsCertType.  If the nsCertType has any CA bits set, then
+             * it must have the right one.
+             */
+            if (!isca || (issuerCert->nsCertType & NS_CERT_TYPE_CA)) {
+                isca = (issuerCert->nsCertType & caCertType) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+            }
+
+            if (!isca) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID);
+                LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+            }
+
+            /* make sure key usage allows cert signing */
+            if (CERT_CheckKeyUsage(issuerCert, requiredCAKeyUsage) != SECSuccess) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE);
+                LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, issuerCert, count + 1, requiredCAKeyUsage);
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* make sure that the issuer is not self signed.  If it is, then
+         * stop here to prevent looping.
+         */
+        if (issuerCert->isRoot) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER);
+            LOG_ERROR(log, issuerCert, count + 1, 0);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        /* The issuer cert will be the subject cert in the next loop.
+         * A cert is self-issued if its subject and issuer are equal and
+         * both are of non-zero length.
+         */
+        subjectCertIsSelfIssued = (PRBool)
+                                      SECITEM_ItemsAreEqual(&issuerCert->derIssuer,
+                                                            &issuerCert->derSubject) &&
+                                  issuerCert->derSubject.len >
+                                      0;
+        if (subjectCertIsSelfIssued == PR_FALSE) {
+            /* RFC 3280 says only non-self-issued intermediate CA certs
+             * count in path length.
+             */
+            ++currentPathLen;
+        }
+
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(subjectCert);
+        subjectCert = issuerCert;
+        issuerCert = NULL;
+    }
+
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
+    LOG_ERROR(log, subjectCert, count, 0);
+loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+done:
+    if (certsList != NULL) {
+        PORT_Free(certsList);
+    }
+    if (issuerCert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuerCert);
+    }
+
+    if (subjectCert) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(subjectCert);
+    }
+
+    if (arena != NULL) {
+        PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+cert_VerifyCertChain(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                     PRBool checkSig, PRBool *sigerror,
+                     SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t, void *wincx,
+                     CERTVerifyLog *log, PRBool *revoked)
+{
+    if (CERT_GetUsePKIXForValidation()) {
+        return cert_VerifyCertChainPkix(cert, checkSig, certUsage, t,
+                                        wincx, log, sigerror, revoked);
+    }
+    return cert_VerifyCertChainOld(handle, cert, checkSig, sigerror,
+                                   certUsage, t, wincx, log, revoked);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCertChain(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                     PRBool checkSig, SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t,
+                     void *wincx, CERTVerifyLog *log)
+{
+    return cert_VerifyCertChain(handle, cert, checkSig, NULL, certUsage, t,
+                                wincx, log, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify that a CA can sign a certificate with the requested usage.
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCACertForUsage(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                          PRBool checkSig, SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t,
+                          void *wincx, CERTVerifyLog *log)
+{
+    SECTrustType trustType;
+    CERTBasicConstraints basicConstraint;
+    PRBool isca;
+    PRBool validCAOverride = PR_FALSE;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECStatus rvFinal = SECSuccess;
+    unsigned int flags;
+    unsigned int caCertType;
+    unsigned int requiredCAKeyUsage;
+    unsigned int requiredFlags;
+    CERTCertificate *issuerCert;
+    CERTCertTrust certTrust;
+
+    if (CERT_KeyUsageAndTypeForCertUsage(certUsage, PR_TRUE,
+                                         &requiredCAKeyUsage,
+                                         &caCertType) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_Assert(0);
+        EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+        requiredCAKeyUsage = 0;
+        caCertType = 0;
+    }
+
+    switch (certUsage) {
+        case certUsageSSLClient:
+        case certUsageSSLServer:
+        case certUsageIPsec:
+        case certUsageSSLCA:
+        case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+        case certUsageEmailSigner:
+        case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+        case certUsageObjectSigner:
+        case certUsageVerifyCA:
+        case certUsageStatusResponder:
+            if (CERT_TrustFlagsForCACertUsage(certUsage, &requiredFlags,
+                                              &trustType) != SECSuccess) {
+                PORT_Assert(0);
+                EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+                requiredFlags = 0;
+                trustType = trustSSL;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+            requiredFlags = 0;
+            trustType = trustSSL; /* This used to be 0, but we need something
+                                   * that matches the enumeration type.
