Adding upstream version 115.7.0esr.upstream/115.7.0esrupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1802 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d8c711bd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ssl/tls13exthandle.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1802 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 4 -*- */
+/*
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nssrenam.h"
+#include "nss.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "sslimpl.h"
+#include "pk11pub.h"
+#include "ssl3ext.h"
+#include "ssl3exthandle.h"
+#include "tls13ech.h"
+#include "tls13exthandle.h"
+#include "tls13psk.h"
+#include "tls13subcerts.h"
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendStatusRequestXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                 sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    const sslServerCert *serverCert = ss->sec.serverCert;
+    const SECItem *item;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (!serverCert->certStatusArray ||
+        !serverCert->certStatusArray->len) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    item = &serverCert->certStatusArray->items[0];
+
+    /* Only send the first entry. */
+    /* status_type == ocsp */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 1 /*ocsp*/, 1);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    /* opaque OCSPResponse<1..2^24-1> */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, item->data, item->len, 3);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *     [draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11] Section 6.3.2.3.
+ *
+ *     struct {
+ *         NamedGroup group;
+ *         opaque key_exchange<1..2^16-1>;
+ *     } KeyShareEntry;
+ *
+ *     struct {
+ *         select (role) {
+ *             case client:
+ *                 KeyShareEntry client_shares<4..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ *             case server:
+ *                 KeyShareEntry server_share;
+ *         }
+ *     } KeyShare;
+ *
+ * DH is Section 6.3.2.3.1.
+ *
+ *     opaque dh_Y<1..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ * ECDH is Section 6.3.2.3.2.
+ *
+ *     opaque point <1..2^8-1>;
+ */
+PRUint32
+tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(const SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+    /* Size = NamedGroup(2) + length(2) + opaque<?> share */
+    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
+        case ecKey:
+            return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len;
+        case dhKey:
+            return 2 + 2 + pubKey->u.dh.prime.len;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(sslBuffer *buf, SSLNamedGroup group,
+                          SECKEYPublicKey *pubKey)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    unsigned int size = tls13_SizeOfKeyShareEntry(pubKey);
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, group, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        return rv;
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, size - 4, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        return rv;
+
+    switch (pubKey->keyType) {
+        case ecKey:
+            rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.data,
+                                  pubKey->u.ec.publicValue.len);
+            break;
+        case dhKey:
+            rv = ssl_AppendPaddedDHKeyShare(buf, pubKey, PR_FALSE);
+            break;
+        default:
+            PORT_Assert(0);
+            PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+            break;
+    }
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRCList *cursor;
+    unsigned int lengthOffset;
+
+    if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* Optimistically try to send an ECDHE key using the
+     * preexisting key (in future will be keys) */
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send client key share xtn",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* Save the offset to the length. */
+    rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 2, &lengthOffset);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    for (cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+         cursor != &ss->ephemeralKeyPairs;
+         cursor = PR_NEXT_LINK(cursor)) {
+        sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)cursor;
+        rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf,
+                                       keyPair->group->name,
+                                       keyPair->keys->pubKey);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* GREASE KeyShareEntry:
+     * [The client] MAY also send KeyShareEntry values for a subset of those
+     * selected in the "key_share" extension.  For each of these, the
+     * "key_exchange" field MAY be any value [RFC8701, Section 3.1].
