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+.. _mozilla_projects_nss_pkcs11_faq:
+
+PKCS11 FAQ
+==========
+
+.. _pkcs11_faq:
+
+`PKCS11 FAQ <#pkcs11_faq>`__
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+.. container::
+
+ .. rubric:: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
+ :name: questions_and_answers
+
+ .. rubric:: GENERAL QUESTIONS
+ :name: general_questions
+
+ .. rubric:: After plugging in an external PKCS #11 module, how do you use the certificate
+ available on the token? Does the certificate need to be imported into NSS's internal
+ certificate database? If so, is there a way to get the certificate from an external token into
+ NSS's internal certificate database?
+ :name: after_plugging_in_an_external_pkcs_.2311_module.2c_how_do_you_use_the_certificate_available_on_the_token.3f_does_the_certificate_need_to_be_imported_into_nss.27s_internal_certificate_database.3f_if_so.2c_is_there_a_way_to_get_the_certificate_from_an_external_token_into_nss.27s_internal_certificate_database.3f
+
+ NSS searches all the installed PKCS #11 modules when looking for certificates. Once you've
+ installed the module, the module's certificates simply appear in the list of certificates
+ displayed in the Certificate window.
+
+ .. rubric:: What version of PKCS #11 does NSS support?
+ :name: what_version_of_pkcs_.2311_does_nss_support.3f
+
+ NSS requires at least PKCS #11 version 2.0, but can support some features of later versions of
+ NSS, including NSS 2.20. NSS does not use all the features of later versions of PKCS #11.
+
+ .. rubric:: What are the expectations in terms of session manipulation? Will NSS potentially open
+ more than one session at a time? Read-only sessions, read/write sessions, serial, parallel?
+ :name: what_are_the_expectations_in_terms_of_session_manipulation.3f_will_nss_potentially_open_more_than_one_session_at_a_time.3f_read-only_sessions.2c_read.2fwrite_sessions.2c_serial.2c_parallel.3f
+
+ NSS typically holds one session read-only session per slot, in which some of the non-multipart
+ functions are handled. Multipart functions, such as bulk encryption, hashing, and mac functions
+ (for example, C_Digest and C_Sign) and those that require overlapped operation (C_Unwrap,
+ C_Decrypt) are handled by creating new sessions. If no new sessions are available, the one
+ read-only session is used, and the state is saved and restored after each multipart operation.
+
+ NSS never uses Parallel mode.
+
+ NSS opens new read/write sessions for key generation, some password management, and storage of
+ new certificates.
+
+ If your token is read/write and has only one session, NSS will open that one initial session
+ read/write.
+
+ .. rubric:: What permanent PKCS #11 objects are used by NSS or read from the token? Example: RSA
+ private key, CA certificate, user's own certificate, user's name.
+ :name: what_permanent_pkcs_.2311_objects_are_used_by_nss_or_read_from_the_token.3f_example:_rsa_private_key.2c_ca_certificate.2c_user.27s_own_certificate.2c_user.27s_name.
+
+ Private keys (RSA and DSA) and the corresponding certificates are read from the token. Other
+ certificates on the token are also loaded (to allow building certificate chains), but it's not
+ necessary to include the full chain, as long as the full chain is available in the regular
+ certificate database. For the sake of completeness, it's also a good idea to expose public key
+ objects. NSS falls back to looking for the existance of public keys to determine if the token may
+ have the corresponding private key while the token is not logged in.
+
+ .. rubric:: How are permanent PKCS #11 objects found by NSS? That is, which PKCS #11 attributes
+ are used in the object searches? Labels? Key IDs? Key types?
+ :name: how_are_permanent_pkcs_.2311_objects_found_by_nss.3f_that_is.2c_which_pkcs_.2311_attributes_are_used_in_the_object_searches.3f_labels.3f_key_ids.3f_key_types.3f
+
+ These are the general guidelines:
+
+ - User certificates are identified by their labels.
+ - Certificates and keys are often looked up by the following methods:
+
+ - By looking up all private keys.
+ - By looking up all certificates.
+ - Certificates may be looked up by label. By convention, all certificates making up a single
+ personality should have the same label (that is, a pair of certificates, one for signing
+ and one for key exchange, should have the same label).
+ - S/MIME-capable certificates are also looked up by issuer/serial number.
+ - Certificates may be looked up by their DER value.
