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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
commit36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9 (patch)
tree105e8c98ddea1c1e4784a60a5a6410fa416be2de /security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-upstream.tar.xz
firefox-esr-upstream.zip
Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esrupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c2158
1 files changed, 2158 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0243a930b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11pars.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2158 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * The following handles the loading, unloading and management of
+ * various PCKS #11 modules
+ */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pki3hack.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "utilpars.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+
+/* create a new module */
+static SECMODModule *
+secmod_NewModule(void)
+{
+ SECMODModule *newMod;
+ PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+ /* create an arena in which dllName and commonName can be
+ * allocated.
+ */
+ arena = PORT_NewArena(512);
+ if (arena == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ newMod = (SECMODModule *)PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, sizeof(SECMODModule));
+ if (newMod == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * initialize of the fields of the module
+ */
+ newMod->arena = arena;
+ newMod->internal = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->loaded = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->isFIPS = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->dllName = NULL;
+ newMod->commonName = NULL;
+ newMod->library = NULL;
+ newMod->functionList = NULL;
+ newMod->slotCount = 0;
+ newMod->slots = NULL;
+ newMod->slotInfo = NULL;
+ newMod->slotInfoCount = 0;
+ newMod->refCount = 1;
+ newMod->ssl[0] = 0;
+ newMod->ssl[1] = 0;
+ newMod->libraryParams = NULL;
+ newMod->moduleDBFunc = NULL;
+ newMod->parent = NULL;
+ newMod->isCritical = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->isModuleDB = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->moduleDBOnly = PR_FALSE;
+ newMod->trustOrder = 0;
+ newMod->cipherOrder = 0;
+ newMod->evControlMask = 0;
+ newMod->refLock = PZ_NewLock(nssILockRefLock);
+ if (newMod->refLock == NULL) {
+ PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return newMod;
+}
+
+/* private flags for isModuleDB (field in SECMODModule). */
+/* The meaing of these flags is as follows:
+ *
+ * SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_IS_MODULE_DB - This is a module that accesses the
+ * database of other modules to load. Module DBs are loadable modules that
+ * tells NSS which PKCS #11 modules to load and when. These module DBs are
+ * chainable. That is, one module DB can load another one. NSS system init
+ * design takes advantage of this feature. In system NSS, a fixed system
+ * module DB loads the system defined libraries, then chains out to the
+ * traditional module DBs to load any system or user configured modules
+ * (like smart cards). This bit is the same as the already existing meaning
+ * of isModuleDB = PR_TRUE. None of the other module db flags should be set
+ * if this flag isn't on.
+ *
+ * SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_SKIP_FIRST - This flag tells NSS to skip the first
+ * PKCS #11 module presented by a module DB. This allows the OS to load a
+ * softoken from the system module, then ask the existing module DB code to
+ * load the other PKCS #11 modules in that module DB (skipping it's request
+ * to load softoken). This gives the system init finer control over the
+ * configuration of that softoken module.
+ *
+ * SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_DEFAULT_MODDB - This flag allows system init to mark a
+ * different module DB as the 'default' module DB (the one in which
+ * 'Add module' changes will go). Without this flag NSS takes the first
+ * module as the default Module DB, but in system NSS, that first module
+ * is the system module, which is likely read only (at least to the user).
+ * This allows system NSS to delegate those changes to the user's module DB,
+ * preserving the user's ability to load new PKCS #11 modules (which only
+ * affect him), from existing applications like Firefox.
+ */
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_IS_MODULE_DB 0x01 /* must be set if any of the \
+ *other flags are set */
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_SKIP_FIRST 0x02
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_DEFAULT_MODDB 0x04
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_POLICY_ONLY 0x08
+
+/* private flags for internal (field in SECMODModule). */
+/* The meaing of these flags is as follows:
+ *
+ * SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_IS_INTERNAL - This is a marks the the module is
+ * the internal module (that is, softoken). This bit is the same as the
+ * already existing meaning of internal = PR_TRUE. None of the other
+ * internal flags should be set if this flag isn't on.
+ *
+ * SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT - This flag allows system init to mark
+ * a different slot returned byt PK11_GetInternalKeySlot(). The 'primary'
+ * slot defined by this module will be the new internal key slot.
+ */
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_IS_INTERNAL 0x01 /* must be set if any of \
+ *the other flags are set */
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT 0x02
+
+/* private flags for policy check. */
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_IDENTIFIER 0x01
+#define SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_VALUE 0x02
+
+/*
+ * for 3.4 we continue to use the old SECMODModule structure
+ */
+SECMODModule *
+SECMOD_CreateModule(const char *library, const char *moduleName,
+ const char *parameters, const char *nss)
+{
+ return SECMOD_CreateModuleEx(library, moduleName, parameters, nss, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NSS config options format:
+ *
+ * The specified ciphers will be allowed by policy, but an application
+ * may allow more by policy explicitly:
+ * config="allow=curve1:curve2:hash1:hash2:rsa-1024..."
+ *
+ * Only the specified hashes and curves will be allowed:
+ * config="disallow=all allow=sha1:sha256:secp256r1:secp384r1"
+ *
+ * Only the specified hashes and curves will be allowed, and
+ * RSA keys of 2048 or more will be accepted, and DH key exchange
+ * with 1024-bit primes or more:
+ * config="disallow=all allow=sha1:sha256:secp256r1:secp384r1:min-rsa=2048:min-dh=1024"
+ *
+ * A policy that enables the AES ciphersuites and the SECP256/384 curves:
+ * config="allow=aes128-cbc:aes128-gcm:TLS1.0:TLS1.2:TLS1.1:HMAC-SHA1:SHA1:SHA256:SHA384:RSA:ECDHE-RSA:SECP256R1:SECP384R1"
+ *
+ * Disallow values are parsed first, then allow values, independent of the
+ * order they appear.
+ *
+ * flags: turn on the following flags:
+ * policy-lock: turn off the ability for applications to change policy with
+ * the call NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy or the other system policy
+ * calls (SSL_SetPolicy, etc.)
+ * ssl-lock: turn off the ability to change the ssl defaults.
+ *
+ * The following only apply to ssl cipher suites (future smime)
+ *
+ * enable: turn on ciphersuites by default.
+ * disable: turn off ciphersuites by default without disallowing them by policy.