+                                   */
+            caCertType = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* If the basicConstraint extension is included in an intermmediate CA
+     * certificate, make sure that the isCA flag is on.  If the
+     * pathLenConstraint component exists, it must be greater than the
+     * number of CA certificates we have seen so far.  If the extension
+     * is omitted, we will assume that this is a CA certificate with
+     * an unlimited pathLenConstraint (since it already passes the
+     * netscape-cert-type extension checking).
+     */
+
+    rv = CERT_FindBasicConstraintExten(cert, &basicConstraint);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        if (PORT_GetError() != SEC_ERROR_EXTENSION_NOT_FOUND) {
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, 0);
+        }
+        /* no basic constraints found, we aren't (yet) a CA. */
+        isca = PR_FALSE;
+    } else {
+        if (basicConstraint.isCA == PR_FALSE) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, 0);
+        }
+
+        /* can't check path length if we don't know the previous path */
+        isca = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (CERT_GetCertTrust(cert, &certTrust) == SECSuccess) {
+        /* we have some trust info, but this does NOT imply that this
+         * cert is actually trusted for any purpose.  The cert may be
+         * explicitly UNtrusted.  We won't know until we examine the
+         * trust bits.
+         */
+        if (certUsage == certUsageStatusResponder) {
+            /* Check the special case of certUsageStatusResponder */
+            issuerCert = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, t, certUsage);
+            if (issuerCert) {
+                if (SEC_CheckCRL(handle, cert, issuerCert, t, wincx) !=
+                    SECSuccess) {
+                    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE);
+                    CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuerCert);
+                    goto loser;
+                }
+                CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuerCert);
+            }
+            /* XXX We have NOT determined that this cert is trusted.
+             * For years, NSS has treated this as trusted,
+             * but it seems incorrect.
+             */
+            rv = rvFinal;
+            goto done;
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * check the trust params of the issuer
+         */
+        flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&certTrust, trustType);
+        if ((flags & requiredFlags) == requiredFlags) {
+            /* we found a trusted one, so return */
+            rv = rvFinal;
+            goto done;
+        }
+        if (flags & CERTDB_VALID_CA) {
+            validCAOverride = PR_TRUE;
+        }
+        /* is it explicitly distrusted? */
+        if ((flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) &&
+            ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0)) {
+            /* untrusted -- the cert is explicitly untrusted, not
+             * just that it doesn't chain to a trusted cert */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, flags);
+        }
+    }
+    if (!validCAOverride) {
+        /*
+         * Make sure that if this is an intermediate CA in the chain that
+         * it was given permission by its signer to be a CA.
+         */
+        /*
+         * if basicConstraints says it is a ca, then we check the
+         * nsCertType.  If the nsCertType has any CA bits set, then
+         * it must have the right one.
+         */
+        if (!isca || (cert->nsCertType & NS_CERT_TYPE_CA)) {
+            isca = (cert->nsCertType & caCertType) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+        }
+
+        if (!isca) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_CA_CERT_INVALID);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, 0);
+        }
+
+        /* make sure key usage allows cert signing */
+        if (CERT_CheckKeyUsage(cert, requiredCAKeyUsage) != SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE);
+            LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, requiredCAKeyUsage);
+        }
+    }
+    /* make sure that the issuer is not self signed.  If it is, then
+     * stop here to prevent looping.
+     */
+    if (cert->isRoot) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER);
+        LOG_ERROR(log, cert, 0, 0);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    return CERT_VerifyCertChain(handle, cert, checkSig, certUsage, t,
+                                wincx, log);
+loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+done:
+    return rv;
+}
+
+#define NEXT_USAGE() \
+    {                \
+        i *= 2;      \
+        certUsage++; \
+        continue;    \
+    }
+
+#define VALID_USAGE() \
+    {                 \
+        NEXT_USAGE(); \
+    }
+
+#define INVALID_USAGE()                 \
+    {                                   \
+        if (returnedUsages) {           \
+            *returnedUsages &= (~i);    \
+        }                               \
+        if (PR_TRUE == requiredUsage) { \
+            valid = SECFailure;         \
+        }                               \
+        NEXT_USAGE();                   \
+    }
+
+/*
+ * check the leaf cert against trust and usage.
+ *   returns success if the cert is not distrusted. If the cert is
+ *       trusted, then the trusted bool will be true.
+ *   returns failure if the cert is distrusted. If failure, flags
+ *       will return the flag bits that indicated distrust.