+ - Certificates may also be looked up by subject. More than one certificate can match, but
+ each certificate with the same subject should be part of the same personality.
+ - NSS may enumerate all the permanment certificates in a token (CKA_TOKEN set to true).
+ - Private keys must have the same CKA_ID value as their corresponding certificate, and this
+ value must be unique on the token.
+ - Orphaned keys have a CKA_ID generated from some part of the public key. This value is set
+ when the key is generated, so that NSS will be able to find the key when the certificate
+ for that key is loaded. This case is interesting only for read/write tokens.
+
+ .. rubric:: What labels does NSS use to identify certificates?
+ :name: what_labels_does_nss_use_to_identify_certificates.3f
+
+ NSS can use the CKA_LABEL attribute to identify user certificates (see previous question) and
+ presents this label to the user. Therefore, each user certificate must have some label associated
+ with it. The label for a token certificate is presented to the user as follows:*token label*
+ **:**\ *certificate label* . This implies that each\ *token label* should be unique and
+ meaningful to the user, and that each\ *certificate label* should be unique to the token.
+
+ NSS gets the value of the CKA_LABEL attribute from the token. Labels should not have any trailing
+ blank characters.
+
+ .. rubric:: Will NSS use the random number generation features of PKCS #11?
+ :name: will_nss_use_the_random_number_generation_features_of__pkcs_.2311.3f
+
+ Only if you identify your token as the default random number generator. If you do, your token
+ must be able to generate random numbers even when it is not logged in. NSS uses installed random
+ number generators if PKCS11_MECH_RANDOM_FLAG is set in the installer script. For information on
+ how to do this, see Using the JAR Installation Manager to Install a PKCS #11 Cryptographic
+ Module.
+
+ .. rubric:: Can Mozilla provide a list of all PKCS #11 functions that NSS will use?
+ :name: can_mozilla_provide_a_list_of_all_pkcs_.2311_functions_that_nss_will_use.3f
+
+ Your token should expect to implement all the PKCS #11 functions that make sense for your token.
+ NSS continues to evolve, and periodically enhances it's functionality by using a more complete
+ list of PKCS #11 functions. You should have implementations for all the functions specified in
+ the version of the PKCS #11 spec your token implements. If you do not actually do the operation
+ specified by that function, you can return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED.
+
+ .. rubric:: Will NSS get the user's CA certificate via PKCS #11 and push it into the CA
+ certificate database or is the CA certificate database expected to obtain the CA certificate
+ by some other means?
+ :name: will_nss_get_the_user.27s_ca_certificate_via_pkcs_.2311_and_push_it_into_the_ca_certificate_database_or_is_the_ca_certificate_database_expected_to_obtain_the_ca_certificate_by_some_other_means.3f
+
+ PKCS #11 certificates that have private keys associated with them are loaded into the temporary
+ database (in memory) and marked as user certificates. All other certificates in the module are
+ loaded into the temporary database with no special trust bits associated with them. NSS is
+ perfectly capable of using token certificates in place.
+
+ .. rubric:: Which function does NSS use to get login state information?
+ :name: which_function_does_nss_use_to_get_login_state_information.3f
+
+ NSS calls C_GetSessionInfo to get the login/logout state. NSS never attempts to cache this
+ information, because login state can change instantly without NSS knowing about it (for example,
+ when the user removes the card). You must update all sessions correctly when the state changes.
+ Not doing so is a common source of problems.
+
+ .. rubric:: I have noticed that NSS sometimes use a session handle value of 0. Is this an invalid
+ session handle?
+ :name: i_have_noticed_that_nss_sometimes_use__a_session_handle_value_of_0._is_this_an_invalid_session_handle.3f
+
+ A session handle of 0 is indeed invalid. In the past, NSS uses the invalid session handle to mark
+ problems with acquiring or using a session. There have been cases where NSS would then use this
+ handle to try to do some operation. PKCS #11 modules should fail with CKR_INVALID_SESSION. We are
+ working to remove these cases as we find them.
+
+ .. rubric:: What are "Generic Crypto Svcs" (the first item listed when you click the View/Edit
+ button for the NSS Internal PKCS #11 Module under Security Devices under Options/Security in
+ Firefox)?
