Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

834 files changed, 64592 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.cpp b/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b46b96cd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/CSPEvalChecker.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerRunnable.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/ErrorResult.h"
+#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
+#include "nsGlobalWindowInner.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsJSUtils.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+namespace {
+
+// We use the subjectPrincipal to assert that eval() is never
+// executed in system privileged context.
+nsresult CheckInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP,
+                       nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+                       nsIPrincipal* aSubjectPrincipal,
+                       const nsAString& aExpression,
+                       const nsAString& aFileNameString, uint32_t aLineNum,
+                       uint32_t aColumnNum, bool* aAllowed) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aAllowed);
+
+  // The value is set at any "return", but better to have a default value here.
+  *aAllowed = false;
+
+  // This is the non-CSP check for gating eval() use in the SystemPrincipal
+#if !defined(ANDROID)
+  JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+  if (!nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(
+          cx, aSubjectPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal(), aExpression)) {
+    *aAllowed = false;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if (!aCSP) {
+    *aAllowed = true;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool reportViolation = false;
+  nsresult rv = aCSP->GetAllowsEval(&reportViolation, aAllowed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    *aAllowed = false;
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (reportViolation) {
+    aCSP->LogViolationDetails(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
+                              nullptr,  // triggering element
+                              aCSPEventListener, aFileNameString, aExpression,
+                              aLineNum, aColumnNum, u""_ns, u""_ns);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+class WorkerCSPCheckRunnable final : public WorkerMainThreadRunnable {
+ public:
+  WorkerCSPCheckRunnable(WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate,
+                         const nsAString& aExpression,
+                         const nsAString& aFileNameString, uint32_t aLineNum,
+                         uint32_t aColumnNum)
+      : WorkerMainThreadRunnable(aWorkerPrivate, "CSP Eval Check"_ns),
+        mExpression(aExpression),
+        mFileNameString(aFileNameString),
+        mLineNum(aLineNum),
+        mColumnNum(aColumnNum),
+        mEvalAllowed(false) {}
+
+  bool MainThreadRun() override {
+    mResult = CheckInternal(
+        mWorkerPrivate->GetCsp(), mWorkerPrivate->CSPEventListener(),
+        mWorkerPrivate->GetLoadingPrincipal(), mExpression, mFileNameString,
+        mLineNum, mColumnNum, &mEvalAllowed);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsresult GetResult(bool* aAllowed) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aAllowed);
+    *aAllowed = mEvalAllowed;
+    return mResult;
+  }
+
+ private:
+  const nsString mExpression;
+  const nsString mFileNameString;
+  const uint32_t mLineNum;
+  const uint32_t mColumnNum;
+  bool mEvalAllowed;
+  nsresult mResult;
+};
+
+}  // namespace
+
+/* static */
+nsresult CSPEvalChecker::CheckForWindow(JSContext* aCx,
+                                        nsGlobalWindowInner* aWindow,
+                                        const nsAString& aExpression,
+                                        bool* aAllowEval) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aWindow);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aAllowEval);
+
+  // The value is set at any "return", but better to have a default value here.
+  *aAllowEval = false;
+
+  // if CSP is enabled, and setTimeout/setInterval was called with a string,
+  // disable the registration and log an error
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = aWindow->GetExtantDoc();
+  if (!doc) {
+    // if there's no document, we don't have to do anything.
+    *aAllowEval = true;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+
+  // Get the calling location.
+  uint32_t lineNum = 0;
+  uint32_t columnNum = 0;
+  nsAutoString fileNameString;
+  if (!nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(aCx, fileNameString, &lineNum,
+                                     &columnNum)) {
+    fileNameString.AssignLiteral("unknown");
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = doc->GetCsp();
+  rv = CheckInternal(csp, nullptr /* no CSPEventListener for window */,
+                     doc->NodePrincipal(), aExpression, fileNameString, lineNum,
+                     columnNum, aAllowEval);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    *aAllowEval = false;
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult CSPEvalChecker::CheckForWorker(JSContext* aCx,
+                                        WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate,
+                                        const nsAString& aExpression,
+                                        bool* aAllowEval) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aWorkerPrivate);
+  aWorkerPrivate->AssertIsOnWorkerThread();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aAllowEval);
+
+  // The value is set at any "return", but better to have a default value here.
+  *aAllowEval = false;
+
+  // Get the calling location.
+  uint32_t lineNum = 0;
+  uint32_t columnNum = 0;
+  nsAutoString fileNameString;
+  if (!nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(aCx, fileNameString, &lineNum,
+                                     &columnNum)) {
+    fileNameString.AssignLiteral("unknown");
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<WorkerCSPCheckRunnable> r = new WorkerCSPCheckRunnable(
+      aWorkerPrivate, aExpression, fileNameString, lineNum, columnNum);
+  ErrorResult error;
+  r->Dispatch(Canceling, error);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(error.Failed())) {
+    *aAllowEval = false;
+    return error.StealNSResult();
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = r->GetResult(aAllowEval);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    *aAllowEval = false;
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.h b/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c2a1f8d774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/CSPEvalChecker.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_CSPEvalChecker_h
+#define mozilla_dom_CSPEvalChecker_h
+
+#include "nsString.h"
+
+struct JSContext;
+class nsGlobalWindowInner;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class WorkerPrivate;
+
+class CSPEvalChecker final {
+ public:
+  static nsresult CheckForWindow(JSContext* aCx, nsGlobalWindowInner* aWindow,
+                                 const nsAString& aExpression,
+                                 bool* aAllowEval);
+
+  static nsresult CheckForWorker(JSContext* aCx, WorkerPrivate* aWorkerPrivate,
+                                 const nsAString& aExpression,
+                                 bool* aAllowEval);
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_CSPEvalChecker_h
diff --git a/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.cpp b/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..70eb7f9e9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "DOMSecurityMonitor.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsJSUtils.h"
+#include "xpcpublic.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+
+/* static */
+void DOMSecurityMonitor::AuditParsingOfHTMLXMLFragments(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, const nsAString& aFragment) {
+  // if the fragment parser (e.g. innerHTML()) is not called in chrome: code
+  // or any of our about: pages, then there is nothing to do here.
+  if (!aPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() && !aPrincipal->SchemeIs("about")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // check if the fragment is empty, if so, we can return early.
+  if (aFragment.IsEmpty()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // check if there is a JS caller, if not, then we can can return early here
+  // because we only care about calls to the fragment parser (e.g. innerHTML)
+  // originating from JS code.
+  nsAutoString filename;
+  uint32_t lineNum = 0;
+  uint32_t columnNum = 0;
+  JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+  if (!cx ||
+      !nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, filename, &lineNum, &columnNum)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // check if we should skip assertion. Please only ever set this pref to
+  // true if really needed for testing purposes.
+  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_skip_html_fragment_assertion()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * WARNING: Do not add any new entries to the htmlFragmentAllowlist
+   * without proper review from a dom:security peer!
+   */
+  static nsLiteralCString htmlFragmentAllowlist[] = {
+      "chrome://global/content/elements/marquee.js"_ns,
+      nsLiteralCString(
+          "chrome://pocket/content/panels/js/vendor/jquery-2.1.1.min.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString("chrome://devtools/content/shared/sourceeditor/"
+                       "codemirror/codemirror.bundle.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString(
+          "resource://activity-stream/data/content/activity-stream.bundle.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString("resource://devtools/client/debugger/src/components/"
+                       "Editor/Breakpoint.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString("resource://devtools/client/debugger/src/components/"
+                       "Editor/ColumnBreakpoint.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString(
+          "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/fluent-react.js"),
+      "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom.js"_ns,
+      nsLiteralCString(
+          "resource://devtools/client/shared/vendor/react-dom-dev.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString(
+          "resource://devtools/client/shared/widgets/FilterWidget.js"),
+      nsLiteralCString("resource://devtools/client/shared/widgets/tooltip/"
+                       "inactive-css-tooltip-helper.js"),
+      "resource://devtools/client/shared/widgets/Spectrum.js"_ns,
+      "resource://gre/modules/narrate/VoiceSelect.jsm"_ns,
+      "resource://normandy-vendor/ReactDOM.js"_ns,
+      // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+      // test pages
+      // ------------------------------------------------------------------
+      "chrome://mochikit/content/browser-harness.xhtml"_ns,
+      "chrome://mochikit/content/harness.xhtml"_ns,
+      "chrome://mochikit/content/tests/"_ns,
+      "chrome://mochitests/content/"_ns,
+      "chrome://reftest/content/"_ns,
+  };
+
+  for (const nsLiteralCString& allowlistEntry : htmlFragmentAllowlist) {
+    if (StringBeginsWith(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(filename), allowlistEntry)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString uriSpec;
+  aPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(uriSpec);
+
+  // Ideally we should not call the fragment parser (e.g. innerHTML()) in
+  // chrome: code or any of our about: pages. If you hit that assertion,
+  // please do *not* add your filename to the allowlist above, but rather
+  // refactor your code.
+  fprintf(stderr,
+          "Do not call the fragment parser (e.g innerHTML()) in chrome code "
+          "or in about: pages, (uri: %s), (caller: %s, line: %d, col: %d), "
+          "(fragment: %s)",
+          uriSpec.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(filename).get(), lineNum,
+          columnNum, NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aFragment).get());
+
+  xpc_DumpJSStack(true, true, false);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(false);
+}
+
+/* static */
+void DOMSecurityMonitor::AuditUseOfJavaScriptURI(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+
+  // We only ever have no loadingPrincipal in case of a new top-level load.
+  // The purpose of this assertion is to make sure we do not allow loading
+  // javascript: URIs in system privileged contexts. Hence there is nothing
+  // to do here in case there is no loadingPrincipal.
+  if (!loadingPrincipal) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if the javascript: URI is not loaded by a system privileged context
+  // or an about: page, there there is nothing to do here.
+  if (!loadingPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      !loadingPrincipal->SchemeIs("about")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+             "Do not use javascript: URIs in chrome code or in about: pages");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.h b/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..457e8a143a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/DOMSecurityMonitor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_DOMSecurityMonitor_h
+#define mozilla_dom_DOMSecurityMonitor_h
+
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+class nsIChannel;
+class nsIPrincipal;
+
+class DOMSecurityMonitor final {
+ public:
+  /* The fragment parser is triggered anytime JS calls innerHTML or similar
+   * JS functions which can generate HTML fragments. This generation of
+   * HTML might be dangerous, hence we should ensure that no new instances
+   * of innerHTML and similar functions are introduced in system privileged
+   * contexts, or also about: pages, in our codebase.
+   *
+   * If the auditor detects a new instance of innerHTML or similar
+   * function it will CRASH using a strong assertion.
+   */
+  static void AuditParsingOfHTMLXMLFragments(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                                             const nsAString& aFragment);
+
+  /* The use of javascript: URIs in system privileged contexts or
+   * also about: pages is considered unsafe and discouraged.
+   *
+   * If the auditor detects a javascript: URI in a privileged
+   * context it will CRASH using a strong assertion.
+   *
+   */
+  static void AuditUseOfJavaScriptURI(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+ private:
+  DOMSecurityMonitor() = default;
+  ~DOMSecurityMonitor() = default;
+};
+
+#endif /* mozilla_dom_DOMSecurityMonitor_h */
diff --git a/dom/security/FramingChecker.cpp b/dom/security/FramingChecker.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be82ac9bb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/FramingChecker.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FramingChecker.h"
+#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "nsDocShell.h"
+#include "nsHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsGlobalWindowOuter.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleReportCollector.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsQueryObject.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/LoadURIOptionsBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
+#include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/HttpBaseChannel.h"
+
+#include "nsIObserverService.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+/* static */
+void FramingChecker::ReportError(const char* aMessageTag,
+                                 nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, nsIURI* aURI,
+                                 const nsAString& aPolicy) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aURI);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<net::HttpBaseChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (!httpChannel) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Get the URL spec
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetAsciiSpec(spec);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsTArray<nsString> params;
+  params.AppendElement(aPolicy);
+  params.AppendElement(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec));
+
+  httpChannel->AddConsoleReport(nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "X-Frame-Options"_ns,
+                                nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, spec, 0,
+                                0, nsDependentCString(aMessageTag), params);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool FramingChecker::CheckOneFrameOptionsPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aHttpChannel,
+                                                const nsAString& aPolicy) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  aHttpChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+
+  // return early if header does not have one of the values with meaning
+  if (!aPolicy.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("deny") &&
+      !aPolicy.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sameorigin")) {
+    ReportError("XFrameOptionsInvalid", aHttpChannel, uri, aPolicy);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If the X-Frame-Options value is SAMEORIGIN, then the top frame in the
+  // parent chain must be from the same origin as this document.
+  bool checkSameOrigin = aPolicy.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("sameorigin");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHttpChannel->LoadInfo();
+  RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> ctx;
+  loadInfo->GetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(ctx));
+
+  while (ctx) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+    // Generally CheckOneFrameOptionsPolicy is consulted from within the
+    // DocumentLoadListener in the parent process. For loads of type object
+    // and embed it's called from the Document in the content process.
+    // After Bug 1646899 we should be able to remove that branching code for
+    // querying the principal.
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      WindowGlobalParent* window = ctx->Canonical()->GetCurrentWindowGlobal();
+      if (window) {
+        // Using the URI of the Principal and not the document because e.g.
+        // window.open inherits the principal and hence the URI of the
+        // opening context needed for same origin checks.
+        principal = window->DocumentPrincipal();
+      }
+    } else if (nsPIDOMWindowOuter* windowOuter = ctx->GetDOMWindow()) {
+      principal = nsGlobalWindowOuter::Cast(windowOuter)->GetPrincipal();
+    }
+
+    if (principal && principal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    if (checkSameOrigin) {
+      bool isSameOrigin = principal && principal->IsSameOrigin(uri);
+      // one of the ancestors is not same origin as this document
+      if (!isSameOrigin) {
+        ReportError("XFrameOptionsDeny", aHttpChannel, uri, aPolicy);
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    ctx = ctx->GetParent();
+  }
+
+  // If the value of the header is DENY, and the previous condition is
+  // not met (current docshell is not the top docshell), prohibit the
+  // load.
+  if (aPolicy.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("deny")) {
+    ReportError("XFrameOptionsDeny", aHttpChannel, uri, aPolicy);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Ignore x-frame-options if CSP with frame-ancestors exists
+static bool ShouldIgnoreFrameOptions(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                     nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP) {
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aChannel, false);
+  if (!aCSP) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool enforcesFrameAncestors = false;
+  aCSP->GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(&enforcesFrameAncestors);
+  if (!enforcesFrameAncestors) {
+    // if CSP does not contain frame-ancestors, then there
+    // is nothing to do here.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // log warning to console that xfo is ignored because of CSP
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint64_t innerWindowID = loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID();
+  bool privateWindow = !!loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId;
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {u"x-frame-options"_ns,
+                                    u"frame-ancestors"_ns};
+  CSP_LogLocalizedStr("IgnoringSrcBecauseOfDirective", params,
+                      u""_ns,  // no sourcefile
+                      u""_ns,  // no scriptsample
+                      0,       // no linenumber
+                      0,       // no columnnumber
+                      nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                      "IgnoringSrcBecauseOfDirective"_ns, innerWindowID,
+                      privateWindow);
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Check if X-Frame-Options permits this document to be loaded as a
+// subdocument. This will iterate through and check any number of
+// X-Frame-Options policies in the request (comma-separated in a header,
+// multiple headers, etc).
+/* static */
+bool FramingChecker::CheckFrameOptions(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                       nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp) {
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // xfo check only makes sense for subdocument and object loads, if this is
+  // not a load of such type, there is nothing to do here.
+  if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+      contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel;
+  nsresult rv = nsContentSecurityUtils::GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
+      aChannel, getter_AddRefs(httpChannel));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // xfo can only hang off an httpchannel, if this is not an httpChannel
+  // then there is nothing to do here.
+  if (!httpChannel) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // ignore XFO checks on channels that will be redirected
+  uint32_t responseStatus;
+  rv = httpChannel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus);
+  // GetResponseStatus returning failure is expected in several situations, so
+  // do not warn if it fails.
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (mozilla::net::nsHttpChannel::IsRedirectStatus(responseStatus)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString xfoHeaderCValue;
+  Unused << httpChannel->GetResponseHeader("X-Frame-Options"_ns,
+                                           xfoHeaderCValue);
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 xfoHeaderValue(xfoHeaderCValue);
+
+  // if no header value, there's nothing to do.
+  if (xfoHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // xfo checks are ignored in case CSP frame-ancestors is present,
+  // if so, there is nothing to do here.
+  if (ShouldIgnoreFrameOptions(aChannel, aCsp)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // iterate through all the header values (usually there's only one, but can
+  // be many.  If any want to deny the load, deny the load.
+  nsCharSeparatedTokenizer tokenizer(xfoHeaderValue, ',');
+  while (tokenizer.hasMoreTokens()) {
+    const nsAString& tok = tokenizer.nextToken();
+    if (!CheckOneFrameOptionsPolicy(httpChannel, tok)) {
+      // if xfo blocks the load we are notifying observers for
+      // testing purposes because there is no event to gather
+      // what an iframe load was blocked or not.
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+      httpChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
+          mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+      nsAutoString policy(tok);
+      observerService->NotifyObservers(uri, "xfo-on-violate-policy",
+                                       policy.get());
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/FramingChecker.h b/dom/security/FramingChecker.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17f0bef82f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/FramingChecker.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_FramingChecker_h
+#define mozilla_dom_FramingChecker_h
+
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+class nsIDocShell;
+class nsIChannel;
+class nsIHttpChannel;
+class nsIDocShellTreeItem;
+class nsIURI;
+class nsIContentSecurityPolicy;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+class BrowsingContext;
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+class FramingChecker {
+ public:
+  // Determine if X-Frame-Options allows content to be framed
+  // as a subdocument
+  static bool CheckFrameOptions(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP);
+
+ protected:
+  enum XFOHeader { eDENY, eSAMEORIGIN };
+
+  /**
+   * Logs to the window about a X-Frame-Options error.
+   *
+   * @param aMessageTag the error message identifier to log
+   * @param aChannel the HTTP Channel
+   * @param aURI the URI of the frame attempting to load
+   * @param aPolicy the header value string from the frame to the console.
+   */
+  static void ReportError(const char* aMessageTag, nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
+                          nsIURI* aURI, const nsAString& aPolicy);
+
+  static bool CheckOneFrameOptionsPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aHttpChannel,
+                                         const nsAString& aPolicy);
+};
+
+#endif /* mozilla_dom_FramingChecker_h */
diff --git a/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.cpp b/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8e28e6ce32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "PolicyTokenizer.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+
+static mozilla::LogModule* GetPolicyTokenizerLog() {
+  static mozilla::LazyLogModule gPolicyTokenizerPRLog("PolicyTokenizer");
+  return gPolicyTokenizerPRLog;
+}
+
+#define POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetPolicyTokenizerLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+
+static const char16_t SEMICOL = ';';
+
+PolicyTokenizer::PolicyTokenizer(const char16_t* aStart, const char16_t* aEnd)
+    : mCurChar(aStart), mEndChar(aEnd) {
+  POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(("PolicyTokenizer::PolicyTokenizer"));
+}
+
+PolicyTokenizer::~PolicyTokenizer() {
+  POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(("PolicyTokenizer::~PolicyTokenizer"));
+}
+
+void PolicyTokenizer::generateNextToken() {
+  skipWhiteSpaceAndSemicolon();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mCurToken.Length() == 0);
+  const char16_t* const start = mCurChar;
+  while (!atEnd() && !nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace(*mCurChar) &&
+         *mCurChar != SEMICOL) {
+    mCurChar++;
+  }
+  if (start != mCurChar) {
+    mCurToken.Append(start, mCurChar - start);
+  }
+  POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(("PolicyTokenizer::generateNextToken: %s",
+                      NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get()));
+}
+
+void PolicyTokenizer::generateTokens(policyTokens& outTokens) {
+  POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(("PolicyTokenizer::generateTokens"));
+
+  // dirAndSrcs holds one set of [ name, src, src, src, ... ]
+  nsTArray<nsString> dirAndSrcs;
+
+  while (!atEnd()) {
+    generateNextToken();
+    dirAndSrcs.AppendElement(mCurToken);
+    skipWhiteSpace();
+    if (atEnd() || accept(SEMICOL)) {
+      outTokens.AppendElement(std::move(dirAndSrcs));
+      dirAndSrcs.ClearAndRetainStorage();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void PolicyTokenizer::tokenizePolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString,
+                                     policyTokens& outTokens) {
+  POLICYTOKENIZERLOG(("PolicyTokenizer::tokenizePolicy"));
+
+  PolicyTokenizer tokenizer(aPolicyString.BeginReading(),
+                            aPolicyString.EndReading());
+
+  tokenizer.generateTokens(outTokens);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.h b/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c3c18175d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/PolicyTokenizer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef PolicyTokenizer_h___
+#define PolicyTokenizer_h___
+
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+
+/**
+ * How does the parsing work?
+ *
+ * We generate tokens by splitting the policy-string by whitespace and
+ * semicolon. Interally the tokens are represented as an array of string-arrays:
+ *
+ *  [
+ *    [ name, src, src, src, ... ],
+ *    [ name, src, src, src, ... ],
+ *    [ name, src, src, src, ... ]
+ *  ]
+ *
+ * for example:
+ *  [
+ *    [ img-src, http://www.example.com, http:www.test.com ],
+ *    [ default-src, 'self'],
+ *    [ script-src, 'unsafe-eval', 'unsafe-inline' ],
+ *  ]
+ */
+
+using policyTokens = nsTArray<CopyableTArray<nsString>>;
+
+class PolicyTokenizer {
+ public:
+  static void tokenizePolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString,
+                             policyTokens& outTokens);
+
+ private:
+  PolicyTokenizer(const char16_t* aStart, const char16_t* aEnd);
+  ~PolicyTokenizer();
+
+  inline bool atEnd() { return mCurChar >= mEndChar; }
+
+  inline void skipWhiteSpace() {
+    while (mCurChar < mEndChar && nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace(*mCurChar)) {
+      mCurChar++;
+    }
+    mCurToken.Truncate();
+  }
+
+  inline void skipWhiteSpaceAndSemicolon() {
+    while (mCurChar < mEndChar &&
+           (*mCurChar == ';' || nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace(*mCurChar))) {
+      mCurChar++;
+    }
+    mCurToken.Truncate();
+  }
+
+  inline bool accept(char16_t aChar) {
+    NS_ASSERTION(mCurChar < mEndChar, "Trying to dereference mEndChar");
+    if (*mCurChar == aChar) {
+      mCurToken.Append(*mCurChar++);
+      return true;
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  void generateNextToken();
+  void generateTokens(policyTokens& outTokens);
+
+  const char16_t* mCurChar;
+  const char16_t* mEndChar;
+  nsString mCurToken;
+};
+
+#endif /* PolicyTokenizer_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.cpp b/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0091fe3b95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1725 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/ReferrerPolicyBinding.h"
+#include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h"
+#include "nsIEffectiveTLDService.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIObjectInputStream.h"
+#include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h"
+#include "nsIOService.h"
+#include "nsIPipe.h"
+#include "nsIURL.h"
+
+#include "nsWhitespaceTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsAlgorithm.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsStreamUtils.h"
+#include "ReferrerInfo.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/ContentBlockingAllowList.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/CookieJarSettings.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/HttpBaseChannel.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/RequestBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
+#include "mozilla/StorageAccess.h"
+#include "mozilla/StyleSheet.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+
+static mozilla::LazyLogModule gReferrerInfoLog("ReferrerInfo");
+#define LOG(msg) MOZ_LOG(gReferrerInfoLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, msg)
+#define LOG_ENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(gReferrerInfoLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
+
+using namespace mozilla::net;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+// Implementation of ClassInfo is required to serialize/deserialize
+NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(ReferrerInfo, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::THREADSAFE,
+                  REFERRERINFO_CID)
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(ReferrerInfo, nsIReferrerInfo, nsISerializable)
+
+#define MAX_REFERRER_SENDING_POLICY 2
+#define MAX_CROSS_ORIGIN_SENDING_POLICY 2
+#define MAX_TRIMMING_POLICY 2
+
+#define MIN_REFERRER_SENDING_POLICY 0
+#define MIN_CROSS_ORIGIN_SENDING_POLICY 0
+#define MIN_TRIMMING_POLICY 0
+
+/*
+ * Default referrer policy to use
+ */
+enum DefaultReferrerPolicy : uint32_t {
+  eDefaultPolicyNoReferrer = 0,
+  eDefaultPolicySameOrgin = 1,
+  eDefaultPolicyStrictWhenXorigin = 2,
+  eDefaultPolicyNoReferrerWhenDownGrade = 3,
+};
+
+static uint32_t GetDefaultFirstPartyReferrerPolicyPref(bool aPrivateBrowsing) {
+  return aPrivateBrowsing
+             ? StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_defaultPolicy_pbmode()
+             : StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_defaultPolicy();
+}
+
+static uint32_t GetDefaultThirdPartyReferrerPolicyPref(bool aPrivateBrowsing) {
+  return aPrivateBrowsing
+             ? StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_defaultPolicy_trackers_pbmode()
+             : StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_defaultPolicy_trackers();
+}
+
+static ReferrerPolicy DefaultReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicy(
+    uint32_t aDefaultToUse) {
+  switch (aDefaultToUse) {
+    case DefaultReferrerPolicy::eDefaultPolicyNoReferrer:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer;
+    case DefaultReferrerPolicy::eDefaultPolicySameOrgin:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin;
+    case DefaultReferrerPolicy::eDefaultPolicyStrictWhenXorigin:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin_when_cross_origin;
+  }
+
+  return ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade;
+}
+
+struct LegacyReferrerPolicyTokenMap {
+  const char* mToken;
+  ReferrerPolicy mPolicy;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Parse ReferrerPolicy from token.
+ * The supported tokens are defined in ReferrerPolicy.webidl.
+ * The legacy tokens are "never", "default", "always" and
+ * "origin-when-crossorigin". The legacy tokens are only supported in meta
+ * referrer content
+ *
+ * @param aContent content string to be transformed into
+ *                 ReferrerPolicyEnum, e.g. "origin".
+ */
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerPolicyFromToken(const nsAString& aContent,
+                                       bool allowedLegacyToken) {
+  nsString lowerContent(aContent);
+  ToLowerCase(lowerContent);
+
+  if (allowedLegacyToken) {
+    static const LegacyReferrerPolicyTokenMap sLegacyReferrerPolicyToken[] = {
+        {"never", ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer},
+        {"default", ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade},
+        {"always", ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url},
+        {"origin-when-crossorigin", ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin},
+    };
+
+    uint8_t numStr = (sizeof(sLegacyReferrerPolicyToken) /
+                      sizeof(sLegacyReferrerPolicyToken[0]));
+    for (uint8_t i = 0; i < numStr; i++) {
+      if (lowerContent.EqualsASCII(sLegacyReferrerPolicyToken[i].mToken)) {
+        return sLegacyReferrerPolicyToken[i].mPolicy;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Supported tokes - ReferrerPolicyValues, are generated from
+  // ReferrerPolicy.webidl
+  for (uint8_t i = 0; ReferrerPolicyValues::strings[i].value; i++) {
+    if (lowerContent.EqualsASCII(ReferrerPolicyValues::strings[i].value)) {
+      return static_cast<enum ReferrerPolicy>(i);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Return no referrer policy (empty string) if none of the previous match
+  return ReferrerPolicy::_empty;
+}
+
+// static
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyFromMetaString(
+    const nsAString& aContent) {
+  // This is implemented as described in
+  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/semantics.html#meta-referrer
+  // Meta referrer accepts both supported tokens in ReferrerPolicy.webidl and
+  // legacy tokens.
+  return ReferrerPolicyFromToken(aContent, true);
+}
+
+// static
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyAttributeFromString(
+    const nsAString& aContent) {
+  // This is implemented as described in
+  // https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#referrer-policy-attribute
+  // referrerpolicy attribute only accepts supported tokens in
+  // ReferrerPolicy.webidl
+  return ReferrerPolicyFromToken(aContent, false);
+}
+
+// static
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyFromHeaderString(
+    const nsAString& aContent) {
+  // Multiple headers could be concatenated into one comma-separated
+  // list of policies. Need to tokenize the multiple headers.
+  ReferrerPolicyEnum referrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicy::_empty;
+  for (const auto& token : nsCharSeparatedTokenizer(aContent, ',').ToRange()) {
+    if (token.IsEmpty()) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Referrer-Policy header only accepts supported tokens in
+    // ReferrerPolicy.webidl
+    ReferrerPolicyEnum policy = ReferrerPolicyFromToken(token, false);
+    // If there are multiple policies available, the last valid policy should be
+    // used.
+    // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/#unknown-policy-values
+    if (policy != ReferrerPolicy::_empty) {
+      referrerPolicy = policy;
+    }
+  }
+  return referrerPolicy;
+}
+
+// static
+const char* ReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyToString(ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) {
+  uint8_t index = static_cast<uint8_t>(aPolicy);
+  uint8_t referrerPolicyCount = ArrayLength(ReferrerPolicyValues::strings);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(index < referrerPolicyCount);
+  if (index >= referrerPolicyCount) {
+    return "";
+  }
+
+  return ReferrerPolicyValues::strings[index].value;
+}
+
+/* static */
+uint32_t ReferrerInfo::GetUserReferrerSendingPolicy() {
+  return clamped<uint32_t>(
+      StaticPrefs::network_http_sendRefererHeader_DoNotUseDirectly(),
+      MIN_REFERRER_SENDING_POLICY, MAX_REFERRER_SENDING_POLICY);
+}
+
+/* static */
+uint32_t ReferrerInfo::GetUserXOriginSendingPolicy() {
+  return clamped<uint32_t>(
+      StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_XOriginPolicy_DoNotUseDirectly(),
+      MIN_CROSS_ORIGIN_SENDING_POLICY, MAX_CROSS_ORIGIN_SENDING_POLICY);
+}
+
+/* static */
+uint32_t ReferrerInfo::GetUserTrimmingPolicy() {
+  return clamped<uint32_t>(
+      StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_trimmingPolicy_DoNotUseDirectly(),
+      MIN_TRIMMING_POLICY, MAX_TRIMMING_POLICY);
+}
+
+/* static */
+uint32_t ReferrerInfo::GetUserXOriginTrimmingPolicy() {
+  return clamped<uint32_t>(
+      StaticPrefs::
+          network_http_referer_XOriginTrimmingPolicy_DoNotUseDirectly(),
+      MIN_TRIMMING_POLICY, MAX_TRIMMING_POLICY);
+}
+
+/* static */
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerInfo::GetDefaultReferrerPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
+                                                      nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                      bool aPrivateBrowsing) {
+  bool thirdPartyTrackerIsolated = false;
+  if (aChannel && aURI) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+    nsCOMPtr<nsICookieJarSettings> cjs;
+    Unused << loadInfo->GetCookieJarSettings(getter_AddRefs(cjs));
+    if (!cjs) {
+      bool shouldResistFingerprinting =
+          nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting(aChannel);
+      cjs = aPrivateBrowsing
+                ? net::CookieJarSettings::Create(CookieJarSettings::ePrivate,
+                                                 shouldResistFingerprinting)
+                : net::CookieJarSettings::Create(CookieJarSettings::eRegular,
+                                                 shouldResistFingerprinting);
+    }
+
+    // We only check if the channel is isolated if it's in the parent process
+    // with the rejection of third party contexts is enabled. We don't need to
+    // check this in content processes since the tracking state of the channel
+    // is unknown here and the referrer policy would be updated when the channel
+    // starts connecting in the parent process.
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess() && cjs->GetRejectThirdPartyContexts()) {
+      uint32_t rejectedReason = 0;
+      thirdPartyTrackerIsolated =
+          !ShouldAllowAccessFor(aChannel, aURI, &rejectedReason) &&
+          rejectedReason !=
+              static_cast<uint32_t>(
+                  nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_COOKIES_PARTITIONED_FOREIGN);
+      // Here we intentionally do not notify about the rejection reason, if any
+      // in order to avoid this check to have any visible side-effects (e.g. a
+      // web console report.)
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Select the appropriate pref starting with
+  // "network.http.referer.defaultPolicy" to use based on private-browsing
+  // ("pbmode") AND third-party trackers ("trackers").
+  return DefaultReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicy(
+      thirdPartyTrackerIsolated
+          ? GetDefaultThirdPartyReferrerPolicyPref(aPrivateBrowsing)
+          : GetDefaultFirstPartyReferrerPolicyPref(aPrivateBrowsing));
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool ReferrerInfo::IsReferrerSchemeAllowed(nsIURI* aReferrer) {
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aReferrer, false);
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aReferrer->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return scheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("https") || scheme.EqualsIgnoreCase("http");
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool ReferrerInfo::ShouldResponseInheritReferrerInfo(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  bool isAbout = channelURI->SchemeIs("about");
+  if (!isAbout) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString aboutSpec;
+  rv = channelURI->GetSpec(aboutSpec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  return aboutSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:srcdoc");
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::HandleSecureToInsecureReferral(
+    nsIURI* aOriginalURI, nsIURI* aURI, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy,
+    bool& aAllowed) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOriginalURI);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aURI);
+
+  aAllowed = false;
+
+  bool referrerIsHttpsScheme = aOriginalURI->SchemeIs("https");
+  if (!referrerIsHttpsScheme) {
+    aAllowed = true;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // It's ok to send referrer for https-to-http scenarios if the referrer
+  // policy is "unsafe-url", "origin", or "origin-when-cross-origin".
+  // in other referrer policies, https->http is not allowed...
+  bool uriIsHttpsScheme = aURI->SchemeIs("https");
+  if (aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url &&
+      aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin &&
+      aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::Origin && !uriIsHttpsScheme) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  aAllowed = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::HandleUserXOriginSendingPolicy(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                      nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                                      bool& aAllowed) const {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aURI);
+  aAllowed = false;
+
+  nsAutoCString uriHost;
+  nsAutoCString referrerHost;
+
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetAsciiHost(uriHost);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = aReferrer->GetAsciiHost(referrerHost);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Send an empty referrer if xorigin and leaving a .onion domain.
+  if (StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_hideOnionSource() &&
+      !uriHost.Equals(referrerHost) &&
+      StringEndsWith(referrerHost, ".onion"_ns)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  switch (GetUserXOriginSendingPolicy()) {
+    // Check policy for sending referrer only when hosts match
+    case XOriginSendingPolicy::ePolicySendWhenSameHost: {
+      if (!uriHost.Equals(referrerHost)) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case XOriginSendingPolicy::ePolicySendWhenSameDomain: {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIEffectiveTLDService> eTLDService =
+          do_GetService(NS_EFFECTIVETLDSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+      if (!eTLDService) {
+        // check policy for sending only when effective top level domain
+        // matches. this falls back on using host if eTLDService does not work
+        if (!uriHost.Equals(referrerHost)) {
+          return NS_OK;
+        }
+        break;
+      }
+
+      nsAutoCString uriDomain;
+      nsAutoCString referrerDomain;
+      uint32_t extraDomains = 0;
+
+      rv = eTLDService->GetBaseDomain(aURI, extraDomains, uriDomain);
+      if (rv == NS_ERROR_HOST_IS_IP_ADDRESS ||
+          rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
+        // uri is either an IP address, an alias such as 'localhost', an eTLD
+        // such as 'co.uk', or the empty string. Uses the normalized host in
+        // such cases.
+        rv = aURI->GetAsciiHost(uriDomain);
+      }
+
+      if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+
+      rv = eTLDService->GetBaseDomain(aReferrer, extraDomains, referrerDomain);
+      if (rv == NS_ERROR_HOST_IS_IP_ADDRESS ||
+          rv == NS_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DOMAIN_LEVELS) {
+        // referrer is either an IP address, an alias such as 'localhost', an
+        // eTLD such as 'co.uk', or the empty string. Uses the normalized host
+        // in such cases.
+        rv = aReferrer->GetAsciiHost(referrerDomain);
+      }
+
+      if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+
+      if (!uriDomain.Equals(referrerDomain)) {
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    default:
+      break;
+  }
+
+  aAllowed = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// This roughly implements Step 3.1. of
+// https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#append-a-request-origin-header
+/* static */
+bool ReferrerInfo::ShouldSetNullOriginHeader(net::HttpBaseChannel* aChannel,
+                                             nsIURI* aOriginURI) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOriginURI);
+
+  // If request’s mode is not "cors", then switch on request’s referrer policy:
+  RequestMode requestMode = RequestMode::No_cors;
+  MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(aChannel->GetRequestMode(&requestMode));
+  if (requestMode == RequestMode::Cors) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(aChannel->GetReferrerInfo(getter_AddRefs(referrerInfo)),
+                    false);
+  if (!referrerInfo) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // "no-referrer":
+  enum ReferrerPolicy policy = referrerInfo->ReferrerPolicy();
+  if (policy == ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer) {
+    // Set serializedOrigin to `null`.
+    // Note: Returning true is the same as setting the serializedOrigin to null
+    // in this method.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // "no-referrer-when-downgrade":
+  // "strict-origin":
+  // "strict-origin-when-cross-origin":
+  //   If request’s origin is a tuple origin, its scheme is "https", and
+  //   request’s current URL’s scheme is not "https", then set serializedOrigin
+  //   to `null`.
+  bool allowed = false;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)), false);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(ReferrerInfo::HandleSecureToInsecureReferral(
+          aOriginURI, uri, policy, allowed)) &&
+      !allowed) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // "same-origin":
+  if (policy == ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin) {
+    // If request’s origin is not same origin with request’s current URL’s
+    // origin, then set serializedOrigin to `null`.
+    return ReferrerInfo::IsCrossOriginRequest(aChannel);
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise:
+  //  Do Nothing.
+  return false;
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::HandleUserReferrerSendingPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
+                                                       bool& aAllowed) const {
+  aAllowed = false;
+  uint32_t referrerSendingPolicy;
+  uint32_t loadFlags;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetLoadFlags(&loadFlags);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (loadFlags & nsIHttpChannel::LOAD_INITIAL_DOCUMENT_URI) {
+    referrerSendingPolicy = ReferrerSendingPolicy::ePolicySendWhenUserTrigger;
+  } else {
+    referrerSendingPolicy = ReferrerSendingPolicy::ePolicySendInlineContent;
+  }
+  if (GetUserReferrerSendingPolicy() < referrerSendingPolicy) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  aAllowed = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool ReferrerInfo::IsCrossOriginRequest(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  if (!loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
+    LOG(("no triggering URI via loadInfo, assuming load is cross-origin"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (LOG_ENABLED()) {
+    nsAutoCString triggeringURISpec;
+    loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetAsciiSpec(triggeringURISpec);
+    LOG(("triggeringURI=%s\n", triggeringURISpec.get()));
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return !loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSameOrigin(uri);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool ReferrerInfo::IsCrossSiteRequest(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  if (!loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetIsContentPrincipal()) {
+    LOG(("no triggering URI via loadInfo, assuming load is cross-site"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (LOG_ENABLED()) {
+    nsAutoCString triggeringURISpec;
+    loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetAsciiSpec(triggeringURISpec);
+    LOG(("triggeringURI=%s\n", triggeringURISpec.get()));
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  bool isCrossSite = true;
+  rv = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsThirdPartyURI(uri, &isCrossSite);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return isCrossSite;
+}
+
+ReferrerInfo::TrimmingPolicy ReferrerInfo::ComputeTrimmingPolicy(
+    nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) const {
+  uint32_t trimmingPolicy = GetUserTrimmingPolicy();
+
+  switch (mPolicy) {
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Origin:
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin:
+      trimmingPolicy = TrimmingPolicy::ePolicySchemeHostPort;
+      break;
+
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin:
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin_when_cross_origin:
+      if (trimmingPolicy != TrimmingPolicy::ePolicySchemeHostPort &&
+          IsCrossOriginRequest(aChannel)) {
+        // Ignore set trimmingPolicy if it is already the strictest
+        // policy.
+        trimmingPolicy = TrimmingPolicy::ePolicySchemeHostPort;
+      }
+      break;
+
+    // This function is called when a nonempty referrer value is allowed to
+    // send. For the next 3 policies: same-origin, no-referrer-when-downgrade,
+    // unsafe-url, without trimming we should have a full uri. And the trimming
+    // policy only depends on user prefs.
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin:
+    case ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade:
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url:
+      if (trimmingPolicy != TrimmingPolicy::ePolicySchemeHostPort) {
+        // Ignore set trimmingPolicy if it is already the strictest
+        // policy. Apply the user cross-origin trimming policy if it's more
+        // restrictive than the general one.
+        if (GetUserXOriginTrimmingPolicy() != TrimmingPolicy::ePolicyFullURI &&
+            IsCrossOriginRequest(aChannel)) {
+          trimmingPolicy =
+              std::max(trimmingPolicy, GetUserXOriginTrimmingPolicy());
+        }
+      }
+      break;
+
+    case ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer:
+    case ReferrerPolicy::_empty:
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Unexpected value");
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return static_cast<TrimmingPolicy>(trimmingPolicy);
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::LimitReferrerLength(
+    nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, nsIURI* aReferrer, TrimmingPolicy aTrimmingPolicy,
+    nsACString& aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer) const {
+  if (!StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_referrerLengthLimit()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer.Length() <=
+      StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_referrerLengthLimit()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString referrerLengthLimit;
+  referrerLengthLimit.AppendInt(
+      StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_referrerLengthLimit());
+  if (aTrimmingPolicy == ePolicyFullURI ||
+      aTrimmingPolicy == ePolicySchemeHostPortPath) {
+    // If referrer header is over max Length, down to origin
+    nsresult rv = GetOriginFromReferrerURI(aReferrer, aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Step 6 within https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/#strip-url
+    // states that the trailing "/" does not need to get stripped. However,
+    // GetOriginFromReferrerURI() also removes any trailing "/" hence we have to
+    // add it back here.
+    aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer.AppendLiteral("/");
+    if (aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer.Length() <=
+        StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_referrerLengthLimit()) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {
+          referrerLengthLimit, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer)};
+      LogMessageToConsole(aChannel, "ReferrerLengthOverLimitation", params);
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If we end up here either the trimmingPolicy is equal to
+  // 'ePolicySchemeHostPort' or the 'origin' of any other policy is still over
+  // the length limit. If so, truncate the referrer entirely.
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {
+      referrerLengthLimit, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer)};
+  LogMessageToConsole(aChannel, "ReferrerOriginLengthOverLimitation", params);
+  aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer.Truncate();
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::GetOriginFromReferrerURI(nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                                nsACString& aResult) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aReferrer);
+  aResult.Truncate();
+  // We want the IDN-normalized PrePath. That's not something currently
+  // available and there doesn't yet seem to be justification for adding it to
+  // the interfaces, so just build it up from scheme+AsciiHostPort
+  nsAutoCString scheme, asciiHostPort;
+  nsresult rv = aReferrer->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  aResult = scheme;
+  aResult.AppendLiteral("://");
+  // Note we explicitly cleared UserPass above, so do not need to build it.
+  rv = aReferrer->GetAsciiHostPort(asciiHostPort);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  aResult.Append(asciiHostPort);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::TrimReferrerWithPolicy(nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                              TrimmingPolicy aTrimmingPolicy,
+                                              nsACString& aResult) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aReferrer);
+
+  if (aTrimmingPolicy == TrimmingPolicy::ePolicyFullURI) {
+    return aReferrer->GetAsciiSpec(aResult);
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = GetOriginFromReferrerURI(aReferrer, aResult);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (aTrimmingPolicy == TrimmingPolicy::ePolicySchemeHostPortPath) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url(do_QueryInterface(aReferrer));
+    if (url) {
+      nsAutoCString path;
+      rv = url->GetFilePath(path);
+      if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+        return rv;
+      }
+
+      aResult.Append(path);
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Step 6 within https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/#strip-url
+  // states that the trailing "/" does not need to get stripped. However,
+  // GetOriginFromReferrerURI() also removes any trailing "/" hence we have to
+  // add it back here.
+  aResult.AppendLiteral("/");
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+bool ReferrerInfo::ShouldIgnoreLessRestrictedPolicies(
+    nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, const ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+
+  // We only care about the less restricted policies.
+  if (aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url &&
+      aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade &&
+      aPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  bool isPrivate = NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(aChannel);
+
+  // Return early if we don't want to ignore less restricted policies for the
+  // top navigation.
+  if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    bool isEnabledForTopNavigation =
+        isPrivate
+            ? StaticPrefs::
+                  network_http_referer_disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault_pbmode_top_navigation()
+            : StaticPrefs::
+                  network_http_referer_disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault_top_navigation();
+    if (!isEnabledForTopNavigation) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // We have to get the value of the contentBlockingAllowList earlier because
+    // the channel hasn't been opened yet here. Note that we only need to do
+    // this for first-party navigation. For third-party loads, the value is
+    // inherited from the parent.
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsICookieJarSettings> cookieJarSettings;
+      Unused << loadInfo->GetCookieJarSettings(
+          getter_AddRefs(cookieJarSettings));
+
+      net::CookieJarSettings::Cast(cookieJarSettings)
+          ->UpdateIsOnContentBlockingAllowList(aChannel);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We don't ignore less restricted referrer policies if ETP is toggled off.
+  // This would affect iframe loads and top navigation. For iframes, it will
+  // stop ignoring if the first-party site toggled ETP off. For top navigation,
+  // it depends on the ETP toggle for the destination site.
+  if (ContentBlockingAllowList::Check(aChannel)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool isCrossSite = IsCrossSiteRequest(aChannel);
+  bool isEnabled =
+      isPrivate
+          ? StaticPrefs::
+                network_http_referer_disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault_pbmode()
+          : StaticPrefs::
+                network_http_referer_disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault();
+
+  if (!isEnabled) {
+    // Log the warning message to console to inform that we will ignore
+    // less restricted policies for cross-site requests in the future.
+    if (isCrossSite) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+      nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {
+          NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uri->GetSpecOrDefault())};
+      LogMessageToConsole(aChannel, "ReferrerPolicyDisallowRelaxingWarning",
+                          params);
+    }
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Check if the channel is triggered by the system or the extension.
+  auto* triggerBasePrincipal =
+      BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+  if (triggerBasePrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal() ||
+      triggerBasePrincipal->AddonPolicy()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (isCrossSite) {
+    // Log the console message to say that the less restricted policy was
+    // ignored.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
+
+    uint32_t idx = static_cast<uint32_t>(aPolicy);
+
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {
+        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(
+            nsDependentCString(ReferrerPolicyValues::strings[idx].value)),
+        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uri->GetSpecOrDefault())};
+    LogMessageToConsole(aChannel, "ReferrerPolicyDisallowRelaxingMessage",
+                        params);
+  }
+
+  return isCrossSite;
+}
+
+void ReferrerInfo::LogMessageToConsole(
+    nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, const char* aMsg,
+    const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  uint64_t windowID = 0;
+
+  rv = aChannel->GetTopLevelContentWindowId(&windowID);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!windowID) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> loadGroup;
+    rv = aChannel->GetLoadGroup(getter_AddRefs(loadGroup));
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (loadGroup) {
+      windowID = nsContentUtils::GetInnerWindowID(loadGroup);
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString localizedMsg;
+  rv = nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aMsg, aParams, localizedMsg);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  rv = nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(
+      localizedMsg, nsIScriptError::infoFlag, "Security"_ns, windowID, uri);
+  Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerPolicyIDLToReferrerPolicy(
+    nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL aReferrerPolicy) {
+  switch (aReferrerPolicy) {
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::EMPTY:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::_empty;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::NO_REFERRER:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::NO_REFERRER_WHEN_DOWNGRADE:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::ORIGIN:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Origin;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::UNSAFE_URL:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::SAME_ORIGIN:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::STRICT_ORIGIN:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin;
+      break;
+    case nsIReferrerInfo::STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN:
+      return ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin_when_cross_origin;
+      break;
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid ReferrerPolicy value");
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return ReferrerPolicy::_empty;
+}
+
+nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL ReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicyIDL(
+    ReferrerPolicy aReferrerPolicy) {
+  switch (aReferrerPolicy) {
+    case ReferrerPolicy::_empty:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::EMPTY;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::NO_REFERRER;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer_when_downgrade:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::NO_REFERRER_WHEN_DOWNGRADE;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Origin:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::ORIGIN;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Origin_when_cross_origin:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Unsafe_url:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::UNSAFE_URL;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::SAME_ORIGIN;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::STRICT_ORIGIN;
+      break;
+    case ReferrerPolicy::Strict_origin_when_cross_origin:
+      return nsIReferrerInfo::STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN;
+      break;
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid ReferrerPolicy value");
+      break;
+  }
+
+  return nsIReferrerInfo::EMPTY;
+}
+
+ReferrerInfo::ReferrerInfo()
+    : mOriginalReferrer(nullptr),
+      mPolicy(ReferrerPolicy::_empty),
+      mOriginalPolicy(ReferrerPolicy::_empty),
+      mSendReferrer(true),
+      mInitialized(false),
+      mOverridePolicyByDefault(false) {}
+
+ReferrerInfo::ReferrerInfo(const Document& aDoc) : ReferrerInfo() {
+  InitWithDocument(&aDoc);
+}
+
+ReferrerInfo::ReferrerInfo(const Element& aElement) : ReferrerInfo() {
+  InitWithElement(&aElement);
+}
+
+ReferrerInfo::ReferrerInfo(nsIURI* aOriginalReferrer,
+                           ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy, bool aSendReferrer,
+                           const Maybe<nsCString>& aComputedReferrer)
+    : mOriginalReferrer(aOriginalReferrer),
+      mPolicy(aPolicy),
+      mOriginalPolicy(aPolicy),
+      mSendReferrer(aSendReferrer),
+      mInitialized(true),
+      mOverridePolicyByDefault(false),
+      mComputedReferrer(aComputedReferrer) {}
+
+ReferrerInfo::ReferrerInfo(const ReferrerInfo& rhs)
+    : mOriginalReferrer(rhs.mOriginalReferrer),
+      mPolicy(rhs.mPolicy),
+      mOriginalPolicy(rhs.mOriginalPolicy),
+      mSendReferrer(rhs.mSendReferrer),
+      mInitialized(rhs.mInitialized),
+      mOverridePolicyByDefault(rhs.mOverridePolicyByDefault),
+      mComputedReferrer(rhs.mComputedReferrer) {}
+
+already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::Clone() const {
+  RefPtr<ReferrerInfo> copy(new ReferrerInfo(*this));
+  return copy.forget();
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CloneWithNewPolicy(
+    ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) const {
+  RefPtr<ReferrerInfo> copy(new ReferrerInfo(*this));
+  copy->mPolicy = aPolicy;
+  copy->mOriginalPolicy = aPolicy;
+  return copy.forget();
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CloneWithNewSendReferrer(
+    bool aSendReferrer) const {
+  RefPtr<ReferrerInfo> copy(new ReferrerInfo(*this));
+  copy->mSendReferrer = aSendReferrer;
+  return copy.forget();
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CloneWithNewOriginalReferrer(
+    nsIURI* aOriginalReferrer) const {
+  RefPtr<ReferrerInfo> copy(new ReferrerInfo(*this));
+  copy->mOriginalReferrer = aOriginalReferrer;
+  return copy.forget();
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::GetOriginalReferrer(nsIURI** aOriginalReferrer) {
+  *aOriginalReferrer = mOriginalReferrer;
+  NS_IF_ADDREF(*aOriginalReferrer);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::GetReferrerPolicy(
+    JSContext* aCx, nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL* aReferrerPolicy) {
+  *aReferrerPolicy = ReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicyIDL(mPolicy);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::GetReferrerPolicyString(nsACString& aResult) {
+  aResult.AssignASCII(ReferrerPolicyToString(mPolicy));
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+ReferrerPolicy ReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicy() { return mPolicy; }
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::GetSendReferrer(bool* aSendReferrer) {
+  *aSendReferrer = mSendReferrer;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::Equals(nsIReferrerInfo* aOther, bool* aResult) {
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aOther, NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mInitialized);
+  if (aOther == this) {
+    *aResult = true;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  *aResult = false;
+  ReferrerInfo* other = static_cast<ReferrerInfo*>(aOther);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(other->mInitialized);
+
+  if (mPolicy != other->mPolicy || mSendReferrer != other->mSendReferrer ||
+      mOverridePolicyByDefault != other->mOverridePolicyByDefault ||
+      mComputedReferrer != other->mComputedReferrer) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (!mOriginalReferrer != !other->mOriginalReferrer) {
+    // One or the other has mOriginalReferrer, but not both... not equal
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool originalReferrerEquals;
+  if (mOriginalReferrer &&
+      (NS_FAILED(mOriginalReferrer->Equals(other->mOriginalReferrer,
+                                           &originalReferrerEquals)) ||
+       !originalReferrerEquals)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  *aResult = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::GetComputedReferrerSpec(nsAString& aComputedReferrerSpec) {
+  aComputedReferrerSpec.Assign(
+      mComputedReferrer.isSome()
+          ? NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(mComputedReferrer.value())
+          : EmptyString());
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<nsIURI> ReferrerInfo::GetComputedReferrer() {
+  if (!mComputedReferrer.isSome() || mComputedReferrer.value().IsEmpty()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> result;
+  nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(result), mComputedReferrer.value());
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return result.forget();
+}
+
+HashNumber ReferrerInfo::Hash() const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mInitialized);
+  nsAutoCString originalReferrerSpec;
+  if (mOriginalReferrer) {
+    Unused << mOriginalReferrer->GetSpec(originalReferrerSpec);
+  }
+
+  return mozilla::AddToHash(
+      static_cast<uint32_t>(mPolicy), mSendReferrer, mOverridePolicyByDefault,
+      mozilla::HashString(originalReferrerSpec),
+      mozilla::HashString(mComputedReferrer.isSome() ? mComputedReferrer.value()
+                                                     : ""_ns));
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::Init(nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL aReferrerPolicy,
+                   bool aSendReferrer, nsIURI* aOriginalReferrer) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialized);
+  if (mInitialized) {
+    return NS_ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+  };
+
+  mPolicy = ReferrerPolicyIDLToReferrerPolicy(aReferrerPolicy);
+  mOriginalPolicy = mPolicy;
+  mSendReferrer = aSendReferrer;
+  mOriginalReferrer = aOriginalReferrer;
+  mInitialized = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::InitWithDocument(const Document* aDocument) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialized);
+  if (mInitialized) {
+    return NS_ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+  };
+
+  mPolicy = aDocument->GetReferrerPolicy();
+  mOriginalPolicy = mPolicy;
+  mSendReferrer = true;
+  mOriginalReferrer = aDocument->GetDocumentURIAsReferrer();
+  mInitialized = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check whether the given node has referrerpolicy attribute and parse
+ * referrer policy from the attribute.
+ * Currently, referrerpolicy attribute is supported in a, area, img, iframe,
+ * script, or link element.
+ */
+static ReferrerPolicy ReferrerPolicyFromAttribute(const Element& aElement) {
+  if (!aElement.IsAnyOfHTMLElements(nsGkAtoms::a, nsGkAtoms::area,
+                                    nsGkAtoms::script, nsGkAtoms::iframe,
+                                    nsGkAtoms::link, nsGkAtoms::img)) {
+    return ReferrerPolicy::_empty;
+  }
+  return aElement.GetReferrerPolicyAsEnum();
+}
+
+static bool HasRelNoReferrer(const Element& aElement) {
+  // rel=noreferrer is only support in <a> and <area>
+  if (!aElement.IsAnyOfHTMLElements(nsGkAtoms::a, nsGkAtoms::area)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString rel;
+  aElement.GetAttr(nsGkAtoms::rel, rel);
+  nsWhitespaceTokenizerTemplate<nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace> tok(rel);
+
+  while (tok.hasMoreTokens()) {
+    const nsAString& token = tok.nextToken();
+    if (token.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("noreferrer")) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::InitWithElement(const Element* aElement) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInitialized);
+  if (mInitialized) {
+    return NS_ERROR_ALREADY_INITIALIZED;
+  };
+
+  // Referrer policy from referrerpolicy attribute will have a higher priority
+  // than referrer policy from <meta> tag and Referrer-Policy header.
+  mPolicy = ReferrerPolicyFromAttribute(*aElement);
+  if (mPolicy == ReferrerPolicy::_empty) {
+    // Fallback to use document's referrer poicy if we don't have referrer
+    // policy from attribute.
+    mPolicy = aElement->OwnerDoc()->GetReferrerPolicy();
+  }
+
+  mOriginalPolicy = mPolicy;
+  mSendReferrer = !HasRelNoReferrer(*aElement);
+  mOriginalReferrer = aElement->OwnerDoc()->GetDocumentURIAsReferrer();
+
+  mInitialized = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo>
+ReferrerInfo::CreateFromOtherAndPolicyOverride(
+    nsIReferrerInfo* aOther, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicyOverride) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOther);
+  ReferrerPolicyEnum policy = aPolicyOverride != ReferrerPolicy::_empty
+                                  ? aPolicyOverride
+                                  : aOther->ReferrerPolicy();
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> referrer = aOther->GetComputedReferrer();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo =
+      new ReferrerInfo(referrer, policy, aOther->GetSendReferrer());
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo>
+ReferrerInfo::CreateFromDocumentAndPolicyOverride(
+    Document* aDoc, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicyOverride) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDoc);
+  ReferrerPolicyEnum policy = aPolicyOverride != ReferrerPolicy::_empty
+                                  ? aPolicyOverride
+                                  : aDoc->GetReferrerPolicy();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo =
+      new ReferrerInfo(aDoc->GetDocumentURIAsReferrer(), policy);
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CreateForFetch(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, Document* aDoc) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
+  if (!aPrincipal || aPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(nullptr);
+    return referrerInfo.forget();
+  }
+
+  if (!aDoc) {
+    aPrincipal->CreateReferrerInfo(ReferrerPolicy::_empty,
+                                   getter_AddRefs(referrerInfo));
+    return referrerInfo.forget();
+  }
+
+  // If it weren't for history.push/replaceState, we could just use the
+  // principal's URI here.  But since we want changes to the URI effected
+  // by push/replaceState to be reflected in the XHR referrer, we have to
+  // be more clever.
+  //
+  // If the document's original URI (before any push/replaceStates) matches
+  // our principal, then we use the document's current URI (after
+  // push/replaceStates).  Otherwise (if the document is, say, a data:
+  // URI), we just use the principal's URI.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> docCurURI = aDoc->GetDocumentURI();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> docOrigURI = aDoc->GetOriginalURI();
+
+  if (docCurURI && docOrigURI) {
+    bool equal = false;
+    aPrincipal->EqualsURI(docOrigURI, &equal);
+    if (equal) {
+      referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(docCurURI, aDoc->GetReferrerPolicy());
+      return referrerInfo.forget();
+    }
+  }
+  aPrincipal->CreateReferrerInfo(aDoc->GetReferrerPolicy(),
+                                 getter_AddRefs(referrerInfo));
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CreateForExternalCSSResources(
+    mozilla::StyleSheet* aExternalSheet, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aExternalSheet && !aExternalSheet->IsInline());
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
+
+  // Step 2
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-referrer-policy/#integration-with-css
+  // Use empty policy at the beginning and update it later from Referrer-Policy
+  // header.
+  referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(aExternalSheet->GetSheetURI(), aPolicy);
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CreateForInternalCSSResources(
+    Document* aDocument) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
+
+  referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(aDocument->GetDocumentURI(),
+                                  aDocument->GetReferrerPolicy());
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+// Bug 1415044 to investigate which referrer and policy we should use
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> ReferrerInfo::CreateForSVGResources(
+    Document* aDocument) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo;
+
+  referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(aDocument->GetDocumentURI(),
+                                  aDocument->GetReferrerPolicy());
+  return referrerInfo.forget();
+}
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::ComputeReferrer(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+  // If the referrerInfo is passed around when redirect, just use the last
+  // computedReferrer to recompute
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> referrer;
+  nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+  mOverridePolicyByDefault = false;
+
+  if (mComputedReferrer.isSome()) {
+    if (mComputedReferrer.value().IsEmpty()) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(referrer), mComputedReferrer.value());
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  mComputedReferrer.reset();
+  // Emplace mComputedReferrer with an empty string, which means we have
+  // computed the referrer and the result referrer value is empty (not send
+  // referrer). So any early return later than this line will use that empty
+  // referrer.
+  mComputedReferrer.emplace(""_ns);
+
+  if (!mSendReferrer || !mOriginalReferrer ||
+      mPolicy == ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (mPolicy == ReferrerPolicy::_empty ||
+      ShouldIgnoreLessRestrictedPolicies(aChannel, mOriginalPolicy)) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+    OriginAttributes attrs = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes();
+    bool isPrivate = attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    mPolicy = GetDefaultReferrerPolicy(aChannel, uri, isPrivate);
+    mOverridePolicyByDefault = true;
+  }
+
+  // This is for the case where the ETP toggle is off. In this case, we need to
+  // reset the referrer and the policy if the original policy is different from
+  // the current policy in order to recompute the referrer policy with the
+  // original policy.
+  if (!mOverridePolicyByDefault && mOriginalPolicy != ReferrerPolicy::_empty &&
+      mPolicy != mOriginalPolicy) {
+    referrer = nullptr;
+    mPolicy = mOriginalPolicy;
+  }
+
+  if (mPolicy == ReferrerPolicy::No_referrer) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool isUserReferrerSendingAllowed = false;
+  rv = HandleUserReferrerSendingPolicy(aChannel, isUserReferrerSendingAllowed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (!isUserReferrerSendingAllowed) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Enforce Referrer allowlist, only http, https scheme are allowed
+  if (!IsReferrerSchemeAllowed(mOriginalReferrer)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  bool isSecureToInsecureAllowed = false;
+  rv = HandleSecureToInsecureReferral(mOriginalReferrer, uri, mPolicy,
+                                      isSecureToInsecureAllowed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (!isSecureToInsecureAllowed) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Don't send referrer when the request is cross-origin and policy is
+  // "same-origin".
+  if (mPolicy == ReferrerPolicy::Same_origin &&
+      IsCrossOriginRequest(aChannel)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Strip away any fragment per RFC 2616 section 14.36
+  // and Referrer Policy section 6.3.5.
+  if (!referrer) {
+    rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(mOriginalReferrer, getter_AddRefs(referrer));
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  bool isUserXOriginAllowed = false;
+  rv = HandleUserXOriginSendingPolicy(uri, referrer, isUserXOriginAllowed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (!isUserXOriginAllowed) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Handle user pref network.http.referer.spoofSource, send spoofed referrer if
+  // desired
+  if (StaticPrefs::network_http_referer_spoofSource()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> userSpoofReferrer;
+    rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(uri, getter_AddRefs(userSpoofReferrer));
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    referrer = userSpoofReferrer;
+  }
+
+  // strip away any userpass; we don't want to be giving out passwords ;-)
+  // This is required by Referrer Policy stripping algorithm.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> exposableURI = nsIOService::CreateExposableURI(referrer);
+  referrer = exposableURI;
+
+  TrimmingPolicy trimmingPolicy = ComputeTrimmingPolicy(aChannel);
+
+  nsAutoCString trimmedReferrer;
+  // We first trim the referrer according to the policy by calling
+  // 'TrimReferrerWithPolicy' and right after we have to call
+  // 'LimitReferrerLength' (using the same arguments) because the trimmed
+  // referrer might exceed the allowed max referrer length.
+  rv = TrimReferrerWithPolicy(referrer, trimmingPolicy, trimmedReferrer);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = LimitReferrerLength(aChannel, referrer, trimmingPolicy, trimmedReferrer);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // finally, remember the referrer spec.
+  mComputedReferrer.reset();
+  mComputedReferrer.emplace(trimmedReferrer);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */
+
+nsresult ReferrerInfo::ReadTailDataBeforeGecko100(
+    const uint32_t& aData, nsIObjectInputStream* aInputStream) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aInputStream);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> reader;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIOutputStream> writer;
+
+  // We need to create a new pipe in order to read the aData and the rest of
+  // the input stream together in the old format. This would also help us with
+  // handling big endian correctly.
+  NS_NewPipe(getter_AddRefs(reader), getter_AddRefs(writer));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIBinaryOutputStream> binaryPipeWriter =
+      NS_NewObjectOutputStream(writer);
+
+  // Write back the aData so that we can read bytes from it and handle big
+  // endian correctly.
+  nsresult rv = binaryPipeWriter->Write32(aData);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIBinaryInputStream> binaryPipeReader =
+      NS_NewObjectInputStream(reader);
+
+  rv = binaryPipeReader->ReadBoolean(&mSendReferrer);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  bool isComputed;
+  rv = binaryPipeReader->ReadBoolean(&isComputed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We need to handle the following string if isComputed is true.
+  if (isComputed) {
+    // Comsume the following 2 bytes from the input stream. They are the half
+    // part of the length prefix of the following string.
+    uint16_t data;
+    rv = aInputStream->Read16(&data);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Write the bytes to the pipe so that we can read the length of the string.
+    rv = binaryPipeWriter->Write16(data);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    uint32_t length;
+    rv = binaryPipeReader->Read32(&length);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    // Consume the string body from the input stream.
+    nsAutoCString computedReferrer;
+    rv = NS_ConsumeStream(aInputStream, length, computedReferrer);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    mComputedReferrer.emplace(computedReferrer);
+
+    // Read the remaining two bytes and write to the pipe.
+    uint16_t remain;
+    rv = aInputStream->Read16(&remain);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = binaryPipeWriter->Write16(remain);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rv = binaryPipeReader->ReadBoolean(&mInitialized);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = binaryPipeReader->ReadBoolean(&mOverridePolicyByDefault);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) {
+  bool nonNull;
+  nsresult rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&nonNull);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (nonNull) {
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    nsresult rv = aStream->ReadCString(spec);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(mOriginalReferrer), spec);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  } else {
+    mOriginalReferrer = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // ReferrerPolicy.webidl has different order with ReferrerPolicyIDL. We store
+  // to disk using the order of ReferrerPolicyIDL, so we convert to
+  // ReferrerPolicyIDL to make it be compatible to the old format.
+  uint32_t policy;
+  rv = aStream->Read32(&policy);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  mPolicy = ReferrerPolicyIDLToReferrerPolicy(
+      static_cast<nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL>(policy));
+
+  uint32_t originalPolicy;
+  rv = aStream->Read32(&originalPolicy);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // See https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1784045#c6 for more
+  // details.
+  //
+  // We need to differentiate the old format and the new format here in order
+  // to be able to read both formats. The check here helps us with verifying
+  // which format it is.
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(originalPolicy > 0xFF)) {
+    mOriginalPolicy = mPolicy;
+
+    return ReadTailDataBeforeGecko100(originalPolicy, aStream);
+  }
+
+  mOriginalPolicy = ReferrerPolicyIDLToReferrerPolicy(
+      static_cast<nsIReferrerInfo::ReferrerPolicyIDL>(originalPolicy));
+
+  rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&mSendReferrer);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  bool isComputed;
+  rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&isComputed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (isComputed) {
+    nsAutoCString computedReferrer;
+    rv = aStream->ReadCString(computedReferrer);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+    mComputedReferrer.emplace(computedReferrer);
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&mInitialized);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&mOverridePolicyByDefault);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+ReferrerInfo::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) {
+  bool nonNull = (mOriginalReferrer != nullptr);
+  nsresult rv = aStream->WriteBoolean(nonNull);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (nonNull) {
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    nsresult rv = mOriginalReferrer->GetSpec(spec);
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+
+    rv = aStream->WriteStringZ(spec.get());
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->Write32(ReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicyIDL(mPolicy));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->Write32(ReferrerPolicyToReferrerPolicyIDL(mOriginalPolicy));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->WriteBoolean(mSendReferrer);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  bool isComputed = mComputedReferrer.isSome();
+  rv = aStream->WriteBoolean(isComputed);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (isComputed) {
+    rv = aStream->WriteStringZ(mComputedReferrer.value().get());
+    if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+      return rv;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->WriteBoolean(mInitialized);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  rv = aStream->WriteBoolean(mOverridePolicyByDefault);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void ReferrerInfo::RecordTelemetry(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mTelemetryRecorded);
+  mTelemetryRecorded = true;
+#endif  // DEBUG
+
+  // The telemetry probe has 18 buckets. The first 9 buckets are for same-site
+  // requests and the rest 9 buckets are for cross-site requests.
+  uint32_t telemetryOffset =
+      IsCrossSiteRequest(aChannel)
+          ? static_cast<uint32_t>(ReferrerPolicy::EndGuard_)
+          : 0;
+
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::REFERRER_POLICY_COUNT,
+                        static_cast<uint32_t>(mPolicy) + telemetryOffset);
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.h b/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79746678ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/ReferrerInfo.h
@@ -0,0 +1,481 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_ReferrerInfo_h
+#define mozilla_dom_ReferrerInfo_h
+
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsIReferrerInfo.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
+#include "mozilla/HashFunctions.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ReferrerPolicyBinding.h"
+
+#define REFERRERINFOF_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/referrer-info;1"
+// 041a129f-10ce-4bda-a60d-e027a26d5ed0
+#define REFERRERINFO_CID                             \
+  {                                                  \
+    0x041a129f, 0x10ce, 0x4bda, {                    \
+      0xa6, 0x0d, 0xe0, 0x27, 0xa2, 0x6d, 0x5e, 0xd0 \
+    }                                                \
+  }
+
+class nsIHttpChannel;
+class nsIURI;
+class nsIChannel;
+class nsILoadInfo;
+class nsINode;
+class nsIPrincipal;
+
+namespace mozilla {
+class StyleSheet;
+class URLAndReferrerInfo;
+
+namespace net {
+class HttpBaseChannel;
+class nsHttpChannel;
+}  // namespace net
+}  // namespace mozilla
+
+using mozilla::Maybe;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+/**
+ * The ReferrerInfo class holds the raw referrer and potentially a referrer
+ * policy which allows to query the computed referrer which should be applied to
+ * a channel as the actual referrer value.
+ *
+ * The ReferrerInfo class solely contains readonly fields and represents a 1:1
+ * sync to the referrer header of the corresponding channel. In turn that means
+ * the class is immutable - so any modifications require to clone the current
+ * ReferrerInfo.
+ *
+ * For example if a request undergoes a redirect, the new channel
+ * will need a new ReferrerInfo clone with members being updated accordingly.
+ */
+
+class ReferrerInfo : public nsIReferrerInfo {
+ public:
+  typedef enum ReferrerPolicy ReferrerPolicyEnum;
+  ReferrerInfo();
+
+  explicit ReferrerInfo(
+      nsIURI* aOriginalReferrer,
+      ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy = ReferrerPolicy::_empty,
+      bool aSendReferrer = true,
+      const Maybe<nsCString>& aComputedReferrer = Maybe<nsCString>());
+
+  // Creates already initialized ReferrerInfo from an element or a document.
+  explicit ReferrerInfo(const Element&);
+  explicit ReferrerInfo(const Document&);
+
+  // create an exact copy of the ReferrerInfo
+  already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> Clone() const;
+
+  // create an copy of the ReferrerInfo with new referrer policy
+  already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> CloneWithNewPolicy(
+      ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) const;
+
+  // create an copy of the ReferrerInfo with new send referrer
+  already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> CloneWithNewSendReferrer(
+      bool aSendReferrer) const;
+
+  // create an copy of the ReferrerInfo with new original referrer
+  already_AddRefed<ReferrerInfo> CloneWithNewOriginalReferrer(
+      nsIURI* aOriginalReferrer) const;
+
+  // Record the telemetry for the referrer policy.
+  void RecordTelemetry(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to create a new ReferrerInfo object from other. We will not
+   * pass in any computed values and override referrer policy if needed
+   *
+   * @param aOther the other referrerInfo object to init from.
+   * @param aPolicyOverride referrer policy to override if necessary.
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateFromOtherAndPolicyOverride(
+      nsIReferrerInfo* aOther, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicyOverride);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to create a new ReferrerInfo object from a given document
+   * and override referrer policy if needed (for example, when parsing link
+   * header or speculative loading).
+   *
+   * @param aDocument the document to init referrerInfo object.
+   * @param aPolicyOverride referrer policy to override if necessary.
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateFromDocumentAndPolicyOverride(
+      Document* aDoc, ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicyOverride);
+
+  /*
+   * Implements step 3.1 and 3.3 of the Determine request's Referrer algorithm
+   * from the Referrer Policy specification.
+   *
+   * https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/referrer-policy/#determine-requests-referrer
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateForFetch(
+      nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal, Document* aDoc);
+
+  /**
+   * Helper function to create new ReferrerInfo object from a given external
+   * stylesheet. The returned nsIReferrerInfo object will be used for any
+   * requests or resources referenced by the sheet.
+   *
+   * @param aSheet the stylesheet to init referrerInfo.
+   * @param aPolicy referrer policy from header if there's any.
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateForExternalCSSResources(
+      StyleSheet* aExternalSheet,
+      ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy = ReferrerPolicy::_empty);
+
+  /**
+   * Helper function to create new ReferrerInfo object from a given document.
+   * The returned nsIReferrerInfo object will be used for any requests or
+   * resources referenced by internal stylesheet (for example style="" or
+   * wrapped by <style> tag).
+   *
+   * @param aDocument the document to init referrerInfo object.
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateForInternalCSSResources(
+      Document* aDocument);
+
+  /**
+   * Helper function to create new ReferrerInfo object from a given document.
+   * The returned nsIReferrerInfo object will be used for any requests or
+   * resources referenced by SVG.
+   *
+   * @param aDocument the document to init referrerInfo object.
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIReferrerInfo> CreateForSVGResources(
+      Document* aDocument);
+
+  /**
+   * Check whether the given referrer's scheme is allowed to be computed and
+   * sent. The allowlist schemes are: http, https.
+   */
+  static bool IsReferrerSchemeAllowed(nsIURI* aReferrer);
+
+  /*
+   * The Referrer Policy should be inherited for nested browsing contexts that
+   * are not created from responses. Such as: srcdoc, data, blob.
+   */
+  static bool ShouldResponseInheritReferrerInfo(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /*
+   * Check whether referrer is allowed to send in secure to insecure scenario.
+   */
+  static nsresult HandleSecureToInsecureReferral(nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
+                                                 nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                 ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy,
+                                                 bool& aAllowed);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true if the given channel is cross-origin request
+   *
+   * Computing whether the request is cross-origin may be expensive, so please
+   * do that in cases where we're going to use this information later on.
+   */
+  static bool IsCrossOriginRequest(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true if the given channel is cross-site request.
+   */
+  static bool IsCrossSiteRequest(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true if the given channel is suppressed by Referrer-Policy header
+   * and should set "null" to Origin header.
+   */
+  static bool ShouldSetNullOriginHeader(net::HttpBaseChannel* aChannel,
+                                        nsIURI* aOriginURI);
+
+  /**
+   * Getter for network.http.sendRefererHeader.
+   */
+  static uint32_t GetUserReferrerSendingPolicy();
+
+  /**
+   * Getter for network.http.referer.XOriginPolicy.
+   */
+  static uint32_t GetUserXOriginSendingPolicy();
+
+  /**
+   * Getter for network.http.referer.trimmingPolicy.
+   */
+  static uint32_t GetUserTrimmingPolicy();
+
+  /**
+   * Getter for network.http.referer.XOriginTrimmingPolicy.
+   */
+  static uint32_t GetUserXOriginTrimmingPolicy();
+
+  /**
+   * Return default referrer policy which is controlled by user
+   * prefs:
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy for regular mode
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy.trackers for third-party trackers
+   * in regular mode
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy.pbmode for private mode
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy.trackers.pbmode for third-party trackers
+   * in private mode
+   */
+  static ReferrerPolicyEnum GetDefaultReferrerPolicy(
+      nsIHttpChannel* aChannel = nullptr, nsIURI* aURI = nullptr,
+      bool aPrivateBrowsing = false);
+
+  /**
+   * Return default referrer policy for third party which is controlled by user
+   * prefs:
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy.trackers for regular mode
+   * network.http.referer.defaultPolicy.trackers.pbmode for private mode
+   */
+  static ReferrerPolicyEnum GetDefaultThirdPartyReferrerPolicy(
+      bool aPrivateBrowsing = false);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to parse ReferrerPolicy from meta tag referrer content.
+   * For example: <meta name="referrer" content="origin">
+   *
+   * @param aContent content string to be transformed into ReferrerPolicyEnum,
+   *                 e.g. "origin".
+   */
+  static ReferrerPolicyEnum ReferrerPolicyFromMetaString(
+      const nsAString& aContent);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to parse ReferrerPolicy from string content of
+   * referrerpolicy attribute.
+   * For example: <a href="http://example.com" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
+   *
+   * @param aContent content string to be transformed into ReferrerPolicyEnum,
+   *                 e.g. "no-referrer".
+   */
+  static ReferrerPolicyEnum ReferrerPolicyAttributeFromString(
+      const nsAString& aContent);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to parse ReferrerPolicy from string content of
+   * Referrer-Policy header.
+   * For example: Referrer-Policy: origin no-referrer
+   * https://www.w3.org/tr/referrer-policy/#parse-referrer-policy-from-header
+   *
+   * @param aContent content string to be transformed into ReferrerPolicyEnum.
+   *                e.g. "origin no-referrer"
+   */
+  static ReferrerPolicyEnum ReferrerPolicyFromHeaderString(
+      const nsAString& aContent);
+
+  /*
+   * Helper function to convert ReferrerPolicy enum to string
+   *
+   * @param aPolicy referrer policy to convert.
+   */
+  static const char* ReferrerPolicyToString(ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy);
+
+  /**
+   * Hash function for this object
+   */
+  HashNumber Hash() const;
+
+  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSIREFERRERINFO
+  NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE
+
+ private:
+  virtual ~ReferrerInfo() = default;
+
+  ReferrerInfo(const ReferrerInfo& rhs);
+
+  /*
+   * Trimming policy when compute referrer, indicate how much information in the
+   * referrer will be sent. Order matters here.
+   */
+  enum TrimmingPolicy : uint32_t {
+    ePolicyFullURI = 0,
+    ePolicySchemeHostPortPath = 1,
+    ePolicySchemeHostPort = 2,
+  };
+
+  /*
+   * Referrer sending policy, indicates type of action could trigger to send
+   * referrer header, not send at all, send only with user's action (click on a
+   * link) or send even with inline content request (image request).
+   * Order matters here.
+   */
+  enum ReferrerSendingPolicy : uint32_t {
+    ePolicyNotSend = 0,
+    ePolicySendWhenUserTrigger = 1,
+    ePolicySendInlineContent = 2,
+  };
+
+  /*
+   * Sending referrer when cross origin policy, indicates when referrer should
+   * be send when compare 2 origins. Order matters here.
+   */
+  enum XOriginSendingPolicy : uint32_t {
+    ePolicyAlwaysSend = 0,
+    ePolicySendWhenSameDomain = 1,
+    ePolicySendWhenSameHost = 2,
+  };
+
+  /*
+   * Handle user controlled pref network.http.referer.XOriginPolicy
+   */
+  nsresult HandleUserXOriginSendingPolicy(nsIURI* aURI, nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                          bool& aAllowed) const;
+
+  /*
+   * Handle user controlled pref network.http.sendRefererHeader
+   */
+  nsresult HandleUserReferrerSendingPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
+                                           bool& aAllowed) const;
+
+  /*
+   * Compute trimming policy from user controlled prefs.
+   * This function is called when we already made sure a nonempty referrer is
+   * allowed to send.
+   */
+  TrimmingPolicy ComputeTrimmingPolicy(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) const;
+
+  // HttpBaseChannel could access IsInitialized() and ComputeReferrer();
+  friend class mozilla::net::HttpBaseChannel;
+
+  /*
+   * Compute referrer for a given channel. The computation result then will be
+   * stored in this class and then used to set the actual referrer header of
+   * the channel. The computation could be controlled by several user prefs
+   * which are defined in StaticPrefList.yaml (see StaticPrefList.yaml for more
+   * details):
+   *  network.http.sendRefererHeader
+   *  network.http.referer.spoofSource
+   *  network.http.referer.hideOnionSource
+   *  network.http.referer.XOriginPolicy
+   *  network.http.referer.trimmingPolicy
+   *  network.http.referer.XOriginTrimmingPolicy
+   */
+  nsresult ComputeReferrer(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /*
+   * Check whether the ReferrerInfo has been initialized or not.
+   */
+  bool IsInitialized() { return mInitialized; }
+
+  // nsHttpChannel, Document could access IsPolicyOverrided();
+  friend class mozilla::net::nsHttpChannel;
+  friend class mozilla::dom::Document;
+  /*
+   * Check whether if unset referrer policy is overrided by default or not
+   */
+  bool IsPolicyOverrided() { return mOverridePolicyByDefault; }
+
+  /*
+   *  Get origin string from a given valid referrer URI (http, https)
+   *
+   *  @aReferrer - the full referrer URI
+   *  @aResult - the resulting aReferrer in string format.
+   */
+  nsresult GetOriginFromReferrerURI(nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                    nsACString& aResult) const;
+
+  /*
+   * Trim a given referrer with a given a trimming policy,
+   */
+  nsresult TrimReferrerWithPolicy(nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                                  TrimmingPolicy aTrimmingPolicy,
+                                  nsACString& aResult) const;
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true if we should ignore less restricted referrer policies,
+   * including 'unsafe_url', 'no_referrer_when_downgrade' and
+   * 'origin_when_cross_origin', for the given channel. We only apply this
+   * restriction for cross-site requests. For the same-site request, we will
+   * still allow overriding the default referrer policy with less restricted
+   * one.
+   *
+   * Note that the channel triggered by the system and the extension will be
+   * exempt from this restriction.
+   */
+  bool ShouldIgnoreLessRestrictedPolicies(
+      nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, const ReferrerPolicyEnum aPolicy) const;
+
+  /*
+   *  Limit referrer length using the following ruleset:
+   *   - If the length of referrer URL is over max length, strip down to origin.
+   *   - If the origin is still over max length, remove the referrer entirely.
+   *
+   *  This function comlements TrimReferrerPolicy and needs to be called right
+   *  after TrimReferrerPolicy.
+   *
+   *  @aChannel - used to query information needed for logging to the console.
+   *  @aReferrer - the full referrer URI; needs to be identical to aReferrer
+   *               passed to TrimReferrerPolicy.
+   *  @aTrimmingPolicy - represents the trimming policy which was applied to the
+   *                     referrer; needs to be identical to aTrimmingPolicy
+   *                     passed to TrimReferrerPolicy.
+   *  @aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer -  an in and outgoing argument representing the
+   *                               referrer value. Please pass the result of
+   *                               TrimReferrerWithPolicy as
+   *                               aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer which will then be
+   *                               reduced to the origin or completely truncated
+   *                               in case the referrer value exceeds the length
+   *                               limitation.
+   */
+  nsresult LimitReferrerLength(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, nsIURI* aReferrer,
+                               TrimmingPolicy aTrimmingPolicy,
+                               nsACString& aInAndOutTrimmedReferrer) const;
+
+  /**
+   * The helper function to read the old data format before gecko 100 for
+   * deserialization.
+   */
+  nsresult ReadTailDataBeforeGecko100(const uint32_t& aData,
+                                      nsIObjectInputStream* aInputStream);
+
+  /*
+   * Write message to the error console
+   */
+  void LogMessageToConsole(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, const char* aMsg,
+                           const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams) const;
+
+  friend class mozilla::URLAndReferrerInfo;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mOriginalReferrer;
+
+  ReferrerPolicyEnum mPolicy;
+
+  // The referrer policy that has been set originally for the channel. Note that
+  // the policy may have been overridden by the default referrer policy, so we
+  // need to keep track of this if we need to recover the original referrer
+  // policy.
+  ReferrerPolicyEnum mOriginalPolicy;
+
+  // Indicates if the referrer should be sent or not even when it's available
+  // (default is true).
+  bool mSendReferrer;
+
+  // Since the ReferrerInfo is immutable, we use this member as a helper to
+  // ensure no one can call e.g. init() twice to modify state of the
+  // ReferrerInfo.
+  bool mInitialized;
+
+  // Indicates if unset referrer policy is overrided by default
+  bool mOverridePolicyByDefault;
+
+  // Store a computed referrer for a given channel
+  Maybe<nsCString> mComputedReferrer;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+  // Indicates if the telemetry has been recorded. This is used to make sure the
+  // telemetry will be only recored once.
+  bool mTelemetryRecorded = false;
+#endif  // DEBUG
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_ReferrerInfo_h
diff --git a/dom/security/SRICheck.cpp b/dom/security/SRICheck.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42e6a8c896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SRICheck.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,490 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "SRICheck.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
+#include "mozilla/LoadTainting.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SRILogHelper.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SRIMetadata.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleReportCollector.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsWhitespaceTokenizer.h"
+
+#define SRIVERBOSE(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Verbose, args)
+#define SRILOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define SRIERROR(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Error, args)
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+/**
+ * Returns whether or not the sub-resource about to be loaded is eligible
+ * for integrity checks. If it's not, the checks will be skipped and the
+ * sub-resource will be loaded.
+ */
+static nsresult IsEligible(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                           mozilla::LoadTainting aTainting,
+                           const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                           nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aReporter);
+
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    SRILOG(("SRICheck::IsEligible, null channel"));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_NOT_ELIGIBLE;
+  }
+
+  // Was the sub-resource loaded via CORS?
+  if (aTainting == LoadTainting::CORS) {
+    SRILOG(("SRICheck::IsEligible, CORS mode"));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI;
+  rv = aChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  nsAutoCString requestSpec;
+  rv = originalURI->GetSpec(requestSpec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    SRILOG(("SRICheck::IsEligible, requestURI=%s; finalURI=%s",
+            requestSpec.get(),
+            finalURI ? finalURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get() : ""));
+  }
+
+  // Is the sub-resource same-origin?
+  if (aTainting == LoadTainting::Basic) {
+    SRILOG(("SRICheck::IsEligible, same-origin"));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  SRILOG(("SRICheck::IsEligible, NOT same-origin"));
+
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 requestSpecUTF16(requestSpec);
+  nsTArray<nsString> params;
+  params.AppendElement(requestSpecUTF16);
+  aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+      nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+      "IneligibleResource"_ns, const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+  return NS_ERROR_SRI_NOT_ELIGIBLE;
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata(const nsAString& aMetadataList,
+                                     const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                                     nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter,
+                                     SRIMetadata* outMetadata) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(outMetadata);
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aReporter);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(outMetadata->IsEmpty());  // caller must pass empty metadata
+
+  // put a reasonable bound on the length of the metadata
+  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 metadataList(aMetadataList);
+  if (metadataList.Length() > SRICheck::MAX_METADATA_LENGTH) {
+    metadataList.Truncate(SRICheck::MAX_METADATA_LENGTH);
+  }
+  SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, metadataList=%s", metadataList.get()));
+
+  // the integrity attribute is a list of whitespace-separated hashes
+  // and options so we need to look at them one by one and pick the
+  // strongest (valid) one
+  nsCWhitespaceTokenizer tokenizer(metadataList);
+  nsAutoCString token;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0;
+       tokenizer.hasMoreTokens() && i < SRICheck::MAX_METADATA_TOKENS; ++i) {
+    token = tokenizer.nextToken();
+
+    SRIMetadata metadata(token);
+    if (metadata.IsMalformed()) {
+      NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 tokenUTF16(token);
+      nsTArray<nsString> params;
+      params.AppendElement(tokenUTF16);
+      aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+          nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+          nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+          "MalformedIntegrityHash"_ns,
+          const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+    } else if (!metadata.IsAlgorithmSupported()) {
+      nsAutoCString alg;
+      metadata.GetAlgorithm(&alg);
+      NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 algUTF16(alg);
+      nsTArray<nsString> params;
+      params.AppendElement(algUTF16);
+      aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+          nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+          nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+          "UnsupportedHashAlg"_ns,
+          const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString alg1, alg2;
+    if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)) {
+      outMetadata->GetAlgorithm(&alg1);
+      metadata.GetAlgorithm(&alg2);
+    }
+    if (*outMetadata == metadata) {
+      SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, alg '%s' is the same as '%s'",
+              alg1.get(), alg2.get()));
+      *outMetadata += metadata;  // add new hash to strongest metadata
+    } else if (*outMetadata < metadata) {
+      SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, alg '%s' is weaker than '%s'",
+              alg1.get(), alg2.get()));
+      *outMetadata = metadata;  // replace strongest metadata with current
+    }
+  }
+
+  outMetadata->mIntegrityString = aMetadataList;
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    if (outMetadata->IsValid()) {
+      nsAutoCString alg;
+      outMetadata->GetAlgorithm(&alg);
+      SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, using a '%s' hash", alg.get()));
+    } else if (outMetadata->IsEmpty()) {
+      SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, no metadata"));
+    } else {
+      SRILOG(("SRICheck::IntegrityMetadata, no valid metadata found"));
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+SRICheckDataVerifier::SRICheckDataVerifier(const SRIMetadata& aMetadata,
+                                           const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                                           nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter)
+    : mCryptoHash(nullptr),
+      mBytesHashed(0),
+      mHashLength(0),
+      mHashType('\0'),
+      mInvalidMetadata(false),
+      mComplete(false) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!aMetadata.IsEmpty());  // should be checked by caller
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aReporter);
+
+  if (!aMetadata.IsValid()) {
+    nsTArray<nsString> params;
+    aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+        nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+        nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+        "NoValidMetadata"_ns, const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+    mInvalidMetadata = true;
+    return;  // ignore invalid metadata for forward-compatibility
+  }
+
+  aMetadata.GetHashType(&mHashType, &mHashLength);
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::EnsureCryptoHash() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInvalidMetadata);
+
+  if (mCryptoHash) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> cryptoHash;
+  nsresult rv = NS_NewCryptoHash(mHashType, getter_AddRefs(cryptoHash));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  mCryptoHash = cryptoHash;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::Update(uint32_t aStringLen,
+                                      const uint8_t* aString) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aString);
+  if (mInvalidMetadata) {
+    return NS_OK;  // ignoring any data updates, see mInvalidMetadata usage
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  rv = EnsureCryptoHash();
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  mBytesHashed += aStringLen;
+
+  return mCryptoHash->Update(aString, aStringLen);
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::Finish() {
+  if (mInvalidMetadata || mComplete) {
+    return NS_OK;  // already finished or invalid metadata
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  rv = EnsureCryptoHash();  // we need computed hash even for 0-length data
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = mCryptoHash->Finish(false, mComputedHash);
+  mCryptoHash = nullptr;
+  mComplete = true;
+  return rv;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::VerifyHash(
+    const SRIMetadata& aMetadata, uint32_t aHashIndex,
+    const nsACString& aSourceFileURI, nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aReporter);
+
+  nsAutoCString base64Hash;
+  aMetadata.GetHash(aHashIndex, &base64Hash);
+  SRILOG(("SRICheckDataVerifier::VerifyHash, hash[%u]=%s", aHashIndex,
+          base64Hash.get()));
+
+  nsAutoCString binaryHash;
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(Base64Decode(base64Hash, binaryHash)))) {
+    nsTArray<nsString> params;
+    aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+        nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+        nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+        "InvalidIntegrityBase64"_ns,
+        const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_CORRUPT;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t hashLength;
+  int8_t hashType;
+  aMetadata.GetHashType(&hashType, &hashLength);
+  if (binaryHash.Length() != hashLength) {
+    nsTArray<nsString> params;
+    aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+        nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+        nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+        "InvalidIntegrityLength"_ns,
+        const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_CORRUPT;
+  }
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    nsAutoCString encodedHash;
+    nsresult rv = Base64Encode(mComputedHash, encodedHash);
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+      SRILOG(("SRICheckDataVerifier::VerifyHash, mComputedHash=%s",
+              encodedHash.get()));
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!binaryHash.Equals(mComputedHash)) {
+    SRILOG(("SRICheckDataVerifier::VerifyHash, hash[%u] did not match",
+            aHashIndex));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_CORRUPT;
+  }
+
+  SRILOG(("SRICheckDataVerifier::VerifyHash, hash[%u] verified successfully",
+          aHashIndex));
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::Verify(const SRIMetadata& aMetadata,
+                                      nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                      const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                                      nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aReporter);
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(SRILogHelper::GetSriLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    nsAutoCString requestURL;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> request = aChannel;
+    request->GetName(requestURL);
+    SRILOG(("SRICheckDataVerifier::Verify, url=%s (length=%zu)",
+            requestURL.get(), mBytesHashed));
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = Finish();
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  LoadTainting tainting = loadInfo->GetTainting();
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(IsEligible(aChannel, tainting, aSourceFileURI, aReporter))) {
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_NOT_ELIGIBLE;
+  }
+
+  if (mInvalidMetadata) {
+    return NS_OK;  // ignore invalid metadata for forward-compatibility
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aMetadata.HashCount(); i++) {
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(VerifyHash(aMetadata, i, aSourceFileURI, aReporter))) {
+      return NS_OK;  // stop at the first valid hash
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString alg;
+  aMetadata.GetAlgorithm(&alg);
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 algUTF16(alg);
+  nsTArray<nsString> params;
+  params.AppendElement(algUTF16);
+  aReporter->AddConsoleReport(
+      nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "Sub-resource Integrity"_ns,
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aSourceFileURI, 0, 0,
+      "IntegrityMismatch"_ns, const_cast<const nsTArray<nsString>&>(params));
+  return NS_ERROR_SRI_CORRUPT;
+}
+
+uint32_t SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInvalidMetadata);
+  return sizeof(mHashType) + sizeof(mHashLength) + mHashLength;
+}
+
+uint32_t SRICheckDataVerifier::EmptyDataSummaryLength() {
+  return sizeof(int8_t) + sizeof(uint32_t);
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength(uint32_t aDataLen,