+ */
+SECStatus
+cert_CheckLeafTrust(CERTCertificate *cert, SECCertUsage certUsage,
+                    unsigned int *failedFlags, PRBool *trusted)
+{
+    unsigned int flags;
+    CERTCertTrust trust;
+
+    *failedFlags = 0;
+    *trusted = PR_FALSE;
+
+    /* check trust flags to see if this cert is directly trusted */
+    if (CERT_GetCertTrust(cert, &trust) == SECSuccess) {
+        switch (certUsage) {
+            case certUsageSSLClient:
+            case certUsageSSLServer:
+            case certUsageIPsec:
+                flags = trust.sslFlags;
+
+                /* is the cert directly trusted or not trusted ? */
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                            * authoritative */
+                    if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED) {     /* trust this cert */
+                        *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                        return SECSuccess;
+                    } else { /* don't trust this cert */
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+                /* XXX - step up certs can't be directly trusted, only distrust */
+                flags = trust.sslFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                                                       * authoritative */
+                    if ((flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED) == 0) {
+                        /* don't trust this cert */
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            case certUsageSSLCA:
+                flags = trust.sslFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                                                       * authoritative */
+                    if ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0) {
+                        /* don't trust this cert */
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            case certUsageEmailSigner:
+            case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+                flags = trust.emailFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                                                       * authoritative */
+                    if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED) {     /* trust this cert */
+                        *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                        return SECSuccess;
+                    } else { /* don't trust this cert */
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+
+                break;
+            case certUsageObjectSigner:
+                flags = trust.objectSigningFlags;
+
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                                                       * authoritative */
+                    if (flags & CERTDB_TRUSTED) {     /* trust this cert */
+                        *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                        return SECSuccess;
+                    } else { /* don't trust this cert */
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+            case certUsageVerifyCA:
+            case certUsageStatusResponder:
+                flags = trust.sslFlags;
+                /* is the cert directly trusted or not trusted ? */
+                if ((flags & (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) ==
+                    (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) {
+                    *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                    return SECSuccess;
+                }
+                flags = trust.emailFlags;
+                /* is the cert directly trusted or not trusted ? */
+                if ((flags & (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) ==
+                    (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) {
+                    *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                    return SECSuccess;
+                }
+                flags = trust.objectSigningFlags;
+                /* is the cert directly trusted or not trusted ? */
+                if ((flags & (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) ==
+                    (CERTDB_VALID_CA | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) {
+                    *trusted = PR_TRUE;
+                    return SECSuccess;
+                }
+            /* fall through to test distrust */
+            case certUsageAnyCA:
+            case certUsageUserCertImport:
+                /* do we distrust these certs explicitly */
+                flags = trust.sslFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                            * authoritative */
+                    if ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0) {
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                flags = trust.emailFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                            * authoritative */
+                    if ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0) {
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+            /* fall through */
+            case certUsageProtectedObjectSigner:
+                flags = trust.objectSigningFlags;
+                if (flags & CERTDB_TERMINAL_RECORD) { /* the trust record is
+                                                       * authoritative */
+                    if ((flags & (CERTDB_TRUSTED | CERTDB_TRUSTED_CA)) == 0) {
+                        *failedFlags = flags;
+                        return SECFailure;
+                    }
+                }
+                break;
+        }
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify a certificate by checking if it's valid and that we
+ * trust the issuer.