+ *
+ *
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned name_size;
+ SECOidTag oid;
+ PRUint32 val;
+} oidValDef;
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned name_size;
+ PRInt32 option;
+} optionFreeDef;
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *name;
+ unsigned name_size;
+ PRUint32 flag;
+} policyFlagDef;
+
+/*
+ * This table should be merged with the SECOID table.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_NAME(x) x, (sizeof(x) - 1)
+static const oidValDef curveOptList[] = {
+ /* Curves */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME192V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME192V2"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME192V3"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V3,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME239V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME239V2"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME239V3"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME239V3,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("PRIME256V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP112R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP112R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP112R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP128R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP128R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP128R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP160K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP160R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP160R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP160R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP192K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP192K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP192R1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME192V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP224K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP224K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP256K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP256R1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PRIME256V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP384R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECP521R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CURVE25519"), SEC_OID_CURVE25519,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ /* ANSI X9.62 named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V2"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB163V3"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB163V3,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB176V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB176V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB191V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB191V2"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB191V3"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB191V3,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2ONB191V4"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V4,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2ONB191V5"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB191V5,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB208W1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB208W1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB239V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB239V2"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB239V3"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB239V3,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2ONB239V4"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V4,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2ONB239V5"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2ONB239V5,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB272W1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB272W1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB304W1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB304W1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB359V1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB359V1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2PNB368W1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2PNB368W1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("C2TNB431R1"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_C2TNB431R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ /* SECG named elliptic curves (characteristic two field) */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT113R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT131R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT113R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT131R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT131R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT131R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT163K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT163R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT163R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT163R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT193R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT193R2"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT193R2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT233K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT233R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT233R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT239K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT239K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT283K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT283R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT283R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT409K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT409R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT409R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT571K1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571K1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SECT571R1"), SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECT571R1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+};
+
+static const oidValDef hashOptList[] = {
+ /* Hashes */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("MD2"), SEC_OID_MD2,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("MD4"), SEC_OID_MD4,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("MD5"), SEC_OID_MD5,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SHA1"), SEC_OID_SHA1,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SHA224"), SEC_OID_SHA224,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SHA256"), SEC_OID_SHA256,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SHA384"), SEC_OID_SHA384,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SHA512"), SEC_OID_SHA512,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE }
+};
+
+static const oidValDef macOptList[] = {
+ /* MACs */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-SHA1"), SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA1, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-SHA224"), SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA224, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-SHA256"), SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA256, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-SHA384"), SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA384, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-SHA512"), SEC_OID_HMAC_SHA512, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("HMAC-MD5"), SEC_OID_HMAC_MD5, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+};
+
+static const oidValDef cipherOptList[] = {
+ /* Ciphers */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES128-CBC"), SEC_OID_AES_128_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES192-CBC"), SEC_OID_AES_192_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES256-CBC"), SEC_OID_AES_256_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES128-GCM"), SEC_OID_AES_128_GCM, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES192-GCM"), SEC_OID_AES_192_GCM, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("AES256-GCM"), SEC_OID_AES_256_GCM, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CAMELLIA128-CBC"), SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_128_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CAMELLIA192-CBC"), SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_192_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CAMELLIA256-CBC"), SEC_OID_CAMELLIA_256_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CHACHA20-POLY1305"), SEC_OID_CHACHA20_POLY1305, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SEED-CBC"), SEC_OID_SEED_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DES-EDE3-CBC"), SEC_OID_DES_EDE3_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DES-40-CBC"), SEC_OID_DES_40_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DES-CBC"), SEC_OID_DES_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("NULL-CIPHER"), SEC_OID_NULL_CIPHER, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RC2"), SEC_OID_RC2_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RC4"), SEC_OID_RC4, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("IDEA"), SEC_OID_IDEA_CBC, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+};
+
+static const oidValDef kxOptList[] = {
+ /* Key exchange */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-EXPORT"), SEC_OID_TLS_RSA_EXPORT, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DHE-DSS"), SEC_OID_TLS_DHE_DSS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_DH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DH-DSS"), SEC_OID_TLS_DH_DSS, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDHE-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDHE_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-ECDSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_ECDSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDH-RSA"), SEC_OID_TLS_ECDH_RSA, NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+};
+
+static const oidValDef signOptList[] = {
+ /* Signatures */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX9_DSA_SIGNATURE,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PKCS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_ENCRYPTION,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-PSS"), SEC_OID_PKCS1_RSA_PSS_SIGNATURE,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECDSA"), SEC_OID_ANSIX962_EC_PUBLIC_KEY,
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+ const oidValDef *list;
+ PRUint32 entries;
+ const char *description;
+ PRBool allowEmpty;
+} algListsDef;
+
+static const algListsDef algOptLists[] = {
+ { curveOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(curveOptList), "ECC", PR_FALSE },
+ { hashOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(hashOptList), "HASH", PR_FALSE },
+ { macOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(macOptList), "MAC", PR_FALSE },
+ { cipherOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(cipherOptList), "CIPHER", PR_FALSE },
+ { kxOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(kxOptList), "OTHER-KX", PR_FALSE },
+ { signOptList, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(signOptList), "OTHER-SIGN", PR_FALSE },
+};
+
+static const optionFreeDef sslOptList[] = {
+ /* Versions */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SSL2.0"), 0x002 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SSL3.0"), 0x300 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SSL3.1"), 0x301 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS1.0"), 0x301 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS1.1"), 0x302 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS1.2"), 0x303 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS1.3"), 0x304 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.0"), 0x302 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.1"), 0x302 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.2"), 0x303 },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS1.3"), 0x304 },
+};
+
+static const optionFreeDef keySizeFlagsList[] = {
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SSL"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SSL_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-SIGN"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_SIGN_FLAG },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-VERIFY"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_VERIFY_FLAG },
+};
+
+static const optionFreeDef freeOptList[] = {
+
+ /* Restrictions for asymetric keys */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("RSA-MIN"), NSS_RSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DH-MIN"), NSS_DH_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DSA-MIN"), NSS_DSA_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ECC-MIN"), NSS_ECC_MIN_KEY_SIZE },
+ /* what operations doe the key size apply to */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-SIZE-FLAGS"), NSS_KEY_SIZE_POLICY_FLAGS },
+ /* constraints on SSL Protocols */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("TLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_TLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY },
+ /* constraints on DTLS Protocols */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS-VERSION-MIN"), NSS_DTLS_VERSION_MIN_POLICY },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("DTLS-VERSION-MAX"), NSS_DTLS_VERSION_MAX_POLICY }
+};
+
+static const policyFlagDef policyFlagList[] = {
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SSL"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SSL-KEY-EXCHANGE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ /* add other key exhanges in the future */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("KEY-EXCHANGE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CERT-SIGNATURE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("CMS-SIGNATURE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CMS_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ALL-SIGNATURE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ /* sign turns off all signatures, but doesn't change the
+ * allowance for specific sigantures... for example:
+ * disallow=sha256/all allow=sha256/signature doesn't allow
+ * cert-sigantures, where disallow=sha256/all allow=sha256/all-signature
+ * does.
+ * however, disallow=sha356/signature and disallow=sha256/all-siganture are
+ * equivalent in effect */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("SIGNATURE"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_ANY_SIGNATURE },
+ /* enable/disable everything */
+ { CIPHER_NAME("ALL"), NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX |
+ NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SIGNATURE },
+ { CIPHER_NAME("NONE"), 0 }
+};
+
+/*
+ * Get the next cipher on the list. point to the next one in 'next'.
+ * return the length;
+ */
+static const char *
+secmod_ArgGetSubValue(const char *cipher, char sep1, char sep2,
+ int *len, const char **next)
+{
+ const char *start = cipher;
+
+ if (start == NULL) {
+ *len = 0;
+ *next = NULL;
+ return start;
+ }
+
+ for (; *cipher && *cipher != sep2; cipher++) {
+ if (*cipher == sep1) {
+ *next = cipher + 1;
+ *len = cipher - start;
+ return start;
+ }
+ }
+ *next = NULL;
+ *len = cipher - start;
+ return start;
+}
+
+static PRUint32
+secmod_parsePolicyValue(const char *policyFlags, int policyLength,
+ PRBool printPolicyFeedback, PRUint32 policyCheckFlags)
+{
+ const char *flag, *currentString;
+ PRUint32 flags = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (currentString = policyFlags; currentString &&
+ currentString < policyFlags + policyLength;) {
+ int length;
+ PRBool unknown = PR_TRUE;
+ flag = secmod_ArgGetSubValue(currentString, ',', ':', &length,
+ &currentString);
+ if (length == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(policyFlagList); i++) {
+ const policyFlagDef *policy = &policyFlagList[i];
+ unsigned name_size = policy->name_size;
+ if ((policy->name_size == length) &&
+ PORT_Strncasecmp(policy->name, flag, name_size) == 0) {
+ flags |= policy->flag;
+ unknown = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (unknown && printPolicyFeedback &&
+ (policyCheckFlags & SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_VALUE)) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_FAIL=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-FAIL %.*s: unknown value: %.*s\n",
+ policyLength, policyFlags, length, flag);
+ }
+ }
+ return flags;
+}
+
+/* allow symbolic names for values. The only ones currently defines or
+ * SSL protocol versions. */
+static SECStatus
+secmod_getPolicyOptValue(const char *policyValue, int policyValueLength,
+ PRInt32 *result)
+{
+ PRInt32 val = atoi(policyValue);
+ int i;
+
+ if ((val != 0) || (*policyValue == '0')) {
+ *result = val;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ /* handle any ssl strings */
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(sslOptList); i++) {
+ if (policyValueLength == sslOptList[i].name_size &&
+ PORT_Strncasecmp(sslOptList[i].name, policyValue,
+ sslOptList[i].name_size) == 0) {
+ *result = sslOptList[i].option;
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ /* handle key_size flags. Each flag represents a bit, which
+ * gets or'd together. They can be separated by , | or + */
+ val = 0;
+ while (*policyValue) {
+ PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(keySizeFlagsList); i++) {
+ if (PORT_Strncasecmp(keySizeFlagsList[i].name, policyValue,
+ keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size) == 0) {
+ val |= keySizeFlagsList[i].option;
+ found = PR_TRUE;
+ policyValue += keySizeFlagsList[i].name_size;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (*policyValue == ',' || *policyValue == '|' || *policyValue == '+') {
+ policyValue++;
+ }
+ }
+ *result = val;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Policy operations:
+ * Disallow: operation is disallowed by policy. Implies disabled.