+ :name: what_are_.22generic_crypto_svcs.22_.28the_first_item_listed_when_you_click_the_view.2fedit_button_for_the_nss_internal_pkcs_.2311_module__under_security_devices_under_options.2fsecurity_in_firefox.29.3f
+
+ Generic Crypto Svcs are the services that NSS uses to do its basic cryptography (RSA encryption
+ with public keys, hashing, AES, DES, RC4, RC2, and so on).Other PKCS #11 modules can supply
+ implementations of these functions, and NSS uses those versions under certain conditions.
+ However, these are not the services NSS calls to get to other PKCS #11 modules, which show up
+ separately under Cryptographic Modules.
+
+ .. rubric:: Our plugin provides several slots with different capabilities. For example, one does
+ all the hashing/symmetric operations, while another does only asymmetric RSA operations. Can
+ this kind of division lead to problems?
+ :name: our_plugin_provides_several_slots_with_different_capabilities._for_example.2c_one_does_all_the_hashing.2fsymmetric_operations.2c_while_another_does_only_asymmetric_rsa_operations._can_this_kind_of_division_lead_to_problems.3f
+
+ The only issue is dealing with keys. For example, if the RSA slot unwraps a key, NSS needs to
+ move that key to a slot that can do the symmetric operations. NSS itself uses two tokens
+ internally--one that provides generic cryptographic services without authentication, and one that
+ provides operations based on the keys stored in the user's database and do need authentication.
+ NSS does this to avoid having to prompt for a password when performing an RSA verify operation,
+ DES encryption, and so on. Therefore, NSS can move keys around when necessary and possible. When
+ operating in FIPS mode, moving keys is significantly harder. In this case NSS uses a single token
+ to handle both key and cert storage and crypto operations.
+
+ In general, you not should use different slots unless you have a good reason. Much of NSS's token
+ selection is based on where the key involved is currently stored. If the token that has your
+ private keys doesn't also do symmetric operations, for example, it's likely that the internal
+ token will end up doing the symmetric operations.
+
+ .. rubric:: Is the PKCS #11 module supplied with NSS accessible through a shared library?
+ :name: is_the_pkcs_.2311_module_supplied_with_nss_accessible_through_a_shared_library.3f
+
+ Yes, the token is call softokn3 (softokn3.dll on windows, libsoftokn3.so on most unix platforms).
+ The NSS softokn3 is not a complete PKCS #11 module, it was implemented only to support NSS,
+ though other products have managed to get it to work in their environment. There are a number of
+ bugs against softoken's non-compliance, but these bugs have lower priority than fixing NSS's
+ non-complient uses of PKCS #11 or adding new features to NSS.
+
+ .. rubric:: If multiple PKCS #11 modules are loaded, how does NSS determine which ones to use for
+ the mechanisms required by SSL?
+ :name: if_multiple_pkcs_.2311_modules_are_loaded.2c_how_does_nss_determine_which_ones_to_use_for_the_mechanisms_required_by_ssl.3f
+
+ NSS uses the first slot it finds that can perform all the required operations. On servers, it's
+ almost always the slot that contains the server's private key.
+
+ .. rubric:: Does NSS support the use of PKCS #11 callbacks specified in the pNotify and
+ pApplication parameters for C_OpenSession?
+ :name: does_nss_support_the_use_of_pkcs_.2311_callbacks_specified_in_the_pnotify_and_papplication_parameters_for_c_opensession.3f
+
+ NSS does not currently use any of the callbacks.
+
+ NSS applications detect card insertion and deletion by means of polling to determine whether the
+ card is still in the slot and whether the open session associated with that card is still valid,
+ or by waiting on the C_WaitForSlotEvent call.
+
+ .. rubric:: What must an X.509 certificate include to allow it to be recognized as an email
+ certificate for use with S/MIME?
+ :name: what_must_an_x.509_certificate_include_to_allow_it_to_be_recognized_as_an_email_certificate_for_use_with_s.2fmime.3f
+
+ An email address must be included in the attribute of the subject DN or the mail attribute of the
+ subject DN. If the subject DN does not include an email address, the certificate extension
+ subjectAltName must include an email address. The subjectAltName extension is part of the X.509
+ v3 and PKIX specifications.
+
+ .. rubric:: If I have a multipurpose token that supports all required PKCS #11 functions and
+ provides RSA_PKCS and DSA mechanisms but not AES, DES or RC4, will NSS use the token for the
+ RSA_PKCS mechanisms and the NSS Internal PKCS #11 module for AES, DES or RC4 when making an
+ SSL connection?