+                                                 const uint8_t* aData,
+                                                 uint32_t* length) {
+  *length = 0;
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aData);
+
+  // we expect to always encode an SRI, even if it is empty or incomplete
+  if (aDataLen < EmptyDataSummaryLength()) {
+    SRILOG(
+        ("SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength, encoded length[%u] is too "
+         "small",
+         aDataLen));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_IMPORT;
+  }
+
+  // decode the content of the buffer
+  size_t offset = sizeof(mHashType);
+  decltype(mHashLength) len = 0;
+  memcpy(&len, &aData[offset], sizeof(mHashLength));
+  offset += sizeof(mHashLength);
+
+  SRIVERBOSE(
+      ("SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength, header {%x, %x, %x, %x, %x, "
+       "...}",
+       aData[0], aData[1], aData[2], aData[3], aData[4]));
+
+  if (offset + len > aDataLen) {
+    SRILOG(
+        ("SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength, encoded length[%u] overflow "
+         "the buffer size",
+         aDataLen));
+    SRIVERBOSE(("SRICheckDataVerifier::DataSummaryLength, offset[%u], len[%u]",
+                uint32_t(offset), uint32_t(len)));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_IMPORT;
+  }
+  *length = uint32_t(offset + len);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::ImportDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen,
+                                                 const uint8_t* aData) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInvalidMetadata);  // mHashType and mHashLength should be valid
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mCryptoHash);  // EnsureCryptoHash should not have been called
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aData);
+  if (mInvalidMetadata) {
+    return NS_OK;  // ignoring any data updates, see mInvalidMetadata usage
+  }
+
+  // we expect to always encode an SRI, even if it is empty or incomplete
+  if (aDataLen < DataSummaryLength()) {
+    SRILOG(
+        ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ImportDataSummary, encoded length[%u] is too "
+         "small",
+         aDataLen));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_IMPORT;
+  }
+
+  SRIVERBOSE(
+      ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ImportDataSummary, header {%x, %x, %x, %x, %x, "
+       "...}",
+       aData[0], aData[1], aData[2], aData[3], aData[4]));
+
+  // decode the content of the buffer
+  size_t offset = 0;
+  decltype(mHashType) hashType;
+  memcpy(&hashType, &aData[offset], sizeof(mHashType));
+  if (hashType != mHashType) {
+    SRILOG(
+        ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ImportDataSummary, hash type[%d] does not "
+         "match[%d]",
+         hashType, mHashType));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_UNEXPECTED_HASH_TYPE;
+  }
+  offset += sizeof(mHashType);
+
+  decltype(mHashLength) hashLength;
+  memcpy(&hashLength, &aData[offset], sizeof(mHashLength));
+  if (hashLength != mHashLength) {
+    SRILOG(
+        ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ImportDataSummary, hash length[%d] does not "
+         "match[%d]",
+         hashLength, mHashLength));
+    return NS_ERROR_SRI_UNEXPECTED_HASH_TYPE;
+  }
+  offset += sizeof(mHashLength);
+
+  // copy the hash to mComputedHash, as-if we had finished streaming the bytes
+  mComputedHash.Assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&aData[offset]),
+                       mHashLength);
+  mCryptoHash = nullptr;
+  mComplete = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::ExportDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen,
+                                                 uint8_t* aData) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!mInvalidMetadata);  // mHashType and mHashLength should be valid
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mComplete);          // finished streaming
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aData);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aDataLen >= DataSummaryLength(), NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
+
+  // serialize the hash in the buffer
+  size_t offset = 0;
+  memcpy(&aData[offset], &mHashType, sizeof(mHashType));
+  offset += sizeof(mHashType);
+  memcpy(&aData[offset], &mHashLength, sizeof(mHashLength));
+  offset += sizeof(mHashLength);
+
+  SRIVERBOSE(
+      ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ExportDataSummary, header {%x, %x, %x, %x, %x, "
+       "...}",
+       aData[0], aData[1], aData[2], aData[3], aData[4]));
+
+  // copy the hash to mComputedHash, as-if we had finished streaming the bytes
+  nsCharTraits<char>::copy(reinterpret_cast<char*>(&aData[offset]),
+                           mComputedHash.get(), mHashLength);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult SRICheckDataVerifier::ExportEmptyDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen,
+                                                      uint8_t* aData) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aData);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(aDataLen >= EmptyDataSummaryLength(), NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG);
+
+  // serialize an unknown hash in the buffer, to be able to skip it later
+  size_t offset = 0;
+  memset(&aData[offset], 0, sizeof(mHashType));
+  offset += sizeof(mHashType);
+  memset(&aData[offset], 0, sizeof(mHashLength));
+  offset += sizeof(mHashLength);
+
+  SRIVERBOSE(
+      ("SRICheckDataVerifier::ExportEmptyDataSummary, header {%x, %x, %x, %x, "
+       "%x, ...}",
+       aData[0], aData[1], aData[2], aData[3], aData[4]));
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/SRICheck.h b/dom/security/SRICheck.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dca0fde633
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SRICheck.h
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_SRICheck_h
+#define mozilla_dom_SRICheck_h
+
+#include "nsTString.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
+
+class nsIChannel;
+class nsIConsoleReportCollector;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class SRIMetadata;
+
+class SRICheck final {
+ public:
+  static const uint32_t MAX_METADATA_LENGTH = 24 * 1024;
+  static const uint32_t MAX_METADATA_TOKENS = 512;
+
+  /**
+   * Parse the multiple hashes specified in the integrity attribute and
+   * return the strongest supported hash.
+   */
+  static nsresult IntegrityMetadata(const nsAString& aMetadataList,
+                                    const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                                    nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter,
+                                    SRIMetadata* outMetadata);
+};
+
+// The SRICheckDataVerifier can be used in 2 different mode:
+//
+// 1. The streaming mode involves reading bytes from an input, and to use
+//    the |Update| function to stream new bytes, and to use the |Verify|
+//    function to check the hash of the content with the hash provided by
+//    the metadata.
+//
+//    Optionally, one can serialize the verified hash with |ExportDataSummary|,
+//    in a buffer in order to rely on the second mode the next time.
+//
+// 2. The pre-computed mode, involves reading a hash with |ImportDataSummary|,
+//    which got exported by the SRICheckDataVerifier and potentially cached, and
+//    then use the |Verify| function to check against the hash provided by the
+//    metadata.
+class SRICheckDataVerifier final {
+ public:
+  SRICheckDataVerifier(const SRIMetadata& aMetadata,
+                       const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                       nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter);
+
+  // Append the following bytes to the content used to compute the hash. Once
+  // all bytes are streamed, use the Verify function to check the integrity.
+  nsresult Update(uint32_t aStringLen, const uint8_t* aString);
+
+  // Verify that the computed hash corresponds to the metadata.
+  nsresult Verify(const SRIMetadata& aMetadata, nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                  const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                  nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter);
+
+  bool IsComplete() const { return mComplete; }
+
+  // Report the length of the computed hash and its type, such that we can
+  // reserve the space for encoding it in a vector.
+  uint32_t DataSummaryLength();
+  static uint32_t EmptyDataSummaryLength();
+
+  // Write the computed hash and its type in a pre-allocated buffer.
+  nsresult ExportDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen, uint8_t* aData);
+  static nsresult ExportEmptyDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen, uint8_t* aData);
+
+  // Report the length of the computed hash and its type, such that we can
+  // skip these data while reading a buffer.
+  static nsresult DataSummaryLength(uint32_t aDataLen, const uint8_t* aData,
+                                    uint32_t* length);
+
+  // Extract the computed hash and its type, such that we can |Verify| if it
+  // matches the metadata. The buffer should be at least the same size or
+  // larger than the value returned by |DataSummaryLength|.
+  nsresult ImportDataSummary(uint32_t aDataLen, const uint8_t* aData);
+
+ private:
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> mCryptoHash;
+  nsAutoCString mComputedHash;
+  size_t mBytesHashed;
+  uint32_t mHashLength;
+  int8_t mHashType;
+  bool mInvalidMetadata;
+  bool mComplete;
+
+  nsresult EnsureCryptoHash();
+  nsresult Finish();
+  nsresult VerifyHash(const SRIMetadata& aMetadata, uint32_t aHashIndex,
+                      const nsACString& aSourceFileURI,
+                      nsIConsoleReportCollector* aReporter);
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_SRICheck_h
diff --git a/dom/security/SRILogHelper.h b/dom/security/SRILogHelper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e453f30842
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SRILogHelper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_SRILogHelper_h
+#define mozilla_dom_SRILogHelper_h
+
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class SRILogHelper final {
+ public:
+  static LogModule* GetSriLog() {
+    static LazyLogModule gSriPRLog("SRI");
+    return gSriPRLog;
+  }
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_SRILogHelper_h
diff --git a/dom/security/SRIMetadata.cpp b/dom/security/SRIMetadata.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..02144f0f13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SRIMetadata.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "SRIMetadata.h"
+
+#include "hasht.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
+
+static mozilla::LogModule* GetSriMetadataLog() {
+  static mozilla::LazyLogModule gSriMetadataPRLog("SRIMetadata");
+  return gSriMetadataPRLog;
+}
+
+#define SRIMETADATALOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetSriMetadataLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define SRIMETADATAERROR(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetSriMetadataLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Error, args)
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata(const nsACString& aToken)
+    : mAlgorithmType(SRIMetadata::UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM), mEmpty(false) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!aToken.IsEmpty());  // callers should check this first
+
+  SRIMETADATALOG(("SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata, aToken='%s'",
+                  PromiseFlatCString(aToken).get()));
+
+  int32_t hyphen = aToken.FindChar('-');
+  if (hyphen == -1) {
+    SRIMETADATAERROR(("SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata, invalid (no hyphen)"));
+    return;  // invalid metadata
+  }
+
+  // split the token into its components
+  mAlgorithm = Substring(aToken, 0, hyphen);
+  uint32_t hashStart = hyphen + 1;
+  if (hashStart >= aToken.Length()) {
+    SRIMETADATAERROR(("SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata, invalid (missing digest)"));
+    return;  // invalid metadata
+  }
+  int32_t question = aToken.FindChar('?');
+  if (question == -1) {
+    mHashes.AppendElement(
+        Substring(aToken, hashStart, aToken.Length() - hashStart));
+  } else {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(question > 0);
+    if (static_cast<uint32_t>(question) <= hashStart) {
+      SRIMETADATAERROR(
+          ("SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata, invalid (options w/o digest)"));
+      return;  // invalid metadata
+    }
+    mHashes.AppendElement(Substring(aToken, hashStart, question - hashStart));
+  }
+
+  if (mAlgorithm.EqualsLiteral("sha256")) {
+    mAlgorithmType = nsICryptoHash::SHA256;
+  } else if (mAlgorithm.EqualsLiteral("sha384")) {
+    mAlgorithmType = nsICryptoHash::SHA384;
+  } else if (mAlgorithm.EqualsLiteral("sha512")) {
+    mAlgorithmType = nsICryptoHash::SHA512;
+  }
+
+  SRIMETADATALOG(("SRIMetadata::SRIMetadata, hash='%s'; alg='%s'",
+                  mHashes[0].get(), mAlgorithm.get()));
+}
+
+bool SRIMetadata::operator<(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const {
+  static_assert(nsICryptoHash::SHA256 < nsICryptoHash::SHA384,
+                "We rely on the order indicating relative alg strength");
+  static_assert(nsICryptoHash::SHA384 < nsICryptoHash::SHA512,
+                "We rely on the order indicating relative alg strength");
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mAlgorithmType == SRIMetadata::UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM ||
+             mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA256 ||
+             mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA384 ||
+             mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA512);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOther.mAlgorithmType == SRIMetadata::UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM ||
+             aOther.mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA256 ||
+             aOther.mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA384 ||
+             aOther.mAlgorithmType == nsICryptoHash::SHA512);
+
+  if (mEmpty) {
+    SRIMETADATALOG(("SRIMetadata::operator<, first metadata is empty"));
+    return true;  // anything beats the empty metadata (incl. invalid ones)
+  }
+
+  SRIMETADATALOG(("SRIMetadata::operator<, alg1='%d'; alg2='%d'",
+                  mAlgorithmType, aOther.mAlgorithmType));
+  return (mAlgorithmType < aOther.mAlgorithmType);
+}
+
+bool SRIMetadata::operator>(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(false);
+  return false;
+}
+
+SRIMetadata& SRIMetadata::operator+=(const SRIMetadata& aOther) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!aOther.IsEmpty() && !IsEmpty());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOther.IsValid() && IsValid());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mAlgorithmType == aOther.mAlgorithmType);
+
+  // We only pull in the first element of the other metadata
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOther.mHashes.Length() == 1);
+  if (mHashes.Length() < SRIMetadata::MAX_ALTERNATE_HASHES) {
+    SRIMETADATALOG((
+        "SRIMetadata::operator+=, appending another '%s' hash (new length=%zu)",
+        mAlgorithm.get(), mHashes.Length()));
+    mHashes.AppendElement(aOther.mHashes[0]);
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mHashes.Length() > 1);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mHashes.Length() <= SRIMetadata::MAX_ALTERNATE_HASHES);
+  return *this;
+}
+
+bool SRIMetadata::operator==(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const {
+  if (IsEmpty() || !IsValid()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return mAlgorithmType == aOther.mAlgorithmType;
+}
+
+void SRIMetadata::GetHash(uint32_t aIndex, nsCString* outHash) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aIndex < SRIMetadata::MAX_ALTERNATE_HASHES);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(aIndex >= mHashes.Length())) {
+    *outHash = nullptr;
+    return;
+  }
+  *outHash = mHashes[aIndex];
+}
+
+void SRIMetadata::GetHashType(int8_t* outType, uint32_t* outLength) const {
+  // these constants are defined in security/nss/lib/util/hasht.h and
+  // netwerk/base/public/nsICryptoHash.idl
+  switch (mAlgorithmType) {
+    case nsICryptoHash::SHA256:
+      *outLength = SHA256_LENGTH;
+      break;
+    case nsICryptoHash::SHA384:
+      *outLength = SHA384_LENGTH;
+      break;
+    case nsICryptoHash::SHA512:
+      *outLength = SHA512_LENGTH;
+      break;
+    default:
+      *outLength = 0;
+  }
+  *outType = mAlgorithmType;
+}
+
+bool SRIMetadata::CanTrustBeDelegatedTo(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const {
+  if (IsEmpty()) {
+    // No integrity requirements enforced, just let go.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (aOther.IsEmpty()) {
+    // This metadata requires a check and the other has none, can't delegate.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (mAlgorithmType != aOther.mAlgorithmType) {
+    // They must use the same hash algorithm.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // They must be completely identical, except for the order of hashes.
+  // We don't know which hash is the one passing eventually the check, so only
+  // option is to require this metadata to contain the same set of hashes as the
+  // one we want to delegate the trust to.
+  if (mHashes.Length() != aOther.mHashes.Length()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const auto& hash : mHashes) {
+    if (!aOther.mHashes.Contains(hash)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/SRIMetadata.h b/dom/security/SRIMetadata.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..caa3ba25f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SRIMetadata.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_SRIMetadata_h
+#define mozilla_dom_SRIMetadata_h
+
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "SRICheck.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class SRIMetadata final {
+  friend class SRICheck;
+
+ public:
+  static const uint32_t MAX_ALTERNATE_HASHES = 256;
+  static const int8_t UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM = -1;
+
+  /**
+   * Create an empty metadata object.
+   */
+  SRIMetadata() : mAlgorithmType(UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM), mEmpty(true) {}
+
+  /**
+   * Split a string token into the components of an SRI metadata
+   * attribute.
+   */
+  explicit SRIMetadata(const nsACString& aToken);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true when this object's hash algorithm is weaker than the
+   * other object's hash algorithm.
+   */
+  bool operator<(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const;
+
+  /**
+   * Not implemented. Should not be used.
+   */
+  bool operator>(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const;
+
+  /**
+   * Add another metadata's hash to this one.
+   */
+  SRIMetadata& operator+=(const SRIMetadata& aOther);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns true when the two metadata use the same hash algorithm.
+   */
+  bool operator==(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const;
+
+  bool IsEmpty() const { return mEmpty; }
+  bool IsMalformed() const { return mHashes.IsEmpty() || mAlgorithm.IsEmpty(); }
+  bool IsAlgorithmSupported() const {
+    return mAlgorithmType != UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM;
+  }
+  bool IsValid() const { return !IsMalformed() && IsAlgorithmSupported(); }
+
+  uint32_t HashCount() const { return mHashes.Length(); }
+  void GetHash(uint32_t aIndex, nsCString* outHash) const;
+  void GetAlgorithm(nsCString* outAlg) const { *outAlg = mAlgorithm; }
+  void GetHashType(int8_t* outType, uint32_t* outLength) const;
+
+  const nsString& GetIntegrityString() const { return mIntegrityString; }
+
+  // Return true if:
+  // - this integrity metadata is empty, or
+  // - the other integrity metadata has the same hash algorithm and also the
+  // same set of values otherwise, return false.
+  //
+  // This method simply checks if the other integrity metadata is identical to
+  // this one (if it exists), so that a load that has been checked against that
+  // other integrity metadata implies that the current integrity metadata is
+  // also satisfied.
+  bool CanTrustBeDelegatedTo(const SRIMetadata& aOther) const;
+
+ private:
+  CopyableTArray<nsCString> mHashes;
+  nsString mIntegrityString;
+  nsCString mAlgorithm;
+  int8_t mAlgorithmType;
+  bool mEmpty;
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_SRIMetadata_h
diff --git a/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp b/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06aa3de699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SecFetch.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "SecFetch.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIReferrerInfo.h"
+#include "mozIThirdPartyUtil.h"
+#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+
+// Helper function which maps an internal content policy type
+// to the corresponding destination for the context of SecFetch.
+nsCString MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(nsContentPolicyType aType) {
+  switch (aType) {
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_IMPORT_SCRIPTS:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_CHROMEUTILS_COMPILED_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME_MESSAGEMANAGER_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+      return "script"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
+      return "worker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
+      return "sharedworker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
+      return "serviceworker"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIOWORKLET:
+      return "audioworklet"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_PAINTWORKLET:
+      return "paintworklet"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+      return "image"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET_PRELOAD:
+      return "style"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_OBJECT:
+      return "object"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EMBED:
+      return "embed"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+      return "document"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IFRAME:
+      return "iframe"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME:
+      return "frame"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FONT_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
+      return "font"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIO:
+      return "audio"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_VIDEO:
+      return "video"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK:
+      return "track"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+      return "websocket"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+      return "report"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
+      return "xslt"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FETCH_PRELOAD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+      return "manifest"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
+      return "empty"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_IDENTITY:
+      return "webidentity"_ns;
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      break;
+      // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+  }
+
+  MOZ_CRASH("Unhandled nsContentPolicyType value");
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine if a ExpandedPrincipal is of the same-origin as
+// a URI in the sec-fetch context.
+void IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> aExpandedPrincipal, nsIURI* aURI,
+    bool* aRes) {
+  *aRes = false;
+  for (const auto& principal : aExpandedPrincipal->AllowList()) {
+    // Ignore extension principals to continue treating
+    // "moz-extension:"-requests as not "same-origin".
+    if (!mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+      // A ExpandedPrincipal usually has at most one ContentPrincipal, so we can
+      // check IsSameOrigin on it here and return early.
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->IsSameOrigin(aURI, aRes);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
+// redirects) is same-origin in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsSameOrigin(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  if (mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
+          ->AddonPolicy()) {
+    // If an extension triggered the load that has access to the URI then the
+    // load is considered as same-origin.
+    return mozilla::BasePrincipal::Cast(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())
+        ->AddonAllowsLoad(channelURI);
+  }
+
+  bool isSameOrigin = false;
+  if (nsContentUtils::IsExpandedPrincipal(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> ep =
+        do_QueryInterface(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+    IsExpandedPrincipalSameOrigin(ep, channelURI, &isSameOrigin);
+  } else {
+    isSameOrigin = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSameOrigin(channelURI);
+  }
+
+  // if the initial request is not same-origin, we can return here
+  // because we already know it's not a same-origin request
+  if (!isSameOrigin) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
+  // ensure all involved redirects are same-origin
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+    if (redirectPrincipal && !redirectPrincipal->IsSameOrigin(channelURI)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // must be a same-origin request
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request (including involved
+// redirects) is same-site in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsSameSite(nsIChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<mozIThirdPartyUtil> thirdPartyUtil =
+      do_GetService(THIRDPARTYUTIL_CONTRACTID);
+  if (!thirdPartyUtil) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString hostDomain;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsresult rv = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  nsAutoCString channelDomain;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aHTTPChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+  rv = thirdPartyUtil->GetBaseDomain(channelURI, channelDomain);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+
+  // if the initial request is not same-site, or not https, we can
+  // return here because we already know it's not a same-site request
+  if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
+      (!loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->SchemeIs("https") &&
+       !nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
+           hostDomain))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // let's further check all the hoops in the redirectChain to
+  // ensure all involved redirects are same-site and https
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : loadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+    if (redirectPrincipal) {
+      redirectPrincipal->GetBaseDomain(hostDomain);
+      if (!hostDomain.Equals(channelDomain) ||
+          !redirectPrincipal->SchemeIs("https")) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // must be a same-site request
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Helper function to determine whether a request was triggered
+// by the end user in the context of SecFetch.
+bool IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  /*
+   * The goal is to distinguish between "webby" navigations that are controlled
+   * by a given website (e.g. links, the window.location setter,form
+   * submissions, etc.), and those that are not (e.g. user interaction with a
+   * user agent’s address bar, bookmarks, etc).
+   */
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // A request issued by the browser is always user initiated.
+  if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // only requests wich result in type "document" are subject to
+  // user initiated actions in the context of SecFetch.
+  if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The load is considered user triggered if it was triggered by an external
+  // application.
+  if (loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // sec-fetch-site can only be user triggered if the load was user triggered.
+  if (!loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We can assert that the navigation must be "webby" if the load was triggered
+  // by a meta refresh. See also Bug 1647128.
+  if (loadInfo->GetIsMetaRefresh()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // All web requests have a valid "original" referrer set in the
+  // ReferrerInfo which we can use to determine whether a request
+  // was triggered by a user or not.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = aHTTPChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
+  if (referrerInfo) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalReferrer;
+    referrerInfo->GetOriginalReferrer(getter_AddRefs(originalReferrer));
+    if (originalReferrer) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchDest(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsCString dest = MapInternalContentPolicyTypeToDest(contentType);
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Dest"_ns, dest, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchMode(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsAutoCString mode("no-cors");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint32_t securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+  ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  if (securityMode ==
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
+      securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED) {
+    mode = "same-origin"_ns;
+  } else if (securityMode ==
+             nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    mode = "cors"_ns;
+  } else {
+    // If it's not one of the security modes above, then we ensure it's
+    // at least one of the others defined in nsILoadInfo
+    MOZ_ASSERT(
+        securityMode ==
+                nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT ||
+            securityMode ==
+                nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+        "unhandled security mode");
+  }
+
+  if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+      externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT ||
+      externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    mode = "navigate"_ns;
+  } else if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET) {
+    mode = "websocket"_ns;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Mode"_ns, mode, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsAutoCString site("same-origin");
+
+  bool isSameOrigin = IsSameOrigin(aHTTPChannel);
+  if (!isSameOrigin) {
+    bool isSameSite = IsSameSite(aHTTPChannel);
+    if (isSameSite) {
+      site = "same-site"_ns;
+    } else {
+      site = "cross-site"_ns;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (IsUserTriggeredForSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel)) {
+    site = "none"_ns;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site"_ns, site, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchUser(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // sec-fetch-user only applies to loads of type document or subdocument
+  if (externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      externalType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // sec-fetch-user only applies if the request is user triggered.
+  // requests triggered by an external application are considerd user triggered.
+  if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
+      !loadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString user("?1");
+  nsresult rv =
+      aHTTPChannel->SetRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-User"_ns, user, false);
+  mozilla::Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+}
+
+void mozilla::dom::SecFetch::AddSecFetchHeader(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel) {
+  // if sec-fetch-* is prefed off, then there is nothing to do
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_security_secFetch_enabled()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aHTTPChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if we are not dealing with a potentially trustworthy URL, then
+  // there is nothing to do here
+  if (!nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(uri)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  AddSecFetchDest(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchMode(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchSite(aHTTPChannel);
+  AddSecFetchUser(aHTTPChannel);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/SecFetch.h b/dom/security/SecFetch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b4b1495f4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/SecFetch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_SecFetch_h
+#define mozilla_dom_SecFetch_h
+
+class nsIHttpChannel;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class SecFetch final {
+ public:
+  static void AddSecFetchHeader(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel);
+
+ private:
+  static void AddSecFetchDest(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel);
+  static void AddSecFetchMode(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel);
+  static void AddSecFetchSite(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel);
+  static void AddSecFetchUser(nsIHttpChannel* aHTTPChannel);
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_SecFetch_h
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..92a92369da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "Feature.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+void Feature::GetAllowList(nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aList) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mPolicy == eAllowList);
+  aList.AppendElements(mAllowList);
+}
+
+bool Feature::Allows(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const {
+  if (mPolicy == eNone) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (mPolicy == eAll) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return AllowListContains(aPrincipal);
+}
+
+Feature::Feature(const nsAString& aFeatureName)
+    : mFeatureName(aFeatureName), mPolicy(eAllowList) {}
+
+Feature::~Feature() = default;
+
+const nsAString& Feature::Name() const { return mFeatureName; }
+
+void Feature::SetAllowsNone() {
+  mPolicy = eNone;
+  mAllowList.Clear();
+}
+
+bool Feature::AllowsNone() const { return mPolicy == eNone; }
+
+void Feature::SetAllowsAll() {
+  mPolicy = eAll;
+  mAllowList.Clear();
+}
+
+bool Feature::AllowsAll() const { return mPolicy == eAll; }
+
+void Feature::AppendToAllowList(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  mPolicy = eAllowList;
+  mAllowList.AppendElement(aPrincipal);
+}
+
+bool Feature::AllowListContains(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  if (!HasAllowList()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (nsIPrincipal* principal : mAllowList) {
+    if (BasePrincipal::Cast(principal)->Subsumes(
+            aPrincipal, BasePrincipal::ConsiderDocumentDomain)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool Feature::HasAllowList() const { return mPolicy == eAllowList; }
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.h b/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e8a3d89c81
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/Feature.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_Feature_h
+#define mozilla_dom_Feature_h
+
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+
+class nsIPrincipal;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class Feature final {
+ public:
+  explicit Feature(const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  ~Feature();
+
+  const nsAString& Name() const;
+
+  void SetAllowsNone();
+
+  bool AllowsNone() const;
+
+  void SetAllowsAll();
+
+  bool AllowsAll() const;
+
+  void AppendToAllowList(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal);
+
+  void GetAllowList(nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>>& aList) const;
+
+  bool AllowListContains(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const;
+
+  bool HasAllowList() const;
+
+  bool Allows(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const;
+
+ private:
+  nsString mFeatureName;
+
+  enum Policy {
+    // denotes a policy of "feature 'none'"
+    eNone,
+
+    // denotes a policy of "feature *"
+    eAll,
+
+    // denotes a policy of "feature bar.com foo.com"
+    eAllowList,
+  };
+
+  Policy mPolicy;
+
+  CopyableTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>> mAllowList;
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_Feature_h
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb5c1ea44a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FeaturePolicy.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Feature.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyParser.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE(FeaturePolicy)
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(FeaturePolicy)
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_RELEASE(FeaturePolicy)
+
+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(FeaturePolicy)
+  NS_WRAPPERCACHE_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY
+  NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISupports)
+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END
+
+FeaturePolicy::FeaturePolicy(nsINode* aNode) : mParentNode(aNode) {}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::InheritPolicy(FeaturePolicy* aParentPolicy) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aParentPolicy);
+
+  mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames.Clear();
+
+  RefPtr<FeaturePolicy> dest = this;
+  RefPtr<FeaturePolicy> src = aParentPolicy;
+
+  // Inherit origins which explicitly declared policy in chain
+  for (const Feature& featureInChain :
+       aParentPolicy->mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain) {
+    dest->AppendToDeclaredAllowInAncestorChain(featureInChain);
+  }
+
+  FeaturePolicyUtils::ForEachFeature([dest, src](const char* aFeatureName) {
+    nsString featureName;
+    featureName.AppendASCII(aFeatureName);
+    // Store unsafe allows all (allow=*)
+    if (src->HasFeatureUnsafeAllowsAll(featureName)) {
+      dest->mParentAllowedAllFeatures.AppendElement(featureName);
+    }
+
+    // If the destination has a declared feature (via the HTTP header or 'allow'
+    // attribute) we allow the feature if the destination allows it and the
+    // parent allows its origin or the destinations' one.
+    if (dest->HasDeclaredFeature(featureName) &&
+        dest->AllowsFeatureInternal(featureName, dest->mDefaultOrigin)) {
+      if (!src->AllowsFeatureInternal(featureName, src->mDefaultOrigin) &&
+          !src->AllowsFeatureInternal(featureName, dest->mDefaultOrigin)) {
+        dest->SetInheritedDeniedFeature(featureName);
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // If there was not a declared feature, we allow the feature if the parent
+    // FeaturePolicy allows the current origin.
+    if (!src->AllowsFeatureInternal(featureName, dest->mDefaultOrigin)) {
+      dest->SetInheritedDeniedFeature(featureName);
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::SetInheritedDeniedFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!HasInheritedDeniedFeature(aFeatureName));
+  mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames.AppendElement(aFeatureName);
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::HasInheritedDeniedFeature(
+    const nsAString& aFeatureName) const {
+  return mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames.Contains(aFeatureName);
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::HasDeclaredFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) const {
+  for (const Feature& feature : mFeatures) {
+    if (feature.Name().Equals(aFeatureName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::HasFeatureUnsafeAllowsAll(
+    const nsAString& aFeatureName) const {
+  for (const Feature& feature : mFeatures) {
+    if (feature.AllowsAll() && feature.Name().Equals(aFeatureName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We should look into parent too (for example, document of iframe which
+  // allows all, would be unsafe)
+  return mParentAllowedAllFeatures.Contains(aFeatureName);
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::AppendToDeclaredAllowInAncestorChain(
+    const Feature& aFeature) {
+  for (Feature& featureInChain : mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain) {
+    if (featureInChain.Name().Equals(aFeature.Name())) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(featureInChain.HasAllowList());
+
+      nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>> list;
+      aFeature.GetAllowList(list);
+
+      for (nsIPrincipal* principal : list) {
+        featureInChain.AppendToAllowList(principal);
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+  }
+
+  mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain.AppendElement(aFeature);
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::IsSameOriginAsSrc(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aPrincipal);
+
+  if (!mSrcOrigin) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return BasePrincipal::Cast(mSrcOrigin)
+      ->Subsumes(aPrincipal, BasePrincipal::ConsiderDocumentDomain);
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::SetDeclaredPolicy(Document* aDocument,
+                                      const nsAString& aPolicyString,
+                                      nsIPrincipal* aSelfOrigin,
+                                      nsIPrincipal* aSrcOrigin) {
+  ResetDeclaredPolicy();
+
+  mDeclaredString = aPolicyString;
+  mSelfOrigin = aSelfOrigin;
+  mSrcOrigin = aSrcOrigin;
+
+  Unused << NS_WARN_IF(!FeaturePolicyParser::ParseString(
+      aPolicyString, aDocument, aSelfOrigin, aSrcOrigin, mFeatures));
+
+  // Only store explicitly declared allowlist
+  for (const Feature& feature : mFeatures) {
+    if (feature.HasAllowList()) {
+      AppendToDeclaredAllowInAncestorChain(feature);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::ResetDeclaredPolicy() {
+  mFeatures.Clear();
+  mDeclaredString.Truncate();
+  mSelfOrigin = nullptr;
+  mSrcOrigin = nullptr;
+  mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain.Clear();
+  mAttributeEnabledFeatureNames.Clear();
+}
+
+JSObject* FeaturePolicy::WrapObject(JSContext* aCx,
+                                    JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) {
+  return FeaturePolicy_Binding::Wrap(aCx, this, aGivenProto);
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::AllowsFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                                  const Optional<nsAString>& aOrigin) const {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> origin;
+  if (aOrigin.WasPassed()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), aOrigin.Value());
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    origin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
+        uri, BasePrincipal::Cast(mDefaultOrigin)->OriginAttributesRef());
+  } else {
+    origin = mDefaultOrigin;
+  }
+
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!origin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return AllowsFeatureInternal(aFeatureName, origin);
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::AllowsFeatureExplicitlyInAncestorChain(
+    const nsAString& aFeatureName, nsIPrincipal* aOrigin) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOrigin);
+
+  for (const Feature& feature : mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain) {
+    if (feature.Name().Equals(aFeatureName)) {
+      return feature.AllowListContains(aOrigin);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool FeaturePolicy::AllowsFeatureInternal(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                                          nsIPrincipal* aOrigin) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aOrigin);
+
+  // Let's see if have to disable this feature because inherited policy.
+  if (HasInheritedDeniedFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  for (const Feature& feature : mFeatures) {
+    if (feature.Name().Equals(aFeatureName)) {
+      return feature.Allows(aOrigin);
+    }
+  }
+
+  switch (FeaturePolicyUtils::DefaultAllowListFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll:
+      return true;
+
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf:
+      return BasePrincipal::Cast(mDefaultOrigin)
+          ->Subsumes(aOrigin, BasePrincipal::ConsiderDocumentDomain);
+
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eNone:
+      return false;
+
+    default:
+      MOZ_CRASH("Unknown default value");
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::Features(nsTArray<nsString>& aFeatures) {
+  RefPtr<FeaturePolicy> self = this;
+  FeaturePolicyUtils::ForEachFeature(
+      [self, &aFeatures](const char* aFeatureName) {
+        nsString featureName;
+        featureName.AppendASCII(aFeatureName);
+        aFeatures.AppendElement(featureName);
+      });
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::AllowedFeatures(nsTArray<nsString>& aAllowedFeatures) {
+  RefPtr<FeaturePolicy> self = this;
+  FeaturePolicyUtils::ForEachFeature(
+      [self, &aAllowedFeatures](const char* aFeatureName) {
+        nsString featureName;
+        featureName.AppendASCII(aFeatureName);
+
+        if (self->AllowsFeatureInternal(featureName, self->mDefaultOrigin)) {
+          aAllowedFeatures.AppendElement(featureName);
+        }
+      });
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::GetAllowlistForFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                                           nsTArray<nsString>& aList) const {
+  if (!AllowsFeatureInternal(aFeatureName, mDefaultOrigin)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  for (const Feature& feature : mFeatures) {
+    if (feature.Name().Equals(aFeatureName)) {
+      if (feature.AllowsAll()) {
+        aList.AppendElement(u"*"_ns);
+        return;
+      }
+
+      nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>> list;
+      feature.GetAllowList(list);
+
+      for (nsIPrincipal* principal : list) {
+        nsAutoCString originNoSuffix;
+        nsresult rv = principal->GetOriginNoSuffix(originNoSuffix);
+        if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+          return;
+        }
+
+        aList.AppendElement(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(originNoSuffix));
+      }
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  switch (FeaturePolicyUtils::DefaultAllowListFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll:
+      aList.AppendElement(u"*"_ns);
+      return;
+
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf: {
+      nsAutoCString originNoSuffix;
+      nsresult rv = mDefaultOrigin->GetOriginNoSuffix(originNoSuffix);
+      if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      aList.AppendElement(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(originNoSuffix));
+      return;
+    }
+
+    case FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eNone:
+      return;
+
+    default:
+      MOZ_CRASH("Unknown default value");
+  }
+}
+
+void FeaturePolicy::MaybeSetAllowedPolicy(const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(FeaturePolicyUtils::IsSupportedFeature(aFeatureName) ||
+             FeaturePolicyUtils::IsExperimentalFeature(aFeatureName));
+  // Skip if feature is in experimental phase
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_security_featurePolicy_experimental_enabled() &&
+      FeaturePolicyUtils::IsExperimentalFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (HasDeclaredFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  Feature feature(aFeatureName);
+  feature.SetAllowsAll();
+
+  mFeatures.AppendElement(feature);
+  mAttributeEnabledFeatureNames.AppendElement(aFeatureName);
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.h b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65f5259749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicy_h
+#define mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicy_h
+
+#include "nsCycleCollectionParticipant.h"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsWrapperCache.h"
+
+/**
+ * FeaturePolicy
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * Each document and each HTMLIFrameElement have a FeaturePolicy object which is
+ * used to allow or deny features in their contexts.
+ *
+ * FeaturePolicy is composed by a set of directives configured by the
+ * 'Feature-Policy' HTTP Header and the 'allow' attribute in HTMLIFrameElements.
+ * Both header and attribute are parsed by FeaturePolicyParser which returns an
+ * array of Feature objects. Each Feature object has a feature name and one of
+ * these policies:
+ * - eNone - the feature is fully disabled.
+ * - eAll - the feature is allowed.
+ * - eAllowList - the feature is allowed for a list of origins.
+ *
+ * An interesting element of FeaturePolicy is the inheritance: each context
+ * inherits the feature-policy directives from the parent context, if it exists.
+ * When a context inherits a policy for feature X, it only knows if that feature
+ * is allowed or denied (it ignores the list of allowed origins for instance).
+ * This information is stored in an array of inherited feature strings because
+ * we care only to know when they are denied.
+ *
+ * FeaturePolicy can be reset if the 'allow' or 'src' attributes change in
+ * HTMLIFrameElements. 'src' attribute is important to compute correcly
+ * the features via FeaturePolicy 'src' keyword.
+ *
+ * When FeaturePolicy must decide if feature X is allowed or denied for the
+ * current origin, it checks if the parent context denied that feature.
+ * If not, it checks if there is a Feature object for that
+ * feature named X and if the origin is allowed or not.
+ *
+ * From a C++ point of view, use FeaturePolicyUtils to obtain the list of
+ * features and to check if they are allowed in the current context.
+ *
+ * dom.security.featurePolicy.header.enabled pref can be used to disable the
+ * HTTP header support.
+ **/
+
+class nsINode;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+class Document;
+class Feature;
+template <typename T>
+class Optional;
+
+class FeaturePolicyUtils;
+
+class FeaturePolicy final : public nsISupports, public nsWrapperCache {
+  friend class FeaturePolicyUtils;
+
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE_CLASS(FeaturePolicy)
+
+  explicit FeaturePolicy(nsINode* aNode);
+
+  // A FeaturePolicy must have a default origin.
+  // This method must be called before any other exposed WebIDL method or before
+  // checking if a feature is allowed.
+  void SetDefaultOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+    mDefaultOrigin = aPrincipal;
+  }
+
+  void SetSrcOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) { mSrcOrigin = aPrincipal; }
+
+  nsIPrincipal* DefaultOrigin() const { return mDefaultOrigin; }
+
+  // Inherits the policy from the 'parent' context if it exists.
+  void InheritPolicy(FeaturePolicy* aParentFeaturePolicy);
+
+  // Sets the declarative part of the policy. This can be from the HTTP header
+  // or for the 'allow' HTML attribute.
+  void SetDeclaredPolicy(mozilla::dom::Document* aDocument,
+                         const nsAString& aPolicyString,
+                         nsIPrincipal* aSelfOrigin, nsIPrincipal* aSrcOrigin);
+
+  // This method creates a policy for aFeatureName allowing it to '*' if it
+  // doesn't exist yet. It's used by HTMLIFrameElement to enable features by
+  // attributes.
+  void MaybeSetAllowedPolicy(const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  // Clears all the declarative policy directives. This is needed when the
+  // 'allow' attribute or the 'src' attribute change for HTMLIFrameElement's
+  // policy.
+  void ResetDeclaredPolicy();
+
+  // This method appends a feature to in-chain declared allowlist. If the name's
+  // feature existed in the list, we only need to append the allowlist of new
+  // feature to the existed one.
+  void AppendToDeclaredAllowInAncestorChain(const Feature& aFeature);
+
+  // This method returns true if aFeatureName is declared as "*" (allow all)
+  // in parent.
+  bool HasFeatureUnsafeAllowsAll(const nsAString& aFeatureName) const;
+
+  // This method returns true if the aFeatureName is allowed for aOrigin
+  // explicitly in ancestor chain,
+  bool AllowsFeatureExplicitlyInAncestorChain(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                                              nsIPrincipal* aOrigin) const;
+
+  bool IsSameOriginAsSrc(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) const;
+
+  // WebIDL internal methods.
+
+  JSObject* WrapObject(JSContext* aCx,
+                       JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) override;
+
+  nsINode* GetParentObject() const { return mParentNode; }
+
+  // WebIDL explosed methods.
+
+  bool AllowsFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                     const Optional<nsAString>& aOrigin) const;
+
+  void Features(nsTArray<nsString>& aFeatures);
+
+  void AllowedFeatures(nsTArray<nsString>& aAllowedFeatures);
+
+  void GetAllowlistForFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                              nsTArray<nsString>& aList) const;
+
+  const nsTArray<nsString>& InheritedDeniedFeatureNames() const {
+    return mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames;
+  }
+
+  const nsTArray<nsString>& AttributeEnabledFeatureNames() const {
+    return mAttributeEnabledFeatureNames;
+  }
+
+  void SetInheritedDeniedFeatureNames(
+      const nsTArray<nsString>& aInheritedDeniedFeatureNames) {
+    mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames = aInheritedDeniedFeatureNames.Clone();
+  }
+
+  const nsAString& DeclaredString() const { return mDeclaredString; }
+
+  nsIPrincipal* GetSelfOrigin() const { return mSelfOrigin; }
+  nsIPrincipal* GetSrcOrigin() const { return mSrcOrigin; }
+
+ private:
+  ~FeaturePolicy() = default;
+
+  // This method returns true if the aFeatureName is allowed for aOrigin,
+  // following the feature-policy directives. See the comment at the top of this
+  // file.
+  bool AllowsFeatureInternal(const nsAString& aFeatureName,
+                             nsIPrincipal* aOrigin) const;
+
+  // Inherits a single denied feature from the parent context.
+  void SetInheritedDeniedFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  bool HasInheritedDeniedFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) const;
+
+  // This returns true if we have a declared feature policy for aFeatureName.
+  bool HasDeclaredFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) const;
+
+  nsINode* mParentNode;
+
+  // This is set in sub-contexts when the parent blocks some feature for the
+  // current context.
+  nsTArray<nsString> mInheritedDeniedFeatureNames;
+
+  // The list of features that have been enabled via MaybeSetAllowedPolicy.
+  nsTArray<nsString> mAttributeEnabledFeatureNames;
+
+  // This is set of feature names when the parent allows all for that feature.
+  nsTArray<nsString> mParentAllowedAllFeatures;
+
+  // The explicitly declared policy contains allowlist as a set of origins
+  // except 'none' and '*'. This set contains all explicitly declared policies
+  // in ancestor chain
+  nsTArray<Feature> mDeclaredFeaturesInAncestorChain;
+
+  // Feature policy for the current context.
+  nsTArray<Feature> mFeatures;
+
+  // Declared string represents Feature policy.
+  nsString mDeclaredString;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mDefaultOrigin;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mSelfOrigin;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mSrcOrigin;
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicy_h
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8ab95420aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FeaturePolicyParser.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Feature.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/PolicyTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+namespace {
+
+void ReportToConsoleUnsupportedFeature(Document* aDocument,
+                                       const nsString& aFeatureName) {
+  if (!aDocument) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {aFeatureName};
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(
+      nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Feature Policy"_ns, aDocument,
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+      "FeaturePolicyUnsupportedFeatureName", params);
+}
+
+void ReportToConsoleInvalidEmptyAllowValue(Document* aDocument,
+                                           const nsString& aFeatureName) {
+  if (!aDocument) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {aFeatureName};
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(
+      nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Feature Policy"_ns, aDocument,
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+      "FeaturePolicyInvalidEmptyAllowValue", params);
+}
+
+void ReportToConsoleInvalidAllowValue(Document* aDocument,
+                                      const nsString& aValue) {
+  if (!aDocument) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {aValue};
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                  "Feature Policy"_ns, aDocument,
+                                  nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                  "FeaturePolicyInvalidAllowValue", params);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+/* static */
+bool FeaturePolicyParser::ParseString(const nsAString& aPolicy,
+                                      Document* aDocument,
+                                      nsIPrincipal* aSelfOrigin,
+                                      nsIPrincipal* aSrcOrigin,
+                                      nsTArray<Feature>& aParsedFeatures) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aSelfOrigin);
+
+  nsTArray<CopyableTArray<nsString>> tokens;
+  PolicyTokenizer::tokenizePolicy(aPolicy, tokens);
+
+  nsTArray<Feature> parsedFeatures;
+
+  for (const nsTArray<nsString>& featureTokens : tokens) {
+    if (featureTokens.IsEmpty()) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (!FeaturePolicyUtils::IsSupportedFeature(featureTokens[0])) {
+      ReportToConsoleUnsupportedFeature(aDocument, featureTokens[0]);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    Feature feature(featureTokens[0]);
+
+    if (featureTokens.Length() == 1) {
+      if (aSrcOrigin) {
+        feature.AppendToAllowList(aSrcOrigin);
+      } else {
+        ReportToConsoleInvalidEmptyAllowValue(aDocument, featureTokens[0]);
+        continue;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // we gotta start at 1 here
+      for (uint32_t i = 1; i < featureTokens.Length(); ++i) {
+        const nsString& curVal = featureTokens[i];
+        if (curVal.LowerCaseEqualsASCII("'none'")) {
+          feature.SetAllowsNone();
+          break;
+        }
+
+        if (curVal.EqualsLiteral("*")) {
+          feature.SetAllowsAll();
+          break;
+        }
+
+        if (curVal.LowerCaseEqualsASCII("'self'")) {
+          feature.AppendToAllowList(aSelfOrigin);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        if (aSrcOrigin && curVal.LowerCaseEqualsASCII("'src'")) {
+          feature.AppendToAllowList(aSrcOrigin);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+        nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), curVal);
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          ReportToConsoleInvalidAllowValue(aDocument, curVal);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> origin = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
+            uri, BasePrincipal::Cast(aSelfOrigin)->OriginAttributesRef());
+        if (NS_WARN_IF(!origin)) {
+          ReportToConsoleInvalidAllowValue(aDocument, curVal);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        feature.AppendToAllowList(origin);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // No duplicate!
+    bool found = false;
+    for (const Feature& parsedFeature : parsedFeatures) {
+      if (parsedFeature.Name() == feature.Name()) {
+        found = true;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (!found) {
+      parsedFeatures.AppendElement(feature);
+    }
+  }
+
+  aParsedFeatures = std::move(parsedFeatures);
+  return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.h b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a60a391a78
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyParser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyParser_h
+#define mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyParser_h
+
+#include "nsString.h"
+
+class nsIPrincipal;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+class Document;
+class Feature;
+
+class FeaturePolicyParser final {
+ public:
+  // aSelfOrigin must not be null. if aSrcOrigin is null, the parsing will not
+  // support 'src' as valid allow directive value.
+  static bool ParseString(const nsAString& aPolicy, Document* aDocument,
+                          nsIPrincipal* aSelfOrigin, nsIPrincipal* aSrcOrigin,
+                          nsTArray<Feature>& aParsedFeatures);
+};
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyParser_h
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b2a383642
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FeaturePolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsIOService.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/DOMTypes.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/IPDLParamTraits.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyViolationReportBody.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ReportingUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsJSUtils.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace dom {
+
+struct FeatureMap {
+  const char* mFeatureName;
+  FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue mDefaultAllowList;
+};
+
+/*
+ * IMPORTANT: Do not change this list without review from a DOM peer _AND_ a
+ * DOM Security peer!
+ */
+static FeatureMap sSupportedFeatures[] = {
+    {"camera", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"geolocation", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"microphone", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"display-capture", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"fullscreen", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"web-share", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"gamepad", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    {"speaker-selection", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is experimental features list, which is disabled by default by pref
+ * dom.security.featurePolicy.experimental.enabled.
+ */
+static FeatureMap sExperimentalFeatures[] = {
+    // We don't support 'autoplay' for now, because it would be overwrote by
+    // 'user-gesture-activation' policy. However, we can still keep it in the
+    // list as we might start supporting it after we use different autoplay
+    // policy.
+    {"autoplay", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    {"encrypted-media", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    {"midi", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+    {"payment", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    {"document-domain", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    {"vr", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eAll},
+    // https://immersive-web.github.io/webxr/#feature-policy
+    {"xr-spatial-tracking", FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue::eSelf},
+};
+
+/* static */
+bool FeaturePolicyUtils::IsExperimentalFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  uint32_t numFeatures =
+      (sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures) / sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures[0]));
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+    if (aFeatureName.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
+            sExperimentalFeatures[i].mFeatureName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool FeaturePolicyUtils::IsSupportedFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  uint32_t numFeatures =
+      (sizeof(sSupportedFeatures) / sizeof(sSupportedFeatures[0]));
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+    if (aFeatureName.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(sSupportedFeatures[i].mFeatureName)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return StaticPrefs::dom_security_featurePolicy_experimental_enabled() &&
+         IsExperimentalFeature(aFeatureName);
+}
+
+/* static */
+void FeaturePolicyUtils::ForEachFeature(
+    const std::function<void(const char*)>& aCallback) {
+  uint32_t numFeatures =
+      (sizeof(sSupportedFeatures) / sizeof(sSupportedFeatures[0]));
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+    aCallback(sSupportedFeatures[i].mFeatureName);
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_featurePolicy_experimental_enabled()) {
+    numFeatures =
+        (sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures) / sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures[0]));
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+      aCallback(sExperimentalFeatures[i].mFeatureName);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */ FeaturePolicyUtils::FeaturePolicyValue
+FeaturePolicyUtils::DefaultAllowListFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  uint32_t numFeatures =
+      (sizeof(sSupportedFeatures) / sizeof(sSupportedFeatures[0]));
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+    if (aFeatureName.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(sSupportedFeatures[i].mFeatureName)) {
+      return sSupportedFeatures[i].mDefaultAllowList;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_featurePolicy_experimental_enabled()) {
+    numFeatures =
+        (sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures) / sizeof(sExperimentalFeatures[0]));
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numFeatures; ++i) {
+      if (aFeatureName.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(
+              sExperimentalFeatures[i].mFeatureName)) {
+        return sExperimentalFeatures[i].mDefaultAllowList;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return FeaturePolicyValue::eNone;
+}
+
+static bool IsSameOriginAsTop(Document* aDocument) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+
+  BrowsingContext* browsingContext = aDocument->GetBrowsingContext();
+  if (!browsingContext) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsPIDOMWindowOuter* topWindow = browsingContext->Top()->GetDOMWindow();
+  if (!topWindow) {
+    // If we don't have a DOMWindow, We are not in same origin.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  Document* topLevelDocument = topWindow->GetExtantDoc();
+  if (!topLevelDocument) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return NS_SUCCEEDED(
+      nsContentUtils::CheckSameOrigin(topLevelDocument, aDocument));
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool FeaturePolicyUtils::IsFeatureUnsafeAllowedAll(
+    Document* aDocument, const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+
+  if (!aDocument->IsHTMLDocument()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  FeaturePolicy* policy = aDocument->FeaturePolicy();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(policy);
+
+  return policy->HasFeatureUnsafeAllowsAll(aFeatureName) &&
+         !policy->IsSameOriginAsSrc(aDocument->NodePrincipal()) &&
+         !policy->AllowsFeatureExplicitlyInAncestorChain(
+             aFeatureName, policy->DefaultOrigin()) &&
+         !IsSameOriginAsTop(aDocument);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool FeaturePolicyUtils::IsFeatureAllowed(Document* aDocument,
+                                          const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+
+  // Skip apply features in experimental phase
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_security_featurePolicy_experimental_enabled() &&
+      IsExperimentalFeature(aFeatureName)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  FeaturePolicy* policy = aDocument->FeaturePolicy();
+  MOZ_ASSERT(policy);
+
+  if (policy->AllowsFeatureInternal(aFeatureName, policy->DefaultOrigin())) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  ReportViolation(aDocument, aFeatureName);
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+void FeaturePolicyUtils::ReportViolation(Document* aDocument,
+                                         const nsAString& aFeatureName) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!uri)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Strip the URL of any possible username/password and make it ready to be
+  // presented in the UI.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> exposableURI = net::nsIOService::CreateExposableURI(uri);
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  nsresult rv = exposableURI->GetSpec(spec);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+  JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!cx)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString fileName;
+  Nullable<int32_t> lineNumber;
+  Nullable<int32_t> columnNumber;
+  uint32_t line = 0;
+  uint32_t column = 0;
+  if (nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, fileName, &line, &column)) {
+    lineNumber.SetValue(static_cast<int32_t>(line));
+    columnNumber.SetValue(static_cast<int32_t>(column));
+  }
+
+  nsPIDOMWindowInner* window = aDocument->GetInnerWindow();
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!window)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<FeaturePolicyViolationReportBody> body =
+      new FeaturePolicyViolationReportBody(window->AsGlobal(), aFeatureName,
+                                           fileName, lineNumber, columnNumber,
+                                           u"enforce"_ns);
+
+  ReportingUtils::Report(window->AsGlobal(), nsGkAtoms::featurePolicyViolation,
+                         u"default"_ns, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec), body);
+}
+
+}  // namespace dom
+
+namespace ipc {
+void IPDLParamTraits<dom::FeaturePolicy*>::Write(IPC::MessageWriter* aWriter,
+                                                 IProtocol* aActor,
+                                                 dom::FeaturePolicy* aParam) {
+  if (!aParam) {
+    WriteIPDLParam(aWriter, aActor, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  WriteIPDLParam(aWriter, aActor, true);
+
+  dom::FeaturePolicyInfo info;
+  info.defaultOrigin() = aParam->DefaultOrigin();
+  info.selfOrigin() = aParam->GetSelfOrigin();
+  info.srcOrigin() = aParam->GetSrcOrigin();
+
+  info.declaredString() = aParam->DeclaredString();
+  info.inheritedDeniedFeatureNames() =
+      aParam->InheritedDeniedFeatureNames().Clone();
+  info.attributeEnabledFeatureNames() =
+      aParam->AttributeEnabledFeatureNames().Clone();
+
+  WriteIPDLParam(aWriter, aActor, info);
+}
+
+bool IPDLParamTraits<dom::FeaturePolicy*>::Read(
+    IPC::MessageReader* aReader, IProtocol* aActor,
+    RefPtr<dom::FeaturePolicy>* aResult) {
+  *aResult = nullptr;
+  bool notnull = false;
+  if (!ReadIPDLParam(aReader, aActor, &notnull)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (!notnull) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  dom::FeaturePolicyInfo info;
+  if (!ReadIPDLParam(aReader, aActor, &info)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Note that we only do IPC for feature policy to inherit policy from parent
+  // to child document. That does not need to bind feature policy with a node.
+  RefPtr<dom::FeaturePolicy> featurePolicy = new dom::FeaturePolicy(nullptr);
+  featurePolicy->SetDefaultOrigin(info.defaultOrigin());
+  featurePolicy->SetInheritedDeniedFeatureNames(
+      info.inheritedDeniedFeatureNames());
+
+  const auto& declaredString = info.declaredString();
+  if (info.selfOrigin() && !declaredString.IsEmpty()) {
+    featurePolicy->SetDeclaredPolicy(nullptr, declaredString, info.selfOrigin(),
+                                     info.srcOrigin());
+  }
+
+  for (auto& featureName : info.attributeEnabledFeatureNames()) {
+    featurePolicy->MaybeSetAllowedPolicy(featureName);
+  }
+
+  *aResult = std::move(featurePolicy);
+  return true;
+}
+}  // namespace ipc
+
+}  // namespace mozilla
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.h b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..380806433d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/FeaturePolicyUtils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyUtils_h
+#define mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyUtils_h
+
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include <functional>
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicy.h"
+
+class PickleIterator;
+
+namespace IPC {
+class Message;
+class MessageReader;
+class MessageWriter;
+}  // namespace IPC
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace dom {
+
+class Document;
+
+class FeaturePolicyUtils final {
+ public:
+  enum FeaturePolicyValue {
+    // Feature always allowed.
+    eAll,
+
+    // Feature allowed for documents that are same-origin with this one.
+    eSelf,
+
+    // Feature denied.
+    eNone,
+  };
+
+  // This method returns true if aFeatureName is allowed for aDocument.
+  // Use this method everywhere you need to check feature-policy directives.
+  static bool IsFeatureAllowed(Document* aDocument,
+                               const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  // Returns true if aFeatureName is a known feature policy name.
+  static bool IsSupportedFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  // Returns true if aFeatureName is a experimental feature policy name.
+  static bool IsExperimentalFeature(const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  // Runs aCallback for each known feature policy, with the feature name as
+  // argument.
+  static void ForEachFeature(const std::function<void(const char*)>& aCallback);
+
+  // Returns the default policy value for aFeatureName.
+  static FeaturePolicyValue DefaultAllowListFeature(
+      const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+  // This method returns true if aFeatureName is in unsafe allowed "*" case.
+  // We are in "unsafe" case when there is 'allow "*"' presents for an origin
+  // that's not presented in the ancestor feature policy chain, via src, via
+  // explicitly listed in allow, and not being the top-level origin.
+  static bool IsFeatureUnsafeAllowedAll(Document* aDocument,
+                                        const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+
+ private:
+  static void ReportViolation(Document* aDocument,
+                              const nsAString& aFeatureName);
+};
+
+}  // namespace dom
+
+namespace ipc {
+
+class IProtocol;
+
+template <typename T>
+struct IPDLParamTraits;
+
+template <>
+struct IPDLParamTraits<mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicy*> {
+  static void Write(IPC::MessageWriter* aWriter, IProtocol* aActor,
+                    mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicy* aParam);
+  static bool Read(IPC::MessageReader* aReader, IProtocol* aActor,
+                   RefPtr<mozilla::dom::FeaturePolicy>* aResult);
+};
+}  // namespace ipc
+}  // namespace mozilla
+
+#endif  // mozilla_dom_FeaturePolicyUtils_h
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25f7dc8d41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FuzzingInterface.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Feature.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyParser.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+static nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> selfURIPrincipal;
+static nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> selfURI;
+
+static int LVVMFuzzerInitTest(int* argc, char*** argv) {
+  nsresult ret;
+  ret = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(selfURI), "http://selfuri.com");
+  if (ret != NS_OK) {
+    MOZ_CRASH("NS_NewURI failed.");
+  }
+
+  mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs;
+  selfURIPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(selfURI, attrs);
+  if (!selfURIPrincipal) {
+    MOZ_CRASH("CreateContentPrincipal failed.");
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
+  if (!size) {
+    return 0;
+  }
+  nsTArray<Feature> parsedFeatures;
+
+  NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 policy(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), size);
+  if (!policy.get()) return 0;
+
+  FeaturePolicyParser::ParseString(policy, nullptr, selfURIPrincipal,
+                                   selfURIPrincipal, parsedFeatures);
+
+  for (const Feature& feature : parsedFeatures) {
+    nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal>> list;
+    feature.GetAllowList(list);
+
+    for (nsIPrincipal* principal : list) {
+      nsAutoCString originNoSuffix;
+      nsresult rv = principal->GetOriginNoSuffix(originNoSuffix);
+      if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+        return 0;
+      }
+      printf("%s - %s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(feature.Name()).get(),
+             originNoSuffix.get());
+    }
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+MOZ_FUZZING_INTERFACE_RAW(LVVMFuzzerInitTest, LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput,
+                          FeaturePolicyParser);
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.dict b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.dict
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e95508bf8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/fp_fuzzer.dict
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# tokens
+"'"
+";"
+
+### https://www.w3.org/TR/{CSP,CSP2,CSP3}/
+# directive names
+"accelerometer"
+"ambient-light-sensor"
+"autoplay"
+"battery"
+"camera"
+"display-capture"
+"document-domain"
+"encrypted-media"
+"execution-while-not-rendered"
+"execution-while-out-of-viewport"
+"fullscreen
+"geolocation
+"gyroscope"
+"layout-animations"
+"legacy-image-formats"
+"magnetometer"
+"microphone"
+"midi"
+"navigation-override"
+"oversized-images"
+"payment"
+"picture-in-picture"
+"publickey-credentials"
+"sync-xhr"
+"usb"
+"vr"
+"wake-lock"
+"xr-spatial-tracking"
+
+# directive values
+"'self'"
+"'none'"
+"'src''"
+*
+
+
+# URI components
+"https:"
+"ws:"
+"blob:"
+"data:"
+"filesystem:"
+"javascript:"
+"http://"
+"selfuri.com"
+"127.0.0.1"
+"::1"
+https://example.com
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/moz.build b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea577e8339
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/fuzztest/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+Library("FuzzingFeaturePolicy")
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/dom/security/featurepolicy",
+    "/netwerk/base",
+]
+
+include("/tools/fuzzing/libfuzzer-config.mozbuild")
+
+SOURCES += ["fp_fuzzer.cpp"]
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul-gtest"
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/moz.build b/dom/security/featurepolicy/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40277836ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+with Files("**"):
+    BUG_COMPONENT = ("Core", "DOM: Security")
+
+TEST_DIRS += ["test/gtest"]
+MOCHITEST_MANIFESTS += ["test/mochitest/mochitest.ini"]
+
+EXPORTS.mozilla.dom += [
+    "Feature.h",
+    "FeaturePolicy.h",
+    "FeaturePolicyParser.h",
+    "FeaturePolicyUtils.h",
+]
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+    "Feature.cpp",
+    "FeaturePolicy.cpp",
+    "FeaturePolicyParser.cpp",
+    "FeaturePolicyUtils.cpp",
+]
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/netwerk/base",
+]
+include("/ipc/chromium/chromium-config.mozbuild")
+include("/tools/fuzzing/libfuzzer-config.mozbuild")
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul"
+
+if CONFIG["FUZZING_INTERFACES"]:
+    TEST_DIRS += ["fuzztest"]
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/TestFeaturePolicyParser.cpp b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/TestFeaturePolicyParser.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e58971c9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/TestFeaturePolicyParser.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this file,
+ * You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Feature.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/FeaturePolicyParser.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+#define URL_SELF "https://example.com"_ns
+#define URL_EXAMPLE_COM "http://example.com"_ns
+#define URL_EXAMPLE_NET "http://example.net"_ns
+
+void CheckParser(const nsAString& aInput, bool aExpectedResults,
+                 uint32_t aExpectedFeatures,
+                 nsTArray<Feature>& aParsedFeatures) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(URL_SELF);
+  nsTArray<Feature> parsedFeatures;
+  ASSERT_TRUE(FeaturePolicyParser::ParseString(aInput, nullptr, principal,
+                                               principal, parsedFeatures) ==
+              aExpectedResults);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures.Length() == aExpectedFeatures);
+
+  aParsedFeatures = std::move(parsedFeatures);
+}
+
+TEST(FeaturePolicyParser, Basic)
+{
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> selfPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(URL_SELF);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> exampleComPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(URL_EXAMPLE_COM);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> exampleNetPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(URL_EXAMPLE_NET);
+
+  nsTArray<Feature> parsedFeatures;
+
+  // Empty string is a valid policy.
+  CheckParser(u""_ns, true, 0, parsedFeatures);
+
+  // Empty string with spaces is still valid.
+  CheckParser(u"   "_ns, true, 0, parsedFeatures);
+
+  // Non-Existing features with no allowed values
+  CheckParser(u"non-existing-feature"_ns, true, 0, parsedFeatures);
+  CheckParser(u"non-existing-feature;another-feature"_ns, true, 0,
+              parsedFeatures);
+
+  // Existing feature with no allowed values
+  CheckParser(u"camera"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+
+  // Some spaces.
+  CheckParser(u" camera "_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+
+  // A random ;
+  CheckParser(u"camera;"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+
+  // Another random ;
+  CheckParser(u";camera;"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+
+  // 2 features
+  CheckParser(u"camera;microphone"_ns, true, 2, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].Name().Equals(u"microphone"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].HasAllowList());
+
+  // 2 features with spaces
+  CheckParser(u" camera ; microphone "_ns, true, 2, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].Name().Equals(u"microphone"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].HasAllowList());
+
+  // 3 features, but only 2 exist.
+  CheckParser(u"camera;microphone;foobar"_ns, true, 2, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].Name().Equals(u"microphone"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[1].HasAllowList());
+
+  // Multiple spaces around the value
+  CheckParser(u"camera      'self'"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+
+  // Multiple spaces around the value
+  CheckParser(u"camera      'self'    "_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+
+  // No final '
+  CheckParser(u"camera      'self"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].HasAllowList());
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+
+  // Lowercase/Uppercase
+  CheckParser(u"camera      'selF'"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+
+  // Lowercase/Uppercase
+  CheckParser(u"camera * 'self' none' a.com 123"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowsAll());
+
+  // After a 'none' we don't continue the parsing.
+  CheckParser(u"camera 'none' a.com b.org c.net d.co.uk"_ns, true, 1,
+              parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowsNone());
+
+  // After a * we don't continue the parsing.
+  CheckParser(u"camera * a.com b.org c.net d.co.uk"_ns, true, 1,
+              parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowsAll());
+
+  // 'self'
+  CheckParser(u"camera 'self'"_ns, true, 1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+
+  // A couple of URLs
+  CheckParser(u"camera http://example.com http://example.net"_ns, true, 1,
+              parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(exampleComPrincipal));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(exampleNetPrincipal));
+
+  // A couple of URLs + self
+  CheckParser(u"camera http://example.com 'self' http://example.net"_ns, true,
+              1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(selfPrincipal));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(exampleComPrincipal));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowListContains(exampleNetPrincipal));
+
+  // A couple of URLs but then *
+  CheckParser(u"camera http://example.com 'self' http://example.net *"_ns, true,
+              1, parsedFeatures);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].Name().Equals(u"camera"_ns));
+  ASSERT_TRUE(parsedFeatures[0].AllowsAll());
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/moz.build b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e307810ff2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/gtest/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, you can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES = [
+    "TestFeaturePolicyParser.cpp",
+]
+
+include("/ipc/chromium/chromium-config.mozbuild")
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul-gtest"
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..64355e7d19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Nothing here
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3c1850cc2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+prefs =
+  dom.security.featurePolicy.header.enabled=true
+  dom.security.featurePolicy.webidl.enabled=true
+support-files =
+  empty.html
+  test_parser.html^headers^
+
+[test_parser.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_featureList.html]
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_featureList.html b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_featureList.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..377c5fccb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_featureList.html
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test feature policy - list</title>
+  <script type="text/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe src="empty.html" id="ifr"></iframe>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+
+let supportedFeatures = [
+  "autoplay",
+  "camera",
+  "encrypted-media",
+  "fullscreen",
+  "gamepad",
+  "geolocation",
+  "microphone",
+  "midi",
+  "payment",
+  "display-capture",
+  "document-domain",
+  "speaker-selection",
+  "vr",
+  "web-share",
+];
+
+function checkFeatures(features) {
+  features.forEach(feature => {
+    ok(supportedFeatures.includes(feature), "Feature: " + feature);
+  });
+}
+
+ok("featurePolicy" in document, "We have document.featurePolicy");
+checkFeatures(document.featurePolicy.features());
+
+let ifr = document.getElementById("ifr");
+ok("featurePolicy" in ifr, "We have HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy");
+checkFeatures(ifr.featurePolicy.features());
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a8322f6e7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html
@@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test feature policy - parsing</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe src="empty.html" id="ifr"></iframe>
+<iframe src="https://example.org/tests/dom/security/featurePolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html" id="cross_ifr"></iframe>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "https://example.org";
+
+function test_document() {
+  info("Checking document.featurePolicy");
+  ok("featurePolicy" in document, "We have document.featurePolicy");
+
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://foo.bar"), "Camera is always allowed");
+  let allowed = document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for camera");
+  is(allowed[0], "*", "allowlist is *");
+
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", location.origin), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+  allowed = document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+  is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is self");
+
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", location.origin), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is allowed for example.com");
+  ok(document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is allowed for example.org");
+  allowed = document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for microphone");
+
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", location.origin), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+  allowed = document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+  allowed = document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures();
+  // microphone is disabled for this origin, vr is disabled everywhere.
+  let camera = false;
+  let geolocation = false;
+  allowed.forEach(a => {
+    if (a == "camera") camera = true;
+    if (a == "geolocation") geolocation = true;
+  });
+
+  ok(camera, "Camera is always allowed");
+  ok(geolocation, "Geolocation is allowed only for self");
+
+  next();
+}
+
+function test_iframe_without_allow() {
+  info("Checking HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy");
+  let ifr = document.getElementById("ifr");
+  ok("featurePolicy" in ifr, "HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy exists");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", location.origin), "Camera is allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://foo.bar"), "Camera is not allowed for a random URL");
+  let allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for camera");
+  is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is 'self'");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", location.origin), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+  is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is '*'");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", location.origin), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is disabled for example.org");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for microphone");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", location.origin), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("camera"), "Camera is allowed");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed");
+  // microphone is disabled for this origin
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "microphone is not allowed");
+  // vr is disabled everywhere.
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("vr"), "VR is not allowed");
+
+  next();
+}
+
+function test_iframe_with_allow() {
+  info("Checking HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy");
+  let ifr = document.getElementById("ifr");
+  ok("featurePolicy" in ifr, "HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy exists");
+
+  ifr.setAttribute("allow", "camera 'none'");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is not allowed");
+  let allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "Camera has an empty allowlist");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", location.origin), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+  is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is '*'");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", location.origin), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is disabled for example.org");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for microphone");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", location.origin), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed only for self");
+
+  next();
+}
+
+function test_iframe_contentDocument() {
+  info("Checking iframe document.featurePolicy");
+
+  let ifr = document.createElement("iframe");
+  ifr.setAttribute("src", "empty.html");
+  ifr.onload = function() {
+    ok("featurePolicy" in ifr.contentDocument, "We have ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy");
+
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+    ok(ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+    ok(ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", location.origin), "Camera is allowed for self");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://foo.bar"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+    let allowed = ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+    is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for camera");
+    is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is 'self'");
+
+    ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+    ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", location.origin), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+    ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+    allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+    is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+    is(allowed[0], location.origin, "allowlist is '*'");
+
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", location.origin), "Microphone is disabled for self");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is allowed for example.com");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is allowed for example.org");
+    allowed = ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+    is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for microphone");
+
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", location.origin), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+    allowed = ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+    is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+    ok(ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("camera"), "Camera is allowed");
+    ok(ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed");
+    // microphone is disabled for this origin
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "Microphone is not allowed");
+    // vr is disabled everywhere.
+    ok(!ifr.contentDocument.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("vr"), "VR is not allowed");
+
+    next();
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(ifr);
+}
+
+function test_cross_iframe_without_allow() {
+  info("Checking cross HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy no allow");
+  let ifr = document.getElementById("cross_ifr");
+  ok("featurePolicy" in ifr, "HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy exists");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Camera is allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://foo.bar"), "Camera is not allowed for a random URL");
+  let allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for camera");
+  is(allowed[0], CROSS_ORIGIN, "allowlist is 'self'");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is not allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", CROSS_ORIGIN),
+    "Geolocation is not allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for geolocation");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for microphone");
+  is(allowed[0], CROSS_ORIGIN, "allowlist is self");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("camera"), "Camera is allowed");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is not allowed");
+  // microphone is enabled for this origin
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "microphone is allowed");
+  // vr is disabled everywhere.
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("vr"), "VR is not allowed");
+
+  next();
+}
+
+function test_cross_iframe_with_allow() {
+  info("Checking cross HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy with allow");
+  let ifr = document.getElementById("cross_ifr");
+  ok("featurePolicy" in ifr, "HTMLIFrameElement.featurePolicy exists");
+
+  ifr.setAttribute("allow", "geolocation; camera 'none'");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is not allowed");
+  let allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "Camera has an empty allowlist");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+  is(allowed[0], CROSS_ORIGIN, "allowlist is '*'");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+  is(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for microphone");
+  is(allowed[0], CROSS_ORIGIN, "allowlist is self");
+
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", CROSS_ORIGIN), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+  ok(!ifr.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+  allowed = ifr.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+  is(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed only for self");
+  // microphone is enabled for this origin
+  ok(ifr.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "microphone is allowed");
+
+  next();
+}
+
+function test_cross_iframe_contentDocument_no_allow() {
+  info("Checking cross iframe document.featurePolicy no allow");
+
+  let ifr = document.createElement("iframe");
+  ifr.setAttribute("src", "https://example.org/tests/dom/security/featurePolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html");
+  ifr.onload = async function() {
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(ifr, [], () => {
+      Assert.ok("featurePolicy" in this.content.document, "We have this.content.document.featurePolicy");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://example.org"), "Camera is allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera", "https://foo.bar"), "Camera is not allowed for a random URL");
+      let allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for camera");
+      Assert.equal(allowed[0], "https://example.org", "allowlist is 'self'");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is not allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://example.org"),
+        "Geolocation is not allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for geolocation");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for microphone");
+      Assert.equal(allowed[0], "https://example.org", "allowlist is self");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://example.org"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("camera"), "Camera is allowed");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is not allowed");
+      // microphone is enabled for this origin
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "microphone is allowed");
+      // vr is disabled everywhere.
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("vr"), "VR is not allowed");
+    });
+
+    next();
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(ifr);
+}
+
+function test_cross_iframe_contentDocument_allow() {
+  info("Checking cross iframe document.featurePolicy with allow");
+
+  let ifr = document.createElement("iframe");
+  ifr.setAttribute("src", "https://example.org/tests/dom/security/featurePolicy/test/mochitest/empty.html");
+  ifr.setAttribute("allow", "geolocation; camera 'none'");
+  ifr.onload = async function() {
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(ifr, [], () => {
+      Assert.ok("featurePolicy" in this.content.document, "We have this.content.document.featurePolicy");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar"), "Random feature");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("foobar", "https://www.something.net"), "Random feature");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("camera"), "Camera is not allowed");
+      let allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("camera");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 0, "Camera has an empty allowlist");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://example.org"), "Geolocation is allowed for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("geolocation", "https://foo.bar"), "Geolocation is not allowed for any random URL");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("geolocation");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for geolocation");
+      Assert.equal(allowed[0], "https://example.org", "allowlist is '*'");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.org"), "Microphone is enabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://foo.bar"), "Microphone is disabled for foo.bar");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("microphone", "https://example.com"), "Microphone is disabled for example.com");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("microphone");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 1, "Only 1 entry in allowlist for microphone");
+      Assert.equal(allowed[0], "https://example.org", "allowlist is self");
+
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://example.org"), "Vibrate is disabled for self");
+      Assert.ok(!this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowsFeature("vr", "https://foo.bar"), "Vibrate is disabled for foo.bar");
+      allowed = this.content.document.featurePolicy.getAllowlistForFeature("vr");
+      Assert.equal(allowed.length, 0, "No allowlist for vr");
+
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("geolocation"), "Geolocation is allowed only for self");
+      // microphone is enabled for this origin
+      Assert.ok(this.content.document.featurePolicy.allowedFeatures().includes("microphone"), "microphone is allowed");
+    });
+
+    next();
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(ifr);
+}
+
+
+var tests = [
+  test_document,
+  test_iframe_without_allow,
+  test_iframe_with_allow,
+  test_iframe_contentDocument,
+  test_cross_iframe_without_allow,
+  test_cross_iframe_with_allow,
+  test_cross_iframe_contentDocument_no_allow,
+  test_cross_iframe_contentDocument_allow
+];
+
+function next() {
+  if (!tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var test = tests.shift();
+  test();
+}
+
+next();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html^headers^ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..949de013d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/featurepolicy/test/mochitest/test_parser.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Feature-Policy: camera *; geolocation 'self'; microphone https://example.com https://example.org; vr 'none'
diff --git a/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.cpp b/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24f938cb1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at https://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "FuzzingInterface.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+static int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
+  nsresult ret;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> selfURI;
+  ret = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(selfURI), "http://selfuri.com");
+  if (ret != NS_OK) return 0;
+
+  mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> selfURIPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(selfURI, attrs);
+  if (!selfURIPrincipal) return 0;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp =
+      do_CreateInstance(NS_CSPCONTEXT_CONTRACTID, &ret);
+  if (ret != NS_OK) return 0;
+
+  ret =
+      csp->SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(selfURIPrincipal, selfURI, u""_ns, 0);
+  if (ret != NS_OK) return 0;
+
+  NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 policy(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data), size);
+  if (!policy.get()) return 0;
+  csp->AppendPolicy(policy, false, false);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+MOZ_FUZZING_INTERFACE_RAW(nullptr, LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput,
+                          ContentSecurityPolicyParser);
diff --git a/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.dict b/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.dict
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..480165d929
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/fuzztest/csp_fuzzer.dict
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+### dom/security/nsCSPParser.cpp
+# tokens
+":"
+";"
+"/"
+"+"
+"-"
+"."
+"_"
+"~"
+"*"
+"'"
+"#"
+"?"
+"%"
+"!"
+"$"
+"&"
+"("
+")"
+"="
+"@"
+
+### https://www.w3.org/TR/{CSP,CSP2,CSP3}/
+# directive names
+"default-src"
+"script-src"
+"object-src"
+"style-src"
+"img-src"
+"media-src"
+"frame-src"
+"font-src"
+"connect-src"
+"report-uri"
+"frame-ancestors"
+"reflected-xss"
+"base-uri"
+"form-action"
+"manifest-src"
+"upgrade-insecure-requests"
+"child-src"
+"block-all-mixed-content"
+"sandbox"
+"worker-src"
+"plugin-types"
+"disown-opener"
+"report-to"
+
+# directive values
+"'self'"
+"'unsafe-inline'"
+"'unsafe-eval'"
+"'none'"
+"'strict-dynamic'"
+"'unsafe-hashed-attributes'"
+"'nonce-AA=='"
+"'sha256-fw=='"
+"'sha384-/w=='"
+"'sha512-//8='"
+
+# subresources
+"a"
+"audio"
+"embed"
+"iframe"
+"img"
+"link"
+"object"
+"script"
+"source"
+"style"
+"track"
+"video"
+
+# sandboxing flags
+"allow-forms"
+"allow-pointer-lock"
+"allow-popups"
+"allow-same-origin"
+"allow-scripts"
+"allow-top-navigation"
+"allow-top-navigation-by-user-activation"
+
+# URI components
+"https:"
+"ws:"
+"blob:"
+"data:"
+"filesystem:"
+"javascript:"
+"http://"
+"selfuri.com"
+"127.0.0.1"
+"::1"
diff --git a/dom/security/fuzztest/moz.build b/dom/security/fuzztest/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a1f3f4396
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/fuzztest/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+Library("FuzzingDOMSecurity")
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/dom/security",
+    "/netwerk/base",
+]
+
+include("/tools/fuzzing/libfuzzer-config.mozbuild")
+
+SOURCES += ["csp_fuzzer.cpp"]
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul-gtest"
diff --git a/dom/security/moz.build b/dom/security/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f2aed6a1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+with Files("*"):
+    BUG_COMPONENT = ("Core", "DOM: Security")
+
+TEST_DIRS += ["test"]
+
+DIRS += ["featurepolicy", "sanitizer"]
+
+EXPORTS.mozilla.dom += [
+    "CSPEvalChecker.h",
+    "DOMSecurityMonitor.h",
+    "FramingChecker.h",
+    "nsContentSecurityManager.h",
+    "nsContentSecurityUtils.h",
+    "nsCSPContext.h",
+    "nsCSPService.h",
+    "nsCSPUtils.h",
+    "nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.h",
+    "nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h",
+    "nsMixedContentBlocker.h",
+    "PolicyTokenizer.h",
+    "ReferrerInfo.h",
+    "SecFetch.h",
+    "SRICheck.h",
+    "SRILogHelper.h",
+    "SRIMetadata.h",
+]
+
+EXPORTS += [
+    "nsContentSecurityManager.h",
+    "nsContentSecurityUtils.h",
+    "nsMixedContentBlocker.h",
+    "ReferrerInfo.h",
+]
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+    "CSPEvalChecker.cpp",
+    "DOMSecurityMonitor.cpp",
+    "FramingChecker.cpp",
+    "nsContentSecurityManager.cpp",
+    "nsContentSecurityUtils.cpp",
+    "nsCSPContext.cpp",
+    "nsCSPParser.cpp",
+    "nsCSPService.cpp",
+    "nsCSPUtils.cpp",
+    "nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.cpp",
+    "nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp",
+    "nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp",
+    "PolicyTokenizer.cpp",
+    "ReferrerInfo.cpp",
+    "SecFetch.cpp",
+    "SRICheck.cpp",
+    "SRIMetadata.cpp",
+]
+
+include("/ipc/chromium/chromium-config.mozbuild")
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul"
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/caps",
+    "/docshell/base",  # for nsDocShell.h
+    "/netwerk/base",
+    "/netwerk/protocol/data",  # for nsDataHandler.h
+    "/netwerk/protocol/http",  # for HttpBaseChannel.h
+]
+
+include("/tools/fuzzing/libfuzzer-config.mozbuild")
+
+if CONFIG["FUZZING_INTERFACES"]:
+    TEST_DIRS += ["fuzztest"]
+
+
+XPIDL_SOURCES += [
+    "nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission.idl",
+]
+
+XPIDL_MODULE = "dom_security"
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be29a78146
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1999 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include <string>
+#include <unordered_set>
+
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "nsCSPParser.h"
+#include "nsCSPService.h"
+#include "nsGlobalWindowOuter.h"
+#include "nsError.h"
+#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
+#include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
+#include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h"
+#include "nsIObjectInputStream.h"
+#include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h"
+#include "nsIObserver.h"
+#include "nsIObserverService.h"
+#include "nsIStringStream.h"
+#include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h"
+#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
+#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
+#include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h"
+#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsStringStream.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
+#include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h"
+#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
+#include "nsIScriptElement.h"
+#include "nsIEventTarget.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/DocGroup.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
+#include "nsXULAppAPI.h"
+#include "nsJSUtils.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+using namespace mozilla::ipc;
+
+static LogModule* GetCspContextLog() {
+  static LazyLogModule gCspContextPRLog("CSPContext");
+  return gCspContextPRLog;
+}
+
+#define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() \
+  MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
+
+static LogModule* GetCspOriginLogLog() {
+  static LazyLogModule gCspOriginPRLog("CSPOrigin");
+  return gCspOriginPRLog;
+}
+
+#define CSPORIGINLOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define CSPORIGINLOGENABLED() \
+  MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+/**
+ * This function is only used for verification purposes within
+ * GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData.
+ */
+static bool ValidateDirectiveName(const nsAString& aDirective) {
+  static const auto directives = []() {
+    std::unordered_set<std::string> directives;
+    constexpr size_t dirLen =
+        sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < dirLen; ++i) {
+      directives.insert(CSPStrDirectives[i]);
+    }
+    return directives;
+  }();
+
+  nsAutoString directive(aDirective);
+  auto itr = directives.find(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(directive).get());
+  return itr != directives.end();
+}
+#endif  // DEBUG
+
+static void BlockedContentSourceToString(
+    nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aSource, nsACString& aString) {
+  switch (aSource) {
+    case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eUnknown:
+      aString.Truncate();
+      break;
+
+    case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eInline:
+      aString.AssignLiteral("inline");
+      break;
+
+    case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eEval:
+      aString.AssignLiteral("eval");
+      break;
+
+    case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf:
+      aString.AssignLiteral("self");
+      break;
+
+    case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eWasmEval:
+      aString.AssignLiteral("wasm-eval");
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+/* =====  nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType,
+                         nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+                         nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                         nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect,
+                         bool aSendViolationReports, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                         bool aParserCreated, int16_t* outDecision) {
+  if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s",
+                   aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+    CSPCONTEXTLOG((">>>>                      aContentType: %d", aContentType));
+  }
+
+  // This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad,
+  // which already checked a number of things, including:
+  // * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks
+  // * scheme is not a allowlisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc).
+  // * CSP is enabled
+  // * Content Type is not allowlisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc).
+  // * Fast Path for Apps
+
+  // Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
+  *outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+
+  // If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for
+  // CSP to do.
+  CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType);
+  if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool permitted = permitsInternal(
+      dir,
+      nullptr,  // aTriggeringElement
+      aCSPEventListener, aContentLocation, aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aNonce,
+      false,  // allow fallback to default-src
+      aSendViolationReports,
+      true,  // send blocked URI in violation reports
+      aParserCreated);
+
+  *outDecision =
+      permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER;
+
+  if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPCONTEXTLOG(
+        ("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, "
+         "aContentLocation: %s",
+         *outDecision > 0 ? "load" : "deny",
+         aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal(
+    CSPDirective aDir, Element* aTriggeringElement,
+    nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+    nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aSpecific,
+    bool aSendViolationReports, bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports,
+    bool aParserCreated) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  bool permits = true;
+
+  nsAutoString violatedDirective;
+  for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
+    if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce,
+                               !!aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aSpecific,
+                               aParserCreated, violatedDirective)) {
+      // If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and
+      // report to the console
+      if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+        CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false"));
+        permits = false;
+      }
+
+      // In CSP 3.0 the effective directive doesn't become the actually used
+      // directive in case of a fallback from e.g. script-src-elem to
+      // script-src or default-src.
+      nsAutoString effectiveDirective;
+      effectiveDirective.AssignASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir));
+
+      // Callers should set |aSendViolationReports| to false if this is a
+      // preload - the decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the
+      // nonce, and will incorrectly fail the unit tests.
+      if (aSendViolationReports) {
+        uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
+        uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
+        nsAutoString spec;
+        JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+        if (cx) {
+          nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
+          // If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
+          // anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
+        }
+        AsyncReportViolation(
+            aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
+            (aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation
+                                                    : nullptr),
+            BlockedContentSource::eUnknown, /* a BlockedContentSource */
+            aOriginalURIIfRedirect, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not
+                                       null */
+            violatedDirective, effectiveDirective, p, /* policy index        */
+            u""_ns,                                   /* no observer subject */
+            spec,                                     /* source file      */
+            false,         // aReportSample (no sample)
+            u""_ns,        /* no script sample    */
+            lineNumber,    /* line number      */
+            columnNumber); /*  column number    */
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return permits;
+}
+
+/* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */
+
+NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY,
+                  NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID)
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable)
+
+nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext()
+    : mInnerWindowID(0),
+      mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(false),
+      mLoadingContext(nullptr),
+      mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr),
+      mQueueUpMessages(true) {
+  CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext"));
+}
+
+nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() {
+  CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext"));
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    delete mPolicies[i];
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsCSPContext::Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP,
+                          nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP) {
+  if (aCSP == aOtherCSP) {
+    // fast path for pointer equality
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = 0;
+  if (aCSP) {
+    aCSP->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount);
+  }
+
+  uint32_t otherPolicyCount = 0;
+  if (aOtherCSP) {
+    aOtherCSP->GetPolicyCount(&otherPolicyCount);
+  }
+
+  if (policyCount != otherPolicyCount) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString policyStr, otherPolicyStr;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) {
+    aCSP->GetPolicyString(i, policyStr);
+    aOtherCSP->GetPolicyString(i, otherPolicyStr);
+    if (!policyStr.Equals(otherPolicyStr)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+nsresult nsCSPContext::InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* aOtherContext) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOtherContext);
+
+  nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(aOtherContext->mLoadingContext);
+  if (doc) {
+    rv = SetRequestContextWithDocument(doc);
+  } else {
+    rv = SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(
+        aOtherContext->mLoadingPrincipal, aOtherContext->mSelfURI,
+        aOtherContext->mReferrer, aOtherContext->mInnerWindowID);
+  }
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aOtherContext->mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
+
+  // This policy was already parsed somewhere else, don't emit parsing errors.
+  mSuppressParserLogMessages = true;
+  for (auto policy : aOtherContext->mPolicies) {
+    nsAutoString policyStr;
+    policy->toString(policyStr);
+    AppendPolicy(policyStr, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
+                 policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
+  }
+
+  mSuppressParserLogMessages = aOtherContext->mSuppressParserLogMessages;
+
+  mIPCPolicies = aOtherContext->mIPCPolicies.Clone();
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void nsCSPContext::EnsureIPCPoliciesRead() {
+  // Most likely the parser errors already happened before serializing
+  // the policy for IPC.
+  bool previous = mSuppressParserLogMessages;
+  mSuppressParserLogMessages = true;
+
+  if (mIPCPolicies.Length() > 0) {
+    nsresult rv;
+    for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