+ *
+ * certificateUsage contains a bitfield of all cert usages that are
+ * required for verification to succeed
+ *
+ * a bitfield of cert usages is returned in *returnedUsages
+ * if requiredUsages is non-zero, the returned bitmap is only
+ * for those required usages, otherwise it is for all usages
+ *
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCertificate(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                       PRBool checkSig, SECCertificateUsage requiredUsages, PRTime t,
+                       void *wincx, CERTVerifyLog *log, SECCertificateUsage *returnedUsages)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    SECStatus valid;
+    unsigned int requiredKeyUsage;
+    unsigned int requiredCertType;
+    unsigned int flags;
+    unsigned int certType;
+    PRBool allowOverride;
+    SECCertTimeValidity validity;
+    CERTStatusConfig *statusConfig;
+    PRInt32 i;
+    SECCertUsage certUsage = 0;
+    PRBool checkedOCSP = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool checkAllUsages = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool revoked = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool sigerror = PR_FALSE;
+    PRBool trusted = PR_FALSE;
+
+    if (!requiredUsages) {
+        /* there are no required usages, so the user probably wants to
+           get status for all usages */
+        checkAllUsages = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (returnedUsages) {
+        *returnedUsages = 0;
+    } else {
+        /* we don't have a place to return status for all usages,
+           so we can skip checks for usages that aren't required */
+        checkAllUsages = PR_FALSE;
+    }
+    valid = SECSuccess; /* start off assuming cert is valid */
+
+    /* make sure that the cert is valid at time t */
+    allowOverride = (PRBool)((requiredUsages & certificateUsageSSLServer) ||
+                             (requiredUsages & certificateUsageSSLServerWithStepUp) ||
+                             (requiredUsages & certificateUsageIPsec));
+    validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(cert, t, allowOverride);
+    if (validity != secCertTimeValid) {
+        valid = SECFailure;
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, validity);
+    }
+
+    /* check key usage and netscape cert type */
+    cert_GetCertType(cert);
+    certType = cert->nsCertType;
+
+    for (i = 1; i <= certificateUsageHighest &&
+                (SECSuccess == valid || returnedUsages || log);) {
+        PRBool requiredUsage = (i & requiredUsages) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+        if (PR_FALSE == requiredUsage && PR_FALSE == checkAllUsages) {
+            NEXT_USAGE();
+        }
+        if (returnedUsages) {
+            *returnedUsages |= i; /* start off assuming this usage is valid */
+        }
+        switch (certUsage) {
+            case certUsageSSLClient:
+            case certUsageSSLServer:
+            case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+            case certUsageSSLCA:
+            case certUsageEmailSigner:
+            case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+            case certUsageObjectSigner:
+            case certUsageStatusResponder:
+            case certUsageIPsec:
+                rv = CERT_KeyUsageAndTypeForCertUsage(certUsage, PR_FALSE,
+                                                      &requiredKeyUsage,
+                                                      &requiredCertType);
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    PORT_Assert(0);
+                    /* EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log); XXX ??? */
+                    requiredKeyUsage = 0;
+                    requiredCertType = 0;
+                    INVALID_USAGE();
+                }
+                break;
+
+            case certUsageAnyCA:
+            case certUsageProtectedObjectSigner:
+            case certUsageUserCertImport:
+            case certUsageVerifyCA:
+                /* these usages cannot be verified */
+                NEXT_USAGE();
+
+            default:
+                PORT_Assert(0);
+                requiredKeyUsage = 0;
+                requiredCertType = 0;
+                INVALID_USAGE();
+        }
+        if (CERT_CheckKeyUsage(cert, requiredKeyUsage) != SECSuccess) {
+            if (PR_TRUE == requiredUsage) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE);
+            }
+            LOG_ERROR(log, cert, 0, requiredKeyUsage);
+            INVALID_USAGE();
+        }
+        if (!(certType & requiredCertType)) {
+            if (PR_TRUE == requiredUsage) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE);
+            }
+            LOG_ERROR(log, cert, 0, requiredCertType);
+            INVALID_USAGE();
+        }
+
+        rv = cert_CheckLeafTrust(cert, certUsage, &flags, &trusted);
+        if (rv == SECFailure) {
+            if (PR_TRUE == requiredUsage) {
+                PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
+            }
+            LOG_ERROR(log, cert, 0, flags);
+            INVALID_USAGE();
+        } else if (trusted) {
+            VALID_USAGE();
+        }
+
+        if (PR_TRUE == revoked || PR_TRUE == sigerror) {
+            INVALID_USAGE();
+        }
+
+        rv = cert_VerifyCertChain(handle, cert,
+                                  checkSig, &sigerror,
+                                  certUsage, t, wincx, log,
+                                  &revoked);
+
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            /* EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log); XXX ???? */
+            INVALID_USAGE();
+        }
+
+        /*
+         * Check OCSP revocation status, but only if the cert we are checking
+         * is not a status responder itself. We only do this in the case
+         * where we checked the cert chain (above); explicit trust "wins"
+         * (avoids status checking, just as it avoids CRL checking) by
+         * bypassing this code.
