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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 19:33:14 +0000
commit36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9 (patch)
tree105e8c98ddea1c1e4784a60a5a6410fa416be2de /security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadfirefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.tar.xz
firefox-esr-36d22d82aa202bb199967e9512281e9a53db42c9.zip
Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esrupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c')
-rw-r--r--security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c3047
1 files changed, 3047 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..66b4ed6a11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/pk11wrap/pk11skey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3047 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+/*
+ * This file implements the Symkey wrapper and the PKCS context
+ * Interfaces.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "seccomon.h"
+#include "secmod.h"
+#include "nssilock.h"
+#include "secmodi.h"
+#include "secmodti.h"
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+#include "pk11func.h"
+#include "secitem.h"
+#include "secoid.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "hasht.h"
+
+static ECPointEncoding pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey);
+
+static void
+pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
+}
+
+static void
+pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ if (!symKey->sessionOwner || !(symKey->slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
+}
+
+/*
+ * pk11_getKeyFromList returns a symKey that has a session (if needSession
+ * was specified), or explicitly does not have a session (if needSession
+ * was not specified).
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_getKeyFromList(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool needSession)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+
+ PZ_Lock(slot->freeListLock);
+ /* own session list are symkeys with sessions that the symkey owns.
+ * 'most' symkeys will own their own session. */
+ if (needSession) {
+ if (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) {
+ symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next;
+ slot->keyCount--;
+ }
+ }
+ /* if we don't need a symkey with its own session, or we couldn't find
+ * one on the owner list, get one from the non-owner free list. */
+ if (!symKey) {
+ if (slot->freeSymKeysHead) {
+ symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next;
+ slot->keyCount--;
+ }
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);
+ if (symKey) {
+ symKey->next = NULL;
+ if (!needSession) {
+ return symKey;
+ }
+ /* if we are getting an owner key, make sure we have a valid session.
+ * session could be invalid if the token has been removed or because
+ * we got it from the non-owner free list */
+ if ((symKey->series != slot->series) ||
+ (symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
+ symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner);
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ if (symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ return symKey;
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ /* if we are here, we need a session, but couldn't get one, it's
+ * unlikely we pk11_GetNewSession will succeed if we call it a second
+ * time. */
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey = PORT_New(PK11SymKey);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->next = NULL;
+ if (needSession) {
+ symKey->session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &symKey->sessionOwner);
+ PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ if (symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ symKey = NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/* Caller MUST hold slot->freeListLock (or ref count == 0?) !! */
+void
+PK11_CleanKeyList(PK11SlotInfo *slot)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+
+ while (slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead) {
+ symKey = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey->next;
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner);
+ PORT_Free(symKey);
+ }
+ while (slot->freeSymKeysHead) {
+ symKey = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey->next;
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, symKey->session, symKey->sessionOwner);
+ PORT_Free(symKey);
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a symetric key:
+ * Slot is the slot to create the key in.
+ * type is the mechanism type
+ * owner is does this symKey structure own it's object handle (rare
+ * that this is false).
+ * needSession means the returned symKey will return with a valid session
+ * allocated already.
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_CreateSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PRBool owner, PRBool needSession, void *wincx)
+{
+
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = pk11_getKeyFromList(slot, needSession);
+
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* if needSession was specified, make sure we have a valid session.
+ * callers which specify needSession as false should do their own
+ * check of the session before returning the symKey */
+ if (needSession && symKey->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->type = type;
+ symKey->data.type = siBuffer;
+ symKey->data.data = NULL;
+ symKey->data.len = 0;
+ symKey->owner = owner;
+ symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ symKey->slot = slot;
+ symKey->series = slot->series;
+ symKey->cx = wincx;
+ symKey->size = 0;
+ symKey->refCount = 1;
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginNULL;
+ symKey->parent = NULL;
+ symKey->freeFunc = NULL;
+ symKey->userData = NULL;
+ PK11_ReferenceSlot(slot);
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * destroy a symetric key
+ */
+void
+PK11_FreeSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ PRBool freeit = PR_TRUE;
+
+ if (!symKey) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (PR_ATOMIC_DECREMENT(&symKey->refCount) == 0) {
+ PK11SymKey *parent = symKey->parent;
+
+ symKey->parent = NULL;
+ if ((symKey->owner) && symKey->objectID != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ (void)PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_DestroyObject(symKey->session, symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ }
+ if (symKey->data.data) {
+ PORT_Memset(symKey->data.data, 0, symKey->data.len);
+ PORT_Free(symKey->data.data);
+ }
+ /* free any existing data */
+ if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) {
+ (*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData);
+ }
+ slot = symKey->slot;
+ PZ_Lock(slot->freeListLock);
+ if (slot->keyCount < slot->maxKeyCount) {
+ /*
+ * freeSymkeysWithSessionHead contain a list of reusable
+ * SymKey structures with valid sessions.
+ * sessionOwner must be true.
+ * session must be valid.
+ * freeSymKeysHead contain a list of SymKey structures without
+ * valid session.
+ * session must be CK_INVALID_HANDLE.
+ * though sessionOwner is false, callers should not depend on
+ * this fact.
+ */
+ if (symKey->sessionOwner) {
+ PORT_Assert(symKey->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysWithSessionHead = symKey;
+ } else {
+ symKey->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ symKey->next = slot->freeSymKeysHead;
+ slot->freeSymKeysHead = symKey;
+ }
+ slot->keyCount++;
+ symKey->slot = NULL;
+ freeit = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ PZ_Unlock(slot->freeListLock);
+ if (freeit) {
+ pk11_CloseSession(symKey->slot, symKey->session,
+ symKey->sessionOwner);
+ PORT_Free(symKey);
+ }
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+
+ if (parent) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(parent);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ReferenceSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ PR_ATOMIC_INCREMENT(&symKey->refCount);
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Accessors
+ */
+CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+PK11_GetMechanism(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return symKey->type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * return the slot associated with a symetric key
+ */
+PK11SlotInfo *
+PK11_GetSlotFromKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return PK11_ReferenceSlot(symKey->slot);
+}
+
+CK_KEY_TYPE
+PK11_GetSymKeyType(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return PK11_GetKeyType(symKey->type, symKey->size);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_GetNextSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return symKey ? symKey->next : NULL;
+}
+
+char *
+PK11_GetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return PK11_GetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID);
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_SetSymKeyNickname(PK11SymKey *symKey, const char *nickname)
+{
+ return PK11_SetObjectNickname(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, nickname);
+}
+
+void *
+PK11_GetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return symKey->userData;
+}
+
+void
+PK11_SetSymKeyUserData(PK11SymKey *symKey, void *userData,
+ PK11FreeDataFunc freeFunc)
+{
+ /* free any existing data */
+ if (symKey->userData && symKey->freeFunc) {
+ (*symKey->freeFunc)(symKey->userData);
+ }
+ symKey->userData = userData;
+ symKey->freeFunc = freeFunc;
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * turn key handle into an appropriate key object
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PK11SymKey *parent, PK11Origin origin,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyID, PRBool owner, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ PRBool needSession = !(owner && parent);
+
+ if (keyID == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, owner, needSession, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->objectID = keyID;
+ symKey->origin = origin;
+
+ /* adopt the parent's session */
+ /* This is only used by SSL. What we really want here is a session
+ * structure with a ref count so the session goes away only after all the
+ * keys do. */
+ if (!needSession) {
+ symKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE;
+ symKey->session = parent->session;
+ symKey->parent = PK11_ReferenceSymKey(parent);
+ /* This is the only case where pk11_CreateSymKey does not explicitly
+ * check symKey->session. We need to assert here to make sure.
+ * the session isn't invalid. */
+ PORT_Assert(parent->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ if (parent->session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore a symmetric wrapping key that was saved using PK11_SetWrapKey.