+      rv = AppendPolicy(policy.policy(), policy.reportOnlyFlag(),
+                        policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
+      Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv));
+    }
+    mIPCPolicies.Clear();
+  }
+
+  mSuppressParserLogMessages = previous;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetPolicyString(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) {
+  outStr.Truncate();
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+  }
+  mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+const nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return mPolicies[aIndex];
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t* outPolicyCount) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length();
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* outUpgradeRequest) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outUpgradeRequest = false;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      *outUpgradeRequest = true;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetBlockAllMixedContent(bool* outBlockAllMixedContent) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outBlockAllMixedContent = false;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
+        mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) {
+      *outBlockAllMixedContent = true;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(bool* outEnforcesFrameAncestors) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outEnforcesFrameAncestors = false;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() &&
+        mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      *outEnforcesFrameAncestors = true;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly,
+                           bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag) {
+  CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s",
+                 NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
+
+  // Use mSelfURI from setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} (bug 991474)
+  MOZ_ASSERT(
+      mLoadingPrincipal,
+      "did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
+  MOZ_ASSERT(
+      mSelfURI,
+      "did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?");
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mLoadingPrincipal, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mSelfURI, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED);
+
+  if (CSPORIGINLOGENABLED()) {
+    nsAutoCString selfURISpec;
+    mSelfURI->GetSpec(selfURISpec);
+    CSPORIGINLOG(("CSP - AppendPolicy"));
+    CSPORIGINLOG((" * selfURI: %s", selfURISpec.get()));
+    CSPORIGINLOG((" * reportOnly: %s", aReportOnly ? "yes" : "no"));
+    CSPORIGINLOG(
+        (" * deliveredViaMetaTag: %s", aDeliveredViaMetaTag ? "yes" : "no"));
+    CSPORIGINLOG(
+        (" * policy: %s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
+  }
+
+  nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(
+      aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, this, aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+      mSuppressParserLogMessages);
+  if (policy) {
+    if (policy->hasDirective(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      nsAutoCString selfURIspec, referrer;
+      if (mSelfURI) {
+        mSelfURI->GetAsciiSpec(selfURIspec);
+      }
+      CopyUTF16toUTF8(mReferrer, referrer);
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(
+          ("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy added UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE "
+           "self-uri=%s referrer=%s",
+           selfURIspec.get(), referrer.get()));
+    }
+
+    mPolicies.AppendElement(policy);
+
+    // set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+    if (doc) {
+      doc->SetHasCSP(true);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation,
+                            bool* outAllowsEval) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outShouldReportViolation = false;
+  *outAllowsEval = true;
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns,
+                              false)) {
+      // policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline
+      // script if the policy is report-only.
+      *outShouldReportViolation = true;
+      if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+        *outAllowsEval = false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetAllowsWasmEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation,
+                                bool* outAllowsWasmEval) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  *outShouldReportViolation = false;
+  *outAllowsWasmEval = true;
+
+  if (!StaticPrefs::security_csp_wasm_unsafe_eval_enabled()) {
+    // Allow and don't report when wasm-unsafe-eval isn't supported.
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    // Either 'unsafe-eval' or 'wasm-unsafe-eval' can allow this
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL,
+                              u""_ns, false) &&
+        !mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns,
+                              false)) {
+      // policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline
+      // script if the policy is report-only.
+      *outShouldReportViolation = true;
+      if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+        *outAllowsWasmEval = false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Helper function to report inline violations
+void nsCSPContext::reportInlineViolation(
+    CSPDirective aDirective, Element* aTriggeringElement,
+    nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aNonce,
+    bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aSample,
+    const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective,
+    uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,  // TODO, use report only flag for that
+    uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
+  nsString observerSubject;
+  // if the nonce is non empty, then we report the nonce error, otherwise
+  // let's report the hash error; no need to report the unsafe-inline error
+  // anymore.
+  if (!aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
+    observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE ||
+                       aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE)
+                          ? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
+                                SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
+                          : NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
+                                STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
+  } else {
+    observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE ||
+                       aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE)
+                          ? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
+                                SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC)
+                          : NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING(
+                                STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString sourceFile;
+  uint32_t lineNumber;
+  uint32_t columnNumber;
+
+  JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+  if (!cx || !nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, sourceFile, &lineNumber,
+                                            &columnNumber)) {
+    // use selfURI as the sourceFile
+    if (mSelfURI) {
+      nsAutoCString cSourceFile;
+      mSelfURI->GetSpec(cSourceFile);
+      sourceFile.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(cSourceFile));
+    }
+    lineNumber = aLineNumber;
+    columnNumber = aColumnNumber;
+  }
+
+  AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
+                       nullptr,                        // aBlockedURI
+                       BlockedContentSource::eInline,  // aBlockedSource
+                       mSelfURI,                       // aOriginalURI
+                       aViolatedDirective,             // aViolatedDirective
+                       aEffectiveDirective,            // aEffectiveDirective
+                       aViolatedPolicyIndex,           // aViolatedPolicyIndex
+                       observerSubject,                // aObserverSubject
+                       sourceFile,                     // aSourceFile
+                       aReportSample,                  // aReportSample
+                       aSample,                        // aScriptSample
+                       lineNumber,                     // aLineNum
+                       columnNumber);                  // aColumnNum
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(CSPDirective aDirective, bool aHasUnsafeHash,
+                              const nsAString& aNonce, bool aParserCreated,
+                              Element* aTriggeringElement,
+                              nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+                              const nsAString& aContentOfPseudoScript,
+                              uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
+                              bool* outAllowsInline) {
+  *outAllowsInline = true;
+
+  if (aDirective != SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE &&
+      aDirective != SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE &&
+      aDirective != STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE &&
+      aDirective != STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+               "can only allow inline for (script/style)-src-(attr/elem)");
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  nsAutoString content(u""_ns);
+
+  // always iterate all policies, otherwise we might not send out all reports
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    bool allowed =
+        mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, u""_ns,
+                             aParserCreated) ||
+        mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated);
+
+    // If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the
+    // nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop so we can avoid allocating
+    // unecessary strings
+    if (allowed) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Check the content length to ensure the content is not allocated more than
+    // once. Even though we are in a for loop, it is probable that there is only
+    // one policy, so this check may be unnecessary.
+    if (content.IsEmpty() && aTriggeringElement) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptElement> element =
+          do_QueryInterface(aTriggeringElement);
+      if (element) {
+        element->GetScriptText(content);
+      }
+    }
+    if (content.IsEmpty()) {
+      content = aContentOfPseudoScript;
+    }
+
+    // Per https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#match-element-to-source-list
+    // Step 5. If type is "script" or "style", or unsafe-hashes flag is true:
+    //
+    // aHasUnsafeHash is true for event handlers (type "script attribute"),
+    // style= attributes (type "style attribute") and the javascript: protocol.
+    if (!aHasUnsafeHash || mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_UNSAFE_HASHES,
+                                                u""_ns, aParserCreated)) {
+      allowed =
+          mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_HASH, content, aParserCreated);
+    }
+
+    if (!allowed) {
+      // policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and
+      // report the violation.
+      if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+        *outAllowsInline = false;
+      }
+      nsAutoString violatedDirective;
+      bool reportSample = false;
+      mPolicies[i]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
+          aDirective, violatedDirective, &reportSample);
+
+      // In CSP 3.0 the effective directive doesn't become the actually used
+      // directive in case of a fallback from e.g. script-src-elem to
+      // script-src or default-src.
+      nsAutoString effectiveDirective;
+      effectiveDirective.AssignASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDirective));
+
+      reportInlineViolation(aDirective, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener,
+                            aNonce, reportSample, content, violatedDirective,
+                            effectiveDirective, i, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetAllowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aIsFormSubmission,
+                                  bool aWasRedirected, bool aEnforceAllowlist,
+                                  bool* outAllowsNavigateTo) {
+  /*
+   * The matrix below shows the different values of (aWasRedirect,
+   * aEnforceAllowlist) for the three different checks we do.
+   *
+   *  Navigation    | Start Loading  | Initiate Redirect | Document
+   *                | (nsDocShell)   | (nsCSPService)    |
+   *  -----------------------------------------------------------------
+   *  A -> B          (false,false)    -                   (false,true)
+   *  A -> ... -> B   (false,false)    (true,false)        (true,true)
+   */
+  *outAllowsNavigateTo = false;
+
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  // The 'form-action' directive overrules 'navigate-to' for form submissions.
+  // So in case this is a form submission and the directive 'form-action' is
+  // present then there is nothing for us to do here, see: 6.3.3.1.2
+  // https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#navigate-to-pre-navigate
+  if (aIsFormSubmission) {
+    for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+      if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective(
+              nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE)) {
+        *outAllowsNavigateTo = true;
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  bool atLeastOneBlock = false;
+  for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->allowsNavigateTo(aURI, aWasRedirected,
+                                        aEnforceAllowlist)) {
+      if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+        atLeastOneBlock = true;
+      }
+
+      // If the load encountered a server side redirect, the spec suggests to
+      // remove the path component from the URI, see:
+      // https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> blockedURIForReporting = aURI;
+      if (aWasRedirected) {
+        nsAutoCString prePathStr;
+        nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> prePathURI;
+        nsresult rv = aURI->GetPrePath(prePathStr);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+        rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(blockedURIForReporting), prePathStr);
+        NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+      }
+
+      // Lines numbers and source file for the violation report
+      uint32_t lineNumber = 0;
+      uint32_t columnNumber = 0;
+      nsAutoCString spec;
+      JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext();
+      if (cx) {
+        nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
+        // If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0
+        // anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case.
+      }
+
+      // Report the violation
+      nsresult rv = AsyncReportViolation(
+          nullptr,                                    // aTriggeringElement
+          nullptr,                                    // aCSPEventListener
+          blockedURIForReporting,                     // aBlockedURI
+          nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf,  // aBlockedSource
+          nullptr,                                    // aOriginalURI
+          u"navigate-to"_ns,                          // aViolatedDirective
+          u"navigate-to"_ns,                          // aEffectiveDirective
+          i,                                          // aViolatedPolicyIndex
+          u""_ns,                                     // aObserverSubject
+          NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec),                // aSourceFile
+          false,                                      // aReportSample
+          u""_ns,                                     // aScriptSample
+          lineNumber,                                 // aLineNum
+          columnNumber);                              // aColumnNum
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+  }
+
+  *outAllowsNavigateTo = !atLeastOneBlock;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report
+ * if a report-uri is present in the policy
+ *
+ * @param aViolationType
+ *     one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval
+ * @param aSourceFile
+ *     name of the source file containing the violation (if available)
+ * @param aContentSample
+ *     sample of the violating content (to aid debugging)
+ * @param aLineNum
+ *     source line number of the violation (if available)
+ * @param aColumnNum
+ *     source column number of the violation (if available)
+ * @param aNonce
+ *     (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can
+ *     recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the
+ *     appropriate reports.
+ * @param aContent
+ *     (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline
+ *     resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to
+ *     determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate
+ *     reports.
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails(
+    uint16_t aViolationType, Element* aTriggeringElement,
+    nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
+    const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, int32_t aColumnNum,
+    const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+
+  BlockedContentSource blockedContentSource;
+  enum CSPKeyword keyword;
+  nsAutoString observerSubject;
+  if (aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL) {
+    blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eEval;
+    keyword = CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL;
+    observerSubject.AssignLiteral(EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
+  } else {
+    NS_ASSERTION(
+        aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_WASM_EVAL,
+        "unexpected aViolationType");
+    blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eWasmEval;
+    keyword = CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL;
+    observerSubject.AssignLiteral(WASM_EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC);
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
+    NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy>");
+
+    if (mPolicies[p]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, keyword, u""_ns, false)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoString violatedDirective;
+    bool reportSample = false;
+    mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
+        SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, violatedDirective, &reportSample);
+
+    AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr,
+                         blockedContentSource, nullptr, violatedDirective,
+                         u"script-src"_ns /* aEffectiveDirective */, p,
+                         observerSubject, aSourceFile, reportSample,
+                         aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum);
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+#undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithDocument(Document* aDocument) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument, "Can't set context without doc");
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aDocument);
+
+  mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(aDocument);
+  mSelfURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+  mLoadingPrincipal = aDocument->NodePrincipal();
+  aDocument->GetReferrer(mReferrer);
+  mInnerWindowID = aDocument->InnerWindowID();
+  // the innerWindowID is not available for CSPs delivered through the
+  // header at the time setReqeustContext is called - let's queue up
+  // console messages until it becomes available, see flushConsoleMessages
+  mQueueUpMessages = !mInnerWindowID;
+  mCallingChannelLoadGroup = aDocument->GetDocumentLoadGroup();
+  // set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry
+  mEventTarget = aDocument->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other);
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal,
+                                             nsIURI* aSelfURI,
+                                             const nsAString& aReferrer,
+                                             uint64_t aInnerWindowId) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aRequestPrincipal);
+
+  mLoadingPrincipal = aRequestPrincipal;
+  mSelfURI = aSelfURI;
+  mReferrer = aReferrer;
+  mInnerWindowID = aInnerWindowId;
+  // if no document is available, then it also does not make sense to queue
+  // console messages sending messages to the browser console instead of the web
+  // console in that case.
+  mQueueUpMessages = false;
+  mCallingChannelLoadGroup = nullptr;
+  mEventTarget = nullptr;
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal");
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI");
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsIPrincipal* nsCSPContext::GetRequestPrincipal() { return mLoadingPrincipal; }
+
+nsIURI* nsCSPContext::GetSelfURI() { return mSelfURI; }
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetReferrer(nsAString& outReferrer) {
+  outReferrer.Truncate();
+  outReferrer.Append(mReferrer);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+uint64_t nsCSPContext::GetInnerWindowID() { return mInnerWindowID; }
+
+bool nsCSPContext::GetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck() {
+  return mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
+}
+
+void nsCSPContext::SetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(
+    bool aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck) {
+  mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::EnsureEventTarget(nsIEventTarget* aEventTarget) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aEventTarget);
+  // Don't bother if we did have a valid event target (if the csp object is
+  // tied to a document in SetRequestContextWithDocument)
+  if (mEventTarget) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  mEventTarget = aEventTarget;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem {
+  nsString mMsg;
+  nsString mSourceName;
+  nsString mSourceLine;
+  uint32_t mLineNumber;
+  uint32_t mColumnNumber;
+  uint32_t mSeverityFlag;
+  nsCString mCategory;
+};
+
+void nsCSPContext::flushConsoleMessages() {
+  bool privateWindow = false;
+
+  // should flush messages even if doc is not available
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+  if (doc) {
+    mInnerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID();
+    privateWindow =
+        !!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
+  }
+
+  mQueueUpMessages = false;
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mConsoleMsgQueue.Length(); i++) {
+    ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = mConsoleMsgQueue[i];
+    CSP_LogMessage(elem.mMsg, elem.mSourceName, elem.mSourceLine,
+                   elem.mLineNumber, elem.mColumnNumber, elem.mSeverityFlag,
+                   elem.mCategory, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow);
+  }
+  mConsoleMsgQueue.Clear();
+}
+
+void nsCSPContext::logToConsole(const char* aName,
+                                const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                                const nsAString& aSourceName,
+                                const nsAString& aSourceLine,
+                                uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
+                                uint32_t aSeverityFlag) {
+  // we are passing aName as the category so we can link to the
+  // appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error.
+  nsDependentCString category(aName);
+
+  // Fallback
+  nsAutoString sourceName(aSourceName);
+  if (sourceName.IsEmpty() && mSelfURI) {
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    mSelfURI->GetSpec(spec);
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, sourceName);
+  }
+
+  // let's check if we have to queue up console messages
+  if (mQueueUpMessages) {
+    nsAutoString msg;
+    CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, msg);
+    ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = *mConsoleMsgQueue.AppendElement();
+    elem.mMsg = msg;
+    elem.mSourceName = PromiseFlatString(sourceName);
+    elem.mSourceLine = PromiseFlatString(aSourceLine);
+    elem.mLineNumber = aLineNumber;
+    elem.mColumnNumber = aColumnNumber;
+    elem.mSeverityFlag = aSeverityFlag;
+    elem.mCategory = category;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  bool privateWindow = false;
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+  if (doc) {
+    privateWindow =
+        !!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId;
+  }
+
+  CSP_LogLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, sourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
+                      aColumnNumber, aSeverityFlag, category, mInnerWindowID,
+                      privateWindow);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Strip URI for reporting according to:
+ * https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#security-violation-reports
+ *
+ * @param aSelfURI
+ *        The URI of the CSP policy. Used for cross-origin checks.
+ * @param aURI
+ *        The URI of the blocked resource. In case of a redirect, this it the
+ *        initial URI the request started out with, not the redirected URI.
+ * @param aEffectiveDirective
+ *        The effective directive that triggered this report
+ * @return The ASCII serialization of the uri to be reported ignoring
+ *         the ref part of the URI.
+ */
+void StripURIForReporting(nsIURI* aSelfURI, nsIURI* aURI,
+                          const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective,
+                          nsACString& outStrippedURI) {
+  // If the origin of aURI is a globally unique identifier (for example,
+  // aURI has a scheme of data, blob, or filesystem), then
+  // return the ASCII serialization of uri’s scheme.
+  bool isHttpFtpOrWs =
+      (aURI->SchemeIs("http") || aURI->SchemeIs("https") ||
+       aURI->SchemeIs("ftp") || aURI->SchemeIs("ws") || aURI->SchemeIs("wss"));
+
+  if (!isHttpFtpOrWs) {
+    // not strictly spec compliant, but what we really care about is
+    // http/https and also ftp. If it's not http/https or ftp, then treat aURI
+    // as if it's a globally unique identifier and just return the scheme.
+    aURI->GetScheme(outStrippedURI);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // For cross-origin URIs in frame-src also strip the path.
+  // This prevents detailed tracking of pages loaded into an iframe
+  // by the embedding page using a report-only policy.
+  if (aEffectiveDirective.EqualsLiteral("frame-src") ||
+      aEffectiveDirective.EqualsLiteral("object-src")) {
+    nsIScriptSecurityManager* ssm = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager();
+    if (NS_FAILED(ssm->CheckSameOriginURI(aSelfURI, aURI, false, false))) {
+      aURI->GetPrePath(outStrippedURI);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Return aURI, with any fragment component removed.
+  aURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(outStrippedURI);
+}
+
+nsresult nsCSPContext::GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
+    nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
+    const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
+    const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample,
+    uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum,
+    mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(ValidateDirectiveName(aEffectiveDirective),
+             "Invalid directive name");
+
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  // document-uri
+  nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI;
+  StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, mSelfURI, aEffectiveDirective,
+                       reportDocumentURI);
+  CopyUTF8toUTF16(reportDocumentURI, aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI);
+
+  // referrer
+  aViolationEventInit.mReferrer = mReferrer;
+
+  // blocked-uri
+  if (aBlockedURI) {
+    nsAutoCString reportBlockedURI;
+    StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, aOriginalURI ? aOriginalURI : aBlockedURI,
+                         aEffectiveDirective, reportBlockedURI);
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(reportBlockedURI, aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI);
+  } else {
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(aBlockedString, aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI);
+  }
+
+  // effective-directive
+  // The name of the policy directive that was violated.
+  aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective = aEffectiveDirective;
+
+  // violated-directive
+  // In CSP2, the policy directive that was violated, as it appears in the
+  // policy. In CSP3, the same as effective-directive.
+  aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective = aEffectiveDirective;
+
+  // original-policy
+  nsAutoString originalPolicy;
+  rv = this->GetPolicyString(aViolatedPolicyIndex, originalPolicy);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy = originalPolicy;
+
+  // source-file
+  if (!aSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
+    // if aSourceFile is a URI, we have to make sure to strip fragments
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> sourceURI;
+    NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI), aSourceFile);
+    if (sourceURI) {
+      nsAutoCString spec;
+      StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, sourceURI, aEffectiveDirective, spec);
+      CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile);
+    } else {
+      aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile = aSourceFile;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // sample (already truncated)
+  aViolationEventInit.mSample = aScriptSample;
+
+  // disposition
+  aViolationEventInit.mDisposition =
+      mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag()
+          ? mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Report
+          : mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Enforce;
+
+  // status-code
+  uint16_t statusCode = 0;
+  {
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+    if (doc) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(doc->GetChannel());
+      if (channel) {
+        uint32_t responseStatus = 0;
+        nsresult rv = channel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus);
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && (responseStatus <= UINT16_MAX)) {
+          statusCode = static_cast<uint16_t>(responseStatus);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode = statusCode;
+
+  // line-number
+  aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber = aLineNum;
+
+  // column-number
+  aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber = aColumnNum;
+
+  aViolationEventInit.mBubbles = true;
+  aViolationEventInit.mComposed = true;
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult nsCSPContext::SendReports(
+    const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit,
+    uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
+
+  dom::CSPReport report;
+
+  // blocked-uri
+  report.mCsp_report.mBlocked_uri = aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI;
+
+  // document-uri
+  report.mCsp_report.mDocument_uri = aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI;
+
+  // original-policy
+  report.mCsp_report.mOriginal_policy = aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy;
+
+  // referrer
+  report.mCsp_report.mReferrer = aViolationEventInit.mReferrer;
+
+  // effective-directive
+  report.mCsp_report.mEffective_directive =
+      aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective;
+
+  // violated-directive
+  report.mCsp_report.mViolated_directive =
+      aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective;
+
+  // disposition
+  report.mCsp_report.mDisposition = aViolationEventInit.mDisposition;
+
+  // status-code
+  report.mCsp_report.mStatus_code = aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode;
+
+  // source-file
+  if (!aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile.IsEmpty()) {
+    report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Construct();
+    report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile;
+  }
+
+  // script-sample
+  if (!aViolationEventInit.mSample.IsEmpty()) {
+    report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Construct();
+    report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSample;
+  }
+
+  // line-number
+  if (aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber != 0) {
+    report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Construct();
+    report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber;
+  }
+
+  if (aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber != 0) {
+    report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Construct();
+    report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Value() =
+        aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber;
+  }
+
+  nsString csp_report;
+  if (!report.ToJSON(csp_report)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // ---------- Assembled, now send it to all the report URIs ----------- //
+
+  nsTArray<nsString> reportURIs;
+  mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportURIs(reportURIs);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> reportURI;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> reportChannel;
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  for (uint32_t r = 0; r < reportURIs.Length(); r++) {
+    nsAutoCString reportURICstring = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(reportURIs[r]);
+    // try to create a new uri from every report-uri string
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(reportURI), reportURIs[r]);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create nsIURI for report URI %s",
+                     reportURICstring.get()));
+      logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
+                   aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
+                   aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
+                   nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
+      continue;  // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
+    }
+
+    // try to create a new channel for every report-uri
+    if (doc) {
+      rv =
+          NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, doc,
+                        nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+                        nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT);
+    } else {
+      rv = NS_NewChannel(
+          getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, mLoadingPrincipal,
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+          nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT);
+    }
+
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create new channel for report URI %s",
+                     reportURICstring.get()));
+      continue;  // don't return yet, there may be more URIs
+    }
+
+    // log a warning to console if scheme is not http or https
+    bool isHttpScheme =
+        reportURI->SchemeIs("http") || reportURI->SchemeIs("https");
+
+    if (!isHttpScheme) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
+      logToConsole(
+          "reportURInotHttpsOrHttp2", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
+          aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
+          aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // make sure this is an anonymous request (no cookies) so in case the
+    // policy URI is injected, it can't be abused for CSRF.
+    nsLoadFlags flags;
+    rv = reportChannel->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS;
+    rv = reportChannel->SetLoadFlags(flags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // we need to set an nsIChannelEventSink on the channel object
+    // so we can tell it to not follow redirects when posting the reports
+    RefPtr<CSPReportRedirectSink> reportSink = new CSPReportRedirectSink();
+    if (doc && doc->GetDocShell()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> interceptController =
+          do_QueryInterface(doc->GetDocShell());
+      reportSink->SetInterceptController(interceptController);
+    }
+    reportChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(reportSink);
+
+    // apply the loadgroup taken by setRequestContextWithDocument. If there's
+    // no loadgroup, AsyncOpen will fail on process-split necko (since the
+    // channel cannot query the iBrowserChild).
+    rv = reportChannel->SetLoadGroup(mCallingChannelLoadGroup);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // wire in the string input stream to send the report
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIStringInputStream> sis(
+        do_CreateInstance(NS_STRINGINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID));
+    NS_ASSERTION(sis,
+                 "nsIStringInputStream is needed but not available to send CSP "
+                 "violation reports");
+    nsAutoCString utf8CSPReport = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(csp_report);
+    rv = sis->SetData(utf8CSPReport.get(), utf8CSPReport.Length());
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
+    if (!uploadChannel) {
+      // It's possible the URI provided can't be uploaded to, in which case
+      // we skip this one. We'll already have warned about a non-HTTP URI
+      // earlier.
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(sis, "application/csp-report"_ns, -1);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // if this is an HTTP channel, set the request method to post
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel));
+    if (httpChannel) {
+      rv = httpChannel->SetRequestMethod("POST"_ns);
+      MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
+    }
+
+    RefPtr<CSPViolationReportListener> listener =
+        new CSPViolationReportListener();
+    rv = reportChannel->AsyncOpen(listener);
+
+    // AsyncOpen should not fail, but could if there's no load group (like if
+    // SetRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} is not given a channel). This
+    // should fail quietly and not return an error since it's really ok if
+    // reports don't go out, but it's good to log the error locally.
+
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportURIs[r]};
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(("AsyncOpen failed for report URI %s",
+                     NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(params[0]).get()));
+      logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile,
+                   aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber,
+                   aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber,
+                   nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
+    } else {
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(
+          ("Sent violation report to URI %s", reportURICstring.get()));
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult nsCSPContext::FireViolationEvent(
+    Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+    const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) {
+  if (aCSPEventListener) {
+    nsAutoString json;
+    if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) {
+      aCSPEventListener->OnCSPViolationEvent(json);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 1. If target is not null, and global is a Window, and target’s
+  // shadow-including root is not global’s associated Document, set target to
+  // null.
+  RefPtr<EventTarget> eventTarget = aTriggeringElement;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext);
+  if (doc && aTriggeringElement &&
+      aTriggeringElement->GetComposedDoc() != doc) {
+    eventTarget = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (!eventTarget) {
+    // If target is a Window, set target to target’s associated Document.
+    eventTarget = doc;
+  }
+
+  if (!eventTarget && mInnerWindowID && XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+    if (RefPtr<WindowGlobalParent> parent =
+            WindowGlobalParent::GetByInnerWindowId(mInnerWindowID)) {
+      nsAutoString json;
+      if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) {
+        Unused << parent->SendDispatchSecurityPolicyViolation(json);
+      }
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (!eventTarget) {
+    // If we are here, we are probably dealing with workers. Those are handled
+    // via nsICSPEventListener. Nothing to do here.
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<mozilla::dom::Event> event =
+      mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEvent::Constructor(
+          eventTarget, u"securitypolicyviolation"_ns, aViolationEventInit);
+  event->SetTrusted(true);
+
+  ErrorResult rv;
+  eventTarget->DispatchEvent(*event, rv);
+  return rv.StealNSResult();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Dispatched from the main thread to send reports for one CSP violation.
+ */
+class CSPReportSenderRunnable final : public Runnable {
+ public:
+  CSPReportSenderRunnable(
+      Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+      nsIURI* aBlockedURI,
+      nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
+      nsIURI* aOriginalURI, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, bool aReportOnlyFlag,
+      const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective,
+      const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
+      bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum,
+      uint32_t aColumnNum, nsCSPContext* aCSPContext)
+      : mozilla::Runnable("CSPReportSenderRunnable"),
+        mTriggeringElement(aTriggeringElement),
+        mCSPEventListener(aCSPEventListener),
+        mBlockedURI(aBlockedURI),
+        mBlockedContentSource(aBlockedContentSource),
+        mOriginalURI(aOriginalURI),
+        mViolatedPolicyIndex(aViolatedPolicyIndex),
+        mReportOnlyFlag(aReportOnlyFlag),
+        mReportSample(aReportSample),
+        mViolatedDirective(aViolatedDirective),
+        mEffectiveDirective(aEffectiveDirective),
+        mSourceFile(aSourceFile),
+        mScriptSample(aScriptSample),
+        mLineNum(aLineNum),
+        mColumnNum(aColumnNum),
+        mCSPContext(aCSPContext) {
+    NS_ASSERTION(!aViolatedDirective.IsEmpty(),
+                 "Can not send reports without a violated directive");
+    // the observer subject is an nsISupports: either an nsISupportsCString
+    // from the arg passed in directly, or if that's empty, it's the blocked
+    // source.
+    if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty() && mBlockedURI) {
+      mObserverSubject = aBlockedURI;
+      return;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString subject;
+    if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty()) {
+      BlockedContentSourceToString(aBlockedContentSource, subject);
+    } else {
+      CopyUTF16toUTF8(aObserverSubject, subject);
+    }
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsCString> supportscstr =
+        do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID);
+    if (supportscstr) {
+      supportscstr->SetData(subject);
+      mObserverSubject = do_QueryInterface(supportscstr);
+    }
+
+    // Truncate sample string.
+    uint32_t length = mScriptSample.Length();
+    if (length > nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
+      uint32_t desiredLength = nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength();
+      // Don't cut off right before a low surrogate. Just include it.
+      if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(mScriptSample[desiredLength])) {
+        desiredLength++;
+      }
+      mScriptSample.Replace(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength(),
+                            length - desiredLength,
+                            nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis());
+    }
+  }
+
+  NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+    nsresult rv;
+
+    // 0) prepare violation data
+    mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit init;
+
+    nsAutoCString blockedContentSource;
+    BlockedContentSourceToString(mBlockedContentSource, blockedContentSource);
+
+    rv = mCSPContext->GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
+        mBlockedURI, blockedContentSource, mOriginalURI, mEffectiveDirective,
+        mViolatedPolicyIndex, mSourceFile,
+        mReportSample ? mScriptSample : EmptyString(), mLineNum, mColumnNum,
+        init);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    // 1) notify observers
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
+        mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+    if (mObserverSubject && observerService) {
+      rv = observerService->NotifyObservers(
+          mObserverSubject, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, mViolatedDirective.get());
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    // 2) send reports for the policy that was violated
+    mCSPContext->SendReports(init, mViolatedPolicyIndex);
+
+    // 3) log to console (one per policy violation)
+
+    if (mBlockedURI) {
+      mBlockedURI->GetSpec(blockedContentSource);
+      if (blockedContentSource.Length() >
+          nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
+        bool isData = mBlockedURI->SchemeIs("data");
+        if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isData &&
+            blockedContentSource.Length() >
+                nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) {
+          blockedContentSource.Truncate(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength());
+          blockedContentSource.Append(
+              NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis()));
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (blockedContentSource.Length() > 0) {
+      nsString blockedContentSource16 =
+          NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(blockedContentSource);
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {mViolatedDirective,
+                                        blockedContentSource16};
+      mCSPContext->logToConsole(
+          mReportOnlyFlag ? "CSPROViolationWithURI" : "CSPViolationWithURI",
+          params, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, mColumnNum,
+          nsIScriptError::errorFlag);
+    }
+
+    // 4) fire violation event
+    // A frame-ancestors violation has occurred, but we should not dispatch
+    // the violation event to a potentially cross-origin ancestor.
+    if (!mViolatedDirective.EqualsLiteral("frame-ancestors")) {
+      mCSPContext->FireViolationEvent(mTriggeringElement, mCSPEventListener,
+                                      init);
+    }
+
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+ private:
+  RefPtr<Element> mTriggeringElement;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> mCSPEventListener;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mBlockedURI;
+  nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource mBlockedContentSource;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mOriginalURI;
+  uint32_t mViolatedPolicyIndex;
+  bool mReportOnlyFlag;
+  bool mReportSample;
+  nsString mViolatedDirective;
+  nsString mEffectiveDirective;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> mObserverSubject;
+  nsString mSourceFile;
+  nsString mScriptSample;
+  uint32_t mLineNum;
+  uint32_t mColumnNum;
+  RefPtr<nsCSPContext> mCSPContext;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Asynchronously notifies any nsIObservers listening to the CSP violation
+ * topic that a violation occurred.  Also triggers report sending and console
+ * logging.  All asynchronous on the main thread.
+ *
+ * @param aTriggeringElement
+ *        The element that triggered this report violation. It can be null.
+ * @param aBlockedContentSource
+ *        Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source
+ *        of the violation.
+ * @param aOriginalUri
+ *        The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null
+ * @param aViolatedDirective
+ *        the directive that was violated (string).
+ * @param aViolatedPolicyIndex
+ *        the index of the policy that was violated (so we know where to send
+ *        the reports).
+ * @param aObserverSubject
+ *        optional, subject sent to the nsIObservers listening to the CSP
+ *        violation topic.
+ * @param aSourceFile
+ *        name of the file containing the inline script violation
+ * @param aScriptSample
+ *        a sample of the violating inline script
+ * @param aLineNum
+ *        source line number of the violation (if available)
+ * @param aColumnNum
+ *        source column number of the violation (if available)
+ */
+nsresult nsCSPContext::AsyncReportViolation(
+    Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+    nsIURI* aBlockedURI, BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource,
+    nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
+    const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
+    const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
+    bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum,
+    uint32_t aColumnNum) {
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> task = new CSPReportSenderRunnable(
+      aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aBlockedURI, aBlockedContentSource,
+      aOriginalURI, aViolatedPolicyIndex,
+      mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag(), aViolatedDirective,
+      aEffectiveDirective, aObserverSubject, aSourceFile, aReportSample,
+      aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum, this);
+
+  if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) {
+    if (mEventTarget) {
+      mEventTarget->Dispatch(task.forget(), NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL);
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  NS_DispatchToMainThread(task.forget());
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Based on the given loadinfo, determines if this CSP context allows the
+ * ancestry.
+ *
+ * In order to determine the URI of the parent document (one causing the load
+ * of this protected document), this function traverses all Browsing Contexts
+ * until it reaches the top level browsing context.
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                              bool* outPermitsAncestry) {
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  *outPermitsAncestry = true;
+
+  RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> ctx;
+  aLoadInfo->GetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(ctx));
+
+  // extract the ancestry as an array
+  nsCOMArray<nsIURI> ancestorsArray;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uriClone;
+
+  while (ctx) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> currentPrincipal;
+    // Generally permitsAncestry is consulted from within the
+    // DocumentLoadListener in the parent process. For loads of type object
+    // and embed it's called from the Document in the content process.
+    // After Bug 1646899 we should be able to remove that branching code for
+    // querying the currentURI.
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      WindowGlobalParent* window = ctx->Canonical()->GetCurrentWindowGlobal();
+      if (window) {
+        // Using the URI of the Principal and not the document because e.g.
+        // about:blank inherits the principal and hence the URI of the
+        // document does not reflect the security context of the document.
+        currentPrincipal = window->DocumentPrincipal();
+      }
+    } else if (nsPIDOMWindowOuter* windowOuter = ctx->GetDOMWindow()) {
+      currentPrincipal = nsGlobalWindowOuter::Cast(windowOuter)->GetPrincipal();
+    }
+
+    if (currentPrincipal) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> currentURI;
+      auto* currentBasePrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(currentPrincipal);
+      currentBasePrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI));
+
+      if (currentURI) {
+        nsAutoCString spec;
+        currentURI->GetSpec(spec);
+        // delete the userpass from the URI.
+        rv = NS_MutateURI(currentURI)
+                 .SetRef(""_ns)
+                 .SetUserPass(""_ns)
+                 .Finalize(uriClone);
+
+        // If setUserPass fails for some reason, just return a clone of the
+        // current URI
+        if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+          rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(uriClone));
+          NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+        }
+        ancestorsArray.AppendElement(uriClone);
+      }
+    }
+    ctx = ctx->GetParent();
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString violatedDirective;
+
+  // Now that we've got the ancestry chain in ancestorsArray, time to check
+  // them against any CSP.
+  // NOTE:  the ancestors are not allowed to be sent cross origin; this is a
+  // restriction not placed on subresource loads.
+
+  for (uint32_t a = 0; a < ancestorsArray.Length(); a++) {
+    if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, checking ancestor: %s",
+                     ancestorsArray[a]->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+    }
+    // omit the ancestor URI in violation reports if cross-origin as per spec
+    // (it is a violation of the same-origin policy).
+    bool okToSendAncestor =
+        NS_SecurityCompareURIs(ancestorsArray[a], mSelfURI, true);
+
+    bool permits =
+        permitsInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE,
+                        nullptr,  // triggering element
+                        nullptr,  // nsICSPEventListener
+                        ancestorsArray[a],
+                        nullptr,  // no redirect here.
+                        u""_ns,   // no nonce
+                        true,     // specific, do not use default-src
+                        true,     // send violation reports
+                        okToSendAncestor,
+                        false);  // not parser created
+    if (!permits) {
+      *outPermitsAncestry = false;
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::Permits(Element* aTriggeringElement,
+                      nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aURI,
+                      CSPDirective aDir, bool aSpecific,
+                      bool aSendViolationReports, bool* outPermits) {
+  // Can't perform check without aURI
+  if (aURI == nullptr) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("resource")) {
+    // XXX Ideally we would call SubjectToCSP() here but that would also
+    // allowlist e.g. javascript: URIs which should not be allowlisted here.
+    // As a hotfix we just allowlist pdf.js internals here explicitly.
+    nsAutoCString uriSpec;
+    aURI->GetSpec(uriSpec);
+    if (StringBeginsWith(uriSpec, "resource://pdf.js/"_ns)) {
+      *outPermits = true;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  *outPermits =
+      permitsInternal(aDir, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aURI,
+                      nullptr,  // no original (pre-redirect) URI
+                      u""_ns,   // no nonce
+                      aSpecific, aSendViolationReports,
+                      true,    // send blocked URI in violation reports
+                      false);  // not parser created
+
+  if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %s, isAllowed: %s",
+                   aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(),
+                   CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir),
+                   *outPermits ? "allow" : "deny"));
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::ToJSON(nsAString& outCSPinJSON) {
+  outCSPinJSON.Truncate();
+  dom::CSPPolicies jsonPolicies;
+  jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Construct();
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+
+  for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
+    dom::CSP jsonCSP;
+    mPolicies[p]->toDomCSPStruct(jsonCSP);
+    if (!jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Value().AppendElement(jsonCSP, fallible)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // convert the gathered information to JSON
+  if (!jsonPolicies.ToJSON(outCSPinJSON)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags(uint32_t* aOutSandboxFlags) {
+  if (!aOutSandboxFlags) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  *aOutSandboxFlags = SANDBOXED_NONE;
+
+  EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) {
+    uint32_t flags = mPolicies[i]->getSandboxFlags();
+
+    // current policy doesn't have sandbox flag, check next policy
+    if (!flags) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // current policy has sandbox flags, if the policy is in enforcement-mode
+    // (i.e. not report-only) set these flags and check for policies with more
+    // restrictions
+    if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) {
+      *aOutSandboxFlags |= flags;
+    } else {
+      // sandbox directive is ignored in report-only mode, warn about it and
+      // continue the loop checking for an enforcement policy.
+      nsAutoString policy;
+      mPolicies[i]->toString(policy);
+
+      CSPCONTEXTLOG(
+          ("nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags, report only policy, ignoring "
+           "sandbox in: %s",
+           NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get()));
+
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {policy};
+      logToConsole("ignoringReportOnlyDirective", params, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0,
+                   nsIScriptError::warningFlag);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* ========== CSPViolationReportListener implementation ========== */
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPViolationReportListener, nsIStreamListener,
+                  nsIRequestObserver, nsISupports);
+
+CSPViolationReportListener::CSPViolationReportListener() = default;
+
+CSPViolationReportListener::~CSPViolationReportListener() = default;
+
+nsresult AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* aInputStream, void* aClosure,
+                               const char* aRawSegment, uint32_t aToOffset,
+                               uint32_t aCount, uint32_t* outWrittenCount) {
+  nsCString* decodedData = static_cast<nsCString*>(aClosure);
+  decodedData->Append(aRawSegment, aCount);
+  *outWrittenCount = aCount;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPViolationReportListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
+                                            nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
+                                            uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
+  uint32_t read;
+  nsCString decodedData;
+  return aInputStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &decodedData, aCount,
+                                    &read);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPViolationReportListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest,
+                                          nsresult aStatus) {
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPViolationReportListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* ========== CSPReportRedirectSink implementation ========== */
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPReportRedirectSink, nsIChannelEventSink,
+                  nsIInterfaceRequestor);
+
+CSPReportRedirectSink::CSPReportRedirectSink() = default;
+
+CSPReportRedirectSink::~CSPReportRedirectSink() = default;
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPReportRedirectSink::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
+    nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags,
+    nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) {
+  if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) {
+    aCallback->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // cancel the old channel so XHR failure callback happens
+  nsresult rv = aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // notify an observer that we have blocked the report POST due to a
+  // redirect, used in testing, do this async since we're in an async call now
+  // to begin with
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService =
+      mozilla::services::GetObserverService();
+  NS_ASSERTION(observerService,
+               "Observer service required to log CSP violations");
+  observerService->NotifyObservers(
+      uri, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC,
+      u"denied redirect while sending violation report");
+
+  return NS_BINDING_REDIRECTED;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPReportRedirectSink::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
+  if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) &&
+      mInterceptController) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> copy(mInterceptController);
+    *aResult = copy.forget().take();
+
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
+}
+
+void CSPReportRedirectSink::SetInterceptController(
+    nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) {
+  mInterceptController = aInterceptController;
+}
+
+/* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) {
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> supports;
+
+  rv = NS_ReadOptionalObject(aStream, true, getter_AddRefs(supports));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  mSelfURI = do_QueryInterface(supports);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need a self URI to de-serialize");
+
+  nsAutoCString JSON;
+  rv = aStream->ReadCString(JSON);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(JSON);
+  mLoadingPrincipal = principal;
+  MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a loadingPrincipal to de-serialize");
+
+  uint32_t numPolicies;
+  rv = aStream->Read32(&numPolicies);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsAutoString policyString;
+
+  while (numPolicies > 0) {
+    numPolicies--;
+
+    rv = aStream->ReadString(policyString);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    bool reportOnly = false;
+    rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&reportOnly);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    bool deliveredViaMetaTag = false;
+    rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&deliveredViaMetaTag);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    AddIPCPolicy(mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, reportOnly,
+                                                     deliveredViaMetaTag));
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsCSPContext::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) {
+  nsresult rv = NS_WriteOptionalCompoundObject(aStream, mSelfURI,
+                                               NS_GET_IID(nsIURI), true);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsAutoCString JSON;
+  BasePrincipal::Cast(mLoadingPrincipal)->ToJSON(JSON);
+  rv = aStream->WriteStringZ(JSON.get());
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Serialize all the policies.
+  aStream->Write32(mPolicies.Length() + mIPCPolicies.Length());
+
+  nsAutoString polStr;
+  for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) {
+    polStr.Truncate();
+    mPolicies[p]->toString(polStr);
+    aStream->WriteWStringZ(polStr.get());
+    aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag());
+    aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
+  }
+  for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) {
+    aStream->WriteWStringZ(policy.policy().get());
+    aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.reportOnlyFlag());
+    aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag());
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void nsCSPContext::AddIPCPolicy(const ContentSecurityPolicy& aPolicy) {
+  mIPCPolicies.AppendElement(aPolicy);
+}
+
+void nsCSPContext::SerializePolicies(
+    nsTArray<ContentSecurityPolicy>& aPolicies) {
+  for (auto* policy : mPolicies) {
+    nsAutoString policyString;
+    policy->toString(policyString);
+    aPolicies.AppendElement(
+        ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(),
+                              policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag()));
+  }
+
+  aPolicies.AppendElements(mIPCPolicies);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85d286f901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPContext.h
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsCSPContext_h___
+#define nsCSPContext_h___
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SecurityPolicyViolationEvent.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h"
+#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
+#include "nsIWeakReferenceUtils.h"
+#include "nsXPCOM.h"
+
+#define NS_CSPCONTEXT_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/cspcontext;1"
+// 09d9ed1a-e5d4-4004-bfe0-27ceb923d9ac
+#define NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID                            \
+  {                                                  \
+    0x09d9ed1a, 0xe5d4, 0x4004, {                    \
+      0xbf, 0xe0, 0x27, 0xce, 0xb9, 0x23, 0xd9, 0xac \
+    }                                                \
+  }
+
+class nsINetworkInterceptController;
+class nsIEventTarget;
+struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem;
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace dom {
+class Element;
+}
+namespace ipc {
+class ContentSecurityPolicy;
+}
+}  // namespace mozilla
+
+class nsCSPContext : public nsIContentSecurityPolicy {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSICONTENTSECURITYPOLICY
+  NS_DECL_NSISERIALIZABLE
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~nsCSPContext();
+
+ public:
+  nsCSPContext();
+
+  static bool Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP,
+                     nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP);
+
+  // Init a CSP from a different CSP
+  nsresult InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* otherContext);
+
+  // Used to suppress errors and warnings produced by the parser.
+  // Use this when doing an one-off parsing of the CSP.
+  void SuppressParserLogMessages() { mSuppressParserLogMessages = true; }
+
+  /**
+   * SetRequestContextWithDocument() needs to be called before the
+   * innerWindowID is initialized on the document. Use this function
+   * to call back to flush queued up console messages and initialize
+   * the innerWindowID. Node, If SetRequestContextWithPrincipal() was
+   * called then we do not have a innerWindowID anyway and hence
+   * we can not flush messages to the correct console.
+   */
+  void flushConsoleMessages();
+
+  void logToConsole(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                    const nsAString& aSourceName, const nsAString& aSourceLine,
+                    uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber,
+                    uint32_t aSeverityFlag);
+
+  /**
+   * Construct SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit structure.
+   *
+   * @param aBlockedURI
+   *        A nsIURI: the source of the violation.
+   * @param aOriginalUri
+   *        The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null
+   * @param aViolatedDirective
+   *        the directive that was violated (string).
+   * @param aSourceFile
+   *        name of the file containing the inline script violation
+   * @param aScriptSample
+   *        a sample of the violating inline script
+   * @param aLineNum
+   *        source line number of the violation (if available)
+   * @param aColumnNum
+   *        source column number of the violation (if available)
+   * @param aViolationEventInit
+   *        The output
+   */
+  nsresult GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData(
+      nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString,
+      nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
+      uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aSourceFile,
+      const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum,
+      mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit);
+
+  nsresult SendReports(
+      const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit,
+      uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex);
+
+  nsresult FireViolationEvent(
+      mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement,
+      nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+      const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit&
+          aViolationEventInit);
+
+  enum BlockedContentSource {
+    eUnknown,
+    eInline,
+    eEval,
+    eSelf,
+    eWasmEval,
+  };
+
+  nsresult AsyncReportViolation(
+      mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement,
+      nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aBlockedURI,
+      BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
+      const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective,
+      uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aObserverSubject,
+      const nsAString& aSourceFile, bool aReportSample,
+      const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum);
+
+  // Hands off! Don't call this method unless you know what you
+  // are doing. It's only supposed to be called from within
+  // the principal destructor to avoid a tangling pointer.
+  void clearLoadingPrincipal() { mLoadingPrincipal = nullptr; }
+
+  nsWeakPtr GetLoadingContext() { return mLoadingContext; }
+
+  static uint32_t ScriptSampleMaxLength() {
+    return std::max(
+        mozilla::StaticPrefs::security_csp_reporting_script_sample_max_length(),
+        0);
+  }
+
+  void AddIPCPolicy(const mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy& aPolicy);
+  void SerializePolicies(
+      nsTArray<mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy>& aPolicies);
+
+ private:
+  void EnsureIPCPoliciesRead();
+
+  bool permitsInternal(CSPDirective aDir,
+                       mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement,
+                       nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+                       nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect,
+                       const nsAString& aNonce, bool aSpecific,
+                       bool aSendViolationReports,
+                       bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports,
+                       bool aParserCreated);
+
+  // helper to report inline script/style violations
+  void reportInlineViolation(CSPDirective aDirective,
+                             mozilla::dom::Element* aTriggeringElement,
+                             nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener,
+                             const nsAString& aNonce, bool aReportSample,
+                             const nsAString& aSample,
+                             const nsAString& aViolatedDirective,
+                             const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective,
+                             uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex,
+                             uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber);
+
+  nsString mReferrer;
+  uint64_t mInnerWindowID;          // used for web console logging
+  bool mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck;  // used to allow Devtools to edit styles
+  // When deserializing an nsCSPContext instance, we initially just keep the
+  // policies unparsed. We will only reconstruct actual CSP policy instances
+  // when there's an attempt to use the CSP. Given a better way to serialize/
+  // deserialize individual nsCSPPolicy objects, this performance
+  // optimization could go away.
+  nsTArray<mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy> mIPCPolicies;
+  nsTArray<nsCSPPolicy*> mPolicies;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mSelfURI;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadGroup> mCallingChannelLoadGroup;
+  nsWeakPtr mLoadingContext;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> mLoadingPrincipal;
+
+  bool mSuppressParserLogMessages = false;
+
+  // helper members used to queue up web console messages till
+  // the windowID becomes available. see flushConsoleMessages()
+  nsTArray<ConsoleMsgQueueElem> mConsoleMsgQueue;
+  bool mQueueUpMessages;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> mEventTarget;
+};
+
+// Class that listens to violation report transmission and logs errors.
+class CSPViolationReportListener : public nsIStreamListener {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER
+  NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+
+ public:
+  CSPViolationReportListener();
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~CSPViolationReportListener();
+};
+
+// The POST of the violation report (if it happens) should not follow
+// redirects, per the spec. hence, we implement an nsIChannelEventSink
+// with an object so we can tell XHR to abort if a redirect happens.
+class CSPReportRedirectSink final : public nsIChannelEventSink,
+                                    public nsIInterfaceRequestor {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK
+  NS_DECL_NSIINTERFACEREQUESTOR
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+
+ public:
+  CSPReportRedirectSink();
+
+  void SetInterceptController(
+      nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController);
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~CSPReportRedirectSink();
+
+ private:
+  nsCOMPtr<nsINetworkInterceptController> mInterceptController;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsCSPContext_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPParser.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPParser.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..623de34f28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPParser.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1290 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/TextUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPParser.h"
+#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+static LogModule* GetCspParserLog() {
+  static LazyLogModule gCspParserPRLog("CSPParser");
+  return gCspParserPRLog;
+}
+
+#define CSPPARSERLOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetCspParserLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define CSPPARSERLOGENABLED() \
+  MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspParserLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
+
+static const uint32_t kSubHostPathCharacterCutoff = 512;
+
+static const char* const kHashSourceValidFns[] = {"sha256", "sha384", "sha512"};
+static const uint32_t kHashSourceValidFnsLen = 3;
+
+/* ===== nsCSPParser ==================== */
+
+nsCSPParser::nsCSPParser(policyTokens& aTokens, nsIURI* aSelfURI,
+                         nsCSPContext* aCSPContext, bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+                         bool aSuppressLogMessages)
+    : mCurChar(nullptr),
+      mEndChar(nullptr),
+      mHasHashOrNonce(false),
+      mHasAnyUnsafeEval(false),
+      mStrictDynamic(false),
+      mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc(nullptr),
+      mChildSrc(nullptr),
+      mFrameSrc(nullptr),
+      mWorkerSrc(nullptr),
+      mScriptSrc(nullptr),
+      mStyleSrc(nullptr),
+      mParsingFrameAncestorsDir(false),
+      mTokens(aTokens.Clone()),
+      mSelfURI(aSelfURI),
+      mPolicy(nullptr),
+      mCSPContext(aCSPContext),
+      mDeliveredViaMetaTag(aDeliveredViaMetaTag),
+      mSuppressLogMessages(aSuppressLogMessages) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::nsCSPParser"));
+}
+
+nsCSPParser::~nsCSPParser() { CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::~nsCSPParser")); }
+
+static bool isCharacterToken(char16_t aSymbol) {
+  return (aSymbol >= 'a' && aSymbol <= 'z') ||
+         (aSymbol >= 'A' && aSymbol <= 'Z');
+}
+
+bool isNumberToken(char16_t aSymbol) {
+  return (aSymbol >= '0' && aSymbol <= '9');
+}
+
+bool isValidHexDig(char16_t aHexDig) {
+  return (isNumberToken(aHexDig) || (aHexDig >= 'A' && aHexDig <= 'F') ||
+          (aHexDig >= 'a' && aHexDig <= 'f'));
+}
+
+static bool isValidBase64Value(const char16_t* cur, const char16_t* end) {
+  // Using grammar at
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#grammardef-nonce-source
+
+  // May end with one or two =
+  if (end > cur && *(end - 1) == EQUALS) end--;
+  if (end > cur && *(end - 1) == EQUALS) end--;
+
+  // Must have at least one character aside from any =
+  if (end == cur) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Rest must all be A-Za-z0-9+/-_
+  for (; cur < end; ++cur) {
+    if (!(isCharacterToken(*cur) || isNumberToken(*cur) || *cur == PLUS ||
+          *cur == SLASH || *cur == DASH || *cur == UNDERLINE)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return true;
+}
+
+void nsCSPParser::resetCurChar(const nsAString& aToken) {
+  mCurChar = aToken.BeginReading();
+  mEndChar = aToken.EndReading();
+  resetCurValue();
+}
+
+// The path is terminated by the first question mark ("?") or
+// number sign ("#") character, or by the end of the URI.
+// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3
+bool nsCSPParser::atEndOfPath() {
+  return (atEnd() || peek(QUESTIONMARK) || peek(NUMBER_SIGN));
+}
+
+// unreserved    = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
+bool nsCSPParser::atValidUnreservedChar() {
+  return (peek(isCharacterToken) || peek(isNumberToken) || peek(DASH) ||
+          peek(DOT) || peek(UNDERLINE) || peek(TILDE));
+}
+
+// sub-delims    = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
+//                 / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
+// Please note that even though ',' and ';' appear to be
+// valid sub-delims according to the RFC production of paths,
+// both can not appear here by itself, they would need to be
+// pct-encoded in order to be part of the path.
+bool nsCSPParser::atValidSubDelimChar() {
+  return (peek(EXCLAMATION) || peek(DOLLAR) || peek(AMPERSAND) ||
+          peek(SINGLEQUOTE) || peek(OPENBRACE) || peek(CLOSINGBRACE) ||
+          peek(WILDCARD) || peek(PLUS) || peek(EQUALS));
+}
+
+// pct-encoded   = "%" HEXDIG HEXDIG
+bool nsCSPParser::atValidPctEncodedChar() {
+  const char16_t* pctCurChar = mCurChar;
+
+  if ((pctCurChar + 2) >= mEndChar) {
+    // string too short, can't be a valid pct-encoded char.
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Any valid pct-encoding must follow the following format:
+  // "% HEXDIG HEXDIG"
+  if (PERCENT_SIGN != *pctCurChar || !isValidHexDig(*(pctCurChar + 1)) ||
+      !isValidHexDig(*(pctCurChar + 2))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// pchar = unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@"
+// http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3
+bool nsCSPParser::atValidPathChar() {
+  return (atValidUnreservedChar() || atValidSubDelimChar() ||
+          atValidPctEncodedChar() || peek(COLON) || peek(ATSYMBOL));
+}
+
+void nsCSPParser::logWarningErrorToConsole(uint32_t aSeverityFlag,
+                                           const char* aProperty,
+                                           const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::logWarningErrorToConsole: %s", aProperty));
+
+  if (mSuppressLogMessages) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // send console messages off to the context and let the context
+  // deal with it (potentially messages need to be queued up)
+  mCSPContext->logToConsole(aProperty, aParams,
+                            u""_ns,          // aSourceName
+                            u""_ns,          // aSourceLine
+                            0,               // aLineNumber
+                            0,               // aColumnNumber
+                            aSeverityFlag);  // aFlags
+}
+
+bool nsCSPParser::hostChar() {
+  if (atEnd()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return accept(isCharacterToken) || accept(isNumberToken) || accept(DASH);
+}
+
+// (ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
+bool nsCSPParser::schemeChar() {
+  if (atEnd()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return accept(isCharacterToken) || accept(isNumberToken) || accept(PLUS) ||
+         accept(DASH) || accept(DOT);
+}
+
+// port = ":" ( 1*DIGIT / "*" )
+bool nsCSPParser::port() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::port, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Consume the COLON we just peeked at in houstSource
+  accept(COLON);
+
+  // Resetting current value since we start to parse a port now.
+  // e.g; "http://www.example.com:8888" then we have already parsed
+  // everything up to (including) ":";
+  resetCurValue();
+
+  // Port might be "*"
+  if (accept(WILDCARD)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Port must start with a number
+  if (!accept(isNumberToken)) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "couldntParsePort",
+                             params);
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Consume more numbers and set parsed port to the nsCSPHost
+  while (accept(isNumberToken)) { /* consume */
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPParser::subPath(nsCSPHostSrc* aCspHost) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::subPath, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Emergency exit to avoid endless loops in case a path in a CSP policy
+  // is longer than 512 characters, or also to avoid endless loops
+  // in case we are parsing unrecognized characters in the following loop.
+  uint32_t charCounter = 0;
+  nsString pctDecodedSubPath;
+
+  while (!atEndOfPath()) {
+    if (peek(SLASH)) {
+      // before appendig any additional portion of a subpath we have to
+      // pct-decode that portion of the subpath. atValidPathChar() already
+      // verified a correct pct-encoding, now we can safely decode and append
+      // the decoded-sub path.
+      CSP_PercentDecodeStr(mCurValue, pctDecodedSubPath);
+      aCspHost->appendPath(pctDecodedSubPath);
+      // Resetting current value since we are appending parts of the path
+      // to aCspHost, e.g; "http://www.example.com/path1/path2" then the
+      // first part is "/path1", second part "/path2"
+      resetCurValue();
+    } else if (!atValidPathChar()) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "couldntParseInvalidSource", params);
+      return false;
+    }
+    // potentially we have encountred a valid pct-encoded character in
+    // atValidPathChar(); if so, we have to account for "% HEXDIG HEXDIG" and
+    // advance the pointer past the pct-encoded char.
+    if (peek(PERCENT_SIGN)) {
+      advance();
+      advance();
+    }
+    advance();
+    if (++charCounter > kSubHostPathCharacterCutoff) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  // before appendig any additional portion of a subpath we have to pct-decode
+  // that portion of the subpath. atValidPathChar() already verified a correct
+  // pct-encoding, now we can safely decode and append the decoded-sub path.
+  CSP_PercentDecodeStr(mCurValue, pctDecodedSubPath);
+  aCspHost->appendPath(pctDecodedSubPath);
+  resetCurValue();
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPParser::path(nsCSPHostSrc* aCspHost) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::path, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Resetting current value and forgetting everything we have parsed so far
+  // e.g. parsing "http://www.example.com/path1/path2", then
+  // "http://www.example.com" has already been parsed so far
+  // forget about it.
+  resetCurValue();
+
+  if (!accept(SLASH)) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldntParseInvalidSource", params);
+    return false;
+  }
+  if (atEndOfPath()) {
+    // one slash right after host [port] is also considered a path, e.g.
+    // www.example.com/ should result in www.example.com/
+    // please note that we do not have to perform any pct-decoding here
+    // because we are just appending a '/' and not any actual chars.
+    aCspHost->appendPath(u"/"_ns);
+    return true;
+  }
+  // path can begin with "/" but not "//"
+  // see http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.3
+  if (peek(SLASH)) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldntParseInvalidSource", params);
+    return false;
+  }
+  return subPath(aCspHost);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPParser::subHost() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::subHost, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Emergency exit to avoid endless loops in case a host in a CSP policy
+  // is longer than 512 characters, or also to avoid endless loops
+  // in case we are parsing unrecognized characters in the following loop.
+  uint32_t charCounter = 0;
+
+  while (!atEndOfPath() && !peek(COLON) && !peek(SLASH)) {
+    ++charCounter;
+    while (hostChar()) {
+      /* consume */
+      ++charCounter;
+    }
+    if (accept(DOT) && !hostChar()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (charCounter > kSubHostPathCharacterCutoff) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// host = "*" / [ "*." ] 1*host-char *( "." 1*host-char )
+nsCSPHostSrc* nsCSPParser::host() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::host, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Check if the token starts with "*"; please remember that we handle
+  // a single "*" as host in sourceExpression, but we still have to handle
+  // the case where a scheme was defined, e.g., as:
+  // "https://*", "*.example.com", "*:*", etc.
+  if (accept(WILDCARD)) {
+    // Might solely be the wildcard
+    if (atEnd() || peek(COLON)) {
+      return new nsCSPHostSrc(mCurValue);
+    }
+    // If the token is not only the "*", a "." must follow right after
+    if (!accept(DOT)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "couldntParseInvalidHost", params);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Expecting at least one host-char
+  if (!hostChar()) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldntParseInvalidHost", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // There might be several sub hosts defined.
+  if (!subHost()) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldntParseInvalidHost", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // HostName might match a keyword, log to the console.
+  if (CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(mCurValue)) {
+    nsString keyword = mCurValue;
+    ToLowerCase(keyword);
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {mCurToken, keyword};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "hostNameMightBeKeyword", params);
+  }
+
+  // Create a new nsCSPHostSrc with the parsed host.
+  return new nsCSPHostSrc(mCurValue);
+}
+
+// keyword-source = "'self'" / "'unsafe-inline'" / "'unsafe-eval'" /
+// "'wasm-unsafe-eval'"
+nsCSPBaseSrc* nsCSPParser::keywordSource() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::keywordSource, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Special case handling for 'self' which is not stored internally as a
+  // keyword, but rather creates a nsCSPHostSrc using the selfURI
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_SELF)) {
+    return CSP_CreateHostSrcFromSelfURI(mSelfURI);
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE)) {
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC)) {
+    if (!CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                         nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE) &&
+        !CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                         nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) &&
+        !CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                         nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      // Todo: Enforce 'strict-dynamic' within default-src; see Bug 1313937
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {u"strict-dynamic"_ns};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "ignoringStrictDynamic", params);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    mStrictDynamic = true;
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE)) {
+    nsWeakPtr ctx = mCSPContext->GetLoadingContext();
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(ctx);
+    if (doc) {
+      doc->SetHasUnsafeInlineCSP(true);
+    }
+    // make sure script-src only contains 'unsafe-inline' once;
+    // ignore duplicates and log warning
+    if (mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "ignoringDuplicateSrc", params);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    // cache if we encounter 'unsafe-inline' so we can invalidate (ignore) it in
+    // case that script-src directive also contains hash- or nonce-.
+    mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc =
+        new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+    return mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc;
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL)) {
+    nsWeakPtr ctx = mCSPContext->GetLoadingContext();
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc = do_QueryReferent(ctx);
+    if (doc) {
+      doc->SetHasUnsafeEvalCSP(true);
+    }
+    mHasAnyUnsafeEval = true;
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_csp_wasm_unsafe_eval_enabled() &&
+      CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL)) {
+    mHasAnyUnsafeEval = true;
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_csp_unsafe_hashes_enabled() &&
+      CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_UNSAFE_HASHES)) {
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_UNSAFE_ALLOW_REDIRECTS)) {
+    if (!CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                         nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NAVIGATE_TO_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      // Only allow 'unsafe-allow-redirects' within navigate-to.
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {u"unsafe-allow-redirects"_ns,
+                                        u"navigate-to"_ns};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "IgnoringSourceWithinDirective", params);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    return new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(mCurToken));
+  }
+
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// host-source = [ scheme "://" ] host [ port ] [ path ]
+nsCSPHostSrc* nsCSPParser::hostSource() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::hostSource, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  nsCSPHostSrc* cspHost = host();
+  if (!cspHost) {
+    // Error was reported in host()
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Calling port() to see if there is a port to parse, if an error
+  // occurs, port() reports the error, if port() returns true;
+  // we have a valid port, so we add it to cspHost.
+  if (peek(COLON)) {
+    if (!port()) {
+      delete cspHost;
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    cspHost->setPort(mCurValue);
+  }
+
+  if (atEndOfPath()) {
+    return cspHost;
+  }
+
+  // Calling path() to see if there is a path to parse, if an error
+  // occurs, path() reports the error; handing cspHost as an argument
+  // which simplifies parsing of several paths.
+  if (!path(cspHost)) {
+    // If the host [port] is followed by a path, it has to be a valid path,
+    // otherwise we pass the nullptr, indicating an error, up the callstack.
+    // see also http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list
+    delete cspHost;
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return cspHost;
+}
+
+// scheme-source = scheme ":"
+nsCSPSchemeSrc* nsCSPParser::schemeSource() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::schemeSource, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  if (!accept(isCharacterToken)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  while (schemeChar()) { /* consume */
+  }
+  nsString scheme = mCurValue;
+
+  // If the potential scheme is not followed by ":" - it's not a scheme
+  if (!accept(COLON)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // If the chraracter following the ":" is a number or the "*"
+  // then we are not parsing a scheme; but rather a host;
+  if (peek(isNumberToken) || peek(WILDCARD)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return new nsCSPSchemeSrc(scheme);
+}
+
+// nonce-source = "'nonce-" nonce-value "'"
+nsCSPNonceSrc* nsCSPParser::nonceSource() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::nonceSource, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Check if mCurToken begins with "'nonce-" and ends with "'"
+  if (!StringBeginsWith(mCurToken,
+                        nsDependentString(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(CSP_NONCE)),
+                        nsASCIICaseInsensitiveStringComparator) ||
+      mCurToken.Last() != SINGLEQUOTE) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Trim surrounding single quotes
+  const nsAString& expr = Substring(mCurToken, 1, mCurToken.Length() - 2);
+
+  int32_t dashIndex = expr.FindChar(DASH);
+  if (dashIndex < 0) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  if (!isValidBase64Value(expr.BeginReading() + dashIndex + 1,
+                          expr.EndReading())) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // cache if encountering hash or nonce to invalidate unsafe-inline
+  mHasHashOrNonce = true;
+  return new nsCSPNonceSrc(
+      Substring(expr, dashIndex + 1, expr.Length() - dashIndex + 1));
+}
+
+// hash-source = "'" hash-algo "-" base64-value "'"
+nsCSPHashSrc* nsCSPParser::hashSource() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::hashSource, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Check if mCurToken starts and ends with "'"
+  if (mCurToken.First() != SINGLEQUOTE || mCurToken.Last() != SINGLEQUOTE) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Trim surrounding single quotes
+  const nsAString& expr = Substring(mCurToken, 1, mCurToken.Length() - 2);
+
+  int32_t dashIndex = expr.FindChar(DASH);
+  if (dashIndex < 0) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (!isValidBase64Value(expr.BeginReading() + dashIndex + 1,
+                          expr.EndReading())) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString algo(Substring(expr, 0, dashIndex));
+  nsAutoString hash(
+      Substring(expr, dashIndex + 1, expr.Length() - dashIndex + 1));
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kHashSourceValidFnsLen; i++) {
+    if (algo.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(kHashSourceValidFns[i])) {
+      // cache if encountering hash or nonce to invalidate unsafe-inline
+      mHasHashOrNonce = true;
+      return new nsCSPHashSrc(algo, hash);
+    }
+  }
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// source-expression = scheme-source / host-source / keyword-source
+//                     / nonce-source / hash-source
+nsCSPBaseSrc* nsCSPParser::sourceExpression() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::sourceExpression, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Check if it is a keyword
+  if (nsCSPBaseSrc* cspKeyword = keywordSource()) {
+    return cspKeyword;
+  }
+
+  // Check if it is a nonce-source
+  if (nsCSPNonceSrc* cspNonce = nonceSource()) {
+    return cspNonce;
+  }
+
+  // Check if it is a hash-source
+  if (nsCSPHashSrc* cspHash = hashSource()) {
+    return cspHash;
+  }
+
+  // We handle a single "*" as host here, to avoid any confusion when applying
+  // the default scheme. However, we still would need to apply the default
+  // scheme in case we would parse "*:80".
+  if (mCurToken.EqualsASCII("*")) {
+    return new nsCSPHostSrc(u"*"_ns);
+  }
+
+  // Calling resetCurChar allows us to use mCurChar and mEndChar
+  // to parse mCurToken; e.g. mCurToken = "http://www.example.com", then
+  // mCurChar = 'h'
+  // mEndChar = points just after the last 'm'
+  // mCurValue = ""
+  resetCurChar(mCurToken);
+
+  // Check if mCurToken starts with a scheme
+  nsAutoString parsedScheme;
+  if (nsCSPSchemeSrc* cspScheme = schemeSource()) {
+    // mCurToken might only enforce a specific scheme
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return cspScheme;
+    }
+    // If something follows the scheme, we do not create
+    // a nsCSPSchemeSrc, but rather a nsCSPHostSrc, which
+    // needs to know the scheme to enforce; remember the
+    // scheme and delete cspScheme;
+    cspScheme->toString(parsedScheme);
+    parsedScheme.Trim(":", false, true);
+    delete cspScheme;
+
+    // If mCurToken provides not only a scheme, but also a host, we have to
+    // check if two slashes follow the scheme.
+    if (!accept(SLASH) || !accept(SLASH)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "failedToParseUnrecognizedSource", params);
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Calling resetCurValue allows us to keep pointers for mCurChar and mEndChar
+  // alive, but resets mCurValue; e.g. mCurToken = "http://www.example.com",
+  // then mCurChar = 'w' mEndChar = 'm' mCurValue = ""
+  resetCurValue();
+
+  // If mCurToken does not provide a scheme (scheme-less source), we apply the
+  // scheme from selfURI
+  if (parsedScheme.IsEmpty()) {
+    // Resetting internal helpers, because we might already have parsed some of
+    // the host when trying to parse a scheme.
+    resetCurChar(mCurToken);
+    nsAutoCString selfScheme;
+    mSelfURI->GetScheme(selfScheme);
+    parsedScheme.AssignASCII(selfScheme.get());
+  }
+
+  // At this point we are expecting a host to be parsed.
+  // Trying to create a new nsCSPHost.
+  if (nsCSPHostSrc* cspHost = hostSource()) {
+    // Do not forget to set the parsed scheme.
+    cspHost->setScheme(parsedScheme);
+    cspHost->setWithinFrameAncestorsDir(mParsingFrameAncestorsDir);
+    return cspHost;
+  }
+  // Error was reported in hostSource()
+  return nullptr;
+}
+
+// source-list = *WSP [ source-expression *( 1*WSP source-expression ) *WSP ]
+//               / *WSP "'none'" *WSP
+void nsCSPParser::sourceList(nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& outSrcs) {
+  bool isNone = false;
+
+  // remember, srcs start at index 1
+  for (uint32_t i = 1; i < mCurDir.Length(); i++) {
+    // mCurToken is only set here and remains the current token
+    // to be processed, which avoid passing arguments between functions.
+    mCurToken = mCurDir[i];
+    resetCurValue();
+
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::sourceList, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+    // Special case handling for none:
+    // Ignore 'none' if any other src is available.
+    // (See http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#parsing)
+    if (CSP_IsKeyword(mCurToken, CSP_NONE)) {
+      isNone = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Must be a regular source expression
+    nsCSPBaseSrc* src = sourceExpression();
+    if (src) {
+      outSrcs.AppendElement(src);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check if the directive contains a 'none'
+  if (isNone) {
+    // If the directive contains no other srcs, then we set the 'none'
+    if (outSrcs.IsEmpty() ||
+        (outSrcs.Length() == 1 && outSrcs[0]->isReportSample())) {
+      nsCSPKeywordSrc* keyword = new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_NONE);
+      outSrcs.InsertElementAt(0, keyword);
+    }
+    // Otherwise, we ignore 'none' and report a warning
+    else {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+      params.AppendElement(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(CSP_NONE));
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "ignoringUnknownOption", params);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+void nsCSPParser::reportURIList(nsCSPDirective* aDir) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::reportURIList"));
+
+  nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*> srcs;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  // remember, srcs start at index 1
+  for (uint32_t i = 1; i < mCurDir.Length(); i++) {
+    mCurToken = mCurDir[i];
+
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::reportURIList, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mCurToken, "", mSelfURI);
+
+    // If creating the URI casued an error, skip this URI
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "couldNotParseReportURI", params);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // Create new nsCSPReportURI and append to the list.
+    nsCSPReportURI* reportURI = new nsCSPReportURI(uri);
+    srcs.AppendElement(reportURI);
+  }
+
+  if (srcs.Length() == 0) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> directiveName = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "ignoringDirectiveWithNoValues", directiveName);
+    delete aDir;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  aDir->addSrcs(srcs);
+  mPolicy->addDirective(aDir);
+}
+
+/* Helper function for parsing sandbox flags. This function solely concatenates
+ * all the source list tokens (the sandbox flags) so the attribute parser
+ * (nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags) can parse them.
+ */
+void nsCSPParser::sandboxFlagList(nsCSPDirective* aDir) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::sandboxFlagList"));
+
+  nsAutoString flags;
+
+  // remember, srcs start at index 1
+  for (uint32_t i = 1; i < mCurDir.Length(); i++) {
+    mCurToken = mCurDir[i];
+
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::sandboxFlagList, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+    if (!nsContentUtils::IsValidSandboxFlag(mCurToken)) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "couldntParseInvalidSandboxFlag", params);
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    flags.Append(mCurToken);
+    if (i != mCurDir.Length() - 1) {
+      flags.AppendLiteral(" ");
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Please note that the sandbox directive can exist
+  // by itself (not containing any flags).
+  nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*> srcs;
+  srcs.AppendElement(new nsCSPSandboxFlags(flags));
+  aDir->addSrcs(srcs);
+  mPolicy->addDirective(aDir);
+}
+
+// directive-value = *( WSP / <VCHAR except ";" and ","> )
+void nsCSPParser::directiveValue(nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& outSrcs) {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::directiveValue"));
+
+  // Just forward to sourceList
+  sourceList(outSrcs);
+}
+
+// directive-name = 1*( ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" )
+nsCSPDirective* nsCSPParser::directiveName() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::directiveName, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Check if it is a valid directive
+  CSPDirective directive = CSP_StringToCSPDirective(mCurToken);
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldNotProcessUnknownDirective", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // The directive 'reflected-xss' is part of CSP 1.1, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/2014/WD-CSP11-20140211/#reflected-xss
+  // Currently we are not supporting that directive, hence we log a
+  // warning to the console and ignore the directive including its values.
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "notSupportingDirective", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // script-src-attr and script-scr-elem might have been disabled.
+  // Similarly style-src-{attr, elem}.
+  if (((directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE ||
+        directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) &&
+       !StaticPrefs::security_csp_script_src_attr_elem_enabled()) ||
+      ((directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE ||
+        directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) &&
+       !StaticPrefs::security_csp_style_src_attr_elem_enabled())) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "notSupportingDirective", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Bug 1529068: Implement navigate-to directive.
+  // Once all corner cases are resolved we can remove that special
+  // if-handling here and let the parser just fall through to
+  // return new nsCSPDirective.
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NAVIGATE_TO_DIRECTIVE &&
+      !StaticPrefs::security_csp_enableNavigateTo()) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "couldNotProcessUnknownDirective", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Make sure the directive does not already exist
+  // (see http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#parsing)
+  if (mPolicy->hasDirective(directive)) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "duplicateDirective",
+                             params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // CSP delivered via meta tag should ignore the following directives:
+  // report-uri, frame-ancestors, and sandbox, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#delivery-html-meta-element
+  if (mDeliveredViaMetaTag &&
+      ((directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE))) {
+    // log to the console to indicate that meta CSP is ignoring the directive
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurToken};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "ignoringSrcFromMetaCSP", params);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for block-all-mixed-content
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT) {
+    return new nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective(directive);
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for upgrade-insecure-requests
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return new nsUpgradeInsecureDirective(directive);
+  }
+
+  // if we have a child-src, cache it as a fallback for
+  //   * workers (if worker-src is not explicitly specified)
+  //   * frames  (if frame-src is not explicitly specified)
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    mChildSrc = new nsCSPChildSrcDirective(directive);
+    return mChildSrc;
+  }
+
+  // if we have a frame-src, cache it so we can discard child-src for frames
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    mFrameSrc = new nsCSPDirective(directive);
+    return mFrameSrc;
+  }
+
+  // if we have a worker-src, cache it so we can discard child-src for workers
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    mWorkerSrc = new nsCSPDirective(directive);
+    return mWorkerSrc;
+  }
+
+  // if we have a script-src, cache it as a fallback for worker-src
+  // in case child-src is not present. It is also used as a fallback for
+  // script-src-elem and script-src-attr.
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    mScriptSrc = new nsCSPScriptSrcDirective(directive);
+    return mScriptSrc;
+  }
+
+  // If we have a style-src, cache it as a fallback for style-src-elem and
+  // style-src-attr.
+  if (directive == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    mStyleSrc = new nsCSPStyleSrcDirective(directive);
+    return mStyleSrc;
+  }
+
+  return new nsCSPDirective(directive);
+}
+
+// directive = *WSP [ directive-name [ WSP directive-value ] ]
+void nsCSPParser::directive() {
+  // Set the directiveName to mCurToken
+  // Remember, the directive name is stored at index 0
+  mCurToken = mCurDir[0];
+
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::directive, mCurToken: %s, mCurValue: %s",
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurToken).get(),
+                NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mCurValue).get()));
+
+  // Make sure that the directive-srcs-array contains at least
+  // one directive.
+  if (mCurDir.Length() == 0) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {u"directive missing"_ns};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "failedToParseUnrecognizedSource", params);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (CSP_IsEmptyDirective(mCurValue, mCurToken)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Try to create a new CSPDirective
+  nsCSPDirective* cspDir = directiveName();
+  if (!cspDir) {
+    // if we can not create a CSPDirective, we can skip parsing the srcs for
+    // that array
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for block-all-mixed-content, which is only specified
+  // by a directive name but does not include any srcs.
+  if (cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) {
+    if (mCurDir.Length() > 1) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {u"block-all-mixed-content"_ns};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "ignoreSrcForDirective", params);
+    }
+    // add the directive and return
+    mPolicy->addDirective(cspDir);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for upgrade-insecure-requests, which is only
+  // specified by a directive name but does not include any srcs.
+  if (cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    if (mCurDir.Length() > 1) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {u"upgrade-insecure-requests"_ns};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "ignoreSrcForDirective", params);
+    }
+    // add the directive and return
+    mPolicy->addUpgradeInsecDir(
+        static_cast<nsUpgradeInsecureDirective*>(cspDir));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for report-uri directive (since it doesn't contain
+  // a valid source list but rather actual URIs)
+  if (CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    reportURIList(cspDir);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // special case handling for sandbox directive (since it doe4sn't contain
+  // a valid source list but rather special sandbox flags)
+  if (CSP_IsDirective(mCurDir[0],
+                      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    sandboxFlagList(cspDir);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // make sure to reset cache variables when trying to invalidate unsafe-inline;
+  // unsafe-inline might not only appear in script-src, but also in default-src
+  mHasHashOrNonce = false;
+  mHasAnyUnsafeEval = false;
+  mStrictDynamic = false;
+  mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc = nullptr;
+
+  mParsingFrameAncestorsDir = CSP_IsDirective(
+      mCurDir[0], nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE);
+
+  // Try to parse all the srcs by handing the array off to directiveValue
+  nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*> srcs;
+  directiveValue(srcs);
+
+  // If we can not parse any srcs; we let the source expression be the empty set
+  // ('none') see, http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-parsing
+  if (srcs.IsEmpty() || (srcs.Length() == 1 && srcs[0]->isReportSample())) {
+    nsCSPKeywordSrc* keyword = new nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSP_NONE);
+    srcs.InsertElementAt(0, keyword);
+  }
+
+  // If policy contains 'strict-dynamic' invalidate all srcs within script-src.
+  if (mStrictDynamic) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(
+        cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE) ||
+            cspDir->equals(
+                nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) ||
+            cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE),
+        "strict-dynamic only allowed within script-src(-elem|attr)");
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < srcs.Length(); i++) {
+      // Please note that nsCSPNonceSrc as well as nsCSPHashSrc overwrite
+      // invalidate(), so it's fine to just call invalidate() on all srcs.
+      // Please also note that nsCSPKeywordSrc() can not be invalidated and
+      // always returns false unless the keyword is 'strict-dynamic' in which
+      // case we allow the load if the script is not parser created!
+      srcs[i]->invalidate();
+      // Log a message to the console that src will be ignored.
+      nsAutoString srcStr;
+      srcs[i]->toString(srcStr);
+      // Even though we invalidate all of the srcs internally, we don't want to
+      // log messages for the srcs: 'strict-dynamic', 'unsafe-inline',
+      // 'unsafe-hashes', nonces, and hashes, because those still apply even
+      // with 'strict-dynamic'.
+      // TODO the comment seems wrong 'unsafe-eval' vs 'unsafe-inline'.
+      if (!srcStr.EqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC)) &&
+          !srcStr.EqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL)) &&
+          !srcStr.EqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(CSP_UNSAFE_HASHES)) &&
+          !StringBeginsWith(
+              srcStr, nsDependentString(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(CSP_NONCE))) &&
+          !StringBeginsWith(srcStr, u"'sha"_ns)) {
+        AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {srcStr, mCurDir[0]};
+        logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                 "ignoringScriptSrcForStrictDynamic", params);
+      }
+    }
+    // Log a warning that all scripts might be blocked because the policy
+    // contains 'strict-dynamic' but no valid nonce or hash.
+    if (!mHasHashOrNonce) {
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurDir[0]};
+      logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                               "strictDynamicButNoHashOrNonce", params);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // From https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#allow-all-inline
+  // follows that when either a hash or nonce is specified, 'unsafe-inline'
+  // should not apply.
+  if (mHasHashOrNonce && mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc &&
+      (cspDir->isDefaultDirective() ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE))) {
+    mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc->invalidate();
+
+    // Log to the console that unsafe-inline will be ignored.
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {u"'unsafe-inline'"_ns, mCurDir[0]};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                             "ignoringSrcWithinNonceOrHashDirective", params);
+  }
+
+  if (mHasAnyUnsafeEval &&
+      (cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) ||
+       cspDir->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE))) {
+    // Log to the console that (wasm-)unsafe-eval will be ignored.
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mCurDir[0]};
+    logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "ignoringUnsafeEval",
+                             params);
+  }
+
+  // Add the newly created srcs to the directive and add the directive to the
+  // policy
+  cspDir->addSrcs(srcs);
+  mPolicy->addDirective(cspDir);
+}
+
+// policy = [ directive *( ";" [ directive ] ) ]
+nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPParser::policy() {
+  CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::policy"));
+
+  mPolicy = new nsCSPPolicy();
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mTokens.Length(); i++) {
+    // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#parse-serialized-policy
+    // Step 2.2. ..., or if token is not an ASCII string, continue.
+    //
+    // Note: In the spec the token isn't split by whitespace yet.
+    bool isAscii = true;
+    for (const auto& token : mTokens[i]) {
+      if (!IsAscii(token)) {
+        AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {mTokens[i][0], token};
+        logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                 "ignoringNonAsciiToken", params);
+        isAscii = false;
+        break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!isAscii) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // All input is already tokenized; set one tokenized array in the form of
+    // [ name, src, src, ... ]
+    // to mCurDir and call directive which processes the current directive.
+    mCurDir = mTokens[i].Clone();
+    directive();
+  }
+
+  if (mChildSrc) {
+    if (!mFrameSrc) {
+      // if frame-src is specified explicitly for that policy than child-src
+      // should not restrict frames; if not, than child-src needs to restrict
+      // frames.
+      mChildSrc->setRestrictFrames();
+    }
+    if (!mWorkerSrc) {
+      // if worker-src is specified explicitly for that policy than child-src
+      // should not restrict workers; if not, than child-src needs to restrict
+      // workers.
+      mChildSrc->setRestrictWorkers();
+    }
+  }
+
+  // if script-src is specified, but not worker-src and also no child-src, then
+  // script-src has to govern workers.
+  if (mScriptSrc && !mWorkerSrc && !mChildSrc) {
+    mScriptSrc->setRestrictWorkers();
+  }
+
+  // If script-src is specified and script-src-elem is not specified, then
+  // script-src has to govern script requests and script blocks.
+  if (mScriptSrc && !mPolicy->hasDirective(
+                        nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    mScriptSrc->setRestrictScriptElem();
+  }
+
+  // If script-src is specified and script-src-attr is not specified, then
+  // script-src has to govern script attr (event handlers).
+  if (mScriptSrc && !mPolicy->hasDirective(
+                        nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    mScriptSrc->setRestrictScriptAttr();
+  }
+
+  // If style-src is specified and style-src-elem is not specified, then
+  // style-src serves as a fallback.
+  if (mStyleSrc && !mPolicy->hasDirective(
+                       nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    mStyleSrc->setRestrictStyleElem();
+  }
+
+  // If style-src is specified and style-attr-elem is not specified, then
+  // style-src serves as a fallback.
+  if (mStyleSrc && !mPolicy->hasDirective(
+                       nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE)) {
+    mStyleSrc->setRestrictStyleAttr();
+  }
+
+  return mPolicy;
+}
+
+nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy(
+    const nsAString& aPolicyString, nsIURI* aSelfURI, bool aReportOnly,
+    nsCSPContext* aCSPContext, bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+    bool aSuppressLogMessages) {
+  if (CSPPARSERLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy, policy: %s",
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get()));
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy, selfURI: %s",
+                  aSelfURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy, reportOnly: %s",
+                  (aReportOnly ? "true" : "false")));
+    CSPPARSERLOG(
+        ("nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy, deliveredViaMetaTag: %s",
+         (aDeliveredViaMetaTag ? "true" : "false")));
+  }
+
+  NS_ASSERTION(aSelfURI, "Can not parseContentSecurityPolicy without aSelfURI");
+
+  // Separate all input into tokens and store them in the form of:
+  // [ [ name, src, src, ... ], [ name, src, src, ... ], ... ]
+  // The tokenizer itself can not fail; all eventual errors
+  // are detected in the parser itself.
+
+  nsTArray<CopyableTArray<nsString> > tokens;
+  PolicyTokenizer::tokenizePolicy(aPolicyString, tokens);
+
+  nsCSPParser parser(tokens, aSelfURI, aCSPContext, aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+                     aSuppressLogMessages);
+
+  // Start the parser to generate a new CSPPolicy using the generated tokens.
+  nsCSPPolicy* policy = parser.policy();
+
+  // Check that report-only policies define a report-uri, otherwise log warning.
+  if (aReportOnly) {
+    policy->setReportOnlyFlag(true);
+    if (!policy->hasDirective(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      nsAutoCString prePath;
+      nsresult rv = aSelfURI->GetPrePath(prePath);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, policy);
+      AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+      CopyUTF8toUTF16(prePath, *params.AppendElement());
+      parser.logWarningErrorToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                      "reportURInotInReportOnlyHeader", params);
+    }
+  }
+
+  policy->setDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag(aDeliveredViaMetaTag);
+
+  if (policy->getNumDirectives() == 0) {
+    // Individual errors were already reported in the parser, but if