+         */
+
+        if (PR_FALSE == checkedOCSP) {
+            checkedOCSP = PR_TRUE; /* only check OCSP once */
+            statusConfig = CERT_GetStatusConfig(handle);
+            if (requiredUsages != certificateUsageStatusResponder &&
+                statusConfig != NULL) {
+                if (statusConfig->statusChecker != NULL) {
+                    rv = (*statusConfig->statusChecker)(handle, cert,
+                                                        t, wincx);
+                    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                        LOG_ERROR(log, cert, 0, 0);
+                        revoked = PR_TRUE;
+                        INVALID_USAGE();
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        NEXT_USAGE();
+    }
+
+loser:
+    return (valid);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCert(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                PRBool checkSig, SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t,
+                void *wincx, CERTVerifyLog *log)
+{
+    return cert_VerifyCertWithFlags(handle, cert, checkSig, certUsage, t,
+                                    CERT_VERIFYCERT_USE_DEFAULTS, wincx, log);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+cert_VerifyCertWithFlags(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                         PRBool checkSig, SECCertUsage certUsage, PRTime t,
+                         PRUint32 flags, void *wincx, CERTVerifyLog *log)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    unsigned int requiredKeyUsage;
+    unsigned int requiredCertType;
+    unsigned int failedFlags;
+    unsigned int certType;
+    PRBool trusted;
+    PRBool allowOverride;
+    SECCertTimeValidity validity;
+    CERTStatusConfig *statusConfig;
+
+#ifdef notdef
+    /* check if this cert is in the Evil list */
+    rv = CERT_CheckForEvilCert(cert);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE);
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, 0);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* make sure that the cert is valid at time t */
+    allowOverride = (PRBool)((certUsage == certUsageSSLServer) ||
+                             (certUsage == certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp) ||
+                             (certUsage == certUsageIPsec));
+    validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(cert, t, allowOverride);
+    if (validity != secCertTimeValid) {
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, validity);
+    }
+
+    /* check key usage and netscape cert type */
+    cert_GetCertType(cert);
+    certType = cert->nsCertType;
+    switch (certUsage) {
+        case certUsageSSLClient:
+        case certUsageSSLServer:
+        case certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp:
+        case certUsageIPsec:
+        case certUsageSSLCA:
+        case certUsageEmailSigner:
+        case certUsageEmailRecipient:
+        case certUsageObjectSigner:
+        case certUsageStatusResponder:
+            rv = CERT_KeyUsageAndTypeForCertUsage(certUsage, PR_FALSE,
+                                                  &requiredKeyUsage,
+                                                  &requiredCertType);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                PORT_Assert(0);
+                EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+                requiredKeyUsage = 0;
+                requiredCertType = 0;
+            }
+            break;
+        case certUsageVerifyCA:
+        case certUsageAnyCA:
+            requiredKeyUsage = KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN;
+            requiredCertType = NS_CERT_TYPE_CA;
+            if (!(certType & NS_CERT_TYPE_CA)) {
+                certType |= NS_CERT_TYPE_CA;
+            }
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+            requiredKeyUsage = 0;
+            requiredCertType = 0;
+    }
+    if (CERT_CheckKeyUsage(cert, requiredKeyUsage) != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE);
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, requiredKeyUsage);
+    }
+    if (!(certType & requiredCertType)) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_CERT_TYPE);
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, requiredCertType);
+    }
+
+    rv = cert_CheckLeafTrust(cert, certUsage, &failedFlags, &trusted);
+    if (rv == SECFailure) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_CERT);
+        LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, failedFlags);
+    } else if (trusted) {
+        goto done;
+    }
+
+    rv = CERT_VerifyCertChain(handle, cert, checkSig, certUsage,
+                              t, wincx, log);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        EXIT_IF_NOT_LOGGING(log);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Check revocation status, but only if the cert we are checking is not a
+     * status responder itself and the caller did not ask us to skip the check.
+     * We only do this in the case where we checked the cert chain (above);
+     * explicit trust "wins" (avoids status checking, just as it avoids CRL
+     * checking, which is all done inside VerifyCertChain) by bypassing this
+     * code.
+     */
+    if (!(flags & CERT_VERIFYCERT_SKIP_OCSP) &&
+        certUsage != certUsageStatusResponder) {
+        statusConfig = CERT_GetStatusConfig(handle);
+        if (statusConfig && statusConfig->statusChecker) {
+            rv = (*statusConfig->statusChecker)(handle, cert,
+                                                t, wincx);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                LOG_ERROR_OR_EXIT(log, cert, 0, 0);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+done:
+    if (log && log->head) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    return (SECSuccess);
+
+loser:
+    rv = SECFailure;
+
+    return (rv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify a certificate by checking if its valid and that we
+ * trust the issuer.  Verify time against now.