+     *
+     * By default we do not send KeyShares for every NamedGroup so the
+     * ServerKeyShare handshake message / additional round-trip is not
+     * triggered by sending GREASE KeyShareEntries. */
+    if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_group], 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+        /* Entry length */
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2, 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+        /* Entry value */
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0xCD, 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(sslReader *rdr, TLS13KeyShareEntry **ksp)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRUint64 group;
+    const sslNamedGroupDef *groupDef;
+    TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
+    sslReadBuffer share;
+
+    rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(rdr, 2, &group);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    groupDef = ssl_LookupNamedGroup(group);
+    rv = sslRead_ReadVariable(rdr, 2, &share);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* This has to happen here because we want to consume
+     * the entire entry even if the group is unknown
+     * or disabled. */
+    /* If the group is disabled, continue. */
+    if (!groupDef) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    ks = PORT_ZNew(TLS13KeyShareEntry);
+    if (!ks) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    ks->group = groupDef;
+
+    rv = SECITEM_MakeItem(NULL, &ks->key_exchange,
+                          share.buf, share.len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    *ksp = ks;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+    tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
+
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the client and copy to
+ * |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
+ * share is processed in tls13_HandleServerKeyShare(). */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                              SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
+    TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
+
+    PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+
+    /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
+    rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
+    if ((rv != SECSuccess) || !ks) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
+        tls13_DestroyKeyShareEntry(ks);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleKeyShareXtnHrr(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                 SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRUint32 tmp;
+    const sslNamedGroupDef *group;
+
+    PORT_Assert(!ss->sec.isServer);
+    PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension in HRR",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure; /* error code already set */
+    }
+    if (data->len) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    group = ssl_LookupNamedGroup((SSLNamedGroup)tmp);
+    /* If the group is not enabled, or we already have a share for the
+     * requested group, abort. */
+    if (!ssl_NamedGroupEnabled(ss, group) ||
+        ssl_HaveEphemeralKeyPair(ss, group)) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Now delete all the key shares per [draft-ietf-tls-tls13 S 4.1.2] */
+    ssl_FreeEphemeralKeyPairs(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss));
+
+    /* And replace with our new share. */
+    rv = tls13_AddKeyShare(CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), group);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, internal_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_KEYGEN_FAIL);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Handle an incoming KeyShare extension at the server and copy to
+ * |xtnData->remoteKeyShares| for future use. The key
+ * share is processed in tls13_HandleClientKeyShare(). */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                              SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRUint32 length;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->sec.isServer);
+    PORT_Assert(PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares));
+
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle key_share extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* Redundant length because of TLS encoding (this vector consumes
+     * the entire extension.) */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &length, 2, &data->data,
+                                        &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        goto loser;
+    if (length != data->len) {
+        /* Check for consistency */
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    sslReader rdr = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
+    while (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&rdr)) {
+        TLS13KeyShareEntry *ks = NULL;
+        rv = tls13_DecodeKeyShareEntry(&rdr, &ks);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_KEY_SHARE);
+            goto loser;
+        }
+        if (ks) {
+            /* |ks| == NULL if this is an unknown group. */
+            PR_APPEND_LINK(&ks->link, &xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
+        ssl_tls13_key_share_xtn;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+    tls13_DestroyKeyShares(&xtnData->remoteKeyShares);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    sslEphemeralKeyPair *keyPair;
+
+    /* There should be exactly one key share. */
+    PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+    PORT_Assert(PR_PREV_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs) ==
+                PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs));
+
+    keyPair = (sslEphemeralKeyPair *)PR_NEXT_LINK(&ss->ephemeralKeyPairs);
+
+    rv = tls13_EncodeKeyShareEntry(buf, keyPair->group->name,
+                                   keyPair->keys->pubKey);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Called by clients.
+ *
+ *      struct {
+ *         opaque identity<0..2^16-1>;
+ *         uint32 obfuscated_ticket_age;
+ *     } PskIdentity;
+ *
+ *     opaque PskBinderEntry<32..255>;
+ *
+ *     struct {
+ *         select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ *             case client_hello:
+ *                 PskIdentity identities<6..2^16-1>;
+ *                 PskBinderEntry binders<33..2^16-1>;
+ *
+ *             case server_hello:
+ *                 uint16 selected_identity;
+ *         };
+ *
+ *     } PreSharedKeyExtension;
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    const static PRUint8 binder[TLS13_MAX_FINISHED_SIZE] = { 0 };
+    unsigned int binderLen;
+    unsigned int identityLen = 0;
+    const PRUint8 *identity = NULL;
+    PRTime age;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* Exit early if no PSKs or max version < 1.3. */
+    if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks) ||
+        ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* ...or if PSK type is resumption, but we're not resuming. */
+    sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
+    if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume && !ss->statelessResume) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* ...or if PSKs are incompatible with negotiated ciphersuites
+     * (different hash algorithms) on HRR.