+ :name: if_i_have_a_multipurpose_token_that_supports_all_required_pkcs_.2311_functions_and_provides_rsa_pkcs_and_dsa_mechanisms_but_but_not_aes.2c_des_or_rc4.2c_will_nss_use_the_token_for_the_rsa_pkcs_mechanisms_and_the_nss_internal_pkcs_.2311_module_for_aes.2c_des_or_rc4_when_making_an_ssl_connection.3f
+
+ Once NSS starts using a token for a given operation (like S/MIME or SSL), it works hard to keep
+ using that same token (so keys don't get moved around). Symmetric operations supported by NSS
+ include the following: CKM_AES_XXX, CKM_DES3_XXX, CKM_DES_XXX, CKM_RC2_XXX, and CKM_RC4_XXX. NSS
+ knows about all the mechanisms defined in PKCS #11 version 2.01, but will not perform those that
+ aren't defined by NSS's policy mechanism.
+
+ .. rubric:: When do NSS Applications spawn threads off the main thread, which in turn opens up a
+ new PKCS #11 session?
+ :name: when_do_nss_applications_spawn_threads_off_the_main_thread.2c_which_in_turn_opens_up_a_new_pkcs_.2311_session.3f
+
+ This depends on the application. PKCS #11 sessions are cryptographic session states, independent
+ of threads. In NSS based servers, multiple threads may call the same session, but two threads
+ will not call the same session at the same time.
+
+ .. rubric:: QUESTIONS ABOUT KEYS AND TOKENS
+ :name: questions_about_keys_and_tokens
+
+ .. rubric:: Is the PKCS #11 token treated in a read-only manner? That is, no token init, no key
+ gens, no data puts, no cert puts, etc.?
+ :name: is_the_pkcs_.2311_token_treated_in_a_read-only_manner.3f_that_is.2c_no_token_init.2c_no_key_gens.2c_no_data_puts.2c_no_cert_puts.2c_etc..3f
+
+ If the token is marked read-only, then it will be treated as such. If the token is marked
+ read/write and advertises that it can generate keys, NSS uses the token (through PKCS #11) to
+ generate the key and loads the user's certificate into the token. If the token is marked
+ read/write and does not advertise that it can generate keys, NSS generates the keys and loads
+ them into the token.
+
+ .. rubric:: How is private key handled when an external PKCS #11 module is loaded? Is it picked
+ up from the token when securing, or does NSS expect it to be added in its private key database
+ to use it?
+ :name: how_is_private_key_handled_when_an_external_pkcs_.2311_module_is_loaded.3f_is_it_picked_up_from_the_token_when_securing.2c_or_does_nss_expect_it_to_be_added_in_its_private_key_database_to_use_it.3f
+
+ While certificates may be read into the temporary database, private keys are never extracted from
+ the PKCS #11 module unless the user is trying to back up the key. NSS represents each private key
+ and a pointer to its PKCS #11 slot as a CK_OBJECT_HANDLE. When NSS needs to do anything with a
+ private key, it calls the PCKS #11 module that holds the key.
+
+ .. rubric:: If a PKCS #11 library reports that, for example, it does not support RSA signing
+ operations, does NSS expect to be able to pull an RSA private key off the token using the
+ C_GetAttributeValue call and then do the operation in software?
+ :name: if_a_pkcs_.2311_library_reports_that.2c_for_example.2c_it_does_not_support_rsa_signing_operations.2c_does_nss_expect_to_be_able_to_pull_an_rsa_private_key_off_the_token_using_the_c_getattributevalue_call_and_then_do_the_operation_in_software.3f
+
+ No. NSS will never try to pull private keys out of tokens (except as wrapped objects for PKCS
+ #12). Operations the token does not support are considered impossible for the key to support.
+
+ NSS may try to pull and load symmetric keys, usually if the key exchange happens in a token that
+ does not support the symmetric algorithm. NSS works very hard not to have to pull any key out of
+ a token (since that operation does not always work on all tokens).
+
+ .. rubric:: If so, by what means does NSS attempt to retrieve the data? By searching for some
+ fixed label attribute? Must the token store any temporary (session) objects?