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCertificateNow(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                          PRBool checkSig, SECCertificateUsage requiredUsages,
+                          void *wincx, SECCertificateUsage *returnedUsages)
+{
+    return (CERT_VerifyCertificate(handle, cert, checkSig,
+                                   requiredUsages, PR_Now(), wincx, NULL, returnedUsages));
+}
+
+/* obsolete, do not use for new code */
+SECStatus
+CERT_VerifyCertNow(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                   PRBool checkSig, SECCertUsage certUsage, void *wincx)
+{
+    return (CERT_VerifyCert(handle, cert, checkSig,
+                            certUsage, PR_Now(), wincx, NULL));
+}
+
+/* [ FROM pcertdb.c ] */
+/*
+ * Supported usage values and types:
+ *  certUsageSSLClient
+ *  certUsageSSLServer
+ *  certUsageSSLServerWithStepUp
+ *  certUsageIPsec
+ *  certUsageEmailSigner
+ *  certUsageEmailRecipient
+ *  certUsageObjectSigner
+ */
+
+CERTCertificate *
+CERT_FindMatchingCert(CERTCertDBHandle *handle, SECItem *derName,
+                      CERTCertOwner owner, SECCertUsage usage,
+                      PRBool preferTrusted, PRTime validTime, PRBool validOnly)
+{
+    CERTCertList *certList = NULL;
+    CERTCertificate *cert = NULL;
+    CERTCertTrust certTrust;
+    unsigned int requiredTrustFlags;
+    SECTrustType requiredTrustType;
+    unsigned int flags;
+
+    PRBool lookingForCA = PR_FALSE;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    CERTCertListNode *node;
+    CERTCertificate *saveUntrustedCA = NULL;
+
+    /* if preferTrusted is set, must be a CA cert */
+    PORT_Assert(!(preferTrusted && (owner != certOwnerCA)));
+
+    if (owner == certOwnerCA) {
+        lookingForCA = PR_TRUE;
+        if (preferTrusted) {
+            rv = CERT_TrustFlagsForCACertUsage(usage, &requiredTrustFlags,
+                                               &requiredTrustType);
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+            requiredTrustFlags |= CERTDB_VALID_CA;
+        }
+    }
+
+    certList = CERT_CreateSubjectCertList(NULL, handle, derName, validTime,
+                                          validOnly);
+    if (certList != NULL) {
+        rv = CERT_FilterCertListByUsage(certList, usage, lookingForCA);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+
+        while (!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList)) {
+            cert = node->cert;
+
+            /* looking for a trusted CA cert */
+            if ((owner == certOwnerCA) && preferTrusted &&
+                (requiredTrustType != trustTypeNone)) {
+
+                if (CERT_GetCertTrust(cert, &certTrust) != SECSuccess) {
+                    flags = 0;
+                } else {
+                    flags = SEC_GET_TRUST_FLAGS(&certTrust, requiredTrustType);
+                }
+
+                if ((flags & requiredTrustFlags) != requiredTrustFlags) {
+                    /* cert is not trusted */
+                    /* if this is the first cert to get this far, then save
+                     * it, so we can use it if we can't find a trusted one
+                     */
+                    if (saveUntrustedCA == NULL) {
+                        saveUntrustedCA = cert;
+                    }
+                    goto endloop;
+                }
+            }
+            /* if we got this far, then this cert meets all criteria */
+            break;
+
+        endloop:
+            node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
+            cert = NULL;
+        }
+
+        /* use the saved one if we have it */
+        if (cert == NULL) {
+            cert = saveUntrustedCA;
+        }
+
+        /* if we found one then bump the ref count before freeing the list */
+        if (cert != NULL) {
+            /* bump the ref count */
+            cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+        }
+
+        CERT_DestroyCertList(certList);
+    }
+
+    return (cert);
+
+loser:
+    if (certList != NULL) {
+        CERT_DestroyCertList(certList);
+    }
+
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* [ From certdb.c ] */
+/*
+ * Filter a list of certificates, removing those certs that do not have
+ * one of the named CA certs somewhere in their cert chain.