+ * Allow: operation is allowed by policy (but could be disabled).
+ * Disable: operation is turned off by default (but could be allowed).
+ * Enable: operation is enabled by default. Implies allowed.
+ */
+typedef enum {
+ NSS_DISALLOW,
+ NSS_ALLOW,
+ NSS_DISABLE,
+ NSS_ENABLE
+} NSSPolicyOperation;
+
+/* apply the operator specific policy */
+SECStatus
+secmod_setPolicyOperation(SECOidTag oid, NSSPolicyOperation operation,
+ PRUint32 value)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ switch (operation) {
+ case NSS_DISALLOW:
+ /* clear the requested policy bits */
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(oid, 0, value);
+ break;
+ case NSS_ALLOW:
+ /* set the requested policy bits */
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(oid, value, 0);
+ break;
+ /* enable/disable only apply to SSL cipher suites (future S/MIME).
+ * Enable/disable is implemented by clearing the DEFAULT_NOT_VALID
+ * flag, then setting the NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE flag to the
+ * correct value. The ssl policy code will then sort out what to
+ * set based on ciphers and cipher suite values.*/
+ case NSS_DISABLE:
+ if (value & (NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ /* clear not valid and enable */
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(oid, 0,
+ NSS_USE_DEFAULT_NOT_VALID |
+ NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE);
+ }
+ break;
+ case NSS_ENABLE:
+ if (value & (NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL | NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ /* set enable, clear not valid. NOTE: enable implies allow! */
+ rv = NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(oid, value | NSS_USE_DEFAULT_SSL_ENABLE,
+ NSS_USE_DEFAULT_NOT_VALID);
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+const char *
+secmod_getOperationString(NSSPolicyOperation operation)
+{
+ switch (operation) {
+ case NSS_DISALLOW:
+ return "disallow";
+ case NSS_ALLOW:
+ return "allow";
+ case NSS_DISABLE:
+ return "disable";
+ case NSS_ENABLE:
+ return "enable";
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return "invalid";
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+secmod_applyCryptoPolicy(const char *policyString, NSSPolicyOperation operation,
+ PRBool printPolicyFeedback, PRUint32 policyCheckFlags)
+{
+ const char *cipher, *currentString;
+ unsigned i, j;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ PRBool unknown;
+
+ if (policyString == NULL || policyString[0] == 0) {
+ return SECSuccess; /* do nothing */
+ }
+
+ /* if we change any of these, make sure it gets applied in ssl as well */
+ NSS_SetAlgorithmPolicy(SEC_OID_APPLY_SSL_POLICY, NSS_USE_POLICY_IN_SSL, 0);
+
+ for (currentString = policyString; currentString;) {
+ int length;
+ PRBool newValue = PR_FALSE;
+
+ cipher = secmod_ArgGetSubValue(currentString, ':', 0, &length,
+ &currentString);
+ unknown = PR_TRUE;
+ if (length >= 3 && cipher[3] == '/') {
+ newValue = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if ((newValue || (length == 3)) && PORT_Strncasecmp(cipher, "all", 3) == 0) {
+ /* disable or enable all options by default */
+ PRUint32 value = 0;
+ if (newValue) {
+ value = secmod_parsePolicyValue(&cipher[3] + 1, length - 3 - 1, printPolicyFeedback, policyCheckFlags);
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(algOptLists); i++) {
+ const algListsDef *algOptList = &algOptLists[i];
+ for (j = 0; j < algOptList->entries; j++) {
+ if (!newValue) {
+ value = algOptList->list[j].val;
+ }
+ secmod_setPolicyOperation(algOptList->list[j].oid, operation, value);
+ }
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(algOptLists); i++) {
+ const algListsDef *algOptList = &algOptLists[i];
+ for (j = 0; j < algOptList->entries; j++) {
+ const oidValDef *algOpt = &algOptList->list[j];
+ unsigned name_size = algOpt->name_size;
+ PRBool newOption = PR_FALSE;
+
+ if ((length >= name_size) && (cipher[name_size] == '/')) {
+ newOption = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if ((newOption || algOpt->name_size == length) &&
+ PORT_Strncasecmp(algOpt->name, cipher, name_size) == 0) {
+ PRUint32 value = algOpt->val;
+ if (newOption) {
+ value = secmod_parsePolicyValue(&cipher[name_size] + 1,
+ length - name_size - 1,
+ printPolicyFeedback,
+ policyCheckFlags);
+ }
+ rv = secmod_setPolicyOperation(algOptList->list[j].oid, operation, value);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* could not enable option */
+ /* NSS_SetAlgorithPolicy should have set the error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ unknown = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (!unknown) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(freeOptList); i++) {
+ const optionFreeDef *freeOpt = &freeOptList[i];
+ unsigned name_size = freeOpt->name_size;
+
+ if ((length > name_size) && cipher[name_size] == '=' &&
+ PORT_Strncasecmp(freeOpt->name, cipher, name_size) == 0) {
+ PRInt32 val;
+ const char *policyValue = &cipher[name_size + 1];
+ int policyValueLength = length - name_size - 1;
+ rv = secmod_getPolicyOptValue(policyValue, policyValueLength,
+ &val);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (printPolicyFeedback &&
+ (policyCheckFlags & SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_VALUE)) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_FAIL=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-FAIL %.*s: unknown value: %.*s\n",
+ length, cipher, policyValueLength, policyValue);
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ rv = NSS_OptionSet(freeOpt->option, val);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* could not enable option */
+ /* NSS_OptionSet should have set the error code */
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ /* to allow the policy to expand in the future. ignore ciphers
+ * we don't understand */
+ unknown = PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (unknown && printPolicyFeedback &&
+ (policyCheckFlags & SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_IDENTIFIER)) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_FAIL=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-FAIL %s: unknown identifier: %.*s\n",
+ secmod_getOperationString(operation), length, cipher);
+ }
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static void
+secmod_sanityCheckCryptoPolicy(void)
+{
+ unsigned i, j;
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ unsigned num_kx_enabled = 0;
+ unsigned num_ssl_enabled = 0;
+ unsigned num_sig_enabled = 0;
+ unsigned enabledCount[PR_ARRAY_SIZE(algOptLists)];
+ const char *sWarn = "WARN";
+ const char *sInfo = "INFO";
+ PRBool haveWarning = PR_FALSE;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(algOptLists); i++) {
+ const algListsDef *algOptList = &algOptLists[i];
+ enabledCount[i] = 0;
+ for (j = 0; j < algOptList->entries; j++) {
+ const oidValDef *algOpt = &algOptList->list[j];
+ PRUint32 value;
+ PRBool anyEnabled = PR_FALSE;
+ rv = NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy(algOpt->oid, &value);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_FAIL=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-FAIL: internal failure with NSS_GetAlgorithmPolicy at %u\n", i);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((algOpt->val & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX) && (value & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL_KX)) {
+ ++num_kx_enabled;
+ anyEnabled = PR_TRUE;
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-INFO: %s is enabled for KX\n", algOpt->name);
+ }
+ if ((algOpt->val & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL) && (value & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_SSL)) {
+ ++num_ssl_enabled;
+ anyEnabled = PR_TRUE;
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-INFO: %s is enabled for SSL\n", algOpt->name);
+ }
+ if ((algOpt->val & NSS_USE_ALG_IN_CERT_SIGNATURE) &&
+ ((value & NSS_USE_CERT_SIGNATURE_OK) == NSS_USE_CERT_SIGNATURE_OK)) {
+ ++num_sig_enabled;
+ anyEnabled = PR_TRUE;
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-INFO: %s is enabled for CERT-SIGNATURE\n", algOpt->name);
+ }
+ if (anyEnabled) {
+ ++enabledCount[i];
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-%s: NUMBER-OF-SSL-ALG-KX: %u\n", num_kx_enabled ? sInfo : sWarn, num_kx_enabled);
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-%s: NUMBER-OF-SSL-ALG: %u\n", num_ssl_enabled ? sInfo : sWarn, num_ssl_enabled);
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-%s: NUMBER-OF-CERT-SIG: %u\n", num_sig_enabled ? sInfo : sWarn, num_sig_enabled);
+ if (!num_kx_enabled || !num_ssl_enabled || !num_sig_enabled) {
+ haveWarning = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(algOptLists); i++) {
+ const algListsDef *algOptList = &algOptLists[i];