+     *
+     * In addition, in its updated ClientHello, the client SHOULD NOT offer any
+     * pre-shared keys associated with a hash other than that of the selected
+     * cipher suite.  This allows the client to avoid having to compute partial
+     * hash transcripts for multiple hashes in the second ClientHello
+     * [RFC8446, Section 4.1.4]. */
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry &&
+        (psk->hash != ss->ssl3.hs.suite_def->prf_hash)) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* Save where this extension starts so that if we have to add padding, it
+    * can be inserted before this extension. */
+    PORT_Assert(buf->len >= 4);
+    xtnData->lastXtnOffset = buf->len - 4;
+    PORT_Assert(psk->type == ssl_psk_resume || psk->type == ssl_psk_external);
+    binderLen = tls13_GetHashSizeForHash(psk->hash);
+    if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) {
+        /* Send a single ticket identity. */
+        NewSessionTicket *session_ticket = &ss->sec.ci.sid->u.ssl3.locked.sessionTicket;
+        identityLen = session_ticket->ticket.len;
+        identity = session_ticket->ticket.data;
+
+        /* Obfuscated age. */
+        age = ssl_Time(ss) - session_ticket->received_timestamp;
+        age /= PR_USEC_PER_MSEC;
+        age += session_ticket->ticket_age_add;
+        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending Resumption PSK with identity", identity, identityLen));
+    } else if (psk->type == ssl_psk_external) {
+        identityLen = psk->label.len;
+        identity = psk->label.data;
+        age = 0;
+        PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Sending External PSK with label", identity, identityLen));
+    } else {
+        PORT_Assert(0);
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Length is len(identityLen) + identityLen + len(age) */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 2 + identityLen + 4, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, identity,
+                                  identityLen, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, age, 4);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Write out the binder list length. */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, binderLen + 1, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    /* Write zeroes for the binder for the moment. These
+     * are overwritten in tls13_WriteExtensionsWithBinder. */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, binder, binderLen, 1);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+
+    if (psk->type == ssl_psk_resume) {
+        xtnData->sentSessionTicketInClientHello = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+    xtnData->ticketTimestampVerified = PR_FALSE;
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                  SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECItem inner;
+    SECStatus rv;
+    unsigned int numIdentities = 0;
+    unsigned int numBinders = 0;
+    SECItem *appToken;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* The application token is set via the cookie extension if this is the
+     * second ClientHello.  Don't set it twice.  The cookie extension handler
+     * sets |helloRetry| and that will have been called already because this
+     * extension always comes last. */
+    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+        appToken = &xtnData->applicationToken;
+    } else {
+        appToken = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the identities list. */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &inner, 2,
+                                          &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    while (inner.len) {
+        SECItem label;
+        PRUint32 obfuscatedAge;
+
+        rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &label, 2,
+                                              &inner.data, &inner.len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+        if (!label.len) {
+            goto alert_loser;
+        }
+
+        rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &obfuscatedAge, 4,
+                                            &inner.data, &inner.len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+
+        if (!numIdentities) {
+            /* Check any configured external PSK for a matching label.
+             * If none exists, try to parse it as a ticket. */
+            PORT_Assert(!xtnData->selectedPsk);
+            for (PRCList *cur_p = PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
+                 cur_p != &ss->ssl3.hs.psks;
+                 cur_p = PR_NEXT_LINK(cur_p)) {
+                sslPsk *psk = (sslPsk *)cur_p;
+                if (psk->type != ssl_psk_external ||
+                    SECITEM_CompareItem(&psk->label, &label) != SECEqual) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Using External PSK with label",
+                               psk->label.data, psk->label.len));
+                xtnData->selectedPsk = psk;
+            }
+
+            if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) {
+                PRINT_BUF(50, (ss, "Handling PreSharedKey value",
+                               label.data, label.len));
+                rv = ssl3_ProcessSessionTicketCommon(
+                    CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss), &label, appToken);
+                /* This only happens if we have an internal error, not
+                * a malformed ticket. Bogus tickets just don't resume
+                * and return SECSuccess. */
+                if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                    return SECFailure;
+                }
+
+                if (ss->sec.ci.sid) {
+                    /* xtnData->ticketAge contains the baseline we use for
+                    * calculating the ticket age (i.e., our RTT estimate less the
+                    * value of ticket_age_add).
+                    *
+                    * Add that to the obfuscated ticket age to recover the client's
+                    * view of the ticket age plus the estimated RTT.