+ *
+ *  "certList" - the list of certificates to filter
+ *  "nCANames" - number of CA names
+ *  "caNames" - array of CA names in string(rfc 1485) form
+ *  "usage" - what use the certs are for, this is used when
+ *      selecting CA certs
+ */
+SECStatus
+CERT_FilterCertListByCANames(CERTCertList *certList, int nCANames,
+                             char **caNames, SECCertUsage usage)
+{
+    CERTCertificate *issuerCert = NULL;
+    CERTCertificate *subjectCert;
+    CERTCertListNode *node, *freenode;
+    CERTCertificate *cert;
+    int n;
+    char **names;
+    PRBool found;
+    PRTime time;
+
+    if (nCANames <= 0) {
+        return (SECSuccess);
+    }
+
+    time = PR_Now();
+
+    node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+
+    while (!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList)) {
+        cert = node->cert;
+
+        subjectCert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+
+        /* traverse the CA certs for this cert */
+        found = PR_FALSE;
+        while (subjectCert != NULL) {
+            n = nCANames;
+            names = caNames;
+
+            if (subjectCert->issuerName != NULL) {
+                while (n > 0) {
+                    if (PORT_Strcmp(*names, subjectCert->issuerName) == 0) {
+                        found = PR_TRUE;
+                        break;
+                    }
+
+                    n--;
+                    names++;
+                }
+            }
+
+            if (found) {
+                break;
+            }
+
+            issuerCert = CERT_FindCertIssuer(subjectCert, time, usage);
+            if (issuerCert == subjectCert) {
+                CERT_DestroyCertificate(issuerCert);
+                issuerCert = NULL;
+                break;
+            }
+            CERT_DestroyCertificate(subjectCert);
+            subjectCert = issuerCert;
+        }
+        CERT_DestroyCertificate(subjectCert);
+        if (!found) {
+            /* CA was not found, so remove this cert from the list */
+            freenode = node;
+            node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
+            CERT_RemoveCertListNode(freenode);
+        } else {
+            /* CA was found, so leave it in the list */
+            node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return (SECSuccess);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a certificate, return a string containing the nickname, and possibly
+ * one of the validity strings, based on the current validity state of the
+ * certificate.
+ *
+ * "arena" - arena to allocate returned string from.  If NULL, then heap
+ *  is used.
+ * "cert" - the cert to get nickname from
+ * "expiredString" - the string to append to the nickname if the cert is
+ *      expired.
+ * "notYetGoodString" - the string to append to the nickname if the cert is
+ *      not yet good.
+ */
+char *
+CERT_GetCertNicknameWithValidity(PLArenaPool *arena, CERTCertificate *cert,
+                                 char *expiredString, char *notYetGoodString)
+{
+    SECCertTimeValidity validity;
+    char *nickname = NULL, *tmpstr = NULL;
+    const char *srcNickname = cert->nickname;
+    if (!srcNickname) {
+        srcNickname = "{???}";
+    }
+
+    validity = CERT_CheckCertValidTimes(cert, PR_Now(), PR_FALSE);
+
+    /* if the cert is good, then just use the nickname directly */
+    if (validity == secCertTimeValid) {
+        if (arena == NULL) {
+            nickname = PORT_Strdup(srcNickname);
+        } else {
+            nickname = PORT_ArenaStrdup(arena, srcNickname);
+        }
+
+        if (nickname == NULL) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    } else {
+
+        /* if the cert is not valid, then tack one of the strings on the
+         * end
+         */
+        if (validity == secCertTimeExpired) {
+            tmpstr = PR_smprintf("%s%s", srcNickname,
+                                 expiredString);
+        } else if (validity == secCertTimeNotValidYet) {
+            /* not yet valid */
+            tmpstr = PR_smprintf("%s%s", srcNickname,
+                                 notYetGoodString);
+        } else {
+            /* undetermined */
+            tmpstr = PR_smprintf("%s",
+                                 "(NULL) (Validity Unknown)");
+        }
+
+        if (tmpstr == NULL) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        if (arena) {
+            /* copy the string into the arena and free the malloc'd one */
+            nickname = PORT_ArenaStrdup(arena, tmpstr);
+            PORT_Free(tmpstr);
+        } else {
+            nickname = tmpstr;
+        }
+        if (nickname == NULL) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+    }
+    return (nickname);
+
+loser:
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect the nicknames from all certs in a CertList.  If the cert is not
+ * valid, append a string to that nickname.