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-%s: NUMBER-OF-%s: %u\n", enabledCount[i] ? sInfo : sWarn, algOptList->description, enabledCount[i]);
+ if (!enabledCount[i] && !algOptList->allowEmpty) {
+ haveWarning = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (haveWarning) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_WARN=1");
+ }
+}
+
+static SECStatus
+secmod_parseCryptoPolicy(const char *policyConfig, PRBool printPolicyFeedback,
+ PRUint32 policyCheckFlags)
+{
+ char *args;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (policyConfig == NULL) {
+ return SECSuccess; /* no policy given */
+ }
+ /* make sure we initialize the oid table and set all the default policy
+ * values first so we can override them here */
+ rv = SECOID_Init();
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ args = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("disallow", policyConfig);
+ rv = secmod_applyCryptoPolicy(args, NSS_DISALLOW, printPolicyFeedback,
+ policyCheckFlags);
+ if (args)
+ PORT_Free(args);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ args = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("allow", policyConfig);
+ rv = secmod_applyCryptoPolicy(args, NSS_ALLOW, printPolicyFeedback,
+ policyCheckFlags);
+ if (args)
+ PORT_Free(args);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ args = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("disable", policyConfig);
+ rv = secmod_applyCryptoPolicy(args, NSS_DISABLE, printPolicyFeedback,
+ policyCheckFlags);
+ if (args)
+ PORT_Free(args);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ args = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("enable", policyConfig);
+ rv = secmod_applyCryptoPolicy(args, NSS_ENABLE, printPolicyFeedback,
+ policyCheckFlags);
+ if (args)
+ PORT_Free(args);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ /* this has to be last. Everything after this will be a noop */
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "ssl-lock", policyConfig)) {
+ PRInt32 locks;
+ /* don't overwrite other (future) lock flags */
+ rv = NSS_OptionGet(NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS, &locks);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ rv = NSS_OptionSet(NSS_DEFAULT_LOCKS, locks | NSS_DEFAULT_SSL_LOCK);
+ }
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "policy-lock", policyConfig)) {
+ NSS_LockPolicy();
+ }
+ if (printPolicyFeedback) {
+ /* This helps to distinguish configurations that don't contain any
+ * policy config= statement. */
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_LOADED=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-INFO: LOADED-SUCCESSFULLY\n");
+ secmod_sanityCheckCryptoPolicy();
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+static PRUint32
+secmod_parsePolicyCheckFlags(const char *nss)
+{
+ PRUint32 policyCheckFlags = 0;
+
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "policyCheckIdentifier", nss)) {
+ policyCheckFlags |= SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_IDENTIFIER;
+ }
+
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "policyCheckValue", nss)) {
+ policyCheckFlags |= SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_VALUE;
+ }
+
+ return policyCheckFlags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * for 3.4 we continue to use the old SECMODModule structure
+ */
+SECMODModule *
+SECMOD_CreateModuleEx(const char *library, const char *moduleName,
+ const char *parameters, const char *nss,
+ const char *config)
+{
+ SECMODModule *mod;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ char *slotParams, *ciphers;
+ PRBool printPolicyFeedback = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "printPolicyFeedback", nss);
+ PRUint32 policyCheckFlags = secmod_parsePolicyCheckFlags(nss);
+
+ rv = secmod_parseCryptoPolicy(config, printPolicyFeedback, policyCheckFlags);
+
+ /* do not load the module if policy parsing fails */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ if (printPolicyFeedback) {
+ PR_SetEnv("NSS_POLICY_FAIL=1");
+ fprintf(stderr, "NSS-POLICY-FAIL: policy config parsing failed, not loading module %s\n", moduleName);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mod = secmod_NewModule();
+ if (mod == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ mod->commonName = PORT_ArenaStrdup(mod->arena, moduleName ? moduleName : "");
+ if (library) {
+ mod->dllName = PORT_ArenaStrdup(mod->arena, library);
+ }
+ /* new field */
+ if (parameters) {
+ mod->libraryParams = PORT_ArenaStrdup(mod->arena, parameters);
+ }
+
+ mod->internal = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "internal", nss);
+ mod->isFIPS = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "FIPS", nss);
+ /* if the system FIPS mode is enabled, force FIPS to be on */
+ if (SECMOD_GetSystemFIPSEnabled()) {
+ mod->isFIPS = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ mod->isCritical = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "critical", nss);
+ slotParams = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("slotParams", nss);
+ mod->slotInfo = NSSUTIL_ArgParseSlotInfo(mod->arena, slotParams,
+ &mod->slotInfoCount);
+ if (slotParams)
+ PORT_Free(slotParams);
+ /* new field */
+ mod->trustOrder = NSSUTIL_ArgReadLong("trustOrder", nss,
+ NSSUTIL_DEFAULT_TRUST_ORDER, NULL);
+ /* new field */
+ mod->cipherOrder = NSSUTIL_ArgReadLong("cipherOrder", nss,
+ NSSUTIL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_ORDER, NULL);
+ /* new field */
+ mod->isModuleDB = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "moduleDB", nss);
+ mod->moduleDBOnly = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "moduleDBOnly", nss);
+ if (mod->moduleDBOnly)
+ mod->isModuleDB = PR_TRUE;
+
+ /* we need more bits, but we also want to preserve binary compatibility
+ * so we overload the isModuleDB PRBool with additional flags.
+ * These flags are only valid if mod->isModuleDB is already set.
+ * NOTE: this depends on the fact that PRBool is at least a char on
+ * all platforms. These flags are only valid if moduleDB is set, so
+ * code checking if (mod->isModuleDB) will continue to work correctly. */
+ if (mod->isModuleDB) {
+ char flags = SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_IS_MODULE_DB;
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "skipFirst", nss)) {
+ flags |= SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_SKIP_FIRST;
+ }
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "defaultModDB", nss)) {
+ flags |= SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_DEFAULT_MODDB;
+ }
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "policyOnly", nss)) {
+ flags |= SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_POLICY_ONLY;
+ }
+ /* additional moduleDB flags could be added here in the future */
+ mod->isModuleDB = (PRBool)flags;
+ }
+
+ if (mod->internal) {
+ char flags = SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_IS_INTERNAL;
+
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "internalKeySlot", nss)) {
+ flags |= SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT;
+ }
+ mod->internal = (PRBool)flags;
+ }
+
+ ciphers = NSSUTIL_ArgGetParamValue("ciphers", nss);
+ NSSUTIL_ArgParseCipherFlags(&mod->ssl[0], ciphers);
+ if (ciphers)
+ PORT_Free(ciphers);
+
+ secmod_PrivateModuleCount++;
+
+ return mod;
+}
+
+PRBool
+SECMOD_GetSkipFirstFlag(SECMODModule *mod)
+{
+ char flags = (char)mod->isModuleDB;
+
+ return (flags & SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_SKIP_FIRST) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+SECMOD_GetDefaultModDBFlag(SECMODModule *mod)
+{
+ char flags = (char)mod->isModuleDB;
+
+ return (flags & SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_DEFAULT_MODDB) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+secmod_PolicyOnly(SECMODModule *mod)
+{
+ char flags = (char)mod->isModuleDB;
+
+ return (flags & SECMOD_FLAG_MODULE_DB_POLICY_ONLY) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+PRBool
+secmod_IsInternalKeySlot(SECMODModule *mod)
+{
+ char flags = (char)mod->internal;
+
+ return (flags & SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+void
+secmod_SetInternalKeySlotFlag(SECMODModule *mod, PRBool val)
+{
+ char flags = (char)mod->internal;
+
+ if (val) {
+ flags |= SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT;
+ } else {
+ flags &= ~SECMOD_FLAG_INTERNAL_KEY_SLOT;
+ }
+ mod->internal = flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * copy desc and value into target. Target is known to be big enough to
+ * hold desc +2 +value, which is good because the result of this will be
+ * *desc"*value". We may, however, have to add some escapes for special
+ * characters imbedded into value (rare). This string potentially comes from
+ * a user, so we don't want the user overflowing the target buffer by using
+ * excessive escapes. To prevent this we count the escapes we need to add and
+ * try to expand the buffer with Realloc.