+                    *
+                    * See ssl3_EncodeSessionTicket() for details. */
+                    xtnData->ticketAge += obfuscatedAge;
+
+                    /* We are not committed to resumption until after unwrapping the
+                    * RMS in tls13_HandleClientHelloPart2. The RPSK will be stored
+                    * in ss->xtnData.selectedPsk at that point, so continue. */
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        ++numIdentities;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->pskBindersLen = data->len;
+
+    /* Parse the binders list. */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
+                                          &inner, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        return SECFailure;
+    if (data->len) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    while (inner.len) {
+        SECItem binder;
+        rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &binder, 1,
+                                              &inner.data, &inner.len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess)
+            return rv;
+        if (binder.len < 32) {
+            goto alert_loser;
+        }
+
+        if (!numBinders) {
+            xtnData->pskBinder = binder;
+        }
+        ++numBinders;
+    }
+
+    if (numBinders != numIdentities)
+        goto alert_loser;
+
+    if (ss->statelessResume) {
+        PORT_Assert(!ss->xtnData.selectedPsk);
+    } else if (!xtnData->selectedPsk) {
+        /* No matching EPSK. */
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+    ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendPreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* We only process the first session ticket the client sends,
+     * so the index is always 0. */
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, 0, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Handle a TLS 1.3 PreSharedKey Extension. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandlePreSharedKeyXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                  SECItem *data)
+{
+    PRUint32 index;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: SSL3[%d]: handle pre_shared_key extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &index, 2, &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        return SECFailure;
+
+    /* This should be the end of the extension. */
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* We only sent one PSK label so index must be equal to 0 */
+    if (index) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PRE_SHARED_KEY);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Assert(!PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks));
+    sslPsk *candidate = (sslPsk *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->ssl3.hs.psks);
+
+    /* Check that the server-selected ciphersuite hash and PSK hash match. */
+    if (candidate->hash != tls13_GetHashForCipherSuite(ss->ssl3.hs.cipher_suite)) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_pre_shared_key_xtn;
+    xtnData->selectedPsk = candidate;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  struct { } EarlyDataIndication;
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                             sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    if (!tls13_ClientAllow0Rtt(ss, ss->sec.ci.sid)) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                               SECItem *data)
+{
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* This will only be called if we also offered the extension. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                               SECItem *data)
+{
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle early_data extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_EARLY_DATA);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_early_data_xtn;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleTicketEarlyDataXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     SECItem *data)
+{
+    PRUint32 utmp;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle ticket early_data extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* The server must not send this extension when negotiating < TLS 1.3. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_EXTENSION_DISALLOWED_FOR_VERSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshake(ss, &utmp, sizeof(utmp),
+                                  &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->max_early_data_size = PR_ntohl(utmp);
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *     struct {
+ *       select (Handshake.msg_type) {
+ *       case client_hello:
+ *          ProtocolVersion versions<2..254>;
+ *       case server_hello:
+ *          ProtocolVersion version;
+ *       };
+ *     } SupportedVersions;
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    PRUint16 version;
+    unsigned int lengthOffset;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client send supported_versions extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_Skip(buf, 1, &lengthOffset);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Assert(!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx || ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+    for (version = ss->vrange.max; version >= ss->vrange.min; --version) {
+        PRUint16 wire = tls13_EncodeVersion(version,
+                                            ss->protocolVariant);
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, wire, 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+
+        if (ss->opt.enableDtls13VersionCompat &&
+            ss->protocolVariant == ssl_variant_datagram) {
+            switch (version) {
+                case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2:
+                case SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_1:
+                    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, (PRUint16)version, 2);
+                    break;
+                default:
+                    continue;
+            }
+            if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+                return SECFailure;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* GREASE SupportedVersions:
+     * A client MAY select one or more GREASE version values and advertise them
+     * in the "supported_versions" extension, if sent [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */
+    if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->idx[grease_version], 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_InsertLength(buf, lengthOffset, 1);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendSupportedVersionsXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server send supported_versions extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    PRUint16 ver = tls13_EncodeVersion(SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3,
+                                       ss->protocolVariant);
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, ver, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *    struct {
+ *        opaque cookie<1..2^16-1>;
+ *    } Cookie;
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleHrrCookie(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->vrange.max >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+    /* IMPORTANT: this is only valid while the HelloRetryRequest is still valid. */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(
+        ss, &CONST_CAST(sslSocket, ss)->ssl3.hs.cookie, 2,
+        &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len || data->len) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                             sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+        !ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send cookie extension", SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.data,
+                                  ss->ssl3.hs.cookie.len, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle cookie extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &xtnData->cookie, 2,
+                                          &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (xtnData->cookie.len == 0) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_cookie_xtn;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendPostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                     TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    /* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single