+    // we do not have an enforcable directive at all, we return null.
+    delete policy;
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  if (CSPPARSERLOGENABLED()) {
+    nsString parsedPolicy;
+    policy->toString(parsedPolicy);
+    CSPPARSERLOG(("nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy, parsedPolicy: %s",
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(parsedPolicy).get()));
+  }
+
+  return policy;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPParser.h b/dom/security/nsCSPParser.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..21679d86a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPParser.h
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsCSPParser_h___
+#define nsCSPParser_h___
+
+#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "PolicyTokenizer.h"
+
+bool isNumberToken(char16_t aSymbol);
+bool isValidHexDig(char16_t aHexDig);
+
+// clang-format off
+const char16_t COLON        = ':';
+const char16_t SEMICOLON    = ';';
+const char16_t SLASH        = '/';
+const char16_t PLUS         = '+';
+const char16_t DASH         = '-';
+const char16_t DOT          = '.';
+const char16_t UNDERLINE    = '_';
+const char16_t TILDE        = '~';
+const char16_t WILDCARD     = '*';
+const char16_t SINGLEQUOTE  = '\'';
+const char16_t NUMBER_SIGN  = '#';
+const char16_t QUESTIONMARK = '?';
+const char16_t PERCENT_SIGN = '%';
+const char16_t EXCLAMATION  = '!';
+const char16_t DOLLAR       = '$';
+const char16_t AMPERSAND    = '&';
+const char16_t OPENBRACE    = '(';
+const char16_t CLOSINGBRACE = ')';
+const char16_t EQUALS       = '=';
+const char16_t ATSYMBOL     = '@';
+// clang-format on
+
+class nsCSPParser {
+ public:
+  /**
+   * The CSP parser only has one publicly accessible function, which is
+   * parseContentSecurityPolicy. Internally the input string is separated into
+   * string tokens and policy() is called, which starts parsing the policy. The
+   * parser calls one function after the other according the the source-list
+   * from http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list. E.g., the parser can only
+   * call port() after the parser has already processed any possible host in
+   * host(), similar to a finite state machine.
+   */
+  static nsCSPPolicy* parseContentSecurityPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString,
+                                                 nsIURI* aSelfURI,
+                                                 bool aReportOnly,
+                                                 nsCSPContext* aCSPContext,
+                                                 bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+                                                 bool aSuppressLogMessages);
+
+ private:
+  nsCSPParser(policyTokens& aTokens, nsIURI* aSelfURI,
+              nsCSPContext* aCSPContext, bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag,
+              bool aSuppressLogMessages);
+
+  ~nsCSPParser();
+
+  // Parsing the CSP using the source-list from
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list
+  nsCSPPolicy* policy();
+  void directive();
+  nsCSPDirective* directiveName();
+  void directiveValue(nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& outSrcs);
+  void referrerDirectiveValue(nsCSPDirective* aDir);
+  void reportURIList(nsCSPDirective* aDir);
+  void sandboxFlagList(nsCSPDirective* aDir);
+  void sourceList(nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& outSrcs);
+  nsCSPBaseSrc* sourceExpression();
+  nsCSPSchemeSrc* schemeSource();
+  nsCSPHostSrc* hostSource();
+  nsCSPBaseSrc* keywordSource();
+  nsCSPNonceSrc* nonceSource();
+  nsCSPHashSrc* hashSource();
+  nsCSPHostSrc* host();
+  bool hostChar();
+  bool schemeChar();
+  bool port();
+  bool path(nsCSPHostSrc* aCspHost);
+
+  bool subHost();                        // helper function to parse subDomains
+  bool atValidUnreservedChar();          // helper function to parse unreserved
+  bool atValidSubDelimChar();            // helper function to parse sub-delims
+  bool atValidPctEncodedChar();          // helper function to parse pct-encoded
+  bool subPath(nsCSPHostSrc* aCspHost);  // helper function to parse paths
+
+  inline bool atEnd() { return mCurChar >= mEndChar; }
+
+  inline bool accept(char16_t aSymbol) {
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return (*mCurChar == aSymbol) && advance();
+  }
+
+  inline bool accept(bool (*aClassifier)(char16_t)) {
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return (aClassifier(*mCurChar)) && advance();
+  }
+
+  inline bool peek(char16_t aSymbol) {
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return *mCurChar == aSymbol;
+  }
+
+  inline bool peek(bool (*aClassifier)(char16_t)) {
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    return aClassifier(*mCurChar);
+  }
+
+  inline bool advance() {
+    if (atEnd()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    mCurValue.Append(*mCurChar++);
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  inline void resetCurValue() { mCurValue.Truncate(); }
+
+  bool atEndOfPath();
+  bool atValidPathChar();
+
+  void resetCurChar(const nsAString& aToken);
+
+  void logWarningErrorToConsole(uint32_t aSeverityFlag, const char* aProperty,
+                                const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams);
+
+  /**
+   * When parsing the policy, the parser internally uses the following helper
+   * variables/members which are used/reset during parsing. The following
+   * example explains how they are used.
+   * The tokenizer separats all input into arrays of arrays of strings, which
+   * are stored in mTokens, for example:
+   *   mTokens = [ [ script-src, http://www.example.com, 'self' ], ... ]
+   *
+   * When parsing starts, mCurdir always holds the currently processed array of
+   * strings.
+   * In our example:
+   *   mCurDir = [ script-src, http://www.example.com, 'self' ]
+   *
+   * During parsing, we process/consume one string at a time of that array.
+   * We set mCurToken to the string we are currently processing; in the first
+   * case that would be: mCurToken = script-src which allows to do simple string
+   * comparisons to see if mCurToken is a valid directive.
+   *
+   * Continuing parsing, the parser consumes the next string of that array,
+   * resetting:
+   *   mCurToken = "http://www.example.com"
+   *                ^                     ^
+   *                mCurChar              mEndChar (points *after* the 'm')
+   *   mCurValue = ""
+   *
+   * After calling advance() the first time, helpers would hold the following
+   * values:
+   *   mCurToken = "http://www.example.com"
+   *                 ^                    ^
+   *                 mCurChar             mEndChar (points *after* the 'm')
+   *  mCurValue = "h"
+   *
+   * We continue parsing till all strings of one directive are consumed, then we
+   * reset mCurDir to hold the next array of strings and start the process all
+   * over.
+   */
+
+  const char16_t* mCurChar;
+  const char16_t* mEndChar;
+  nsString mCurValue;
+  nsString mCurToken;
+  nsTArray<nsString> mCurDir;
+
+  // helpers to allow invalidation of srcs within script-src and style-src
+  // if either 'strict-dynamic' or at least a hash or nonce is present.
+  bool mHasHashOrNonce;    // false, if no hash or nonce is defined
+  bool mHasAnyUnsafeEval;  // false, if no (wasm-)unsafe-eval keyword is used.
+  bool mStrictDynamic;     // false, if 'strict-dynamic' is not defined
+  nsCSPKeywordSrc* mUnsafeInlineKeywordSrc;  // null, otherwise invlidate()
+
+  // cache variables for child-src, frame-src and worker-src handling;
+  // in CSP 3 child-src is deprecated. For backwards compatibility
+  // child-src needs to restrict:
+  //   (*) frames, in case frame-src is not expicitly specified
+  //   (*) workers, in case worker-src is not expicitly specified
+  // If neither worker-src, nor child-src is present, then script-src
+  // needs to govern workers.
+  nsCSPChildSrcDirective* mChildSrc;
+  nsCSPDirective* mFrameSrc;
+  nsCSPDirective* mWorkerSrc;
+  nsCSPScriptSrcDirective* mScriptSrc;
+  nsCSPStyleSrcDirective* mStyleSrc;
+
+  // cache variable to let nsCSPHostSrc know that it's within
+  // the frame-ancestors directive.
+  bool mParsingFrameAncestorsDir;
+
+  policyTokens mTokens;
+  nsIURI* mSelfURI;
+  nsCSPPolicy* mPolicy;
+  nsCSPContext* mCSPContext;  // used for console logging
+  bool mDeliveredViaMetaTag;
+  bool mSuppressLogMessages;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsCSPParser_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5c65ad4d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPService.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsIContent.h"
+#include "nsCSPService.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsError.h"
+#include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h"
+#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsIProtocolHandler.h"
+#include "nsQueryObject.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DocumentLoadListener.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DocumentChannel.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+
+static LazyLogModule gCspPRLog("CSP");
+
+CSPService::CSPService() = default;
+
+CSPService::~CSPService() = default;
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPService, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink)
+
+// Helper function to identify protocols and content types not subject to CSP.
+bool subjectToCSP(nsIURI* aURI, nsContentPolicyType aContentType) {
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType =
+      nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(aContentType);
+
+  // These content types are not subject to CSP content policy checks:
+  // TYPE_CSP_REPORT -- csp can't block csp reports
+  // TYPE_DOCUMENT   -- used for frame-ancestors
+  if (contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT ||
+      contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The three protocols: data:, blob: and filesystem: share the same
+  // protocol flag (URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE) with other protocols,
+  // but those three protocols get special attention in CSP and
+  // are subject to CSP, hence we have to make sure those
+  // protocols are subject to CSP, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-guid-matching
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("data") || aURI->SchemeIs("blob") ||
+      aURI->SchemeIs("filesystem")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Finally we have to allowlist "about:" which does not fall into
+  // the category underneath and also "javascript:" which is not
+  // subject to CSP content loading rules.
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("about") || aURI->SchemeIs("javascript")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Please note that it should be possible for websites to
+  // allowlist their own protocol handlers with respect to CSP,
+  // hence we use protocol flags to accomplish that, but we also
+  // want resource:, chrome: and moz-icon to be subject to CSP
+  // (which also use URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE).
+  // Exception to the rule are images, styles, and localization
+  // DTDs using a scheme of resource: or chrome:
+  bool isImgOrStyleOrDTD = contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE ||
+                           contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET ||
+                           contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD;
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("resource")) {
+    nsAutoCString uriSpec;
+    aURI->GetSpec(uriSpec);
+    // Exempt pdf.js from being subject to a page's CSP.
+    if (StringBeginsWith(uriSpec, "resource://pdf.js/"_ns)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!isImgOrStyleOrDTD) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("chrome") && !isImgOrStyleOrDTD) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (aURI->SchemeIs("moz-icon")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  bool match;
+  nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+      aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE, &match);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && match) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // all other protocols are subject To CSP.
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* static */ nsresult CSPService::ConsultCSP(nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                             nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                             const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess,
+                                             int16_t* aDecision) {
+  if (!aContentLocation) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  nsContentPolicyType contentType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  bool parserCreatedScript = aLoadInfo->GetParserCreatedScript();
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
+  nsresult rv =
+      aLoadInfo->GetCspEventListener(getter_AddRefs(cspEventListener));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CSPService::ShouldLoad called for %s",
+             aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+
+  // default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce
+  *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+
+  // No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol
+  // or type is *not* subject to CSP.
+  // Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom
+  // protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags
+  // that are allowlistet in subjectToCSP()
+  if (!subjectToCSP(aContentLocation, contentType)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString cspNonce;
+  rv = aLoadInfo->GetCspNonce(cspNonce);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // 1) Apply speculate CSP for preloads
+  bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(contentType);
+
+  if (isPreload) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp = aLoadInfo->GetPreloadCsp();
+    if (preloadCsp) {
+      // obtain the enforcement decision
+      rv = preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(
+          contentType, cspEventListener, aContentLocation,
+          nullptr,  // no redirect, aOriginal URL is null.
+          false, cspNonce, parserCreatedScript, aDecision);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+      // if the preload policy already denied the load, then there
+      // is no point in checking the real policy
+      if (NS_CP_REJECTED(*aDecision)) {
+        NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(
+            aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_PRELOAD);
+
+        return NS_OK;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads. Please note that in case
+  // the csp should be overruled (e.g. by an ExpandedPrincipal)
+  // then loadinfo->GetCsp() returns that CSP instead of the
+  // document's CSP.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aLoadInfo->GetCsp();
+
+  if (csp) {
+    // Generally aOriginalURI denotes the URI before a redirect and hence
+    // will always be a nullptr here. Only exception are frame navigations
+    // which we want to treat as a redirect for the purpose of CSP reporting
+    // and in particular the `blocked-uri` in the CSP report where we want
+    // to report the prePath information.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalURI = nullptr;
+    ExtContentPolicyType extType =
+        nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(contentType);
+    if (extType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+        !aLoadInfo->GetOriginalFrameSrcLoad() &&
+        mozilla::StaticPrefs::
+            security_csp_truncate_blocked_uri_for_frame_navigations()) {
+      nsAutoCString prePathStr;
+      nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetPrePath(prePathStr);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+      rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(originalURI), prePathStr);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    // obtain the enforcement decision
+    rv = csp->ShouldLoad(
+        contentType, cspEventListener, aContentLocation,
+        originalURI,  // no redirect, unless it's a frame navigation.
+        !isPreload && aLoadInfo->GetSendCSPViolationEvents(), cspNonce,
+        parserCreatedScript, aDecision);
+
+    if (NS_CP_REJECTED(*aDecision)) {
+      NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(
+          aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL);
+    }
+
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* nsIContentPolicy implementation */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPService::ShouldLoad(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                       const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess, int16_t* aDecision) {
+  return ConsultCSP(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeTypeGuess, aDecision);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPService::ShouldProcess(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                          const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess,
+                          int16_t* aDecision) {
+  if (!aContentLocation) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+  nsContentPolicyType contentType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  if (MOZ_LOG_TEST(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gCspPRLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CSPService::ShouldProcess called for %s",
+             aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+
+  // ShouldProcess is only relevant to TYPE_OBJECT, so let's convert the
+  // internal contentPolicyType to the mapping external one.
+  // If it is not TYPE_OBJECT, we can return at this point.
+  // Note that we should still pass the internal contentPolicyType
+  // (contentType) to ShouldLoad().
+  ExtContentPolicyType policyType =
+      nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(contentType);
+
+  if (policyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  return ShouldLoad(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeTypeGuess, aDecision);
+}
+
+/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+CSPService::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(nsIChannel* oldChannel,
+                                   nsIChannel* newChannel, uint32_t flags,
+                                   nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* callback) {
+  net::nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(callback);
+
+  if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> parentChannel;
+    NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(oldChannel, parentChannel);
+    RefPtr<net::DocumentLoadListener> docListener =
+        do_QueryObject(parentChannel);
+    // Since this is an IPC'd channel we do not have access to the request
+    // context. In turn, we do not have an event target for policy violations.
+    // Enforce the CSP check in the content process where we have that info.
+    // We allow redirect checks to run for document loads via
+    // DocumentLoadListener, since these are fully supported and we don't
+    // expose the redirects to the content process. We can't do this for all
+    // request types yet because we don't serialize nsICSPEventListener.
+    if (parentChannel && !docListener) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Don't do these checks if we're switching from DocumentChannel
+  // to a real channel. In that case, we should already have done
+  // the checks in the parent process. AsyncOnChannelRedirect
+  // isn't called in the content process if we switch process,
+  // so checking here would just hide bugs in the process switch
+  // cases.
+  if (RefPtr<net::DocumentChannel> docChannel = do_QueryObject(oldChannel)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri;
+  nsresult rv = newChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = oldChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  /* Since redirecting channels don't call into nsIContentPolicy, we call our
+   * Content Policy implementation directly when redirects occur using the
+   * information set in the LoadInfo when channels are created.
+   *
+   * We check if the CSP permits this host for this type of load, if not,
+   * we cancel the load now.
+   */
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originalUri;
+  rv = oldChannel->GetOriginalURI(getter_AddRefs(originalUri));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    autoCallback.DontCallback();
+    oldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  Maybe<nsresult> cancelCode;
+  rv = ConsultCSPForRedirect(originalUri, newUri, loadInfo, cancelCode);
+  if (cancelCode) {
+    oldChannel->Cancel(*cancelCode);
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    autoCallback.DontCallback();
+  }
+
+  return rv;
+}
+
+nsresult CSPService::ConsultCSPForRedirect(nsIURI* aOriginalURI,
+                                           nsIURI* aNewURI,
+                                           nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                           Maybe<nsresult>& aCancelCode) {
+  // Check CSP navigate-to
+  // We need to enforce the CSP of the document that initiated the load,
+  // which is the CSP to inherit.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> cspToInherit =
+      aLoadInfo->GetCspToInherit();
+  if (cspToInherit) {
+    bool allowsNavigateTo = false;
+    nsresult rv = cspToInherit->GetAllowsNavigateTo(
+        aNewURI, aLoadInfo->GetIsFormSubmission(), true, /* aWasRedirected */
+        false,                                           /* aEnforceAllowlist */
+        &allowsNavigateTo);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (!allowsNavigateTo) {
+      aCancelCode = Some(NS_ERROR_CSP_NAVIGATE_TO_VIOLATION);
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // No need to continue processing if CSP is disabled or if the protocol
+  // is *not* subject to CSP.
+  // Please note, the correct way to opt-out of CSP using a custom
+  // protocolHandler is to set one of the nsIProtocolHandler flags
+  // that are allowlistet in subjectToCSP()
+  nsContentPolicyType policyType = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  if (!subjectToCSP(aNewURI, policyType)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICSPEventListener> cspEventListener;
+  nsresult rv =
+      aLoadInfo->GetCspEventListener(getter_AddRefs(cspEventListener));
+  MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(rv);
+
+  nsAutoString cspNonce;
+  rv = aLoadInfo->GetCspNonce(cspNonce);
+  MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(rv);
+
+  bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(policyType);
+
+  /* On redirect, if the content policy is a preload type, rejecting the
+   * preload results in the load silently failing, so we pass true to
+   * the aSendViolationReports parameter. See Bug 1219453.
+   */
+
+  int16_t decision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+  bool parserCreatedScript = aLoadInfo->GetParserCreatedScript();
+
+  // 1) Apply speculative CSP for preloads
+  if (isPreload) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> preloadCsp = aLoadInfo->GetPreloadCsp();
+    if (preloadCsp) {
+      // Pass  originalURI to indicate the redirect
+      preloadCsp->ShouldLoad(
+          policyType,  // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t)
+          cspEventListener,
+          aNewURI,       // nsIURI
+          aOriginalURI,  // Original nsIURI
+          true,          // aSendViolationReports
+          cspNonce,      // nonce
+          parserCreatedScript, &decision);
+
+      // if the preload policy already denied the load, then there
+      // is no point in checking the real policy
+      if (NS_CP_REJECTED(decision)) {
+        aCancelCode = Some(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+        return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2) Apply actual CSP to all loads
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aLoadInfo->GetCsp();
+  if (csp) {
+    // Pass  originalURI to indicate the redirect
+    csp->ShouldLoad(policyType,  // load type per nsIContentPolicy (uint32_t)
+                    cspEventListener,
+                    aNewURI,       // nsIURI
+                    aOriginalURI,  // Original nsIURI
+                    true,          // aSendViolationReports
+                    cspNonce,      // nonce
+                    parserCreatedScript, &decision);
+    if (NS_CP_REJECTED(decision)) {
+      aCancelCode = Some(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+      return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPService.h b/dom/security/nsCSPService.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc0db250fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPService.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsCSPService_h___
+#define nsCSPService_h___
+
+#include "nsXPCOM.h"
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+
+#define CSPSERVICE_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/cspservice;1"
+#define CSPSERVICE_CID                               \
+  {                                                  \
+    0x8d2f40b2, 0x4875, 0x4c95, {                    \
+      0x97, 0xd9, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0xca, 0x2c, 0xb4, 0x60 \
+    }                                                \
+  }
+class CSPService : public nsIContentPolicy, public nsIChannelEventSink {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSICONTENTPOLICY
+  NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK
+
+  CSPService();
+
+  // helper function to avoid creating a new instance of the
+  // cspservice everytime we call content policies.
+  static nsresult ConsultCSP(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                             const nsACString& aMimeTypeGuess,
+                             int16_t* aDecision);
+
+  // Static helper to check CSP when doing a channel redirect.
+  // Returns the results to returns from
+  // AsyncOnChannelRedirect/nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback. Optionally returns
+  // an nsresult to Cancel the old channel with.
+  static nsresult ConsultCSPForRedirect(nsIURI* aOriginalURI, nsIURI* aNewURI,
+                                        nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                        mozilla::Maybe<nsresult>& aCancelCode);
+
+ protected:
+  virtual ~CSPService();
+};
+#endif /* nsCSPService_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c430c6ee3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1615 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsAttrValue.h"
+#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPUtils.h"
+#include "nsDebug.h"
+#include "nsCSPParser.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
+#include "nsIURL.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
+#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Components.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_PORT -1
+
+static mozilla::LogModule* GetCspUtilsLog() {
+  static mozilla::LazyLogModule gCspUtilsPRLog("CSPUtils");
+  return gCspUtilsPRLog;
+}
+
+#define CSPUTILSLOG(args) \
+  MOZ_LOG(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args)
+#define CSPUTILSLOGENABLED() \
+  MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspUtilsLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
+
+void CSP_PercentDecodeStr(const nsAString& aEncStr, nsAString& outDecStr) {
+  outDecStr.Truncate();
+
+  // helper function that should not be visible outside this methods scope
+  struct local {
+    static inline char16_t convertHexDig(char16_t aHexDig) {
+      if (isNumberToken(aHexDig)) {
+        return aHexDig - '0';
+      }
+      if (aHexDig >= 'A' && aHexDig <= 'F') {
+        return aHexDig - 'A' + 10;
+      }
+      // must be a lower case character
+      // (aHexDig >= 'a' && aHexDig <= 'f')
+      return aHexDig - 'a' + 10;
+    }
+  };
+
+  const char16_t *cur, *end, *hexDig1, *hexDig2;
+  cur = aEncStr.BeginReading();
+  end = aEncStr.EndReading();
+
+  while (cur != end) {
+    // if it's not a percent sign then there is
+    // nothing to do for that character
+    if (*cur != PERCENT_SIGN) {
+      outDecStr.Append(*cur);
+      cur++;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // get the two hexDigs following the '%'-sign
+    hexDig1 = cur + 1;
+    hexDig2 = cur + 2;
+
+    // if there are no hexdigs after the '%' then
+    // there is nothing to do for us.
+    if (hexDig1 == end || hexDig2 == end || !isValidHexDig(*hexDig1) ||
+        !isValidHexDig(*hexDig2)) {
+      outDecStr.Append(PERCENT_SIGN);
+      cur++;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // decode "% hexDig1 hexDig2" into a character.
+    char16_t decChar =
+        (local::convertHexDig(*hexDig1) << 4) + local::convertHexDig(*hexDig2);
+    outDecStr.Append(decChar);
+
+    // increment 'cur' to after the second hexDig
+    cur = ++hexDig2;
+  }
+}
+
+// The Content Security Policy should be inherited for
+// local schemes like: "about", "blob", "data", or "filesystem".
+// see: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#initialize-document-csp
+bool CSP_ShouldResponseInheritCSP(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  bool isAbout = uri->SchemeIs("about");
+  if (isAbout) {
+    nsAutoCString aboutSpec;
+    rv = uri->GetSpec(aboutSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+    // also allow about:blank#foo
+    if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:blank"_ns) ||
+        StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:srcdoc"_ns)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return uri->SchemeIs("blob") || uri->SchemeIs("data") ||
+         uri->SchemeIs("filesystem") || uri->SchemeIs("javascript");
+}
+
+void CSP_ApplyMetaCSPToDoc(mozilla::dom::Document& aDoc,
+                           const nsAString& aPolicyStr) {
+  if (aDoc.IsLoadedAsData()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString policyStr(
+      nsContentUtils::TrimWhitespace<nsContentUtils::IsHTMLWhitespace>(
+          aPolicyStr));
+
+  if (policyStr.IsEmpty()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aDoc.GetCsp();
+  if (!csp) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false, "how come there is no CSP");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Multiple CSPs (delivered through either header of meta tag) need to
+  // be joined together, see:
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/#delivery-html-meta-element
+  nsresult rv =
+      csp->AppendPolicy(policyStr,
+                        false,  // csp via meta tag can not be report only
+                        true);  // delivered through the meta tag
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
+  if (nsPIDOMWindowInner* inner = aDoc.GetInnerWindow()) {
+    inner->SetCsp(csp);
+  }
+  aDoc.ApplySettingsFromCSP(false);
+}
+
+void CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                         nsAString& outResult) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> keyStringBundle;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringBundleService =
+      mozilla::components::StringBundle::Service();
+
+  NS_ASSERTION(stringBundleService, "String bundle service must be present!");
+  stringBundleService->CreateBundle(
+      "chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties",
+      getter_AddRefs(keyStringBundle));
+
+  NS_ASSERTION(keyStringBundle, "Key string bundle must be available!");
+
+  if (!keyStringBundle) {
+    return;
+  }
+  keyStringBundle->FormatStringFromName(aName, aParams, outResult);
+}
+
+void CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
+      do_GetService("@mozilla.org/consoleservice;1"));
+
+  if (!console) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsString msg(aMsg);
+  console->LogStringMessage(msg.get());
+}
+
+void CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, const nsAString& aSourceName,
+                    const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                    uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
+                    const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
+                    bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
+      do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
+
+  if (!console || !error) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Prepending CSP to the outgoing console message
+  nsString cspMsg;
+  cspMsg.AppendLiteral(u"Content Security Policy: ");
+  cspMsg.Append(aMessage);
+
+  // Currently 'aSourceLine' is not logged to the console, because similar
+  // information is already included within the source link of the message.
+  // For inline violations however, the line and column number are 0 and
+  // information contained within 'aSourceLine' can be really useful for devs.
+  // E.g. 'aSourceLine' might be: 'onclick attribute on DIV element'.
+  // In such cases we append 'aSourceLine' directly to the error message.
+  if (!aSourceLine.IsEmpty() && aLineNumber == 0) {
+    cspMsg.AppendLiteral(u"\nSource: ");
+    cspMsg.Append(aSourceLine);
+  }
+
+  // Since we are leveraging csp errors as the category names which
+  // we pass to devtools, we should prepend them with "CSP_" to
+  // allow easy distincution in devtools code. e.g.
+  // upgradeInsecureRequest -> CSP_upgradeInsecureRequest
+  nsCString category("CSP_");
+  category.Append(aCategory);
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
+    rv = error->InitWithWindowID(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
+                                 aColumnNumber, aFlags, category,
+                                 aInnerWindowID);
+  } else {
+    rv = error->Init(cspMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber,
+                     aColumnNumber, aFlags, category, aFromPrivateWindow,
+                     true /* from chrome context */);
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  console->LogMessage(error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Combines CSP_LogMessage and CSP_GetLocalizedStr into one call.
+ */
+void CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                         const nsAString& aSourceName,
+                         const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                         uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
+                         const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
+                         bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
+  nsAutoString logMsg;
+  CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, logMsg);
+  CSP_LogMessage(logMsg, aSourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber,
+                 aFlags, aCategory, aInnerWindowID, aFromPrivateWindow);
+}
+
+/* ===== Helpers ============================ */
+// This implements
+// https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#effective-directive-for-a-request.
+// However the spec doesn't currently cover all request destinations, which
+// we roughly represent using nsContentPolicyType.
+CSPDirective CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType) {
+  switch (aType) {
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    // BLock XSLT as script, see bug 910139
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SCRIPT_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_MODULE_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER_IMPORT_SCRIPTS:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIOWORKLET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_PAINTWORKLET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_CHROMEUTILS_COMPILED_SCRIPT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME_MESSAGEMANAGER_SCRIPT:
+      // (https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/issues/554)
+      // Some of these types are not explicitly defined in the spec.
+      //
+      // Chrome seems to use script-src-elem for worklet!
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_STYLESHEET_PRELOAD:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FONT_PRELOAD:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIO:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_VIDEO:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FRAME:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IFRAME:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FETCH_PRELOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_IDENTITY:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EMBED:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_OBJECT:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    // CSP does not apply to webrtc connections
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
+    // csp shold not block top level loads, e.g. in case
+    // of a redirect.
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+    // CSP can not block csp reports
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
+      return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
+
+    // Fall through to error for all other directives
+    // Note that we should never end up here for navigate-to
+    case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Can not map nsContentPolicyType to CSPDirective");
+      // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+  }
+  return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+}
+
+nsCSPHostSrc* CSP_CreateHostSrcFromSelfURI(nsIURI* aSelfURI) {
+  // Create the host first
+  nsCString host;
+  aSelfURI->GetAsciiHost(host);
+  nsCSPHostSrc* hostsrc = new nsCSPHostSrc(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(host));
+  hostsrc->setGeneratedFromSelfKeyword();
+
+  // Add the scheme.
+  nsCString scheme;
+  aSelfURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  hostsrc->setScheme(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(scheme));
+
+  // An empty host (e.g. for data:) indicates it's effectively a unique origin.
+  // Please note that we still need to set the scheme on hostsrc (see above),
+  // because it's used for reporting.
+  if (host.EqualsLiteral("")) {
+    hostsrc->setIsUniqueOrigin();
+    // no need to query the port in that case.
+    return hostsrc;
+  }
+
+  int32_t port;
+  aSelfURI->GetPort(&port);
+  // Only add port if it's not default port.
+  if (port > 0) {
+    nsAutoString portStr;
+    portStr.AppendInt(port);
+    hostsrc->setPort(portStr);
+  }
+  return hostsrc;
+}
+
+bool CSP_IsEmptyDirective(const nsAString& aValue, const nsAString& aDir) {
+  return (aDir.Length() == 0 && aValue.Length() == 0);
+}
+bool CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir) {
+  return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir));
+}
+
+bool CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey) {
+  return aValue.LowerCaseEqualsASCII(CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKey));
+}
+
+bool CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey) {
+  nsString lowerKey;
+  ToLowerCase(aKey, lowerKey);
+
+  nsAutoString keyword;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) {
+    // skipping the leading ' and trimming the trailing '
+    keyword.AssignASCII(gCSPUTF8Keywords[i] + 1);
+    keyword.Trim("'", false, true);
+    if (lowerKey.Equals(keyword)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the current directive permits a specific
+ * scheme. This function is called from nsCSPSchemeSrc() and
+ * also nsCSPHostSrc.
+ * @param aEnforcementScheme
+ *        The scheme that this directive allows
+ * @param aUri
+ *        The uri of the subresource load.
+ * @param aReportOnly
+ *        Whether the enforced policy is report only or not.
+ * @param aUpgradeInsecure
+ *        Whether the policy makes use of the directive
+ *        'upgrade-insecure-requests'.
+ * @param aFromSelfURI
+ *        Whether a scheme was generated from the keyword 'self'
+ *        which then allows schemeless sources to match ws and wss.
+ */
+
+bool permitsScheme(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme, nsIURI* aUri,
+                   bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aFromSelfURI) {
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aUri->GetScheme(scheme);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  // no scheme to enforce, let's allow the load (e.g. script-src *)
+  if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // if the scheme matches, all good - allow the load
+  if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII(scheme.get())) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // allow scheme-less sources where the protected resource is http
+  // and the load is https, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#match-source-expression
+  if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("http")) {
+    if (scheme.EqualsASCII("https")) {
+      return true;
+    }
+    if ((scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") || scheme.EqualsASCII("wss")) &&
+        aFromSelfURI) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) {
+    if (scheme.EqualsLiteral("wss") && aFromSelfURI) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  if (aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && scheme.EqualsASCII("wss")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Allow the load when enforcing upgrade-insecure-requests with the
+  // promise the request gets upgraded from http to https and ws to wss.
+  // See nsHttpChannel::Connect() and also WebSocket.cpp. Please note,
+  // the report only policies should not allow the load and report
+  // the error back to the page.
+  return (
+      (aUpgradeInsecure && !aReportOnly) &&
+      ((scheme.EqualsASCII("http") &&
+        aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("https")) ||
+       (scheme.EqualsASCII("ws") && aEnforcementScheme.EqualsASCII("wss"))));
+}
+
+/*
+ * A helper function for appending a CSP header to an existing CSP
+ * policy.
+ *
+ * @param aCsp           the CSP policy
+ * @param aHeaderValue   the header
+ * @param aReportOnly    is this a report-only header?
+ */
+
+nsresult CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp,
+                                 const nsAString& aHeaderValue,
+                                 bool aReportOnly) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aCsp);
+
+  // Need to tokenize the header value since multiple headers could be
+  // concatenated into one comma-separated list of policies.
+  // See RFC2616 section 4.2 (last paragraph)
+  nsresult rv = NS_OK;
+  for (const nsAString& policy :
+       nsCharSeparatedTokenizer(aHeaderValue, ',').ToRange()) {
+    rv = aCsp->AppendPolicy(policy, aReportOnly, false);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    {
+      CSPUTILSLOG(("CSP refined with policy: \"%s\"",
+                   NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get()));
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPSrc ============================ */
+
+nsCSPBaseSrc::nsCSPBaseSrc() : mInvalidated(false) {}
+
+nsCSPBaseSrc::~nsCSPBaseSrc() = default;
+
+// ::permits is only called for external load requests, therefore:
+// nsCSPKeywordSrc and nsCSPHashSource fall back to this base class
+// implementation which will never allow the load.
+bool nsCSPBaseSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                           bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                           bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(
+        ("nsCSPBaseSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+// ::allows is only called for inlined loads, therefore:
+// nsCSPSchemeSrc, nsCSPHostSrc fall back
+// to this base class implementation which will never allow the load.
+bool nsCSPBaseSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                          const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                          bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPBaseSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
+               aKeyword == CSP_HASH ? "hash" : CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* ====== nsCSPSchemeSrc ===================== */
+
+nsCSPSchemeSrc::nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme) : mScheme(aScheme) {
+  ToLowerCase(mScheme);
+}
+
+nsCSPSchemeSrc::~nsCSPSchemeSrc() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                             bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                             bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(
+        ("nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+  MOZ_ASSERT((!mScheme.EqualsASCII("")), "scheme can not be the empty string");
+  if (mInvalidated) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  return permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure, false);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPSchemeSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  return aVisitor->visitSchemeSrc(*this);
+}
+
+void nsCSPSchemeSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.Append(mScheme);
+  outStr.AppendLiteral(":");
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPHostSrc ======================== */
+
+nsCSPHostSrc::nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost)
+    : mHost(aHost),
+      mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword(false),
+      mIsUniqueOrigin(false),
+      mWithinFrameAncstorsDir(false) {
+  ToLowerCase(mHost);
+}
+
+nsCSPHostSrc::~nsCSPHostSrc() = default;
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the current directive permits a specific port.
+ * @param aEnforcementScheme
+ *        The scheme that this directive allows
+ *        (used to query the default port for that scheme)
+ * @param aEnforcementPort
+ *        The port that this directive allows
+ * @param aResourceURI
+ *        The uri of the subresource load
+ */
+bool permitsPort(const nsAString& aEnforcementScheme,
+                 const nsAString& aEnforcementPort, nsIURI* aResourceURI) {
+  // If enforcement port is the wildcard, don't block the load.
+  if (aEnforcementPort.EqualsASCII("*")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  int32_t resourcePort;
+  nsresult rv = aResourceURI->GetPort(&resourcePort);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) && aEnforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
+    // If we cannot get a Port (e.g. because of an Custom Protocol handler)
+    // We need to check if a default port is associated with the Scheme
+    if (aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    int defaultPortforScheme =
+        NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aEnforcementScheme).get());
+
+    // If there is no default port associated with the Scheme (
+    // defaultPortforScheme == -1) or it is an externally handled protocol (
+    // defaultPortforScheme == 0 ) and the csp does not enforce a port - we can
+    // allow not having a port
+    return (defaultPortforScheme == -1 || defaultPortforScheme == -0);
+  }
+  // Avoid unnecessary string creation/manipulation and don't block the
+  // load if the resource to be loaded uses the default port for that
+  // scheme and there is no port to be enforced.
+  // Note, this optimization relies on scheme checks within permitsScheme().
+  if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT && aEnforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // By now we know at that either the resourcePort does not use the default
+  // port or there is a port restriction to be enforced. A port value of -1
+  // corresponds to the protocol's default port (eg. -1 implies port 80 for
+  // http URIs), in such a case we have to query the default port of the
+  // resource to be loaded.
+  if (resourcePort == DEFAULT_PORT) {
+    nsAutoCString resourceScheme;
+    rv = aResourceURI->GetScheme(resourceScheme);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+    resourcePort = NS_GetDefaultPort(resourceScheme.get());
+  }
+
+  // If there is a port to be enforced and the ports match, then
+  // don't block the load.
+  nsString resourcePortStr;
+  resourcePortStr.AppendInt(resourcePort);
+  if (aEnforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If there is no port to be enforced, query the default port for the load.
+  nsString enforcementPort(aEnforcementPort);
+  if (enforcementPort.IsEmpty()) {
+    // For scheme less sources, our parser always generates a scheme
+    // which is the scheme of the protected resource.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(!aEnforcementScheme.IsEmpty(),
+               "need a scheme to query default port");
+    int32_t defaultEnforcementPort =
+        NS_GetDefaultPort(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aEnforcementScheme).get());
+    enforcementPort.Truncate();
+    enforcementPort.AppendInt(defaultEnforcementPort);
+  }
+
+  // If default ports match, don't block the load
+  if (enforcementPort.Equals(resourcePortStr)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Additional port matching where the regular URL matching algorithm
+  // treats insecure ports as matching their secure variants.
+  // default port for http is  :80
+  // default port for https is :443
+  if (enforcementPort.EqualsLiteral("80") &&
+      resourcePortStr.EqualsLiteral("443")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // ports do not match, block the load.
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPHostSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                           bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                           bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(
+        ("nsCSPHostSrc::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+
+  if (mInvalidated || mIsUniqueOrigin) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // we are following the enforcement rules from the spec, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#match-source-expression
+
+  // 4.3) scheme matching: Check if the scheme matches.
+  if (!permitsScheme(mScheme, aUri, aReportOnly, aUpgradeInsecure,
+                     mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // The host in nsCSpHostSrc should never be empty. In case we are enforcing
+  // just a specific scheme, the parser should generate a nsCSPSchemeSource.
+  NS_ASSERTION((!mHost.IsEmpty()), "host can not be the empty string");
+
+  // Before we can check if the host matches, we have to
+  // extract the host part from aUri.
+  nsAutoCString uriHost;
+  nsresult rv = aUri->GetAsciiHost(uriHost);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  nsString decodedUriHost;
+  CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriHost), decodedUriHost);
+
+  // 2) host matching: Enforce a single *
+  if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*")) {
+    // The single ASTERISK character (*) does not match a URI's scheme of a type
+    // designating a globally unique identifier (such as blob:, data:, or
+    // filesystem:) At the moment firefox does not support filesystem; but for
+    // future compatibility we support it in CSP according to the spec,
+    // see: 4.2.2 Matching Source Expressions Note, that allowlisting any of
+    // these schemes would call nsCSPSchemeSrc::permits().
+    if (aUri->SchemeIs("blob") || aUri->SchemeIs("data") ||
+        aUri->SchemeIs("filesystem")) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // If no scheme is present there also wont be a port and folder to check
+    // which means we can return early
+    if (mScheme.IsEmpty()) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  // 4.5) host matching: Check if the allowed host starts with a wilcard.
+  else if (mHost.First() == '*') {
+    NS_ASSERTION(
+        mHost[1] == '.',
+        "Second character needs to be '.' whenever host starts with '*'");
+
+    // Eliminate leading "*", but keeping the FULL STOP (.) thereafter before
+    // checking if the remaining characters match
+    nsString wildCardHost = mHost;
+    wildCardHost = Substring(wildCardHost, 1, wildCardHost.Length() - 1);
+    if (!StringEndsWith(decodedUriHost, wildCardHost)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  // 4.6) host matching: Check if hosts match.
+  else if (!mHost.Equals(decodedUriHost)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Port matching: Check if the ports match.
+  if (!permitsPort(mScheme, mPort, aUri)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 4.9) Path matching: If there is a path, we have to enforce
+  // path-level matching, unless the channel got redirected, see:
+  // http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
+  if (!aWasRedirected && !mPath.IsEmpty()) {
+    // converting aUri into nsIURL so we can strip query and ref
+    // example.com/test#foo     -> example.com/test
+    // example.com/test?val=foo -> example.com/test
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(aUri);
+    if (!url) {
+      NS_ASSERTION(false, "can't QI into nsIURI");
+      return false;
+    }
+    nsAutoCString uriPath;
+    rv = url->GetFilePath(uriPath);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+    if (mWithinFrameAncstorsDir) {
+      // no path matching for frame-ancestors to not leak any path information.
+      return true;
+    }
+
+    nsString decodedUriPath;
+    CSP_PercentDecodeStr(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriPath), decodedUriPath);
+
+    // check if the last character of mPath is '/'; if so
+    // we just have to check loading resource is within
+    // the allowed path.
+    if (mPath.Last() == '/') {
+      if (!StringBeginsWith(decodedUriPath, mPath)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    // otherwise mPath refers to a specific file, and we have to
+    // check if the loading resource matches the file.
+    else {
+      if (!mPath.Equals(decodedUriPath)) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // At the end: scheme, host, port and path match -> allow the load.
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPHostSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  return aVisitor->visitHostSrc(*this);
+}
+
+void nsCSPHostSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  if (mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword) {
+    outStr.AppendLiteral("'self'");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If mHost is a single "*", we append the wildcard and return.
+  if (mHost.EqualsASCII("*") && mScheme.IsEmpty() && mPort.IsEmpty()) {
+    outStr.Append(mHost);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // append scheme
+  outStr.Append(mScheme);
+
+  // append host
+  outStr.AppendLiteral("://");
+  outStr.Append(mHost);
+
+  // append port
+  if (!mPort.IsEmpty()) {
+    outStr.AppendLiteral(":");
+    outStr.Append(mPort);
+  }
+
+  // append path
+  outStr.Append(mPath);
+}
+
+void nsCSPHostSrc::setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme) {
+  mScheme = aScheme;
+  ToLowerCase(mScheme);
+}
+
+void nsCSPHostSrc::setPort(const nsAString& aPort) { mPort = aPort; }
+
+void nsCSPHostSrc::appendPath(const nsAString& aPath) { mPath.Append(aPath); }
+
+/* ===== nsCSPKeywordSrc ===================== */
+
+nsCSPKeywordSrc::nsCSPKeywordSrc(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword)
+    : mKeyword(aKeyword) {
+  NS_ASSERTION((aKeyword != CSP_SELF),
+               "'self' should have been replaced in the parser");
+}
+
+nsCSPKeywordSrc::~nsCSPKeywordSrc() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                              bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                              bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+                              bool aParserCreated) const {
+  // no need to check for invalidated, this will always return false unless
+  // it is an nsCSPKeywordSrc for 'strict-dynamic', which should allow non
+  // parser created scripts.
+  return ((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                             const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                             bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(
+      ("nsCSPKeywordSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, aHashOrNonce: %s, mInvalidated: "
+       "%s",
+       CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+       NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get(),
+       mInvalidated ? "true" : "false"));
+
+  if (mInvalidated) {
+    // only 'self', 'report-sample' and 'unsafe-inline' are keywords that can be
+    // ignored. Please note that the parser already translates 'self' into a uri
+    // (see assertion in constructor).
+    MOZ_ASSERT(mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE || mKeyword == CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE,
+               "should only invalidate unsafe-inline");
+    return false;
+  }
+  // either the keyword allows the load or the policy contains 'strict-dynamic',
+  // in which case we have to make sure the script is not parser created before
+  // allowing the load and also eval & wasm-eval should be blocked even if
+  // 'strict-dynamic' is present. Should be allowed only if 'unsafe-eval' is
+  // present.
+  return ((mKeyword == aKeyword) ||
+          ((mKeyword == CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC) && !aParserCreated &&
+           aKeyword != CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL && aKeyword != CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL));
+}
+
+bool nsCSPKeywordSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  return aVisitor->visitKeywordSrc(*this);
+}
+
+void nsCSPKeywordSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.Append(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(mKeyword));
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPNonceSrc ==================== */
+
+nsCSPNonceSrc::nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce) : mNonce(aNonce) {}
+
+nsCSPNonceSrc::~nsCSPNonceSrc() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPNonceSrc::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                            bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                            bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::permits, aUri: %s, aNonce: %s",
+                 aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get(),
+                 NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aNonce).get()));
+  }
+
+  if (aReportOnly && aWasRedirected && aNonce.IsEmpty()) {
+    /* Fix for Bug 1505412
+     *  If we land here, we're currently handling a script-preload which got
+     *  redirected. Preloads do not have any info about the nonce assiociated.
+     *  Because of Report-Only the preload passes the 1st CSP-check so the
+     *  preload does not get retried with a nonce attached.
+     *  Currently we're relying on the script-manager to
+     *  provide a fake loadinfo to check the preloads against csp.
+     *  So during HTTPChannel->OnRedirect we cant check csp for this case.
+     *  But as the script-manager already checked the csp,
+     *  a report would already have been send,
+     *  if the nonce didnt match.
+     *  So we can pass the check here for Report-Only Cases.
+     */
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aParserCreated == false,
+               "Skipping nonce-check is only allowed for Preloads");
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
+  return mNonce.Equals(aNonce);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPNonceSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                           const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                           bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPNonceSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
+               CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
+
+  if (aKeyword != CSP_NONCE) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // nonces can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
+  return mNonce.Equals(aHashOrNonce);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPNonceSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  return aVisitor->visitNonceSrc(*this);
+}
+
+void nsCSPNonceSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.Append(CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(CSP_NONCE));
+  outStr.Append(mNonce);
+  outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPHashSrc ===================== */
+
+nsCSPHashSrc::nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& aAlgo, const nsAString& aHash)
+    : mAlgorithm(aAlgo), mHash(aHash) {
+  // Only the algo should be rewritten to lowercase, the hash must remain the
+  // same.
+  ToLowerCase(mAlgorithm);
+  // Normalize the base64url encoding to base64 encoding:
+  char16_t* cur = mHash.BeginWriting();
+  char16_t* end = mHash.EndWriting();
+
+  for (; cur < end; ++cur) {
+    if (char16_t('-') == *cur) {
+      *cur = char16_t('+');
+    }
+    if (char16_t('_') == *cur) {
+      *cur = char16_t('/');
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+nsCSPHashSrc::~nsCSPHashSrc() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPHashSrc::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                          const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                          bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPHashSrc::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
+               CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
+
+  if (aKeyword != CSP_HASH) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // hashes can not be invalidated by strict-dynamic
+
+  // Convert aHashOrNonce to UTF-8
+  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8 utf8_hash(aHashOrNonce);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher;
+  nsresult rv = NS_NewCryptoHash(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mAlgorithm),
+                                 getter_AddRefs(hasher));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  rv = hasher->Update((uint8_t*)utf8_hash.get(), utf8_hash.Length());
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  nsAutoCString hash;
+  rv = hasher->Finish(true, hash);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  return NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(mHash).Equals(hash);
+}
+
+bool nsCSPHashSrc::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  return aVisitor->visitHashSrc(*this);
+}
+
+void nsCSPHashSrc::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
+  outStr.Append(mAlgorithm);
+  outStr.AppendLiteral("-");
+  outStr.Append(mHash);
+  outStr.AppendLiteral("'");
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPReportURI ===================== */
+
+nsCSPReportURI::nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI* aURI) : mReportURI(aURI) {}
+
+nsCSPReportURI::~nsCSPReportURI() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPReportURI::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const { return false; }
+
+void nsCSPReportURI::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  nsresult rv = mReportURI->GetSpec(spec);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  outStr.AppendASCII(spec.get());
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPSandboxFlags ===================== */
+
+nsCSPSandboxFlags::nsCSPSandboxFlags(const nsAString& aFlags) : mFlags(aFlags) {
+  ToLowerCase(mFlags);
+}
+
+nsCSPSandboxFlags::~nsCSPSandboxFlags() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPSandboxFlags::visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const { return false; }
+
+void nsCSPSandboxFlags::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.Append(mFlags);
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPDirective ====================== */
+
+nsCSPDirective::nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective) {
+  mDirective = aDirective;
+}
+
+nsCSPDirective::~nsCSPDirective() {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    delete mSrcs[i];
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsCSPDirective::permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                             bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                             bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(
+        ("nsCSPDirective::permits, aUri: %s", aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get()));
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mSrcs[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, aReportOnly,
+                          aUpgradeInsecure, aParserCreated)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPDirective::allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                            const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                            bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPDirective::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
+               CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mSrcs[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+void nsCSPDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  // Append directive name
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective));
+  outStr.AppendLiteral(" ");
+
+  // Append srcs
+  StringJoinAppend(outStr, u" "_ns, mSrcs,
+                   [](nsAString& dest, nsCSPBaseSrc* cspBaseSrc) {
+                     cspBaseSrc->toString(dest);
+                   });
+}
+
+void nsCSPDirective::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const {
+  mozilla::dom::Sequence<nsString> srcs;
+  nsString src;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    src.Truncate();
+    mSrcs[i]->toString(src);
+    if (!srcs.AppendElement(src, mozilla::fallible)) {
+      // XXX(Bug 1632090) Instead of extending the array 1-by-1 (which might
+      // involve multiple reallocations) and potentially crashing here,
+      // SetCapacity could be called outside the loop once.
+      mozalloc_handle_oom(0);
+    }
+  }
+
+  switch (mDirective) {
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mDefault_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mDefault_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mScript_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mScript_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mObject_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mObject_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mStyle_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mStyle_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mImg_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mImg_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mMedia_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mMedia_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mFrame_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mFrame_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mFont_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mFont_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mConnect_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mConnect_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mReport_uri.Construct();
+      outCSP.mReport_uri.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Construct();
+      outCSP.mFrame_ancestors.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WEB_MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mManifest_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mManifest_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+      // not supporting REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mBase_uri.Construct();
+      outCSP.mBase_uri.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mForm_action.Construct();
+      outCSP.mForm_action.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT:
+      outCSP.mBlock_all_mixed_content.Construct();
+      // does not have any srcs
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mUpgrade_insecure_requests.Construct();
+      // does not have any srcs
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mChild_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mChild_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mSandbox.Construct();
+      outCSP.mSandbox.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mWorker_src.Construct();
+      outCSP.mWorker_src.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mScript_src_elem.Construct();
+      outCSP.mScript_src_elem.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    case nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE:
+      outCSP.mScript_src_attr.Construct();
+      outCSP.mScript_src_attr.Value() = std::move(srcs);
+      return;
+
+    default:
+      NS_ASSERTION(false, "cannot find directive to convert CSP to JSON");
+  }
+}
+
+void nsCSPDirective::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const {
+  NS_ASSERTION((mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE),
+               "not a report-uri directive");
+
+  // append uris
+  nsString tmpReportURI;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    tmpReportURI.Truncate();
+    mSrcs[i]->toString(tmpReportURI);
+    outReportURIs.AppendElement(tmpReportURI);
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsCSPDirective::visitSrcs(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSrcs.Length(); i++) {
+    if (!mSrcs[i]->visit(aVisitor)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const {
+  return (mDirective == aDirective);
+}
+
+void nsCSPDirective::getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(mDirective));
+}
+
+bool nsCSPDirective::hasReportSampleKeyword() const {
+  for (nsCSPBaseSrc* src : mSrcs) {
+    if (src->isReportSample()) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* =============== nsCSPChildSrcDirective ============= */
+
+nsCSPChildSrcDirective::nsCSPChildSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
+    : nsCSPDirective(aDirective),
+      mRestrictFrames(false),
+      mRestrictWorkers(false) {}
+
+nsCSPChildSrcDirective::~nsCSPChildSrcDirective() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPChildSrcDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const {
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictFrames;
+  }
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictWorkers;
+  }
+  return (mDirective == aDirective);
+}
+
+/* =============== nsCSPScriptSrcDirective ============= */
+
+nsCSPScriptSrcDirective::nsCSPScriptSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
+    : nsCSPDirective(aDirective) {}
+
+nsCSPScriptSrcDirective::~nsCSPScriptSrcDirective() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPScriptSrcDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const {
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictWorkers;
+  }
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictScriptElem;
+  }
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictScriptAttr;
+  }
+  return mDirective == aDirective;
+}
+
+/* =============== nsCSPStyleSrcDirective ============= */
+
+nsCSPStyleSrcDirective::nsCSPStyleSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
+    : nsCSPDirective(aDirective) {}
+
+nsCSPStyleSrcDirective::~nsCSPStyleSrcDirective() = default;
+
+bool nsCSPStyleSrcDirective::equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const {
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictStyleElem;
+  }
+  if (aDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) {
+    return mRestrictStyleAttr;
+  }
+  return mDirective == aDirective;
+}
+
+/* =============== nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective ============= */
+
+nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective(
+    CSPDirective aDirective)
+    : nsCSPDirective(aDirective) {}
+
+nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::~nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective() = default;
+
+void nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
+      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT));
+}
+
+void nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective::getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
+      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT));
+}
+
+/* =============== nsUpgradeInsecureDirective ============= */
+
+nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::nsUpgradeInsecureDirective(CSPDirective aDirective)
+    : nsCSPDirective(aDirective) {}
+
+nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::~nsUpgradeInsecureDirective() = default;
+
+void nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
+      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE));
+}
+
+void nsUpgradeInsecureDirective::getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  outStr.AppendASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(
+      nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE));
+}
+
+/* ===== nsCSPPolicy ========================= */
+
+nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy()
+    : mUpgradeInsecDir(nullptr),
+      mReportOnly(false),
+      mDeliveredViaMetaTag(false) {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::nsCSPPolicy"));
+}
+
+nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy() {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::~nsCSPPolicy"));
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    delete mDirectives[i];
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsCSPPolicy::permits(CSPDirective aDir, nsIURI* aUri,
+                          const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+                          bool aSpecific, bool aParserCreated,
+                          nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const {
+  if (CSPUTILSLOGENABLED()) {
+    CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %d, aSpecific: %s",
+                 aUri->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), aDir,
+                 aSpecific ? "true" : "false"));
+  }
+
+  NS_ASSERTION(aUri, "permits needs an uri to perform the check!");
+  outViolatedDirective.Truncate();
+
+  nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
+
+  // Try to find a relevant directive
+  // These directive arrays are short (1-5 elements), not worth using a
+  // hashtable.
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
+      if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly,
+                                   mUpgradeInsecDir, aParserCreated)) {
+        mDirectives[i]->getDirName(outViolatedDirective);
+        return false;
+      }
+      return true;
+    }
+    if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
+      defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
+  // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
+  if (!aSpecific && defaultDir) {
+    if (!defaultDir->permits(aUri, aNonce, aWasRedirected, mReportOnly,
+                             mUpgradeInsecDir, aParserCreated)) {
+      defaultDir->getDirName(outViolatedDirective);
+      return false;
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Nothing restricts this, so we're allowing the load
+  // See bug 764937
+  return true;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPPolicy::allows(CSPDirective aDirective, enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+                         const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                         bool aParserCreated) const {
+  CSPUTILSLOG(("nsCSPPolicy::allows, aKeyWord: %s, a HashOrNonce: %s",
+               CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(aKeyword),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aHashOrNonce).get()));
+
+  nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
+
+  // Try to find a matching directive
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
+      defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDirective)) {
+      if (mDirectives[i]->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // If the above loop runs through, we haven't found a matching directive.
+  // Avoid relooping, just store the result of default-src while looping.
+  if (defaultDir) {
+    return defaultDir->allows(aKeyword, aHashOrNonce, aParserCreated);
+  }
+
+  // Allowing the load; see Bug 885433
+  // a) inline scripts (also unsafe eval) should only be blocked
+  //    if there is a [script-src] or [default-src]
+  // b) inline styles should only be blocked
+  //    if there is a [style-src] or [default-src]
+  return true;
+}
+
+void nsCSPPolicy::toString(nsAString& outStr) const {
+  StringJoinAppend(outStr, u"; "_ns, mDirectives,
+                   [](nsAString& dest, nsCSPDirective* cspDirective) {
+                     cspDirective->toString(dest);
+                   });
+}
+
+void nsCSPPolicy::toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const {
+  outCSP.mReport_only = mReportOnly;
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); ++i) {
+    mDirectives[i]->toDomCSPStruct(outCSP);
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsCSPPolicy::hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool nsCSPPolicy::allowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aWasRedirected,
+                                   bool aEnforceAllowlist) const {
+  bool allowsNavigateTo = true;
+
+  for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NAVIGATE_TO_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      // Early return if we can skip the allowlist AND 'unsafe-allow-redirects'
+      // is present.
+      if (!aEnforceAllowlist &&
+          mDirectives[i]->allows(CSP_UNSAFE_ALLOW_REDIRECTS, u""_ns, false)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+      // Otherwise, check against the allowlist.
+      if (!mDirectives[i]->permits(aURI, u""_ns, aWasRedirected, false, false,
+                                   false)) {
+        allowsNavigateTo = false;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return allowsNavigateTo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use this function only after ::allows() returned 'false'. Most and
+ * foremost it's used to get the violated directive before sending reports.
+ * The parameter outDirective is the equivalent of 'outViolatedDirective'
+ * for the ::permits() function family.
+ */
+void nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
+    CSPDirective aDirective, nsAString& outDirective,
+    bool* aReportSample) const {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aReportSample);
+  *aReportSample = false;
+
+  nsCSPDirective* defaultDir = nullptr;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->isDefaultDirective()) {
+      defaultDir = mDirectives[i];
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDirective)) {
+      mDirectives[i]->getDirName(outDirective);
+      *aReportSample = mDirectives[i]->hasReportSampleKeyword();
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  // if we haven't found a matching directive yet,
+  // the contentType must be restricted by the default directive
+  if (defaultDir) {
+    defaultDir->getDirName(outDirective);
+    *aReportSample = defaultDir->hasReportSampleKeyword();
+    return;
+  }
+  NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not query directive string for contentType!");
+  outDirective.AppendLiteral("couldNotQueryViolatedDirective");
+}
+
+void nsCSPPolicy::getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir,
+                                       nsAString& outDirective) const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
+      mDirectives[i]->toString(outDirective);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helper function that returns the underlying bit representation of sandbox
+ * flags. The function returns SANDBOXED_NONE if there are no sandbox
+ * directives.
+ */
+uint32_t nsCSPPolicy::getSandboxFlags() const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      nsAutoString flags;
+      mDirectives[i]->toString(flags);
+
+      if (flags.IsEmpty()) {
+        return SANDBOX_ALL_FLAGS;
+      }
+
+      nsAttrValue attr;
+      attr.ParseAtomArray(flags);
+
+      return nsContentUtils::ParseSandboxAttributeToFlags(&attr);
+    }
+  }
+
+  return SANDBOXED_NONE;
+}
+
+void nsCSPPolicy::getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(
+            nsIContentSecurityPolicy::REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE)) {
+      mDirectives[i]->getReportURIs(outReportURIs);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsCSPPolicy::visitDirectiveSrcs(CSPDirective aDir,
+                                     nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const {
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mDirectives.Length(); i++) {
+    if (mDirectives[i]->equals(aDir)) {
+      return mDirectives[i]->visitSrcs(aVisitor);
+    }
+  }
+  return false;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.h b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd3ea9a1c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsCSPUtils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,699 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsCSPUtils_h___
+#define nsCSPUtils_h___
+
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsLiteralString.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsTArray.h"
+#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+
+class nsIChannel;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+struct CSP;
+class Document;
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+/* =============== Logging =================== */
+
+void CSP_LogLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                         const nsAString& aSourceName,
+                         const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                         uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
+                         const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
+                         bool aFromPrivateWindow);
+
+void CSP_GetLocalizedStr(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                         nsAString& outResult);
+
+void CSP_LogStrMessage(const nsAString& aMsg);
+
+void CSP_LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, const nsAString& aSourceName,
+                    const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                    uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aFlags,
+                    const nsACString& aCategory, uint64_t aInnerWindowID,
+                    bool aFromPrivateWindow);
+
+/* =============== Constant and Type Definitions ================== */
+
+#define INLINE_STYLE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC \
+  "violated base restriction: Inline Stylesheets will not apply"
+#define INLINE_SCRIPT_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC \
+  "violated base restriction: Inline Scripts will not execute"
+#define EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC \
+  "violated base restriction: Code will not be created from strings"
+#define WASM_EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC                                \
+  "violated base restriction: WebAssembly code will not be created from " \
+  "dynamically"
+#define SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC "Inline Script had invalid nonce"
+#define STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC "Inline Style had invalid nonce"
+#define SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC "Inline Script had invalid hash"
+#define STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC "Inline Style had invalid hash"
+
+// these strings map to the CSPDirectives in nsIContentSecurityPolicy
+// NOTE: When implementing a new directive, you will need to add it here but
+// also add a corresponding entry to the constants in
+// nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl and also create an entry for the new directive
+// in nsCSPDirective::toDomCSPStruct() and add it to CSPDictionaries.webidl.
+// Order of elements below important! Make sure it matches the order as in
+// nsIContentSecurityPolicy.idl
+static const char* CSPStrDirectives[] = {
+    "-error-",                    // NO_DIRECTIVE
+    "default-src",                // DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "script-src",                 // SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "object-src",                 // OBJECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "style-src",                  // STYLE_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "img-src",                    // IMG_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "media-src",                  // MEDIA_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "frame-src",                  // FRAME_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "font-src",                   // FONT_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "connect-src",                // CONNECT_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "report-uri",                 // REPORT_URI_DIRECTIVE
+    "frame-ancestors",            // FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE
+    "reflected-xss",              // REFLECTED_XSS_DIRECTIVE
+    "base-uri",                   // BASE_URI_DIRECTIVE
+    "form-action",                // FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE
+    "manifest-src",               // MANIFEST_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "upgrade-insecure-requests",  // UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE
+    "child-src",                  // CHILD_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "block-all-mixed-content",    // BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT
+    "sandbox",                    // SANDBOX_DIRECTIVE
+    "worker-src",                 // WORKER_SRC_DIRECTIVE
+    "navigate-to",                // NAVIGATE_TO_DIRECTIVE
+    "script-src-elem",            // SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE
+    "script-src-attr",            // SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE
+    "style-src-elem",             // STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE
+    "style-src-attr",             // STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE
+};
+
+inline const char* CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(CSPDirective aDir) {
+  return CSPStrDirectives[static_cast<uint32_t>(aDir)];
+}
+
+inline CSPDirective CSP_StringToCSPDirective(const nsAString& aDir) {
+  nsString lowerDir = PromiseFlatString(aDir);
+  ToLowerCase(lowerDir);
+
+  uint32_t numDirs = (sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]));
+  for (uint32_t i = 1; i < numDirs; i++) {
+    if (lowerDir.EqualsASCII(CSPStrDirectives[i])) {
+      return static_cast<CSPDirective>(i);
+    }
+  }
+  return nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE;
+}
+
+#define FOR_EACH_CSP_KEYWORD(MACRO)                             \
+  MACRO(CSP_SELF, "'self'")                                     \
+  MACRO(CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, "'unsafe-inline'")                   \
+  MACRO(CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, "'unsafe-eval'")                       \
+  MACRO(CSP_UNSAFE_HASHES, "'unsafe-hashes'")                   \
+  MACRO(CSP_NONE, "'none'")                                     \
+  MACRO(CSP_NONCE, "'nonce-")                                   \
+  MACRO(CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE, "'report-sample'")                   \
+  MACRO(CSP_STRICT_DYNAMIC, "'strict-dynamic'")                 \
+  MACRO(CSP_UNSAFE_ALLOW_REDIRECTS, "'unsafe-allow-redirects'") \
+  MACRO(CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL, "'wasm-unsafe-eval'")
+
+enum CSPKeyword {
+#define KEYWORD_ENUM(id_, string_) id_,
+  FOR_EACH_CSP_KEYWORD(KEYWORD_ENUM)
+#undef KEYWORD_ENUM
+
+  // CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE always needs to be the last element in the enum
+  // because we use it to calculate the size for the char* array.
+  CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE,
+
+  // Putting CSP_HASH after the delimitor, because CSP_HASH is not a valid
+  // keyword (hash uses e.g. sha256, sha512) but we use CSP_HASH internally
+  // to identify allowed hashes in ::allows.
+  CSP_HASH
+};
+
+// The keywords, in UTF-8 form.
+static const char* gCSPUTF8Keywords[] = {
+#define KEYWORD_UTF8_LITERAL(id_, string_) string_,
+    FOR_EACH_CSP_KEYWORD(KEYWORD_UTF8_LITERAL)
+#undef KEYWORD_UTF8_LITERAL
+};
+
+// The keywords, in UTF-16 form.
+static const char16_t* gCSPUTF16Keywords[] = {
+#define KEYWORD_UTF16_LITERAL(id_, string_) u"" string_,
+    FOR_EACH_CSP_KEYWORD(KEYWORD_UTF16_LITERAL)
+#undef KEYWORD_UTF16_LITERAL
+};
+
+#undef FOR_EACH_CSP_KEYWORD
+
+inline const char* CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword(enum CSPKeyword aKey) {
+  // Make sure all elements in enum CSPKeyword got added to gCSPUTF8Keywords.
+  static_assert((sizeof(gCSPUTF8Keywords) / sizeof(gCSPUTF8Keywords[0]) ==
+                 CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE),
+                "CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE != length(gCSPUTF8Keywords)");
+
+  if (static_cast<uint32_t>(aKey) <
+      static_cast<uint32_t>(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE)) {
+    return gCSPUTF8Keywords[static_cast<uint32_t>(aKey)];
+  }
+  return "error: invalid keyword in CSP_EnumToUTF8Keyword";
+}
+
+inline const char16_t* CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword(enum CSPKeyword aKey) {
+  // Make sure all elements in enum CSPKeyword got added to gCSPUTF16Keywords.
+  static_assert((sizeof(gCSPUTF16Keywords) / sizeof(gCSPUTF16Keywords[0]) ==
+                 CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE),
+                "CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE != length(gCSPUTF16Keywords)");
+
+  if (static_cast<uint32_t>(aKey) <
+      static_cast<uint32_t>(CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE)) {
+    return gCSPUTF16Keywords[static_cast<uint32_t>(aKey)];
+  }
+  return u"error: invalid keyword in CSP_EnumToUTF16Keyword";
+}
+
+inline CSPKeyword CSP_UTF16KeywordToEnum(const nsAString& aKey) {
+  nsString lowerKey = PromiseFlatString(aKey);
+  ToLowerCase(lowerKey);
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE; i++) {
+    if (lowerKey.Equals(gCSPUTF16Keywords[i])) {
+      return static_cast<CSPKeyword>(i);
+    }
+  }
+  NS_ASSERTION(false, "Can not convert unknown Keyword to Enum");
+  return CSP_LAST_KEYWORD_VALUE;
+}
+
+nsresult CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp,
+                                 const nsAString& aHeaderValue,
+                                 bool aReportOnly);
+
+/* =============== Helpers ================== */
+
+class nsCSPHostSrc;
+
+nsCSPHostSrc* CSP_CreateHostSrcFromSelfURI(nsIURI* aSelfURI);
+bool CSP_IsEmptyDirective(const nsAString& aValue, const nsAString& aDir);
+bool CSP_IsDirective(const nsAString& aValue, CSPDirective aDir);
+bool CSP_IsKeyword(const nsAString& aValue, enum CSPKeyword aKey);
+bool CSP_IsQuotelessKeyword(const nsAString& aKey);
+CSPDirective CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(nsContentPolicyType aType);
+
+class nsCSPSrcVisitor;
+
+void CSP_PercentDecodeStr(const nsAString& aEncStr, nsAString& outDecStr);
+bool CSP_ShouldResponseInheritCSP(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+void CSP_ApplyMetaCSPToDoc(mozilla::dom::Document& aDoc,
+                           const nsAString& aPolicyStr);
+
+/* =============== nsCSPSrc ================== */
+
+class nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  nsCSPBaseSrc();
+  virtual ~nsCSPBaseSrc();
+
+  virtual bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                       bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                       bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const;
+  virtual bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                      bool aParserCreated) const;
+  virtual bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const = 0;
+  virtual void toString(nsAString& outStr) const = 0;
+
+  virtual void invalidate() const { mInvalidated = true; }
+
+  virtual bool isReportSample() const { return false; }
+
+ protected:
+  // invalidate srcs if 'script-dynamic' is present or also invalidate
+  // unsafe-inline' if nonce- or hash-source specified
+  mutable bool mInvalidated;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPSchemeSrc ============ */
+
+class nsCSPSchemeSrc : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPSchemeSrc(const nsAString& aScheme);
+  virtual ~nsCSPSchemeSrc();
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  inline void getScheme(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mScheme); };
+
+ private:
+  nsString mScheme;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPHostSrc ============== */
+
+class nsCSPHostSrc : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPHostSrc(const nsAString& aHost);
+  virtual ~nsCSPHostSrc();
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  void setScheme(const nsAString& aScheme);
+  void setPort(const nsAString& aPort);
+  void appendPath(const nsAString& aPath);
+
+  inline void setGeneratedFromSelfKeyword() const {
+    mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword = true;
+  }
+
+  inline void setIsUniqueOrigin() const { mIsUniqueOrigin = true; }
+
+  inline void setWithinFrameAncestorsDir(bool aValue) const {
+    mWithinFrameAncstorsDir = aValue;
+  }
+
+  inline void getScheme(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mScheme); };
+
+  inline void getHost(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mHost); };
+
+  inline void getPort(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mPort); };
+
+  inline void getPath(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mPath); };
+
+ private:
+  nsString mScheme;
+  nsString mHost;
+  nsString mPort;
+  nsString mPath;
+  mutable bool mGeneratedFromSelfKeyword;
+  mutable bool mIsUniqueOrigin;
+  mutable bool mWithinFrameAncstorsDir;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPKeywordSrc ============ */
+
+class nsCSPKeywordSrc : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPKeywordSrc(CSPKeyword aKeyword);
+  virtual ~nsCSPKeywordSrc();
+
+  bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+              bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  inline CSPKeyword getKeyword() const { return mKeyword; };
+
+  inline void invalidate() const override {
+    // keywords that need to invalidated
+    if (mKeyword == CSP_SELF || mKeyword == CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE ||
+        mKeyword == CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE) {
+      mInvalidated = true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  bool isReportSample() const override { return mKeyword == CSP_REPORT_SAMPLE; }
+
+ private:
+  CSPKeyword mKeyword;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPNonceSource =========== */
+
+class nsCSPNonceSrc : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPNonceSrc(const nsAString& aNonce);
+  virtual ~nsCSPNonceSrc();
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+              bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  inline void getNonce(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mNonce); };
+
+  inline void invalidate() const override {
+    // overwrite nsCSPBaseSRC::invalidate() and explicitily
+    // do *not* invalidate, because 'strict-dynamic' should
+    // not invalidate nonces.
+  }
+
+ private:
+  nsString mNonce;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPHashSource ============ */
+
+class nsCSPHashSrc : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  nsCSPHashSrc(const nsAString& algo, const nsAString& hash);
+  virtual ~nsCSPHashSrc();
+
+  bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+              bool aParserCreated) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+
+  inline void getAlgorithm(nsAString& outStr) const {
+    outStr.Assign(mAlgorithm);
+  };
+
+  inline void getHash(nsAString& outStr) const { outStr.Assign(mHash); };
+
+  inline void invalidate() const override {
+    // overwrite nsCSPBaseSRC::invalidate() and explicitily
+    // do *not* invalidate, because 'strict-dynamic' should
+    // not invalidate hashes.
+  }
+
+ private:
+  nsString mAlgorithm;
+  nsString mHash;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPReportURI ============ */
+
+class nsCSPReportURI : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPReportURI(nsIURI* aURI);
+  virtual ~nsCSPReportURI();
+
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+ private:
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mReportURI;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPSandboxFlags ================== */
+
+class nsCSPSandboxFlags : public nsCSPBaseSrc {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPSandboxFlags(const nsAString& aFlags);
+  virtual ~nsCSPSandboxFlags();
+
+  bool visit(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const override;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+ private:
+  nsString mFlags;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPSrcVisitor ================== */
+
+class nsCSPSrcVisitor {
+ public:
+  virtual bool visitSchemeSrc(const nsCSPSchemeSrc& src) = 0;
+
+  virtual bool visitHostSrc(const nsCSPHostSrc& src) = 0;
+
+  virtual bool visitKeywordSrc(const nsCSPKeywordSrc& src) = 0;
+
+  virtual bool visitNonceSrc(const nsCSPNonceSrc& src) = 0;
+
+  virtual bool visitHashSrc(const nsCSPHashSrc& src) = 0;
+
+ protected:
+  explicit nsCSPSrcVisitor() = default;
+  virtual ~nsCSPSrcVisitor() = default;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPDirective ============= */
+
+class nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  virtual ~nsCSPDirective();
+
+  virtual bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+                       bool aWasRedirected, bool aReportOnly,
+                       bool aUpgradeInsecure, bool aParserCreated) const;
+  virtual bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+                      bool aParserCreated) const;
+  virtual void toString(nsAString& outStr) const;
+  void toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const;
+
+  virtual void addSrcs(const nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& aSrcs) {
+    mSrcs = aSrcs.Clone();
+  }
+
+  inline bool isDefaultDirective() const {
+    return mDirective == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::DEFAULT_SRC_DIRECTIVE;
+  }
+
+  virtual bool equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const;
+
+  void getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const;
+
+  bool visitSrcs(nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const;
+
+  virtual void getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const;
+
+  bool hasReportSampleKeyword() const;
+
+ protected:
+  CSPDirective mDirective;
+  nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*> mSrcs;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPChildSrcDirective ============= */
+
+/*
+ * In CSP 3 child-src is deprecated. For backwards compatibility
+ * child-src needs to restrict:
+ *   (*) frames, in case frame-src is not expicitly specified
+ *   (*) workers, in case worker-src is not expicitly specified
+ */
+class nsCSPChildSrcDirective : public nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPChildSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  virtual ~nsCSPChildSrcDirective();
+
+  void setRestrictFrames() { mRestrictFrames = true; }
+
+  void setRestrictWorkers() { mRestrictWorkers = true; }
+
+  virtual bool equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const override;
+
+ private:
+  bool mRestrictFrames;
+  bool mRestrictWorkers;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPScriptSrcDirective ============= */
+
+/*
+ * In CSP 3 worker-src restricts workers, for backwards compatibily
+ * script-src has to restrict workers as the ultimate fallback if
+ * neither worker-src nor child-src is present in a CSP.
+ */
+class nsCSPScriptSrcDirective : public nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPScriptSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  virtual ~nsCSPScriptSrcDirective();
+
+  void setRestrictWorkers() { mRestrictWorkers = true; }
+  void setRestrictScriptElem() { mRestrictScriptElem = true; }
+  void setRestrictScriptAttr() { mRestrictScriptAttr = true; }
+
+  bool equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const override;
+
+ private:
+  bool mRestrictWorkers = false;
+  bool mRestrictScriptElem = false;
+  bool mRestrictScriptAttr = false;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPStyleSrcDirective ============= */
+
+/*
+ * In CSP 3 style-src is use as a fallback for style-src-elem and
+ * style-src-attr.
+ */
+class nsCSPStyleSrcDirective : public nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsCSPStyleSrcDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  virtual ~nsCSPStyleSrcDirective();
+
+  void setRestrictStyleElem() { mRestrictStyleElem = true; }
+  void setRestrictStyleAttr() { mRestrictStyleAttr = true; }
+
+  bool equals(CSPDirective aDirective) const override;
+
+ private:
+  bool mRestrictStyleElem = false;
+  bool mRestrictStyleAttr = false;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective === */
+
+class nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective : public nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  ~nsBlockAllMixedContentDirective();
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri) const { return false; }
+
+  bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+              bool aParserCreated) const override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  void addSrcs(const nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& aSrcs) override {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false, "block-all-mixed-content does not hold any srcs");
+  }
+
+  void getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsUpgradeInsecureDirective === */
+
+/*
+ * Upgrading insecure requests includes the following actors:
+ * (1) CSP:
+ *     The CSP implementation allowlists the http-request
+ *     in case the policy is executed in enforcement mode.
+ *     The CSP implementation however does not allow http
+ *     requests to succeed if executed in report-only mode.
+ *     In such a case the CSP implementation reports the
+ *     error back to the page.
+ *
+ * (2) MixedContent:
+ *     The evalution of MixedContent allowlists all http
+ *     requests with the promise that the http requests
+ *     gets upgraded to https before any data is fetched
+ *     from the network.
+ *
+ * (3) CORS:
+ *     Does not consider the http request to be of a
+ *     different origin in case the scheme is the only
+ *     difference in otherwise matching URIs.
+ *
+ * (4) nsHttpChannel:
+ *     Before connecting, the channel gets redirected
+ *     to use https.
+ *
+ * (5) WebSocketChannel:
+ *     Similar to the httpChannel, the websocketchannel
+ *     gets upgraded from ws to wss.
+ */
+class nsUpgradeInsecureDirective : public nsCSPDirective {
+ public:
+  explicit nsUpgradeInsecureDirective(CSPDirective aDirective);
+  ~nsUpgradeInsecureDirective();
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aWasRedirected,
+               bool aReportOnly, bool aUpgradeInsecure,
+               bool aParserCreated) const override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  bool permits(nsIURI* aUri) const { return false; }
+
+  bool allows(enum CSPKeyword aKeyword, const nsAString& aHashOrNonce,
+              bool aParserCreated) const override {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+
+  void addSrcs(const nsTArray<nsCSPBaseSrc*>& aSrcs) override {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false, "upgrade-insecure-requests does not hold any srcs");
+  }
+
+  void getDirName(nsAString& outStr) const override;
+};
+
+/* =============== nsCSPPolicy ================== */
+
+class nsCSPPolicy {
+ public:
+  nsCSPPolicy();
+  virtual ~nsCSPPolicy();
+
+  bool permits(CSPDirective aDirective, nsIURI* aUri, const nsAString& aNonce,
+               bool aWasRedirected, bool aSpecific, bool aParserCreated,
+               nsAString& outViolatedDirective) const;
+  bool allows(CSPDirective aDirective, enum CSPKeyword aKeyword,
+              const nsAString& aHashOrNonce, bool aParserCreated) const;
+  void toString(nsAString& outStr) const;
+  void toDomCSPStruct(mozilla::dom::CSP& outCSP) const;
+
+  inline void addDirective(nsCSPDirective* aDir) {
+    mDirectives.AppendElement(aDir);
+  }
+
+  inline void addUpgradeInsecDir(nsUpgradeInsecureDirective* aDir) {
+    mUpgradeInsecDir = aDir;
+    addDirective(aDir);
+  }
+
+  bool hasDirective(CSPDirective aDir) const;
+
+  inline void setDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag(bool aFlag) {
+    mDeliveredViaMetaTag = aFlag;
+  }
+
+  inline bool getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag() const {
+    return mDeliveredViaMetaTag;
+  }
+
+  inline void setReportOnlyFlag(bool aFlag) { mReportOnly = aFlag; }
+
+  inline bool getReportOnlyFlag() const { return mReportOnly; }
+
+  void getReportURIs(nsTArray<nsString>& outReportURIs) const;
+
+  void getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType(
+      CSPDirective aDirective, nsAString& outDirective,
+      bool* aReportSample) const;
+
+  void getDirectiveAsString(CSPDirective aDir, nsAString& outDirective) const;
+
+  uint32_t getSandboxFlags() const;
+
+  inline uint32_t getNumDirectives() const { return mDirectives.Length(); }
+
+  bool visitDirectiveSrcs(CSPDirective aDir, nsCSPSrcVisitor* aVisitor) const;
+
+  bool allowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aWasRedirected,
+                        bool aEnforceAllowlist) const;
+
+ private:
+  nsUpgradeInsecureDirective* mUpgradeInsecDir;
+  nsTArray<nsCSPDirective*> mDirectives;
+  bool mReportOnly;
+  bool mDeliveredViaMetaTag;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsCSPUtils_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3a38c9776
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1849 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsAboutProtocolUtils.h"
+#include "nsArray.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsEscape.h"
+#include "nsDataHandler.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "nsINode.h"
+#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsIMIMEService.h"
+#include "nsIOService.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsCORSListenerProxy.h"
+#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIXULRuntime.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsReadableUtils.h"
+#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
+#include "nsIXPConnect.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
+#include "mozilla/CmdLineAndEnvUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Element.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/BrowserChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentParent.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/extensions/WebExtensionPolicy.h"
+#include "mozilla/Components.h"
+#include "mozilla/ExtensionPolicyService.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/TelemetryComms.h"
+#include "xpcpublic.h"
+#include "nsMimeTypes.h"
+
+#include "jsapi.h"
+#include "js/RegExp.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+using namespace mozilla::Telemetry;
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsContentSecurityManager, nsIContentSecurityManager,
+                  nsIChannelEventSink)
+
+mozilla::LazyLogModule sCSMLog("CSMLog");
+
+// These first two are used for off-the-main-thread checks of
+// general.config.filename
+//   (which can't be checked off-main-thread).
+Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksChecked(false);
+Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksPresent(false);
+Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksChecked(false);
+Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksPresent(false);
+Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sTelemetryEventEnabled(false);
+
+/* static */
+bool nsContentSecurityManager::AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  // Let's block all toplevel document navigations to a data: URI.
+  // In all cases where the toplevel document is navigated to a
+  // data: URI the triggeringPrincipal is a contentPrincipal, or
+  // a NullPrincipal. In other cases, e.g. typing a data: URL into
+  // the URL-Bar, the triggeringPrincipal is a SystemPrincipal;
+  // we don't want to block those loads. Only exception, loads coming
+  // from an external applicaton (e.g. Thunderbird) don't load
+  // using a contentPrincipal, but we want to block those loads.
+  if (!StaticPrefs::security_data_uri_block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (loadInfo->GetForceAllowDataURI()) {
+    // if the loadinfo explicitly allows the data URI navigation, let's allow it
+    // now
+    return true;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
+  bool isDataURI = uri->SchemeIs("data");
+  if (!isDataURI) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  rv = uri->GetSpec(spec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
+  nsAutoCString contentType;
+  bool base64;
+  rv = nsDataHandler::ParseURI(spec, contentType, nullptr, base64, nullptr);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true);
+
+  // Allow data: images as long as they are not SVGs
+  if (StringBeginsWith(contentType, "image/"_ns) &&
+      !contentType.EqualsLiteral("image/svg+xml")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Allow all data: PDFs. or JSON documents
+  if (contentType.EqualsLiteral(APPLICATION_JSON) ||
+      contentType.EqualsLiteral(TEXT_JSON) ||
+      contentType.EqualsLiteral(APPLICATION_PDF)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  // Redirecting to a toplevel data: URI is not allowed, hence we make
+  // sure the RedirectChain is empty.
+  if (!loadInfo->GetLoadTriggeredFromExternal() &&
+      loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      loadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // We're going to block the request, construct the localized error message to
+  // report to the console.
+  nsAutoCString dataSpec;
+  uri->GetSpec(dataSpec);
+  if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
+    dataSpec.Truncate(50);
+    dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
+  }
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+  CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec), *params.AppendElement());
+  nsAutoString errorText;
+  rv = nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, "BlockTopLevelDataURINavigation",
+      params, errorText);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  // Report the localized error message to the console for the loading
+  // BrowsingContext's current inner window.
+  RefPtr<BrowsingContext> target = loadInfo->GetBrowsingContext();
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(
+      errorText, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "DATA_URI_BLOCKED"_ns,
+      target ? target->GetCurrentInnerWindowId() : 0);
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsContentSecurityManager::AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(
+    nsIChannel* aNewChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aNewChannel->LoadInfo();
+  if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !newURI) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  bool isDataURI = newURI->SchemeIs("data");
+  if (!isDataURI) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Web Extensions are exempt from that restriction and are allowed to redirect
+  // a channel to a data: URI. When a web extension redirects a channel, we set
+  // a flag on the loadInfo which allows us to identify such redirects here.
+  if (loadInfo->GetAllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString dataSpec;
+  newURI->GetSpec(dataSpec);
+  if (dataSpec.Length() > 50) {
+    dataSpec.Truncate(50);
+    dataSpec.AppendLiteral("...");
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
+  nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode();
+  if (node) {
+    doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+  }
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+  CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(dataSpec), *params.AppendElement());
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                  "DATA_URI_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
+                                  nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                  "BlockSubresourceRedirectToData", params);
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  // We dissallow using FTP resources as a subresource everywhere.
+  // The only valid way to use FTP resources is loading it as
+  // a top level document.
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // Allow top-level FTP documents and save-as download of FTP files on
+  // HTTP pages.
+  if (type == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+      type == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Allow the system principal to load everything. This is meant to
+  // temporarily fix downloads and pdf.js.
+  nsIPrincipal* triggeringPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+  if (triggeringPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (!uri) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool isFtpURI = uri->SchemeIs("ftp");
+  if (!isFtpURI) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
+  if (nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode()) {
+    doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  uri->GetSpec(spec);
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+  CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(spec), *params.AppendElement());
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(
+      nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "FTP_URI_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, "BlockSubresourceFTP", params);
+
+  return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+}
+
+static nsresult ValidateSecurityFlags(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  nsSecurityFlags securityMode = aLoadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+
+  // We should never perform a security check on a loadInfo that uses the flag
+  // SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK, because that is only used for
+  // temporary loadInfos used for explicit nsIContentPolicy checks, but never be
+  // set as a security flag on an actual channel.
+  if (securityMode !=
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT &&
+      securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED &&
+      securityMode !=
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT &&
+      securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL &&
+      securityMode != nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(
+        false,
+        "need one securityflag from nsILoadInfo to perform security checks");
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // all good, found the right security flags
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static already_AddRefed<nsIPrincipal> GetExtensionSandboxPrincipal(
+    nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // An extension is allowed to load resources from itself when its pages are
+  // loaded into a sandboxed frame.  Extension resources in a sandbox have
+  // a null principal and no access to extension APIs.  See "sandbox" in
+  // MDN extension docs for more information.
+  if (!aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  RefPtr<Document> doc;
+  aLoadInfo->GetLoadingDocument(getter_AddRefs(doc));
+  if (!doc || !(doc->GetSandboxFlags() & SANDBOXED_ORIGIN)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // node principal is also a null principal here, so we need to
+  // create a principal using documentURI, which is the moz-extension
+  // uri for the page if this is an extension sandboxed page.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> docPrincipal = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(
+      doc->GetDocumentURI(), doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef());
+
+  if (!BasePrincipal::Cast(docPrincipal)->AddonPolicy()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return docPrincipal.forget();
+}
+
+static bool IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // Editor apps get special treatment here, editors can load images
+  // from anywhere.  This allows editor to insert images from file://
+  // into documents that are being edited.
+  nsContentPolicyType type = aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  if (type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE &&
+      type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_PRELOAD &&
+      type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_IMAGE_FAVICON &&
+      type != nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  auto appType = nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+  nsINode* node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+  if (!node) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  Document* doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+  if (!doc) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem = doc->GetDocShell();
+  if (!docShellTreeItem) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> root;
+  docShellTreeItem->GetInProcessRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(root));
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(root));
+  if (docShell) {
+    appType = docShell->GetAppType();
+  }
+
+  return appType == nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_EDITOR;
+}
+
+static nsresult DoCheckLoadURIChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // In practice, these DTDs are just used for localization, so applying the
+  // same principal check as Fluent.
+  if (aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType() ==
+      nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_DTD) {
+    RefPtr<Document> doc;
+    aLoadInfo->GetLoadingDocument(getter_AddRefs(doc));
+    bool allowed = false;
+    aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsL10nAllowed(
+        doc ? doc->GetDocumentURI() : nullptr, &allowed);
+
+    return allowed ? NS_OK : NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+  }
+
+  // This is used in order to allow a privileged DOMParser to parse documents
+  // that need to access localization DTDs. We just allow through
+  // TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD no matter what the triggering principal is.
+  if (aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType() ==
+      nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_FORCE_ALLOWED_DTD) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (IsImageLoadInEditorAppType(aLoadInfo)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> addonPrincipal =
+      GetExtensionSandboxPrincipal(aLoadInfo);
+  if (addonPrincipal) {
+    // call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() as below to continue other checks, but
+    // with the addon principal.
+    triggeringPrincipal = addonPrincipal;
+  }
+
+  // Only call CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal() using the TriggeringPrincipal and not
+  // the LoadingPrincipal when SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_* security flags are set,
+  // to allow, e.g. user stylesheets to load chrome:// URIs.
+  return nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
+      triggeringPrincipal, aURI, aLoadInfo->CheckLoadURIFlags(),
+      aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
+}
+
+static bool URIHasFlags(nsIURI* aURI, uint32_t aURIFlags) {
+  bool hasFlags;
+  nsresult rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(aURI, aURIFlags, &hasFlags);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  return hasFlags;
+}
+
+static nsresult DoSOPChecks(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                            nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetAllowChrome() &&
+      (URIHasFlags(aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) ||
+       nsContentUtils::SchemeIs(aURI, "moz-safe-about"))) {
+    // UI resources are allowed.
+    return DoCheckLoadURIChecks(aURI, aLoadInfo);
+  }
+
+  if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel, true)) {
+    NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