+ *
+ * This function is provided for ABI compatibility; see PK11_SetWrapKey below.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_GetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ int series, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE keyHandle;
+
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ if (slot->series != series ||
+ slot->refKeys[wrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (type == CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM) {
+ type = slot->wrapMechanism;
+ }
+
+ keyHandle = slot->refKeys[wrap];
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ symKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ slot->wrapMechanism, keyHandle, PR_FALSE, wincx);
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function sets an attribute on the current slot with a wrapping key. The
+ * data saved is ephemeral; it needs to be run every time the program is
+ * invoked.
+ *
+ * Since NSS 3.45, this function is marginally more thread safe. It uses the
+ * slot lock (if present) and fails silently if a value is already set. Use
+ * PK11_GetWrapKey() after calling this function to get the current wrapping key
+ * in case there was an update on another thread.
+ *
+ * Either way, using this function is inadvisable. It's provided for ABI
+ * compatibility only.
+ */
+void
+PK11_SetWrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, int wrap, PK11SymKey *wrapKey)
+{
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ if (wrap >= 0) {
+ size_t uwrap = (size_t)wrap;
+ if (uwrap < PR_ARRAY_SIZE(slot->refKeys) &&
+ slot->refKeys[uwrap] == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ /* save the handle and mechanism for the wrapping key */
+ /* mark the key and session as not owned by us so they don't get
+ * freed when the key goes way... that lets us reuse the key
+ * later */
+ slot->refKeys[uwrap] = wrapKey->objectID;
+ wrapKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
+ wrapKey->sessionOwner = PR_FALSE;
+ slot->wrapMechanism = wrapKey->type;
+ }
+ }
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+}
+
+/*
+ * figure out if a key is still valid or if it is stale.
+ */
+PRBool
+PK11_VerifyKeyOK(PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ if (!PK11_IsPresent(key->slot)) {
+ return PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return (PRBool)(key->series == key->slot->series);
+}
+
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, PRBool isToken, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate,
+ unsigned int templateCount, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->size = key->len;
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(&keyTemplate[templateCount], CKA_VALUE, key->data, key->len);
+ templateCount++;
+
+ if (SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &symKey->data, key) != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->origin = origin;
+
+ /* import the keys */
+ rv = PK11_CreateNewObject(slot, symKey->session, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, isToken, &symKey->objectID);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * turn key bits into an appropriate key object
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ImportSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ unsigned int templateCount = 0;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; /* sigh */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[5];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
+ attrs++;
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len);
+ symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, PR_FALSE,
+ keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx);
+ return symKey;
+}
+/* Import a PKCS #11 data object and return it as a key. This key is
+ * only useful in a limited number of mechanisms, such as HKDF. */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ImportDataKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, PK11Origin origin,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key, void *wincx)
+{
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS ckoData = CKO_DATA;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE template[2] = { { CKA_CLASS, (CK_BYTE_PTR)&ckoData, sizeof(ckoData) },
+ { CKA_VALUE, (CK_BYTE_PTR)key->data, key->len } };
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE handle;
+ PK11GenericObject *genObject;
+
+ genObject = PK11_CreateGenericObject(slot, template, PR_ARRAY_SIZE(template), PR_FALSE);
+ if (genObject == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ handle = PK11_GetObjectHandle(PK11_TypeGeneric, genObject, NULL);
+ if (handle == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* A note about ownership of the PKCS #11 handle:
+ * PK11_CreateGenericObject() will not destroy the object it creates
+ * on Free, For that you want PK11_CreateManagedGenericObject().
+ * Below we import the handle into the symKey structure. We pass
+ * PR_TRUE as the owner so that the symKey will destroy the object
+ * once it's freed. This is way it's safe to free now. */
+ PK11_DestroyGenericObject(genObject);
+ return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, origin, type, handle, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+}
+
+/* turn key bits into an appropriate key object */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ PK11Origin origin, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, SECItem *key,
+ CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ unsigned int templateCount = 0;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE; /* sigh */
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ attrs++;
+ if (isPerm) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
+ attrs++;
+ /* sigh some tokens think CKA_PRIVATE = false is a reasonable
+ * default for secret keys */
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_PRIVATE, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
+ if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
+ !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, attrs - keyTemplate, operation)) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount + 1 <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(type, key->len);
+ symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, type, origin, isPerm,
+ keyTemplate, templateCount, key, wincx);
+ if (symKey && isPerm) {
+ symKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
+ }
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_FindFixedKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *keyID,
+ void *wincx)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ size_t tsize = 0;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE key_id;
+
+ attrs = findTemp;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
+ attrs++;
+ if (keyID) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyID->data, keyID->len);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ tsize = attrs - findTemp;
+ PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ key_id = pk11_FindObjectByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize);
+ if (key_id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive, type, key_id,
+ PR_FALSE, wincx);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ListFixedKeysInSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, char *nickname, void *wincx)
+{
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE findTemp[4];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyclass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ int tsize = 0;
+ int objCount = 0;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *key_ids;
+ PK11SymKey *nextKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *topKey = NULL;
+ int i, len;
+
+ attrs = findTemp;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyclass, sizeof(keyclass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
+ attrs++;
+ if (nickname) {
+ len = PORT_Strlen(nickname);
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_LABEL, nickname, len);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ tsize = attrs - findTemp;
+ PORT_Assert(tsize <= sizeof(findTemp) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ key_ids = pk11_FindObjectsByTemplate(slot, findTemp, tsize, &objCount);
+ if (key_ids == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < objCount; i++) {
+ SECItem typeData;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ SECStatus rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(slot, key_ids[i],
+ CKA_KEY_TYPE, NULL, &typeData);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ if (typeData.len == sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE)) {
+ type = *(CK_KEY_TYPE *)typeData.data;
+ }
+ PORT_Free(typeData.data);
+ }
+ nextKey = PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL, PK11_OriginDerive,
+ PK11_GetKeyMechanism(type), key_ids[i], PR_FALSE, wincx);
+ if (nextKey) {
+ nextKey->next = topKey;
+ topKey = nextKey;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_Free(key_ids);
+ return topKey;
+}
+
+void *
+PK11_GetWindow(PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ return key->cx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extract a symmetric key value. NOTE: if the key is sensitive, we will
+ * not be able to do this operation. This function is used to move
+ * keys from one token to another */
+SECStatus
+PK11_ExtractKeyValue(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ if (symKey->data.data != NULL) {
+ if (symKey->size == 0) {
+ symKey->size = symKey->data.len;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ if (symKey->slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_KEY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ rv = PK11_ReadAttribute(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID, CKA_VALUE, NULL,
+ &symKey->data);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ symKey->size = symKey->data.len;
+ }
+ return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+PK11_DeleteTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ if (!PK11_IsPermObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID)) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ PK11_DestroyTokenObject(symKey->slot, symKey->objectID);
+ symKey->objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECItem *
+PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return &symKey->data;
+}
+
+/* This symbol is exported for backward compatibility. */
+SECItem *
+__PK11_GetKeyData(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return PK11_GetKeyData(symKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * PKCS #11 key Types with predefined length
+ */
+unsigned int
+pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(CK_KEY_TYPE keyType)
+{
+ int length = 0;
+ switch (keyType) {
+ case CKK_DES:
+ length = 8;
+ break;
+ case CKK_DES2:
+ length = 16;
+ break;
+ case CKK_DES3:
+ length = 24;
+ break;
+ case CKK_SKIPJACK:
+ length = 10;
+ break;
+ case CKK_BATON:
+ length = 20;
+ break;
+ case CKK_JUNIPER:
+ length = 20;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return length;
+}
+
+/* return the keylength if possible. '0' if not */
+unsigned int
+PK11_GetKeyLength(PK11SymKey *key)
+{
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType;
+
+ if (key->size != 0)
+ return key->size;
+
+ /* First try to figure out the key length from its type */
+ keyType = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_KEY_TYPE);
+ key->size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType);
+ if ((keyType == CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) &&
+ (key->type == CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN)) {
+ key->size = 48;
+ }
+
+ if (key->size != 0)
+ return key->size;
+
+ if (key->data.data == NULL) {
+ PK11_ExtractKeyValue(key);
+ }
+ /* key is probably secret. Look up its length */
+ /* this is new PKCS #11 version 2.0 functionality. */
+ if (key->size == 0) {
+ CK_ULONG keyLength;
+
+ keyLength = PK11_ReadULongAttribute(key->slot, key->objectID, CKA_VALUE_LEN);
+ if (keyLength != CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION) {
+ key->size = (unsigned int)keyLength;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return key->size;
+}
+
+/* return the strength of a key. This is different from length in that
+ * 1) it returns the size in bits, and 2) it returns only the secret portions
+ * of the key minus any checksums or parity.