+ :name: if_so.2c_by_what_means_does_nss_attempt_to_retrieve_the_data.3f_by_searching_for_some_fixed_label_attribute.3f_must_the_token_store_any_temporary_.28session.29_objects.3f
+
+ In general, yes, the token should store temporary session objects. This may not be necessary for
+ "private key op only" tokens, but this is not guaranteed. You should be prepared to handle
+ temporary objects. (Many NSS based server products will use temporary session objects, even for
+ "private key op only" tokens.)
+
+ .. rubric:: If a session key is unwrapped and stays on a hardware token, is it sufficient to
+ support just the usual decryption mechanisms for it, or is it assumed that such a symmetric
+ key will always be extractable from the token into the browser? The motivation for this is
+ that some hardware tokens will prevent extraction of symmetric keys by design.
+ :name: if_a_session_key_is_unwrapped_and_stays_on_a_hardware_token.2c_is_it_sufficient_to_support_just_the_usual_decryption_mechanisms_for_it.2c_or_is_it_assumed_that_such_a_symmetric_key_will_always_be_extractable_from_the_token_into_the_browser.3f_the_motivation_for_this_is_that_some_hardware_tokens_will_prevent_extraction_of_symmetric_keys_by_design.
+
+ NSS attempts to extract an unwrapped key from a token only if the token cannot provide the
+ necessary service with that key. For instance if you are decrypting an S/MIME message and you
+ have unwrapped the DES key with the private key provided by a given token, NSS attempts to use
+ that token to provide the DES encryption. Only if that token cannot do DES will NSS try to
+ extract the key.
+
+ .. rubric:: If the smartcard can't do key generation, will NSS do the key generation
+ automatically?
+ :name: if_the_smartcard_can.27t_do_key_generation.2c_will_nss_do_the_key_generation_automatically.3f
+
+ Yes. If your token can do CKM_RSA_PKCS, and is writable, NSS displays it as one of the options to
+ do key generation with. If the token cannot do CKM_RSA_PKCS_GEN_KEYPAIR, NSS uses its software
+ key generation code and writes the private and public keys into the token using C_CreateObject.
+ The RSA private key will contain all the attributes specified by PKCS #11 version 2.0. This is
+ also true for CKM_DSA and CKM_DSA_GEN_KEYPAIR.
+
+ .. rubric:: What is the C_GenerateKeyPair process? For example, what happens when an application
+ in the a server asks an NSS based client to do a keypair generation while a smartCard is
+ attached? How is the private key stored to the smartCard, and how is the public key sent to
+ the server (with wrapping?).
+ :name: what_is_the_c_generatekeypair_process.3f_for_example.2c_what_happens_when_an_application_in_the_a_server_asks_an_nss_based_client_to_do_a_keypair_generation_while_a_smartcard_is_attached.3f_how_is_the_private_key_stored_to_the_smartcard.2c_and_how_is_the_public_key_sent_to_the_server_.28with_wrapping.3f.29.
+
+ The private key is created using C_GenerateKeyPair or stored using C_CreateObject (depending on
+ who generates the key). NSS does not keep a copy of the generated key if it generates the key
+ itself. Key generation in Mozilla clients is triggered either by the standard <KEYGEN> tag, or by
+ the keygen functions off the window.crypto object. This is the same method used for generating
+ software keys and certificates and is used by certificate authorities like VeriSign and Thawte.
+ (Red Hat Certificate Server also uses this method). The public key is sent to the server
+ base-64-DER-encoded with an (optional) signed challenge.
+
+ .. rubric:: Are persistent objects that are stored on the token, such as private keys and
+ certificates, created by the PKCS #11 module? Is it safe to assume that NSS never calls
+ C_CreateObject for those persistent objects?
+ :name: are_persistent_objects_that_are_stored_on_the_token.2c_such_as_private_keys_and_certificates.2c_created_by_the_pkcs_.2311_module.3f_is_it_safe_to_assume_that_nss_never_calls_c_createobject_for_those_persistent_objects.3f
+
+ No. As stated in the answer to the preceding question, when NSS does a keygen it uses
+ C_GenerateKeyPair if the token supports the keygen method. If the token does not support keygen,
+ NSS generates the key internally and uses C_CreateObject to load the private key into the token.
+ When the certificate is received after the keygen, NSS loads it into the token with
+ C_CreateObject. NSS also does a similar operation for importing private keys and certificates
+ through pkcs12.
+
+ The above statement is true for read-write tokens only.