+ */
+static char *
+secmod_doDescCopy(char *target, char **base, int *baseLen,
+ const char *desc, int descLen, char *value)
+{
+ int diff, esc_len;
+
+ esc_len = NSSUTIL_EscapeSize(value, '\"') - 1;
+ diff = esc_len - strlen(value);
+ if (diff > 0) {
+ /* we need to escape... expand newSpecPtr as well to make sure
+ * we don't overflow it */
+ int offset = target - *base;
+ char *newPtr = PORT_Realloc(*base, *baseLen + diff);
+ if (!newPtr) {
+ return target; /* not enough space, just drop the whole copy */
+ }
+ *baseLen += diff;
+ target = newPtr + offset;
+ *base = newPtr;
+ value = NSSUTIL_Escape(value, '\"');
+ if (value == NULL) {
+ return target; /* couldn't escape value, just drop the copy */
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(target, desc, descLen);
+ target += descLen;
+ *target++ = '\"';
+ PORT_Memcpy(target, value, esc_len);
+ target += esc_len;
+ *target++ = '\"';
+ if (diff > 0) {
+ PORT_Free(value);
+ }
+ return target;
+}
+
+#define SECMOD_SPEC_COPY(new, start, end) \
+ if (end > start) { \
+ int _cnt = end - start; \
+ PORT_Memcpy(new, start, _cnt); \
+ new += _cnt; \
+ }
+#define SECMOD_TOKEN_DESCRIPTION "tokenDescription="
+#define SECMOD_SLOT_DESCRIPTION "slotDescription="
+
+/*
+ * Find any tokens= values in the module spec.
+ * Always return a new spec which does not have any tokens= arguments.
+ * If tokens= arguments are found, Split the the various tokens defined into
+ * an array of child specs to return.
+ *
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing the child spec and the new token
+ * spec.
+ */
+char *
+secmod_ParseModuleSpecForTokens(PRBool convert, PRBool isFIPS,
+ const char *moduleSpec, char ***children,
+ CK_SLOT_ID **ids)
+{
+ int newSpecLen = PORT_Strlen(moduleSpec) + 2;
+ char *newSpec = PORT_Alloc(newSpecLen);
+ char *newSpecPtr = newSpec;
+ const char *modulePrev = moduleSpec;
+ char *target = NULL;
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+ char **childArray = NULL;
+ const char *tokenIndex;
+ CK_SLOT_ID *idArray = NULL;
+ int tokenCount = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ if (newSpec == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *children = NULL;
+ if (ids) {
+ *ids = NULL;
+ }
+ moduleSpec = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(moduleSpec);
+ SECMOD_SPEC_COPY(newSpecPtr, modulePrev, moduleSpec);
+
+ /* Notes on 'convert' and 'isFIPS' flags: The base parameters for opening
+ * a new softoken module takes the following parameters to name the
+ * various tokens:
+ *
+ * cryptoTokenDescription: name of the non-fips crypto token.
+ * cryptoSlotDescription: name of the non-fips crypto slot.
+ * dbTokenDescription: name of the non-fips db token.
+ * dbSlotDescription: name of the non-fips db slot.
+ * FIPSTokenDescription: name of the fips db/crypto token.
+ * FIPSSlotDescription: name of the fips db/crypto slot.
+ *
+ * if we are opening a new slot, we need to have the following
+ * parameters:
+ * tokenDescription: name of the token.
+ * slotDescription: name of the slot.
+ *
+ *
+ * The convert flag tells us to drop the unnecessary *TokenDescription
+ * and *SlotDescription arguments and convert the appropriate pair
+ * (either db or FIPS based on the isFIPS flag) to tokenDescription and
+ * slotDescription).
+ */
+ /*
+ * walk down the list. if we find a tokens= argument, save it,
+ * otherise copy the argument.
+ */
+ while (*moduleSpec) {
+ int next;
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec;
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(moduleSpec, target, "tokens=",
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec;
+ /* skip copying */)
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "cryptoTokenDescription=",
+ if (convert) { modulePrev = moduleSpec; })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "cryptoSlotDescription=",
+ if (convert) { modulePrev = moduleSpec; })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "dbTokenDescription=",
+ if (convert) {
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec;
+ if (!isFIPS) {
+ newSpecPtr = secmod_doDescCopy(newSpecPtr,
+ &newSpec, &newSpecLen,
+ SECMOD_TOKEN_DESCRIPTION,
+ sizeof(SECMOD_TOKEN_DESCRIPTION) - 1,
+ tmp);
+ }
+ })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "dbSlotDescription=",
+ if (convert) {
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec; /* skip copying */
+ if (!isFIPS) {
+ newSpecPtr = secmod_doDescCopy(newSpecPtr,
+ &newSpec, &newSpecLen,
+ SECMOD_SLOT_DESCRIPTION,
+ sizeof(SECMOD_SLOT_DESCRIPTION) - 1,
+ tmp);
+ }
+ })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "FIPSTokenDescription=",
+ if (convert) {
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec; /* skip copying */
+ if (isFIPS) {
+ newSpecPtr = secmod_doDescCopy(newSpecPtr,
+ &newSpec, &newSpecLen,
+ SECMOD_TOKEN_DESCRIPTION,
+ sizeof(SECMOD_TOKEN_DESCRIPTION) - 1,
+ tmp);
+ }
+ })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(
+ moduleSpec, tmp, "FIPSSlotDescription=",
+ if (convert) {
+ modulePrev = moduleSpec; /* skip copying */
+ if (isFIPS) {
+ newSpecPtr = secmod_doDescCopy(newSpecPtr,
+ &newSpec, &newSpecLen,
+ SECMOD_SLOT_DESCRIPTION,
+ sizeof(SECMOD_SLOT_DESCRIPTION) - 1,
+ tmp);
+ }
+ })
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_FINAL_ARG(moduleSpec)
+ SECMOD_SPEC_COPY(newSpecPtr, modulePrev, moduleSpec);
+ }
+ if (tmp) {
+ PORT_Free(tmp);
+ tmp = NULL;
+ }
+ *newSpecPtr = 0;
+
+ /* no target found, return the newSpec */
+ if (target == NULL) {
+ return newSpec;
+ }
+
+ /* now build the child array from target */
+ /*first count them */
+ for (tokenIndex = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(target); *tokenIndex;
+ tokenIndex = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(NSSUTIL_ArgSkipParameter(tokenIndex))) {
+ tokenCount++;
+ }
+
+ childArray = PORT_NewArray(char *, tokenCount + 1);
+ if (childArray == NULL) {
+ /* just return the spec as is then */
+ PORT_Free(target);
+ return newSpec;
+ }
+ if (ids) {
+ idArray = PORT_NewArray(CK_SLOT_ID, tokenCount + 1);
+ if (idArray == NULL) {
+ PORT_Free(childArray);
+ PORT_Free(target);
+ return newSpec;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now fill them in */
+ for (tokenIndex = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(target), i = 0;
+ *tokenIndex && (i < tokenCount);
+ tokenIndex = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(tokenIndex)) {
+ int next;
+ char *name = NSSUTIL_ArgGetLabel(tokenIndex, &next);
+ tokenIndex += next;
+
+ if (idArray) {
+ idArray[i] = NSSUTIL_ArgDecodeNumber(name);
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free(name); /* drop the explicit number */
+
+ /* if anything is left, copy the args to the child array */
+ if (!NSSUTIL_ArgIsBlank(*tokenIndex)) {
+ childArray[i++] = NSSUTIL_ArgFetchValue(tokenIndex, &next);
+ tokenIndex += next;
+ }
+ }
+
+ PORT_Free(target);
+ childArray[i] = 0;
+ if (idArray) {
+ idArray[i] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* return it */
+ *children = childArray;
+ if (ids) {
+ *ids = idArray;
+ }
+ return newSpec;
+}
+
+/* get the database and flags from the spec */
+static char *
+secmod_getConfigDir(const char *spec, char **certPrefix, char **keyPrefix,
+ PRBool *readOnly)
+{
+ char *config = NULL;
+
+ *certPrefix = NULL;
+ *keyPrefix = NULL;
+ *readOnly = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "readOnly", spec);
+ if (NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "nocertdb", spec) ||
+ NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "nokeydb", spec)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ spec = NSSUTIL_ArgStrip(spec);
+ while (*spec) {
+ int next;
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(spec, config, "configdir=", ;)
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(spec, *certPrefix, "certPrefix=", ;)
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_STRING_ARG(spec, *keyPrefix, "keyPrefix=", ;)
+ NSSUTIL_HANDLE_FINAL_ARG(spec)
+ }
+ return config;
+}
+
+struct SECMODConfigListStr {
+ char *config;
+ char *certPrefix;
+ char *keyPrefix;
+ PRBool isReadOnly;
+};
+
+/*
+ * return an array of already openned databases from a spec list.