+                                nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_NOT_SAME_ORIGIN);
+    return NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult DoCORSChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                             nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener) {
+  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(aInAndOutListener,
+                     "can not perform CORS checks without a listener");
+
+  // No need to set up CORS if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
+  if (aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // We use the triggering principal here, rather than the loading principal
+  // to ensure that anonymous CORS content in the browser resources and in
+  // WebExtensions is allowed to load.
+  nsIPrincipal* principal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+  RefPtr<nsCORSListenerProxy> corsListener = new nsCORSListenerProxy(
+      aInAndOutListener, principal,
+      aLoadInfo->GetCookiePolicy() == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE);
+  // XXX: @arg: DataURIHandling::Allow
+  // lets use  DataURIHandling::Allow for now and then decide on callsite basis.
+  // see also:
+  // http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/dom/security/nsCORSListenerProxy.h#33
+  nsresult rv = corsListener->Init(aChannel, DataURIHandling::Allow);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  aInAndOutListener = corsListener;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static nsresult DoContentSecurityChecks(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                        nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+      aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsContentPolicyType internalContentPolicyType =
+      aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsCString mimeTypeGuess;
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  switch (contentPolicyType) {
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess = "application/javascript"_ns;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET: {
+      mimeTypeGuess = "text/css"_ns;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess = "text/html"_ns;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PING: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+                   "type_xml requires requestingContext of type Document");
+      }
+#endif
+      // We're checking for the external TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST here in case
+      // an addon creates a request with that type.
+      if (internalContentPolicyType ==
+              nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_XMLHTTPREQUEST ||
+          internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) {
+        mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      } else {
+        MOZ_ASSERT(internalContentPolicyType ==
+                       nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_EVENTSOURCE,
+                   "can not set mime type guess for unexpected internal type");
+        mimeTypeGuess = nsLiteralCString(TEXT_EVENT_STREAM);
+      }
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(
+            !node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+            "type_subrequest requires requestingContext of type Element");
+      }
+#endif
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+                   "type_dtd requires requestingContext of type Document");
+      }
+#endif
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA: {
+      if (internalContentPolicyType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK) {
+        mimeTypeGuess = "text/vtt"_ns;
+      } else {
+        mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE,
+                   "type_media requires requestingContext of type Element");
+      }
+#endif
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: {
+      // Websockets have to use the proxied URI:
+      // ws:// instead of http:// for CSP checks
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal =
+          do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+      MOZ_ASSERT(httpChannelInternal);
+      if (httpChannelInternal) {
+        rv = httpChannelInternal->GetProxyURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+        MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
+      }
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT: {
+      mimeTypeGuess = "application/xml"_ns;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+                   "type_xslt requires requestingContext of type Document");
+      }
+#endif
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+#ifdef DEBUG
+      {
+        nsCOMPtr<nsINode> node = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode();
+        MOZ_ASSERT(!node || node->NodeType() == nsINode::DOCUMENT_NODE,
+                   "type_beacon requires requestingContext of type Document");
+      }
+#endif
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST: {
+      mimeTypeGuess = "application/manifest+json"_ns;
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA: {
+      mimeTypeGuess.Truncate();
+      break;
+    }
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+                 "can not perform security check without a valid contentType");
+      // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+  }
+
+  int16_t shouldLoad = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+  rv = NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy(uri, aLoadInfo, mimeTypeGuess, &shouldLoad,
+                                 nsContentUtils::GetContentPolicy());
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || NS_CP_REJECTED(shouldLoad)) {
+    NS_SetRequestBlockingReasonIfNull(
+        aLoadInfo, nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_CONTENT_POLICY_GENERAL);
+
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) &&
+        (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+         contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT)) {
+      if (shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE) {
+        // for docshell loads we might have to return SHOW_ALT.
+        return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED_SHOW_ALT;
+      }
+      if (shouldLoad == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_POLICY) {
+        return NS_ERROR_BLOCKED_BY_POLICY;
+      }
+    }
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static void LogHTTPSOnlyInfo(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("  httpsOnlyFirstStatus:"));
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus &
+      nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_REGISTERED"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE"));
+  }
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("    - HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST"));
+  }
+}
+
+static void LogPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal,
+                         const nsAString& aPrincipalName,
+                         const uint8_t& aNestingLevel) {
+  nsPrintfCString aIndentationString("%*s", aNestingLevel * 2, "");
+
+  if (aPrincipal && aPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("%s%s: SystemPrincipal\n", aIndentationString.get(),
+             NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (aPrincipal) {
+    if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("%s%s: NullPrincipal\n", aIndentationString.get(),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
+      return;
+    }
+    if (aPrincipal->GetIsExpandedPrincipal()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded(do_QueryInterface(aPrincipal));
+      nsAutoCString origin;
+      origin.AssignLiteral("[Expanded Principal [");
+
+      StringJoinAppend(origin, ", "_ns, expanded->AllowList(),
+                       [](nsACString& dest, nsIPrincipal* principal) {
+                         nsAutoCString subOrigin;
+                         DebugOnly<nsresult> rv =
+                             principal->GetOrigin(subOrigin);
+                         MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv));
+                         dest.Append(subOrigin);
+                       });
+
+      origin.AppendLiteral("]]");
+
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("%s%s: %s\n", aIndentationString.get(),
+               NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get(), origin.get()));
+      return;
+    }
+    nsAutoCString principalSpec;
+    aPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(principalSpec);
+    if (aPrincipalName.IsEmpty()) {
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("%s - \"%s\"\n", aIndentationString.get(), principalSpec.get()));
+    } else {
+      MOZ_LOG(
+          sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("%s%s: \"%s\"\n", aIndentationString.get(),
+           NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get(), principalSpec.get()));
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("%s%s: nullptr\n", aIndentationString.get(),
+           NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPrincipalName).get()));
+}
+
+static void LogSecurityFlags(nsSecurityFlags securityFlags) {
+  struct DebugSecFlagType {
+    unsigned long secFlag;
+    char secTypeStr[128];
+  };
+  static const DebugSecFlagType secTypes[] = {
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK,
+       "SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
+       "SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED,
+       "SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
+       "SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+       "SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT,
+       "SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT, "SEC_COOKIES_DEFAULT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE, "SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN, "SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT, "SEC_COOKIES_OMIT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL, "SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS, "SEC_ABOUT_BLANK_INHERITS"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CHROME, "SEC_ALLOW_CHROME"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT, "SEC_DISALLOW_SCRIPT"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS, "SEC_DONT_FOLLOW_REDIRECTS"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE, "SEC_LOAD_ERROR_PAGE"},
+      {nsILoadInfo::SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER,
+       "SEC_FORCE_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL_OVERRULE_OWNER"}};
+
+  for (const DebugSecFlagType& flag : secTypes) {
+    if (securityFlags & flag.secFlag) {
+      // the logging level should be in sync with the logging level in
+      // DebugDoContentSecurityCheck()
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("    - %s\n", flag.secTypeStr));
+    }
+  }
+}
+static void DebugDoContentSecurityCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                        nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(aChannel));
+
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("\n#DebugDoContentSecurityCheck Begin\n"));
+
+  // we only log http channels, unless loglevel is 5.
+  if (httpChannel || MOZ_LOG_TEST(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("doContentSecurityCheck:\n"));
+
+    nsAutoCString remoteType;
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> parentChannel;
+      NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, parentChannel);
+      if (parentChannel) {
+        parentChannel->GetRemoteType(remoteType);
+      }
+    } else {
+      remoteType.Assign(
+          mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType());
+    }
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  processType: \"%s\"\n", remoteType.get()));
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+    nsAutoCString channelSpec;
+    nsAutoCString channelMethod;
+    NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+    if (channelURI) {
+      channelURI->GetSpec(channelSpec);
+    }
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  channelURI: \"%s\"\n", channelSpec.get()));
+
+    // Log HTTP-specific things
+    if (httpChannel) {
+      nsresult rv;
+      rv = httpChannel->GetRequestMethod(channelMethod);
+      if (!NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+        MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+                ("  httpMethod: %s\n", channelMethod.get()));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Log Principals
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+    LogPrincipal(aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal(), u"loadingPrincipal"_ns, 1);
+    LogPrincipal(requestPrincipal, u"triggeringPrincipal"_ns, 1);
+    LogPrincipal(aLoadInfo->PrincipalToInherit(), u"principalToInherit"_ns, 1);
+
+    // Log Redirect Chain
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("  redirectChain:\n"));
+    for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* redirectHistoryEntry :
+         aLoadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+      redirectHistoryEntry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
+      LogPrincipal(principal, u""_ns, 2);
+    }
+
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  internalContentPolicyType: %s\n",
+             NS_CP_ContentTypeName(aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType())));
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  externalContentPolicyType: %s\n",
+             NS_CP_ContentTypeName(aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType())));
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  upgradeInsecureRequests: %s\n",
+             aLoadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests() ? "true" : "false"));
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  initialSecurityChecksDone: %s\n",
+             aLoadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone() ? "true" : "false"));
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  allowDeprecatedSystemRequests: %s\n",
+             aLoadInfo->GetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests() ? "true" : "false"));
+
+    // Log CSPrequestPrincipal
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aLoadInfo->GetCsp();
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("  CSP:"));
+    if (csp) {
+      nsAutoString parsedPolicyStr;
+      uint32_t count = 0;
+      csp->GetPolicyCount(&count);
+      for (uint32_t i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
+        csp->GetPolicyString(i, parsedPolicyStr);
+        // we need to add quotation marks, as otherwise yaml parsers may fail
+        // with CSP directives
+        // no need to escape quote marks in the parsed policy string, as URLs in
+        // there are already encoded
+        MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+                ("  - \"%s\"\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(parsedPolicyStr).get()));
+      }
+    }
+
+    // Security Flags
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("  securityFlags:"));
+    LogSecurityFlags(aLoadInfo->GetSecurityFlags());
+    LogHTTPSOnlyInfo(aLoadInfo);
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("\n#DebugDoContentSecurityCheck End\n"));
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityManager::MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(
+    nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIURI* aFinalURI, const nsACString& aRemoteType) {
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_security_unexpected_system_load_telemetry_enabled()) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectJsHacks();
+  nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectCssHacks();
+  // The detection only work on the main-thread.
+  // To avoid races and early reports, we need to ensure the checks actually
+  // happened.
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent || !sJSHacksChecked || sCSSHacksPresent ||
+                   !sCSSHacksChecked)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+      aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  // restricting reported types to script, styles and documents
+  // to be continued in follow-ups of bug 1697163.
+  if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT &&
+      contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_STYLESHEET &&
+      contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Gather redirected schemes in string
+  nsAutoCString loggedRedirects;
+  const nsTArray<nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry>>& redirects =
+      aLoadInfo->RedirectChain();
+  if (!redirects.IsEmpty()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry> end = redirects.LastElement();
+    for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : redirects) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+      entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal));
+      if (principal) {
+        nsAutoCString scheme;
+        principal->GetScheme(scheme);
+        loggedRedirects.Append(scheme);
+        if (entry != end) {
+          loggedRedirects.AppendLiteral(", ");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString uriString;
+  if (aFinalURI) {
+    aFinalURI->GetAsciiSpec(uriString);
+  } else {
+    uriString.AssignLiteral("");
+  }
+  FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
+      nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(
+          NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uriString), true);
+
+  nsCString loggedFileDetails = "unknown"_ns;
+  if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
+    loggedFileDetails.Assign(
+        NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value()));
+  }
+  // sanitize remoteType because it may contain sensitive
+  // info, like URLs. e.g. `webIsolated=https://example.com`
+  nsAutoCString loggedRemoteType(dom::RemoteTypePrefix(aRemoteType));
+  nsAutoCString loggedContentType(NS_CP_ContentTypeName(contentPolicyType));
+
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug, ("UnexpectedPrivilegedLoadTelemetry:\n"));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- contentType: %s\n", loggedContentType.get()));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- URL (not to be reported): %s\n", uriString.get()));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- remoteType: %s\n", loggedRemoteType.get()));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- fileInfo: %s\n", fileNameTypeAndDetails.first.get()));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- fileDetails: %s\n", loggedFileDetails.get()));
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("- redirects: %s\n\n", loggedRedirects.get()));
+
+  // Send Telemetry
+  auto extra = Some<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>>(
+      {EventExtraEntry{"contenttype"_ns, loggedContentType},
+       EventExtraEntry{"remotetype"_ns, loggedRemoteType},
+       EventExtraEntry{"filedetails"_ns, loggedFileDetails},
+       EventExtraEntry{"redirects"_ns, loggedRedirects}});
+
+  if (!sTelemetryEventEnabled.exchange(true)) {
+    Telemetry::SetEventRecordingEnabled("security"_ns, true);
+  }
+
+  Telemetry::EventID eventType =
+      Telemetry::EventID::Security_Unexpectedload_Systemprincipal;
+  Telemetry::RecordEvent(eventType, mozilla::Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first),
+                         extra);
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsSecurityFlags nsContentSecurityManager::ComputeSecurityFlags(
+    mozilla::CORSMode aCORSMode, CORSSecurityMapping aCORSSecurityMapping) {
+  if (aCORSSecurityMapping == CORSSecurityMapping::DISABLE_CORS_CHECKS) {
+    return nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL;
+  }
+
+  switch (aCORSMode) {
+    case CORS_NONE:
+      if (aCORSSecurityMapping == CORSSecurityMapping::REQUIRE_CORS_CHECKS) {
+        // CORS_NONE gets treated like CORS_ANONYMOUS in this mode
+        return nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT |
+               nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN;
+      } else if (aCORSSecurityMapping ==
+                 CORSSecurityMapping::CORS_NONE_MAPS_TO_INHERITED_CONTEXT) {
+        // CORS_NONE inherits
+        return nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT;
+      } else {
+        // CORS_NONE_MAPS_TO_DISABLED_CORS_CHECKS, the only remaining enum
+        // variant. CORSSecurityMapping::DISABLE_CORS_CHECKS returned early.
+        MOZ_ASSERT(aCORSSecurityMapping ==
+                   CORSSecurityMapping::CORS_NONE_MAPS_TO_DISABLED_CORS_CHECKS);
+        return nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL;
+      }
+    case CORS_ANONYMOUS:
+      return nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT |
+             nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN;
+    case CORS_USE_CREDENTIALS:
+      return nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT |
+             nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_INCLUDE;
+      break;
+    default:
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid aCORSMode enum value");
+      return nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT |
+             nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN;
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckAllowLoadInSystemPrivilegedContext(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> inspectedPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+  if (!inspectedPrincipal) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  // Check if we are actually dealing with a privileged request
+  if (!inspectedPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  // loads with the allow flag are waived through
+  // until refactored (e.g., Shavar, OCSP)
+  if (loadInfo->GetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+      loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  // For now, let's not inspect top-level document loads
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // allowing some fetches due to their lowered risk
+  // i.e., data & downloads fetches do limited parsing, no rendering
+  // remote images are too widely used (favicons, about:addons etc.)
+  if ((contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH) ||
+      (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST) ||
+      (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET) ||
+      (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD) ||
+      (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Allow the user interface (e.g., schemes like chrome, resource)
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
+  bool isUiResource = false;
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          finalURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, &isUiResource)) &&
+      isUiResource) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  // For about: and extension-based URIs, which don't get
+  // URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE, first remove layers of view-source:, if present.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(finalURI);
+
+  nsAutoCString remoteType;
+  if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> parentChannel;
+    NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, parentChannel);
+    if (parentChannel) {
+      parentChannel->GetRemoteType(remoteType);
+    }
+  } else {
+    remoteType.Assign(
+        mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType());
+  }
+
+  // GetInnerURI can return null for malformed nested URIs like moz-icon:trash
+  if (!innerURI) {
+    MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(loadInfo, innerURI, remoteType);
+    if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_no_finaluri_loads()) {
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  // loads of userContent.css during startup and tests that show up as file:
+  if (innerURI->SchemeIs("file")) {
+    if ((contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) ||
+        (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER)) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+  // (1) loads from within omni.ja and system add-ons use jar:
+  // this is safe to allow, because we do not support remote jar.
+  // (2) about: resources are always allowed: they are part of the build.
+  // (3) extensions are signed or the user has made bad decisions.
+  if (innerURI->SchemeIs("jar") || innerURI->SchemeIs("about") ||
+      innerURI->SchemeIs("moz-extension")) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString requestedURL;
+  innerURI->GetAsciiSpec(requestedURL);
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Warning,
+          ("SystemPrincipal should not load remote resources. URL: %s, type %d",
+           requestedURL.get(), int(contentPolicyType)));
+
+  // The load types that we want to disallow, will extend over time and
+  // prioritized by risk. The most risky/dangerous are load-types are documents,
+  // subdocuments, scripts and styles in that order. The most dangerous URL
+  // schemes to cover are HTTP, HTTPS, data, blob in that order. Meta bug
+  // 1725112 will track upcoming restrictions
+
+  // Telemetry for unexpected privileged loads.
+  // pref check & data sanitization happens in the called function
+  MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(loadInfo, innerURI, remoteType);
+
+  // Relaxing restrictions for our test suites:
+  // (1) AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() disables network, so
+  // http://mochitest is actually local and allowed. (2) The marionette test
+  // framework uses injections and data URLs to execute scripts, checking for
+  // the environment variable breaks the attack but not the tests.
+  if (xpc::AreNonLocalConnectionsDisabled() ||
+      mozilla::EnvHasValue("MOZ_MARIONETTE")) {
+    bool disallowSystemPrincipalRemoteDocuments = Preferences::GetBool(
+        "security.disallow_non_local_systemprincipal_in_tests");
+    if (disallowSystemPrincipalRemoteDocuments) {
+      // our own mochitest needs NS_ASSERTION instead of MOZ_ASSERT
+      NS_ASSERTION(false, "SystemPrincipal must not load remote documents.");
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+    // but other mochitest are exempt from this
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_https_subdocuments_loads() &&
+        (innerURI->SchemeIs("http") || innerURI->SchemeIs("https"))) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(
+          false,
+          "Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of subdocuments on HTTP(S).");
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+    if ((StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_data_subdocuments_loads()) &&
+        (innerURI->SchemeIs("data"))) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(
+          false,
+          "Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of subdocuments on data URL.");
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+  }
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
+    if ((StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_https_script_loads()) &&
+        (innerURI->SchemeIs("http") || innerURI->SchemeIs("https"))) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+                 "Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of scripts on HTTP(S).");
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+  }
+  if (contentPolicyType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET) {
+    if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privileged_https_stylesheet_loads() &&
+        (innerURI->SchemeIs("http") || innerURI->SchemeIs("https"))) {
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false,
+                 "Disallowing SystemPrincipal load of stylesheets on HTTP(S).");
+      aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disallow about pages in the privilegedaboutcontext (e.g., password manager,
+ * newtab etc.) to load remote scripts. Regardless of whether this is coming
+ * from the contentprincipal or the systemprincipal.
+ */
+/* static */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckAllowLoadInPrivilegedAboutContext(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  // bail out if check is disabled
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_disallow_privilegedabout_remote_script_loads()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString remoteType;
+  if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> parentChannel;
+    NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aChannel, parentChannel);
+    if (parentChannel) {
+      parentChannel->GetRemoteType(remoteType);
+    }
+  } else {
+    remoteType.Assign(
+        mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton()->GetRemoteType());
+  }
+
+  // only perform check for privileged about process
+  if (!remoteType.Equals(PRIVILEGEDABOUT_REMOTE_TYPE)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentPolicyType =
+      loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  // only check for script loads
+  if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
+  NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(finalURI);
+
+  bool isLocal;
+  NS_URIChainHasFlags(innerURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE,
+                      &isLocal);
+  // We allow URLs that are URI_IS_LOCAL (but that includes `data`
+  // and `blob` which are also undesirable.
+  if ((isLocal) && (!innerURI->SchemeIs("data")) &&
+      (!innerURI->SchemeIs("blob"))) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  MOZ_ASSERT(
+      false,
+      "Disallowing privileged about process to load scripts on HTTP(S).");
+  aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+  return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Every protocol handler must set one of the six security flags
+ * defined in nsIProtocolHandler - if not - deny the load.
+ */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService(&rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  uint32_t flags;
+  rv = ios->GetDynamicProtocolFlags(uri, &flags);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  uint32_t securityFlagsSet = 0;
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::WEBEXT_URI_WEB_ACCESSIBLE) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_ANYONE) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DANGEROUS_TO_LOAD) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+  if (flags & nsIProtocolHandler::URI_LOADABLE_BY_SUBSUMERS) {
+    securityFlagsSet += 1;
+  }
+
+  // Ensure that only "1" valid security flags is set.
+  if (securityFlagsSet == 1) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(false, "protocol must use one valid security flag");
+  return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+}
+
+// We should not allow loading non-JavaScript files as scripts using
+// a file:// URL.
+static nsresult CheckAllowFileProtocolScriptLoad(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // Only check script loads.
+  if (type != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  if (!StaticPrefs::security_block_fileuri_script_with_wrong_mime()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (!uri || !uri->SchemeIs("file")) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIMIMEService> mime = do_GetService("@mozilla.org/mime;1", &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // GetTypeFromURI fails for missing or unknown file-extensions.
+  nsAutoCString contentType;
+  rv = mime->GetTypeFromURI(uri, contentType);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !nsContentUtils::IsJavascriptMIMEType(
+                           NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(contentType))) {
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
+    if (nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode()) {
+      doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    uri->GetSpec(spec);
+
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(spec), *params.AppendElement());
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(contentType), *params.AppendElement());
+
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                    "FILE_SCRIPT_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
+                                    nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                    "BlockFileScriptWithWrongMimeType", params);
+
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// We should not allow loading non-JavaScript files as scripts using
+// a moz-extension:// URL.
+static nsresult CheckAllowExtensionProtocolScriptLoad(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  // Only check script loads.
+  if (type != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (!uri || !uri->SchemeIs("moz-extension")) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // We expect this code to never be hit off-the-main-thread (even worker
+  // scripts are currently hitting only on the main thread, see
+  // WorkerScriptLoader::DispatchLoadScript calling NS_DispatchToMainThread
+  // internally), this diagnostic assertion is meant to let us notice if that
+  // isn't the case anymore.
+  MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(),
+                        "Unexpected off-the-main-thread call to "
+                        "CheckAllowFileProtocolScriptLoad");
+
+  nsAutoCString host;
+  rv = uri->GetHost(host);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  RefPtr<extensions::WebExtensionPolicyCore> targetPolicy =
+      ExtensionPolicyService::GetCoreByHost(host);
+
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(!targetPolicy) || targetPolicy->ManifestVersion() < 3) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIMIMEService> mime = do_GetService("@mozilla.org/mime;1", &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // GetDefaultTypeFromExtension fails for missing or unknown file-extensions.
+  nsAutoCString contentType;
+  rv = mime->GetDefaultTypeFromURI(uri, contentType);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !nsContentUtils::IsJavascriptMIMEType(
+                           NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(contentType))) {
+    nsCOMPtr<Document> doc;
+    if (nsINode* node = loadInfo->LoadingNode()) {
+      doc = node->OwnerDoc();
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    uri->GetSpec(spec);
+
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(NS_UnescapeURL(spec), *params.AppendElement());
+
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsole(nsIScriptError::warningFlag,
+                                    "EXTENSION_SCRIPT_BLOCKED"_ns, doc,
+                                    nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                    "BlockExtensionScriptWithWrongExt", params);
+
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// Validate that a load should be allowed based on its remote type. This
+// intentionally prevents some loads from occuring even using the system
+// principal, if they were started in a content process.
+static nsresult CheckAllowLoadByTriggeringRemoteType(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  // For now, only restrict loads for documents. We currently have no
+  // interesting subresource checks for protocols which are are not fully
+  // handled within the content process.
+  ExtContentPolicy contentPolicyType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  if (contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+      contentPolicyType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread(),
+                        "Unexpected off-the-main-thread call to "
+                        "CheckAllowLoadByTriggeringRemoteType");
+
+  // Due to the way that session history is handled without SHIP, we cannot run
+  // these checks when SHIP is disabled.
+  if (!mozilla::SessionHistoryInParent()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString triggeringRemoteType;
+  nsresult rv = loadInfo->GetTriggeringRemoteType(triggeringRemoteType);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // For now, only restrict loads coming from web remote types. In the future we
+  // may want to expand this a bit.
+  if (!StringBeginsWith(triggeringRemoteType, WEB_REMOTE_TYPE)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
+  rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Don't allow web content processes to load non-remote about pages.
+  // NOTE: URIs with a `moz-safe-about:` inner scheme are safe to link to, so
+  // it's OK we miss them here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innermostURI = NS_GetInnermostURI(finalURI);
+  if (innermostURI->SchemeIs("about")) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIAboutModule> aboutModule;
+    rv = NS_GetAboutModule(innermostURI, getter_AddRefs(aboutModule));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    uint32_t aboutModuleFlags = 0;
+    rv = aboutModule->GetURIFlags(innermostURI, &aboutModuleFlags);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    if (!(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::MAKE_LINKABLE) &&
+        !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::URI_CAN_LOAD_IN_CHILD) &&
+        !(aboutModuleFlags & nsIAboutModule::URI_MUST_LOAD_IN_CHILD)) {
+      NS_WARNING(nsPrintfCString("Blocking load of about URI (%s) which cannot "
+                                 "be linked to in web content process",
+                                 finalURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get())
+                     .get());
+#ifdef MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT_ENABLED
+      if (NS_SUCCEEDED(
+              loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->CheckMayLoad(finalURI, true))) {
+        nsAutoCString aboutModuleName;
+        MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(
+            NS_GetAboutModuleName(innermostURI, aboutModuleName));
+        MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF(
+            "Blocking load of about uri by content process which may have "
+            "otherwise succeeded [aboutModule=%s, isSystemPrincipal=%d]",
+            aboutModuleName.get(),
+            loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal());
+      }
+#endif
+      return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Don't allow web content processes to load file documents. Loads of file
+  // URIs as subresources will be handled by the sandbox, and may be allowed in
+  // some cases.
+  bool localFile = false;
+  rv = NS_URIChainHasFlags(finalURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_FILE,
+                           &localFile);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (localFile) {
+    NS_WARNING(
+        nsPrintfCString(
+            "Blocking document load of file URI (%s) from web content process",
+            innermostURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get())
+            .get());
+#ifdef MOZ_DIAGNOSTIC_ASSERT_ENABLED
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(
+            loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->CheckMayLoad(finalURI, true))) {
+      MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF(
+          "Blocking document load of file URI by content process which may "
+          "have otherwise succeeded [isSystemPrincipal=%d]",
+          loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal());
+    }
+#endif
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Based on the security flags provided in the loadInfo of the channel,
+ * doContentSecurityCheck() performs the following content security checks
+ * before opening the channel:
+ *
+ * (1) Same Origin Policy Check (if applicable)
+ * (2) Allow Cross Origin but perform sanity checks whether a principal
+ *     is allowed to access the following URL.
+ * (3) Perform CORS check (if applicable)
+ * (4) ContentPolicy checks (Content-Security-Policy, Mixed Content, ...)
+ *
+ * @param aChannel
+ *    The channel to perform the security checks on.
+ * @param aInAndOutListener
+ *    The streamListener that is passed to channel->AsyncOpen() that is now
+ * potentially wrappend within nsCORSListenerProxy() and becomes the
+ * corsListener that now needs to be set as new streamListener on the channel.
+ */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::doContentSecurityCheck(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel, nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener) {
+  NS_ENSURE_ARG(aChannel);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(MOZ_LOG_TEST(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose))) {
+    DebugDoContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, loadInfo);
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv = CheckAllowLoadInSystemPrivilegedContext(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = CheckAllowLoadInPrivilegedAboutContext(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // We want to also check redirected requests to ensure
+  // the target maintains the proper javascript file extensions.
+  rv = CheckAllowExtensionProtocolScriptLoad(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = CheckAllowLoadByTriggeringRemoteType(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // if dealing with a redirected channel then we have already installed
+  // streamlistener and redirect proxies and so we are done.
+  if (loadInfo->GetInitialSecurityCheckDone()) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // make sure that only one of the five security flags is set in the loadinfo
+  // e.g. do not require same origin and allow cross origin at the same time
+  rv = ValidateSecurityFlags(loadInfo);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() ==
+      nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    rv = DoCORSChecks(aChannel, loadInfo, aInAndOutListener);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  rv = CheckChannel(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Perform all ContentPolicy checks (MixedContent, CSP, ...)
+  rv = DoContentSecurityChecks(aChannel, loadInfo);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Apply this after CSP to match Chrome.
+  rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  rv = CheckAllowFileProtocolScriptLoad(aChannel);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // now lets set the initialSecurityFlag for subsequent calls
+  loadInfo->SetInitialSecurityCheckDone(true);
+
+  // all security checks passed - lets allow the load
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsContentSecurityManager::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
+    nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags,
+    nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCb) {
+  // Since we compare the principal from the loadInfo to the URI's
+  // princicpal, it's possible that the checks fail when doing an internal
+  // redirect. We can just return early instead, since we should never
+  // need to block an internal redirect.
+  if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) {
+    aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsresult rv = CheckChannel(aNewChannel);
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
+    rv = CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(aNewChannel);
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    aOldChannel->Cancel(rv);
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // Also verify that the redirecting server is allowed to redirect to the
+  // given URI
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> oldPrincipal;
+  nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelResultPrincipal(
+      aOldChannel, getter_AddRefs(oldPrincipal));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
+  Unused << NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aNewChannel, getter_AddRefs(newURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_STATE(oldPrincipal && newURI);
+
+  // Do not allow insecure redirects to data: URIs
+  if (!AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(aNewChannel)) {
+    // cancel the old channel and return an error
+    aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED);
+    return NS_ERROR_CONTENT_BLOCKED;
+  }
+
+  const uint32_t flags =
+      nsIScriptSecurityManager::LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT |
+      nsIScriptSecurityManager::DISALLOW_SCRIPT;
+  rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal(
+      oldPrincipal, newURI, flags, loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  aCb->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static void AddLoadFlags(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsLoadFlags aNewFlags) {
+  nsLoadFlags flags;
+  aRequest->GetLoadFlags(&flags);
+  flags |= aNewFlags;
+  aRequest->SetLoadFlags(flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that this channel passes all security checks. Returns an error code
+ * if this requesst should not be permitted.
+ */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Handle cookie policies
+  uint32_t cookiePolicy = loadInfo->GetCookiePolicy();
+  if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN) {
+    // We shouldn't have the SEC_COOKIES_SAME_ORIGIN flag for top level loads
+    MOZ_ASSERT(loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+               ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT);
+    nsIPrincipal* loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+
+    // It doesn't matter what we pass for the second, data-inherits, argument.
+    // Any protocol which inherits won't pay attention to cookies anyway.
+    rv = loadingPrincipal->CheckMayLoad(uri, false);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
+    }
+  } else if (cookiePolicy == nsILoadInfo::SEC_COOKIES_OMIT) {
+    AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
+  }
+
+  if (!CrossOriginEmbedderPolicyAllowsCredentials(aChannel)) {
+    AddLoadFlags(aChannel, nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS);
+  }
+
+  nsSecurityFlags securityMode = loadInfo->GetSecurityMode();
+
+  // CORS mode is handled by nsCORSListenerProxy
+  if (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
+      loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::CORS);
+    }
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Allow subresource loads if TriggeringPrincipal is the SystemPrincipal.
+  if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // if none of the REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN flags are set, then SOP does not apply
+  if ((securityMode ==
+       nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) ||
+      (securityMode == nsILoadInfo::SEC_REQUIRE_SAME_ORIGIN_DATA_IS_BLOCKED)) {
+    rv = DoSOPChecks(uri, loadInfo, aChannel);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  if ((securityMode ==
+       nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) ||
+      (securityMode ==
+       nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL)) {
+    if (NS_HasBeenCrossOrigin(aChannel)) {
+      NS_ENSURE_FALSE(loadInfo->GetDontFollowRedirects(), NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+      loadInfo->MaybeIncreaseTainting(LoadTainting::Opaque);
+    }
+    // Please note that DoCheckLoadURIChecks should only be enforced for
+    // cross origin requests. If the flag SEC_REQUIRE_CORS_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT
+    // is set within the loadInfo, then CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal is performed
+    // within nsCorsListenerProxy
+    rv = DoCheckLoadURIChecks(uri, loadInfo);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    // TODO: Bug 1371237
+    // consider calling SetBlockedRequest in
+    // nsContentSecurityManager::CheckChannel
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-cross-origin-embedder-policy-allows-credentials
+bool nsContentSecurityManager::CrossOriginEmbedderPolicyAllowsCredentials(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  // 1. If request’s mode is not "no-cors", then return true.
+  //
+  // `no-cors` check applies to document navigation such that if it is
+  // an document navigation, this check should return true to allow
+  // credentials.
+  if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT ||
+      loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+          ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() !=
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL &&
+      loadInfo->GetSecurityMode() !=
+          nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If request’s client’s policy container’s embedder policy’s value is not
+  // "credentialless", then return true.
+  if (loadInfo->GetLoadingEmbedderPolicy() !=
+      nsILoadInfo::EMBEDDER_POLICY_CREDENTIALLESS) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If request’s origin is same origin with request’s current URL’s origin and
+  // request does not have a redirect-tainted origin, then return true.
+  nsIScriptSecurityManager* ssm = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> resourcePrincipal;
+  ssm->GetChannelURIPrincipal(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(resourcePrincipal));
+
+  bool sameOrigin = resourcePrincipal->Equals(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal());
+  nsAutoCString serializedOrigin;
+  GetSerializedOrigin(loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal(), resourcePrincipal,
+                      serializedOrigin, loadInfo);
+  if (sameOrigin && !serializedOrigin.IsEmpty()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+// https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#serializing-a-request-origin
+void nsContentSecurityManager::GetSerializedOrigin(
+    nsIPrincipal* aOrigin, nsIPrincipal* aResourceOrigin,
+    nsACString& aSerializedOrigin, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // The following for loop performs the
+  // https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/#ref-for-concept-request-tainted-origin
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> lastOrigin;
+  for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : aLoadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+    if (!lastOrigin) {
+      entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(lastOrigin));
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> currentOrigin;
+    entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(currentOrigin));
+
+    if (!currentOrigin->Equals(lastOrigin) && !lastOrigin->Equals(aOrigin)) {
+      return;
+    }
+    lastOrigin = currentOrigin;
+  }
+
+  // When the redirectChain is empty, it means this is the first redirect.
+  // So according to the #serializing-a-request-origin spec, we don't
+  // have a redirect-tainted origin, so we return the origin of the request
+  // here.
+  if (!lastOrigin) {
+    aOrigin->GetAsciiOrigin(aSerializedOrigin);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Same as above, redirectChain doesn't contain the current redirect,
+  // so we have to do the check one last time here.
+  if (lastOrigin->Equals(aResourceOrigin) && !lastOrigin->Equals(aOrigin)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  aOrigin->GetAsciiOrigin(aSerializedOrigin);
+}
+
+// ==== nsIContentSecurityManager implementation =====
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsContentSecurityManager::PerformSecurityCheck(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIStreamListener* aStreamListener,
+    nsIStreamListener** outStreamListener) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> inAndOutListener = aStreamListener;
+  nsresult rv = doContentSecurityCheck(aChannel, inAndOutListener);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  inAndOutListener.forget(outStreamListener);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..208b52d6e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsContentSecurityManager_h___
+#define nsContentSecurityManager_h___
+
+#include "mozilla/CORSMode.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+
+class nsILoadInfo;
+class nsIStreamListener;
+
+#define NS_CONTENTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID \
+  "@mozilla.org/contentsecuritymanager;1"
+// cdcc1ab8-3cea-4e6c-a294-a651fa35227f
+#define NS_CONTENTSECURITYMANAGER_CID                \
+  {                                                  \
+    0xcdcc1ab8, 0x3cea, 0x4e6c, {                    \
+      0xa2, 0x94, 0xa6, 0x51, 0xfa, 0x35, 0x22, 0x7f \
+    }                                                \
+  }
+
+class nsContentSecurityManager : public nsIContentSecurityManager,
+                                 public nsIChannelEventSink {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSICONTENTSECURITYMANAGER
+  NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK
+
+  nsContentSecurityManager() = default;
+
+  static nsresult doContentSecurityCheck(
+      nsIChannel* aChannel, nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener>& aInAndOutListener);
+
+  static bool AllowTopLevelNavigationToDataURI(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static bool AllowInsecureRedirectToDataURI(nsIChannel* aNewChannel);
+  static void MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                               nsIURI* aFinalURI,
+                                               const nsACString& aRemoteType);
+
+  enum CORSSecurityMapping {
+    // Disables all CORS checking overriding the value of aCORSMode. All checks
+    // are disabled even when CORSMode::CORS_ANONYMOUS or
+    // CORSMode::CORS_USE_CREDENTIALS is passed. This is mostly used for chrome
+    // code, where we don't need security checks. See
+    // SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL for the detailed explanation
+    // of the security mode.
+    DISABLE_CORS_CHECKS,
+    // Disables all CORS checking on CORSMode::CORS_NONE. The other two CORS
+    // modes CORSMode::CORS_ANONYMOUS and CORSMode::CORS_USE_CREDENTIALS are
+    // respected.
+    CORS_NONE_MAPS_TO_DISABLED_CORS_CHECKS,
+    // Allow load from any origin, but cross-origin requests require CORS. See
+    // SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_INHERITS_SEC_CONTEXT. Like above the other two
+    // CORS modes are unaffected and get parsed.
+    CORS_NONE_MAPS_TO_INHERITED_CONTEXT,
+    // Always require the server to acknowledge the request via CORS.
+    // CORSMode::CORS_NONE is parsed as if CORSMode::CORS_ANONYMOUS is passed.
+    REQUIRE_CORS_CHECKS,
+  };
+
+  // computes the security flags for the requested CORS mode
+  // @param aCORSSecurityMapping: See CORSSecurityMapping for variant
+  // descriptions
+  static nsSecurityFlags ComputeSecurityFlags(
+      mozilla::CORSMode aCORSMode, CORSSecurityMapping aCORSSecurityMapping);
+
+  static void GetSerializedOrigin(nsIPrincipal* aOrigin,
+                                  nsIPrincipal* aResourceOrigin,
+                                  nsACString& aResult, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+ private:
+  static nsresult CheckChannel(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static nsresult CheckFTPSubresourceLoad(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static nsresult CheckAllowLoadInSystemPrivilegedContext(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static nsresult CheckAllowLoadInPrivilegedAboutContext(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static nsresult CheckChannelHasProtocolSecurityFlag(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+  static bool CrossOriginEmbedderPolicyAllowsCredentials(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+  virtual ~nsContentSecurityManager() = default;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsContentSecurityManager_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.cpp b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b90f9bbab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1566 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/* A namespace class for static content security utilities. */
+
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/Components.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerCommon.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WorkerPrivate.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIMultiPartChannel.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsITransfer.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsSandboxFlags.h"
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+#  include "mozilla/WinHeaderOnlyUtils.h"
+#  include "WinUtils.h"
+#  include <wininet.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "FramingChecker.h"
+#include "js/Array.h"  // JS::GetArrayLength
+#include "js/ContextOptions.h"
+#include "js/PropertyAndElement.h"  // JS_GetElement
+#include "js/RegExp.h"
+#include "js/RegExpFlags.h"           // JS::RegExpFlags
+#include "js/friend/ErrorMessages.h"  // JSMSG_UNSAFE_FILENAME
+#include "mozilla/ExtensionPolicyService.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "LoadInfo.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_extensions.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/TelemetryComms.h"
+#include "mozilla/TelemetryEventEnums.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
+#include "nsIStringBundle.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+using namespace mozilla::Telemetry;
+
+extern mozilla::LazyLogModule sCSMLog;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksChecked;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksPresent;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksChecked;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksPresent;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sTelemetryEventEnabled;
+
+// Helper function for IsConsideredSameOriginForUIR which makes
+// Principals of scheme 'http' return Principals of scheme 'https'.
+static already_AddRefed<nsIPrincipal> MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = aPrincipal;
+  // if the principal is not http, then it can also not be upgraded
+  // to https.
+  if (!principal->SchemeIs("http")) {
+    return principal.forget();
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  aPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(spec);
+  // replace http with https
+  spec.ReplaceLiteral(0, 4, "https");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
+  nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI), spec);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  mozilla::OriginAttributes OA =
+      BasePrincipal::Cast(aPrincipal)->OriginAttributesRef();
+
+  principal = BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(newURI, OA);
+  return principal.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsContentSecurityUtils::IsConsideredSameOriginForUIR(
+    nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal, nsIPrincipal* aResultPrincipal) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aTriggeringPrincipal);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aResultPrincipal);
+  // we only have to make sure that the following truth table holds:
+  // aTriggeringPrincipal         | aResultPrincipal             | Result
+  // ----------------------------------------------------------------
+  // http://example.com/foo.html  | http://example.com/bar.html  | true
+  // http://example.com/foo.html  | https://example.com/bar.html | true
+  // https://example.com/foo.html | https://example.com/bar.html | true
+  // https://example.com/foo.html | http://example.com/bar.html  | true
+
+  // fast path if both principals are same-origin
+  if (aTriggeringPrincipal->Equals(aResultPrincipal)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // in case a principal uses a scheme of 'http' then we just upgrade to
+  // 'https' and use the principal equals comparison operator to check
+  // for same-origin.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> compareTriggeringPrincipal =
+      MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(aTriggeringPrincipal);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> compareResultPrincipal =
+      MakeHTTPPrincipalHTTPS(aResultPrincipal);
+
+  return compareTriggeringPrincipal->Equals(compareResultPrincipal);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs a Regular Expression match, optionally returning the results.
+ * This function is not safe to use OMT.
+ *
+ * @param aPattern      The regex pattern
+ * @param aString       The string to compare against
+ * @param aOnlyMatch    Whether we want match results or only a true/false for
+ * the match
+ * @param aMatchResult  Out param for whether or not the pattern matched
+ * @param aRegexResults Out param for the matches of the regex, if requested
+ * @returns nsresult indicating correct function operation or error
+ */
+nsresult RegexEval(const nsAString& aPattern, const nsAString& aString,
+                   bool aOnlyMatch, bool& aMatchResult,
+                   nsTArray<nsString>* aRegexResults = nullptr) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  aMatchResult = false;
+
+  mozilla::dom::AutoJSAPI jsapi;
+  jsapi.Init();
+
+  JSContext* cx = jsapi.cx();
+  mozilla::AutoDisableJSInterruptCallback disabler(cx);
+
+  // We can use the junk scope here, because we're just using it for regexp
+  // evaluation, not actual script execution, and we disable statics so that the
+  // evaluation does not interact with the execution global.
+  JSAutoRealm ar(cx, xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope());
+
+  JS::Rooted<JSObject*> regexp(
+      cx, JS::NewUCRegExpObject(cx, aPattern.BeginReading(), aPattern.Length(),
+                                JS::RegExpFlag::Unicode));
+  if (!regexp) {
+    return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE;
+  }
+
+  JS::Rooted<JS::Value> regexResult(cx, JS::NullValue());
+
+  size_t index = 0;
+  if (!JS::ExecuteRegExpNoStatics(cx, regexp, aString.BeginReading(),
+                                  aString.Length(), &index, aOnlyMatch,
+                                  &regexResult)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  if (regexResult.isNull()) {
+    // On no match, ExecuteRegExpNoStatics returns Null
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  if (aOnlyMatch) {
+    // On match, with aOnlyMatch = true, ExecuteRegExpNoStatics returns boolean
+    // true.
+    MOZ_ASSERT(regexResult.isBoolean() && regexResult.toBoolean());
+    aMatchResult = true;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  if (aRegexResults == nullptr) {
+    return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG;
+  }
+
+  // Now we know we have a result, and we need to extract it so we can read it.
+  uint32_t length;
+  JS::Rooted<JSObject*> regexResultObj(cx, &regexResult.toObject());
+  if (!JS::GetArrayLength(cx, regexResultObj, &length)) {
+    return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+  }
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("Regex Matched %i strings", length));
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> element(cx);
+    if (!JS_GetElement(cx, regexResultObj, i, &element)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT;
+    }
+
+    nsAutoJSString value;
+    if (!value.init(cx, element)) {
+      return NS_ERROR_NO_CONTENT;
+    }
+
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("Regex Matching: %i: %s", i, NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(value).get()));
+    aRegexResults->AppendElement(value);
+  }
+
+  aMatchResult = true;
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF has a sPrintfCrashReasonSize-sized buffer. We need
+ * to make sure we don't exceed it.  These functions perform this check and
+ * munge things for us.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Destructively truncates a string to fit within the limit
+ */
+char* nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(const char* str) {
+  return nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(strdup(str));
+}
+
+char* nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(char* str) {
+  auto str_len = strlen(str);
+
+  if (str_len > sPrintfCrashReasonSize) {
+    str[sPrintfCrashReasonSize - 1] = '\0';
+    str_len = strlen(str);
+  }
+  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sPrintfCrashReasonSize > str_len);
+
+  return str;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destructively truncates two strings to fit within the limit.
+ * format_string is a format string containing two %s entries
+ * The second string will be truncated to the _last_ 25 characters
+ * The first string will be truncated to the remaining limit.
+ */
+nsCString nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+    const char* part1, const char* part2, const char* format_string) {
+  return SmartFormatCrashString(strdup(part1), strdup(part2), format_string);
+}
+
+nsCString nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+    char* part1, char* part2, const char* format_string) {
+  auto part1_len = strlen(part1);
+  auto part2_len = strlen(part2);
+
+  auto constant_len = strlen(format_string) - 4;
+
+  if (part1_len + part2_len + constant_len > sPrintfCrashReasonSize) {
+    if (part2_len > 25) {
+      part2 += (part2_len - 25);
+    }
+    part2_len = strlen(part2);
+
+    part1[sPrintfCrashReasonSize - (constant_len + part2_len + 1)] = '\0';
+    part1_len = strlen(part1);
+  }
+  MOZ_RELEASE_ASSERT(sPrintfCrashReasonSize >
+                     constant_len + part1_len + part2_len);
+
+  auto parts = nsPrintfCString(format_string, part1, part2);
+  return std::move(parts);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Telemetry Events extra data only supports 80 characters, so we optimize the
+ * filename to be smaller and collect more data.
+ */
+nsString OptimizeFileName(const nsAString& aFileName) {
+  nsString optimizedName(aFileName);
+
+  MOZ_LOG(
+      sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+      ("Optimizing FileName: %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(optimizedName).get()));
+
+  optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring(u".xpi!"_ns, u"!"_ns);
+  optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring(u"shield.mozilla.org!"_ns, u"s!"_ns);
+  optimizedName.ReplaceSubstring(u"mozilla.org!"_ns, u"m!"_ns);
+  if (optimizedName.Length() > 80) {
+    optimizedName.Truncate(80);
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(
+      sCSMLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+      ("Optimized FileName: %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(optimizedName).get()));
+  return optimizedName;
+}
+
+/*
+ * FilenameToFilenameType takes a fileName and returns a Pair of strings.
+ * The First entry is a string indicating the type of fileName
+ * The Second entry is a Maybe<string> that can contain additional details to
+ * report.
+ *
+ * The reason we use strings (instead of an int/enum) is because the Telemetry
+ * Events API only accepts strings.
+ *
+ * Function is a static member of the class to enable gtests.
+ */
+
+/* static */
+FilenameTypeAndDetails nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(
+    const nsString& fileName, bool collectAdditionalExtensionData) {
+  // These are strings because the Telemetry Events API only accepts strings
+  static constexpr auto kChromeURI = "chromeuri"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kResourceURI = "resourceuri"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kBlobUri = "bloburi"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kDataUri = "dataurl"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kAboutUri = "abouturi"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kDataUriWebExtCStyle =
+      "dataurl-extension-contentstyle"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kSingleString = "singlestring"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kMozillaExtensionFile = "mozillaextension_file"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kOtherExtensionFile = "otherextension_file"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kExtensionURI = "extension_uri"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kSuspectedUserChromeJS = "suspectedUserChromeJS"_ns;
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+  static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsURL = "sanitizedWindowsURL"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsPath = "sanitizedWindowsPath"_ns;
+#endif
+  static constexpr auto kOther = "other"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kOtherWorker = "other-on-worker"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kRegexFailure = "regexfailure"_ns;
+
+  static constexpr auto kUCJSRegex = u"(.+).uc.js\\?*[0-9]*$"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kExtensionRegex = u"extensions/(.+)@(.+)!(.+)$"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto kSingleFileRegex = u"^[a-zA-Z0-9.?]+$"_ns;
+
+  if (fileName.IsEmpty()) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOther, Nothing());
+  }
+
+  // resource:// and chrome://
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"chrome://"_ns)) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kChromeURI, Some(fileName));
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"resource://"_ns)) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kResourceURI, Some(fileName));
+  }
+
+  // blob: and data:
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"blob:"_ns)) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kBlobUri, Nothing());
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"data:text/css;extension=style;"_ns)) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kDataUriWebExtCStyle, Nothing());
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"data:"_ns)) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kDataUri, Nothing());
+  }
+
+  // Can't do regex matching off-main-thread
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    // Extension as loaded via a file://
+    bool regexMatch;
+    nsTArray<nsString> regexResults;
+    nsresult rv = RegexEval(kExtensionRegex, fileName, /* aOnlyMatch = */ false,
+                            regexMatch, &regexResults);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
+    }
+    if (regexMatch) {
+      nsCString type = StringEndsWith(regexResults[2], u"mozilla.org.xpi"_ns)
+                           ? kMozillaExtensionFile
+                           : kOtherExtensionFile;
+      const auto& extensionNameAndPath =
+          Substring(regexResults[0], ArrayLength("extensions/") - 1);
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(
+          type, Some(OptimizeFileName(extensionNameAndPath)));
+    }
+
+    // Single File
+    rv = RegexEval(kSingleFileRegex, fileName, /* aOnlyMatch = */ true,
+                   regexMatch);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
+    }
+    if (regexMatch) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSingleString, Some(fileName));
+    }
+
+    // Suspected userChromeJS script
+    rv = RegexEval(kUCJSRegex, fileName, /* aOnlyMatch = */ true, regexMatch);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kRegexFailure, Nothing());
+    }
+    if (regexMatch) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSuspectedUserChromeJS, Nothing());
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Something loaded via an about:// URI.
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"about:"_ns)) {
+    // Remove any querystrings and such
+    long int desired_length = fileName.Length();
+    long int possible_new_length = 0;
+
+    possible_new_length = fileName.FindChar('?');
+    if (possible_new_length != -1 && possible_new_length < desired_length) {
+      desired_length = possible_new_length;
+    }
+
+    possible_new_length = fileName.FindChar('#');
+    if (possible_new_length != -1 && possible_new_length < desired_length) {
+      desired_length = possible_new_length;
+    }
+
+    auto subFileName = Substring(fileName, 0, desired_length);
+
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kAboutUri, Some(subFileName));
+  }
+
+  // Something loaded via a moz-extension:// URI.
+  if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, u"moz-extension://"_ns)) {
+    if (!collectAdditionalExtensionData) {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI, Nothing());
+    }
+
+    nsAutoString sanitizedPathAndScheme;
+    sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"moz-extension://["_ns);
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), fileName);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      // Return after adding ://[ so we know we failed here.
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI,
+                                    Some(sanitizedPathAndScheme));
+    }
+
+    mozilla::extensions::URLInfo url(uri);
+    if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+      // EPS is only usable on main thread
+      auto* policy =
+          ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().GetByHost(url.Host());
+      if (policy) {
+        nsString addOnId;
+        policy->GetId(addOnId);
+
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(addOnId);
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u": "_ns);
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(policy->Name());
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"]"_ns);
+
+        if (policy->IsPrivileged()) {
+          sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"P=1"_ns);
+        } else {
+          sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"P=0"_ns);
+        }
+      } else {
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"failed finding addon by host]"_ns);
+      }
+    } else {
+      sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"can't get addon off main thread]"_ns);
+    }
+
+    AppendUTF8toUTF16(url.FilePath(), sanitizedPathAndScheme);
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kExtensionURI, Some(sanitizedPathAndScheme));
+  }
+
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+  auto flags = mozilla::widget::WinUtils::PathTransformFlags::Default |
+               mozilla::widget::WinUtils::PathTransformFlags::RequireFilePath;
+  nsAutoString strSanitizedPath(fileName);
+  if (widget::WinUtils::PreparePathForTelemetry(strSanitizedPath, flags)) {
+    DWORD cchDecodedUrl = INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH;
+    WCHAR szOut[INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH];
+    HRESULT hr;
+    SAFECALL_URLMON_FUNC(CoInternetParseUrl, fileName.get(), PARSE_SCHEMA, 0,
+                         szOut, INTERNET_MAX_URL_LENGTH, &cchDecodedUrl, 0);
+    if (hr == S_OK && cchDecodedUrl) {
+      nsAutoString sanitizedPathAndScheme;
+      sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(szOut);
+      if (sanitizedPathAndScheme == u"file"_ns) {
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(u"://.../"_ns);
+        sanitizedPathAndScheme.Append(strSanitizedPath);
+      }
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSanitizedWindowsURL,
+                                    Some(sanitizedPathAndScheme));
+    } else {
+      return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kSanitizedWindowsPath,
+                                    Some(strSanitizedPath));
+    }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOtherWorker, Nothing());
+  }
+  return FilenameTypeAndDetails(kOther, Nothing());
+}
+
+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD
+// Crash String must be safe from a telemetry point of view.
+// This will be ensured when this function is used.
+void PossiblyCrash(const char* aPrefSuffix, const char* aUnsafeCrashString,
+                   const nsCString& aSafeCrashString) {
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(!XRE_IsParentProcess())) {
+    // We only crash in the parent (unfortunately) because it's
+    // the only place we can be sure that our only-crash-once
+    // pref-writing works.
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    // Setting a pref off the main thread causes ContentParent to observe the
+    // pref set, resulting in a Release Assertion when it tries to update the
+    // child off main thread. So don't do any of this off main thread. (Which
+    // is a bit of a blind spot for this purpose...)
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCString previous_crashes("security.crash_tracking.");
+  previous_crashes.Append(aPrefSuffix);
+  previous_crashes.Append(".prevCrashes");
+
+  nsCString max_crashes("security.crash_tracking.");
+  max_crashes.Append(aPrefSuffix);
+  max_crashes.Append(".maxCrashes");
+
+  int32_t numberOfPreviousCrashes = 0;
+  numberOfPreviousCrashes = Preferences::GetInt(previous_crashes.get(), 0);
+
+  int32_t maxAllowableCrashes = 0;
+  maxAllowableCrashes = Preferences::GetInt(max_crashes.get(), 0);
+
+  if (numberOfPreviousCrashes >= maxAllowableCrashes) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv =
+      Preferences::SetInt(previous_crashes.get(), ++numberOfPreviousCrashes);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefService> prefsCom = Preferences::GetService();
+  Preferences* prefs = static_cast<Preferences*>(prefsCom.get());
+
+  if (!prefs->AllowOffMainThreadSave()) {
+    // Do not crash if we can't save prefs off the main thread
+    return;
+  }
+
+  rv = prefs->SavePrefFileBlocking();
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    // We can only use this in local builds where we don't send stuff up to the
+    // crash reporter because it has user private data.
+    // MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s",
+    //                        nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(aUnsafeCrashString));
+    MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF(
+        "%s",
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(aSafeCrashString.get()));
+  }
+}
+#endif
+
+class EvalUsageNotificationRunnable final : public Runnable {
+ public:
+  EvalUsageNotificationRunnable(bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
+                                NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16& aFileNameA,
+                                uint64_t aWindowID, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                                uint32_t aColumnNumber)
+      : mozilla::Runnable("EvalUsageNotificationRunnable"),
+        mIsSystemPrincipal(aIsSystemPrincipal),
+        mFileNameA(aFileNameA),
+        mWindowID(aWindowID),
+        mLineNumber(aLineNumber),
+        mColumnNumber(aColumnNumber) {}
+
+  NS_IMETHOD Run() override {
+    nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(
+        mIsSystemPrincipal, mFileNameA, mWindowID, mLineNumber, mColumnNumber);
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  void Revoke() {}
+
+ private:
+  bool mIsSystemPrincipal;
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 mFileNameA;
+  uint64_t mWindowID;
+  uint32_t mLineNumber;
+  uint32_t mColumnNumber;
+};
+
+/* static */
+bool nsContentSecurityUtils::IsEvalAllowed(JSContext* cx,
+                                           bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
+                                           const nsAString& aScript) {
+  // This allowlist contains files that are permanently allowed to use
+  // eval()-like functions. It will ideally be restricted to files that are
+  // exclusively used in testing contexts.
+  static nsLiteralCString evalAllowlist[] = {
+      // Test-only third-party library
+      "resource://testing-common/sinon-7.2.7.js"_ns,
+      // Test-only utility
+      "resource://testing-common/content-task.js"_ns,
+
+      // Tracked by Bug 1584605
+      "resource://gre/modules/translation/cld-worker.js"_ns,
+
+      // require.js implements a script loader for workers. It uses eval
+      // to load the script; but injection is only possible in situations
+      // that you could otherwise control script that gets executed, so
+      // it is okay to allow eval() as it adds no additional attack surface.
+      // Bug 1584564 tracks requiring safe usage of require.js
+      "resource://gre/modules/workers/require.js"_ns,
+
+      // The profiler's symbolication code uses a wasm module to extract symbols
+      // from the binary files result of local builds.
+      // See bug 1777479
+      "resource://devtools/client/performance-new/symbolication.jsm.js"_ns,
+
+      // The Browser Toolbox/Console
+      "debugger"_ns,
+  };
+
+  // We also permit two specific idioms in eval()-like contexts. We'd like to
+  // elminate these too; but there are in-the-wild Mozilla privileged extensions
+  // that use them.
+  static constexpr auto sAllowedEval1 = u"this"_ns;
+  static constexpr auto sAllowedEval2 =
+      u"function anonymous(\n) {\nreturn this\n}"_ns;
+
+  if (MOZ_LIKELY(!aIsSystemPrincipal && !XRE_IsE10sParentProcess())) {
+    // We restrict eval in the system principal and parent process.
+    // Other uses (like web content and null principal) are allowed.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (JS::ContextOptionsRef(cx).disableEvalSecurityChecks()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing eval() because this JSContext was set to allow it"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (aIsSystemPrincipal &&
+      StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_with_system_principal()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing eval() with System Principal because allowing pref is "
+             "enabled"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
+      StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_in_parent_process()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing eval() in parent process because allowing pref is "
+             "enabled"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  DetectJsHacks();
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+        ("Allowing eval() %s because some "
+         "JS hacks may be present.",
+         (aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process")));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
+      !StaticPrefs::extensions_webextensions_remote()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing eval() in parent process because the web extension "
+             "process is disabled"));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // We permit these two common idioms to get access to the global JS object
+  if (!aScript.IsEmpty() &&
+      (aScript == sAllowedEval1 || aScript == sAllowedEval2)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+        ("Allowing eval() %s because a key string is "
+         "provided",
+         (aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process")));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Check the allowlist for the provided filename. getFilename is a helper
+  // function
+  nsAutoCString fileName;
+  uint32_t lineNumber = 0, columnNumber = 0;
+  nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, fileName, &lineNumber, &columnNumber);
+  if (fileName.IsEmpty()) {
+    fileName = "unknown-file"_ns;
+  }
+
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 fileNameA(fileName);
+  for (const nsLiteralCString& allowlistEntry : evalAllowlist) {
+    // checking if current filename begins with entry, because JS Engine
+    // gives us additional stuff for code inside eval or Function ctor
+    // e.g., "require.js > Function"
+    if (StringBeginsWith(fileName, allowlistEntry)) {
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("Allowing eval() %s because the containing "
+               "file is in the allowlist",
+               (aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal"
+                                   : "in parent process")));
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Send Telemetry and Log to the Console
+  uint64_t windowID = nsJSUtils::GetCurrentlyRunningCodeInnerWindowID(cx);
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(aIsSystemPrincipal, fileNameA,
+                                            windowID, lineNumber, columnNumber);
+  } else {
+    auto runnable = new EvalUsageNotificationRunnable(
+        aIsSystemPrincipal, fileNameA, windowID, lineNumber, columnNumber);
+    NS_DispatchToMainThread(runnable);
+  }
+
+  // Log to MOZ_LOG
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Error,
+          ("Blocking eval() %s from file %s and script "
+           "provided %s",
+           (aIsSystemPrincipal ? "with System Principal" : "in parent process"),
+           fileName.get(), NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aScript).get()));
+
+  // Maybe Crash
+#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING)
+  auto crashString = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+      NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aScript).get(), fileName.get(),
+      (aIsSystemPrincipal
+           ? "Blocking eval() with System Principal with script %s from file %s"
+           : "Blocking eval() in parent process with script %s from file %s"));
+  MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", crashString.get());
+#endif
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::NotifyEvalUsage(bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
+                                             NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16& aFileNameA,
+                                             uint64_t aWindowID,
+                                             uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                                             uint32_t aColumnNumber) {
+  // Send Telemetry
+  Telemetry::EventID eventType =
+      aIsSystemPrincipal ? Telemetry::EventID::Security_Evalusage_Systemcontext
+                         : Telemetry::EventID::Security_Evalusage_Parentprocess;
+
+  FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
+      FilenameToFilenameType(aFileNameA, false);
+  mozilla::Maybe<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>> extra;
+  if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
+    extra = Some<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>>({EventExtraEntry{
+        "fileinfo"_ns,
+        NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value())}});
+  } else {
+    extra = Nothing();
+  }
+  if (!sTelemetryEventEnabled.exchange(true)) {
+    sTelemetryEventEnabled = true;
+    Telemetry::SetEventRecordingEnabled("security"_ns, true);
+  }
+  Telemetry::RecordEvent(eventType, mozilla::Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first),
+                         extra);
+
+  // Report an error to console
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIConsoleService> console(
+      do_GetService(NS_CONSOLESERVICE_CONTRACTID));
+  if (!console) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIScriptError> error(do_CreateInstance(NS_SCRIPTERROR_CONTRACTID));
+  if (!error) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundle> bundle;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStringBundleService> stringService =
+      mozilla::components::StringBundle::Service();
+  if (!stringService) {
+    return;
+  }
+  stringService->CreateBundle(
+      "chrome://global/locale/security/security.properties",
+      getter_AddRefs(bundle));
+  if (!bundle) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsAutoString message;
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {aFileNameA};
+  nsresult rv = bundle->FormatStringFromName("RestrictBrowserEvalUsage",
+                                             formatStrings, message);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  rv = error->InitWithWindowID(message, aFileNameA, u""_ns, aLineNumber,
+                               aColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag,
+                               "BrowserEvalUsage", aWindowID,
+                               true /* From chrome context */);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  console->LogMessage(error);
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectJsHacks() {
+  // We can only perform the check of this preference on the Main Thread
+  // (because a String-based preference check is only safe on Main Thread.)
+  // In theory, it would be possible that a separate thread could get here
+  // before the main thread, resulting in the other thread not being able to
+  // perform this check, but the odds of that are small (and probably zero.)
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If the pref service isn't available, do nothing and re-do this later.
+  if (!Preferences::IsServiceAvailable()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // No need to check again.
+  if (MOZ_LIKELY(sJSHacksChecked || sJSHacksPresent)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsresult rv;
+  sJSHacksChecked = true;
+
+  // This preference is required by bootstrapLoader.xpi, which is an
+  // alternate way to load legacy-style extensions. It only works on
+  // DevEdition/Nightly.
+  bool xpinstallSignatures;
+  rv = Preferences::GetBool("xpinstall.signatures.required",
+                            &xpinstallSignatures, PrefValueKind::Default);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !xpinstallSignatures) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = Preferences::GetBool("xpinstall.signatures.required",
+                            &xpinstallSignatures, PrefValueKind::User);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !xpinstallSignatures) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // This preference is a file used for autoconfiguration of Firefox
+  // by administrators. It has also been (ab)used by the userChromeJS
+  // project to run legacy-style 'extensions', some of which use eval,
+  // all of which run in the System Principal context.
+  nsAutoString jsConfigPref;
+  rv = Preferences::GetString("general.config.filename", jsConfigPref,
+                              PrefValueKind::Default);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !jsConfigPref.IsEmpty()) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = Preferences::GetString("general.config.filename", jsConfigPref,
+                              PrefValueKind::User);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !jsConfigPref.IsEmpty()) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // These preferences are for autoconfiguration of Firefox by admins.
+  // The first will load a file over the network; the second will
+  // fall back to a local file if the network is unavailable
+  nsAutoString configUrlPref;
+  rv = Preferences::GetString("autoadmin.global_config_url", configUrlPref,
+                              PrefValueKind::Default);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !configUrlPref.IsEmpty()) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = Preferences::GetString("autoadmin.global_config_url", configUrlPref,
+                              PrefValueKind::User);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && !configUrlPref.IsEmpty()) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  bool failOverToCache;
+  rv = Preferences::GetBool("autoadmin.failover_to_cached", &failOverToCache,
+                            PrefValueKind::Default);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && failOverToCache) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = Preferences::GetBool("autoadmin.failover_to_cached", &failOverToCache,
+                            PrefValueKind::User);
+  if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && failOverToCache) {
+    sJSHacksPresent = true;
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::DetectCssHacks() {
+  // We can only perform the check of this preference on the Main Thread
+  // It's possible that this function may therefore race and we expect the
+  // caller to ensure that the checks have actually happened.
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If the pref service isn't available, do nothing and re-do this later.
+  if (!Preferences::IsServiceAvailable()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // No need to check again.
+  if (MOZ_LIKELY(sCSSHacksChecked || sCSSHacksPresent)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // This preference is a bool to see if userChrome css is loaded
+  bool customStylesPresent = Preferences::GetBool(
+      "toolkit.legacyUserProfileCustomizations.stylesheets", false);
+  if (customStylesPresent) {
+    sCSSHacksPresent = true;
+  }
+
+  sCSSHacksChecked = true;
+}
+
+/* static */
+nsresult nsContentSecurityUtils::GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIHttpChannel** aHttpChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (httpChannel) {
+    httpChannel.forget(aHttpChannel);
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIMultiPartChannel> multipart = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (!multipart) {
+    *aHttpChannel = nullptr;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> baseChannel;
+  nsresult rv = multipart->GetBaseChannel(getter_AddRefs(baseChannel));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(baseChannel);
+  httpChannel.forget(aHttpChannel);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult ParseCSPAndEnforceFrameAncestorCheck(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIContentSecurityPolicy** aOutCSP) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  // frame-ancestor check only makes sense for subdocument and object loads,
+  // if this is not a load of such type, there is nothing to do here.
+  if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+      contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // CSP can only hang off an http channel, if this channel is not
+  // an http channel then there is nothing to do here,
+  // except with add-ons, where the CSP is stored in a WebExtensionPolicy.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel;
+  nsresult rv = nsContentSecurityUtils::GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
+      aChannel, getter_AddRefs(httpChannel));
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString tCspHeaderValue, tCspROHeaderValue;
+  if (httpChannel) {
+    Unused << httpChannel->GetResponseHeader("content-security-policy"_ns,
+                                             tCspHeaderValue);
+
+    Unused << httpChannel->GetResponseHeader(
+        "content-security-policy-report-only"_ns, tCspROHeaderValue);
+
+    // if there are no CSP values, then there is nothing to do here.
+    if (tCspHeaderValue.IsEmpty() && tCspROHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> resultPrincipal;
+  rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelResultPrincipal(
+      aChannel, getter_AddRefs(resultPrincipal));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  RefPtr<extensions::WebExtensionPolicy> addonPolicy;
+  if (!httpChannel) {
+    addonPolicy = BasePrincipal::Cast(resultPrincipal)->AddonPolicy();
+    if (!addonPolicy) {
+      // Neither a HTTP channel, nor a moz-extension:-resource.
+      // CSP is not supported.
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<nsCSPContext> csp = new nsCSPContext();
+  // This CSPContext is only used for checking frame-ancestors, we
+  // will parse the CSP again anyway. (Unless this blocks the load, but
+  // parser warnings aren't really important in that case)
+  csp->SuppressParserLogMessages();
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> selfURI;
+  nsAutoString referrerSpec;
+  if (httpChannel) {
+    aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(selfURI));
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo = httpChannel->GetReferrerInfo();
+    if (referrerInfo) {
+      referrerInfo->GetComputedReferrerSpec(referrerSpec);
+    }
+  } else {
+    // aChannel::GetURI would return the jar: or file:-URI for extensions.
+    // Use the "final" URI to get the actual moz-extension:-URL.
+    NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(selfURI));
+  }
+
+  uint64_t innerWindowID = loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID();
+
+  rv = csp->SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(resultPrincipal, selfURI,
+                                           referrerSpec, innerWindowID);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  if (addonPolicy) {
+    csp->AppendPolicy(addonPolicy->BaseCSP(), false, false);
+    csp->AppendPolicy(addonPolicy->ExtensionPageCSP(), false, false);
+  } else {
+    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 cspHeaderValue(tCspHeaderValue);
+    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 cspROHeaderValue(tCspROHeaderValue);
+
+    // ----- if there's a full-strength CSP header, apply it.
+    if (!cspHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
+      rv = CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(csp, cspHeaderValue, false);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+
+    // ----- if there's a report-only CSP header, apply it.
+    if (!cspROHeaderValue.IsEmpty()) {
+      rv = CSP_AppendCSPFromHeader(csp, cspROHeaderValue, true);
+      NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // ----- Enforce frame-ancestor policy on any applied policies
+  bool safeAncestry = false;
+  // PermitsAncestry sends violation reports when necessary
+  rv = csp->PermitsAncestry(loadInfo, &safeAncestry);
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !safeAncestry) {
+    // stop!  ERROR page!
+    aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_CSP_FRAME_ANCESTOR_VIOLATION);
+    return NS_ERROR_CSP_FRAME_ANCESTOR_VIOLATION;
+  }
+
+  // return the CSP for x-frame-options check
+  csp.forget(aOutCSP);
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+void EnforceXFrameOptionsCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                               nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCsp) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel);
+  if (!FramingChecker::CheckFrameOptions(aChannel, aCsp)) {
+    // stop!  ERROR page!
+    aChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_XFO_VIOLATION);
+  }
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::PerformCSPFrameAncestorAndXFOCheck(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp;
+  nsresult rv =
+      ParseCSPAndEnforceFrameAncestorCheck(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(csp));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // X-Frame-Options needs to be enforced after CSP frame-ancestors
+  // checks because if frame-ancestors is present, then x-frame-options
+  // will be discarded
+  EnforceXFrameOptionsCheck(aChannel, csp);
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::AssertAboutPageHasCSP(Document* aDocument) {
+  // We want to get to a point where all about: pages ship with a CSP. This
+  // assertion ensures that we can not deploy new about: pages without a CSP.
+  // Please note that any about: page should not use inline JS or inline CSS,
+  // and instead should load JS and CSS from an external file (*.js, *.css)
+  // which allows us to apply a strong CSP omitting 'unsafe-inline'. Ideally,
+  // the CSP allows precisely the resources that need to be loaded; but it
+  // should at least be as strong as:
+  // <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src chrome:;
+  // object-src 'none'"/>
+
+  // This is a data document, created using DOMParser or
+  // document.implementation.createDocument() or such, not an about: page which
+  // is loaded as a web page.
+  if (aDocument->IsLoadedAsData()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if we should skip the assertion
+  if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_skip_about_page_has_csp_assert()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if we are loading an about: URI at all
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> documentURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI();
+  if (!documentURI->SchemeIs("about")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp = aDocument->GetCsp();
+  bool foundDefaultSrc = false;
+  bool foundObjectSrc = false;
+  bool foundUnsafeEval = false;
+  bool foundUnsafeInline = false;
+  bool foundScriptSrc = false;
+  bool foundWorkerSrc = false;
+  bool foundWebScheme = false;
+  if (csp) {
+    uint32_t policyCount = 0;
+    csp->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount);
+    nsAutoString parsedPolicyStr;
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) {
+      csp->GetPolicyString(i, parsedPolicyStr);
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"default-src") >= 0) {
+        foundDefaultSrc = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"object-src 'none'") >= 0) {
+        foundObjectSrc = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"'unsafe-eval'") >= 0) {
+        foundUnsafeEval = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"'unsafe-inline'") >= 0) {
+        foundUnsafeInline = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"script-src") >= 0) {
+        foundScriptSrc = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"worker-src") >= 0) {
+        foundWorkerSrc = true;
+      }
+      if (parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"http:") >= 0 ||
+          parsedPolicyStr.Find(u"https:") >= 0) {
+        foundWebScheme = true;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check if we should skip the allowlist and assert right away. Please note
+  // that this pref can and should only be set for automated testing.
+  if (StaticPrefs::dom_security_skip_about_page_csp_allowlist_and_assert()) {
+    NS_ASSERTION(foundDefaultSrc, "about: page must have a CSP");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString aboutSpec;
+  documentURI->GetSpec(aboutSpec);
+  ToLowerCase(aboutSpec);
+
+  // This allowlist contains about: pages that are permanently allowed to
+  // render without a CSP applied.
+  static nsLiteralCString sAllowedAboutPagesWithNoCSP[] = {
+    // about:blank is a special about page -> no CSP
+    "about:blank"_ns,
+    // about:srcdoc is a special about page -> no CSP
+    "about:srcdoc"_ns,
+    // about:sync-log displays plain text only -> no CSP
+    "about:sync-log"_ns,
+    // about:logo just displays the firefox logo -> no CSP
+    "about:logo"_ns,
+    // about:sync is a special mozilla-signed developer addon with low usage ->
+    // no CSP
+    "about:sync"_ns,
+#  if defined(ANDROID)
+    "about:config"_ns,
+#  endif
+  };
+
+  for (const nsLiteralCString& allowlistEntry : sAllowedAboutPagesWithNoCSP) {
+    // please note that we perform a substring match here on purpose,
+    // so we don't have to deal and parse out all the query arguments
+    // the various about pages rely on.
+    if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, allowlistEntry)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(foundDefaultSrc,
+             "about: page must contain a CSP including default-src");
+  MOZ_ASSERT(foundObjectSrc,
+             "about: page must contain a CSP denying object-src");
+
+  // preferences and downloads allow legacy inline scripts through hash src.
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!foundScriptSrc ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:preferences"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:downloads"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:newtab"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:logins"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:compat"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:welcome"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:profiling"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:studies"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:home"_ns),
+             "about: page must not contain a CSP including script-src");
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!foundWorkerSrc,
+             "about: page must not contain a CSP including worker-src");
+
+  // addons, preferences, debugging, ion, devtools all have to allow some
+  // remote web resources
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!foundWebScheme ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:preferences"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:addons"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:newtab"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:debugging"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:ion"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:compat"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:logins"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:home"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:welcome"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:devtools"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:pocket-saved"_ns) ||
+                 StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, "about:pocket-home"_ns),
+             "about: page must not contain a CSP including a web scheme");
+
+  if (aDocument->IsExtensionPage()) {
+    // Extensions have two CSP policies applied where the baseline CSP
+    // includes 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline', hence we have to skip
+    // the 'unsafe-eval' and 'unsafe-inline' assertions for extension
+    // pages.
+    return;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!foundUnsafeEval,
+             "about: page must not contain a CSP including 'unsafe-eval'");
+
+  static nsLiteralCString sLegacyUnsafeInlineAllowList[] = {
+      // Bug 1579160: Remove 'unsafe-inline' from style-src within
+      // about:preferences
+      "about:preferences"_ns,
+      // Bug 1571346: Remove 'unsafe-inline' from style-src within about:addons
+      "about:addons"_ns,
+      // Bug 1584485: Remove 'unsafe-inline' from style-src within:
+      // * about:newtab
+      // * about:welcome
+      // * about:home
+      "about:newtab"_ns,
+      "about:welcome"_ns,
+      "about:home"_ns,
+  };
+
+  for (const nsLiteralCString& aUnsafeInlineEntry :
+       sLegacyUnsafeInlineAllowList) {
+    // please note that we perform a substring match here on purpose,
+    // so we don't have to deal and parse out all the query arguments
+    // the various about pages rely on.
+    if (StringBeginsWith(aboutSpec, aUnsafeInlineEntry)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!foundUnsafeInline,
+             "about: page must not contain a CSP including 'unsafe-inline'");
+}
+#endif
+
+/* static */
+bool nsContentSecurityUtils::ValidateScriptFilename(JSContext* cx,
+                                                    const char* aFilename) {
+  // If the pref is permissive, allow everything
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_allow_parent_unrestricted_js_loads()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If we're not in the parent process allow everything (presently)
+  if (!XRE_IsE10sParentProcess()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If we have allowed eval (because of a user configuration or more
+  // likely a test has requested it), and the script is an eval, allow it.
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 filenameU(aFilename);
+  if (StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_with_system_principal() ||
+      StaticPrefs::security_allow_eval_in_parent_process()) {
+    if (StringEndsWith(filenameU, u"> eval"_ns)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  DetectJsHacks();
+
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(!sJSHacksChecked)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+        ("Allowing a javascript load of %s because "
+         "we have not yet been able to determine if JS hacks may be present",
+         aFilename));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(sJSHacksPresent)) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing a javascript load of %s because "
+             "some JS hacks may be present",
+             aFilename));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (XRE_IsE10sParentProcess() &&
+      !StaticPrefs::extensions_webextensions_remote()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
+             "process is disabled.",
+             aFilename));
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, u"chrome://"_ns)) {
+    // If it's a chrome:// url, allow it
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, u"resource://"_ns)) {
+    // If it's a resource:// url, allow it
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, u"file://"_ns)) {
+    // We will temporarily allow all file:// URIs through for now
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, u"jar:file://"_ns)) {
+    // We will temporarily allow all jar URIs through for now
+    return true;
+  }
+  if (filenameU.Equals(u"about:sync-log"_ns)) {
+    // about:sync-log runs in the parent process and displays a directory
+    // listing. The listing has inline javascript that executes on load.
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, u"moz-extension://"_ns)) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+    nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), aFilename);
+    if (!NS_FAILED(rv) && NS_IsMainThread()) {
+      mozilla::extensions::URLInfo url(uri);
+      auto* policy =
+          ExtensionPolicyService::GetSingleton().GetByHost(url.Host());
+
+      if (policy && policy->IsPrivileged()) {
+        MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+                ("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
+                 "it is associated with is privileged.",
+                 aFilename));
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  } else if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    WorkerPrivate* workerPrivate = GetWorkerPrivateFromContext(cx);
+    if (workerPrivate && workerPrivate->IsPrivilegedAddonGlobal()) {
+      MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+              ("Allowing a javascript load of %s because the web extension "
+               "it is associated with is privileged.",
+               aFilename));
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  auto kAllowedFilenamesExact = {
+      // Allow through the injection provided by about:sync addon
+      u"data:,new function() {\n  const { AboutSyncRedirector } = ChromeUtils.import(\"chrome://aboutsync/content/AboutSyncRedirector.js\");\n  AboutSyncRedirector.register();\n}"_ns,
+  };
+
+  for (auto allowedFilename : kAllowedFilenamesExact) {
+    if (filenameU == allowedFilename) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  auto kAllowedFilenamesPrefix = {
+      // Until 371900 is fixed, we need to do something about about:downloads
+      // and this is the most reasonable. See 1727770
+      u"about:downloads"_ns,
+      // We think this is the same problem as about:downloads
+      u"about:preferences"_ns,
+      // Browser console will give a filename of 'debugger' See 1763943
+      // Sometimes it's 'debugger eager eval code', other times just 'debugger
+      // eval code'
+      u"debugger"_ns};
+
+  for (auto allowedFilenamePrefix : kAllowedFilenamesPrefix) {
+    if (StringBeginsWith(filenameU, allowedFilenamePrefix)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Log to MOZ_LOG
+  MOZ_LOG(sCSMLog, LogLevel::Error,
+          ("ValidateScriptFilename Failed: %s\n", aFilename));
+
+  // Send Telemetry
+  FilenameTypeAndDetails fileNameTypeAndDetails =
+      FilenameToFilenameType(filenameU, true);
+
+  Telemetry::EventID eventType =
+      Telemetry::EventID::Security_Javascriptload_Parentprocess;
+
+  mozilla::Maybe<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>> extra;
+  if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
+    extra = Some<nsTArray<EventExtraEntry>>({EventExtraEntry{
+        "fileinfo"_ns,
+        NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value())}});
+  } else {
+    extra = Nothing();
+  }
+
+  if (!sTelemetryEventEnabled.exchange(true)) {
+    sTelemetryEventEnabled = true;
+    Telemetry::SetEventRecordingEnabled("security"_ns, true);
+  }
+  Telemetry::RecordEvent(eventType, mozilla::Some(fileNameTypeAndDetails.first),
+                         extra);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG) || defined(FUZZING)
+  auto crashString = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+      aFilename,
+      fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()
+          ? NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value()).get()
+          : "(None)",
+      "Blocking a script load %s from file %s");
+  MOZ_CRASH_UNSAFE_PRINTF("%s", crashString.get());
+#elif defined(NIGHTLY_BUILD)
+  // Cause a crash (if we've never crashed before and we can ensure we won't do
+  // it again.)
+  // The details in the second arg, passed to UNSAFE_PRINTF, are also included
+  // in Event Telemetry and have received data review.
+  if (fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.isSome()) {
+    PossiblyCrash("js_load_1", aFilename,
+                  NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fileNameTypeAndDetails.second.value()));
+  } else {
+    PossiblyCrash("js_load_1", aFilename, "(None)"_ns);
+  }
+#endif
+
+  // Presently we are only enforcing restrictions for the script filename
+  // on Nightly.  On all channels we are reporting Telemetry. In the future we
+  // will assert in debug builds and return false to prevent execution in
+  // non-debug builds.
+#ifdef NIGHTLY_BUILD
+  return false;
+#else
+  return true;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsContentSecurityUtils::LogMessageToConsole(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel,
+                                                 const char* aMsg) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  uint64_t windowID = 0;
+  rv = aChannel->GetTopLevelContentWindowId(&windowID);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!windowID) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+    loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID(&windowID);
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString localizedMsg;
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  uri->GetSpec(spec);
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec)};
+  rv = nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(
+      nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES, aMsg, params, localizedMsg);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(
+      localizedMsg, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, "Security"_ns, windowID, uri);
+}
+
+/* static */
+long nsContentSecurityUtils::ClassifyDownload(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel, const nsAutoCString& aMimeTypeGuess) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aChannel, "IsDownloadAllowed without channel?");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> contentLocation;
+  aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(contentLocation));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+  if (!loadingPrincipal) {
+    loadingPrincipal = loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+  }
+  // Creating a fake Loadinfo that is just used for the MCB check.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> secCheckLoadInfo = new mozilla::net::LoadInfo(
+      loadingPrincipal, loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal(), nullptr,
+      nsILoadInfo::SEC_ONLY_FOR_EXPLICIT_CONTENTSEC_CHECK,
+      nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH);
+
+  int16_t decission = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+  nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(false,  //  aHadInsecureImageRedirect
+                                    contentLocation,   //  aContentLocation,
+                                    secCheckLoadInfo,  //  aLoadinfo
+                                    aMimeTypeGuess,    //  aMimeGuess,
+                                    false,             //  aReportError
+                                    &decission         // aDecision
+  );
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_DOWNLOADS,
+                        decission != nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT);
+
+  if (StaticPrefs::dom_block_download_insecure() &&
+      decission != nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+    if (httpChannel) {
+      LogMessageToConsole(httpChannel, "MixedContentBlockedDownload");
+    }
+    return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_POTENTIALLY_UNSAFE;
+  }
+
+  if (loadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+    return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_ACCEPTABLE;
+  }
+
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_block_download_in_sandboxed_iframes()) {
+    return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_ACCEPTABLE;
+  }
+
+  uint32_t triggeringFlags = loadInfo->GetTriggeringSandboxFlags();
+  uint32_t currentflags = loadInfo->GetSandboxFlags();
+
+  if ((triggeringFlags & SANDBOXED_ALLOW_DOWNLOADS) ||
+      (currentflags & SANDBOXED_ALLOW_DOWNLOADS)) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+    if (httpChannel) {
+      LogMessageToConsole(httpChannel, "IframeSandboxBlockedDownload");
+    }
+    return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_FORBIDDEN;
+  }
+
+  return nsITransfer::DOWNLOAD_ACCEPTABLE;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.h b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7cdf78d066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsContentSecurityUtils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+/* A namespace class for static content security utilities. */
+
+#ifndef nsContentSecurityUtils_h___
+#define nsContentSecurityUtils_h___
+
+#include <utility>
+#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+struct JSContext;
+class nsIChannel;
+class nsIHttpChannel;
+class nsIPrincipal;
+class NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16;
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+class Document;
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
+
+using FilenameTypeAndDetails = std::pair<nsCString, mozilla::Maybe<nsString>>;
+
+class nsContentSecurityUtils {
+ public:
+  // CSPs upgrade-insecure-requests directive applies to same origin top level
+  // navigations. Using the SOP would return false for the case when an https
+  // page triggers and http page to load, even though that http page would be
+  // upgraded to https later. Hence we have to use that custom function instead
+  // of simply calling aTriggeringPrincipal->Equals(aResultPrincipal).
+  static bool IsConsideredSameOriginForUIR(nsIPrincipal* aTriggeringPrincipal,
+                                           nsIPrincipal* aResultPrincipal);
+
+  static bool IsEvalAllowed(JSContext* cx, bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
+                            const nsAString& aScript);
+  static void NotifyEvalUsage(bool aIsSystemPrincipal,
+                              NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16& aFileNameA,
+                              uint64_t aWindowID, uint32_t aLineNumber,
+                              uint32_t aColumnNumber);
+
+  // Helper function for various checks:
+  // This function detects profiles with userChrome.js or extension signatures
+  // disabled. We can't/won't enforce strong security for people with those
+  // hacks. The function will cache its result.
+  static void DetectJsHacks();
+  // Helper function for detecting custom agent styles
+  static void DetectCssHacks();
+
+  // Helper function to query the HTTP Channel of a potential
+  // multi-part channel. Mostly used for querying response headers
+  static nsresult GetHttpChannelFromPotentialMultiPart(
+      nsIChannel* aChannel, nsIHttpChannel** aHttpChannel);
+
+  // Helper function which performs the following framing checks
+  // * CSP frame-ancestors
+  // * x-frame-options
+  // If any of the two disallows framing, the channel will be cancelled.
+  static void PerformCSPFrameAncestorAndXFOCheck(nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+  // Helper function to Check if a Download is allowed;
+  static long ClassifyDownload(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                               const nsAutoCString& aMimeTypeGuess);
+
+  // Public only for testing
+  static FilenameTypeAndDetails FilenameToFilenameType(
+      const nsString& fileName, bool collectAdditionalExtensionData);
+  static char* SmartFormatCrashString(const char* str);
+  static char* SmartFormatCrashString(char* str);
+  static nsCString SmartFormatCrashString(const char* part1, const char* part2,
+                                          const char* format_string);
+  static nsCString SmartFormatCrashString(char* part1, char* part2,
+                                          const char* format_string);
+
+#if defined(DEBUG)
+  static void AssertAboutPageHasCSP(mozilla::dom::Document* aDocument);
+#endif
+
+  static bool ValidateScriptFilename(JSContext* cx, const char* aFilename);
+  // Helper Function to Post a message to the corresponding JS-Console