+ *
+ * "certList" - the list of certificates
+ * "expiredString" - the string to append to the nickname of any expired cert
+ * "notYetGoodString" - the string to append to the nickname of any cert
+ *      that is not yet valid
+ */
+CERTCertNicknames *
+CERT_NicknameStringsFromCertList(CERTCertList *certList, char *expiredString,
+                                 char *notYetGoodString)
+{
+    CERTCertNicknames *names;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+    CERTCertListNode *node;
+    char **nn;
+
+    /* allocate an arena */
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (arena == NULL) {
+        return (NULL);
+    }
+
+    /* allocate the structure */
+    names = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(CERTCertNicknames));
+    if (names == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* init the structure */
+    names->arena = arena;
+    names->head = NULL;
+    names->numnicknames = 0;
+    names->nicknames = NULL;
+    names->totallen = 0;
+
+    /* count the certs in the list */
+    node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+    while (!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList)) {
+        names->numnicknames++;
+        node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
+    }
+
+    /* allocate nicknames array */
+    names->nicknames = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena,
+                                       sizeof(char *) * names->numnicknames);
+    if (names->nicknames == NULL) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* just in case printf can't deal with null strings */
+    if (expiredString == NULL) {
+        expiredString = "";
+    }
+
+    if (notYetGoodString == NULL) {
+        notYetGoodString = "";
+    }
+
+    /* traverse the list of certs and collect the nicknames */
+    nn = names->nicknames;
+    node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
+    while (!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList)) {
+        *nn = CERT_GetCertNicknameWithValidity(arena, node->cert,
+                                               expiredString,
+                                               notYetGoodString);
+        if (*nn == NULL) {
+            goto loser;
+        }
+
+        names->totallen += PORT_Strlen(*nn);
+
+        nn++;
+        node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node);
+    }
+
+    return (names);
+
+loser:
+    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extract the nickname from a nickmake string that may have either
+ * expiredString or notYetGoodString appended.
+ *
+ * Args:
+ *  "namestring" - the string containing the nickname, and possibly
+ *      one of the validity label strings
+ *  "expiredString" - the expired validity label string
+ *  "notYetGoodString" - the not yet good validity label string
+ *
+ * Returns the raw nickname
+ */
+char *
+CERT_ExtractNicknameString(char *namestring, char *expiredString,
+                           char *notYetGoodString)
+{
+    int explen, nyglen, namelen;
+    int retlen;
+    char *retstr;
+
+    namelen = PORT_Strlen(namestring);
+    explen = PORT_Strlen(expiredString);
+    nyglen = PORT_Strlen(notYetGoodString);
+
+    if (namelen > explen) {
+        if (PORT_Strcmp(expiredString, &namestring[namelen - explen]) == 0) {
+            retlen = namelen - explen;
+            retstr = (char *)PORT_Alloc(retlen + 1);
+            if (retstr == NULL) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(retstr, namestring, retlen);
+            retstr[retlen] = '\0';
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (namelen > nyglen) {
+        if (PORT_Strcmp(notYetGoodString, &namestring[namelen - nyglen]) == 0) {
+            retlen = namelen - nyglen;
+            retstr = (char *)PORT_Alloc(retlen + 1);
+            if (retstr == NULL) {
+                goto loser;
+            }
+
+            PORT_Memcpy(retstr, namestring, retlen);
+            retstr[retlen] = '\0';
+            goto done;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* if name string is shorter than either invalid string, then it must
+     * be a raw nickname
+     */
+    retstr = PORT_Strdup(namestring);
+
+done:
+    return (retstr);
+
+loser:
+    return (NULL);
+}
+
+CERTCertList *
+CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(CERTCertificate *cert, PRTime time, SECCertUsage usage)
+{
+    CERTCertList *chain = NULL;
+    int count = 0;
+
+    if (NULL == cert) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    cert = CERT_DupCertificate(cert);
+    if (NULL == cert) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    chain = CERT_NewCertList();
+    if (NULL == chain) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    while (cert != NULL && ++count <= CERT_MAX_CERT_CHAIN) {
+        if (SECSuccess != CERT_AddCertToListTail(chain, cert)) {
+            /* return partial chain */
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+            return chain;
+        }
+
+        if (cert->isRoot) {
+            /* return complete chain */
+            return chain;
+        }
+
+        cert = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, time, usage);
+    }
+
+    /* return partial chain */
+    PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER);
+    return chain;
+}