+ */
+SECMODConfigList *
+secmod_GetConfigList(PRBool isFIPS, char *spec, int *count)
+{
+ char **children;
+ CK_SLOT_ID *ids;
+ char *strippedSpec;
+ int childCount;
+ SECMODConfigList *conflist = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ strippedSpec = secmod_ParseModuleSpecForTokens(PR_TRUE, isFIPS,
+ spec, &children, &ids);
+ if (strippedSpec == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (childCount = 0; children && children[childCount]; childCount++)
+ ;
+ *count = childCount + 1; /* include strippedSpec */
+ conflist = PORT_NewArray(SECMODConfigList, *count);
+ if (conflist == NULL) {
+ *count = 0;
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ conflist[0].config = secmod_getConfigDir(strippedSpec,
+ &conflist[0].certPrefix,
+ &conflist[0].keyPrefix,
+ &conflist[0].isReadOnly);
+ for (i = 0; i < childCount; i++) {
+ conflist[i + 1].config = secmod_getConfigDir(children[i],
+ &conflist[i + 1].certPrefix,
+ &conflist[i + 1].keyPrefix,
+ &conflist[i + 1].isReadOnly);
+ }
+
+loser:
+ secmod_FreeChildren(children, ids);
+ PORT_Free(strippedSpec);
+ return conflist;
+}
+
+/*
+ * determine if we are trying to open an old dbm database. For this test
+ * RDB databases should return PR_FALSE.
+ */
+static PRBool
+secmod_configIsDBM(char *configDir)
+{
+ char *env;
+
+ /* explicit dbm open */
+ if (strncmp(configDir, "dbm:", 4) == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* explicit open of a non-dbm database */
+ if ((strncmp(configDir, "sql:", 4) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp(configDir, "rdb:", 4) == 0) ||
+ (strncmp(configDir, "extern:", 7) == 0)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ env = PR_GetEnvSecure("NSS_DEFAULT_DB_TYPE");
+ /* implicit dbm open */
+ if ((env == NULL) || (strcmp(env, "dbm") == 0)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ /* implicit non-dbm open */
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * match two prefixes. prefix may be NULL. NULL patches '\0'
+ */
+static PRBool
+secmod_matchPrefix(char *prefix1, char *prefix2)
+{
+ if ((prefix1 == NULL) || (*prefix1 == 0)) {
+ if ((prefix2 == NULL) || (*prefix2 == 0)) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(prefix1, prefix2) == 0) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ return PR_FALSE;
+}
+
+/* do two config paramters match? Not all callers are compariing
+ * SECMODConfigLists directly, so this function breaks them out to their
+ * components. */
+static PRBool
+secmod_matchConfig(char *configDir1, char *configDir2,
+ char *certPrefix1, char *certPrefix2,
+ char *keyPrefix1, char *keyPrefix2,
+ PRBool isReadOnly1, PRBool isReadOnly2)
+{
+ /* TODO: Document the answer to the question:
+ * "Why not allow them to match if they are both NULL?"
+ * See: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1318633#c1
+ */
+ if ((configDir1 == NULL) || (configDir2 == NULL)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(configDir1, configDir2) != 0) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!secmod_matchPrefix(certPrefix1, certPrefix2)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ if (!secmod_matchPrefix(keyPrefix1, keyPrefix2)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ /* these last test -- if we just need the DB open read only,
+ * than any open will suffice, but if we requested it read/write
+ * and it's only open read only, we need to open it again */
+ if (isReadOnly1) {
+ return PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ if (isReadOnly2) { /* isReadonly1 == PR_FALSE */
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return PR_TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return true if we are requesting a database that is already openned.
+ */
+PRBool
+secmod_MatchConfigList(const char *spec, SECMODConfigList *conflist, int count)
+{
+ char *config;
+ char *certPrefix;
+ char *keyPrefix;
+ PRBool isReadOnly;
+ PRBool ret = PR_FALSE;
+ int i;
+
+ config = secmod_getConfigDir(spec, &certPrefix, &keyPrefix, &isReadOnly);
+ if (!config) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE: we dbm isn't multiple open safe. If we open the same database
+ * twice from two different locations, then we can corrupt our database
+ * (the cache will be inconsistent). Protect against this by claiming
+ * for comparison only that we are always openning dbm databases read only.
+ */
+ if (secmod_configIsDBM(config)) {
+ isReadOnly = 1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ if (secmod_matchConfig(config, conflist[i].config, certPrefix,
+ conflist[i].certPrefix, keyPrefix,
+ conflist[i].keyPrefix, isReadOnly,
+ conflist[i].isReadOnly)) {
+ ret = PR_TRUE;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = PR_FALSE;
+done:
+ PORT_Free(config);
+ PORT_Free(certPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(keyPrefix);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the slot id from the module spec. If the slot is the database slot, we
+ * can get the slot id from the default database slot.