+  static void LogMessageToConsole(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel, const char* aMsg);
+};
+
+#endif /* nsContentSecurityUtils_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.cpp b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..936cfd8cf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,275 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "NSSErrorsService.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixnss.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.h"
+#include "nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIRequest.h"
+#include "nsITransportSecurityInfo.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsPrintfCString.h"
+#include "secerr.h"
+#include "sslerr.h"
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener, nsIStreamListener,
+                  nsIRequestObserver)
+
+nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener(
+    nsIStreamListener* aListener, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo)
+    : mListener(aListener), mCreationStart(mozilla::TimeStamp::Now()) {
+  RefPtr<mozilla::dom::WindowGlobalParent> wgp =
+      mozilla::dom::WindowGlobalParent::GetByInnerWindowId(
+          aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
+  // For Top-level document loads (which don't have a requesting window-context)
+  // we compute these flags once we create the Document in nsSecureBrowserUI.
+  if (wgp) {
+    wgp->TopWindowContext()->AddSecurityState(
+        nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_HTTPS_ONLY_MODE_UPGRADED);
+  }
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
+                                           nsIInputStream* aInputStream,
+                                           uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
+  return mListener->OnDataAvailable(aRequest, aInputStream, aOffset, aCount);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* request) {
+  return mListener->OnStartRequest(request);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* request,
+                                         nsresult aStatus) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(request);
+
+  // Note: CouldBeHttpsOnlyError also returns true if there was no error
+  if (nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::CouldBeHttpsOnlyError(channel, aStatus)) {
+    RecordUpgradeTelemetry(request, aStatus);
+    LogUpgradeFailure(request, aStatus);
+
+    // If the request failed and there is a requesting window-context, set
+    // HTTPS-Only state flag to indicate a failed upgrade.
+    // For Top-level document loads (which don't have a requesting
+    // window-context) we simply check in the UI code whether we landed on the
+    // HTTPS-Only error page.
+    if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
+      RefPtr<mozilla::dom::WindowGlobalParent> wgp =
+          mozilla::dom::WindowGlobalParent::GetByInnerWindowId(
+              loadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
+
+      if (wgp) {
+        wgp->TopWindowContext()->AddSecurityState(
+            nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_HTTPS_ONLY_MODE_UPGRADE_FAILED);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return mListener->OnStopRequest(request, aStatus);
+}
+
+void nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::RecordUpgradeTelemetry(nsIRequest* request,
+                                                       nsresult aStatus) {
+  // 1. Get time between now and when the initial upgrade request started
+  int64_t duration =
+      (mozilla::TimeStamp::Now() - mCreationStart).ToMilliseconds();
+
+  // 2. Assemble the category string
+  // [!] All strings have to be present in Histograms.json
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(request, &rv);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString category;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
+  nsContentPolicyType internalType = loadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+
+  if (internalType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    category.AppendLiteral("top_");
+  } else {
+    category.AppendLiteral("sub_");
+  }
+
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aStatus)) {
+    category.AppendLiteral("successful");
+  } else {
+    int32_t code = -1 * NS_ERROR_GET_CODE(aStatus);
+
+    if (aStatus == NS_ERROR_REDIRECT_LOOP) {
+      category.AppendLiteral("f_redirectloop");
+    } else if (aStatus == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT ||
+               aStatus == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT_EXTERNAL) {
+      category.AppendLiteral("f_timeout");
+    } else if (aStatus == NS_BINDING_ABORTED) {
+      category.AppendLiteral("f_aborted");
+    } else if (aStatus == NS_ERROR_CONNECTION_REFUSED) {
+      category.AppendLiteral("f_cxnrefused");
+    } else if (mozilla::psm::IsNSSErrorCode(code)) {
+      switch (code) {
+        case mozilla::pkix::MOZILLA_PKIX_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
+          category.AppendLiteral("f_ssl_selfsignd");
+          break;
+        case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERT_DOMAIN:
+          category.AppendLiteral("f_ssl_badcertdm");
+          break;
+        case SEC_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ISSUER:
+          category.AppendLiteral("f_ssl_unkwnissr");
+          break;
+        default:
+          category.AppendLiteral("f_ssl_other");
+          break;
+      }
+    } else {
+      category.AppendLiteral("f_other");
+    }
+  }
+  mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+      mozilla::Telemetry::HTTPS_ONLY_MODE_UPGRADE_TIME_MS, category, duration);
+
+  bool success = NS_SUCCEEDED(aStatus);
+  ExtContentPolicyType externalType = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  auto typeKey = nsAutoCString("unknown");
+
+  if (externalType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA) {
+    switch (internalType) {
+      case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_AUDIO:
+      case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_TRACK:
+        typeKey = "audio"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_VIDEO:
+        typeKey = "video"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        break;
+    }
+  } else {
+    switch (externalType) {
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+        typeKey = "script"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+        typeKey = "object"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+        typeKey = "document"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+        typeKey = "subdocument"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+        typeKey = "xmlhttprequest"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+        typeKey = "image"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
+        typeKey = "dtd"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
+        typeKey = "font"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
+        typeKey = "fetch"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+        typeKey = "websocket"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+        typeKey = "stylesheet"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+        typeKey = "cspreport"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+        typeKey = "webmanifest"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+        typeKey = "ping"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
+        typeKey = "xslt"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
+        typeKey = "proxied-webrtc"_ns;
+        break;
+
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:  // already handled above
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
+      case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
+        break;
+        // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+    }
+  }
+
+  mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(
+      mozilla::Telemetry::HTTPS_ONLY_MODE_UPGRADE_TYPE, typeKey, success);
+}
+
+void nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener::LogUpgradeFailure(nsIRequest* request,
+                                                  nsresult aStatus) {
+  // If the request failed we'll log it to the console with the error-code
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aStatus)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  nsresult rv;
+  // Try to query for the channel-object
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(request, &rv);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  rv = channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  // Logging URI as well as Module- and Error-Code
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {
+      NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(uri->GetSpecOrDefault()),
+      NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(nsPrintfCString("M%u-C%u",
+                                            NS_ERROR_GET_MODULE(aStatus),
+                                            NS_ERROR_GET_CODE(aStatus)))};
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
+  nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString("HTTPSOnlyFailedRequest", params,
+                                       nsIScriptError::errorFlag, loadInfo,
+                                       uri);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.h b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2ab4711e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener.h
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener_h___
+#define nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener_h___
+
+#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsIStreamListener.h"
+
+class nsILoadInfo;
+
+/**
+ * This event listener gets registered for requests that have been upgraded
+ * using the HTTPS-only mode to log failed upgrades to the console.
+ */
+class nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener : public nsIStreamListener {
+ public:
+  // nsISupports methods
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER
+  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER
+
+  explicit nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener(nsIStreamListener* aListener,
+                                     nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+ private:
+  virtual ~nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener() = default;
+
+  /**
+   * Records telemetry about the upgraded request.
+   * @param aStatus Request object
+   */
+  void RecordUpgradeTelemetry(nsIRequest* request, nsresult aStatus);
+
+  /**
+   * Logs information to the console if the request failed.
+   * @param request Request object
+   * @param aStatus Status of request
+   */
+  void LogUpgradeFailure(nsIRequest* request, nsresult aStatus);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamListener> mListener;
+  mozilla::TimeStamp mCreationStart;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsHTTPSOnlyStreamListener_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c99a223eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "mozilla/Components.h"
+#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h"
+#include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h"
+#include "nsIConsoleService.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission.h"
+#include "nsIPermissionManager.h"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIURIMutator.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "prnetdb.h"
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
+  // if the general pref is set to true, then we always return
+  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_only_mode()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // otherwise we check if executing in private browsing mode and return true
+  // if the PBM pref for HTTPS-Only is set.
+  if (aFromPrivateWindow &&
+      mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_only_mode_pbm()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
+  // if the general pref is set to true, then we always return
+  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_first()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // otherwise we check if executing in private browsing mode and return true
+  // if the PBM pref for HTTPS-First is set.
+  if (aFromPrivateWindow &&
+      mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_first_pbm()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::PotentiallyFireHttpRequestToShortenTimout(
+    mozilla::net::DocumentLoadListener* aDocumentLoadListener) {
+  // only send http background request to counter timeouts if the
+  // pref allows us to do that.
+  if (!mozilla::StaticPrefs::
+          dom_security_https_only_mode_send_http_background_request()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = aDocumentLoadListener->GetChannel();
+  if (!channel) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
+  bool isPrivateWin = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+
+  // if neither HTTPS-Only nor HTTPS-First mode is enabled, then there is
+  // nothing to do here.
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      !IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if we are not dealing with a top-level load, then there is nothing to do
+  // here.
+  if (loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if the load is exempt, then there is nothing to do here.
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if it's not an http channel, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel));
+  if (!httpChannel) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if it's not a GET method, then there is nothing to do here either.
+  nsAutoCString method;
+  mozilla::Unused << httpChannel->GetRequestMethod(method);
+  if (!method.EqualsLiteral("GET")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if it's already an https channel, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> channelURI;
+  channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(channelURI));
+  if (!channelURI->SchemeIs("http")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // HTTPS-First only applies to standard ports but HTTPS-Only brute forces
+  // all http connections to be https and overrules HTTPS-First. In case
+  // HTTPS-First is enabled, but HTTPS-Only is not enabled, we might return
+  // early if attempting to send a background request to a non standard port.
+  if (IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      !IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    int32_t port = 0;
+    nsresult rv = channelURI->GetPort(&port);
+    int defaultPortforScheme = NS_GetDefaultPort("http");
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && port != defaultPortforScheme && port != -1) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Check for general exceptions
+  if (OnionException(channelURI) || LoopbackOrLocalException(channelURI)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<nsIRunnable> task =
+      new TestHTTPAnswerRunnable(channelURI, aDocumentLoadListener);
+  NS_DispatchToMainThread(task.forget());
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::ShouldUpgradeRequest(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                            nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // 1. Check if the HTTPS-Only Mode is even enabled, before we do anything else
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 2. Check for general exceptions
+  if (OnionException(aURI) || LoopbackOrLocalException(aURI)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Check if NoUpgrade-flag is set in LoadInfo
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {
+        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aURI->GetSpecOrDefault())};
+    nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString("HTTPSOnlyNoUpgradeException", params,
+                                         nsIScriptError::infoFlag, aLoadInfo,
+                                         aURI);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // All subresources of an exempt triggering principal are also exempt
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    if (!aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+        TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We can upgrade the request - let's log it to the console
+  // Appending an 's' to the scheme for the logging. (http -> https)
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  scheme.AppendLiteral("s");
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportSpec(aURI->GetSpecOrDefault());
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportScheme(scheme);
+
+  bool isSpeculative = aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+                       ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE;
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {reportSpec, reportScheme};
+  nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString(
+      isSpeculative ? "HTTPSOnlyUpgradeSpeculativeConnection"
+                    : "HTTPSOnlyUpgradeRequest",
+      params, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, aLoadInfo, aURI);
+
+  // If the status was not determined before, we now indicate that the request
+  // will get upgraded, but no event-listener has been registered yet.
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED) {
+    httpsOnlyStatus ^= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED;
+    httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_LISTENER_NOT_REGISTERED;
+    aLoadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::ShouldUpgradeWebSocket(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                              nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // 1. Check if the HTTPS-Only Mode is even enabled, before we do anything else
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 2. Check for general exceptions
+  if (OnionException(aURI) || LoopbackOrLocalException(aURI)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Check if NoUpgrade-flag is set in LoadInfo
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    // Let's log to the console, that we didn't upgrade this request
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {
+        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(aURI->GetSpecOrDefault())};
+    nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString("HTTPSOnlyNoUpgradeException", params,
+                                         nsIScriptError::infoFlag, aLoadInfo,
+                                         aURI);
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // All subresources of an exempt triggering principal are also exempt.
+  if (!aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal()->IsSystemPrincipal() &&
+      TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal())) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We can upgrade the request - let's log it to the console
+  // Appending an 's' to the scheme for the logging. (ws -> wss)
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  scheme.AppendLiteral("s");
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportSpec(aURI->GetSpecOrDefault());
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportScheme(scheme);
+
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {reportSpec, reportScheme};
+  nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString("HTTPSOnlyUpgradeRequest", params,
+                                       nsIScriptError::warningFlag, aLoadInfo,
+                                       aURI);
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsUpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoop(
+    nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+    const mozilla::EnumSet<UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions>& aOptions) {
+  // 1. Check if the HTTPS-Only/HTTPS-First is even enabled, before doing
+  // anything else
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  bool enforceForHTTPSOnlyMode =
+      IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      aOptions.contains(
+          UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions::EnforceForHTTPSOnlyMode);
+  bool enforceForHTTPSFirstMode =
+      IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      aOptions.contains(
+          UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions::EnforceForHTTPSFirstMode);
+  bool enforceForHTTPSRR =
+      aOptions.contains(UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions::EnforceForHTTPSRR);
+  if (!enforceForHTTPSOnlyMode && !enforceForHTTPSFirstMode &&
+      !enforceForHTTPSRR) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 2. Check if the upgrade downgrade pref even wants us to try to break the
+  // cycle. In the case that HTTPS RR is presented, we ignore this pref.
+  if (!mozilla::StaticPrefs::
+          dom_security_https_only_mode_break_upgrade_downgrade_endless_loop() &&
+      !enforceForHTTPSRR) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 3. If it's not a top-level load, then there is nothing to do here either.
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 4. If the load is exempt, then it's defintely not related to https-only
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if ((httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) &&
+      !enforceForHTTPSRR) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 5. If the URI to be loaded is not http, then it's defnitely no endless
+  // loop caused by https-only.
+  if (!aURI->SchemeIs("http")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString uriHost;
+  aURI->GetAsciiHost(uriHost);
+
+  auto uriAndPrincipalComparator = [&](nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+    nsAutoCString principalHost;
+    aPrincipal->GetAsciiHost(principalHost);
+    bool checkPath = mozilla::StaticPrefs::
+        dom_security_https_only_check_path_upgrade_downgrade_endless_loop();
+    if (!checkPath) {
+      return uriHost.Equals(principalHost);
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString uriPath;
+    nsresult rv = aURI->GetFilePath(uriPath);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return false;
+    }
+    nsAutoCString principalPath;
+    aPrincipal->GetFilePath(principalPath);
+    return uriHost.Equals(principalHost) && uriPath.Equals(principalPath);
+  };
+
+  // 6. Check actual redirects. If the Principal that kicked off the
+  // load/redirect is not https, then it's definitely not a redirect cause by
+  // https-only. If the scheme of the principal however is https and the
+  // asciiHost of the URI to be loaded and the asciiHost of the Principal are
+  // identical, then we are dealing with an upgrade downgrade scenario and we
+  // have to break the cycle.
+  if (!aLoadInfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirectPrincipal;
+    for (nsIRedirectHistoryEntry* entry : aLoadInfo->RedirectChain()) {
+      entry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(redirectPrincipal));
+      if (redirectPrincipal && redirectPrincipal->SchemeIs("https") &&
+          uriAndPrincipalComparator(redirectPrincipal)) {
+        return true;
+      }
+    }
+  } else {
+    // 6.1 We should only check if this load is triggered by a user gesture
+    // when the redirect chain is empty, since this information is only useful
+    // in our case here. When the redirect chain is not empty, this load is
+    // defnitely triggered by redirection, not a user gesture.
+    if (aLoadInfo->GetHasValidUserGestureActivation()) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 7. Meta redirects and JS based redirects (win.location). If the security
+  // context that triggered the load is not https, then it's defnitely no
+  // endless loop caused by https-only. If the scheme is http however and the
+  // asciiHost of the URI to be loaded matches the asciiHost of the Principal,
+  // then we are dealing with an upgrade downgrade scenario and we have to break
+  // the cycle.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+  if (!triggeringPrincipal->SchemeIs("https")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return uriAndPrincipalComparator(triggeringPrincipal);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::ShouldUpgradeHttpsFirstRequest(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                                      nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // 1. Check if HTTPS-First Mode is enabled
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 2. HTTPS-First only upgrades top-level loads (and speculative connections)
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType = aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  if (contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT &&
+      contentType != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Check for general exceptions
+  if (OnionException(aURI) || LoopbackOrLocalException(aURI)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 4. Don't upgrade if upgraded previously or exempt from upgrades
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST ||
+      httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 5. HTTPS-First Mode only upgrades default ports - do not upgrade the
+  // request to https if port is specified and not the default port of 80.
+  MOZ_ASSERT(aURI->SchemeIs("http"), "how come the request is not 'http'?");
+  int defaultPortforScheme = NS_GetDefaultPort("http");
+  // If no port is specified, then the API returns -1 to indicate the default
+  // port.
+  int32_t port = 0;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetPort(&port);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  if (port != defaultPortforScheme && port != -1) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // 6. Do not upgrade form submissions (for now), revisit within
+  // Bug 1720500: Revisit upgrading form submissions.
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetIsFormSubmission()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // https-first needs to account for breaking upgrade-downgrade endless
+  // loops at this point because this function is called before we
+  // check the redirect limit in HttpBaseChannel. If we encounter
+  // a same-origin server side downgrade from e.g https://example.com
+  // to http://example.com then we simply not annotating the loadinfo
+  // and returning false from within this function. Please note that
+  // the handling for https-only mode is different from https-first mode,
+  // because https-only mode results in an exception page in case
+  // we encounter and endless upgrade downgrade loop.
+  bool isUpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoop = IsUpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoop(
+      aURI, aLoadInfo,
+      {UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions::EnforceForHTTPSFirstMode});
+  if (isUpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoop) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // We can upgrade the request - let's log to the console and set the status
+  // so we know that we upgraded the request.
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  scheme.AppendLiteral("s");
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportSpec(aURI->GetSpecOrDefault());
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportScheme(scheme);
+
+  bool isSpeculative = contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE;
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 2> params = {reportSpec, reportScheme};
+  nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString(
+      isSpeculative ? "HTTPSOnlyUpgradeSpeculativeConnection"
+                    : "HTTPSOnlyUpgradeRequest",
+      params, nsIScriptError::warningFlag, aLoadInfo, aURI, true);
+
+  // Set flag so we know that we upgraded the request
+  httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST;
+  aLoadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+  return true;
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<nsIURI>
+nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::PotentiallyDowngradeHttpsFirstRequest(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                                        nsresult aStatus) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  // Only downgrade if we this request was upgraded using HTTPS-First Mode
+  if (!(httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UPGRADED_HTTPS_FIRST)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  // Once loading is in progress we set that flag so that timeout counter
+  // measures do not kick in.
+  loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(
+      httpsOnlyStatus | nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS);
+
+  nsresult status = aStatus;
+  // Since 4xx and 5xx errors return NS_OK instead of NS_ERROR_*, we need
+  // to check each NS_OK for those errors.
+  // Only downgrade an NS_OK status if it is an 4xx or 5xx error.
+  if (NS_SUCCEEDED(aStatus)) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+    // If no httpChannel exists we have nothing to do here.
+    if (!httpChannel) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    uint32_t responseStatus = 0;
+    if (NS_FAILED(httpChannel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus))) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+
+    // In case we found one 4xx or 5xx error we need to log it later on,
+    // for that reason we flip the nsresult 'status' from 'NS_OK' to the
+    // corresponding NS_ERROR_*.
+    // To do so we convert the response status to  an nsresult error
+    // Every NS_OK that is NOT an 4xx or 5xx error code won't get downgraded.
+    if (responseStatus >= 400 && responseStatus < 600) {
+      // HttpProxyResponseToErrorCode() maps 400 and 404 on
+      // the same error as a 500 status which would lead to no downgrade
+      // later on. For that reason we explicit filter for 400 and 404 status
+      // codes to log them correctly and to downgrade them if possible.
+      switch (responseStatus) {
+        case 400:
+          status = NS_ERROR_PROXY_BAD_REQUEST;
+          break;
+        case 404:
+          status = NS_ERROR_PROXY_NOT_FOUND;
+          break;
+        default:
+          status = mozilla::net::HttpProxyResponseToErrorCode(responseStatus);
+          break;
+      }
+    }
+    if (NS_SUCCEEDED(status)) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // We're only downgrading if it's possible that the error was
+  // caused by the upgrade.
+  if (HttpsUpgradeUnrelatedErrorCode(status)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = aChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr);
+
+  // Only downgrade if the current scheme is (a) https or (b) view-source:https
+  nsAutoCString spec;
+  if (uri->SchemeIs("https")) {
+    rv = uri->GetSpec(spec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr);
+  } else if (uri->SchemeIs("view-source")) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsINestedURI> nestedURI = do_QueryInterface(uri);
+    if (!nestedURI) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerURI;
+    rv = nestedURI->GetInnerURI(getter_AddRefs(innerURI));
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr);
+    if (!innerURI || !innerURI->SchemeIs("https")) {
+      return nullptr;
+    }
+    nsAutoCString innerSpec;
+    rv = innerURI->GetSpec(innerSpec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr);
+
+    spec.Append("view-source:");
+    spec.Append(innerSpec);
+  } else {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Change the scheme to http
+  if (spec.Find("https://") < 0) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false, "how can we end up here not dealing with an https: URI?");
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  spec.ReplaceSubstring("https://", "http://");
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newURI;
+  rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(newURI), spec);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr);
+
+  // Log downgrade to console
+  NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16 reportSpec(uri->GetSpecOrDefault());
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {reportSpec};
+  nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString("HTTPSOnlyFailedDowngradeAgain", params,
+                                       nsIScriptError::warningFlag, loadInfo,
+                                       uri, true);
+
+  return newURI.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::CouldBeHttpsOnlyError(nsIChannel* aChannel,
+                                             nsresult aError) {
+  // If there is no failed channel, then there is nothing to do here.
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If HTTPS-Only Mode is not enabled, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  bool isPrivateWin = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If the load is exempt or did not get upgraded,
+  // then there is nothing to do here.
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT ||
+      httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_UNINITIALIZED) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If it's one of those errors, then most likely it's not a HTTPS-Only error
+  // (This list of errors is largely drawn from nsDocShell::DisplayLoadError())
+  return !HttpsUpgradeUnrelatedErrorCode(aError);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  static nsCOMPtr<nsIPermissionManager> sPermMgr;
+  if (!sPermMgr) {
+    sPermMgr = mozilla::components::PermissionManager::Service();
+    mozilla::ClearOnShutdown(&sPermMgr);
+  }
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(sPermMgr, false);
+
+  uint32_t perm;
+  nsresult rv = sPermMgr->TestExactPermissionFromPrincipal(
+      aPrincipal, "https-only-load-insecure"_ns, &perm);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  return perm == nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW ||
+         perm == nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission::LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION;
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::TestSitePermissionAndPotentiallyAddExemption(
+    nsIChannel* aChannel) {
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE_VOID(aChannel);
+
+  // if https-only mode is not enabled, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  bool isPrivateWin = loadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // if it's not a top-level load then there is nothing to here.
+  ExtContentPolicyType type = loadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType();
+  if (type != ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // it it's not an http channel, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel = do_QueryInterface(aChannel);
+  if (!httpChannel) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal;
+  nsresult rv = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager()->GetChannelResultPrincipal(
+      aChannel, getter_AddRefs(principal));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv);
+
+  // We explicitly add or also remove the exemption flag, because this
+  // function is also consulted after redirects.
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(principal)) {
+    httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+  } else {
+    httpsOnlyStatus &= ~nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+  }
+  loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsSafeToAcceptCORSOrMixedContent(
+    nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // Check if the request is exempt from upgrades
+  if ((aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus() & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Check if HTTPS-Only Mode is enabled for this request
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  return nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::HttpsUpgradeUnrelatedErrorCode(nsresult aError) {
+  return NS_ERROR_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_FILE_ACCESS_DENIED == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_UNKNOWN_HOST == aError || NS_ERROR_PHISHING_URI == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_MALWARE_URI == aError || NS_ERROR_UNWANTED_URI == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_HARMFUL_URI == aError || NS_ERROR_CONTENT_CRASHED == aError ||
+         NS_ERROR_FRAME_CRASHED == aError;
+}
+
+/* ------ Logging ------ */
+
+/* static */
+void nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogLocalizedString(const char* aName,
+                                          const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                                          uint32_t aFlags,
+                                          nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIURI* aURI,
+                                          bool aUseHttpsFirst) {
+  nsAutoString logMsg;
+  nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                        aName, aParams, logMsg);
+  LogMessage(logMsg, aFlags, aLoadInfo, aURI, aUseHttpsFirst);
+}
+
+/* static */
+void nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, uint32_t aFlags,
+                                  nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIURI* aURI,
+                                  bool aUseHttpsFirst) {
+  // do not log to the console if the loadinfo says we should not!
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Prepending HTTPS-Only to the outgoing console message
+  nsString message;
+  message.Append(aUseHttpsFirst ? u"HTTPS-First Mode: "_ns
+                                : u"HTTPS-Only Mode: "_ns);
+  message.Append(aMessage);
+
+  // Allow for easy distinction in devtools code.
+  auto category = aUseHttpsFirst ? "HTTPSFirst"_ns : "HTTPSOnly"_ns;
+
+  uint64_t innerWindowId = aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID();
+  if (innerWindowId > 0) {
+    // Send to content console
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(message, aFlags, category,
+                                              innerWindowId, aURI);
+  } else {
+    // Send to browser console
+    bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+    nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(message, category, isPrivateWin,
+                                          true /* from chrome context */,
+                                          aFlags);
+  }
+}
+
+/* ------ Exceptions ------ */
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::OnionException(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  // Onion-host exception can get disabled with a pref
+  if (mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_only_mode_upgrade_onion()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  nsAutoCString host;
+  aURI->GetHost(host);
+  return StringEndsWith(host, ".onion"_ns);
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::LoopbackOrLocalException(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  nsAutoCString asciiHost;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetAsciiHost(asciiHost);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  // Let's make a quick check if the host matches these loopback strings
+  // before we do anything else
+  if (asciiHost.EqualsLiteral("localhost") || asciiHost.EqualsLiteral("::1")) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  mozilla::net::NetAddr addr;
+  if (NS_FAILED(addr.InitFromString(asciiHost))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // Loopback IPs are always exempt
+  if (addr.IsLoopbackAddr()) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Local IP exception can get disabled with a pref
+  bool upgradeLocal =
+      mozilla::StaticPrefs::dom_security_https_only_mode_upgrade_local();
+  return (!upgradeLocal && addr.IsIPAddrLocal());
+}
+
+/* static */
+bool nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsEqualURIExceptSchemeAndRef(nsIURI* aHTTPSSchemeURI,
+                                                    nsIURI* aOtherURI,
+                                                    nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // 1. Check if one of parameters is null then webpage can't be loaded yet
+  // and no further inspections are needed
+  if (!aHTTPSSchemeURI || !aOtherURI || !aLoadInfo) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 2. If the URI to be loaded is not http, then same origin will be detected
+  // already
+  if (!mozilla::net::SchemeIsHTTP(aOtherURI)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 3. Check if the HTTPS-Only Mode is even enabled, before we do anything else
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      !IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 4. If the load is exempt, then it's defintely not related to https-only
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // 5. Create a new target URI with 'https' instead of 'http' and compare it
+  // to the current URI
+  int32_t port = 0;
+  nsresult rv = aOtherURI->GetPort(&port);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  // a port of -1 indicates the default port, hence we upgrade from port 80 to
+  // port 443
+  // otherwise we keep the port.
+  if (port == -1) {
+    port = NS_GetDefaultPort("https");
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newHTTPSchemeURI;
+  rv = NS_MutateURI(aOtherURI)
+           .SetScheme("https"_ns)
+           .SetPort(port)
+           .Finalize(newHTTPSchemeURI);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+
+  bool uriEquals = false;
+  if (NS_FAILED(
+          aHTTPSSchemeURI->EqualsExceptRef(newHTTPSchemeURI, &uriEquals))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  return uriEquals;
+}
+
+/*static*/
+void nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::PotentiallyClearExemptFlag(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) {
+  // if neither HTTPS-Only nor HTTPS-First mode is enabled, then there is
+  // nothing to do here.
+  bool isPrivateWin = aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId > 0;
+  if (!IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(isPrivateWin) &&
+      !IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(isPrivateWin)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  // if it is not a top-level load we have nothing to do here
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() !=
+      ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) {
+    return;
+  }
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = aLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  // if request is not exempt we have nothing do here
+  if (httpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT) {
+    // clear exempt flag
+    httpsOnlyStatus ^= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+    aLoadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+  }
+}
+/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// Implementation of TestHTTPAnswerRunnable
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED(TestHTTPAnswerRunnable, mozilla::Runnable,
+                            nsIStreamListener, nsIInterfaceRequestor,
+                            nsITimerCallback)
+
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::TestHTTPAnswerRunnable(
+    nsIURI* aURI, mozilla::net::DocumentLoadListener* aDocumentLoadListener)
+    : mozilla::Runnable("TestHTTPAnswerRunnable"),
+      mURI(aURI),
+      mDocumentLoadListener(aDocumentLoadListener) {}
+
+/* static */
+bool TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::IsBackgroundRequestRedirected(
+    nsIHttpChannel* aChannel) {
+  // If there is no background request (aChannel), then there is nothing
+  // to do here.
+  if (!aChannel) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  // If the request was not redirected, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadinfo = aChannel->LoadInfo();
+  if (loadinfo->RedirectChain().IsEmpty()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If the final URI is not targeting an https scheme, then we definitely not
+  // dealing with a 'same-origin' redirect.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> finalURI;
+  nsresult rv = NS_GetFinalChannelURI(aChannel, getter_AddRefs(finalURI));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  if (!finalURI->SchemeIs("https")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // If the background request was not http, then there is nothing to do here.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> firstURIPrincipal;
+  loadinfo->RedirectChain()[0]->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(firstURIPrincipal));
+  if (!firstURIPrincipal || !firstURIPrincipal->SchemeIs("http")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // By now we have verified that the inital background request was http and
+  // that the redirected scheme is https. We want to find the following case
+  // where the background channel redirects to the https version of the
+  // top-level request.
+  // --> background channel: http://example.com
+  //      |--> redirects to: https://example.com
+  // Now we have to check that the hosts are 'same-origin'.
+  nsAutoCString redirectHost;
+  nsAutoCString finalHost;
+  firstURIPrincipal->GetAsciiHost(redirectHost);
+  finalURI->GetAsciiHost(finalHost);
+  return finalHost.Equals(redirectHost);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) {
+  // If the request status is not OK, it means it encountered some
+  // kind of error in which case we do not want to do anything.
+  nsresult requestStatus;
+  aRequest->GetStatus(&requestStatus);
+  if (requestStatus != NS_OK) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check if the original top-level channel which https-only is trying
+  // to upgrade is already in progress or if the channel is an auth channel.
+  // If it is in progress or Auth is in progress, then all good, if not
+  // then let's cancel that channel so we can dispaly the exception page.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> docChannel = mDocumentLoadListener->GetChannel();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpsOnlyChannel = do_QueryInterface(docChannel);
+  if (httpsOnlyChannel) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = httpsOnlyChannel->LoadInfo();
+    uint32_t topLevelLoadInProgress =
+        loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus() &
+        nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS;
+
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> httpChannelInternal =
+        do_QueryInterface(httpsOnlyChannel);
+    bool isAuthChannel = false;
+    mozilla::Unused << httpChannelInternal->GetIsAuthChannel(&isAuthChannel);
+    // some server configurations need a long time to respond to an https
+    // connection, but also redirect any http connection to the https version of
+    // it. If the top-level load has not started yet, but the http background
+    // request redirects to https, then do not show the error page, but keep
+    // waiting for the https response of the upgraded top-level request.
+    if (!topLevelLoadInProgress) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> backgroundHttpChannel =
+          do_QueryInterface(aRequest);
+      topLevelLoadInProgress =
+          IsBackgroundRequestRedirected(backgroundHttpChannel);
+    }
+    if (!topLevelLoadInProgress && !isAuthChannel) {
+      // Only really cancel the original top-level channel if it's
+      // status is still NS_OK, otherwise it might have already
+      // encountered some other error and was cancelled.
+      nsresult httpsOnlyChannelStatus;
+      httpsOnlyChannel->GetStatus(&httpsOnlyChannelStatus);
+      if (httpsOnlyChannelStatus == NS_OK) {
+        httpsOnlyChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT_EXTERNAL);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Cancel this http request because it has reached the end of it's
+  // lifetime at this point.
+  aRequest->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT);
+  return NS_ERROR_ABORT;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest,
+                                        nsIInputStream* aStream,
+                                        uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) {
+  // TestHTTPAnswerRunnable only cares about ::OnStartRequest which
+  // will also cancel the request, so we should in fact never even
+  // get here.
+  MOZ_ASSERT(false, "how come we get to ::OnDataAvailable");
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest,
+                                      nsresult aStatusCode) {
+  // TestHTTPAnswerRunnable only cares about ::OnStartRequest
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) {
+  return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::Run() {
+  // Wait N milliseconds to give the original https request a heads start
+  // before firing up this http request in the background. By default the
+  // timer is set to 3 seconds.  If the https request has not received
+  // any signal from the server during that time, than it's almost
+  // certain the upgraded request will result in time out.
+  uint32_t background_timer_ms = mozilla::StaticPrefs::
+      dom_security_https_only_fire_http_request_background_timer_ms();
+
+  return NS_NewTimerWithCallback(getter_AddRefs(mTimer), this,
+                                 background_timer_ms, nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+TestHTTPAnswerRunnable::Notify(nsITimer* aTimer) {
+  if (mTimer) {
+    mTimer->Cancel();
+    mTimer = nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // If the original channel has already started loading at this point
+  // then there is no need to do the dance.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> origChannel = mDocumentLoadListener->GetChannel();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> origLoadInfo = origChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint32_t origHttpsOnlyStatus = origLoadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  uint32_t topLevelLoadInProgress =
+      origHttpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_TOP_LEVEL_LOAD_IN_PROGRESS;
+  uint32_t downloadInProgress =
+      origHttpsOnlyStatus & nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DOWNLOAD_IN_PROGRESS;
+  if (topLevelLoadInProgress || downloadInProgress) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs = origLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes();
+  RefPtr<nsIPrincipal> nullPrincipal = mozilla::NullPrincipal::Create(attrs);
+
+  uint32_t loadFlags =
+      nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS | nsIRequest::INHIBIT_CACHING |
+      nsIRequest::INHIBIT_PERSISTENT_CACHING | nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
+      nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER;
+
+  // No need to connect to the URI including the path because we only care about
+  // the round trip time if a server responds to an http request.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> backgroundChannelURI;
+  nsAutoCString prePathStr;
+  nsresult rv = mURI->GetPrePath(prePathStr);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(backgroundChannelURI), prePathStr);
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // we are using TYPE_OTHER because TYPE_DOCUMENT might have side effects
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> testHTTPChannel;
+  rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(testHTTPChannel), backgroundChannelURI,
+                     nullPrincipal,
+                     nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+                     nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr,
+                     nullptr, loadFlags);
+
+  if (NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv))) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+
+  // We have exempt that load from HTTPS-Only to avoid getting upgraded
+  // to https as well. Additonally let's not log that request to the console
+  // because it might confuse end users.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = testHTTPChannel->LoadInfo();
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT |
+                     nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_DO_NOT_LOG_TO_CONSOLE;
+  loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+
+  testHTTPChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(this);
+  testHTTPChannel->AsyncOpen(this);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5cf94ae6a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsHTTPSOnlyUtils_h___
+#define nsHTTPSOnlyUtils_h___
+
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsISupports.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DocumentLoadListener.h"
+
+class nsHTTPSOnlyUtils {
+ public:
+  /**
+   * Returns if HTTPS-Only Mode preference is enabled
+   * @param aFromPrivateWindow true if executing in private browsing mode
+   * @return true if HTTPS-Only Mode is enabled
+   */
+  static bool IsHttpsOnlyModeEnabled(bool aFromPrivateWindow);
+
+  /**
+   * Returns if HTTPS-First Mode preference is enabled
+   * @param aFromPrivateWindow true if executing in private browsing mode
+   * @return true if HTTPS-First Mode is enabled
+   */
+  static bool IsHttpsFirstModeEnabled(bool aFromPrivateWindow);
+
+  /**
+   * Potentially fires an http request for a top-level load (provided by
+   * aDocumentLoadListener) in the background to avoid long timeouts in case
+   * the upgraded https top-level load most likely will result in timeout.
+   * @param aDocumentLoadListener The Document listener associated with
+   *                              the original top-level channel.
+   */
+  static void PotentiallyFireHttpRequestToShortenTimout(
+      mozilla::net::DocumentLoadListener* aDocumentLoadListener);
+
+  /**
+   * Determines if a request should get upgraded because of the HTTPS-Only mode.
+   * If true, the httpsOnlyStatus flag in LoadInfo gets updated and a message is
+   * logged in the console.
+   * @param  aURI      nsIURI of request
+   * @param  aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of request
+   * @return           true if request should get upgraded
+   */
+  static bool ShouldUpgradeRequest(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+  /**
+   * Determines if a request should get upgraded because of the HTTPS-Only mode.
+   * If true, a message is logged in the console.
+   * @param  aURI      nsIURI of request
+   * @param  aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of request
+   * @return           true if request should get upgraded
+   */
+  static bool ShouldUpgradeWebSocket(nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+  /**
+   * Determines if we might get stuck in an upgrade-downgrade-endless loop
+   * where https-only upgrades the request to https and the website downgrades
+   * the scheme to http again causing an endless upgrade downgrade loop. E.g.
+   * https-only upgrades to https and the website answers with a meta-refresh
+   * to downgrade to same-origin http version. Similarly this method breaks
+   * the endless cycle for JS based redirects and 302 based redirects.
+   * Note this function is also used when we got an HTTPS RR for the website.
+   * @param  aURI      nsIURI of request
+   * @param  aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of request
+   * @param  aOptions an options object indicating if the function
+   *                  should be consulted for https-only or https-first mode or
+   *                  the case that an HTTPS RR is presented.
+   * @return           true if an endless loop is detected
+   */
+  enum class UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions {
+    EnforceForHTTPSOnlyMode,
+    EnforceForHTTPSFirstMode,
+    EnforceForHTTPSRR,
+  };
+  static bool IsUpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoop(
+      nsIURI* aURI, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+      const mozilla::EnumSet<UpgradeDowngradeEndlessLoopOptions>& aOptions =
+          {});
+
+  /**
+   * Determines if a request should get upgraded because of the HTTPS-First
+   * mode. If true, the httpsOnlyStatus in LoadInfo gets updated and a message
+   * is logged in the console.
+   * @param  aURI      nsIURI of request
+   * @param  aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of request
+   * @return           true if request should get upgraded
+   */
+  static bool ShouldUpgradeHttpsFirstRequest(nsIURI* aURI,
+                                             nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+  /**
+   * Determines if the request was previously upgraded with HTTPS-First, creates
+   * a downgraded URI and logs to console.
+   * @param  aStatus   Status code
+   * @param  aChannel Failed channel
+   * @return          URI with http-scheme or nullptr
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<nsIURI> PotentiallyDowngradeHttpsFirstRequest(
+      nsIChannel* aChannel, nsresult aStatus);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks if the error code is on a block-list of codes that are probably
+   * not related to a HTTPS-Only Mode upgrade.
+   * @param  aChannel The failed Channel.
+   * @param  aError Error Code from Request
+   * @return        false if error is not related to upgrade
+   */
+  static bool CouldBeHttpsOnlyError(nsIChannel* aChannel, nsresult aError);
+
+  /**
+   * Logs localized message to either content console or browser console
+   * @param aName            Localization key
+   * @param aParams          Localization parameters
+   * @param aFlags           Logging Flag (see nsIScriptError)
+   * @param aLoadInfo        The loadinfo of the request.
+   * @param [aURI]           Optional: URI to log
+   * @param [aUseHttpsFirst] Optional: Log using HTTPS-First (vs. HTTPS-Only)
+   */
+  static void LogLocalizedString(const char* aName,
+                                 const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                                 uint32_t aFlags, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                 nsIURI* aURI = nullptr,
+                                 bool aUseHttpsFirst = false);
+
+  /**
+   * Tests if the HTTPS-Only upgrade exception is set for a given principal.
+   * @param  aPrincipal The principal for whom the exception should be checked
+   * @return            True if exempt
+   */
+  static bool TestIfPrincipalIsExempt(nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal);
+
+  /**
+   * Tests if the HTTPS-Only Mode upgrade exception is set for channel result
+   * principal and sets or removes the httpsOnlyStatus-flag on the loadinfo
+   * accordingly.
+   * Note: This function only adds an exemption for loads of TYPE_DOCUMENT.
+   * @param  aChannel The channel to be checked
+   */
+  static void TestSitePermissionAndPotentiallyAddExemption(
+      nsIChannel* aChannel);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks whether CORS or mixed content requests are safe because they'll get
+   * upgraded to HTTPS
+   * @param  aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of request
+   * @return           true if it's safe to accept
+   */
+  static bool IsSafeToAcceptCORSOrMixedContent(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks if two URIs are same origin modulo the difference that
+   * aHTTPSchemeURI uses an http scheme.
+   * @param aHTTPSSchemeURI nsIURI using scheme of https
+   * @param aOtherURI nsIURI using scheme of http
+   * @param aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of the request
+   * @return true, if URIs are equal except scheme and ref
+   */
+  static bool IsEqualURIExceptSchemeAndRef(nsIURI* aHTTPSSchemeURI,
+                                           nsIURI* aOtherURI,
+                                           nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks a top-level load, if it is exempt by HTTPS-First/ Only
+   * clear exemption flag.
+   * @param aLoadInfo nsILoadInfo of the request
+   */
+  static void PotentiallyClearExemptFlag(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo);
+
+ private:
+  /**
+   * Checks if it can be ruled out that the error has something
+   * to do with an HTTPS upgrade.
+   * @param  aError error code
+   * @return        true if error is unrelated to the upgrade
+   */
+  static bool HttpsUpgradeUnrelatedErrorCode(nsresult aError);
+  /**
+   * Logs localized message to either content console or browser console
+   * @param aMessage         Message to log
+   * @param aFlags           Logging Flag (see nsIScriptError)
+   * @param aLoadInfo        The loadinfo of the request.
+   * @param [aURI]           Optional: URI to log
+   * @param [aUseHttpsFirst] Optional: Log using HTTPS-First (vs. HTTPS-Only)
+   */
+  static void LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, uint32_t aFlags,
+                         nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, nsIURI* aURI = nullptr,
+                         bool aUseHttpsFirst = false);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks whether the URI ends with .onion
+   * @param  aURI URI object
+   * @return      true if the URI is an Onion URI
+   */
+  static bool OnionException(nsIURI* aURI);
+
+  /**
+   * Checks whether the URI is a loopback- or local-IP
+   * @param  aURI URI object
+   * @return      true if the URI is either loopback or local
+   */
+  static bool LoopbackOrLocalException(nsIURI* aURI);
+};
+
+/**
+ * Helper class to perform an http request with a N milliseconds
+ * delay. If that http request is 'receiving data' before the
+ * upgraded https request, then it's a strong indicator that
+ * the https request will result in a timeout and hence we
+ * cancel the https request which will result in displaying
+ * the exception page.
+ */
+class TestHTTPAnswerRunnable final : public mozilla::Runnable,
+                                     public nsIStreamListener,
+                                     public nsIInterfaceRequestor,
+                                     public nsITimerCallback {
+ public:
+  // TestHTTPAnswerRunnable needs to implement all these channel related
+  // interfaces because otherwise our Necko code is not happy, but we
+  // really only care about ::OnStartRequest.
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS_INHERITED
+  NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE
+  NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER
+  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER
+  NS_DECL_NSIINTERFACEREQUESTOR
+  NS_DECL_NSITIMERCALLBACK
+
+  explicit TestHTTPAnswerRunnable(
+      nsIURI* aURI, mozilla::net::DocumentLoadListener* aDocumentLoadListener);
+
+ protected:
+  ~TestHTTPAnswerRunnable() = default;
+
+ private:
+  /**
+   * Checks whether the HTTP background request results in a redirect
+   * to the same upgraded top-level HTTPS URL
+   * @param  aChannel a nsIHttpChannel object
+   * @return  true if the backgroundchannel is redirected
+   */
+  static bool IsBackgroundRequestRedirected(nsIHttpChannel* aChannel);
+
+  RefPtr<nsIURI> mURI;
+  // We're keeping a reference to DocumentLoadListener instead of a specific
+  // channel, because the current top-level channel can change (for example
+  // through redirects)
+  RefPtr<mozilla::net::DocumentLoadListener> mDocumentLoadListener;
+  RefPtr<nsITimer> mTimer;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsHTTPSOnlyUtils_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission.idl b/dom/security/nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission.idl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7eabdb6715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission.idl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsISupports.idl"
+/**
+ * An interface to test for cookie permissions
+ */
+[scriptable, uuid(73f4f039-d6ff-41a7-9eb3-00db57b0b7f4)]
+interface nsIHttpsOnlyModePermission : nsISupports
+{
+  /**
+   * nsIPermissionManager permission values
+   */
+  const uint32_t LOAD_INSECURE_DEFAULT = 0;
+  const uint32_t LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW   = 1;
+  const uint32_t LOAD_INSECURE_BLOCK   = 2;
+
+  /**
+   * additional values which do not match
+   * nsIPermissionManager. Keep space available to allow nsIPermissionManager to
+   * add values without colliding. ACCESS_SESSION is not directly returned by
+   * any methods on this interface.
+   */
+  const uint32_t LOAD_INSECURE_ALLOW_SESSION = 9;
+};
diff --git a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93a60de85a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1040 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsMixedContentBlocker.h"
+
+#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h"
+#include "nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "nsThreadUtils.h"
+#include "nsINode.h"
+#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
+#include "nsDocShell.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/BrowsingContext.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/WindowContext.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIParentChannel.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+#include "nsIScriptObjectPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsIProtocolHandler.h"
+#include "nsCharSeparatedTokenizer.h"
+#include "nsISecureBrowserUI.h"
+#include "nsIWebNavigation.h"
+#include "nsLoadGroup.h"
+#include "nsIScriptError.h"
+#include "nsIURI.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsAsyncRedirectVerifyHelper.h"
+#include "mozilla/LoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsISiteSecurityService.h"
+#include "prnetdb.h"
+#include "nsQueryObject.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_dom.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_fission.h"
+#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ContentChild.h"
+#include "mozilla/ipc/URIUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DocumentLoadListener.h"
+#include "mozilla/net/DocumentChannel.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsHTTPSOnlyUtils.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::dom;
+
+static mozilla::LazyLogModule sMCBLog("MCBLog");
+
+enum nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType { eBlocked = 0x00, eUserOverride = 0x01 };
+
+// Allowlist of hostnames that should be considered secure contexts even when
+// served over http:// or ws://
+nsCString* nsMixedContentBlocker::sSecurecontextAllowlist = nullptr;
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::sSecurecontextAllowlistCached = false;
+
+enum MixedContentHSTSState {
+  MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS = 0,
+  MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS = 1,
+  MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS = 2,
+  MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS = 3
+};
+
+nsMixedContentBlocker::~nsMixedContentBlocker() = default;
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMixedContentBlocker, nsIContentPolicy, nsIChannelEventSink)
+
+static void LogMixedContentMessage(
+    MixedContentTypes aClassification, nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+    uint64_t aInnerWindowID, nsMixedContentBlockerMessageType aMessageType,
+    nsIURI* aRequestingLocation,
+    const nsACString& aOverruleMessageLookUpKeyWithThis = ""_ns) {
+  nsAutoCString messageCategory;
+  uint32_t severityFlag;
+  nsAutoCString messageLookupKey;
+
+  if (aMessageType == eBlocked) {
+    severityFlag = nsIScriptError::errorFlag;
+    messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Blocker");
+    if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedDisplayContent");
+    } else {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("BlockMixedActiveContent");
+    }
+  } else {
+    severityFlag = nsIScriptError::warningFlag;
+    messageCategory.AssignLiteral("Mixed Content Message");
+    if (aClassification == eMixedDisplay) {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedDisplayContent2");
+    } else {
+      messageLookupKey.AssignLiteral("LoadingMixedActiveContent2");
+    }
+  }
+
+  // if the callee explicitly wants to use a special message for this
+  // console report, then we allow to overrule the default with the
+  // explicitly provided one here.
+  if (!aOverruleMessageLookUpKeyWithThis.IsEmpty()) {
+    messageLookupKey = aOverruleMessageLookUpKeyWithThis;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString localizedMsg;
+  AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+  CopyUTF8toUTF16(aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault(),
+                  *params.AppendElement());
+  nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                        messageLookupKey.get(), params,
+                                        localizedMsg);
+
+  nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(localizedMsg, severityFlag,
+                                            messageCategory, aInnerWindowID,
+                                            aRequestingLocation);
+}
+
+/* nsIChannelEventSink implementation
+ * This code is called when a request is redirected.
+ * We check the channel associated with the new uri is allowed to load
+ * in the current context
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::AsyncOnChannelRedirect(
+    nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aFlags,
+    nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) {
+  mozilla::net::nsAsyncRedirectAutoCallback autoCallback(aCallback);
+
+  if (!aOldChannel) {
+    NS_ERROR("No channel when evaluating mixed content!");
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  // If we are in the parent process in e10s, we don't have access to the
+  // document node, and hence ShouldLoad will fail when we try to get
+  // the docShell.  If that's the case, ignore mixed content checks
+  // on redirects in the parent.  Let the child check for mixed content.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIParentChannel> is_ipc_channel;
+  NS_QueryNotificationCallbacks(aNewChannel, is_ipc_channel);
+  RefPtr<net::DocumentLoadListener> docListener =
+      do_QueryObject(is_ipc_channel);
+  if (is_ipc_channel && !docListener) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Don't do these checks if we're switching from DocumentChannel
+  // to a real channel. In that case, we should already have done
+  // the checks in the parent process. AsyncOnChannelRedirect
+  // isn't called in the content process if we switch process,
+  // so checking here would just hide bugs in the process switch
+  // cases.
+  if (RefPtr<net::DocumentChannel> docChannel = do_QueryObject(aOldChannel)) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> oldUri;
+  rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(oldUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> newUri;
+  rv = aNewChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(newUri));
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // Get the loading Info from the old channel
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = aOldChannel->LoadInfo();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> requestingPrincipal = loadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+
+  // Since we are calling shouldLoad() directly on redirects, we don't go
+  // through the code in nsContentPolicyUtils::NS_CheckContentLoadPolicy().
+  // Hence, we have to duplicate parts of it here.
+  if (requestingPrincipal) {
+    // We check to see if the loadingPrincipal is systemPrincipal and return
+    // early if it is
+    if (requestingPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  int16_t decision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+  rv = ShouldLoad(newUri, loadInfo,
+                  ""_ns,  // aMimeGuess
+                  &decision);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    autoCallback.DontCallback();
+    aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+    return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
+  }
+
+  // If the channel is about to load mixed content, abort the channel
+  if (!NS_CP_ACCEPTED(decision)) {
+    autoCallback.DontCallback();
+    aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI);
+    return NS_BINDING_FAILED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+/* This version of ShouldLoad() is non-static and called by the Content Policy
+ * API and AsyncOnChannelRedirect().  See nsIContentPolicy::ShouldLoad()
+ * for detailed description of the parameters.
+ */
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                  nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                  const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                  int16_t* aDecision) {
+  // We pass in false as the first parameter to ShouldLoad(), because the
+  // callers of this method don't know whether the load went through cached
+  // image redirects.  This is handled by direct callers of the static
+  // ShouldLoad.
+  nsresult rv =
+      ShouldLoad(false,  // aHadInsecureImageRedirect
+                 aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeGuess, true, aDecision);
+
+  if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST) {
+    NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
+                                nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED);
+  }
+
+  return rv;
+}
+
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
+    const nsACString& aAsciiHost) {
+  if (mozilla::net::IsLoopbackHostname(aAsciiHost)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  using namespace mozilla::net;
+  NetAddr addr;
+  if (NS_FAILED(addr.InitFromString(aAsciiHost))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Step 4 of
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy says
+  // we should only consider [::1]/128 as a potentially trustworthy IPv6
+  // address, whereas for IPv4 127.0.0.1/8 are considered as potentially
+  // trustworthy.
+  return addr.IsLoopBackAddressWithoutIPv6Mapping();
+}
+
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackURL(nsIURI* aURL) {
+  if (!aURL) {
+    return false;
+  }
+  nsAutoCString asciiHost;
+  nsresult rv = aURL->GetAsciiHost(asciiHost);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  return IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(asciiHost);
+}
+
+/* Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as trustworthy as well if
+ * `dom.securecontext.allowlist_onions` is `true`.
+ */
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(nsIURI* aURL) {
+  if (!StaticPrefs::dom_securecontext_allowlist_onions()) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString host;
+  nsresult rv = aURL->GetHost(host);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false);
+  return StringEndsWith(host, ".onion"_ns);
+}
+
+// static
+void nsMixedContentBlocker::OnPrefChange(const char* aPref, void* aClosure) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!strcmp(aPref, "dom.securecontext.allowlist"));
+  Preferences::GetCString("dom.securecontext.allowlist",
+                          *sSecurecontextAllowlist);
+}
+
+// static
+void nsMixedContentBlocker::GetSecureContextAllowList(nsACString& aList) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!sSecurecontextAllowlistCached) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(!sSecurecontextAllowlist);
+    sSecurecontextAllowlistCached = true;
+    sSecurecontextAllowlist = new nsCString();
+    Preferences::RegisterCallbackAndCall(OnPrefChange,
+                                         "dom.securecontext.allowlist");
+  }
+  aList = *sSecurecontextAllowlist;
+}
+
+// static
+void nsMixedContentBlocker::Shutdown() {
+  if (sSecurecontextAllowlist) {
+    delete sSecurecontextAllowlist;
+    sSecurecontextAllowlist = nullptr;
+  }
+}
+
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  // The following implements:
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
+
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  nsresult rv = aURI->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // Blobs are expected to inherit their principal so we don't expect to have
+  // a content principal with scheme 'blob' here.  We can't assert that though
+  // since someone could mess with a non-blob URI to give it that scheme.
+  NS_WARNING_ASSERTION(!scheme.EqualsLiteral("blob"),
+                       "IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy ignoring blob scheme");
+
+  // According to the specification, the user agent may choose to extend the
+  // trust to other, vendor-specific URL schemes. We use this for "resource:",
+  // which is technically a substituting protocol handler that is not limited to
+  // local resource mapping, but in practice is never mapped remotely as this
+  // would violate assumptions a lot of code makes.
+  // We use nsIProtocolHandler flags to determine which protocols we consider a
+  // priori authenticated.
+  bool aPrioriAuthenticated = false;
+  if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY,
+          &aPrioriAuthenticated))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (aPrioriAuthenticated) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString host;
+  rv = aURI->GetHost(host);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  if (IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackURL(aURI)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // If a host is not considered secure according to the default algorithm, then
+  // check to see if it has been allowlisted by the user.  We only apply this
+  // allowlist for network resources, i.e., those with scheme "http" or "ws".
+  // The pref should contain a comma-separated list of hostnames.
+
+  if (!scheme.EqualsLiteral("http") && !scheme.EqualsLiteral("ws")) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoCString allowlist;
+  GetSecureContextAllowList(allowlist);
+  for (const nsACString& allowedHost :
+       nsCCharSeparatedTokenizer(allowlist, ',').ToRange()) {
+    if (host.Equals(allowedHost)) {
+      return true;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Maybe we have a .onion URL. Treat it as trustworthy as well if
+  // `dom.securecontext.allowlist_onions` is `true`.
+  if (nsMixedContentBlocker::IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(aURI)) {
+    return true;
+  }
+  return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the URI of the precusor principal or the URI of aPrincipal if there is
+ * no precursor URI.
+ */
+static already_AddRefed<nsIURI> GetPrincipalURIOrPrecursorPrincipalURI(
+    nsIPrincipal* aPrincipal) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> precursorURI = nullptr;
+  if (aPrincipal->GetIsNullPrincipal()) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> precursorPrin = aPrincipal->GetPrecursorPrincipal();
+    precursorURI = precursorPrin ? precursorPrin->GetURI() : nullptr;
+  }
+
+  return precursorURI ? precursorURI.forget() : aPrincipal->GetURI();
+}
+
+/* Static version of ShouldLoad() that contains all the Mixed Content Blocker
+ * logic.  Called from non-static ShouldLoad().
+ */
+nsresult nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
+                                           nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                           nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                           const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                           bool aReportError,
+                                           int16_t* aDecision) {
+  // Asserting that we are on the main thread here and hence do not have to lock
+  // and unlock security.mixed_content.block_active_content and
+  // security.mixed_content.block_display_content before reading/writing to
+  // them.
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(MOZ_LOG_TEST(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose))) {
+    nsAutoCString asciiUrl;
+    aContentLocation->GetAsciiSpec(asciiUrl);
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("shouldLoad:"));
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  - contentLocation: %s", asciiUrl.get()));
+  }
+
+  nsContentPolicyType internalContentType =
+      aLoadInfo->InternalContentPolicyType();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal();
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> triggeringPrincipal = aLoadInfo->TriggeringPrincipal();
+
+  if (MOZ_UNLIKELY(MOZ_LOG_TEST(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose))) {
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  - internalContentPolicyType: %s",
+             NS_CP_ContentTypeName(internalContentType)));
+
+    if (loadingPrincipal != nullptr) {
+      nsAutoCString loadingPrincipalAsciiUrl;
+      loadingPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(loadingPrincipalAsciiUrl);
+      MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+              ("  - loadingPrincipal: %s", loadingPrincipalAsciiUrl.get()));
+    } else {
+      MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("  - loadingPrincipal: (nullptr)"));
+    }
+
+    nsAutoCString triggeringPrincipalAsciiUrl;
+    triggeringPrincipal->GetAsciiSpec(triggeringPrincipalAsciiUrl);
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  - triggeringPrincipal: %s", triggeringPrincipalAsciiUrl.get()));
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<WindowContext> requestingWindow =
+      WindowContext::GetById(aLoadInfo->GetInnerWindowID());
+
+  bool isPreload = nsContentUtils::IsPreloadType(internalContentType);
+
+  // The content policy type that we receive may be an internal type for
+  // scripts.  Let's remember if we have seen a worker type, and reset it to the
+  // external type in all cases right now.
+  bool isWorkerType =
+      internalContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_WORKER ||
+      internalContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SHARED_WORKER ||
+      internalContentType == nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_INTERNAL_SERVICE_WORKER;
+  ExtContentPolicyType contentType =
+      nsContentUtils::InternalContentPolicyTypeToExternal(internalContentType);
+
+  // Assume active (high risk) content and blocked by default
+  MixedContentTypes classification = eMixedScript;
+  // Make decision to block/reject by default
+  *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+
+  // Notes on non-obvious decisions:
+  //
+  // TYPE_DTD: A DTD can contain entity definitions that expand to scripts.
+  //
+  // TYPE_FONT: The TrueType hinting mechanism is basically a scripting
+  // language that gets interpreted by the operating system's font rasterizer.
+  // Mixed content web fonts are relatively uncommon, and we can can fall back
+  // to built-in fonts with minimal disruption in almost all cases.
+  //
+  // TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST could actually be either active content (e.g. a
+  // script that a plugin will execute) or display content (e.g. Flash video
+  // content).  Until we have a way to determine active vs passive content
+  // from plugin requests (bug 836352), we will treat this as passive content.
+  // This is to prevent false positives from causing users to become
+  // desensitized to the mixed content blocker.
+  //
+  // TYPE_CSP_REPORT: High-risk because they directly leak information about
+  // the content of the page, and because blocking them does not have any
+  // negative effect on the page loading.
+  //
+  // TYPE_PING: Ping requests are POSTS, not GETs like images and media.
+  // Also, PING requests have no bearing on the rendering or operation of
+  // the page when used as designed, so even though they are lower risk than
+  // scripts, blocking them is basically risk-free as far as compatibility is
+  // concerned.
+  //
+  // TYPE_STYLESHEET: XSLT stylesheets can insert scripts. CSS positioning
+  // and other advanced CSS features can possibly be exploited to cause
+  // spoofing attacks (e.g. make a "grant permission" button look like a
+  // "refuse permission" button).
+  //
+  // TYPE_BEACON: Beacon requests are similar to TYPE_PING, and are blocked by
+  // default.
+  //
+  // TYPE_WEBSOCKET: The Websockets API requires browsers to
+  // reject mixed-content websockets: "If secure is false but the origin of
+  // the entry script has a scheme component that is itself a secure protocol,
+  // e.g. HTTPS, then throw a SecurityError exception." We already block mixed
+  // content websockets within the websockets implementation, so we don't need
+  // to do any blocking here, nor do we need to provide a way to undo or
+  // override the blocking. Websockets without TLS are very flaky anyway in the
+  // face of many HTTP-aware proxies. Compared to passive content, there is
+  // additional risk that the script using WebSockets will disclose sensitive
+  // information from the HTTPS page and/or eval (directly or indirectly)
+  // received data.
+  //
+  // TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST: XHR requires either same origin or CORS, so most
+  // mixed-content XHR will already be blocked by that check. This will also
+  // block HTTPS-to-HTTP XHR with CORS. The same security concerns mentioned
+  // above for WebSockets apply to XHR, and XHR should have the same security
+  // properties as WebSockets w.r.t. mixed content. XHR's handling of redirects
+  // amplifies these concerns.
+  //
+  // TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA: Ordinarily, webrtc uses low-level sockets for
+  // peer-to-peer media, which bypasses this code entirely. However, when a
+  // web proxy is being used, the TCP and TLS webrtc connections are routed
+  // through the web proxy (using HTTP CONNECT), which causes these connections
+  // to be checked. We just skip mixed content blocking in that case.
+
+  switch (contentType) {
+    // The top-level document cannot be mixed content by definition
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    // Creating insecure websocket connections in a secure page is blocked
+    // already in the websocket constructor. We don't need to check the blocking
+    // here and we don't want to un-block
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+
+      // TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD: Save-link-as feature is used to download a
+      // resource
+      // without involving a docShell. This kind of loading must be
+      // allowed, if not disabled in the preferences.
+      // Creating insecure connections for a save-as link download is
+      // acceptable. This download is completely disconnected from the docShell,
+      // but still using the same loading principal.
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SAVEAS_DOWNLOAD:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+      break;
+
+    // It does not make sense to subject webrtc media connections to mixed
+    // content blocking, since those connections are peer-to-peer and will
+    // therefore almost never match the origin.
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PROXIED_WEBRTC_MEDIA:
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+
+    // Static display content is considered moderate risk for mixed content so
+    // these will be blocked according to the mixed display preference
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
+      classification = eMixedDisplay;
+      break;
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST:
+      if (StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_object_subrequest()) {
+        classification = eMixedScript;
+      } else {
+        classification = eMixedDisplay;
+      }
+      break;
+
+    // Active content (or content with a low value/risk-of-blocking ratio)
+    // that has been explicitly evaluated; listed here for documentation
+    // purposes and to avoid the assertion and warning for the default case.
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DTD:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FETCH:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_UA_FONT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_WEB_MANIFEST:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_XSLT:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER:
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_SPECULATIVE:
+      break;
+
+    case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_INVALID:
+      MOZ_ASSERT(false, "Mixed content of unknown type");
+      // Do not add default: so that compilers can catch the missing case.
+  }
+
+  // Make sure to get the URI the load started with. No need to check
+  // outer schemes because all the wrapping pseudo protocols inherit the
+  // security properties of the actual network request represented
+  // by the innerMost URL.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerContentLocation = NS_GetInnermostURI(aContentLocation);
+  if (!innerContentLocation) {
+    NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from aContentLocation");
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because the innermost "
+             "URI could not be "
+             "retrieved"));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // TYPE_IMAGE redirects are cached based on the original URI, not the final
+  // destination and hence cache hits for images may not have the correct
+  // innerContentLocation.  Check if the cached hit went through an http
+  // redirect, and if it did, we can't treat this as a secure subresource.
+  if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect &&
+      URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext(innerContentLocation)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Most likely aLoadingPrincipal reflects the security context of the owning
+   * document for this mixed content check. There are cases where that is not
+   * true, hence we have to we process requests in the following order:
+   * 1) If the load is triggered by the SystemPrincipal, we allow the load.
+   *    Content scripts from addon code do provide aTriggeringPrincipal, which
+   *    is an ExpandedPrincipal. If encountered, we allow the load.
+   * 2) If aLoadingPrincipal does not yield to a requestingLocation, then we
+   *    fall back to querying the requestingLocation from aTriggeringPrincipal.
+   * 3) If we still end up not having a requestingLocation, we reject the load.
+   */
+
+  // 1) Check if the load was triggered by the system (SystemPrincipal) or
+  // a content script from addons code (ExpandedPrincipal) in which case the
+  // load is not subject to mixed content blocking.
+  if (triggeringPrincipal) {
+    if (triggeringPrincipal->IsSystemPrincipal()) {
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIExpandedPrincipal> expanded =
+        do_QueryInterface(triggeringPrincipal);
+    if (expanded) {
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 2) If aLoadingPrincipal does not provide a requestingLocation, then
+  // we fall back to to querying the requestingLocation from
+  // aTriggeringPrincipal.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> requestingLocation;
+  auto* baseLoadingPrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(loadingPrincipal);
+  if (baseLoadingPrincipal) {
+    requestingLocation =
+        GetPrincipalURIOrPrecursorPrincipalURI(baseLoadingPrincipal);
+  }
+  if (!requestingLocation) {
+    auto* baseTriggeringPrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(triggeringPrincipal);
+    if (baseTriggeringPrincipal) {
+      requestingLocation =
+          GetPrincipalURIOrPrecursorPrincipalURI(baseTriggeringPrincipal);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // 3) Giving up. We still don't have a requesting location, therefore we can't
+  // tell if this is a mixed content load. Deny to be safe.
+  if (!requestingLocation) {
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because no requesting "
+             "location could be "
+             "gathered."));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check the parent scheme. If it is not an HTTPS page then mixed content
+  // restrictions do not apply.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> innerRequestingLocation =
+      NS_GetInnermostURI(requestingLocation);
+  if (!innerRequestingLocation) {
+    NS_ERROR("Can't get innerURI from requestingLocation");
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because the innermost "
+             "URI of the "
+             "requesting location could be gathered."));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool parentIsHttps = innerRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("https");
+  if (!parentIsHttps) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  -> decision: Request will be allowed because the requesting "
+             "location is not using "
+             "HTTPS."));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Disallow mixed content loads for workers, shared workers and service
+  // workers.
+  if (isWorkerType) {
+    // For workers, we can assume that we're mixed content at this point, since
+    // the parent is https, and the protocol associated with
+    // innerContentLocation doesn't map to the secure URI flags checked above.
+    // Assert this for sanity's sake
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    bool isHttpsScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("https");
+    MOZ_ASSERT(!isHttpsScheme);
+#endif
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+            ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected, trying to load a worker "
+             "from an insecure origin."));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  bool isHttpScheme = innerContentLocation->SchemeIs("http");
+  if (isHttpScheme && IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(innerContentLocation)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Check if https-only mode upgrades this later anyway
+  if (nsHTTPSOnlyUtils::IsSafeToAcceptCORSOrMixedContent(aLoadInfo)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // The page might have set the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests'. In
+  // such a case allow the http: load to succeed with the promise that the
+  // channel will get upgraded to https before fetching any data from the
+  // netwerk. Please see: nsHttpChannel::Connect()
+  //
+  // Please note that the CSP directive 'upgrade-insecure-requests' only applies
+  // to http: and ws: (for websockets). Websockets are not subject to mixed
+  // content blocking since insecure websockets are not allowed within secure
+  // pages. Hence, we only have to check against http: here. Skip mixed content
+  // blocking if the subresource load uses http: and the CSP directive
+  // 'upgrade-insecure-requests' is present on the page.
+
+  // Carve-out: if we're in the parent and we're loading media, e.g. through
+  // webbrowserpersist, don't reject it if we can't find a docshell.
+  if (XRE_IsParentProcess() && !requestingWindow &&
+      (contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE ||
+       contentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA)) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+  // Otherwise, we must have a window
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(requestingWindow, NS_OK);
+
+  if (isHttpScheme && aLoadInfo->GetUpgradeInsecureRequests()) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Allow http: mixed content if we are choosing to upgrade them when the
+  // pref "security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content" is true.
+  // This behaves like GetUpgradeInsecureRequests above in that the channel will
+  // be upgraded to https before fetching any data from the netwerk.
+  bool isUpgradableDisplayType =
+      nsContentUtils::IsUpgradableDisplayType(contentType) &&
+      StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_upgrade_display_content();
+  if (isHttpScheme && isUpgradableDisplayType) {
+    *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // The page might have set the CSP directive 'block-all-mixed-content' which
+  // should block not only active mixed content loads but in fact all mixed
+  // content loads, see https://www.w3.org/TR/mixed-content/#strict-checking
+  // Block all non secure loads in case the CSP directive is present. Please
+  // note that at this point we already know, based on |schemeSecure| that the
+  // load is not secure, so we can bail out early at this point.
+  if (aLoadInfo->GetBlockAllMixedContent()) {
+    // log a message to the console before returning.
+    nsAutoCString spec;
+    nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(spec);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params;
+    CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, *params.AppendElement());
+
+    CSP_LogLocalizedStr("blockAllMixedContent", params,
+                        u""_ns,  // aSourceFile
+                        u""_ns,  // aScriptSample
+                        0,       // aLineNumber
+                        0,       // aColumnNumber
+                        nsIScriptError::errorFlag, "blockAllMixedContent"_ns,
+                        requestingWindow->Id(),
+                        !!aLoadInfo->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId);
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    MOZ_LOG(
+        sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+        ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because the CSP directive "
+         "'block-all-mixed-content' was set while trying to load data from "
+         "a non-secure origin."));
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // Determine if the rootDoc is https and if the user decided to allow Mixed
+  // Content
+  WindowContext* topWC = requestingWindow->TopWindowContext();
+  bool rootHasSecureConnection = topWC->GetIsSecure();
+  bool allowMixedContent = topWC->GetAllowMixedContent();
+
+  // When navigating an iframe, the iframe may be https
+  // but its parents may not be.  Check the parents to see if any of them are
+  // https. If none of the parents are https, allow the load.
+  if (contentType == ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT &&
+      !rootHasSecureConnection) {
+    bool httpsParentExists = false;
+
+    RefPtr<WindowContext> curWindow = requestingWindow;
+    while (!httpsParentExists && curWindow) {
+      httpsParentExists = curWindow->GetIsSecure();
+      curWindow = curWindow->GetParentWindowContext();
+    }
+
+    if (!httpsParentExists) {
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+  }
+
+  OriginAttributes originAttributes;
+  if (loadingPrincipal) {
+    originAttributes = loadingPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef();
+  } else if (triggeringPrincipal) {
+    originAttributes = triggeringPrincipal->OriginAttributesRef();
+  }
+
+  // At this point we know that the request is mixed content, and the only
+  // question is whether we block it.  Record telemetry at this point as to
+  // whether HSTS would have fixed things by making the content location
+  // into an HTTPS URL.
+  //
+  // Note that we count this for redirects as well as primary requests. This
+  // will cause some degree of double-counting, especially when mixed content
+  // is not blocked (e.g., for images).  For more detail, see:
+  //   https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1198572#c19
+  //
+  // We do not count requests aHadInsecureImageRedirect=true, since these are
+  // just an artifact of the image caching system.
+  bool active = (classification == eMixedScript);
+  if (!aHadInsecureImageRedirect) {
+    if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+      AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(innerContentLocation, active,
+                                 originAttributes);
+    } else {
+      // Ask the parent process to do the same call
+      mozilla::dom::ContentChild* cc =
+          mozilla::dom::ContentChild::GetSingleton();
+      if (cc) {
+        cc->SendAccumulateMixedContentHSTS(innerContentLocation, active,
+                                           originAttributes);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // set hasMixedContentObjectSubrequest on this object if necessary
+  if (contentType == ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_OBJECT_SUBREQUEST &&
+      aReportError) {
+    if (!StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_object_subrequest()) {
+      nsAutoCString messageLookUpKey(
+          "LoadingMixedDisplayObjectSubrequestDeprecation");
+
+      LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, topWC->Id(),
+                             eUserOverride, requestingLocation,
+                             messageLookUpKey);
+    }
+  }
+
+  uint32_t newState = 0;
+  // If the content is display content, and the pref says display content should
+  // be blocked, block it.
+  if (classification == eMixedDisplay) {
+    if (!StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_display_content() ||
+        allowMixedContent) {
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      // User has overriden the pref and the root is not https;
+      // mixed display content was allowed on an https subframe.
+      newState |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
+    } else {
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
+      MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+              ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because the content is "
+               "display "
+               "content (blocked by pref "
+               "security.mixed_content.block_display_content)."));
+      newState |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_DISPLAY_CONTENT;
+    }
+  } else {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(classification == eMixedScript);
+    // If the content is active content, and the pref says active content should
+    // be blocked, block it unless the user has choosen to override the pref
+    if (!StaticPrefs::security_mixed_content_block_active_content() ||
+        allowMixedContent) {
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT;
+      // User has already overriden the pref and the root is not https;
+      // mixed active content was allowed on an https subframe.
+      newState |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_LOADED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
+    } else {
+      // User has not overriden the pref by Disabling protection. Reject the
+      // request and update the security state.
+      *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST;
+      MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+              ("  -> decision: Request will be rejected because the content is "
+               "active "
+               "content (blocked by pref "
+               "security.mixed_content.block_active_content)."));
+      // The user has not overriden the pref, so make sure they still have an
+      // option by calling nativeDocShell which will invoke the doorhanger
+      newState |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_BLOCKED_MIXED_ACTIVE_CONTENT;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // To avoid duplicate errors on the console, we do not report blocked
+  // preloads to the console.
+  if (!isPreload && aReportError) {
+    LogMixedContentMessage(classification, aContentLocation, topWC->Id(),
+                           (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST)
+                               ? eBlocked
+                               : eUserOverride,
+                           requestingLocation);
+  }
+
+  // Notify the top WindowContext of the flags we've computed, and it
+  // will handle updating any relevant security UI.
+  topWC->AddSecurityState(newState);
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+bool nsMixedContentBlocker::URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext(nsIURI* aURI) {
+  /* Returns a bool if the URI can be loaded as a sub resource safely.
+   *
+   * Check Protocol Flags to determine if scheme is safe to load:
+   * URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA - e.g.
+   *   "mailto"
+   * URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE - e.g.
+   *   "data",
+   *   "resource",
+   *   "moz-icon"
+   * URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT - e.g.
+   *   "javascript"
+   * URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY - e.g.
+   *   "https",
+   *   "moz-safe-about"
+   *
+   */
+  bool schemeLocal = false;
+  bool schemeNoReturnData = false;
+  bool schemeInherits = false;
+  bool schemeSecure = false;
+  if (NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_LOCAL_RESOURCE, &schemeLocal)) ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_DOES_NOT_RETURN_DATA,
+          &schemeNoReturnData)) ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT,
+          &schemeInherits)) ||
+      NS_FAILED(NS_URIChainHasFlags(
+          aURI, nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_POTENTIALLY_TRUSTWORTHY,
+          &schemeSecure))) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("  - URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext:"));
+  MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("    - schemeLocal: %i", schemeLocal));
+  MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("    - schemeNoReturnData: %i", schemeNoReturnData));
+  MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose,
+          ("    - schemeInherits: %i", schemeInherits));
+  MOZ_LOG(sMCBLog, LogLevel::Verbose, ("    - schemeSecure: %i", schemeSecure));
+  return (schemeLocal || schemeNoReturnData || schemeInherits || schemeSecure);
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+nsMixedContentBlocker::ShouldProcess(nsIURI* aContentLocation,
+                                     nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                                     const nsACString& aMimeGuess,
+                                     int16_t* aDecision) {
+  if (!aContentLocation) {
+    // aContentLocation may be null when a plugin is loading without an
+    // associated URI resource
+    if (aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType() ==
+        ExtContentPolicyType::TYPE_OBJECT) {
+      *aDecision = ACCEPT;
+      return NS_OK;
+    }
+
+    NS_SetRequestBlockingReason(aLoadInfo,
+                                nsILoadInfo::BLOCKING_REASON_MIXED_BLOCKED);
+    *aDecision = REJECT_REQUEST;
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  return ShouldLoad(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo, aMimeGuess, aDecision);
+}
+
+// Record information on when HSTS would have made mixed content not mixed
+// content (regardless of whether it was actually blocked)
+void nsMixedContentBlocker::AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(
+    nsIURI* aURI, bool aActive, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes) {
+  // This method must only be called in the parent, because
+  // nsSiteSecurityService is only available in the parent
+  if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  bool hsts;
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISiteSecurityService> sss =
+      do_GetService(NS_SSSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+  rv = sss->IsSecureURI(aURI, aOriginAttributes, &hsts);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // states: would upgrade, would prime, hsts info cached
+  // active, passive
+  //
+  if (!aActive) {
+    if (!hsts) {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_NO_HSTS);
+    } else {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_PASSIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (!hsts) {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_NO_HSTS);
+    } else {
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::MIXED_CONTENT_HSTS,
+                            MCB_HSTS_ACTIVE_WITH_HSTS);
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.h b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..abf409c8f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/nsMixedContentBlocker.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef nsMixedContentBlocker_h___
+#define nsMixedContentBlocker_h___
+
+#define NS_MIXEDCONTENTBLOCKER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/mixedcontentblocker;1"
+/* daf1461b-bf29-4f88-8d0e-4bcdf332c862 */
+#define NS_MIXEDCONTENTBLOCKER_CID                   \
+  {                                                  \
+    0xdaf1461b, 0xbf29, 0x4f88, {                    \
+      0x8d, 0x0e, 0x4b, 0xcd, 0xf3, 0x32, 0xc8, 0x62 \
+    }                                                \
+  }
+
+// This enum defines type of content that is detected when an
+// nsMixedContentEvent fires
+enum MixedContentTypes {
+  // "Active" content, such as fonts, plugin content, JavaScript, stylesheets,
+  // iframes, WebSockets, and XHR
+  eMixedScript,
+  // "Display" content, such as images, audio, video, and <a ping>
+  eMixedDisplay
+};
+
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIChannelEventSink.h"
+#include "imgRequest.h"
+
+using mozilla::OriginAttributes;
+
+class nsILoadInfo;  // forward declaration
+namespace mozilla::net {
+class nsProtocolProxyService;  // forward declaration
+}  // namespace mozilla::net
+
+class nsMixedContentBlocker : public nsIContentPolicy,
+                              public nsIChannelEventSink {
+ private:
+  virtual ~nsMixedContentBlocker();
+
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSICONTENTPOLICY
+  NS_DECL_NSICHANNELEVENTSINK
+
+  nsMixedContentBlocker() = default;
+
+  // See:
+  // https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy
+  static bool IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackHost(
+      const nsACString& aAsciiHost);
+  static bool IsPotentiallyTrustworthyLoopbackURL(nsIURI* aURL);
+  static bool IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOnion(nsIURI* aURL);
+  static bool IsPotentiallyTrustworthyOrigin(nsIURI* aURI);
+
+  /* Static version of ShouldLoad() that contains all the Mixed Content Blocker
+   * logic.  Called from non-static ShouldLoad().
+   * Called directly from imageLib when an insecure redirect exists in a cached
+   * image load.
+   * @param aHadInsecureImageRedirect
+   *        boolean flag indicating that an insecure redirect through http
+   *        occured when this image was initially loaded and cached.
+   * @param aReportError
+   *        boolean flag indicating if a rejection should automaticly be
+   *        logged into the Console.
+   * Remaining parameters are from nsIContentPolicy::ShouldLoad().
+   */
+  static nsresult ShouldLoad(bool aHadInsecureImageRedirect,
+                             nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo,
+                             const nsACString& aMimeGuess, bool aReportError,
+                             int16_t* aDecision);
+  static void AccumulateMixedContentHSTS(
+      nsIURI* aURI, bool aActive, const OriginAttributes& aOriginAttributes);
+
+  static bool URISafeToBeLoadedInSecureContext(nsIURI* aURI);
+
+  static void OnPrefChange(const char* aPref, void* aClosure);
+  static void GetSecureContextAllowList(nsACString& aList);
+  static void Shutdown();
+
+  static bool sSecurecontextAllowlistCached;
+  static nsCString* sSecurecontextAllowlist;
+};
+
+#endif /* nsMixedContentBlocker_h___ */
diff --git a/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.cpp b/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b302a76b7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "BindingDeclarations.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/BindingUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/DocumentFragment.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SanitizerBinding.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsGenericHTMLElement.h"
+#include "nsTreeSanitizer.h"
+#include "Sanitizer.h"
+
+namespace mozilla::dom {
+
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE(Sanitizer, mGlobal)
+
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ADDREF(Sanitizer)
+NS_IMPL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_RELEASE(Sanitizer)
+
+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_BEGIN_CYCLE_COLLECTION(Sanitizer)
+  NS_WRAPPERCACHE_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY
+  NS_INTERFACE_MAP_ENTRY(nsISupports)
+NS_INTERFACE_MAP_END
+
+JSObject* Sanitizer::WrapObject(JSContext* aCx,
+                                JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) {
+  return Sanitizer_Binding::Wrap(aCx, this, aGivenProto);
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<Sanitizer> Sanitizer::Constructor(
+    const GlobalObject& aGlobal, const SanitizerConfig& aOptions,
+    ErrorResult& aRv) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIGlobalObject> global = do_QueryInterface(aGlobal.GetAsSupports());
+  RefPtr<Sanitizer> sanitizer = new Sanitizer(global, aOptions);
+  return sanitizer.forget();
+}
+
+/* static */
+already_AddRefed<DocumentFragment> Sanitizer::InputToNewFragment(
+    const mozilla::dom::DocumentFragmentOrDocument& aInput, ErrorResult& aRv) {
+  // turns an DocumentFragmentOrDocument into a new DocumentFragment for
+  // internal use with nsTreeSanitizer
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(mGlobal);
+  if (!window || !window->GetDoc()) {
+    // FIXME: Should we throw another exception?
+    aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // We need to create a new docfragment based on the input
+  // and can't use a live document (possibly with mutation observershandlers)
+  nsAutoString innerHTML;
+  if (aInput.IsDocumentFragment()) {
+    RefPtr<DocumentFragment> inFragment = &aInput.GetAsDocumentFragment();
+    inFragment->GetInnerHTML(innerHTML);
+  } else if (aInput.IsDocument()) {
+    RefPtr<Document> doc = &aInput.GetAsDocument();
+    nsCOMPtr<Element> docElement = doc->GetDocumentElement();
+    if (docElement) {
+      docElement->GetInnerHTML(innerHTML, IgnoreErrors());
+    }
+  }
+  if (innerHTML.IsEmpty()) {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> params = {};
+    LogLocalizedString("SanitizerRcvdNoInput", params,
+                       nsIScriptError::warningFlag);
+
+    RefPtr<DocumentFragment> emptyFragment =
+        window->GetDoc()->CreateDocumentFragment();
+    return emptyFragment.forget();
+  }
+  // Create an inert HTML document, loaded as data.
+  // this ensures we do not cause any requests.
+  RefPtr<Document> emptyDoc =
+      nsContentUtils::CreateInertHTMLDocument(window->GetDoc());
+  if (!emptyDoc) {
+    aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  // We don't have a context element yet. let's create a mock HTML body element
+  RefPtr<mozilla::dom::NodeInfo> info =
+      emptyDoc->NodeInfoManager()->GetNodeInfo(
+          nsGkAtoms::body, nullptr, kNameSpaceID_XHTML, nsINode::ELEMENT_NODE);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsINode> context = NS_NewHTMLBodyElement(
+      info.forget(), mozilla::dom::FromParser::FROM_PARSER_FRAGMENT);
+  RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment = nsContentUtils::CreateContextualFragment(
+      context, innerHTML, true /* aPreventScriptExecution */, aRv);
+  if (aRv.Failed()) {
+    aRv.ThrowInvalidStateError("Could not parse input");
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  return fragment.forget();
+}
+
+already_AddRefed<DocumentFragment> Sanitizer::Sanitize(
+    const mozilla::dom::DocumentFragmentOrDocument& aInput, ErrorResult& aRv) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(mGlobal);
+  if (!window || !window->GetDoc()) {
+    aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  RefPtr<DocumentFragment> fragment =
+      Sanitizer::InputToNewFragment(aInput, aRv);
+  if (aRv.Failed()) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  mTreeSanitizer.Sanitize(fragment);
+  return fragment.forget();
+}
+
+RefPtr<DocumentFragment> Sanitizer::SanitizeFragment(
+    RefPtr<DocumentFragment> aFragment, ErrorResult& aRv) {
+  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(mGlobal);
+  if (!window || !window->GetDoc()) {
+    aRv.Throw(NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  // FIXME(freddyb)
+  // (how) can we assert that the supplied doc is indeed inert?
+  mTreeSanitizer.Sanitize(aFragment);
+  return aFragment.forget();
+}
+
+/* ------ Logging ------ */
+
+void Sanitizer::LogLocalizedString(const char* aName,
+                                   const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                                   uint32_t aFlags) {
+  uint64_t innerWindowID = 0;
+  bool isPrivateBrowsing = true;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsPIDOMWindowInner> window = do_QueryInterface(mGlobal);
+  if (window && window->GetDoc()) {
+    auto* doc = window->GetDoc();
+    innerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID();
+    isPrivateBrowsing = nsContentUtils::IsInPrivateBrowsing(doc);
+  }
+  nsAutoString logMsg;
+  nsContentUtils::FormatLocalizedString(nsContentUtils::eSECURITY_PROPERTIES,
+                                        aName, aParams, logMsg);
+  LogMessage(logMsg, aFlags, innerWindowID, isPrivateBrowsing);
+}
+
+/* static */
+void Sanitizer::LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, uint32_t aFlags,
+                           uint64_t aInnerWindowID, bool aFromPrivateWindow) {
+  // Prepending 'Sanitizer' to the outgoing console message
+  nsString message;
+  message.AppendLiteral(u"Sanitizer: ");
+  message.Append(aMessage);
+
+  // Allow for easy distinction in devtools code.
+  constexpr auto category = "Sanitizer"_ns;
+
+  if (aInnerWindowID > 0) {
+    // Send to content console
+    nsContentUtils::ReportToConsoleByWindowID(message, aFlags, category,
+                                              aInnerWindowID);
+  } else {
+    // Send to browser console
+    nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(message, category, aFromPrivateWindow,
+                                          true /* from chrome context */,
+                                          aFlags);
+  }
+}
+
+}  // namespace mozilla::dom
diff --git a/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.h b/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41b59c2ae2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/sanitizer/Sanitizer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#ifndef mozilla_dom_Sanitizer_h
+#define mozilla_dom_Sanitizer_h
+
+#include "mozilla/dom/BindingDeclarations.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/DocumentFragment.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SanitizerBinding.h"
+#include "nsString.h"
+#include "nsIGlobalObject.h"
+#include "nsIParserUtils.h"
+#include "nsTreeSanitizer.h"
+
+// XXX(Bug 1673929) This is not really needed here, but the generated
+// SanitizerBinding.cpp needs it and does not include it.
+#include "mozilla/dom/Document.h"
+
+class nsISupports;
+
+namespace mozilla {
+
+class ErrorResult;
+
+namespace dom {
+
+class GlobalObject;
+
+class Sanitizer final : public nsISupports, public nsWrapperCache {
+ public:
+  NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTING_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_CYCLE_COLLECTION_WRAPPERCACHE_CLASS(Sanitizer);
+
+  explicit Sanitizer(nsIGlobalObject* aGlobal, const SanitizerConfig& aOptions)
+      : mGlobal(aGlobal), mTreeSanitizer(nsIParserUtils::SanitizerAllowStyle) {
+    MOZ_ASSERT(aGlobal);
+    mTreeSanitizer.WithWebSanitizerOptions(aGlobal, aOptions);
+  }
+
+  nsIGlobalObject* GetParentObject() const { return mGlobal; }
+
+  JSObject* WrapObject(JSContext* aCx,
+                       JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) override;
+
+  /**
+   * Sanitizer() WebIDL constructor
+   * @return a new Sanitizer object, with methods as below
+   */
+  static already_AddRefed<Sanitizer> Constructor(
+      const GlobalObject& aGlobal, const SanitizerConfig& aOptions,
+      ErrorResult& aRv);
+
+  /**
+   * sanitize WebIDL method.
+   * @param aInput       "bad" HTML that needs to be sanitized
+   * @return DocumentFragment of the sanitized HTML
+   */
+  already_AddRefed<DocumentFragment> Sanitize(
+      const mozilla::dom::DocumentFragmentOrDocument& aInput, ErrorResult& aRv);
+
+  /**
+   * Sanitizes a fragment in place. This assumes that the fragment
+   * belongs but an inert document.
+   *
+   * @param aFragment Fragment to be sanitized in place
+   * @return DocumentFragment
+   */
+
+  RefPtr<DocumentFragment> SanitizeFragment(RefPtr<DocumentFragment> aFragment,
+                                            ErrorResult& aRv);
+
+  /**
+   * Logs localized message to either content console or browser console
+   * @param aName              Localization key
+   * @param aParams            Localization parameters
+   * @param aFlags             Logging Flag (see nsIScriptError)
+   */
+  void LogLocalizedString(const char* aName, const nsTArray<nsString>& aParams,
+                          uint32_t aFlags);
+
+ private:
+  ~Sanitizer() = default;
+  already_AddRefed<DocumentFragment> InputToNewFragment(