+ */
+unsigned int
+PK11_GetKeyStrength(PK11SymKey *key, SECAlgorithmID *algid)
+{
+ int size = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism = CKM_INVALID_MECHANISM; /* RC2 only */
+ SECItem *param = NULL; /* RC2 only */
+ CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *rc2_params = NULL; /* RC2 ONLY */
+ unsigned int effectiveBits = 0; /* RC2 ONLY */
+
+ switch (PK11_GetKeyType(key->type, 0)) {
+ case CKK_CDMF:
+ return 40;
+ case CKK_DES:
+ return 56;
+ case CKK_DES3:
+ case CKK_DES2:
+ size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key);
+ if (size == 16) {
+ /* double des */
+ return 112; /* 16*7 */
+ }
+ return 168;
+ /*
+ * RC2 has is different than other ciphers in that it allows the user
+ * to deprecating keysize while still requiring all the bits for the
+ * original key. The info
+ * on what the effective key strength is in the parameter for the key.
+ * In S/MIME this parameter is stored in the DER encoded algid. In Our
+ * other uses of RC2, effectiveBits == keyBits, so this code functions
+ * correctly without an algid.
+ */
+ case CKK_RC2:
+ /* if no algid was provided, fall through to default */
+ if (!algid) {
+ break;
+ }
+ /* verify that the algid is for RC2 */
+ mechanism = PK11_AlgtagToMechanism(SECOID_GetAlgorithmTag(algid));
+ if ((mechanism != CKM_RC2_CBC) && (mechanism != CKM_RC2_ECB)) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* now get effective bits from the algorithm ID. */
+ param = PK11_ParamFromAlgid(algid);
+ /* if we couldn't get memory just use key length */
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ rc2_params = (CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS *)param->data;
+ /* paranoia... shouldn't happen */
+ PORT_Assert(param->data != NULL);
+ if (param->data == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ break;
+ }
+ effectiveBits = (unsigned int)rc2_params->ulEffectiveBits;
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param, PR_TRUE);
+ param = NULL;
+ rc2_params = NULL; /* paranoia */
+
+ /* we have effective bits, is and allocated memory is free, now
+ * we need to return the smaller of effective bits and keysize */
+ size = PK11_GetKeyLength(key);
+ if ((unsigned int)size * 8 > effectiveBits) {
+ return effectiveBits;
+ }
+
+ return size * 8; /* the actual key is smaller, the strength can't be
+ * greater than the actual key size */
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ return PK11_GetKeyLength(key) * 8;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The next three utilities are to deal with the fact that a given operation
+ * may be a multi-slot affair. This creates a new key object that is copied
+ * into the new slot.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_FLAGS flags,
+ PRBool isPerm, PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+
+ /* Extract the raw key data if possible */
+ if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
+ /* KEY is sensitive, we're try key exchanging it. */
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ return pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation,
+ flags, isPerm, symKey);
+ }
+ }
+
+ newKey = PK11_ImportSymKeyWithFlags(slot, type, symKey->origin,
+ operation, &symKey->data, flags, isPerm, symKey->cx);
+ if (newKey == NULL) {
+ newKey = pk11_KeyExchange(slot, type, operation, flags, isPerm, symKey);
+ }
+ return newKey;
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+pk11_CopyToSlot(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, type, operation, 0, PR_FALSE, symKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation
+ * by verifying that it supports all of the specified mechanism types.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE *type,
+ int mechCount, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = symKey->slot;
+ PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+ PRBool needToCopy = PR_FALSE;
+ int i;
+
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ needToCopy = PR_TRUE;
+ } else {
+ i = 0;
+ while ((i < mechCount) && (needToCopy == PR_FALSE)) {
+ if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type[i])) {
+ needToCopy = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (needToCopy == PR_TRUE) {
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlotMultiple(type, mechCount, symKey->cx);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ newKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, type[0], operation, symKey);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ return newKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Make sure the slot we are in is the correct slot for the operation
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ForceSlot(PK11SymKey *symKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+ return pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(symKey, &type, 1, operation);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_MoveSymKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool perm, PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ if (symKey->slot == slot) {
+ if (perm) {
+ return PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(symKey, symKey->cx);
+ } else {
+ return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(symKey);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return pk11_CopyToSlotPerm(slot, symKey->type,
+ operation, flags, perm, symKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the token to generate a key.
+ *
+ * keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero
+ * keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template
+ * for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN
+ * attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you
+ * select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN
+ * parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen
+ * function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN).
+ *
+ * keyType must be -1 for most algorithms. Some PBE algorthims cannot
+ * determine the correct key type from the mechanism or the parameters,
+ * so key type must be specified. Other PKCS #11 mechanisms may do so in
+ * the future. Currently there is no need to export this publically.
+ * Keep it private until there is a need in case we need to expand the
+ * keygen parameters again...
+ *
+ * CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags
+ * PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ SECItem *param, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, int keySize, SECItem *keyid,
+ CK_FLAGS opFlags, PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE genTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = genTemplate;
+ int count = sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(genTemplate[0]);
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_BBOOL ckfalse = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_ULONG ck_key_size; /* only used for variable-length keys */
+
+ if (pk11_BadAttrFlags(attrFlags)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if ((keySize != 0) && (type != CKM_DES3_CBC) &&
+ (type != CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD) && (type != CKM_DES3_ECB)) {
+ ck_key_size = keySize; /* Convert to PK11 type */
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &ck_key_size, sizeof(ck_key_size));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ if (keyType != -1) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(CK_KEY_TYPE));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ /* Include key id value if provided */
+ if (keyid) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_ID, keyid->data, keyid->len);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ attrs += pk11_AttrFlagsToAttributes(attrFlags, attrs, &cktrue, &ckfalse);
+ attrs += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(opFlags, attrs, &cktrue);
+
+ count = attrs - genTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(count <= sizeof(genTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyGenType = PK11_GetKeyGenWithSize(type, keySize);
+ if (keyGenType == CKM_FAKE_RANDOM) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ symKey = PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(slot, type, keyGenType,
+ param, genTemplate, count, wincx);
+ if (symKey != NULL) {
+ symKey->size = keySize;
+ }
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the token to generate a key. - Public
+ *
+ * keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key length algorithms. A nonzero
+ * keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute to be added to the template
+ * for the key. Most PKCS #11 modules fail if you specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN
+ * attribute for keys with fixed length. The exception is DES2. If you
+ * select a CKM_DES3_CBC mechanism, this code will not add the CKA_VALUE_LEN
+ * parameter and use the key size to determine which underlying DES keygen
+ * function to use (CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN or CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN).
+ *
+ * CK_FLAGS flags: key operation flags
+ * PK11AttrFlags attrFlags: PK11_ATTR_XXX key attribute flags
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_TokenKeyGenWithFlags(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ SECItem *param, int keySize, SECItem *keyid, CK_FLAGS opFlags,
+ PK11AttrFlags attrFlags, void *wincx)
+{
+ return pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param, -1, keySize,
+ keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use the token to generate a key. keySize must be 'zero' for fixed key
+ * length algorithms. A nonzero keySize causes the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute
+ * to be added to the template for the key. PKCS #11 modules fail if you
+ * specify the CKA_VALUE_LEN attribute for keys with fixed length.