+ */
+CK_SLOT_ID
+secmod_GetSlotIDFromModuleSpec(const char *moduleSpec, SECMODModule *module)
+{
+ char *tmp_spec = NULL;
+ char **children, **thisChild;
+ CK_SLOT_ID *ids, *thisID, slotID = -1;
+ char *inConfig = NULL, *thisConfig = NULL;
+ char *inCertPrefix = NULL, *thisCertPrefix = NULL;
+ char *inKeyPrefix = NULL, *thisKeyPrefix = NULL;
+ PRBool inReadOnly, thisReadOnly;
+
+ inConfig = secmod_getConfigDir(moduleSpec, &inCertPrefix, &inKeyPrefix,
+ &inReadOnly);
+ if (!inConfig) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (secmod_configIsDBM(inConfig)) {
+ inReadOnly = 1;
+ }
+
+ tmp_spec = secmod_ParseModuleSpecForTokens(PR_TRUE, module->isFIPS,
+ module->libraryParams, &children, &ids);
+ if (tmp_spec == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* first check to see if the parent is the database */
+ thisConfig = secmod_getConfigDir(tmp_spec, &thisCertPrefix, &thisKeyPrefix,
+ &thisReadOnly);
+ if (!thisConfig) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (secmod_matchConfig(inConfig, thisConfig, inCertPrefix, thisCertPrefix,
+ inKeyPrefix, thisKeyPrefix, inReadOnly, thisReadOnly)) {
+ /* yup it's the default key slot, get the id for it */
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = PK11_GetInternalKeySlot();
+ if (slot) {
+ slotID = slot->slotID;
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* find id of the token */
+ for (thisChild = children, thisID = ids; thisChild && *thisChild; thisChild++, thisID++) {
+ PORT_Free(thisConfig);
+ PORT_Free(thisCertPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(thisKeyPrefix);
+ thisConfig = secmod_getConfigDir(*thisChild, &thisCertPrefix,
+ &thisKeyPrefix, &thisReadOnly);
+ if (thisConfig == NULL) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (secmod_matchConfig(inConfig, thisConfig, inCertPrefix, thisCertPrefix,
+ inKeyPrefix, thisKeyPrefix, inReadOnly, thisReadOnly)) {
+ slotID = *thisID;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+done:
+ PORT_Free(inConfig);
+ PORT_Free(inCertPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(inKeyPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(thisConfig);
+ PORT_Free(thisCertPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(thisKeyPrefix);
+ if (tmp_spec) {
+ secmod_FreeChildren(children, ids);
+ PORT_Free(tmp_spec);
+ }
+ return slotID;
+}
+
+void
+secmod_FreeConfigList(SECMODConfigList *conflist, int count)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ PORT_Free(conflist[i].config);
+ PORT_Free(conflist[i].certPrefix);
+ PORT_Free(conflist[i].keyPrefix);
+ }
+ PORT_Free(conflist);
+}
+
+void
+secmod_FreeChildren(char **children, CK_SLOT_ID *ids)
+{
+ char **thisChild;
+
+ if (!children) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (thisChild = children; thisChild && *thisChild; thisChild++) {
+ PORT_Free(*thisChild);
+ }
+ PORT_Free(children);
+ if (ids) {
+ PORT_Free(ids);
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * caclulate the length of each child record:
+ * " 0x{id}=<{escaped_child}>"
+ */
+static int
+secmod_getChildLength(char *child, CK_SLOT_ID id)
+{
+ int length = NSSUTIL_DoubleEscapeSize(child, '>', ']');
+ if (id == 0) {
+ length++;
+ }
+ while (id) {
+ length++;
+ id = id >> 4;
+ }
+ length += 6; /* {sp}0x[id]=<{child}> */
+ return length;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Build a child record:
+ * " 0x{id}=<{escaped_child}>"
+ */
+static SECStatus
+secmod_mkTokenChild(char **next, int *length, char *child, CK_SLOT_ID id)
+{
+ int len;
+ char *escSpec;
+
+ len = PR_snprintf(*next, *length, " 0x%x=<", id);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *next += len;
+ *length -= len;
+ escSpec = NSSUTIL_DoubleEscape(child, '>', ']');
+ if (escSpec == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ if (*child && (*escSpec == 0)) {
+ PORT_Free(escSpec);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ len = strlen(escSpec);
+ if (len + 1 > *length) {
+ PORT_Free(escSpec);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PORT_Memcpy(*next, escSpec, len);
+ *next += len;
+ *length -= len;
+ PORT_Free(escSpec);
+ **next = '>';
+ (*next)++;
+ (*length)--;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+#define TOKEN_STRING " tokens=["
+
+char *
+secmod_MkAppendTokensList(PLArenaPool *arena, char *oldParam, char *newToken,
+ CK_SLOT_ID newID, char **children, CK_SLOT_ID *ids)
+{
+ char *rawParam = NULL; /* oldParam with tokens stripped off */
+ char *newParam = NULL; /* space for the return parameter */
+ char *nextParam = NULL; /* current end of the new parameter */
+ char **oldChildren = NULL;
+ CK_SLOT_ID *oldIds = NULL;
+ void *mark = NULL; /* mark the arena pool in case we need
+ * to release it */
+ int length, i, tmpLen;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* first strip out and save the old tokenlist */
+ rawParam = secmod_ParseModuleSpecForTokens(PR_FALSE, PR_FALSE,
+ oldParam, &oldChildren, &oldIds);
+ if (!rawParam) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* now calculate the total length of the new buffer */
+ /* First the 'fixed stuff', length of rawparam (does not include a NULL),
+ * length of the token string (does include the NULL), closing bracket */
+ length = strlen(rawParam) + sizeof(TOKEN_STRING) + 1;
+ /* now add then length of all the old children */
+ for (i = 0; oldChildren && oldChildren[i]; i++) {
+ length += secmod_getChildLength(oldChildren[i], oldIds[i]);
+ }
+
+ /* add the new token */
+ length += secmod_getChildLength(newToken, newID);
+
+ /* and it's new children */
+ for (i = 0; children && children[i]; i++) {
+ if (ids[i] == -1) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ length += secmod_getChildLength(children[i], ids[i]);
+ }
+
+ /* now allocate and build the string */
+ mark = PORT_ArenaMark(arena);
+ if (!mark) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ newParam = PORT_ArenaAlloc(arena, length);
+ if (!newParam) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PORT_Strcpy(newParam, oldParam);
+ tmpLen = strlen(oldParam);
+ nextParam = newParam + tmpLen;
+ length -= tmpLen;
+ PORT_Memcpy(nextParam, TOKEN_STRING, sizeof(TOKEN_STRING) - 1);
+ nextParam += sizeof(TOKEN_STRING) - 1;
+ length -= sizeof(TOKEN_STRING) - 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; oldChildren && oldChildren[i]; i++) {
+ rv = secmod_mkTokenChild(&nextParam, &length, oldChildren[i], oldIds[i]);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rv = secmod_mkTokenChild(&nextParam, &length, newToken, newID);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; children && children[i]; i++) {
+ if (ids[i] == -1) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ rv = secmod_mkTokenChild(&nextParam, &length, children[i], ids[i]);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (length < 2) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ *nextParam++ = ']';
+ *nextParam++ = 0;
+
+ /* we are going to return newParam now, don't release the mark */
+ PORT_ArenaUnmark(arena, mark);
+ mark = NULL;
+
+loser:
+ if (mark) {
+ PORT_ArenaRelease(arena, mark);
+ newParam = NULL; /* if the mark is still active,
+ * don't return the param */
+ }
+ if (rawParam) {
+ PORT_Free(rawParam);
+ }
+ if (oldChildren) {
+ secmod_FreeChildren(oldChildren, oldIds);
+ }
+ return newParam;
+}
+
+static char *
+secmod_mkModuleSpec(SECMODModule *module)
+{
+ char *nss = NULL, *modSpec = NULL, **slotStrings = NULL;
+ int slotCount, i, si;
+ SECMODListLock *moduleLock = SECMOD_GetDefaultModuleListLock();
+
+ /* allocate target slot info strings */
+ slotCount = 0;
+
+ SECMOD_GetReadLock(moduleLock);
+ if (module->slotCount) {
+ for (i = 0; i < module->slotCount; i++) {
+ if (module->slots[i]->defaultFlags != 0) {
+ slotCount++;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ slotCount = module->slotInfoCount;
+ }
+
+ slotStrings = (char **)PORT_ZAlloc(slotCount * sizeof(char *));
+ if (slotStrings == NULL) {
+ SECMOD_ReleaseReadLock(moduleLock);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* build the slot info strings */
+ if (module->slotCount) {
+ for (i = 0, si = 0; i < module->slotCount; i++) {
+ if (module->slots[i]->defaultFlags) {
+ PORT_Assert(si < slotCount);
+ if (si >= slotCount)
+ break;