+      const mozilla::dom::DocumentFragmentOrDocument& aInput, ErrorResult& aRv);
+  /**
+   * Logs localized message to either content console or browser console
+   * @param aMessage           Message to log
+   * @param aFlags             Logging Flag (see nsIScriptError)
+   * @param aInnerWindowID     Inner Window ID (Logged on browser console if 0)
+   * @param aFromPrivateWindow If from private window
+   */
+  static void LogMessage(const nsAString& aMessage, uint32_t aFlags,
+                         uint64_t aInnerWindowID, bool aFromPrivateWindow);
+
+  RefPtr<nsIGlobalObject> mGlobal;
+  nsTreeSanitizer mTreeSanitizer;
+};
+}  // namespace dom
+}  // namespace mozilla
+
+#endif  // ifndef mozilla_dom_Sanitizer_h
diff --git a/dom/security/sanitizer/moz.build b/dom/security/sanitizer/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4baec486c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/sanitizer/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+with Files("**"):
+    BUG_COMPONENT = ("Core", "DOM: Security")
+
+# TEST_DIRS += [ 'tests' ]
+
+MOCHITEST_MANIFESTS += ["tests/mochitest/mochitest.ini"]
+
+
+EXPORTS.mozilla.dom += [
+    "Sanitizer.h",
+]
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+    "Sanitizer.cpp",
+]
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/dom/base",
+    "/dom/bindings",
+    "/dom/html",
+]
+
+# include('/ipc/chromium/chromium-config.mozbuild')
+# include('/tools/fuzzing/libfuzzer-config.mozbuild')
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul"
+
+# if CONFIG['FUZZING_INTERFACES']:
+#    TEST_DIRS += [
+#            'fuzztest'
+#    ]
diff --git a/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2388e0bd12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+prefs =
+  dom.security.sanitizer.enabled=true
+  dom.security.setHTML.enabled=true
+scheme=https
+[test_sanitizer_api.html]
diff --git a/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/test_sanitizer_api.html b/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/test_sanitizer_api.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cfc24d0386
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/sanitizer/tests/mochitest/test_sanitizer_api.html
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<title>Test sanitizer api</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+<script type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/* global Sanitizer */
+// we're not done after "onload"
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+(async function() {
+  // Ensure Sanitizer is not exposed when the pref is false
+  const isEnabled = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("dom.security.sanitizer.enabled");
+  if (!isEnabled) {
+    ok(false, "This test should only be run with dom.security.sanitizer.enabled set to true");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  function* possibleInputTypes(inputStr) {
+    /* This generator function, given a string, yields all possible input objects
+    for our sanitizer API (string, docfragment, document).
+    */
+
+    // 1) as string
+    yield ({testInput: inputStr, testType: "String" });
+    // 2) as DocumentFragment
+    let temp = document.createElement('template');
+    // asking eslint to skip this: innerHTML is safe for template elements.
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-unsanitized/property
+    temp.innerHTML = inputStr;
+    yield ({testInput: temp.content, testType: "DocumentFragment" });
+    // 3) as HTMLDocument
+    const parser = new DOMParser;
+    yield ({testInput: parser.parseFromString(inputStr, "text/html"), testType: "Document" });
+  }
+  // basic interface smoke test
+  ok(typeof Sanitizer === "function", "Sanitizer constructor exposed when preffed on");
+  const mySanitizer = new Sanitizer();
+  ok(mySanitizer, "Sanitizer constructor works");
+  ok(mySanitizer.sanitize, "sanitize function exists");
+  ok("setHTML" in Element.prototype, "Element.setHTML exists");
+
+  // testing sanitizer results
+  const testCases = [
+    {
+      testString: "<p>hello</p>",
+      testExpected: "<p>hello</p>",
+      sanitizerOptions: {}
+    },
+    {
+      // script element encoded to not confuse the HTML parser and end execution here
+      testString: "<p>second test</p><script>alert(1)\x3C/script>",
+      testExpected: "<p>second test</p>",
+      sanitizerOptions: {},
+    },
+    {
+      // test for the allowElements option
+      testString: "<p>hello <i>folks</i></p>",
+      testExpected: "<p>hello folks</p>",
+      sanitizerOptions: { allowElements: ["p"] },
+    },
+    {
+      // test for the blockElements option
+      testString: "<p>hello <i>folks</i></p>",
+      testExpected: "<p>hello folks</p>",
+      sanitizerOptions: { blockElements: ["i"] },
+    },
+    // TODO: Unknown attributes aren't supported yet.
+    // {
+    //   // test for the allowAttributes option
+    //   testString: `<p haha="lol">hello</p>`,
+    //   testExpected: `<p haha="lol">hello</p>`,
+    //   sanitizerOptions: { allowUnknownMarkup: true, allowAttributes: { 'haha': ['p'] } },
+    // },
+    {
+      // confirming the inverse
+      testString: `<p haha="lol">hello</p>`,
+      testExpected: `<p>hello</p>`,
+      sanitizerOptions: {},
+    },
+    {
+      // test for the dropAttributes option
+      testString: `<p title="dropme">hello</p>`,
+      testExpected: `<p>hello</p>`,
+      sanitizerOptions: { dropAttributes: { 'title': ['p'] } },
+    },
+    {
+      // confirming the inverse
+      testString: `<p title="dontdropme">hello</p>`,
+      testExpected: `<p title="dontdropme">hello</p>`,
+      sanitizerOptions: {},
+    },
+    {
+      // if an attribute is allowed and dropped, the drop will take preference
+      testString: `<p title="lol">hello</p>`,
+      testExpected: `<p>hello</p>`,
+      sanitizerOptions: {
+        allowAttributes: { 'title': ['p'] },
+        dropAttributes: { 'title': ['p'] },
+      },
+    },
+  ];
+
+
+  const div = document.createElement("div");
+  for (let test of testCases) {
+    const {testString, testExpected, sanitizerOptions} = test;
+    const testSanitizer = new Sanitizer(sanitizerOptions);
+
+    for (let testInputAndType of possibleInputTypes(testString)) {
+      const {testInput, testType} = testInputAndType;
+
+      if (testType != "String") {
+        // test sanitize(document/fragment)
+        try {
+          div.innerHTML = "";
+          const docFragment = testSanitizer.sanitize(testInput);
+          div.append(docFragment);
+          is(div.innerHTML, testExpected, `Sanitizer.sanitize() should turn (${testType}) '${testInput}' into '${testExpected}'`);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+          ok(false, 'Error in sanitize() test: ' + e)
+        }
+      }
+      else {
+        // test setHTML:
+        try {
+          div.setHTML(testString, { sanitizer: testSanitizer });
+          is(div.innerHTML, testExpected, `div.setHTML() should turn(${testType}) '${testInput}' into '${testExpected}'`);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+          ok(false, 'Error in setHTML() test: ' + e)
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+})();
+</script>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/cors/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..350d382e34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html
+  file_cors_logging_test.html
+  file_bug1456721.html
+  bug1456721.sjs
+
+[browser_CORS-console-warnings.js]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/browser_CORS-console-warnings.js b/dom/security/test/cors/browser_CORS-console-warnings.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c90ee3086
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/browser_CORS-console-warnings.js
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   Ensure that CORS warnings are printed to the web console.
+ *
+ *   This test uses the same tests as the plain mochitest, but needs access to
+ *   the console.
+ */
+"use strict";
+
+function console_observer(subject, topic, data) {
+  var message = subject.wrappedJSObject.arguments[0];
+  ok(false, message);
+}
+
+var webconsole = null;
+var messages_seen = 0;
+var expected_messages = 50;
+
+function on_new_message(msgObj) {
+  let text = msgObj.message;
+
+  if (text.match("Cross-Origin Request Blocked:")) {
+    ok(true, "message is: " + text);
+    messages_seen++;
+  }
+}
+
+async function do_cleanup() {
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_message);
+  await unsetCookiePref();
+}
+
+/**
+ * Set e10s related preferences in the test environment.
+ * @return {Promise} promise that resolves when preferences are set.
+ */
+function setCookiePref() {
+  return new Promise(resolve =>
+    // accept all cookies so that the CORS requests will send the right cookies
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+      {
+        set: [["network.cookie.cookieBehavior", 0]],
+      },
+      resolve
+    )
+  );
+}
+
+/**
+ * Unset e10s related preferences in the test environment.
+ * @return {Promise} promise that resolves when preferences are unset.
+ */
+function unsetCookiePref() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv(resolve);
+  });
+}
+
+//jscs:disable
+add_task(async function() {
+  //jscs:enable
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+  registerCleanupFunction(do_cleanup);
+  await setCookiePref();
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_message);
+
+  let test_uri =
+    "http://mochi.test:8888/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html";
+
+  let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(
+    gBrowser,
+    "about:blank"
+  );
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, test_uri);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForLocationChange(
+    gBrowser,
+    test_uri + "#finished"
+  );
+
+  // Different OS combinations
+  ok(messages_seen > 0, "Saw " + messages_seen + " messages.");
+
+  messages_seen = 0;
+  let test_two_uri =
+    "http://mochi.test:8888/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_bug1456721.html";
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, test_two_uri);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForLocationChange(
+    gBrowser,
+    test_two_uri + "#finishedTestTwo"
+  );
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => messages_seen > 0);
+
+  ok(messages_seen > 0, "Saw " + messages_seen + " messages.");
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/bug1456721.sjs b/dom/security/test/cors/bug1456721.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de8bd5a7f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/bug1456721.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let queryStr = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryStr === "redirect") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", "bug1456721.sjs?load", false);
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryStr === "load") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+    response.write("foo");
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here - return something unexpected
+  response.write("d'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_cache_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_cache_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3e8f291327
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_cache_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  if ("setState" in query) {
+    setState(
+      "test/dom/security/test_CrossSiteXHR_cache:secData",
+      query.setState
+    );
+
+    response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain", false);
+    response.write("hi");
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var isPreflight = request.method == "OPTIONS";
+
+  // Send response
+
+  secData = JSON.parse(
+    getState("test/dom/security/test_CrossSiteXHR_cache:secData")
+  );
+
+  if (secData.allowOrigin) {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", secData.allowOrigin);
+  }
+
+  if (secData.withCred) {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true");
+  }
+
+  if (isPreflight) {
+    if (secData.allowHeaders) {
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", secData.allowHeaders);
+    }
+
+    if (secData.allowMethods) {
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", secData.allowMethods);
+    }
+
+    if (secData.cacheTime) {
+      response.setHeader(
+        "Access-Control-Max-Age",
+        secData.cacheTime.toString()
+      );
+    }
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/xml", false);
+  response.write("<res>hello pass</res>\n");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d3e8421362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!--
+  NOTE! The content of this file is duplicated in file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.jar
+  and file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs
+  Please update those files if you update this one.
+-->
+
+<html>
+<head>
+<script>
+function trimString(stringValue) {
+  return stringValue.replace(/^\s+|\s+$/g, '');
+};
+
+window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+
+  sendData = null;
+
+  req = JSON.parse(e.data);
+  var res = {
+    didFail: false,
+    events: [],
+    progressEvents: 0,
+    status: 0,
+    responseText: "",
+    statusText: "",
+    responseXML: null,
+    sendThrew: false
+  };
+  
+  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  for (type of ["load", "abort", "error", "loadstart", "loadend"]) {
+    xhr.addEventListener(type, function(e) {
+      res.events.push(e.type);
+    });
+  }
+  xhr.addEventListener("readystatechange", function(e) {
+    res.events.push("rs" + xhr.readyState);
+  });
+  xhr.addEventListener("progress", function(e) {
+    res.progressEvents++;
+  });
+  if (req.uploadProgress) {
+    xhr.upload.addEventListener(req.uploadProgress, function(e) {
+      res.progressEvents++;
+    });
+  }
+  xhr.onerror = function(e) {
+    res.didFail = true;
+  };
+  xhr.onloadend = function (event) {
+    res.status = xhr.status;
+    try {
+      res.statusText = xhr.statusText;
+    } catch (e) {
+      delete(res.statusText);
+    }
+    res.responseXML = xhr.responseXML ?
+      (new XMLSerializer()).serializeToString(xhr.responseXML) :
+      null;
+    res.responseText = xhr.responseText;
+
+    res.responseHeaders = {};
+    for (responseHeader in req.responseHeaders) {
+      res.responseHeaders[responseHeader] =
+        xhr.getResponseHeader(responseHeader);
+    }
+    res.allResponseHeaders = {};
+    var splitHeaders = xhr.getAllResponseHeaders().split("\r\n");
+    for (var i = 0; i < splitHeaders.length; i++) {
+      var headerValuePair = splitHeaders[i].split(":");
+        if(headerValuePair[1] != null) {
+          var headerName = trimString(headerValuePair[0]);
+          var headerValue = trimString(headerValuePair[1]);
+          res.allResponseHeaders[headerName] = headerValue;
+        }
+    }
+    post(e, res);
+  }
+
+  if (req.withCred)
+    xhr.withCredentials = true;
+  if (req.body)
+    sendData = req.body;
+
+  res.events.push("opening");
+  // Allow passign in falsy usernames/passwords so we can test them
+  try {
+    xhr.open(req.method, req.url, true,
+             ("username" in req) ? req.username : "",
+             ("password" in req) ? req.password : "");
+  } catch (ex) {
+    res.didFail = true;
+    post(e, res);
+  }
+
+  for (header in req.headers) {
+    xhr.setRequestHeader(header, req.headers[header]);
+  }
+
+  res.events.push("sending");
+  try {
+    xhr.send(sendData);
+  } catch (ex) {
+    res.didFail = true;
+    res.sendThrew = true;
+    post(e, res);
+  }
+
+});
+
+function post(e, res) {
+  e.source.postMessage(JSON.stringify(res), "http://mochi.test:8888");
+}
+
+</script>
+</head>
+<body>
+Inner page
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.jar b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.jar
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bdb0eb4408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.jar
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a030c4211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+var data =
+  '<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+<html>\n\
+<head>\n\
+<script>\n\
+window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {\n\
+\n\
+  sendData = null;\n\
+\n\
+  req = JSON.parse(e.data);\n\
+  var res = {\n\
+    didFail: false,\n\
+    events: [],\n\
+    progressEvents: 0\n\
+  };\n\
+  \n\
+  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();\n\
+  for (type of ["load", "abort", "error", "loadstart", "loadend"]) {\n\
+    xhr.addEventListener(type, function(e) {\n\
+      res.events.push(e.type);\n\
+    }, false);\n\
+  }\n\
+  xhr.addEventListener("readystatechange", function(e) {\n\
+    res.events.push("rs" + xhr.readyState);\n\
+  }, false);\n\
+  xhr.addEventListener("progress", function(e) {\n\
+    res.progressEvents++;\n\
+  }, false);\n\
+  if (req.uploadProgress) {\n\
+    xhr.upload.addEventListener(req.uploadProgress, function(e) {\n\
+      res.progressEvents++;\n\
+    }, false);\n\
+  }\n\
+  xhr.onerror = function(e) {\n\
+    res.didFail = true;\n\
+  };\n\
+  xhr.onloadend = function (event) {\n\
+    res.status = xhr.status;\n\
+    try {\n\
+      res.statusText = xhr.statusText;\n\
+    } catch (e) {\n\
+      delete(res.statusText);\n\
+    }\n\
+    res.responseXML = xhr.responseXML ?\n\
+      (new XMLSerializer()).serializeToString(xhr.responseXML) :\n\
+      null;\n\
+    res.responseText = xhr.responseText;\n\
+\n\
+    res.responseHeaders = {};\n\
+    for (responseHeader in req.responseHeaders) {\n\
+      res.responseHeaders[responseHeader] =\n\
+        xhr.getResponseHeader(responseHeader);\n\
+    }\n\
+    res.allResponseHeaders = {};\n\
+    var splitHeaders = xhr.getAllResponseHeaders().split("\\r\\n");\n\
+    for (var i = 0; i < splitHeaders.length; i++) {\n\
+      var headerValuePair = splitHeaders[i].split(":");\n\
+        if(headerValuePair[1] != null){\n\
+          var headerName = trimString(headerValuePair[0]);\n\
+          var headerValue = trimString(headerValuePair[1]); \n\
+          res.allResponseHeaders[headerName] = headerValue;\n\
+        }\n\
+    }\n\
+    post(e, res);\n\
+  }\n\
+\n\
+  if (req.withCred)\n\
+    xhr.withCredentials = true;\n\
+  if (req.body)\n\
+    sendData = req.body;\n\
+\n\
+  res.events.push("opening");\n\
+  xhr.open(req.method, req.url, true);\n\
+\n\
+  for (header in req.headers) {\n\
+    xhr.setRequestHeader(header, req.headers[header]);\n\
+  }\n\
+\n\
+  res.events.push("sending");\n\
+  xhr.send(sendData);\n\
+\n\
+}, false);\n\
+\n\
+function post(e, res) {\n\
+  e.source.postMessage(JSON.stringify(res), "*");\n\
+}\n\
+function trimString(stringValue) {\n\
+  return stringValue.replace("/^s+|s+$/g","");\n\
+};\n\
+\n\
+</script>\n\
+</head>\n\
+<body>\n\
+Inner page\n\
+</body>\n\
+</html>';
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setStatusLine(null, 302, "Follow me");
+  response.setHeader("Location", "data:text/html," + escape(data));
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
+  response.write("Follow that guy!");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a2e93ba029
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+const CC = Components.Constructor;
+const BinaryInputStream = CC(
+  "@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1",
+  "nsIBinaryInputStream",
+  "setInputStream"
+);
+Services.prefs.setBoolPref("security.allow_eval_with_system_principal", true);
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var isPreflight = request.method == "OPTIONS";
+
+  var bodyStream = new BinaryInputStream(request.bodyInputStream);
+  var bodyBytes = [];
+  while ((bodyAvail = bodyStream.available()) > 0) {
+    Array.prototype.push.apply(bodyBytes, bodyStream.readByteArray(bodyAvail));
+  }
+
+  var body = decodeURIComponent(
+    escape(String.fromCharCode.apply(null, bodyBytes))
+  );
+
+  if (query.hop) {
+    query.hop = parseInt(query.hop, 10);
+    hops = JSON.parse(query.hops);
+    var curHop = hops[query.hop - 1];
+    query.allowOrigin = curHop.allowOrigin;
+    query.allowHeaders = curHop.allowHeaders;
+    query.allowMethods = curHop.allowMethods;
+    query.allowCred = curHop.allowCred;
+    query.noAllowPreflight = curHop.noAllowPreflight;
+    if (curHop.setCookie) {
+      query.setCookie = unescape(curHop.setCookie);
+    }
+    if (curHop.cookie) {
+      query.cookie = unescape(curHop.cookie);
+    }
+    query.noCookie = curHop.noCookie;
+  }
+
+  // Check that request was correct
+
+  if (!isPreflight && query.body && body != query.body) {
+    sendHttp500(
+      response,
+      "Wrong body. Expected " + query.body + " got " + body
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!isPreflight && "headers" in query) {
+    headers = JSON.parse(query.headers);
+    for (headerName in headers) {
+      // Content-Type is changed if there was a body
+      if (
+        !(headerName == "Content-Type" && body) &&
+        (!request.hasHeader(headerName) ||
+          request.getHeader(headerName) != headers[headerName])
+      ) {
+        var actual = request.hasHeader(headerName)
+          ? request.getHeader(headerName)
+          : "<missing header>";
+        sendHttp500(
+          response,
+          "Header " +
+            headerName +
+            " had wrong value. Expected " +
+            headers[headerName] +
+            " got " +
+            actual
+        );
+        return;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (
+    isPreflight &&
+    "requestHeaders" in query &&
+    request.getHeader("Access-Control-Request-Headers") != query.requestHeaders
+  ) {
+    sendHttp500(
+      response,
+      "Access-Control-Request-Headers had wrong value. Expected " +
+        query.requestHeaders +
+        " got " +
+        request.getHeader("Access-Control-Request-Headers")
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (
+    isPreflight &&
+    "requestMethod" in query &&
+    request.getHeader("Access-Control-Request-Method") != query.requestMethod
+  ) {
+    sendHttp500(
+      response,
+      "Access-Control-Request-Method had wrong value. Expected " +
+        query.requestMethod +
+        " got " +
+        request.getHeader("Access-Control-Request-Method")
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if ("origin" in query && request.getHeader("Origin") != query.origin) {
+    sendHttp500(
+      response,
+      "Origin had wrong value. Expected " +
+        query.origin +
+        " got " +
+        request.getHeader("Origin")
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if ("cookie" in query) {
+    cookies = {};
+    request
+      .getHeader("Cookie")
+      .split(/ *; */)
+      .forEach(function(val) {
+        var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+        cookies[name] = unescape(value);
+      });
+
+    query.cookie.split(",").forEach(function(val) {
+      var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+      if (cookies[name] != value) {
+        sendHttp500(
+          response,
+          "Cookie " +
+            name +
+            " had wrong value. Expected " +
+            value +
+            " got " +
+            cookies[name]
+        );
+        return;
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  if (query.noCookie && request.hasHeader("Cookie")) {
+    sendHttp500(
+      response,
+      "Got cookies when didn't expect to: " + request.getHeader("Cookie")
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Send response
+
+  if (!isPreflight && query.status) {
+    response.setStatusLine(null, query.status, query.statusMessage);
+  }
+  if (isPreflight && query.preflightStatus) {
+    response.setStatusLine(null, query.preflightStatus, "preflight status");
+  }
+
+  if (query.allowOrigin && (!isPreflight || !query.noAllowPreflight)) {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", query.allowOrigin);
+  }
+
+  if (query.allowCred) {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true");
+  }
+
+  if (query.setCookie) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", query.setCookie + "; path=/");
+  }
+
+  if (isPreflight) {
+    if (query.allowHeaders) {
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", query.allowHeaders);
+    }
+
+    if (query.allowMethods) {
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", query.allowMethods);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (query.responseHeaders) {
+      let responseHeaders = JSON.parse(query.responseHeaders);
+      for (let responseHeader in responseHeaders) {
+        response.setHeader(responseHeader, responseHeaders[responseHeader]);
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (query.exposeHeaders) {
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Expose-Headers", query.exposeHeaders);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!isPreflight && query.hop && query.hop < hops.length) {
+    newURL =
+      hops[query.hop].server +
+      "/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs?" +
+      "hop=" +
+      (query.hop + 1) +
+      "&hops=" +
+      escape(query.hops);
+    if ("headers" in query) {
+      newURL += "&headers=" + escape(query.headers);
+    }
+    response.setStatusLine(null, 307, "redirect");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newURL);
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Send response body
+  if (!isPreflight && request.method != "HEAD") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/xml", false);
+    response.write("<res>hello pass</res>\n");
+  }
+  if (isPreflight && "preflightBody" in query) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain", false);
+    response.write(query.preflightBody);
+  }
+}
+
+function sendHttp500(response, text) {
+  response.setStatusLine(null, 500, text);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_bug1456721.html b/dom/security/test/cors/file_bug1456721.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20ef00d06d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_bug1456721.html
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+  <title>Test new CORS console messages</title>
+</head>
+<body onload="initTest()">
+<p id="display">
+<iframe id=loader></iframe>
+</p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+let gen;
+let number_of_tests = 0;
+
+function initTest() {
+  window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+    gen.next(e.data);
+    if (number_of_tests == 2) {
+      document.location.href += "#finishedTestTwo";
+    }
+  });
+
+  gen = runTest();
+
+  gen.next();
+}
+
+function* runTest() {
+  let loader = document.getElementById("loader");
+  let loaderWindow = loader.contentWindow;
+  loader.onload = function() { gen.next(); };
+
+  loader.src = "http://example.org/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html";
+  origin = "http://example.org";
+  yield undefined;
+
+  let tests = [
+               // Loading URLs other than http(s) should throw 'CORS request
+               // not http' console message.
+               { baseURL: "ftp://mochi.test:8888/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs",
+                 method: "GET",
+               },
+               // (https://www.w3.org/TR/cors/#cross-origin-request-with-preflight-0)
+               // CORs preflight external redirect should throw 'CORS request
+               // external redirect not allowed' error.
+               // This will also throw 'CORS preflight channel did not succeed'
+               // and 'CORS request did not succeed' console messages.
+               {
+                 baseURL: "http://mochi.test:8888/browser/dom/security/test/cors/bug1456721.sjs?redirect",
+                 method: "OPTIONS",
+               },
+              ];
+
+  for (let test of tests) {
+    let req = {
+      url: test.baseURL,
+      method: test.method
+    };
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+    number_of_tests++;
+    yield;
+  }
+}
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html b/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d29f93cf9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html
@@ -0,0 +1,1311 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Cross Site XMLHttpRequest</title>
+</head>
+<body onload="initTest()">
+<p id="display">
+<iframe id=loader></iframe>
+</p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+const runPreflightTests = 1;
+const runCookieTests = 1;
+const runRedirectTests = 1;
+
+var gen;
+
+function initTest() {
+  window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+    gen.next(e.data);
+  });
+
+  gen = runTest();
+
+  gen.next()
+}
+
+function initTestCallback() {
+}
+
+function* runTest() {
+  var loader = document.getElementById('loader');
+  var loaderWindow = loader.contentWindow;
+  loader.onload = function () { gen.next() };
+
+  // Test preflight-less requests
+  basePath = "/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs?"
+  baseURL = "http://mochi.test:8888" + basePath;
+
+  // Test preflighted requests
+  loader.src = "http://example.org/browser/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html";
+  origin = "http://example.org";
+  yield undefined;
+
+  tests =     [// Plain request
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // undefined username
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: undefined
+               },
+
+               // undefined username and password
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: undefined,
+                 password: undefined
+               },
+
+               // nonempty username
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: "user",
+               },
+
+               // nonempty password
+               // XXXbz this passes for now, because we ignore passwords
+               // without usernames in most cases.
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 password: "password",
+               },
+
+               // Default allowed headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // Custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "X-My-Header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my%-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my%-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-header z",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-he(ader",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "myheader": "" },
+                 allowMethods: "myheader",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "User-Agent": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "User-Agent",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "User-Agent": "myValue" },
+               },
+
+               // Multiple custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, second-header, third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header,second-header,third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header ,second-header ,third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header , second-header , third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: ",  x-my-header, , ,, second-header, ,   ",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, second-header, unused-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "y-my-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "",
+                            "y-my-header": "" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+
+               // HEAD requests
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // HEAD with safe headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // HEAD with custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header y-my-header",
+               },
+
+               // POST tests
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // POST with standard headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "multipart/form-data" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // POST with custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, content-type",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, $_%",
+               },
+
+               // Other methods
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowHeaders: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST, PUT, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST, DELETE, PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, POST, PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST ,PUT ,DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST,PUT,DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST , PUT , DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "  ,,  PUT ,,  ,    , DELETE  ,  ,",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETEZ",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, PUT Z",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, PU(T",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT Z, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PU(T, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "MYMETHOD",
+                 allowMethods: "myMethod",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "PUT",
+                 allowMethods: "put",
+               },
+
+               // Progress events
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 uploadProgress: "progress",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 uploadProgress: "progress",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // Status messages
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 404,
+                 statusMessage: "nothin' here",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 401,
+                 statusMessage: "no can do",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+                 allowHeaders: "content-type",
+                 status: 500,
+                 statusMessage: "server boo",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 200,
+                 statusMessage: "Yes!!",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 400
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 200
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 204
+               },
+
+               // exposed headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["x-my-header"],
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 origin: "http://invalid",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header y",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "y x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-header z",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-hea(er",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header",
+                                    "y-my-header": "y header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "  ,  ,,y-my-header,z-my-header,  ",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["y-my-header"],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "Cache-Control": "cacheControl header",
+                                    "Content-Language": "contentLanguage header",
+                                    "Expires":"expires header",
+                                    "Last-Modified":"lastModified header",
+                                    "Pragma":"pragma header",
+                                    "Unexpected":"unexpected header" },
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["Cache-Control","Content-Language","Content-Type","Expires","Last-Modified","Pragma"],
+               },
+               // Check that sending a body in the OPTIONS response works
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                 preflightBody: "I'm a preflight response body",
+               },
+               ];
+
+  if (!runPreflightTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    var req = {
+      url: baseURL + "allowOrigin=" + escape(test.origin || origin),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      uploadProgress: test.uploadProgress,
+      body: test.body,
+      responseHeaders: test.responseHeaders,
+    };
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+       req.url += "&origin=" + escape(origin) +
+                  "&requestMethod=" + test.method;
+    }
+
+    if ("username" in test) {
+      req.username = test.username;
+    }
+
+    if ("password" in test) {
+      req.password = test.password;
+    }
+
+    if (test.noAllowPreflight)
+      req.url += "&noAllowPreflight";
+
+    if (test.pass && "headers" in test) {
+      function isUnsafeHeader(name) {
+        lName = name.toLowerCase();
+        return lName != "accept" &&
+               lName != "accept-language" &&
+               (lName != "content-type" ||
+                !["text/plain",
+                 "multipart/form-data",
+                 "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"]
+                   .includes(test.headers[name].toLowerCase()));
+      }
+      req.url += "&headers=" + escape(JSON.stringify(test.headers));
+      reqHeaders =
+        escape(Object.keys(test.headers)
+               .filter(isUnsafeHeader)
+               .map(s => s.toLowerCase())
+               .sort()
+               .join(","));
+      req.url += reqHeaders ? "&requestHeaders=" + reqHeaders : "";
+    }
+    if ("allowHeaders" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowHeaders=" + escape(test.allowHeaders);
+    if ("allowMethods" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowMethods=" + escape(test.allowMethods);
+    if (test.body)
+      req.url += "&body=" + escape(test.body);
+    if (test.status) {
+      req.url += "&status=" + test.status;
+      req.url += "&statusMessage=" + escape(test.statusMessage);
+    }
+    if (test.preflightStatus)
+      req.url += "&preflightStatus=" + test.preflightStatus;
+    if (test.responseHeaders)
+      req.url += "&responseHeaders=" + escape(JSON.stringify(test.responseHeaders));
+    if (test.exposeHeaders)
+      req.url += "&exposeHeaders=" + escape(test.exposeHeaders);
+    if (test.preflightBody)
+      req.url += "&preflightBody=" + escape(test.preflightBody);
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+  }
+
+  // Test cookie behavior
+  tests = [{ pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+             origin: "*",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+             origin: "*",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             noCookie: 1,
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             noCookie: 1,
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           ];
+
+  if (!runCookieTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    req = {
+      url: baseURL + "allowOrigin=" + escape(test.origin || origin),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      withCred: test.withCred,
+    };
+
+    if (test.allowCred)
+      req.url += "&allowCred";
+
+    if (test.setCookie)
+      req.url += "&setCookie=" + escape(test.setCookie);
+    if (test.cookie)
+      req.url += "&cookie=" + escape(test.cookie);
+    if (test.noCookie)
+      req.url += "&noCookie";
+
+    if ("allowHeaders" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowHeaders=" + escape(test.allowHeaders);
+    if ("allowMethods" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowMethods=" + escape(test.allowMethods);
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+  }
+
+  // Make sure to clear cookies to avoid affecting other tests
+  document.cookie = "a=; path=/; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT"
+
+  // Test redirects
+
+  tests = [{ pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "x"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                      noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+
+           // test redirects with different credentials settings
+           {
+             // Initialize by setting a cookies for same- and cross- origins.
+             pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      setCookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      setCookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      noCookie: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           // expected fail because allow-credentials CORS header is not set
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: '*',
+                      noCookie: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: '*',
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           ];
+
+  if (!runRedirectTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    req = {
+      url: test.hops[0].server + basePath + "hop=1&hops=" +
+           escape(JSON.stringify(test.hops)),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      body: test.body,
+      withCred: test.withCred,
+    };
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+      if (test.body)
+        req.url += "&body=" + escape(test.body);
+    }
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+  }
+
+  document.location.href += "#finished";
+}
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html.css b/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/file_cors_logging_test.html.css
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/cors/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dcdc05c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_cache_server.sjs
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs
+  file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs
+
+[test_CrossSiteXHR.html]
+[test_CrossSiteXHR_cache.html]
+[test_CrossSiteXHR_origin.html]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR.html b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45929a8c2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR.html
@@ -0,0 +1,1491 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Cross Site XMLHttpRequest</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body onload="initTest()">
+<p id="display">
+<iframe id=loader></iframe>
+</p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+const runPreflightTests = 1;
+const runCookieTests = 1;
+const runRedirectTests = 1;
+
+var gen;
+
+function initTest() {
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  // Allow all cookies, then do the actual test initialization
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    "set": [
+      ["network.cookie.cookieBehavior", 0],
+      // Bug 1617611: Fix all the tests broken by "cookies SameSite=lax by default"
+      ["network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault", false],
+	]
+  }, initTestCallback);
+}
+
+function initTestCallback() {
+  window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+    gen.next(e.data);
+  });
+
+  gen = runTest();
+
+  gen.next()
+}
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+function* runTest() {
+  var loader = document.getElementById('loader');
+  var loaderWindow = loader.contentWindow;
+  loader.onload = function () { gen.next() };
+
+  // Test preflight-less requests
+  basePath = "/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs?"
+  baseURL = "http://mochi.test:8888" + basePath;
+
+  // Test preflighted requests
+  loader.src = "http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html";
+  origin = "http://example.org";
+  yield undefined;
+
+  tests =     [// Plain request
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // undefined username
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: undefined
+               },
+
+               // undefined username and password
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: undefined,
+                 password: undefined
+               },
+
+               // nonempty username
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 username: "user",
+               },
+
+               // nonempty password
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 password: "password",
+               },
+
+               // Default allowed headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // Custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "X-My-Header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header-long-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my%-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my%-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-header z",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-he(ader",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "myheader": "" },
+                 allowMethods: "myheader",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "User-Agent": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "User-Agent",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "User-Agent": "myValue" },
+               },
+
+               // Multiple custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, second-header, third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header,second-header,third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header ,second-header ,third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue",
+                            "third-header": "thirdValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header , second-header , third-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: ",  x-my-header, , ,, second-header, ,   ",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "second-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, second-header, unused-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                            "y-my-header": "secondValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "",
+                            "y-my-header": "" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+
+               // HEAD requests
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // HEAD with safe headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // HEAD with custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "HEAD",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header y-my-header",
+               },
+
+               // POST tests
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // POST with standard headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "multipart/form-data" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar, text/plain, garbage" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // POST with custom headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Accept": "foo/bar",
+                            "Accept-Language": "sv-SE",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, content-type",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar",
+                            "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header, $_%",
+               },
+
+               // Other methods
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowHeaders: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST, PUT, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST, DELETE, PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, POST, PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST ,PUT ,DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST,PUT,DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "POST , PUT , DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "  ,,  PUT ,,  ,    , DELETE  ,  ,",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETEZ",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE PUT",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, PUT Z",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE, PU(T",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PUT Z, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "PU(T, DELETE",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "MYMETHOD",
+                 allowMethods: "myMethod",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "PUT",
+                 allowMethods: "put",
+               },
+
+               // Progress events
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 uploadProgress: "progress",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+                 uploadProgress: "progress",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+               },
+
+               // Status messages
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 404,
+                 statusMessage: "nothin' here",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 401,
+                 statusMessage: "no can do",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "POST",
+                 body: "hi there",
+                 headers: { "Content-Type": "foo/bar" },
+                 allowHeaders: "content-type",
+                 status: 500,
+                 statusMessage: "server boo",
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                 status: 200,
+                 statusMessage: "Yes!!",
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 400
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 200
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 headers: { "x-my-header": "header value" },
+                 allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 preflightStatus: 204
+               },
+
+               // exposed headers
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["x-my-header"],
+               },
+               { pass: 0,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 origin: "http://invalid",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header y",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "y x-my-header",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-header z",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-hea(er",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: [],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "x-my-header": "x header",
+                                    "y-my-header": "y header" },
+                 exposeHeaders: "  ,  ,,y-my-header,z-my-header,  ",
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["y-my-header"],
+               },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "GET",
+                 responseHeaders: { "Cache-Control": "cacheControl header",
+                                    "Content-Language": "contentLanguage header",
+                                    "Expires":"expires header",
+                                    "Last-Modified":"lastModified header",
+                                    "Pragma":"pragma header",
+                                    "Unexpected":"unexpected header" },
+                 expectedResponseHeaders: ["Cache-Control","Content-Language","Content-Type","Expires","Last-Modified","Pragma"],
+               },
+               // Check that sending a body in the OPTIONS response works
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                 preflightBody: "I'm a preflight response body",
+               },
+               ];
+
+  if (!runPreflightTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    var req = {
+      url: baseURL + "allowOrigin=" + escape(test.origin || origin),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      uploadProgress: test.uploadProgress,
+      body: test.body,
+      responseHeaders: test.responseHeaders,
+    };
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+       req.url += "&origin=" + escape(origin) +
+                  "&requestMethod=" + test.method;
+    }
+
+    if ("username" in test) {
+      req.username = test.username;
+    }
+
+    if ("password" in test) {
+      req.password = test.password;
+    }
+
+    if (test.noAllowPreflight)
+      req.url += "&noAllowPreflight";
+
+    if (test.pass && "headers" in test) {
+      function isUnsafeHeader(name) {
+        lName = name.toLowerCase();
+        return lName != "accept" &&
+               lName != "accept-language" &&
+               (lName != "content-type" ||
+                !["text/plain",
+                 "multipart/form-data",
+                 "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"]
+                   .includes(test.headers[name].toLowerCase()));
+      }
+      req.url += "&headers=" + escape(JSON.stringify(test.headers));
+      reqHeaders =
+        escape(Object.keys(test.headers)
+               .filter(isUnsafeHeader)
+               .map(s => s.toLowerCase())
+               .sort()
+               .join(","));
+      req.url += reqHeaders ? "&requestHeaders=" + reqHeaders : "";
+    }
+    if ("allowHeaders" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowHeaders=" + escape(test.allowHeaders);
+    if ("allowMethods" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowMethods=" + escape(test.allowMethods);
+    if (test.body)
+      req.url += "&body=" + escape(test.body);
+    if (test.status) {
+      req.url += "&status=" + test.status;
+      req.url += "&statusMessage=" + escape(test.statusMessage);
+    }
+    if (test.preflightStatus)
+      req.url += "&preflightStatus=" + test.preflightStatus;
+    if (test.responseHeaders)
+      req.url += "&responseHeaders=" + escape(JSON.stringify(test.responseHeaders));
+    if (test.exposeHeaders)
+      req.url += "&exposeHeaders=" + escape(test.exposeHeaders);
+    if (test.preflightBody)
+      req.url += "&preflightBody=" + escape(test.preflightBody);
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+      is(res.didFail, false,
+        "shouldn't have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      if (test.status) {
+        is(res.status, test.status, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.statusText, test.statusMessage, "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      }
+      else {
+        is(res.status, 200, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.statusText, "OK", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      }
+      if (test.method !== "HEAD") {
+        is(res.responseXML, "<res>hello pass</res>",
+           "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.responseText, "<res>hello pass</res>\n",
+           "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.events.join(","),
+           "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs3,rs4,load,loadend",
+           "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      }
+      else {
+        is(res.responseXML, null,
+           "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.responseText, "",
+           "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+        is(res.events.join(","),
+           "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs4,load,loadend",
+           "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      }
+      if (test.responseHeaders) {
+        for (header in test.responseHeaders) {
+          if (!test.expectedResponseHeaders.includes(header)) {
+            is(res.responseHeaders[header], null,
+               "|xhr.getResponseHeader()|wrong response header (" + header + ") in test for " +
+               JSON.stringify(test));
+            is(res.allResponseHeaders[header], undefined,
+              "|xhr.getAllResponseHeaderss()|wrong response header (" + header + ") in test for " +
+              JSON.stringify(test));
+          }
+          else {
+            is(res.responseHeaders[header], test.responseHeaders[header],
+               "|xhr.getResponseHeader()|wrong response header (" + header + ") in test for " +
+               JSON.stringify(test));
+            is(res.allResponseHeaders[header.toLowerCase()], test.responseHeaders[header],
+              "|xhr.getAllResponseHeaderss()|wrong response header (" + header + ") in test for " +
+              JSON.stringify(test));
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    else {
+      is(res.didFail, true,
+        "should have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.status, 0, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.statusText, "", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseXML, null,
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseText, "",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      if (!res.sendThrew) {
+        is(res.events.join(","),
+           "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs4,error,loadend",
+           "wrong events in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      }
+      is(res.progressEvents, 0,
+         "wrong events in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      if (test.responseHeaders) {
+        for (header in test.responseHeaders) {
+          is(res.responseHeaders[header], null,
+             "wrong response header (" + header + ") in test for " +
+             JSON.stringify(test));
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Test cookie behavior
+  tests = [{ pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+             origin: "*",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+             origin: "*",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             noCookie: 1,
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             noCookie: 1,
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 0,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=1",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             setCookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             cookie: "a=2",
+             withCred: 1,
+             allowCred: 1,
+           },
+           ];
+
+  if (!runCookieTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    req = {
+      url: baseURL + "allowOrigin=" + escape(test.origin || origin),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      withCred: test.withCred,
+    };
+
+    if (test.allowCred)
+      req.url += "&allowCred";
+
+    if (test.setCookie)
+      req.url += "&setCookie=" + escape(test.setCookie);
+    if (test.cookie)
+      req.url += "&cookie=" + escape(test.cookie);
+    if (test.noCookie)
+      req.url += "&noCookie";
+
+    if ("allowHeaders" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowHeaders=" + escape(test.allowHeaders);
+    if ("allowMethods" in test)
+      req.url += "&allowMethods=" + escape(test.allowMethods);
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+    if (test.pass) {
+      is(res.didFail, false,
+        "shouldn't have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.status, 200, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.statusText, "OK", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseXML, "<res>hello pass</res>",
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseText, "<res>hello pass</res>\n",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs3,rs4,load,loadend",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+    }
+    else {
+      is(res.didFail, true,
+        "should have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.status, 0, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.statusText, "", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseXML, null,
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseText, "",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs4,error,loadend",
+         "wrong events in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.progressEvents, 0,
+         "wrong events in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Make sure to clear cookies to avoid affecting other tests
+  document.cookie = "a=; path=/; expires=Thu, 01-Jan-1970 00:00:01 GMT"
+  is(document.cookie, "", "No cookies should be left over");
+
+
+  // Test redirects
+  is(loader.src, "http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html");
+  is(origin, "http://example.org");
+
+  tests = [{ pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "x"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://test2.example.org:8000",
+                      allowOrigin: origin
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*"
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*",
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: "*",
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                      noAllowPreflight: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://sub1.test1.example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain" },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.org",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "POST",
+             body: "hi there",
+             headers: { "Content-Type": "text/plain",
+                        "my-header": "myValue",
+                      },
+             hops: [{ server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.org",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowHeaders: "my-header",
+                    },
+                    ],
+           },
+
+           // test redirects with different credentials settings
+           {
+             // Initialize by setting a cookies for same- and cross- origins.
+             pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      setCookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      setCookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      noCookie: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           // expected fail because allow-credentials CORS header is not set
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: '*',
+                      noCookie: 1,
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 0,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             hops: [{ server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: origin,
+                      cookie: escape("a=1"),
+                    },
+                    { server: "http://example.com",
+                      allowOrigin: '*',
+                      allowCred: 1,
+                      cookie: escape("a=2"),
+                    },
+                    ],
+             withCred: 1,
+           },
+           ];
+
+  if (!runRedirectTests) {
+    tests = [];
+  }
+
+  for (test of tests) {
+    req = {
+      url: test.hops[0].server + basePath + "hop=1&hops=" +
+           escape(JSON.stringify(test.hops)),
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      body: test.body,
+      withCred: test.withCred,
+    };
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+      if (test.body)
+        req.url += "&body=" + escape(test.body);
+    }
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+    if (test.pass) {
+      is(res.didFail, false,
+        "shouldn't have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.status, 200, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.statusText, "OK", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseXML, "<res>hello pass</res>",
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseText, "<res>hello pass</res>\n",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs3,rs4,load,loadend",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+    }
+    else {
+      is(res.didFail, true,
+        "should have failed in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.status, 0, "wrong status in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.statusText, "", "wrong status text for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseXML, null,
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.responseText, "",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs4,error,loadend",
+         "wrong events in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+      is(res.progressEvents, 0,
+         "wrong progressevents in test for " + JSON.stringify(test));
+    }
+  }
+
+
+  SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_cache.html b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_cache.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77898e38ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_cache.html
@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Cross Site XMLHttpRequest</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>        
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body onload="gen.next()">
+<p id="display">
+<iframe id=loader></iframe>
+</p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+  
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+let gen;
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("This test needs to generate artificial pauses, hence it uses timeouts.  There is no way around it, unfortunately. :(");
+
+window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+  gen.next(e.data);
+});
+
+gen = runTest();
+
+function* runTest() {
+  var loader = document.getElementById('loader');
+  var loaderWindow = loader.contentWindow;
+  loader.onload = function () { gen.next() };
+
+  loader.src = "http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html";
+  origin = "http://example.org";
+  yield undefined;
+
+  tests = [{ pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                        "y-my-header": "second" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "hello" },
+             allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "hello" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "hello" },
+             allowHeaders: "y-my-header,x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                        "y-my-header": "second" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "hello" },
+             allowHeaders: "y-my-header,x-my-header",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "hello" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue",
+                        "y-my-header": "second" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 2
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header, y-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "z-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: "\t  3600 \t ",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: "3600 3",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: "asdf",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "first-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "first-header",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "second-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "second-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "third-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "third-header",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "second-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "first-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "first-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "first-header",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "second-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "second-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "third-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "third-header",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "second-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "third-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+             allowMethods: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+             allowMethods: "PATCH",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "PUT",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+             allowMethods: "PATCH",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 2
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE, PUT",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "PUT",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "PATCH",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "FIRST",
+             allowMethods: "FIRST",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "SECOND",
+             allowMethods: "SECOND",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "THIRD",
+             allowMethods: "THIRD",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "SECOND",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "FIRST",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "FIRST",
+             allowMethods: "FIRST",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "SECOND",
+             allowMethods: "SECOND",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "THIRD",
+             allowMethods: "THIRD",
+             cacheTime: 2,
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "SECOND",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "THIRD",
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" }
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "y-value" }
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" }
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "PUT",
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             noOrigin: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "x-value" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "PUT"
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             headers: { "my-header": "value" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 3600,
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             noOrigin: 1,
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "DELETE"
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "y-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 2
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pause: 2.1 },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             withCred: true,
+             headers: { "y-my-header": "myValue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "DELETE",
+             allowMethods: "DELETE",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "DELETE": "myvalue" },
+           },
+           { newTest: "*******" },
+           { pass: 1,
+             method: "GET",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myValue" },
+             allowHeaders: "x-my-header",
+             cacheTime: 3600
+           },
+           { pass: 0,
+             method: "3600",
+             headers: { "x-my-header": "myvalue" },
+           },
+           ];
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < 110; i++) {
+    tests.push({ newTest: "*******" },
+               { pass: 1,
+                 method: "DELETE",
+                 allowMethods: "DELETE",
+                 cacheTime: 3600,
+               });
+  }
+
+  baseURL = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/cors/" +
+             "file_CrossSiteXHR_cache_server.sjs?";
+  setStateURL = baseURL + "setState=";
+
+  var unique = Date.now();
+  for (test of tests) {
+    if (test.newTest) {
+      unique++;
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (test.pause) {
+      setTimeout(function() { gen.next() }, test.pause * 1000);
+      yield undefined;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    req = {
+      url: baseURL + "c=" + unique,
+      method: test.method,
+      headers: test.headers,
+      withCred: test.withCred,
+    };
+
+    sec = { allowOrigin: test.noOrigin ? "" : origin,
+            allowHeaders: test.allowHeaders,
+            allowMethods: test.allowMethods,
+            cacheTime: test.cacheTime,
+            withCred: test.withCred };
+    xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("POST", setStateURL + escape(JSON.stringify(sec)), true);
+    xhr.onloadend = function() { gen.next(); }
+    xhr.send();
+    yield undefined;
+
+    loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), origin);
+
+    res = JSON.parse(yield);
+
+    testName = JSON.stringify(test) + " (index " + tests.indexOf(test) + ")";
+
+    if (test.pass) {
+      is(res.didFail, false,
+        "shouldn't have failed in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.status, 200, "wrong status in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.responseXML, "<res>hello pass</res>",
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.responseText, "<res>hello pass</res>\n",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs3,rs4,load,loadend",
+         "wrong events in test for " + testName);
+    }
+    else {
+      is(res.didFail, true,
+        "should have failed in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.status, 0, "wrong status in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.responseXML, null,
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.responseText, "",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs4,error,loadend",
+         "wrong events in test for " + testName);
+      is(res.progressEvents, 0,
+         "wrong events in test for " + testName);
+    }
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_origin.html b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_origin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..31cc5809d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/cors/test_CrossSiteXHR_origin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Cross Site XMLHttpRequest</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>        
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display">
+<iframe id=loader></iframe>
+</p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+  
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+var origins =
+  [{ server: 'http://example.org' },
+   { server: 'http://example.org:80',
+     origin: 'http://example.org'
+   },
+   { server: 'http://sub1.test1.example.org' },
+   { server: 'http://test2.example.org:8000' },
+   { server: 'http://sub1.\xe4lt.example.org:8000',
+     origin: 'http://sub1.xn--lt-uia.example.org:8000'
+   },
+   { server: 'http://sub2.\xe4lt.example.org',
+     origin: 'http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org'
+   },
+   { server: 'http://ex\xe4mple.test',
+     origin: 'http://xn--exmple-cua.test'
+   },
+   { server: 'http://xn--exmple-cua.test' },
+   { server: 'http://\u03c0\u03b1\u03c1\u03ac\u03b4\u03b5\u03b9\u03b3\u03bc\u03b1.\u03b4\u03bf\u03ba\u03b9\u03bc\u03ae',
+     origin: 'http://xn--hxajbheg2az3al.xn--jxalpdlp'
+   },
+   { origin: 'null',
+     file: 'http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner_data.sjs'
+   },
+   ];
+
+   //['https://example.com:443'],
+   //['https://sub1.test1.example.com:443'],
+
+window.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+  gen.next(e.data);
+});
+
+gen = runTest();
+
+function* runTest() {
+  var loader = document.getElementById('loader');
+  var loaderWindow = loader.contentWindow;
+  loader.onload = function () { gen.next() };
+
+  // Test preflight-less requests
+  basePath = "/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_server.sjs?"
+  baseURL = "http://mochi.test:8888" + basePath;
+
+  for (originEntry of origins) {
+    origin = originEntry.origin || originEntry.server;
+
+    loader.src = originEntry.file ||
+                 (originEntry.server + "/tests/dom/security/test/cors/file_CrossSiteXHR_inner.html");
+    yield undefined;
+
+    var isNullOrigin = origin == "null";
+
+    port = /:\d+/;
+    passTests = [
+      origin,
+      "*",
+      " \t " + origin + "\t \t",
+      "\t \t* \t ",
+    ];
+    failTests = [
+      "",
+      " ",
+      port.test(origin) ? origin.replace(port, "")
+                        : origin + ":1234",
+      port.test(origin) ? origin.replace(port, ":")
+                        : origin + ":",
+      origin + ".",
+      origin + "/",
+      origin + "#",
+      origin + "?",
+      origin + "\\",
+      origin + "%",
+      origin + "@",
+      origin + "/hello",
+      "foo:bar@" + origin,
+      "* " + origin,
+      origin + " " + origin,
+      "allow <" + origin + ">",
+      "<" + origin + ">",
+      "<*>",
+      origin.substr(0, 5) == "https" ? origin.replace("https", "http")
+                                     : origin.replace("http", "https"),
+      origin.replace("://", "://www."),
+      origin.replace("://", ":// "),
+      origin.replace(/\/[^.]+\./, "/"),
+    ];
+
+    if (isNullOrigin) {
+      passTests = ["*", "\t \t* \t ", "null"];
+      failTests = failTests.filter(function(v) { return v != origin });
+    }
+    
+    for (allowOrigin of passTests) {
+      req = {
+        url: baseURL +
+             "allowOrigin=" + escape(allowOrigin) +
+             "&origin=" + escape(origin),
+        method: "GET",
+      };
+      loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), isNullOrigin ? "*" : origin);
+
+      res = JSON.parse(yield);
+      is(res.didFail, false, "shouldn't have failed for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.status, 200, "wrong status for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.statusText, "OK", "wrong status text for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.responseXML,
+         "<res>hello pass</res>",
+         "wrong responseXML in test for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.responseText, "<res>hello pass</res>\n",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs2,rs3,rs4,load,loadend",
+         "wrong responseText in test for " + allowOrigin);
+    }
+
+    for (allowOrigin of failTests) {
+      req = {
+        url: baseURL + "allowOrigin=" + escape(allowOrigin),
+        method: "GET",
+      };
+      loaderWindow.postMessage(JSON.stringify(req), isNullOrigin ? "*" : origin);
+
+      res = JSON.parse(yield);
+      is(res.didFail, true, "should have failed for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.responseText, "", "should have no text for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.status, 0, "should have no status for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.statusText, "", "wrong status text for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.responseXML, null, "should have no XML for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.events.join(","),
+         "opening,rs1,sending,loadstart,rs4,error,loadend",
+         "wrong events in test for " + allowOrigin);
+      is(res.progressEvents, 0,
+         "wrong events in test for " + allowOrigin);
+    }
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+addLoadEvent(function() {
+  gen.next();
+});
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/crashtests/1577572.html b/dom/security/test/crashtests/1577572.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..732c7aa5dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/crashtests/1577572.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<title>Bug 1577572</title>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="&#xFF;">
+</head>
+<body>
+  Bug 1577572
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/crashtests/1583044.html b/dom/security/test/crashtests/1583044.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa6d496d64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/crashtests/1583044.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1583044</title>
+<script>
+  function testOpenMozIcon() {
+    window.location.href = "moz-icon://.pdf?size=128";
+  }
+</script>
+</head>
+<body onload="testOpenMozIcon();"></body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/crashtests/crashtests.list b/dom/security/test/crashtests/crashtests.list
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc7986cf3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/crashtests/crashtests.list
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+load 1583044.html
+load 1577572.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/Ahem.ttf b/dom/security/test/csp/Ahem.ttf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac81cb0316
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/Ahem.ttf
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/File b/dom/security/test/csp/File
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/File
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/csp/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f2273f0180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.html
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json^headers^
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.html
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.json
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html
+  !/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_remote.html
+  file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html
+  file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html^headers^
+[browser_test_web_manifest.js]
+[browser_test_web_manifest_mixed_content.js]
+[browser_test_bookmarklets.js]
+[browser_test_uir_optional_clicks.js]
+support-files =
+  file_csp_meta_uir.html
+[browser_manifest-src-override-default-src.js]
+[browser_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.js]
+support-files =
+  dummy.pdf
+  file_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_manifest-src-override-default-src.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_manifest-src-override-default-src.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd2b0f4460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_manifest-src-override-default-src.js
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Description of the tests:
+ * Tests check that default-src can be overridden by manifest-src.
+ */
+/*globals Cu, is, ok*/
+"use strict";
+const { ManifestObtainer } = ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://gre/modules/ManifestObtainer.jsm"
+);
+const path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+const testFile = `${path}file_web_manifest.html`;
+const mixedContentFile = `${path}file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html`;
+const server = `${path}file_testserver.sjs`;
+const defaultURL = new URL(`https://example.org${server}`);
+const mixedURL = new URL(`http://mochi.test:8888${server}`);
+
+// Enable web manifest processing.
+Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.manifest.enabled", true);
+
+const tests = [
+  // Check interaction with default-src and another origin,
+  // CSP allows fetching from example.org, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: `CSP manifest-src overrides default-src of elsewhere.com`,
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("cors", "*");
+      url.searchParams.append(
+        "csp",
+        "default-src http://elsewhere.com; manifest-src http://example.org"
+      );
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // Check interaction with default-src none,
+  // CSP allows fetching manifest from example.org, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: `CSP manifest-src overrides default-src`,
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(mixedURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", mixedContentFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("cors", "http://test:80");
+      url.searchParams.append(
+        "csp",
+        "default-src 'self'; manifest-src http://test:80"
+      );
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+//jscs:disable
+add_task(async function() {
+  //jscs:enable
+  const testPromises = tests.map(test => {
+    const tabOptions = {
+      gBrowser,
+      url: test.tabURL,
+      skipAnimation: true,
+    };
+    return BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(tabOptions, browser =>
+      testObtainingManifest(browser, test)
+    );
+  });
+  await Promise.all(testPromises);
+});
+
+async function testObtainingManifest(aBrowser, aTest) {
+  const expectsBlocked = aTest.expected.includes("block");
+  const observer = expectsBlocked ? createNetObserver(aTest) : null;
+  // Expect an exception (from promise rejection) if there a content policy
+  // that is violated.
+  try {
+    const manifest = await ManifestObtainer.browserObtainManifest(aBrowser);
+    aTest.run(manifest);
+  } catch (e) {
+    const wasBlocked = e.message.includes(
+      "NetworkError when attempting to fetch resource"
+    );
+    ok(
+      wasBlocked,
+      `Expected promise rejection obtaining ${aTest.tabURL}: ${e.message}`
+    );
+    if (observer) {
+      await observer.untilFinished;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Helper object used to observe policy violations. It waits 1 seconds
+// for a response, and then times out causing its associated test to fail.
+function createNetObserver(test) {
+  let finishedTest;
+  let success = false;
+  const finished = new Promise(resolver => {
+    finishedTest = resolver;
+  });
+  const timeoutId = setTimeout(() => {
+    if (!success) {
+      test.run("This test timed out.");
+      finishedTest();
+    }
+  }, 1000);
+  var observer = {
+    get untilFinished() {
+      return finished;
+    },
+    observe(subject, topic) {
+      SpecialPowers.removeObserver(observer, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+      test.run(topic);
+      finishedTest();
+      clearTimeout(timeoutId);
+      success = true;
+    },
+  };
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(observer, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  return observer;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbcbf8efbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.js
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["pdfjs.eventBusDispatchToDOM", true]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    TEST_PATH + "file_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.html",
+    async function(browser) {
+      let pdfPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForContentEvent(
+        browser,
+        "documentloaded",
+        false,
+        null,
+        true
+      );
+
+      await ContentTask.spawn(browser, {}, async function() {
+        let pdfButton = content.document.getElementById("pdfButton");
+        pdfButton.click();
+      });
+
+      await pdfPromise;
+
+      await ContentTask.spawn(browser, {}, async function() {
+        let pdfFrame = content.document.getElementById("pdfFrame");
+        // 1) Sanity that we have loaded the PDF using a blob
+        ok(pdfFrame.src.startsWith("blob:"), "it's a blob URL");
+
+        // 2) Ensure that the PDF has actually loaded
+        ok(
+          pdfFrame.contentDocument.querySelector("div#viewer"),
+          "document content has viewer UI"
+        );
+
+        // 3) Ensure we have the correct CSP attached
+        let cspJSON = pdfFrame.contentDocument.cspJSON;
+        ok(cspJSON.includes("script-src"), "found script-src directive");
+        ok(cspJSON.includes("allowPDF"), "found script-src nonce value");
+      });
+    }
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_bookmarklets.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_bookmarklets.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d5bf8cf79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_bookmarklets.js
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"use strict";
+
+let BASE_URL = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content/",
+  "https://example.com/"
+);
+const DUMMY_URL = BASE_URL + "file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html";
+
+function makeBookmarkFor(url, keyword) {
+  return Promise.all([
+    PlacesUtils.bookmarks.insert({
+      parentGuid: PlacesUtils.bookmarks.unfiledGuid,
+      title: "bookmarklet",
+      url,
+    }),
+    PlacesUtils.keywords.insert({ url, keyword }),
+  ]);
+}
+/* Test Description:
+ * 1 - Load a Page with CSP script-src: none
+ * 2 - Create a bookmarklet with javascript:window.open('about:blank')
+ * 3 - Select and enter the bookmarklet
+ *  A new tab with about:blank should be opened
+ */
+add_task(async function openKeywordBookmarkWithWindowOpen() {
+  // This is the current default, but let's not assume that...
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["browser.link.open_newwindow", 3],
+      ["dom.disable_open_during_load", true],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  let moztab;
+  let tabOpened = BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(
+    gBrowser,
+    DUMMY_URL
+  ).then(tab => {
+    moztab = tab;
+  });
+  let keywordForBM = "openNewWindowBookmarklet";
+
+  let bookmarkInfo;
+  let bookmarkCreated = makeBookmarkFor(
+    `javascript: window.open("about:blank")`,
+    keywordForBM
+  ).then(values => {
+    bookmarkInfo = values[0];
+  });
+  await Promise.all([tabOpened, bookmarkCreated]);
+
+  registerCleanupFunction(function() {
+    return Promise.all([
+      PlacesUtils.bookmarks.remove(bookmarkInfo),
+      PlacesUtils.keywords.remove(keywordForBM),
+    ]);
+  });
+  gURLBar.value = keywordForBM;
+  gURLBar.focus();
+
+  let tabCreatedPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(
+    gBrowser.tabContainer,
+    "TabOpen"
+  );
+  EventUtils.synthesizeKey("KEY_Enter");
+  info("Waiting for tab being created");
+  let { target: tab } = await tabCreatedPromise;
+  info("Got tab");
+  let browser = tab.linkedBrowser;
+  if (!browser.currentURI || browser.currentURI.spec != "about:blank") {
+    info("Waiting for browser load");
+    await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, "about:blank");
+  }
+  is(
+    browser.currentURI && browser.currentURI.spec,
+    "about:blank",
+    "Tab with expected URL loaded."
+  );
+  info("Waiting to remove tab");
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(moztab);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_uir_optional_clicks.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_uir_optional_clicks.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05cd15dd04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_uir_optional_clicks.js
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+const TEST_PATH_HTTPS = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", false]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    TEST_PATH_HTTPS + "file_csp_meta_uir.html",
+    async function(browser) {
+      let newTabPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(gBrowser, null, true);
+      BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouse(
+        "#mylink",
+        2,
+        2,
+        { accelKey: true },
+        browser
+      );
+      let tab = await newTabPromise;
+      is(
+        tab.linkedBrowser.currentURI.scheme,
+        "https",
+        "Should have opened https page."
+      );
+      BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+    }
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..02736f3c08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest.js
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+ * Description of the tests:
+ *   These tests check for conformance to the CSP spec as they relate to Web Manifests.
+ *
+ *   In particular, the tests check that default-src and manifest-src directives are
+ *   are respected by the ManifestObtainer.
+ */
+/*globals Cu, is, ok*/
+"use strict";
+const { ManifestObtainer } = ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://gre/modules/ManifestObtainer.jsm"
+);
+const path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+const testFile = `${path}file_web_manifest.html`;
+const remoteFile = `${path}file_web_manifest_remote.html`;
+const httpsManifest = `${path}file_web_manifest_https.html`;
+const server = `${path}file_testserver.sjs`;
+const defaultURL = new URL(`http://example.org${server}`);
+const secureURL = new URL(`https://example.com:443${server}`);
+
+// Enable web manifest processing.
+Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.manifest.enabled", true);
+
+const tests = [
+  // CSP block everything, so trying to load a manifest
+  // will result in a policy violation.
+  {
+    expected: "default-src 'none' blocks fetching manifest.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "default-src 'none'");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(topic) {
+      is(topic, "csp-on-violate-policy", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP allows fetching only from mochi.test:8888,
+  // so trying to load a manifest from same origin
+  // triggers a CSP violation.
+  {
+    expected: "default-src mochi.test:8888 blocks manifest fetching.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "default-src mochi.test:8888");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(topic) {
+      is(topic, "csp-on-violate-policy", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP restricts fetching to 'self', so allowing the manifest
+  // to load. The name of the manifest is then checked.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP default-src 'self' allows fetch of manifest.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "default-src 'self'");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP only allows fetching from mochi.test:8888 and remoteFile
+  // requests a manifest from that origin, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP default-src mochi.test:8888 allows fetching manifest.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", remoteFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "default-src http://mochi.test:8888");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // default-src blocks everything, so any attempt to
+  // fetch a manifest from another origin will trigger a
+  // policy violation.
+  {
+    expected: "default-src 'none' blocks mochi.test:8888",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", remoteFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "default-src 'none'");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(topic) {
+      is(topic, "csp-on-violate-policy", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP allows fetching from self, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP manifest-src allows self",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "manifest-src 'self'");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP allows fetching from example.org, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP manifest-src allows http://example.org",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "manifest-src http://example.org");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    expected: "CSP manifest-src allows mochi.test:8888",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", remoteFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("cors", "*");
+      url.searchParams.append(
+        "csp",
+        "default-src *; manifest-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+      );
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP restricts fetching to mochi.test:8888, but the test
+  // file is at example.org. Hence, a policy violation is
+  // triggered.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP blocks manifest fetching from example.org.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", testFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "manifest-src mochi.test:8888");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(topic) {
+      is(topic, "csp-on-violate-policy", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP is set to only allow manifest to be loaded from same origin,
+  // but the remote file attempts to load from a different origin. Thus
+  // this causes a CSP violation.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP manifest-src 'self' blocks cross-origin fetch.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(defaultURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", remoteFile);
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "manifest-src 'self'");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(topic) {
+      is(topic, "csp-on-violate-policy", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+  // CSP allows fetching over TLS from example.org, so manifest should load.
+  {
+    expected: "CSP manifest-src allows example.com over TLS",
+    get tabURL() {
+      // secureURL loads https://example.com:443
+      // and gets manifest from https://example.org:443
+      const url = new URL(secureURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", httpsManifest);
+      url.searchParams.append("cors", "*");
+      url.searchParams.append("csp", "manifest-src https://example.com:443");
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(manifest) {
+      is(manifest.name, "loaded", this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+//jscs:disable
+add_task(async function() {
+  //jscs:enable
+  const testPromises = tests.map(test => {
+    const tabOptions = {
+      gBrowser,
+      url: test.tabURL,
+      skipAnimation: true,
+    };
+    return BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(tabOptions, browser =>
+      testObtainingManifest(browser, test)
+    );
+  });
+  await Promise.all(testPromises);
+});
+
+async function testObtainingManifest(aBrowser, aTest) {
+  const waitForObserver = waitForNetObserver(aBrowser, aTest);
+  // Expect an exception (from promise rejection) if there a content policy
+  // that is violated.
+  try {
+    const manifest = await ManifestObtainer.browserObtainManifest(aBrowser);
+    aTest.run(manifest);
+  } catch (e) {
+    const wasBlocked = e.message.includes(
+      "NetworkError when attempting to fetch resource"
+    );
+    ok(
+      wasBlocked,
+      `Expected promise rejection obtaining ${aTest.tabURL}: ${e.message}`
+    );
+  } finally {
+    await waitForObserver;
+  }
+}
+
+// Helper object used to observe policy violations when blocking is expected.
+function waitForNetObserver(aBrowser, aTest) {
+  // We don't need to wait for violation, so just resolve
+  if (!aTest.expected.includes("block")) {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+
+  return ContentTask.spawn(aBrowser, [], () => {
+    return new Promise(resolve => {
+      function observe(subject, topic) {
+        Services.obs.removeObserver(observe, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+        resolve();
+      }
+      Services.obs.addObserver(observe, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    });
+  }).then(() => aTest.run("csp-on-violate-policy"));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest_mixed_content.js b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest_mixed_content.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c1d2a594f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/browser_test_web_manifest_mixed_content.js
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   Check that mixed content blocker works prevents fetches of
+ *   mixed content manifests.
+ */
+/*globals Cu, ok*/
+"use strict";
+const { ManifestObtainer } = ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://gre/modules/ManifestObtainer.jsm"
+);
+const path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+const mixedContent = `${path}file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html`;
+const server = `${path}file_testserver.sjs`;
+const secureURL = new URL(`https://example.com${server}`);
+const tests = [
+  // Trying to load mixed content in file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html
+  // needs to result in an error.
+  {
+    expected: "Mixed Content Blocker prevents fetching manifest.",
+    get tabURL() {
+      const url = new URL(secureURL);
+      url.searchParams.append("file", mixedContent);
+      return url.href;
+    },
+    run(error) {
+      // Check reason for error.
+      const check = /NetworkError when attempting to fetch resource/.test(
+        error.message
+      );
+      ok(check, this.expected);
+    },
+  },
+];
+
+//jscs:disable
+add_task(async function() {
+  //jscs:enable
+  const testPromises = tests.map(test => {
+    const tabOptions = {
+      gBrowser,
+      url: test.tabURL,
+      skipAnimation: true,
+    };
+    return BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(tabOptions, browser =>
+      testObtainingManifest(browser, test)
+    );
+  });
+  await Promise.all(testPromises);
+});
+
+async function testObtainingManifest(aBrowser, aTest) {
+  try {
+    await ManifestObtainer.browserObtainManifest(aBrowser);
+  } catch (e) {
+    aTest.run(e);
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/dummy.pdf b/dom/security/test/csp/dummy.pdf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ad87e3c2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/dummy.pdf
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.css b/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6835c4d4ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.css
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * Moved this CSS from an inline stylesheet to an external file when we added
+ * inline-style blocking in bug 763879.
+ * This test may hang if the load for this .css file is blocked due to a
+ * malfunction of CSP, but should pass if the style_good test passes.
+ */
+
+/* CSS font embedding tests */
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "arbitrary_good";
+  src: url('file_CSP.sjs?testid=font_good&type=application/octet-stream');
+}
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "arbitrary_bad";
+  src: url('http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=font_bad&type=application/octet-stream');
+}
+
+.div_arbitrary_good { font-family: "arbitrary_good"; }
+.div_arbitrary_bad { font-family: "arbitrary_bad"; }
+
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..834f7e13ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// SJS file for CSP mochitests
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var isPreflight = request.method == "OPTIONS";
+
+  //avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if ("type" in query) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", unescape(query.type), false);
+  } else {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  }
+
+  if ("content" in query) {
+    response.write(unescape(query.content));
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_allow_https_schemes.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_allow_https_schemes.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..787e683e87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_allow_https_schemes.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 826805 - CSP: Allow http and https for scheme-less sources</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+  <!--
+    We resue file_path_matching.js which just updates the contents of 'testdiv' to contain allowed.
+    Note, that we are loading the file_path_matchting.js using a scheme of 'https'.
+   -->
+  <script src="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js#foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_base_uri_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_base_uri_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ba130e99e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_base_uri_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1263286
+
+"use strict";
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const PRE_BASE = `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+  <title>Bug 1045897 - Test CSP base-uri directive</title>`;
+
+const REGULAR_POST_BASE = `
+  </head>
+  <body onload='window.parent.postMessage({result: document.baseURI}, "*");'>
+  <!-- just making use of the 'base' tag for this test -->
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const SCRIPT_POST_BASE = `
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script>
+    document.getElementById("base1").removeAttribute("href");
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: document.baseURI}, "*");
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // Deliver the CSP policy encoded in the URL
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", query.get("csp"), false);
+
+  // Send HTML to test allowed/blocked behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.write(PRE_BASE);
+  var base1 = '<base id="base1" href="' + query.get("base1") + '">';
+  var base2 = '<base id="base2" href="' + query.get("base2") + '">';
+  response.write(base1 + base2);
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "enforce-csp") {
+    response.write(REGULAR_POST_BASE);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "remove-base1") {
+    response.write(SCRIPT_POST_BASE);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_data_schemes.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_data_schemes.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a4a491606
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_data_schemes.html
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1086999 - Wildcard should not match blob:, data:</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+
+var base64data =
+"iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+"P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==";
+
+
+// construct an image element using *data:*
+var data_src = "data:image/png;base64," + base64data;
+var data_img = document.createElement('img');
+data_img.onload = function() {
+  window.parent.postMessage({scheme: "data", result: "allowed"}, "*");
+}
+data_img.onerror = function() {
+  window.parent.postMessage({scheme: "data", result: "blocked"}, "*");
+}
+data_img.src = data_src;
+document.body.appendChild(data_img);
+
+
+// construct an image element using *blob:*
+var byteCharacters = atob(base64data);
+var byteNumbers = new Array(byteCharacters.length);
+for (var i = 0; i < byteCharacters.length; i++) {
+  byteNumbers[i] = byteCharacters.charCodeAt(i);
+}
+var byteArray = new Uint8Array(byteNumbers);
+var blob = new Blob([byteArray], {type: "image/png"});
+var imageUrl = URL.createObjectURL( blob );
+
+var blob_img = document.createElement('img');
+blob_img.onload = function() {
+  window.parent.postMessage({scheme: "blob", result: "allowed"}, "*");
+}
+blob_img.onerror = function() {
+  window.parent.postMessage({scheme: "blob", result: "blocked"}, "*");
+}
+blob_img.src = imageUrl;
+document.body.appendChild(blob_img);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..545f6cffff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  // If the alert box is blocked correctly by the CSP then postMessage will
+  // send the message and test passes.
+  var text = "<script>alert(document.domain);window.opener.postMessage("+
+             "{\"test\": \"block_top_nav_alert_test\", \"msg\": "+
+             "\"blob top nav alert blocked by CSP\"}, \"*\")<\/script>";
+  var blob = new Blob([text], {type : 'text/html'});
+  var url = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+  location.href=url;
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2d945d556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts;
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..caf2a5de41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<body>
+<!-- iframe loading the blob url with null origin -->
+<iframe id="blobFrame"></iframe>
+<script>
+  // If the alert box is blocked correctly by the CSP then postMessage will
+  // send the message and test passes.
+  var alertScriptText = "data:text/html,<script>location=URL.createObjectURL(" +
+        "new Blob(['<script>alert(document.URL);parent.parent.postMessage(" +
+        "{\"test\": \"block_alert_test\", \"msg\": \"alert blocked by" +
+        " CSP\"}, \"*\");<\\/script>'], {type:\"text/html\"}));<\/script>";
+  document.getElementById("blobFrame").src=alertScriptText;
+  try {
+    var w = window.open("http://www.example.com","newwindow");
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "block_window_open_test",
+                               "msg": "new window not blocked by CSP"},"*");
+  } catch(err) {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "block_window_open_test",
+                               "msg": "window blocked by CSP"},"*");
+  }
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e2d945d556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts;
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mcb.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mcb.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..003c9df57c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mcb.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+// custom *.sjs for Bug 1122236
+// CSP: 'block-all-mixed-content'
+
+const HEAD =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  '<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">' +
+  "<title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>" +
+  "</head>";
+
+const CSP_ALLOW =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src *">';
+
+const CSP_BLOCK =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="block-all-mixed-content">';
+
+const BODY =
+  "<body>" +
+  '<img id="testimage" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png"></img>' +
+  '<script type="application/javascript">' +
+  '  var myImg = document.getElementById("testimage");' +
+  "  myImg.onload = function(e) {" +
+  '    window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-loaded"}, "*");' +
+  "  };" +
+  "  myImg.onerror = function(e) {" +
+  '    window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-blocked"}, "*");' +
+  "  };" +
+  "</script>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+// We have to use this special code fragment, in particular '?nocache' to trigger an
+// actual network load rather than loading the image from the cache.
+const BODY_CSPRO =
+  "<body>" +
+  '<img id="testimage" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png?nocache"></img>' +
+  '<script type="application/javascript">' +
+  '  var myImg = document.getElementById("testimage");' +
+  "  myImg.onload = function(e) {" +
+  '    window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-loaded"}, "*");' +
+  "  };" +
+  "  myImg.onerror = function(e) {" +
+  '    window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-blocked"}, "*");' +
+  "  };" +
+  "</script>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString === "csp-block") {
+    response.write(HEAD + CSP_BLOCK + BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "csp-allow") {
+    response.write(HEAD + CSP_ALLOW + BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "no-csp") {
+    response.write(HEAD + BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "cspro-block") {
+    // CSP RO is not supported in meta tag, let's use the header
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only",
+      "block-all-mixed-content",
+      false
+    );
+    response.write(HEAD + BODY_CSPRO);
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation1.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation1.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fdc1ae87ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation1.html
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="block-all-mixed-content">
+  <title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<b>user clicks and navigates from https://b.com to http://c.com</b>
+
+<a id="navlink" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation2.html">foo</a>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  // click the link to start the frame navigation
+  document.getElementById("navlink").click();
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation2.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c4084e9ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<b>http://c.com loaded, let's tell the parent</b>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  window.parent.postMessage({result: "frame-navigated"}, "*");
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74af0ff767
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1542194 - Check blockedURI in violation reports after redirects</title>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'unsafe-inline' http://example.com">
+</head>
+<body>
+<button id="test1" onclick="createAndNavFrame('?test1a#ref1a')">Test 1: 302 redirect</button>
+<button id="test2" onclick="createAndNavFrame('?test2a#ref2a')">Test 2: JS redirect</button>
+<button id="test3" onclick="createAndNavFrame('?test3a#ref3a')">Test 3: Link navigation</button>
+<div id="div"></div>
+<script>
+  const SERVER_LOCATION =
+    "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs";
+
+  document.addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', e => {
+    // just forward the blockedURI to the parent
+    window.parent.postMessage({blockedURI: e.blockedURI}, '*');
+  });
+
+  function createAndNavFrame(aTest) {
+  	let myFrame = document.createElement('iframe');
+    myFrame.src = SERVER_LOCATION + aTest;
+    div.appendChild(myFrame);
+  }
+
+  window.onload = function() {
+    let button1 = document.getElementById("test1");
+    button1.click();
+  
+    let button2 = document.getElementById("test2");
+    button2.click();
+  
+    let button3 = document.getElementById("test3");
+    button3.click();
+  }
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..faf400d6d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// Redirect server specifically for the needs of Bug 1542194
+
+"use strict";
+
+let REDIRECT_302_URI =
+  "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs?test1b#ref1b";
+
+let JS_REDIRECT = `<html>
+   <body>
+   <script>
+     var url= "http://test2.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs?test2b#ref2b";
+     window.location = url;
+   </script>
+   </body>
+   </html>`;
+
+let LINK_CLICK_NAVIGATION = `<html>
+   <body>
+   <a id="navlink" href="http://test3.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs?test3b#ref3b">click me</a>
+   <script>
+     window.onload = function() { document.getElementById('navlink').click(); }
+   </script>
+   </body>
+   </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+
+  // Test 1: 302 redirect
+  if (query === "test1a") {
+    var newLocation = REDIRECT_302_URI;
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Test 2: JS redirect
+  if (query === "test2a") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(JS_REDIRECT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Test 3: Link navigation
+  if (query === "test3a") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(LINK_CLICK_NAVIGATION);
+    return;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c3af4d5a09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1687342 - Check blocked-uri in csp-reports after frame redirect</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  Contents of the following iframe will be blocked<br/>
+  <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs?doredirect#ref1"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b69131f8eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: frame-src http://example.com; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e5dbdafdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+// Redirect server specifically for the needs of Bug 1687342
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  if (query === "doredirect") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs?query#ref2";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e6152ead0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- this should be allowed -->
+    <script src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/%24.js"> </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0177de7a38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1229639.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: "default-src 'self'; script-src http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/%24.js
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18e0e5589e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>marquee inline script tests for Bug 1312272</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<marquee id="m" onstart="parent.postMessage('csp-violation-marquee-onstart', '*')">bug 1312272</marquee>
+<script src="file_bug1312272.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..25a9483ea9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src *; script-src * 'unsafe-eval'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1b70c890fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1312272.js
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+var m = document.getElementById("m");
+m.addEventListener("click", function() {
+  // this will trigger after onstart, obviously.
+  parent.postMessage("finish", "*");
+});
+console.log("finish-handler setup");
+m.click();
+console.log("clicked");
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1452037.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1452037.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0fb41d6654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1452037.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src 'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU='">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a href="javascript:window.parent.postMessage({}, '*');">Click here</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc7fa48b62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+// This SJS file serves file_redirect_content.html
+// with a CSP that will trigger a violation and that will report it
+// to file_redirect_report.sjs
+//
+// This handles 301, 302, 303 and 307 redirects. The HTTP status code
+// returned/type of redirect to do comes from the query string
+// parameter passed in from the test_bug650386_* files and then also
+// uses that value in the report-uri parameter of the CSP
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // this gets used in the CSP as part of the report URI.
+  var redirect = request.queryString;
+
+  if (!redirect) {
+    // if we somehow got some bogus redirect code here,
+    // do a 302 redirect to the same URL as the report URI
+    // redirects to - this will fail the test.
+    var loc =
+      "http://sub1.test1.example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412.sjs?redirected";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // response.setHeader("content-type", "text/application", false);
+  // the actual file content.
+  // this image load will (intentionally) fail due to the CSP policy of default-src: 'self'
+  // specified by the CSP string above.
+  var content = "info('Script Loaded')";
+
+  response.write(content);
+
+  return;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b58af55849
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+    <title> Bug 1505412 CSP-RO reports violations in inline-scripts with nonce</title>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js" nonce="foobar"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+ 
+
+<body>
+    <script src="file_bug1505412.sjs" nonce="foobar"></script>
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e60b63c29c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_frame.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: script-src 'nonce-foobar'; report-uri file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..323a4edb1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var receivedRequests = parseInt(getState("requests"));
+  if (isNaN(receivedRequests)) {
+    receivedRequests = 0;
+  }
+  if (request.queryString.includes("state")) {
+    response.write(receivedRequests);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.queryString.includes("flush")) {
+    setState("requests", "0");
+    response.write("OK");
+    return;
+  }
+  receivedRequests = receivedRequests + 1;
+  setState("requests", "" + receivedRequests);
+  response.write("OK");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_child.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_child.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26e7f8f1f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_child.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  window.parent.parent.postMessage({
+    element: location.hash.substr(1),
+    domain: document.domain,
+  }, '*');
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8bdbb2c46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <base href="file_bug1738418_child.html">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe src="#iframe"></iframe>
+  <embed src="#embed"></embed>
+  <object data="#object"></object>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4705ce9ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1738418_parent.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1777572.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1777572.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51f2a80d28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug1777572.html
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src https://*;">
+    <script>
+      async function timeout (cmd) {
+        const timer = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          const id = setTimeout(() => {
+            clearTimeout(id)
+            reject(new Error('Promise timed out!'))
+          }, 750)
+        })
+        return Promise.race([cmd, timer])
+      }
+
+      let ourOpener = window.opener;
+
+      if (location.search.includes("close")) {
+        window.close();
+      }
+
+      document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', async () => {
+        const frame = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml', 'frame');
+        const image = document.createElementNS('http://www.w3.org/2000/svg', 'image');
+        document.documentElement.appendChild(frame)
+        image.setAttribute('href', 'a.png')
+        for (let i = 0; i < 5; ++i) {
+          try { await timeout(image.decode()) } catch (e) {}
+        }
+        let w = window.open();
+        // Need to run SpecialPowers in the newly opened window to avoid
+        // .wrap throwing because of dead objects.
+        let csp = w.eval("SpecialPowers.wrap(document).cspJSON;");
+        ourOpener.postMessage(csp, "*");
+        w.close();
+
+        if (!location.search.includes("close")) {
+          window.close();
+        }
+      })
+    </script>
+</head>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567.xsl b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567.xsl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b12b0d3b1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567.xsl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>