+     * NST immediately following the client Finished. */
+    if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send post_handshake_auth extension",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        *added = ss->opt.enablePostHandshakeAuth;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandlePostHandshakeAuthXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                       TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                       SECItem *data)
+{
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle post_handshake_auth extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    if (data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Only one post-handshake message is supported: a single
+     * NST immediately following the client Finished. */
+    if (!IS_DTLS(ss)) {
+        /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+        xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_post_handshake_auth_xtn;
+    }
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ *     enum { psk_ke(0), psk_dhe_ke(1), (255) } PskKeyExchangeMode;
+ *
+ *     struct {
+ *         PskKeyExchangeMode ke_modes<1..255>;
+ *     } PskKeyExchangeModes;
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendPskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+        ss->opt.noCache) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: send psk key exchange modes extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode:
+     * A client MAY select one or more GREASE PskKeyExchangeMode values and
+     * advertise them in the "psk_key_exchange_modes" extension, if sent
+     * [RFC8701, Section 3.1]. */
+    if (ss->opt.enableGrease) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke, ss->ssl3.hs.grease->pskKem }, 2, 1);
+    } else {
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ tls13_psk_dh_ke }, 1, 1);
+    }
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandlePskModesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                              SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    /* If we are doing < TLS 1.3, then ignore this. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle PSK key exchange modes extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    /* IMPORTANT: We aren't copying these values, just setting pointers.
+     * They will only be valid as long as the ClientHello is in memory. */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss,
+                                          &xtnData->psk_ke_modes, 1,
+                                          &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess)
+        return rv;
+    if (!xtnData->psk_ke_modes.len || data->len) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_MALFORMED_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
+        ssl_tls13_psk_key_exchange_modes_xtn;
+
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_SendCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                             sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    unsigned int calen;
+    const SECItem *name;
+    unsigned int nnames;
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+    rv = ssl_GetCertificateRequestCAs(ss, &calen, &name, &nnames);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    if (!calen) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, calen, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    while (nnames) {
+        rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, name->data, name->len, 2);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        ++name;
+        --nnames;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                     TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                     SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PLArenaPool *arena;
+
+    if (!data->len) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    arena = PORT_NewArena(DER_DEFAULT_CHUNKSIZE);
+    if (!arena) {
+        PORT_SetError(SEC_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = arena;
+    rv = ssl3_ParseCertificateRequestCAs((sslSocket *)ss,
+                                         &data->data, &data->len,
+                                         &xtnData->certReqAuthorities);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    if (data->len) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CERT_REQUEST);
+        goto loser;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+loser:
+    PORT_FreeArena(arena, PR_FALSE);
+    xtnData->certReqAuthorities.arena = NULL;
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleCertAuthoritiesXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData, SECItem *data)
+{
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: ignore certificate_authorities extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    /* NSS ignores certificate_authorities in the ClientHello */
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendHrrKeyShareXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                               sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+
+    if (!xtnData->selectedGroup) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendNumber(buf, xtnData->selectedGroup->name, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendHrrCookieXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                             sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+
+    PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+    PORT_Assert(xtnData->cookie.len > 0);
+
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf,
+                                  xtnData->cookie.data, xtnData->cookie.len, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                            SECItem *data)
+{
+    if (data->len != TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (!ssl3_ExtensionAdvertised(ss, ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn)) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx) {
+        SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received GREASEd ECH confirmation",
+                     SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    SSL_TRC(50, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: client received HRR ECH confirmation",
+                 SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
+    xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
+    if (!xtnData->ech) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    xtnData->ech->hrrConfirmation = data->data;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                         SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PRCList parsedConfigs;
+    PR_INIT_CLIST(&parsedConfigs);
+
+    /* The [retry config] response is valid only when the server used the
+     * ClientHelloOuter. If the server sent this extension in response to the
+     * inner variant [ECH was accepted], then the client MUST abort with an
+     * "unsupported_extension" alert [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 5]. */
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* If the server is configured with any ECHConfigs, it MUST include the
+     * "encrypted_client_hello" extension in its EncryptedExtensions with the
+     * "retry_configs" field set to one or more ECHConfig structures with
+     * up-to-date keys [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7.1]. */
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.msg_type != ssl_hs_encrypted_extensions) {
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+            /* For TLS < 1.3 the extension is unkown/unsupported. */
+            ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, unsupported_extension);
+        } else {
+            /* For TLS 1.3 the extension is known but prohibited outside EE
+             * (see RFC8446, Section 4.2 for alert rationale). */
+            ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        }
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
+    xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
+    if (!xtnData->ech) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the list to determine 1) That the configs are valid
+     * and properly encoded, and 2) If any are compatible. */
+    rv = tls13_DecodeEchConfigs(data, &parsedConfigs);
+    if (rv == SECFailure) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_CONFIG);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    /* Don't mark ECH negotiated on rejection with retry_config.