+ * NOTE: this means to generate a DES2 key from this interface you must
+ * specify CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN as the mechanism directly; specifying
+ * CKM_DES3_CBC as the mechanism and 16 as keySize currently doesn't work.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_TokenKeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
+ int keySize, SECItem *keyid, PRBool isToken, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ PRBool weird = PR_FALSE; /* hack for fortezza */
+ CK_FLAGS opFlags = CKF_SIGN;
+ PK11AttrFlags attrFlags = 0;
+
+ if ((keySize == -1) && (type == CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64)) {
+ weird = PR_TRUE;
+ keySize = 0;
+ }
+
+ opFlags |= weird ? CKF_DECRYPT : CKF_ENCRYPT;
+
+ if (isToken) {
+ attrFlags |= (PK11_ATTR_TOKEN | PK11_ATTR_PRIVATE);
+ }
+
+ symKey = pk11_TokenKeyGenWithFlagsAndKeyType(slot, type, param,
+ -1, keySize, keyid, opFlags, attrFlags, wincx);
+ if (symKey && weird) {
+ PK11_SetFortezzaHack(symKey);
+ }
+
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_KeyGen(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
+ int keySize, void *wincx)
+{
+ return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, type, param, keySize, 0, PR_FALSE, wincx);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_KeyGenWithTemplate(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE keyGenType,
+ SECItem *param, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs,
+ unsigned int attrsCount, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ PRBool isToken = CK_FALSE;
+ CK_ULONG keySize = 0;
+ unsigned i;
+
+ /* Extract the template's CKA_VALUE_LEN into keySize and CKA_TOKEN into
+ isToken. */
+ for (i = 0; i < attrsCount; ++i) {
+ switch (attrs[i].type) {
+ case CKA_VALUE_LEN:
+ if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL ||
+ attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_ULONG)) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ keySize = *(CK_ULONG *)attrs[i].pValue;
+ break;
+ case CKA_TOKEN:
+ if (attrs[i].pValue == NULL ||
+ attrs[i].ulValueLen != sizeof(CK_BBOOL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ isToken = (*(CK_BBOOL *)attrs[i].pValue) ? PR_TRUE : PR_FALSE;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* find a slot to generate the key into */
+ /* Only do slot management if this is not a token key */
+ if (!isToken && (slot == NULL || !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, type))) {
+ PK11SlotInfo *bestSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(type, wincx);
+ if (bestSlot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(bestSlot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(bestSlot);
+ } else {
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, type, !isToken, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ }
+ if (symKey == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ symKey->size = keySize;
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginGenerated;
+
+ /* Set the parameters for the key gen if provided */
+ mechanism.mechanism = keyGenType;
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ if (param) {
+ mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ }
+
+ /* Get session and perform locking */
+ if (isToken) {
+ PK11_Authenticate(symKey->slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ /* Should always be original slot */
+ session = PK11_GetRWSession(symKey->slot);
+ symKey->owner = PR_FALSE;
+ } else {
+ session = symKey->session;
+ if (session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ }
+ if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_GenerateKey(session, &mechanism, attrs, attrsCount, &symKey->objectID);
+
+ /* Release lock and session */
+ if (isToken) {
+ PK11_RestoreROSession(symKey->slot, session);
+ } else {
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/* --- */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_GenDES3TokenKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, SECItem *keyid, void *cx)
+{
+ return PK11_TokenKeyGen(slot, CKM_DES3_CBC, 0, 0, keyid, PR_TRUE, cx);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_ConvertSessionSymKeyToTokenSymKey(PK11SymKey *symk, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = symk->slot;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE template[1];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = template;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE newKeyID;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(cktrue));
+ attrs++;
+
+ PK11_Authenticate(slot, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
+ if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_DATA);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_CopyObject(rwsession, symk->objectID,
+ template, 1, &newKeyID);
+ PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return PK11_SymKeyFromHandle(slot, NULL /*parent*/, symk->origin,
+ symk->type, newKeyID, PR_FALSE /*owner*/, NULL /*wincx*/);
+}
+
+/* This function does a straight public key wrap with the CKM_RSA_PKCS
+ * mechanism. */
+SECStatus
+PK11_PubWrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE inferred = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(pubKey->keyType);
+ return PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(pubKey, inferred, NULL, symKey,
+ wrappedKey);
+}
+
+/* This function wraps a symmetric key with a public key, such as with the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS and CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanisms. */
+SECStatus
+PK11_PubWrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param,
+ PK11SymKey *symKey, SECItem *wrappedKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len;
+ PK11SymKey *newKey = NULL;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE id;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* if this slot doesn't support the mechanism, go to a slot that does */
+ newKey = pk11_ForceSlot(symKey, mechType, CKA_ENCRYPT);
+ if (newKey != NULL) {
+ symKey = newKey;
+ }
+
+ if (symKey->slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ slot = symKey->slot;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = mechType;
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ } else {
+ mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ }
+
+ id = PK11_ImportPublicKey(slot, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
+ if (id == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ if (newKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ }
+ return SECFailure; /* Error code has been set. */
+ }
+
+ session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism,
+ id, symKey->objectID, wrappedKey->data, &len);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ if (newKey) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newKey);
+ }
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ wrappedKey->len = len;
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this little function uses the Encrypt function to wrap a key, just in
+ * case we have problems with the wrap implementation for a token.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_HandWrap(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type,
+ SECItem *inKey, SECItem *outKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ CK_ULONG len;
+ SECItem *data;
+ CK_MECHANISM mech;
+ PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ slot = wrappingKey->slot;
+ /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
+ mech.mechanism = type;
+ if (param) {
+ mech.pParameter = param->data;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ } else {
+ mech.pParameter = NULL;
+ mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ }
+ session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_EncryptInit(session, &mech,
+ wrappingKey->objectID);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+
+ /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far,
+ * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */
+ data = PK11_BlockData(inKey, PK11_GetBlockSize(type, param));
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ len = outKey->len;
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Encrypt(session, data->data, data->len,
+ outKey->data, &len);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(data, PR_TRUE);
+ outKey->len = len;
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * helper function which moves two keys into a new slot based on the
+ * desired mechanism.
+ */
+static SECStatus
+pk11_moveTwoKeys(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation,
+ PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey,
+ PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *newSlot;
+ *newMovingKey = NULL;
+ *newPreferedKey = NULL;
+
+ newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(mech, preferedKey->cx);
+ if (newSlot == NULL) {
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ *newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, movingKey->type,
+ movingOperation, movingKey);
+ if (*newMovingKey == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ *newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, preferedKey->type,
+ preferedOperation, preferedKey);
+ if (*newPreferedKey == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
+ return SECSuccess;
+loser:
+ PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(*newMovingKey);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(*newPreferedKey);
+ *newMovingKey = NULL;
+ *newPreferedKey = NULL;
+ return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/*
+ * To do joint operations, we often need two keys in the same slot.