+ slotStrings[si] = NSSUTIL_MkSlotString(module->slots[i]->slotID,
+ module->slots[i]->defaultFlags,
+ module->slots[i]->timeout,
+ module->slots[i]->askpw,
+ module->slots[i]->hasRootCerts,
+ module->slots[i]->hasRootTrust);
+ si++;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < slotCount; i++) {
+ slotStrings[i] = NSSUTIL_MkSlotString(
+ module->slotInfo[i].slotID,
+ module->slotInfo[i].defaultFlags,
+ module->slotInfo[i].timeout,
+ module->slotInfo[i].askpw,
+ module->slotInfo[i].hasRootCerts,
+ module->slotInfo[i].hasRootTrust);
+ }
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_ReleaseReadLock(moduleLock);
+ nss = NSSUTIL_MkNSSString(slotStrings, slotCount, module->internal,
+ module->isFIPS, module->isModuleDB,
+ module->moduleDBOnly, module->isCritical,
+ module->trustOrder, module->cipherOrder,
+ module->ssl[0], module->ssl[1]);
+ modSpec = NSSUTIL_MkModuleSpec(module->dllName, module->commonName,
+ module->libraryParams, nss);
+ PORT_Free(slotStrings);
+ PR_smprintf_free(nss);
+loser:
+ return (modSpec);
+}
+
+char **
+SECMOD_GetModuleSpecList(SECMODModule *module)
+{
+ SECMODModuleDBFunc func = (SECMODModuleDBFunc)module->moduleDBFunc;
+ if (func) {
+ return (*func)(SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_FIND,
+ module->libraryParams, NULL);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SECMOD_AddPermDB(SECMODModule *module)
+{
+ SECMODModuleDBFunc func;
+ char *moduleSpec;
+ char **retString;
+
+ if (module->parent == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ func = (SECMODModuleDBFunc)module->parent->moduleDBFunc;
+ if (func) {
+ moduleSpec = secmod_mkModuleSpec(module);
+ retString = (*func)(SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_ADD,
+ module->parent->libraryParams, moduleSpec);
+ PORT_Free(moduleSpec);
+ if (retString != NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SECMOD_DeletePermDB(SECMODModule *module)
+{
+ SECMODModuleDBFunc func;
+ char *moduleSpec;
+ char **retString;
+
+ if (module->parent == NULL)
+ return SECFailure;
+
+ func = (SECMODModuleDBFunc)module->parent->moduleDBFunc;
+ if (func) {
+ moduleSpec = secmod_mkModuleSpec(module);
+ retString = (*func)(SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_DEL,
+ module->parent->libraryParams, moduleSpec);
+ PORT_Free(moduleSpec);
+ if (retString != NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+SECMOD_FreeModuleSpecList(SECMODModule *module, char **moduleSpecList)
+{
+ SECMODModuleDBFunc func = (SECMODModuleDBFunc)module->moduleDBFunc;
+ char **retString;
+ if (func) {
+ retString = (*func)(SECMOD_MODULE_DB_FUNCTION_RELEASE,
+ module->libraryParams, moduleSpecList);
+ if (retString != NULL)
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load a PKCS#11 module but do not add it to the default NSS trust domain
+ */
+SECMODModule *
+SECMOD_LoadModule(char *modulespec, SECMODModule *parent, PRBool recurse)
+{
+ char *library = NULL, *moduleName = NULL, *parameters = NULL, *nss = NULL;
+ char *config = NULL;
+ SECStatus status;
+ SECMODModule *module = NULL;
+ SECMODModule *oldModule = NULL;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PRBool forwardPolicyFeedback = PR_FALSE;
+ PRUint32 forwardPolicyCheckFlags;
+
+ /* initialize the underlying module structures */
+ SECMOD_Init();
+
+ status = NSSUTIL_ArgParseModuleSpecEx(modulespec, &library, &moduleName,
+ &parameters, &nss,
+ &config);
+ if (status != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ module = SECMOD_CreateModuleEx(library, moduleName, parameters, nss, config);
+ forwardPolicyFeedback = NSSUTIL_ArgHasFlag("flags", "printPolicyFeedback", nss);
+ forwardPolicyCheckFlags = secmod_parsePolicyCheckFlags(nss);
+
+ if (library)
+ PORT_Free(library);
+ if (moduleName)
+ PORT_Free(moduleName);
+ if (parameters)
+ PORT_Free(parameters);
+ if (nss)
+ PORT_Free(nss);
+ if (config)
+ PORT_Free(config);
+ if (!module) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* a policy only stanza doesn't actually get 'loaded'. policy has already
+ * been parsed as a side effect of the CreateModuleEx call */
+ if (secmod_PolicyOnly(module)) {
+ return module;
+ }
+ if (parent) {
+ module->parent = SECMOD_ReferenceModule(parent);
+ if (module->internal && secmod_IsInternalKeySlot(parent)) {
+ module->internal = parent->internal;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* load it */
+ rv = secmod_LoadPKCS11Module(module, &oldModule);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* if we just reload an old module, no need to add it to any lists.
+ * we simple release all our references */
+ if (oldModule) {
+ /* This module already exists, don't link it anywhere. This
+ * will probably destroy this module */
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(module);
+ return oldModule;
+ }
+
+ if (recurse && module->isModuleDB) {
+ char **moduleSpecList;
+ PORT_SetError(0);
+
+ moduleSpecList = SECMOD_GetModuleSpecList(module);
+ if (moduleSpecList) {
+ char **index;
+
+ index = moduleSpecList;
+ if (*index && SECMOD_GetSkipFirstFlag(module)) {
+ index++;
+ }
+
+ for (; *index; index++) {
+ SECMODModule *child;
+ if (0 == PORT_Strcmp(*index, modulespec)) {
+ /* avoid trivial infinite recursion */
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!forwardPolicyFeedback) {
+ child = SECMOD_LoadModule(*index, module, PR_TRUE);
+ } else {
+ /* Add printPolicyFeedback to the nss flags */
+ char *specWithForwards =
+ NSSUTIL_AddNSSFlagToModuleSpec(*index, "printPolicyFeedback");
+ char *tmp;
+ if (forwardPolicyCheckFlags & SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_IDENTIFIER) {
+ tmp = NSSUTIL_AddNSSFlagToModuleSpec(specWithForwards, "policyCheckIdentifier");
+ PORT_Free(specWithForwards);
+ specWithForwards = tmp;
+ }
+ if (forwardPolicyCheckFlags & SECMOD_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK_VALUE) {
+ tmp = NSSUTIL_AddNSSFlagToModuleSpec(specWithForwards, "policyCheckValue");
+ PORT_Free(specWithForwards);
+ specWithForwards = tmp;
+ }
+ child = SECMOD_LoadModule(specWithForwards, module, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_Free(specWithForwards);
+ }
+ if (!child)
+ break;
+ if (child->isCritical && !child->loaded) {
+ int err = PORT_GetError();
+ if (!err)
+ err = SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE;
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(child);
+ PORT_SetError(err);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ break;
+ }
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(child);
+ }
+ SECMOD_FreeModuleSpecList(module, moduleSpecList);
+ } else {
+ if (!PORT_GetError())
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* inherit the reference */
+ if (!module->moduleDBOnly) {
+ SECMOD_AddModuleToList(module);
+ } else {
+ SECMOD_AddModuleToDBOnlyList(module);
+ }
+
+ /* handle any additional work here */
+ return module;
+
+loser:
+ if (module) {
+ if (module->loaded) {
+ SECMOD_UnloadModule(module);
+ }
+ SECMOD_AddModuleToUnloadList(module);
+ }
+ return module;
+}
+
+/*
+ * load a PKCS#11 module and add it to the default NSS trust domain
+ */
+SECMODModule *
+SECMOD_LoadUserModule(char *modulespec, SECMODModule *parent, PRBool recurse)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ SECMODModule *newmod = SECMOD_LoadModule(modulespec, parent, recurse);
+ SECMODListLock *moduleLock = SECMOD_GetDefaultModuleListLock();
+
+ if (newmod) {
+ SECMOD_GetReadLock(moduleLock);
+ rv = STAN_AddModuleToDefaultTrustDomain(newmod);
+ SECMOD_ReleaseReadLock(moduleLock);
+ if (SECSuccess != rv) {
+ SECMOD_DestroyModule(newmod);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ return newmod;
+}
+
+/*
+ * remove the PKCS#11 module from the default NSS trust domain, call
+ * C_Finalize, and destroy the module structure
+ */
+SECStatus
+SECMOD_UnloadUserModule(SECMODModule *mod)
+{
+ SECStatus rv = SECSuccess;
+ int atype = 0;
+ SECMODListLock *moduleLock = SECMOD_GetDefaultModuleListLock();
+ if (!mod) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ SECMOD_GetReadLock(moduleLock);
+ rv = STAN_RemoveModuleFromDefaultTrustDomain(mod);
+ SECMOD_ReleaseReadLock(moduleLock);
+ if (SECSuccess != rv) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECMOD_DeleteModuleEx(NULL, mod, &atype, PR_FALSE);
+}