+     * Save the the raw configs so the application can retry. If
+     * we sent GREASE ECH (no echHpkeCtx), don't apply retry_configs. */
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.echHpkeCtx && !PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&parsedConfigs)) {
+        rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->retryConfigs, data);
+    }
+    tls13_DestroyEchConfigs(&parsedConfigs);
+
+    return rv;
+}
+
+/* Indicates support for the delegated credentials extension. This should be
+ * hooked while processing the ClientHello. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                        TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                        sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    /* Only send the extension if support is enabled and the client can
+     * negotiate TLS 1.3. */
+    if (ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+        !ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    /* Filter the schemes that are enabled and acceptable. Save these in
+     * the "advertised" list, then encode them to be sent. If we receive
+     * a DC in response, validate that it matches one of the advertised
+     * schemes. */
+    SSLSignatureScheme filtered[MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES] = { 0 };
+    unsigned int filteredCount = 0;
+    SECStatus rv = ssl3_FilterSigAlgs(ss, ss->vrange.max,
+                                      PR_TRUE /* disableRsae */,
+                                      PR_FALSE /* forCert */,
+                                      MAX_SIGNATURE_SCHEMES,
+                                      filtered,
+                                      &filteredCount);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* If no schemes available for the DC extension, don't send it. */
+    if (!filteredCount) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    rv = ssl3_EncodeFilteredSigAlgs(ss, filtered, filteredCount,
+                                    PR_FALSE /* GREASE */, buf);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    SSLSignatureScheme *dcSchemesAdvertised = PORT_ZNewArray(SSLSignatureScheme,
+                                                             filteredCount);
+    if (!dcSchemesAdvertised) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < filteredCount; i++) {
+        dcSchemesAdvertised[i] = filtered[i];
+    }
+
+    if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised) {
+        PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised);
+    }
+    xtnData->delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = dcSchemesAdvertised;
+    xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised = filteredCount;
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* Parses the delegated credential (DC) offered by the server. This should be
+ * hooked while processing the server's CertificateVerify.
+ *
+ * Only the DC sent with the end-entity certificate is to be parsed. This is
+ * ensured by |tls13_HandleCertificateEntry|, which only processes extensions
+ * for the first certificate in the chain.
+ */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ClientHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                          TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                          SECItem *data)
+{
+    if (!ss->opt.enableDelegatedCredentials ||
+        ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    sslDelegatedCredential *dc = NULL;
+    SECStatus rv = tls13_ReadDelegatedCredential(data->data, data->len, &dc);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto loser; /* code already set */
+    }
+
+    /* When using RSA, the public key MUST NOT use the rsaEncryption OID. */
+    if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 ||
+        dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 ||
+        dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ssl_sig_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    /* The algorithm and expected_cert_verify_algorithm fields MUST be of a
+     * type advertised by the client in the SignatureSchemeList and are
+     * considered invalid otherwise.  Clients that receive invalid delegated
+     * credentials MUST terminate the connection with an "illegal_parameter"
+     * alert. */
+    PRBool found = PR_FALSE;
+    for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) {
+        if (dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) {
+            found = PR_TRUE;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    if (found == PR_FALSE) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    // Check the dc->alg, if necessary.