+ * Usually the PKCS #11 wrappers handle this correctly (like for PK11_WrapKey),
+ * but sometimes the wrappers don't know about mechanism specific keys in
+ * the Mechanism params. This function makes sure the two keys are in the
+ * same slot by copying one or both of the keys into a common slot. This
+ * functions makes sure the slot can handle the target mechanism. If the copy
+ * is warranted, this function will prefer to move the movingKey first, then
+ * the preferedKey. If the keys are moved, the new keys are returned in
+ * newMovingKey and/or newPreferedKey. The application is responsible
+ * for freeing those keys once the operation is complete.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE preferedOperation,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE movingOperation,
+ PK11SymKey *preferedKey, PK11SymKey *movingKey,
+ PK11SymKey **newPreferedKey, PK11SymKey **newMovingKey)
+{
+ /* usually don't return new keys */
+ *newMovingKey = NULL;
+ *newPreferedKey = NULL;
+ if (movingKey->slot == preferedKey->slot) {
+
+ /* this should be the most common case */
+ if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+
+ /* we are in the same slot, but it doesn't do the operation,
+ * move both keys to an appropriate target slot */
+ return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation,
+ preferedKey, movingKey,
+ newPreferedKey, newMovingKey);
+ }
+
+ /* keys are in different slot, try moving the moving key to the prefered
+ * key's slot */
+ if ((preferedKey->slot != NULL) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanism(preferedKey->slot, mech)) {
+ *newMovingKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(preferedKey->slot, movingKey->type,
+ movingOperation, movingKey);
+ if (*newMovingKey != NULL) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ /* couldn't moving the moving key to the prefered slot, try moving
+ * the prefered key */
+ if ((movingKey->slot != NULL) &&
+ PK11_DoesMechanism(movingKey->slot, mech)) {
+ *newPreferedKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(movingKey->slot, preferedKey->type,
+ preferedOperation, preferedKey);
+ if (*newPreferedKey != NULL) {
+ return SECSuccess;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Neither succeeded, but that could be that they were not in slots that
+ * supported the operation, try moving both keys into a common slot that
+ * can do the operation. */
+ return pk11_moveTwoKeys(mech, preferedOperation, movingOperation,
+ preferedKey, movingKey,
+ newPreferedKey, newMovingKey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function does a symetric based wrap.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_WrapSymKey(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, SECItem *param,
+ PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, PK11SymKey *symKey,
+ SECItem *wrappedKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot;
+ CK_ULONG len = wrappedKey->len;
+ PK11SymKey *newSymKey = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *newWrappingKey = NULL;
+ SECItem *param_save = NULL;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv;
+
+ /* force the keys into same slot */
+ rv = PK11_SymKeysToSameSlot(type, CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_WRAP,
+ symKey, wrappingKey,
+ &newSymKey, &newWrappingKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ /* Couldn't move the keys as desired, try to hand unwrap if possible */
+ if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ return SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL);
+ }
+ rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data, wrappedKey);
+ if (param_save)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+ }
+ if (newSymKey) {
+ symKey = newSymKey;
+ }
+ if (newWrappingKey) {
+ wrappingKey = newWrappingKey;
+ }
+
+ /* at this point both keys are in the same token */
+ slot = wrappingKey->slot;
+ mechanism.mechanism = type;
+ /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
+ if (param == NULL) {
+ param_save = param = PK11_ParamFromIV(type, NULL);
+ }
+ if (param) {
+ mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ } else {
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ }
+
+ len = wrappedKey->len;
+
+ session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_WrapKey(session, &mechanism,
+ wrappingKey->objectID, symKey->objectID,
+ wrappedKey->data, &len);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ /* can't wrap it? try hand wrapping it... */
+ do {
+ if (symKey->data.data == NULL) {
+ rv = PK11_ExtractKeyValue(symKey);
+ if (rv != SECSuccess)
+ break;
+ }
+ rv = pk11_HandWrap(wrappingKey, param, type, &symKey->data,
+ wrappedKey);
+ } while (PR_FALSE);
+ } else {
+ wrappedKey->len = len;
+ }
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newSymKey);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newWrappingKey);
+ if (param_save)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_save, PR_TRUE);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This Generates a new key based on a symetricKey
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_Derive(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, SECItem *param,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize)
+{
+ return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
+ keySize, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_DeriveWithFlags(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
+ SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
+{
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+
+ templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
+ return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
+ keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_DeriveWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
+ SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+ unsigned int templateCount = 0;
+
+ attrs = keyTemplate;
+ if (isPerm) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
+ return PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(baseKey, derive, param, target, operation,
+ keySize, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_DeriveWithTemplate(PK11SymKey *baseKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive,
+ SECItem *param, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs,
+ PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = baseKey->slot;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ PK11SymKey *newBaseKey = NULL;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_ULONG valueLen = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ CK_RV crv;
+#define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS + MAX_ADD_ATTRS];
+#undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+
+ if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ /* first copy caller attributes in. */
+ for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) {
+ *attrs++ = *userAttr++;
+ }
+
+ /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller
+ ** didn't already supply them.
+ */
+ if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ if (keySize > 0 &&
+ !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) {
+ valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
+ !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, sizeof cktrue);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ /* move the key to a slot that can do the function */
+ if (!PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, derive)) {
+ /* get a new base key & slot */
+ PK11SlotInfo *newSlot = PK11_GetBestSlot(derive, baseKey->cx);
+
+ if (newSlot == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ newBaseKey = pk11_CopyToSlot(newSlot, derive, CKA_DERIVE,
+ baseKey);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(newSlot);
+ if (newBaseKey == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ baseKey = newBaseKey;
+ slot = baseKey->slot;
+ }
+
+ /* get our key Structure */
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE, baseKey->cx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->size = keySize;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = derive;
+ if (param) {
+ mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ } else {
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ }
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
+
+ if (isPerm) {
+ session = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
+ } else {
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ session = symKey->session;
+ }
+ if (session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+ if (!isPerm)
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ } else {
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(session, &mechanism,
+ baseKey->objectID, keyTemplate, templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ if (isPerm) {
+ PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, session);
+ } else {
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ }
+ }
+ if (newBaseKey)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newBaseKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/* Create a new key by concatenating base and data
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(PK11SymKey *base,
+ CK_BYTE *data, CK_ULONG dataLen, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation)
+{
+ CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA mechParams;
+ SECItem param;
+
+ if (base == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ mechParams.pData = data;
+ mechParams.ulLen = dataLen;
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&mechParams;
+ param.len = sizeof(CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA);
+
+ return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA,
+ &param, target, operation, 0);
+}
+
+/* Create a new key by concatenating base and key
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(PK11SymKey *base,
+ PK11SymKey *key, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize)
+{
+ SECItem param;
+
+ if ((base == NULL) || (key == NULL)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ param.data = (unsigned char *)&(key->objectID);
+ param.len = sizeof(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE);
+
+ return PK11_Derive(base, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY,
+ &param, target, operation, keySize);
+}
+
+/* Create a new key whose value is the hash of tobehashed.
+ * type is the mechanism for the derived key.
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_HashKeyDerivation(PK11SymKey *toBeHashed,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, CK_ULONG keySize)
+{
+ return PK11_Derive(toBeHashed, hashMechanism, NULL, target, operation, keySize);
+}
+
+/* This function implements the ANSI X9.63 key derivation function
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_ANSIX963Derive(PK11SymKey *sharedSecret,
+ CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf, SECItem *sharedData,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ CK_ULONG keySize)
+{
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType;
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashMechanism, mechanismArray[4];
+ CK_ULONG derivedKeySize, HashLen, counter, maxCounter, bufferLen;
+ CK_ULONG SharedInfoLen;
+ CK_BYTE *buffer = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *toBeHashed, *hashOutput;
+ PK11SymKey *newSharedSecret = NULL;
+ PK11SymKey *oldIntermediateResult, *intermediateResult = NULL;
+
+ if (sharedSecret == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ switch (kdf) {
+ case CKD_SHA1_KDF:
+ HashLen = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ hashMechanism = CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA224_KDF:
+ HashLen = SHA224_LENGTH;
+ hashMechanism = CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA256_KDF:
+ HashLen = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ hashMechanism = CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA384_KDF:
+ HashLen = SHA384_LENGTH;
+ hashMechanism = CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA512_KDF:
+ HashLen = SHA512_LENGTH;
+ hashMechanism = CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ derivedKeySize = keySize;
+ if (derivedKeySize == 0) {
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ derivedKeySize = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType);
+ if (derivedKeySize == 0) {
+ derivedKeySize = HashLen;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check that key_len isn't too long. The maximum key length could be
+ * greatly increased if the code below did not limit the 4-byte counter
+ * to a maximum value of 255. */
+ if (derivedKeySize > 254 * HashLen) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ maxCounter = derivedKeySize / HashLen;
+ if (derivedKeySize > maxCounter * HashLen)
+ maxCounter++;
+
+ if ((sharedData == NULL) || (sharedData->data == NULL))
+ SharedInfoLen = 0;
+ else
+ SharedInfoLen = sharedData->len;
+
+ bufferLen = SharedInfoLen + 4;
+
+ /* Populate buffer with Counter || sharedData
+ * where Counter is 0x00000001. */
+ buffer = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(bufferLen);
+ if (buffer == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ buffer[0] = 0;
+ buffer[1] = 0;
+ buffer[2] = 0;
+ buffer[3] = 1;
+ if (SharedInfoLen > 0) {
+ PORT_Memcpy(&buffer[4], sharedData->data, SharedInfoLen);
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a slot that supports the mechanisms needed
+ * to implement the ANSI X9.63 KDF as well as the
+ * target mechanism.