+
+ .. rubric:: When and how does NSS generate private keys on the token?
+ :name: when_and_how_does_nss_generate_private_keys_on_the_token.3f
+
+ As stated above, NSS uses C_GenerateKeyPair if the token supports the keygen method. If an RSA
+ key is being generated, the NSS application will present a list of all writable RSA devices asks
+ the user to select which one to use, if a DSA key is being generated, it will present a list of
+ all the writable DSA devices, if an EC key is being generated, it will present a list of all
+ writable EC devices.
+
+ .. rubric:: Does NSS ever use C_CopyObject to copy symmetric keys if it needs to reference the
+ same key for different sessions?
+ :name: does_nss_ever_use_c_copyobject_to_copy_symmetric_keys_if_it_needs_to_reference_the_same_key_for_different_sessions.3f
+
+ No. This is never necessary. The PKCS #11 specification explicitly requires that symmetric keys
+ must be visible to all sessions of the same application. NSS explicitly depends on this semantic
+ without the use of C_CopyObject. If your module does not support this semantic, it will not work
+ with NSS.
+
+ .. rubric:: QUESTIONS ABOUT PINS
+ :name: questions_about_pins
+
+ .. rubric:: Will a password change ever be done on the token?
+ :name: will_a_password_change_ever_be_done_on_the_token.3f
+
+ Yes, NSS attempts to change the password in user mode only. (It goes to SSO mode only if your
+ token identifies itself as CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED, but not CKF_USER_INITIALIZED).
+
+ It's perfectly valid to reject the password change request with a return value such as
+ CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED. If you do this, NSS applications display an appropriate error message
+ for the user.
+
+ .. rubric:: If I have my smart card which has initial PIN set at '9999', I insert it into my
+ reader and download with my certificate (keygen completed), can I issue 'Change Password' from
+ the Firefox to set a new PIN to the smart card? Any scenario that you can give me similar to
+ this process (a way to issue a certificate on an initialized new card)?
+ :name: if_i_have_my_smart_card_which_has_initial_pin_set_at__.279999.27.2c_i_insert_it_into_my_reader_and_download_with_my_certificate_.28keygen_completed.29.2c_can_i_issue_.27change_password.27_from_the_firefox_to_set_a_new_pin_to_the_smart_card.3f_any_scenario_that_you_can_give_me_similar_to_this_process_.28a_way_to_issue_a_certificate_on_an_initialized_new_card.29.3f
+
+ Yes. First open the Tools/Options/Advanced/Security window in Mozilla and click Security Devices.
+ Then select your PKCS #11 module, click View/Edit, select the token, and click Change Password.
+ For this to work, you must supply a C_SetPIN function that operates as CKU_USER. Mozilla,
+ Thunderbird, and Netscape products that use NSS have different UI to get the Security Devices
+ dialog.
+
+ To get a key into an initialized token, go to your local Certificate Authority and initiate a
+ certificate request. Somewhere along the way you will be prompted with a keygen dialog. Normally
+ this dialog does not have any options and just provides information; however, if you have more
+ than one token that can be used in this key generation process (for example, your smartcard and
+ the NSS internal PKCS#11 module), you will see a selection of "cards and databases" that can be
+ used to generate your new key info.
+
+ In the key generation process, NSS arranges for the key to have it's CKA_ID set to some value
+ derived from the public key, and the public key will be extracted using C_GetAttributes. This key
+ will be sent to the CA.
+
+ At some later point, the CA presents the certificate to you (as part of this keygen, or in an
+ e-mail, or you go back and fetch it from a web page once the CA notifies you of the arrival of
+ the new certificate). NSS uses the public key to search all its tokens for the private key that
+ matches that certificate. The certificate is then written to the token where that private key
+ resides, and the certificate's CKA_ID is set to match the private key.
+
+ .. rubric:: Why does Firefox require users to authenticate themselves by entering a PIN at the
+ keyboard? Why not use a PIN pad or a fingerprint reader located on the token or reader?
+ :name: why_does_firefox_require_users_to_authenticate_themselves_by_entering_a_pin_at_the_keyboard.3f_why_not_use_a_pin_pad_or_a_fingerprint_reader_located_on_the_token_or_reader.3f
+
+ PKCS #11 defines how these kinds of devices work. There is an outstanding bug in Firefox to
+ implement this support. \ No newline at end of file