+    if (dc->alg != dc->expectedCertVerifyAlg) {
+        found = PR_FALSE;
+        for (unsigned int i = 0; i < ss->xtnData.numDelegCredSigSchemesAdvertised; ++i) {
+            if (dc->alg == ss->xtnData.delegCredSigSchemesAdvertised[i]) {
+                found = PR_TRUE;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+        if (found == PR_FALSE) {
+            goto alert_loser;
+        }
+    }
+
+    xtnData->peerDelegCred = dc;
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
+        ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn;
+    return SECSuccess;
+alert_loser:
+    ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+loser:
+    tls13_DestroyDelegatedCredential(dc);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+/* Adds the DC extension if we're committed to authenticating with a DC. */
+static SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                        TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                        sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    if (tls13_IsSigningWithDelegatedCredential(ss)) {
+        const SECItem *dc = &ss->sec.serverCert->delegCred;
+        SECStatus rv;
+        rv = sslBuffer_Append(buf, dc->data, dc->len);
+        if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        *added = PR_TRUE;
+    }
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* The client has indicated support of DCs. We can't act on this information
+ * until we've committed to signing with a DC, so just set a callback for
+ * sending the DC extension later. */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleDelegatedCredentialsXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                                          TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                                          SECItem *data)
+{
+    if (xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes) {
+        PORT_Free(xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes);
+        xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes = NULL;
+        xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes = 0;
+    }
+    SECStatus rv = ssl_ParseSignatureSchemes(ss, NULL,
+                                             &xtnData->delegCredSigSchemes,
+                                             &xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes,
+                                             &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    if (xtnData->numDelegCredSigSchemes == 0) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, handshake_failure);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    /* Check for trailing data. */
+    if (data->len != 0) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_CLIENT_HELLO);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Keep track of negotiated extensions. */
+    xtnData->peerRequestedDelegCred = PR_TRUE;
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] =
+        ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn;
+
+    return ssl3_RegisterExtensionSender(
+        ss, xtnData, ssl_delegated_credentials_xtn,
+        tls13_ServerSendDelegatedCredentialsXtn);
+}
+
+/* Adds the ECH extension containing server retry_configs */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                       TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                       sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    PORT_Assert(ss->version >= SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3);
+    if (PR_CLIST_IS_EMPTY(&ss->echConfigs)) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    const sslEchConfig *cfg = (sslEchConfig *)PR_LIST_HEAD(&ss->echConfigs);
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, cfg->raw.data, cfg->raw.len, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+/* If an ECH server sends the HRR ECH extension after it accepted ECH, the
+ * extension's payload must be set to 8 zero bytes, these are overwritten with
+ * the accept_confirmation value after the required transcript calculation.
+ * If a client-facing/shared-mode server did not accept ECH when offered in CH
+ * or if ECH GREASE is enabled on the server and a ECH extension was received,
+ * a 8 byte random value is set as the extension's payload
+ * [draft-ietf-tls-esni-14, Section 7].
+ *
+ * Depending on the acceptance of ECH, zero or random bytes are written to
+ * ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf in tls13con.c/tls13_SendHelloRetryRequest(). */
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerSendHrrEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                          sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    /* Do not send HRR ECH extension if TLS < 1.3 was negotiated OR no ECH
+     * extension was received OR the server is NOT in any ECH server mode AND
+     * ECH GREASE is NOT enabled. */
+    if (ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3 ||
+        !xtnData->ech ||
+        (!ss->echPubKey && !ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch && !ss->opt.enableTls13GreaseEch)) {
+        SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server not sending HRR ECH Xtn",
+                      SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+    SSL_TRC(100, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: server sending HRR ECH Xtn",
+                  SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+    PR_ASSERT(SSL_BUFFER_LEN(&ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf) == TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN);
+    PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "grease_ech_confirmation", ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf.buf, TLS13_ECH_SIGNAL_LEN));
+    rv = sslBuffer_AppendBuffer(buf, &ss->ssl3.hs.greaseEchBuf);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                              SECItem *data)
+{
+    PRUint64 xtn_type;