+ */
+ mechanismArray[0] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA;
+ mechanismArray[1] = hashMechanism;
+ mechanismArray[2] = CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY;
+ mechanismArray[3] = target;
+
+ newSharedSecret = pk11_ForceSlotMultiple(sharedSecret,
+ mechanismArray, 4, operation);
+ if (newSharedSecret != NULL) {
+ sharedSecret = newSharedSecret;
+ }
+
+ for (counter = 1; counter <= maxCounter; counter++) {
+ /* Concatenate shared_secret and buffer */
+ toBeHashed = pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndData(sharedSecret, buffer,
+ bufferLen, hashMechanism, operation);
+ if (toBeHashed == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Hash value */
+ if (maxCounter == 1) {
+ /* In this case the length of the key to be derived is
+ * less than or equal to the length of the hash output.
+ * So, the output of the hash operation will be the
+ * dervied key. */
+ hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism,
+ target, operation, keySize);
+ } else {
+ /* In this case, the output of the hash operation will be
+ * concatenated with other data to create the derived key. */
+ hashOutput = pk11_HashKeyDerivation(toBeHashed, hashMechanism,
+ CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY, operation, 0);
+ }
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(toBeHashed);
+ if (hashOutput == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+
+ /* Append result to intermediate result, if necessary */
+ oldIntermediateResult = intermediateResult;
+
+ if (oldIntermediateResult == NULL) {
+ intermediateResult = hashOutput;
+ } else {
+ if (counter == maxCounter) {
+ /* This is the final concatenation, and so the output
+ * will be the derived key. */
+ intermediateResult =
+ pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult,
+ hashOutput, target, operation, keySize);
+ } else {
+ /* The output of this concatenation will be concatenated
+ * with other data to create the derived key. */
+ intermediateResult =
+ pk11_ConcatenateBaseAndKey(oldIntermediateResult,
+ hashOutput, CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY,
+ operation, 0);
+ }
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(hashOutput);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(oldIntermediateResult);
+ if (intermediateResult == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Increment counter (assumes maxCounter < 255) */
+ buffer[3]++;
+ }
+
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufferLen);
+ if (newSharedSecret != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret);
+ return intermediateResult;
+
+loser:
+ PORT_ZFree(buffer, bufferLen);
+ if (newSharedSecret != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(newSharedSecret);
+ if (intermediateResult != NULL)
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(intermediateResult);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This regenerate a public key from a private key. This function is currently
+ * NSS private. If we want to make it public, we need to add and optional
+ * template or at least flags (a.la. PK11_DeriveWithFlags).
+ */
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+PK11_DerivePubKeyFromPrivKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objectID = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = CKM_NSS_PUB_FROM_PRIV;
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(slot->session, &mechanism,
+ privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0,
+ &objectID);
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ return CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+ }
+ return objectID;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This Generates a wrapping key based on a privateKey, publicKey, and two
+ * random numbers. For Mail usage RandomB should be NULL. In the Sender's
+ * case RandomA is generate, outherwize it is passed.
+ */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubDerive(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ CK_RV crv;
+
+ /* get our key Structure */
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
+
+ switch (privKey->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case rsaPssKey:
+ case rsaOaepKey:
+ case nullKey:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ break;
+ case dsaKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey: {
+ static unsigned char rb_email[128] = { 0 };
+ CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS param;
+ param.isSender = (CK_BBOOL)isSender;
+ param.ulRandomLen = randomA->len;
+ param.pRandomA = randomA->data;
+ param.pRandomB = rb_email;
+ param.pRandomB[127] = 1;
+ if (randomB)
+ param.pRandomB = randomB->data;
+ if (pubKey->keyType == fortezzaKey) {
+ param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len;
+ param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data;
+ } else {
+ /* assert type == keaKey */
+ /* XXX change to match key key types */
+ param.ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.len;
+ param.pPublicData = pubKey->u.fortezza.KEAKey.data;
+ }
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = derive;
+ mechanism.pParameter = &param;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param);
+
+ /* get a new symKey structure */
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
+ privKey->pkcs11ID, NULL, 0,
+ &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ return symKey;
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ } break;
+ case dhKey: {
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
+ int templateCount;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+
+ if (pubKey->keyType != dhKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
+ attrs++;
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ key_size = keySize;
+ symKey->size = keySize;
+ if (key_size == 0)
+ templateCount--;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = derive;
+
+ /* we can undefine these when we define diffie-helman keys */
+
+ mechanism.pParameter = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = pubKey->u.dh.publicValue.len;
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
+ privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ return symKey;
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ } break;
+ case ecKey: {
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
+ int templateCount;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+ CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL;
+
+ if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
+ attrs++;
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ key_size = keySize;
+ if (key_size == 0) {
+ if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) {
+ templateCount--;
+ } else {
+ /* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require
+ * CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */
+ key_size = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ }
+ }
+ symKey->size = key_size;
+
+ mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ mechParams->kdf = CKD_SHA1_KDF;
+ mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
+ mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = derive;
+ mechanism.pParameter = mechParams;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
+ &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+
+ /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
+ * try this again with and encoded public key */
+ if (crv != CKR_OK && pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) != ECPoint_XOnly) {
+ SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+ &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+ if (pubValue == NULL) {
+ PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
+ break;
+ }
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
+ &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+ PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
+
+ if (crv == CKR_OK)
+ return symKey;
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ }
+ }
+
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Test for curves that are known to use a special encoding.
+ * Extend this function when additional curves are added. */
+static ECPointEncoding
+pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+ SECItem oid;
+ SECStatus rv;
+ PORTCheapArenaPool tmpArena;
+ ECPointEncoding encoding = ECPoint_Undefined;
+
+ PORT_InitCheapArena(&tmpArena, DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+
+ /* decode the OID tag */
+ rv = SEC_QuickDERDecodeItem(&tmpArena.arena, &oid,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_ObjectIDTemplate),
+ &pubKey->u.ec.DEREncodedParams);
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ SECOidTag tag = SECOID_FindOIDTag(&oid);
+ switch (tag) {
+ case SEC_OID_CURVE25519:
+ encoding = ECPoint_XOnly;
+ break;
+ case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP256R1:
+ case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP384R1:
+ case SEC_OID_SECG_EC_SECP521R1:
+ default:
+ /* unknown curve, default to uncompressed */
+ encoding = ECPoint_Uncompressed;
+ }
+ }
+ PORT_DestroyCheapArena(&tmpArena);
+ return encoding;
+}
+
+/* Returns the size of the public key, or 0 if there
+ * is an error. */
+static CK_ULONG
+pk11_ECPubKeySize(SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+ SECItem *publicValue = &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue;
+
+ ECPointEncoding encoding = pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey);
+ if (encoding == ECPoint_XOnly) {
+ return publicValue->len;
+ }
+ if (encoding == ECPoint_Uncompressed) {
+ /* key encoded in uncompressed form */
+ return ((publicValue->len - 1) / 2);
+ }
+ /* key encoding not recognized */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF(
+ SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
+ CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = privKey->pkcs11Slot;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ PK11SymKey *SharedSecret;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_ULONG key_size = 0;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[4];
+ int templateCount;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+ CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS *mechParams = NULL;
+
+ if (pubKey->keyType != ecKey) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((kdf != CKD_NULL) && (kdf != CKD_SHA1_KDF) &&
+ (kdf != CKD_SHA224_KDF) && (kdf != CKD_SHA256_KDF) &&
+ (kdf != CKD_SHA384_KDF) && (kdf != CKD_SHA512_KDF)) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* get our key Structure */
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, PR_TRUE, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginDerive;
+
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType));
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
+ attrs++;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &key_size, sizeof(key_size));
+ attrs++;
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ key_size = keySize;
+ if (key_size == 0) {
+ if ((key_size = pk11_GetPredefinedKeyLength(keyType))) {
+ templateCount--;
+ } else {
+ /* sigh, some tokens can't figure this out and require
+ * CKA_VALUE_LEN to be set */
+ switch (kdf) {
+ case CKD_NULL:
+ key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey);
+ if (key_size == 0) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA1_KDF:
+ key_size = SHA1_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA224_KDF:
+ key_size = SHA224_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA256_KDF:
+ key_size = SHA256_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA384_KDF:
+ key_size = SHA384_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ case CKD_SHA512_KDF:
+ key_size = SHA512_LENGTH;
+ break;
+ default:
+ PORT_AssertNotReached("Invalid CKD");
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ALGORITHM);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ symKey->size = key_size;
+
+ mechParams = PORT_ZNew(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+ if (!mechParams) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ mechParams->kdf = kdf;
+ if (sharedData == NULL) {
+ mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
+ mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
+ } else {
+ mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = sharedData->len;
+ mechParams->pSharedData = sharedData->data;
+ }
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
+
+ mechanism.mechanism = derive;
+ mechanism.pParameter = mechParams;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS);
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session, &mechanism,
+ privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+
+ /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
+ * try this again with an encoded public key */
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ /* For curves that only use X as public value and no encoding we don't
+ * have to try again. (Currently only Curve25519) */
+ if (pk11_ECGetPubkeyEncoding(pubKey) == ECPoint_XOnly) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ SECItem *pubValue = SEC_ASN1EncodeItem(NULL, NULL,
+ &pubKey->u.ec.publicValue,
+ SEC_ASN1_GET(SEC_OctetStringTemplate));
+ if (pubValue == NULL) {
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(symKey->session,
+ &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &symKey->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+
+ if ((crv != CKR_OK) && (kdf != CKD_NULL)) {
+ /* Some PKCS #11 libraries cannot perform the key derivation
+ * function. So, try calling C_DeriveKey with CKD_NULL and then
+ * performing the KDF separately.
+ */
+ CK_ULONG derivedKeySize = key_size;
+
+ keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ key_size = pk11_ECPubKeySize(pubKey);
+ if (key_size == 0) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ goto loser;
+ }
+ SharedSecret = symKey;
+ SharedSecret->size = key_size;
+
+ mechParams->kdf = CKD_NULL;
+ mechParams->ulSharedDataLen = 0;
+ mechParams->pSharedData = NULL;
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data;
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session,
+ &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ /* old PKCS #11 spec was ambiguous on what needed to be passed,
+ * try this one final time with an encoded public key */
+ mechParams->ulPublicDataLen = pubValue->len;
+ mechParams->pPublicData = pubValue->data;
+
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DeriveKey(SharedSecret->session,
+ &mechanism, privKey->pkcs11ID, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &SharedSecret->objectID);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(SharedSecret);
+ }
+
+ /* Perform KDF. */
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ symKey = pk11_ANSIX963Derive(SharedSecret, kdf,
+ sharedData, target, operation,
+ derivedKeySize);
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(SharedSecret);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(pubValue, PR_TRUE);
+ }
+
+loser:
+ PORT_ZFree(mechParams, sizeof(CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS));
+
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ symKey = NULL;
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ }
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubDeriveWithKDF(SECKEYPrivateKey *privKey, SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey,
+ PRBool isSender, SECItem *randomA, SECItem *randomB,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE derive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
+ CK_ULONG kdf, SECItem *sharedData, void *wincx)
+{
+
+ switch (privKey->keyType) {
+ case rsaKey:
+ case nullKey:
+ case dsaKey:
+ case keaKey:
+ case fortezzaKey:
+ case dhKey:
+ return PK11_PubDerive(privKey, pubKey, isSender, randomA, randomB,
+ derive, target, operation, keySize, wincx);
+ case ecKey:
+ return pk11_PubDeriveECKeyWithKDF(privKey, pubKey, isSender,
+ randomA, randomB, derive, target,
+ operation, keySize,
+ kdf, sharedData, wincx);
+ default:
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_BAD_KEY);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this little function uses the Decrypt function to unwrap a key, just in
+ * case we are having problem with unwrap. NOTE: The key size may
+ * not be preserved properly for some algorithms!
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_HandUnwrap(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM *mech, SECItem *inKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyTemplate, unsigned int templateCount,
+ int key_size, void *wincx, CK_RV *crvp, PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ CK_ULONG len;
+ SECItem outKey;
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ PRBool owner = PR_TRUE;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+
+ /* remove any VALUE_LEN parameters */
+ if (keyTemplate[templateCount - 1].type == CKA_VALUE_LEN) {
+ templateCount--;
+ }
+
+ /* keys are almost always aligned, but if we get this far,
+ * we've gone above and beyond anyway... */
+ outKey.data = (unsigned char *)PORT_Alloc(inKey->len);
+ if (outKey.data == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MEMORY);
+ if (crvp)
+ *crvp = CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ len = inKey->len;
+
+ /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
+ session = pk11_GetNewSession(slot, &owner);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_DecryptInit(session, mech, wrappingKey);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ PORT_Free(outKey.data);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ if (crvp)
+ *crvp = crv;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_Decrypt(session, inKey->data, inKey->len,
+ outKey.data, &len);
+ if (!owner || !(slot->isThreadSafe))
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ pk11_CloseSession(slot, session, owner);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PORT_Free(outKey.data);
+ PORT_SetError(PK11_MapError(crv));
+ if (crvp)
+ *crvp = crv;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ outKey.len = (key_size == 0) ? len : key_size;
+ outKey.type = siBuffer;
+
+ if (PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) {
+ symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ isPerm, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &outKey, wincx);
+ } else {
+ slot = PK11_GetBestSlot(target, wincx);
+ if (slot == NULL) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_NO_MODULE);
+ PORT_Free(outKey.data);
+ if (crvp)
+ *crvp = CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ symKey = pk11_ImportSymKeyWithTempl(slot, target, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
+ isPerm, keyTemplate,
+ templateCount, &outKey, wincx);
+ PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
+ }
+ PORT_Free(outKey.data);
+
+ if (crvp)
+ *crvp = symKey ? CKR_OK : CKR_DEVICE_ERROR;
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The wrap/unwrap function is pretty much the same for private and
+ * public keys. It's just getting the Object ID and slot right. This is
+ * the combined unwrap function.
+ */
+static PK11SymKey *
+pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(PK11SlotInfo *slot, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE wrappingKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType, SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
+ void *wincx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *userAttr, unsigned int numAttrs, PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ PK11SymKey *symKey;
+ SECItem *param_free = NULL;
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
+ CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
+ CK_ULONG valueLen = 0;
+ CK_MECHANISM mechanism;
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE rwsession;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_MECHANISM_INFO mechanism_info;
+#define MAX_ADD_ATTRS 4
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS + MAX_ADD_ATTRS];
+#undef MAX_ADD_ATTRS
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs = keyTemplate;
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+
+ if (numAttrs > MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS) {
+ PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGS);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* CKA_NSS_MESSAGE is a fake operation to distinguish between
+ * Normal Encrypt/Decrypt and MessageEncrypt/Decrypt. Don't try to set
+ * it as a real attribute */
+ if ((operation & CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK) == CKA_NSS_MESSAGE) {
+ /* Message is or'd with a real Attribute (CKA_ENCRYPT, CKA_DECRYPT),
+ * etc. Strip out the real attribute here */
+ operation &= ~CKA_NSS_MESSAGE_MASK;
+ }
+
+ /* first copy caller attributes in. */
+ for (templateCount = 0; templateCount < numAttrs; ++templateCount) {
+ *attrs++ = *userAttr++;
+ }
+
+ /* We only add the following attributes to the template if the caller
+ ** didn't already supply them.