+    sslReader xtnReader = SSL_READER(data->data, data->len);
+
+    PR_ASSERT(ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted || ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch);
+    PR_ASSERT(!xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn);
+
+    SECStatus rv = sslRead_ReadNumber(&xtnReader, 1, &xtn_type);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    if (SSL_READER_REMAINING(&xtnReader)) {
+        /* Inner ECH Extension must contain only type enum */
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    xtnData->ech->receivedInnerXtn = PR_TRUE;
+    xtnData->negotiated[xtnData->numNegotiated++] = ssl_tls13_encrypted_client_hello_xtn;
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+    ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_ServerHandleOuterEchXtn(const sslSocket *ss, TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                              SECItem *data)
+{
+    SECStatus rv;
+    HpkeKdfId kdf;
+    HpkeAeadId aead;
+    PRUint32 tmp;
+    PRUint8 configId;
+    SECItem senderPubKey;
+    SECItem encryptedCh;
+
+    PRUint32 xtn_type;
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &xtn_type, 1, &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    if (xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_outer && xtn_type != ech_xtn_type_inner) {
+        SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: unexpected ECH extension type in client hello outer, alert",
+                    SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    /* If we are operating in shared mode, we can accept an inner xtn in the ClientHelloOuter */
+    if (xtn_type == ech_xtn_type_inner) {
+        if (!ss->opt.enableTls13BackendEch) {
+            ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+            PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
+        xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
+        if (!xtnData->ech) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+        /* We have to rewind the buffer advanced by ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber */
+        data->data--;
+        data->len++;
+        return tls13_ServerHandleInnerEchXtn(ss, xtnData, data);
+    }
+    if (ss->ssl3.hs.echAccepted) {
+        ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, illegal_parameter);
+        PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_UNEXPECTED_EXTENSION);
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    SSL_TRC(3, ("%d: TLS13[%d]: handle outer ECH extension",
+                SSL_GETPID(), ss->fd));
+
+    PORT_Assert(!xtnData->ech);
+    xtnData->ech = PORT_ZNew(sslEchXtnState);
+    if (!xtnData->ech) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    /* Parse the KDF and AEAD. */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2,
+                                        &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    kdf = (HpkeKdfId)tmp;
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 2,
+                                        &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    aead = (HpkeAeadId)tmp;
+
+    /* config_id */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeNumber(ss, &tmp, 1,
+                                        &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    configId = tmp;
+
+    /* enc */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &senderPubKey, 2,
+                                          &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    /* payload, which must be final and non-empty. */
+    xtnData->ech->payloadStart = data->data + 2; /* Move past length */
+    rv = ssl3_ExtConsumeHandshakeVariable(ss, &encryptedCh, 2,
+                                          &data->data, &data->len);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+    if (data->len || !encryptedCh.len) {
+        goto alert_loser;
+    }
+
+    if (!ss->ssl3.hs.helloRetry) {
+        /* In the real ECH HRR case, config_id and enc should be empty. This
+         * is checked after acceptance, because it might be GREASE ECH. */
+        if (!senderPubKey.len) {
+            goto alert_loser;
+        }
+
+        rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->senderPubKey, &senderPubKey);
+        if (rv == SECFailure) {
+            return SECFailure;
+        }
+    }
+
+    rv = SECITEM_CopyItem(NULL, &xtnData->ech->innerCh, &encryptedCh);
+    PRINT_BUF(100, (ss, "CT for ECH Decryption", encryptedCh.data, encryptedCh.len));
+    if (rv == SECFailure) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+    xtnData->ech->configId = configId;
+    xtnData->ech->kdfId = kdf;
+    xtnData->ech->aeadId = aead;
+
+    /* Not negotiated until tls13_MaybeAcceptEch. */
+    return SECSuccess;
+
+alert_loser:
+    ssl3_ExtSendAlert(ss, alert_fatal, decode_error);
+    PORT_SetError(SSL_ERROR_RX_MALFORMED_ECH_EXTENSION);
+    return SECFailure;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_SendEmptyGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                         TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                         sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    if (!ss->opt.enableGrease ||
+        (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) ||
+        (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+SECStatus
+tls13_SendGreaseXtn(const sslSocket *ss,
+                    TLSExtensionData *xtnData,
+                    sslBuffer *buf, PRBool *added)
+{
+    if (!ss->opt.enableGrease ||
+        (!ss->sec.isServer && ss->vrange.max < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) ||
+        (ss->sec.isServer && ss->version < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3)) {
+        return SECSuccess;
+    }
+
+    SECStatus rv = sslBuffer_AppendVariable(buf, (PRUint8[]){ 0x00 }, 1, 2);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+        return SECFailure;
+    }
+
+    *added = PR_TRUE;
+    return SECSuccess;
+}