+ */
+ if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_CLASS)) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof keyClass);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ if (!pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE)) {
+ keyType = PK11_GetKeyType(target, keySize);
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof keyType);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ if ((operation != CKA_FLAGS_ONLY) &&
+ !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, operation)) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, operation, &cktrue, 1);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * must be last in case we need to use this template to import the key
+ */
+ if (keySize > 0 &&
+ !pk11_FindAttrInTemplate(keyTemplate, numAttrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN)) {
+ valueLen = (CK_ULONG)keySize;
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_VALUE_LEN, &valueLen, sizeof valueLen);
+ attrs++;
+ }
+
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ PR_ASSERT(templateCount <= sizeof(keyTemplate) / sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE));
+
+ /* find out if we can do wrap directly. Because the RSA case if *very*
+ * common, cache the results for it. */
+ if ((wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) && (slot->hasRSAInfo)) {
+ mechanism_info.flags = slot->RSAInfoFlags;
+ } else {
+ if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot->slotID, wrapType,
+ &mechanism_info);
+ if (!slot->isThreadSafe)
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(slot);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ mechanism_info.flags = 0;
+ }
+ if (wrapType == CKM_RSA_PKCS) {
+ slot->RSAInfoFlags = mechanism_info.flags;
+ slot->hasRSAInfo = PR_TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* initialize the mechanism structure */
+ mechanism.mechanism = wrapType;
+ /* use NULL IV's for wrapping */
+ if (param == NULL)
+ param = param_free = PK11_ParamFromIV(wrapType, NULL);
+ if (param) {
+ mechanism.pParameter = param->data;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = param->len;
+ } else {
+ mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
+ mechanism.ulParameterLen = 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((mechanism_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT) && !PK11_DoesMechanism(slot, target)) {
+ symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey,
+ target, keyTemplate, templateCount, keySize,
+ wincx, &crv, isPerm);
+ if (symKey) {
+ if (param_free)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
+ return symKey;
+ }
+ /*
+ * if the RSA OP simply failed, don't try to unwrap again
+ * with this module.
+ */
+ if (crv == CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) {
+ if (param_free)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* fall through, maybe they incorrectly set CKF_DECRYPT */
+ }
+
+ /* get our key Structure */
+ symKey = pk11_CreateSymKey(slot, target, !isPerm, PR_TRUE, wincx);
+ if (symKey == NULL) {
+ if (param_free)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ symKey->size = keySize;
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginUnwrap;
+
+ if (isPerm) {
+ rwsession = PK11_GetRWSession(slot);
+ } else {
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ rwsession = symKey->session;
+ }
+ PORT_Assert(rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+ if (rwsession == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ crv = CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID;
+ else
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_UnwrapKey(rwsession, &mechanism, wrappingKey,
+ wrappedKey->data, wrappedKey->len,
+ keyTemplate, templateCount,
+ &symKey->objectID);
+ if (isPerm) {
+ if (rwsession != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
+ PK11_RestoreROSession(slot, rwsession);
+ } else {
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(symKey);
+ }
+ if (param_free)
+ SECITEM_FreeItem(param_free, PR_TRUE);
+ if (crv != CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_FreeSymKey(symKey);
+ symKey = NULL;
+ if (crv != CKR_DEVICE_ERROR) {
+ /* try hand Unwrapping */
+ symKey = pk11_HandUnwrap(slot, wrappingKey, &mechanism, wrappedKey,
+ target, keyTemplate, templateCount,
+ keySize, wincx, NULL, isPerm);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return symKey;
+}
+
+/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_UnwrapSymKey(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
+ SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize)
+{
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
+ wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->cx, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+/* use a symetric key to unwrap another symetric key */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
+ SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
+{
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+
+ templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
+ wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_UnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(PK11SymKey *wrappingKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType,
+ SECItem *param, SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation,
+ int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+
+ attrs = keyTemplate;
+ if (isPerm) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+ templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
+
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(wrappingKey->slot, wrappingKey->objectID,
+ wrapType, param, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->cx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
+}
+
+/* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key. Only supports CKM_RSA_PKCS. */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubUnwrapSymKey(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey, SECItem *wrappedKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target, CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
+
+ return PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(wrappingKey, wrapType, NULL,
+ wrappedKey, target, operation,
+ keySize);
+}
+
+/* unwrap a symmetric key with a private key with the given parameters. */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithMechanism(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, SECItem *param,
+ SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize)
+{
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
+
+ if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
+ PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
+ }
+
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID, mechType, param,
+ wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->wincx, NULL, 0, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+/* unwrap a symetric key with a private key. */
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlags(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
+ SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize, CK_FLAGS flags)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
+
+ templateCount = pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, keyTemplate, &ckTrue);
+
+ if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
+ PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
+ }
+
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID,
+ wrapType, NULL, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, PR_FALSE);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_PubUnwrapSymKeyWithFlagsPerm(SECKEYPrivateKey *wrappingKey,
+ SECItem *wrappedKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE target,
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE operation, int keySize,
+ CK_FLAGS flags, PRBool isPerm)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM_TYPE wrapType = pk11_mapWrapKeyType(wrappingKey->keyType);
+ CK_BBOOL cktrue = CK_TRUE;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE keyTemplate[MAX_TEMPL_ATTRS];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attrs;
+ unsigned int templateCount;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = wrappingKey->pkcs11Slot;
+
+ attrs = keyTemplate;
+ if (isPerm) {
+ PK11_SETATTRS(attrs, CKA_TOKEN, &cktrue, sizeof(CK_BBOOL));
+ attrs++;
+ }
+ templateCount = attrs - keyTemplate;
+
+ templateCount += pk11_OpFlagsToAttributes(flags, attrs, &cktrue);
+
+ if (SECKEY_HAS_ATTRIBUTE_SET(wrappingKey, CKA_PRIVATE)) {
+ PK11_HandlePasswordCheck(slot, wrappingKey->wincx);
+ }
+
+ return pk11_AnyUnwrapKey(slot, wrappingKey->pkcs11ID,
+ wrapType, NULL, wrappedKey, target, operation, keySize,
+ wrappingKey->wincx, keyTemplate, templateCount, isPerm);
+}
+
+PK11SymKey *
+PK11_CopySymKeyForSigning(PK11SymKey *originalKey, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech)
+{
+ CK_RV crv;
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE setTemplate;
+ CK_BBOOL ckTrue = CK_TRUE;
+ PK11SlotInfo *slot = originalKey->slot;
+
+ /* first just try to set this key up for signing */
+ PK11_SETATTRS(&setTemplate, CKA_SIGN, &ckTrue, sizeof(ckTrue));
+ pk11_EnterKeyMonitor(originalKey);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(slot)->C_SetAttributeValue(originalKey->session,
+ originalKey->objectID, &setTemplate, 1);
+ pk11_ExitKeyMonitor(originalKey);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ return PK11_ReferenceSymKey(originalKey);
+ }
+
+ /* nope, doesn't like it, use the pk11 copy object command */
+ return pk11_CopyToSlot(slot, mech, CKA_SIGN, originalKey);
+}
+
+void
+PK11_SetFortezzaHack(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ symKey->origin = PK11_OriginFortezzaHack;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is required to allow FORTEZZA_NULL and FORTEZZA_RC4
+ * working. This function simply gets a valid IV for the keys.
+ */
+SECStatus
+PK11_GenerateFortezzaIV(PK11SymKey *symKey, unsigned char *iv, int len)
+{
+ CK_MECHANISM mech_info;
+ CK_ULONG count = 0;
+ CK_RV crv;
+ SECStatus rv = SECFailure;
+
+ mech_info.mechanism = CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64;
+ mech_info.pParameter = iv;
+ mech_info.ulParameterLen = len;
+
+ /* generate the IV for fortezza */
+ PK11_EnterSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
+ crv = PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptInit(symKey->slot->session, &mech_info, symKey->objectID);
+ if (crv == CKR_OK) {
+ PK11_GETTAB(symKey->slot)->C_EncryptFinal(symKey->slot->session, NULL, &count);
+ rv = SECSuccess;
+ }
+ PK11_ExitSlotMonitor(symKey->slot);
+ return rv;
+}
+
+CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+PK11_GetSymKeyHandle(PK11SymKey *symKey)
+{
+ return symKey->objectID;
+}