+<!-- Edited by XMLSpy® -->

+<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">

+

+<xsl:template match="/">

+  <html>

+  <body>

+  <h2 id="xsltheader">this xml file should be formatted using an xsl file(lower iframe should contain xml dump)!</h2>

+    <table border="1">

+      <tr bgcolor="#990099">

+        <th>Title</th>

+        <th>Artist</th>

+        <th>Price</th>

+      </tr>

+      <xsl:for-each select="catalog/cd">

+      <tr>

+        <td><xsl:value-of select="title"/></td>

+        <td><xsl:value-of select="artist"/></td>

+        <td><xsl:value-of select="price"/></td>

+      </tr>

+      </xsl:for-each>

+    </table>

+  </body>

+  </html>

+</xsl:template>

+</xsl:stylesheet>

+

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93d3451038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>

+<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug663567.xsl"?>

+<catalog>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Empire Burlesque</title>

+		<artist>Bob Dylan</artist>

+		<country>USA</country>

+		<company>Columbia</company>

+		<price>10.90</price>

+		<year>1985</year>

+	</cd>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Hide your heart</title>

+		<artist>Bonnie Tyler</artist>

+		<country>UK</country>

+		<company>CBS Records</company>

+		<price>9.90</price>

+		<year>1988</year>

+	</cd>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Greatest Hits</title>

+		<artist>Dolly Parton</artist>

+		<country>USA</country>

+		<company>RCA</company>

+		<price>9.90</price>

+		<year>1982</year>

+	</cd>

+</catalog>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c6fa3c26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_allows.xml^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93d3451038
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>

+<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug663567.xsl"?>

+<catalog>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Empire Burlesque</title>

+		<artist>Bob Dylan</artist>

+		<country>USA</country>

+		<company>Columbia</company>

+		<price>10.90</price>

+		<year>1985</year>

+	</cd>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Hide your heart</title>

+		<artist>Bonnie Tyler</artist>

+		<country>UK</country>

+		<company>CBS Records</company>

+		<price>9.90</price>

+		<year>1988</year>

+	</cd>

+	<cd>

+		<title>Greatest Hits</title>

+		<artist>Dolly Parton</artist>

+		<country>USA</country>

+		<company>RCA</company>

+		<price>9.90</price>

+		<year>1982</year>

+	</cd>

+</catalog>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..baf7f3c6af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug663567_blocks.xml^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src *.example.com
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dae040376b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <title>Bug 802872</title>

+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use AddLoadEvent !-->

+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>

+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />

+</head>

+<body>

+  <script src='file_bug802872.js'></script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c6fa3c26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e47b643a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.js
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ *   The policy for this test is:
+ *   Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
+ */
+
+function createAllowedEvent() {
+  /*
+   * Creates a new EventSource using 'http://mochi.test:8888'. Since all mochitests run on
+   * 'http://mochi.test', a default-src of 'self' allows this request.
+   */
+  var src_event = new EventSource(
+    "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.sjs"
+  );
+
+  src_event.onmessage = function(e) {
+    src_event.close();
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new Event("allowedEventSrcCallbackOK"));
+  };
+
+  src_event.onerror = function(e) {
+    src_event.close();
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new Event("allowedEventSrcCallbackFailed"));
+  };
+}
+
+function createBlockedEvent() {
+  /*
+   * creates a new EventSource using 'http://example.com'. This domain is not allowlisted by the
+   * CSP of this page, therefore the CSP blocks this request.
+   */
+  var src_event = new EventSource(
+    "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.sjs"
+  );
+
+  src_event.onmessage = function(e) {
+    src_event.close();
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new Event("blockedEventSrcCallbackOK"));
+  };
+
+  src_event.onerror = function(e) {
+    src_event.close();
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new Event("blockedEventSrcCallbackFailed"));
+  };
+}
+
+addLoadEvent(createAllowedEvent);
+addLoadEvent(createBlockedEvent);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6877bd5833
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug802872.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/event-stream", false);
+  response.write("data: eventsource response from server!");
+  response.write("\n\n");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a728813a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'
+          href='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=css_self&type=text/css' />
+
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_self&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script_self&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec6ba8c4ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+content-security-policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'none'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs
+content-security-policy-report-only: default-src *; img-src 'self'; script-src 'none'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f465f09f22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// SJS file that receives violation reports and then responds with nothing.
+
+const CC = Components.Constructor;
+const BinaryInputStream = CC(
+  "@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1",
+  "nsIBinaryInputStream",
+  "setInputStream"
+);
+
+const STATE_KEY = "bug836922_ro_violations";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  if ("results" in query) {
+    // if asked for the received data, send it.
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/javascript", false);
+    if (getState(STATE_KEY)) {
+      response.write(getState(STATE_KEY));
+    } else {
+      // no state has been recorded.
+      response.write(JSON.stringify({}));
+    }
+  } else if ("reset" in query) {
+    //clear state
+    setState(STATE_KEY, JSON.stringify(null));
+  } else {
+    // ... otherwise, just respond "ok".
+    response.write("null");
+
+    var bodystream = new BinaryInputStream(request.bodyInputStream);
+    var avail;
+    var bytes = [];
+    while ((avail = bodystream.available()) > 0) {
+      Array.prototype.push.apply(bytes, bodystream.readByteArray(avail));
+    }
+
+    var data = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, bytes);
+
+    // figure out which test was violating a policy
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+    var testid = testpat.exec(data)[1];
+
+    // store the violation in the persistent state
+    var s = JSON.parse(getState(STATE_KEY) || "{}");
+    s[testid] ? s[testid]++ : (s[testid] = 1);
+    setState(STATE_KEY, JSON.stringify(s));
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5c8318c252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// SJS file that receives violation reports and then responds with nothing.
+
+const CC = Components.Constructor;
+const BinaryInputStream = CC(
+  "@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1",
+  "nsIBinaryInputStream",
+  "setInputStream"
+);
+
+const STATE = "bug836922_violations";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  if ("results" in query) {
+    // if asked for the received data, send it.
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/javascript", false);
+    if (getState(STATE)) {
+      response.write(getState(STATE));
+    } else {
+      // no state has been recorded.
+      response.write(JSON.stringify({}));
+    }
+  } else if ("reset" in query) {
+    //clear state
+    setState(STATE, JSON.stringify(null));
+  } else {
+    // ... otherwise, just respond "ok".
+    response.write("null");
+
+    var bodystream = new BinaryInputStream(request.bodyInputStream);
+    var avail;
+    var bytes = [];
+    while ((avail = bodystream.available()) > 0) {
+      Array.prototype.push.apply(bytes, bodystream.readByteArray(avail));
+    }
+
+    var data = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, bytes);
+
+    // figure out which test was violating a policy
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+    var testid = testpat.exec(data)[1];
+
+    // store the violation in the persistent state
+    var s = getState(STATE);
+    if (!s) {
+      s = "{}";
+    }
+    s = JSON.parse(s);
+    if (!s) {
+      s = {};
+    }
+
+    if (!s[testid]) {
+      s[testid] = 0;
+    }
+    s[testid]++;
+    setState(STATE, JSON.stringify(s));
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d7aacbda4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<!--
+The Content-Security-Policy header for this file is:
+
+  Content-Security-Policy: img-src 'self';
+
+It does not include any of the default-src, script-src, or style-src
+directives. It should allow the use of unsafe-inline and unsafe-eval on
+scripts, and unsafe-inline on styles, because no directives related to scripts
+or styles are specified.
+-->
+<html>
+<body>
+  <ol>
+    <li id="unsafe-inline-script-allowed">Inline script allowed (this text should be green)</li>
+    <li id="unsafe-eval-script-allowed">Eval script allowed (this text should be green)</li>
+    <li id="unsafe-inline-style-allowed">Inline style allowed (this text should be green)</li>
+  </ol>
+
+  <script>
+    // Use inline script to set a style attribute
+    document.getElementById("unsafe-inline-script-allowed").style.color = "green";
+
+    // Use eval to set a style attribute
+    // try/catch is used because CSP causes eval to throw an exception when it
+    // is blocked, which would derail the rest of the tests  in this file.
+    try {
+      eval('document.getElementById("unsafe-eval-script-allowed").style.color = "green";');
+    } catch (e) {}
+  </script>
+
+  <style>
+    li#unsafe-inline-style-allowed {
+      color: green;
+    }
+  </style>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..767b9ca926
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_allows.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: img-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2279b33e46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<!--
+The Content-Security-Policy header for this file is:
+
+  Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';
+
+The Content-Security-Policy header for this file includes the default-src
+directive, which triggers the default behavior of blocking unsafe-inline and
+unsafe-eval on scripts, and unsafe-inline on styles.
+-->
+<html>
+<body>
+  <ol>
+    <li id="unsafe-inline-script-blocked">Inline script blocked (this text should be black)</li>
+    <li id="unsafe-eval-script-blocked">Eval script blocked (this text should be black)</li>
+    <li id="unsafe-inline-style-blocked">Inline style blocked (this text should be black)</li>
+  </ol>
+
+  <script>
+    // Use inline script to set a style attribute
+    document.getElementById("unsafe-inline-script-blocked").style.color = "green";
+
+    // Use eval to set a style attribute
+    // try/catch is used because CSP causes eval to throw an exception when it
+    // is blocked, which would derail the rest of the tests  in this file.
+    try {
+      eval('document.getElementById("unsafe-eval-script-blocked").style.color = "green";');
+    } catch (e) {}
+  </script>
+
+  <style>
+    li#unsafe-inline-style-blocked {
+      color: green;
+    }
+  </style>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f82598b673
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug885433_blocks.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ec8c9e7e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox="allow-same-origin" -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_good&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=scripta_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c6fa3c26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83d36c55ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2a_good&type=img/png" />
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c6fa3c26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_2.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b4313000f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img3_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img3a_bad&type=img/png" />
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6581fd425e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_3.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41137ea017
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img4_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img4a_bad&type=img/png" />
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6581fd425e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_4.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82c10f20c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_iframe_sandbox_pass.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with only inline "allow-scripts"
+
+ <!-- sandbox="allow-scripts" -->
+ <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' 'unsafe-inline'-->
+
+ <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+ <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img5_bad&type=img/png" />
+ <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img5a_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+ <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script5_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+ <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script5a_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3abc190552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_5.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' 'unsafe-inline';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f6567b470e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+</head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+
+    document.getElementById('a_form').submit();
+
+    // trigger the javascript: url test
+    sendMouseEvent({type:'click'}, 'a_link');
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_iframe_sandbox_pass.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with "allow-scripts"
+  <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img6_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+  <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script6_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  <form method="get" action="file_iframe_sandbox_form_fail.html" id="a_form">
+    First name: <input type="text" name="firstname">
+    Last name: <input type="text" name="lastname">
+    <input type="submit" onclick="doSubmit()" id="a_button">
+  </form>
+
+  <a href = 'javascript:ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from javascript: URLs");' id='a_link'>click me</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f9fc3f25d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug886164_6.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27cf9b00ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.html
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <body>
+    <ol>
+      <li id="unsafe-inline-script">Inline script (green if allowed, black if blocked)</li>
+      <li id="unsafe-eval-script">Eval script (green if allowed, black if blocked)</li>
+      <li id="unsafe-inline-style">Inline style (green if allowed, black if blocked)</li>
+    </ol>
+
+    <script>
+      // Use inline script to set a style attribute
+    document.getElementById("unsafe-inline-script").style.color = "green";
+
+    // Use eval to set a style attribute
+    // try/catch is used because CSP causes eval to throw an exception when it
+    // is blocked, which would derail the rest of the tests  in this file.
+    try {
+      eval('document.getElementById("unsafe-eval-script").style.color = "green";');
+    } catch (e) {}
+    </script>
+
+    <style>
+      li#unsafe-inline-style {
+        color: green;
+      }
+    </style>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de8cf96811
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+// SJS file for CSP mochitests
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+function loadHTMLFromFile(path) {
+  // Load the HTML to return in the response from file.
+  // Since it's relative to the cwd of the test runner, we start there and
+  // append to get to the actual path of the file.
+  var testHTMLFile = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+  var dirs = path.split("/");
+  for (var i = 0; i < dirs.length; i++) {
+    testHTMLFile.append(dirs[i]);
+  }
+  var testHTMLFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+  testHTMLFileStream.init(testHTMLFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  var testHTML = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+    testHTMLFileStream,
+    testHTMLFileStream.available()
+  );
+  return testHTML;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // Deliver the CSP policy encoded in the URI
+  if (query.csp) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", unescape(query.csp), false);
+  }
+
+  // Send HTML to test allowed/blocked behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.write(
+    loadHTMLFromFile("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug888172.html")
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d4934a4a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <!-- file_CSP.sjs mocks a resource load -->
+    <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?testid=noneExternalStylesBlocked&type=text/css' />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="inline-style">This should be green</p>
+    <p id="inline-script">This should be black</p>
+    <style>
+      p#inline-style { color:rgb(0, 128, 0); }
+    </style>
+    <script>
+      // Use inline script to set a style attribute
+      document.getElementById("inline-script").style.color = "rgb(0, 128, 0)";
+    </script>
+    <img src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=noneExternalImgLoaded&type=img/png" />
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecb3458750
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_none.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src * ; style-src 'none' 'unsafe-inline';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bcb907a965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?testid=starExternalStylesLoaded&type=text/css' />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="inline-style">This should be green</p>
+    <p id="inline-script">This should be black</p>
+    <style>
+      p#inline-style { color:rgb(0, 128, 0); }
+    </style>
+    <script>
+      // Use inline script to set a style attribute
+      document.getElementById("inline-script").style.color = "rgb(0, 128, 0)";
+    </script>
+    <img src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=starExternalImgLoaded&type=img/png" />
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eccc1c0110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug909029_star.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src *; style-src * 'unsafe-inline';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56647134f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// Server side js file for bug 910139, see file test_bug910139.html for details.
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+function loadResponseFromFile(path) {
+  var testHTMLFile = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+  var dirs = path.split("/");
+  for (var i = 0; i < dirs.length; i++) {
+    testHTMLFile.append(dirs[i]);
+  }
+  var testHTMLFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+  testHTMLFileStream.init(testHTMLFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  var testHTML = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+    testHTMLFileStream,
+    testHTMLFileStream.available()
+  );
+  return testHTML;
+}
+
+var policies = [
+  "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'", // CSP for checkAllowed
+  "default-src 'self'; script-src *.example.com", // CSP for checkBlocked
+];
+
+function getPolicy() {
+  var index;
+  // setState only accepts strings as arguments
+  if (!getState("counter")) {
+    index = 0;
+    setState("counter", index.toString());
+  } else {
+    index = parseInt(getState("counter"));
+    ++index;
+    setState("counter", index.toString());
+  }
+  return policies[index];
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // set the required CSP
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", getPolicy(), false);
+
+  // return the requested XML file.
+  response.write(
+    loadResponseFromFile("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xml")
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xml b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29feba9418
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
+<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug910139.xsl"?>
+<catalog>
+	<cd>
+		<title>Empire Burlesque</title>
+		<artist>Bob Dylan</artist>
+		<country>USA</country>
+		<company>Columbia</company>
+		<price>10.90</price>
+		<year>1985</year>
+	</cd>
+	<cd>
+		<title>Hide your heart</title>
+		<artist>Bonnie Tyler</artist>
+		<country>UK</country>
+		<company>CBS Records</company>
+		<price>9.90</price>
+		<year>1988</year>
+	</cd>
+	<cd>
+		<title>Greatest Hits</title>
+		<artist>Dolly Parton</artist>
+		<country>USA</country>
+		<company>RCA</company>
+		<price>9.90</price>
+		<year>1982</year>
+	</cd>
+</catalog>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xsl b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xsl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b99abca099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug910139.xsl
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
+<!-- Edited by XMLSpy® -->
+<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
+
+<xsl:template match="/">
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <h2 id="xsltheader">this xml file should be formatted using an xsl file(lower iframe should contain xml dump)!</h2>
+    <table border="1">
+      <tr bgcolor="#990099">
+        <th>Title</th>
+        <th>Artist</th>
+        <th>Price</th>
+      </tr>
+      <xsl:for-each select="catalog/cd">
+      <tr>
+        <td><xsl:value-of select="title"/></td>
+        <td><xsl:value-of select="artist"/></td>
+        <td><xsl:value-of select="price"/></td>
+      </tr>
+      </xsl:for-each>
+    </table>
+  </body>
+  </html>
+</xsl:template>
+</xsl:stylesheet>
+
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a2e636e0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404.html
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+
+    <!-- this should be allowed (no CSP)-->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_good&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+
+    <script type="text/javascript">
+      var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      req.onload = function() {
+        //this should be allowed (no CSP)
+        try {
+        var img = document.createElement("img");
+        img.src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2_good&type=img/png";
+        document.body.appendChild(img);
+        } catch(e) {
+          console.log("yo: "+e);
+        }
+      };
+      req.open("get", "file_bug941404_xhr.html", true);
+      req.responseType = "document";
+      req.send();
+    </script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..22e176f208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e5f70cc37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_bug941404_xhr.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18749011b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe id="testframe"> </iframe>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+
+    function executeTest(ev) {
+      testframe = document.getElementById('testframe');
+      testframe.contentWindow.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"execute"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    }
+
+    function reportError(ev) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      cleanup();
+    }
+
+    function recvMessage(ev) {
+      if (ev.data.id == page_id) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:ev.data.id, message:ev.data.message}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+        cleanup();
+      }
+    }
+
+    function cleanup() {
+      testframe = document.getElementById('testframe');
+      window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+      testframe.removeEventListener('load', executeTest);
+      testframe.removeEventListener('error', reportError);
+    }
+
+
+    window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+
+    try {
+      // Please note that file_testserver.sjs?foo does not return a response.
+      // For testing purposes this is not necessary because we only want to check
+      // whether CSP allows or blocks the load.
+      src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+      src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_inner_frame.html");
+      src += "#" + escape(page_id);
+      testframe = document.getElementById('testframe');
+
+      testframe.addEventListener('load', executeTest);
+      testframe.addEventListener('error', reportError);
+
+      testframe.src = src;
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      if (e.message.match(/Failed to load script/)) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      } else {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"exception"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_inner_frame.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_inner_frame.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0c4e66fa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_inner_frame.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe id="innermosttestframe"> </iframe>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+
+    function recvMessage(ev) {
+      if (ev.data.id == page_id) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:ev.data.id, message:'allowed'}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+        window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+      }
+    }
+
+    window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b291a4a4e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    try {
+      if ('serviceWorker' in navigator) {
+        navigator.serviceWorker.register(
+            'file_child-src_service_worker.js',
+            { scope: './' + page_id + '/' }
+            ).then(function(reg)
+              {
+                // registration worked
+                reg.unregister().then(function() {
+                  window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+                });
+              }).catch(function(error) {
+              // registration failed
+              window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+            });
+      };
+    } catch(ex) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"exception"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68cd8401f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_service_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+this.addEventListener("install", function(event) {
+  close();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker-redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker-redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..313915302e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker-redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    var redir = 'none';
+
+    page_id.split('_').forEach(function (val) {
+      var [name, value] = val.split('-');
+      if (name  == 'redir') {
+        redir = unescape(value);
+      }
+    });
+
+    try {
+      worker = new SharedWorker('file_redirect_worker.sjs?path='
+          + escape("/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.js")
+          + "&redir=" + redir
+          + "&page_id=" + page_id,
+          page_id);
+      worker.port.start();
+
+      worker.onerror = function(evt) {
+        evt.preventDefault();
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"},
+                                  'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+
+      worker.port.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      };
+
+      worker.onerror = function() {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      };
+
+      worker.port.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce0c0261ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    try {
+      worker = new SharedWorker(
+          'file_testserver.sjs?file='+
+                escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.js") +
+                "&type=text/javascript",
+          page_id);
+      worker.port.start();
+
+      worker.onerror = function(evt) {
+        evt.preventDefault();
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"},
+                                  'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+
+      worker.port.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"},
+            'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      };
+      worker.port.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"},
+          'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..98702469c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+onconnect = function(e) {
+  var port = e.ports[0];
+  port.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+    port.postMessage("success");
+  });
+
+  port.start();
+};
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker_data.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker_data.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a4befe4ca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_shared_worker_data.html
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    var shared_worker = "onconnect = function(e) { " +
+                        "var port = e.ports[0];" +
+                        "port.addEventListener('message'," +
+                        "function(e) { port.postMessage('success'); });" +
+                        "port.start(); }";
+    
+    try {
+      var worker = new SharedWorker('data:application/javascript;charset=UTF-8,'+
+          escape(shared_worker), page_id);
+      worker.port.start();
+
+      worker.onerror = function(evt) {
+        evt.preventDefault();
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+
+      worker.port.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      };
+      
+      worker.port.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker-redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker-redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0029935c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker-redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    var redir = 'none';
+
+    page_id.split('_').forEach(function (val) {
+      var [name, value] = val.split('-');
+      if (name  == 'redir') {
+        redir = unescape(value);
+      }
+    });
+
+    try {
+      worker = new Worker('file_redirect_worker.sjs?path='
+          + escape("/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.js")
+          + "&redir=" + redir
+          + "&page_id=" + page_id
+          );
+
+      worker.onerror = function(error) {
+        // this means CSP blocked it
+        var msg = !("message" in error) ? "blocked" : e.message;
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:msg}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+        error.preventDefault();
+      };
+
+      worker.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+
+      };
+      worker.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      if (e.message.match(/Failed to load script/)) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      } else {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"exception"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9fdbb3282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    try {
+      worker = new Worker('file_testserver.sjs?file='+
+          escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.js")
+          +"&type=text/javascript");
+
+      worker.onerror = function(e) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+        e.preventDefault();
+      }
+
+      worker.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+
+      worker.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      if (e.message.match(/Failed to load script/)) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      } else {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"exception"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5a615a98a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+onmessage = function(e) {
+  postMessage("worker");
+};
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker_data.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker_data.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e9e22f01da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_child-src_worker_data.html
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    page_id = window.location.hash.substring(1);
+    try {
+      worker = new Worker('data:application/javascript;charset=UTF-8,'+escape('onmessage = function(e) { postMessage("worker"); };'));
+
+      worker.onerror = function(e) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+        e.preventDefault();
+      }
+
+      worker.onmessage = function(ev) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"allowed"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+
+      worker.postMessage('foo');
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      if (e.message.match(/Failed to load script/)) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"blocked"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      } else {
+        console.log(e);
+        window.parent.postMessage({id:page_id, message:"exception"}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+      }
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src-fetch.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src-fetch.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff9b2f740b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src-fetch.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1139667 - Test mapping of fetch() to connect-src</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+
+    // Please note that file_testserver.sjs?foo does not return a response.
+    // For testing purposes this is not necessary because we only want to check
+    // whether CSP allows or blocks the load.
+    fetch( "file_testserver.sjs?foo");
+
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17a940a0e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_connect-src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1031530 - Test mapping of XMLHttpRequest to connect-src</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+
+    try {
+      // Please note that file_testserver.sjs?foo does not return a response.
+      // For testing purposes this is not necessary because we only want to check
+      // whether CSP allows or blocks the load.
+      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      xhr.open("GET", "file_testserver.sjs?foo", false);
+      xhr.send(null);
+    }
+    catch (e) { }
+
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ce361a438
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Helper file for Bug 1668071 - CSP frame-ancestors in about:blank</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  CSP frame-ancestors in about:blank
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e5d129c3e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors http://mochi.test:8888 http://mochi.xorigin-test:8888
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_meta_uir.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_meta_uir.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dba1030975
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_csp_meta_uir.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+ <meta charset="UTF-8">
+ <title>Hello World</title>
+ <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <script>
+    document.write("<a href='" + document.location.href.replace(/^https/, "http") + "' id='mylink'>Click me</a>");
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59b7b25902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242019
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 587377</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <img width='1' height='1' title='' alt='' 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+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4248cca188
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data-uri_blocked.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' 'report-sample'; img-src 'none' 'report-sample'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_inheritance.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_inheritance.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4ae2fedc69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_inheritance.html
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1381761 - Treating 'data:' documents as unique, opaque origins should still inherit the CSP</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content= "img-src 'none'"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="dataFrame" src="data:text/html,<body>should inherit csp</body>"></iframe>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  // get the csp in JSON notation from the principal
+  var frame = document.getElementById("dataFrame");
+  frame.onload = function () {
+    var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame).contentDocument;
+    var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(contentDoc.cspJSON);
+    // make sure we got >>one<< policy
+    var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: policies.length}, "*");
+  }
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_merge.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_merge.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88ae8febe5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_csp_merge.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1386183 - Meta CSP on data: URI iframe should be merged with toplevel CSP</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content= "img-src https:"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="dataFrame" onload="doCSPMergeCheck()"
+        src="data:text/html,<html><head><meta http-equiv='Content-Security-Policy' content='script-src https:'/></head><body>merge csp</body></html>">
+</iframe>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  function doCSPMergeCheck() {
+    // get the csp in JSON notation from the principal
+    var frame = document.getElementById("dataFrame");
+    var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame).contentDocument;
+    var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(contentDoc.cspJSON);
+    // make sure we got >>two<< policies
+    var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: policies.length}, "*");
+  }
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d6e9834dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1382869: data document should ignore meta csp</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  // 1) create a data document
+  const doc = document.implementation.createHTMLDocument();
+  // 2) add meta csp to that document
+  const metaEl = doc.createElement('meta');
+  metaEl.setAttribute('http-equiv', 'Content-Security-Policy');
+  metaEl.setAttribute('content', "img-src 'none'");
+  doc.head.appendChild(metaEl);
+  // 3) let the parent know we are done here
+  var result = "dataDocCreated";
+  window.parent.postMessage({result}, "*");
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_doccomment_meta.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_doccomment_meta.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0f36a4bfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_doccomment_meta.html
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Test doc.write(meta csp)</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+
+  <!-- Use doc.write() to *un*apply meta csp -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    document.write("<!--");
+  </script>
+
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content= "style-src 'none';  script-src 'none'; img-src 'none'">
+  -->
+
+  <!-- try to load a css on a page where meta CSP is commented out -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="file_docwrite_meta.css">
+
+  <!-- try to load a script on a page where meta CSP is commented out -->
+  <script id="testscript" src="file_docwrite_meta.js"></script>
+
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- try to load an image on a page where meta CSP is commented out -->
+  <img id="testimage" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png"></img>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.css b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..de725038b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.css
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+body {
+  background-color: rgb(255, 0, 0);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..292de3bec5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Test doc.write(meta csp)</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+
+  <!-- Use doc.write() to apply meta csp -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var metaCSP = "style-src 'none';  script-src 'none'; img-src 'none'";
+    document.write("<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Security-Policy\" content=\" " + metaCSP + "\">");
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- try to load a css which is forbidden by meta CSP -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="file_docwrite_meta.css">
+
+  <!-- try to load a script which is forbidden by meta CSP -->
+  <script id="testscript" src="file_docwrite_meta.js"></script>
+
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- try to load an image which is forbidden by meta CSP -->
+  <img id="testimage" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png"></img>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..722adc235e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_docwrite_meta.js
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+// set a variable on the document which we can check to verify
+// whether the external script was loaded or blocked
+document.myMetaCSPScript = "external-JS-loaded";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_dual_header_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_dual_header_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0efe186d57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_dual_header_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/*
+ * Custom sjs file serving a test page using *two* CSP policies.
+ * See Bug 1036399 - Multiple CSP policies should be combined towards an intersection
+ */
+
+const TIGHT_POLICY = "default-src 'self'";
+const LOOSE_POLICY = "default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  var csp = "";
+  // deliver *TWO* comma separated policies which is in fact the same as serving
+  // to separate CSP headers (AppendPolicy is called twice).
+  if (request.queryString == "tight") {
+    // script execution will be *blocked*
+    csp = TIGHT_POLICY + ", " + LOOSE_POLICY;
+  } else {
+    // script execution will be *allowed*
+    csp = LOOSE_POLICY + ", " + LOOSE_POLICY;
+  }
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", csp, false);
+
+  // Send HTML to test allowed/blocked behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  // generate an html file that contains a div container which is updated
+  // in case the inline script is *not* blocked by CSP.
+  var html =
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+    "<html>" +
+    "<head>" +
+    "<title>Testpage for Bug 1036399</title>" +
+    "</head>" +
+    "<body>" +
+    "<div id='testdiv'>blocked</div>" +
+    "<script type='text/javascript'>" +
+    "document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML = 'allowed';" +
+    "</script>" +
+    "</body>" +
+    "</html>";
+
+  response.write(html);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_dummy_pixel.png b/dom/security/test/csp/file_dummy_pixel.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52c591798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_dummy_pixel.png
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..16196bb19f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <meta charset="utf8">
+    <title>Bug 587377 - CSP keywords "'self'" and "'none'" are easy to confuse with host names "self" and "none"</title>
+    <!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+       - http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50dbe57bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_empty_directive.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: ;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e83c1d9ed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>CSP eval script tests</title>
+    <script type="application/javascript"
+             src="file_evalscript_main.js"></script>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+
+    Foo.
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b91ba384d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23c385afe4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main.js
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+// some javascript for the CSP eval() tests
+
+function logResult(str, passed) {
+  var elt = document.createElement("div");
+  var color = passed ? "#cfc;" : "#fcc";
+  elt.setAttribute(
+    "style",
+    "background-color:" +
+      color +
+      "; width:100%; border:1px solid black; padding:3px; margin:4px;"
+  );
+  elt.innerHTML = str;
+  document.body.appendChild(elt);
+}
+
+window._testResults = {};
+
+// check values for return values from blocked timeout or intervals
+var verifyZeroRetVal = (function(window) {
+  return function(val, details) {
+    logResult(
+      (val === 0 ? "PASS: " : "FAIL: ") +
+        "Blocked interval/timeout should have zero return value; " +
+        details,
+      val === 0
+    );
+    window.parent.verifyZeroRetVal(val, details);
+  };
+})(window);
+
+// callback for when stuff is allowed by CSP
+var onevalexecuted = (function(window) {
+  return function(shouldrun, what, data) {
+    window._testResults[what] = "ran";
+    window.parent.scriptRan(shouldrun, what, data);
+    logResult(
+      (shouldrun ? "PASS: " : "FAIL: ") + what + " : " + data,
+      shouldrun
+    );
+  };
+})(window);
+
+// callback for when stuff is blocked
+var onevalblocked = (function(window) {
+  return function(shouldrun, what, data) {
+    window._testResults[what] = "blocked";
+    window.parent.scriptBlocked(shouldrun, what, data);
+    logResult(
+      (shouldrun ? "FAIL: " : "PASS: ") + what + " : " + data,
+      !shouldrun
+    );
+  };
+})(window);
+
+// Defer until document is loaded so that we can write the pretty result boxes
+// out.
+addEventListener(
+  "load",
+  function() {
+    // setTimeout(String) test -- mutate something in the window._testResults
+    // obj, then check it.
+    {
+      var str_setTimeoutWithStringRan =
+        'onevalexecuted(false, "setTimeout(String)", "setTimeout with a string was enabled.");';
+      function fcn_setTimeoutWithStringCheck() {
+        if (this._testResults["setTimeout(String)"] !== "ran") {
+          onevalblocked(
+            false,
+            "setTimeout(String)",
+            "setTimeout with a string was blocked"
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      setTimeout(fcn_setTimeoutWithStringCheck.bind(window), 10);
+      var res = setTimeout(str_setTimeoutWithStringRan, 10);
+      verifyZeroRetVal(res, "setTimeout(String)");
+    }
+
+    // setInterval(String) test -- mutate something in the window._testResults
+    // obj, then check it.
+    {
+      var str_setIntervalWithStringRan =
+        'onevalexecuted(false, "setInterval(String)", "setInterval with a string was enabled.");';
+      function fcn_setIntervalWithStringCheck() {
+        if (this._testResults["setInterval(String)"] !== "ran") {
+          onevalblocked(
+            false,
+            "setInterval(String)",
+            "setInterval with a string was blocked"
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      setTimeout(fcn_setIntervalWithStringCheck.bind(window), 10);
+      var res = setInterval(str_setIntervalWithStringRan, 10);
+      verifyZeroRetVal(res, "setInterval(String)");
+
+      // emergency cleanup, just in case.
+      if (res != 0) {
+        setTimeout(function() {
+          clearInterval(res);
+        }, 15);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // setTimeout(function) test -- mutate something in the window._testResults
+    // obj, then check it.
+    {
+      function fcn_setTimeoutWithFunctionRan() {
+        onevalexecuted(
+          true,
+          "setTimeout(function)",
+          "setTimeout with a function was enabled."
+        );
+      }
+      function fcn_setTimeoutWithFunctionCheck() {
+        if (this._testResults["setTimeout(function)"] !== "ran") {
+          onevalblocked(
+            true,
+            "setTimeout(function)",
+            "setTimeout with a function was blocked"
+          );
+        }
+      }
+      setTimeout(fcn_setTimeoutWithFunctionRan.bind(window), 10);
+      setTimeout(fcn_setTimeoutWithFunctionCheck.bind(window), 10);
+    }
+
+    // eval() test -- should throw exception as per spec
+    try {
+      eval('onevalexecuted(false, "eval(String)", "eval() was enabled.");');
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(false, "eval(String)", "eval() was blocked");
+    }
+
+    // eval(foo,bar) test -- should throw exception as per spec
+    try {
+      eval(
+        'onevalexecuted(false, "eval(String,scope)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+        1
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        false,
+        "eval(String,object)",
+        "eval() with scope was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // [foo,bar].sort(eval) test -- should throw exception as per spec
+    try {
+      [
+        'onevalexecuted(false, "[String, obj].sort(eval)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+        1,
+      ].sort(eval);
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        false,
+        "[String, obj].sort(eval)",
+        "eval() with scope via sort was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // [].sort.call([foo,bar], eval) test -- should throw exception as per spec
+    try {
+      [].sort.call(
+        [
+          'onevalexecuted(false, "[String, obj].sort(eval)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+          1,
+        ],
+        eval
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        false,
+        "[].sort.call([String, obj], eval)",
+        "eval() with scope via sort/call was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // new Function() test -- should throw exception as per spec
+    try {
+      var fcn = new Function(
+        'onevalexecuted(false, "new Function(String)", "new Function(String) was enabled.");'
+      );
+      fcn();
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        false,
+        "new Function(String)",
+        "new Function(String) was blocked."
+      );
+    }
+
+    // ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate -- should throw exception as per spec.
+    try {
+      var sr = new ShadowRealm();
+      sr.evaluate("var x = 10");
+      onevalexecuted(
+        false,
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String)",
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String) was enabled."
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        false,
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String)",
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String) was blocked."
+      );
+    }
+
+    // setTimeout(eval, 0, str)
+    {
+      // error is not catchable here, instead, we're going to side-effect
+      // 'worked'.
+      var worked = false;
+
+      setTimeout(eval, 0, "worked = true");
+      setTimeout(
+        function(worked) {
+          if (worked) {
+            onevalexecuted(
+              false,
+              "setTimeout(eval, 0, str)",
+              "setTimeout(eval, 0, string) was enabled."
+            );
+          } else {
+            onevalblocked(
+              false,
+              "setTimeout(eval, 0, str)",
+              "setTimeout(eval, 0, str) was blocked."
+            );
+          }
+        },
+        0,
+        worked
+      );
+    }
+  },
+  false
+);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..274972d9bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>CSP eval script tests</title>
+    <script type="application/javascript"
+             src="file_evalscript_main_allowed.js"></script>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+
+    Foo.
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0cb5288bec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Cache-Control: no-cache
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' ; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce180f64e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_evalscript_main_allowed.js
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+// some javascript for the CSP eval() tests
+// all of these evals should succeed, as the document loading this script
+// has script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'
+
+function logResult(str, passed) {
+  var elt = document.createElement("div");
+  var color = passed ? "#cfc;" : "#fcc";
+  elt.setAttribute(
+    "style",
+    "background-color:" +
+      color +
+      "; width:100%; border:1px solid black; padding:3px; margin:4px;"
+  );
+  elt.innerHTML = str;
+  document.body.appendChild(elt);
+}
+
+// callback for when stuff is allowed by CSP
+var onevalexecuted = (function(window) {
+  return function(shouldrun, what, data) {
+    window.parent.scriptRan(shouldrun, what, data);
+    logResult(
+      (shouldrun ? "PASS: " : "FAIL: ") + what + " : " + data,
+      shouldrun
+    );
+  };
+})(window);
+
+// callback for when stuff is blocked
+var onevalblocked = (function(window) {
+  return function(shouldrun, what, data) {
+    window.parent.scriptBlocked(shouldrun, what, data);
+    logResult(
+      (shouldrun ? "FAIL: " : "PASS: ") + what + " : " + data,
+      !shouldrun
+    );
+  };
+})(window);
+
+// Defer until document is loaded so that we can write the pretty result boxes
+// out.
+addEventListener(
+  "load",
+  function() {
+    // setTimeout(String) test  -- should pass
+    try {
+      setTimeout(
+        'onevalexecuted(true, "setTimeout(String)", "setTimeout with a string was enabled.");',
+        10
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "setTimeout(String)",
+        "setTimeout with a string was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // setTimeout(function) test  -- should pass
+    try {
+      setTimeout(function() {
+        onevalexecuted(
+          true,
+          "setTimeout(function)",
+          "setTimeout with a function was enabled."
+        );
+      }, 10);
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "setTimeout(function)",
+        "setTimeout with a function was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // eval() test
+    try {
+      eval('onevalexecuted(true, "eval(String)", "eval() was enabled.");');
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(true, "eval(String)", "eval() was blocked");
+    }
+
+    // eval(foo,bar) test
+    try {
+      eval(
+        'onevalexecuted(true, "eval(String,scope)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+        1
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "eval(String,object)",
+        "eval() with scope was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // [foo,bar].sort(eval) test
+    try {
+      [
+        'onevalexecuted(true, "[String, obj].sort(eval)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+        1,
+      ].sort(eval);
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "[String, obj].sort(eval)",
+        "eval() with scope via sort was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // [].sort.call([foo,bar], eval) test
+    try {
+      [].sort.call(
+        [
+          'onevalexecuted(true, "[String, obj].sort(eval)", "eval() was enabled.");',
+          1,
+        ],
+        eval
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "[].sort.call([String, obj], eval)",
+        "eval() with scope via sort/call was blocked"
+      );
+    }
+
+    // new Function() test
+    try {
+      var fcn = new Function(
+        'onevalexecuted(true, "new Function(String)", "new Function(String) was enabled.");'
+      );
+      fcn();
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "new Function(String)",
+        "new Function(String) was blocked."
+      );
+    }
+
+    // ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate
+    try {
+      var sr = new ShadowRealm();
+      sr.evaluate("var x = 10");
+      onevalexecuted(
+        true,
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String)",
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String) was enabled."
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      onevalblocked(
+        true,
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String)",
+        "ShadowRealm.prototype.evaluate(String) was blocked."
+      );
+    }
+
+    function checkResult() {
+      //alert(bar);
+      if (bar) {
+        onevalexecuted(
+          true,
+          "setTimeout(eval, 0, str)",
+          "setTimeout(eval, 0, string) was enabled."
+        );
+      } else {
+        onevalblocked(
+          true,
+          "setTimeout(eval, 0, str)",
+          "setTimeout(eval, 0, str) was blocked."
+        );
+      }
+    }
+
+    var bar = false;
+
+    function foo() {
+      bar = true;
+    }
+
+    window.foo = foo;
+
+    // setTimeout(eval, 0, str)
+
+    // error is not catchable here
+
+    setTimeout(eval, 0, "window.foo();");
+
+    setTimeout(checkResult.bind(this), 0);
+  },
+  false
+);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b9b5e602fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+// custom *.sjs for Bug 1195172
+// CSP: 'block-all-mixed-content'
+
+const PRE_HEAD =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  '<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">' +
+  "<title>Bug 1195172 - CSP should block font from cache</title>";
+
+const CSP_BLOCK =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="font-src \'none\'">';
+
+const CSP_ALLOW =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="font-src *">';
+
+const CSS =
+  "<style>" +
+  "  @font-face {" +
+  "    font-family: myFontTest;" +
+  "    src: url(file_fontloader.woff);" +
+  "  }" +
+  "  div {" +
+  "    font-family: myFontTest;" +
+  "  }" +
+  "</style>";
+
+const POST_HEAD_AND_BODY =
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<div> Just testing the font </div>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString == "baseline") {
+    response.write(PRE_HEAD + POST_HEAD_AND_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString == "no-csp") {
+    response.write(PRE_HEAD + CSS + POST_HEAD_AND_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString == "csp-block") {
+    response.write(PRE_HEAD + CSP_BLOCK + CSS + POST_HEAD_AND_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString == "csp-allow") {
+    response.write(PRE_HEAD + CSP_ALLOW + CSS + POST_HEAD_AND_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.woff b/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.woff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbf7390d59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_fontloader.woff
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_form-action.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_form-action.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cfff156bae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_form-action.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 529697 - Test mapping of form submission to form-action</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <form action="submit-form">
+    <input id="submitButton" type="submit" value="Submit form">
+  </form>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+  var submitButton = document.getElementById('submitButton');
+  submitButton.click();
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_form_action_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_form_action_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c79736d47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_form_action_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1251043
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1251043 - Test form-action blocks URL</title>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="form-action 'none';">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    CONTROL-TEXT
+    <form action="file_form_action_server.sjs?formsubmission" method="GET">
+      <input type="submit" id="submitButton" value="submit">
+    </form>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // PART 1: Return a frame including the FORM and the CSP
+  if (request.queryString === "loadframe") {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // PART 2: We should never get here because the form
+  // should not be submitted. Just in case; return
+  // something unexpected so the test fails!
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff5ae9cf9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<html><body>Child Document</body></html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d018af3a96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: frame-ancestors 'none'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..db9ac0ecbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src.js
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+testframe.onload = function() {
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "frame-allowed",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+};
+testframe.onerror = function() {
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "frame-blocked",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+};
+testframe.src = "file_frame_src_inner.html";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_child_governs.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_child_governs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a51cb75be2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_child_governs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="child-src https://example.com">";
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script type="text/javascript" src="file_frame_src.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_frame_governs.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_frame_governs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c5d5857f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_frame_governs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="frame-src https://example.com; child-src 'none'">";
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script type="text/javascript" src="file_frame_src.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_inner.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_inner.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a2fc6095a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_src_inner.html
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+dummy iframe
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6627c8b027
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+// SJS file for CSP frame ancestor mochitests
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var isPreflight = request.method == "OPTIONS";
+
+  //avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // grab the desired policy from the query, and then serve a page
+  if (query.csp) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", unescape(query.csp), false);
+  }
+  if (query.scriptedreport) {
+    // spit back a script that records that the page loaded
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/javascript", false);
+    if (query.double) {
+      response.write(
+        'window.parent.parent.parent.postMessage({call: "frameLoaded", testname: "' +
+          query.scriptedreport +
+          '", uri: "window.location.toString()"}, "*");'
+      );
+    } else {
+      response.write(
+        'window.parent.parent.postMessage({call: "frameLoaded", testname: "' +
+          query.scriptedreport +
+          '", uri: "window.location.toString()"}, "*");'
+      );
+    }
+  } else if (query.internalframe) {
+    // spit back an internal iframe (one that might be blocked)
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("<html><head>");
+    if (query.double) {
+      response.write(
+        '<script src="file_frameancestors.sjs?double=1&scriptedreport=' +
+          query.testid +
+          '"></script>'
+      );
+    } else {
+      response.write(
+        '<script src="file_frameancestors.sjs?scriptedreport=' +
+          query.testid +
+          '"></script>'
+      );
+    }
+    response.write("</head><body>");
+    response.write(unescape(query.internalframe));
+    response.write("</body></html>");
+  } else if (query.externalframe) {
+    // spit back an internal iframe (one that won't be blocked, and probably
+    // has no CSP)
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("<html><head>");
+    response.write("</head><body>");
+    response.write(unescape(query.externalframe));
+    response.write("</body></html>");
+  } else {
+    // default case: error.
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("<html><body>");
+    response.write("ERROR: not sure what to serve.");
+    response.write("</body></html>");
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..97f9cb9ac5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>CSP frame ancestors tests</title>
+
+    <!-- this page shouldn't have a CSP, just the sub-pages. -->
+    <script src='file_frameancestors_main.js'></script>
+
+  </head>
+  <body>
+
+<!-- These iframes will get populated by the attached javascript. -->
+<tt>  aa_allow:   /* innermost frame allows a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='aa_allow'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  aa_block:     /* innermost frame denies a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='aa_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  ab_allow:     /* innermost frame allows a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='ab_allow'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  ab_block:     /* innermost frame denies a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='ab_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  aba_allow:    /* innermost frame allows b,a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='aba_allow'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  aba_block:    /* innermost frame denies b */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='aba_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  aba2_block:   /* innermost frame denies a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='aba2_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  abb_allow:    /* innermost frame allows b,a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='abb_allow'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  abb_block:    /* innermost frame denies b */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='abb_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+<tt>  abb2_block:   /* innermost frame denies a */</tt><br/>
+<iframe id='abb2_block'></iframe><br/>
+
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ee251020d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_main.js
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+// Script to populate the test frames in the frame ancestors mochitest.
+//
+function setupFrames() {
+  var $ = function(v) {
+    return document.getElementById(v);
+  };
+  var base = {
+    self: "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs",
+    a:
+      "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs",
+    b: "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors.sjs",
+  };
+
+  // In both cases (base.a, base.b) the path starts with /tests/. Let's make sure this
+  // path within the CSP policy is completely ignored when enforcing frame ancestors.
+  // To test this behavior we use /foo/ and /bar/ as dummy values for the path.
+  var host = {
+    a: "http://mochi.test:8888/foo/",
+    b: "http://example.com:80/bar/",
+  };
+
+  var innerframeuri = null;
+  var elt = null;
+
+  elt = $("aa_allow");
+  elt.src =
+    base.a +
+    "?testid=aa_allow&internalframe=aa_a&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.a + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+
+  elt = $("aa_block");
+  elt.src =
+    base.a +
+    "?testid=aa_block&internalframe=aa_b&csp=" +
+    escape("default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'self'");
+
+  elt = $("ab_allow");
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?testid=ab_allow&internalframe=ab_a&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.a + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+
+  elt = $("ab_block");
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?testid=ab_block&internalframe=ab_b&csp=" +
+    escape("default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'self'");
+
+  /* .... two-level framing */
+  elt = $("aba_allow");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.a +
+    "?testid=aba_allow&double=1&internalframe=aba_a&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " +
+        host.a +
+        " " +
+        host.b +
+        "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+
+  elt = $("aba_block");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.a +
+    "?testid=aba_allow&double=1&internalframe=aba_b&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.a + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+
+  elt = $("aba2_block");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.a +
+    "?testid=aba_allow&double=1&internalframe=aba2_b&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.b + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+
+  elt = $("abb_allow");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.b +
+    "?testid=abb_allow&double=1&internalframe=abb_a&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " +
+        host.a +
+        " " +
+        host.b +
+        "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+
+  elt = $("abb_block");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.b +
+    "?testid=abb_allow&double=1&internalframe=abb_b&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.a + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+
+  elt = $("abb2_block");
+  innerframeuri =
+    base.b +
+    "?testid=abb_allow&double=1&internalframe=abb2_b&csp=" +
+    escape(
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors " + host.b + "; script-src 'self'"
+    );
+  elt.src =
+    base.b +
+    "?externalframe=" +
+    escape('<iframe src="' + innerframeuri + '"></iframe>');
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("load", setupFrames);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c840995b6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>CSP frame ancestors tests</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <tt>Nested Frames</tt><br/>
+  <iframe src='http://sampleuser:samplepass@mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_a.html'></iframe><br/>
+  <iframe src='http://sampleuser:samplepass@example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_b.html'></iframe><br/>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_a.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_a.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d5a5bb604b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_a.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Nested frame</title>
+  <script>
+  parent.parent.postMessage({call: "frameLoaded", testname: "frame_a", uri: window.location.toString()}, "*");
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <tt>IFRAME A</tt><br/>
+  <iframe src='http://sampleuser:samplepass@mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html'></iframe><br/>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_b.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_b.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87055ef149
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_b.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Nested frame</title>
+  <script>
+  parent.parent.postMessage({call: "frameLoaded", testname: "frame_b", uri: window.location.toString()}, "*");
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <tt>IFRAME B</tt><br/>
+  <iframe src='http://sampleuser:samplepass@example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html'></iframe><br/>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..159e6c4633
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Nested frame</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  Nested frame C content
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e7dfefcda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors http://mochi.test:8888/ ; script-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0cb49c4836
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Nested frame</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  Nested frame D content
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..019fcea026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors http://sampleuser:samplepass@example.com/ ; script-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..47eba6cf3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <body>
+    <!-- inline scripts -->
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-hash">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-invalid-hash">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-invalid-hash-valid-nonce">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-hash-invalid-nonce">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-sha512-hash">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-sha384-hash">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-sha1-hash">blocked</p>
+    <p id="inline-script-valid-md5-hash">blocked</p>
+
+    <!-- 'sha256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI=' (in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha256-cYPTF2pm0QeyDtbmJ3+xi00o2Rxrw7vphBoHgOg9EnQ=' (not in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-invalid-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha256-SKtBKyfeMjBpOujES0etR9t/cklbouJu/3T4PXnjbIo=' (not in policy) -->
+    <script nonce="jPRxvuRHbiQnCWVuoCMAvQ==">document.getElementById("inline-script-invalid-hash-valid-nonce").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha256-z7rzCkbOJqi08lga3CVQ3b+3948ZbJWaSxsBs8zPliE=' -->
+    <script nonce="foobar">document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-hash-invalid-nonce").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha256-E5TX2PmYZ4YQOK/F3XR1wFcvFjbO7QHMmxHTT/18LbE=' (not in policy) -->
+    <script nonce="foobar">document.getElementById("inline-script-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha512-tMLuv22jJ5RHkvLNlv0otvA2fgw6PF16HKu6wy0ZDQ3M7UKzoygs1uxIMSfjMttgWrB5WRvIr35zrTZppMYBVw==' (in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-sha512-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha384-XjAD+FxZfipkxna4id1JrR2QP6OYUZfAxpn9+yHOmT1VSLVa9SQR/dz7CEb7jw7w' (in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-sha384-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'sha1-LHErkMxKGcSpa/znpzmKYkKnI30=' (in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-sha1-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+    <!-- 'md5-/m4wX3YU+IHs158KwKOBWg==' (in policy) -->
+    <script>document.getElementById("inline-script-valid-md5-hash").innerHTML = "allowed";</script>
+
+    <!-- inline styles -->
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-hash"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-invalid-hash"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-invalid-hash-valid-nonce"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-hash-invalid-nonce"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-sha512-hash"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-sha384-hash"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-sha1-hash"></p>
+    <p id="inline-style-valid-md5-hash"></p>
+
+    <!-- 'sha256-UpNH6x+Ux99QTW1fJikQsVbBERJruIC98et0YDVKKHQ=' (in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-valid-hash { color: green; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha256-+TYxTx+bsfTDdivWLZUwScEYyxuv6lknMbNjrgGBRZo=' (not in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-invalid-hash { color: red; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha256-U+9UPC/CFzz3QuOrl5q3KCVNngOYWuIkE2jK6Ir0Mbs=' (not in policy) -->
+    <style nonce="ftL2UbGHlSEaZTLWMwtA5Q==">p#inline-style-invalid-hash-valid-nonce { color: green; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha256-0IPbWW5IDJ/juvETq60oTnhC+XzOqdYp5/UBsBKCaOY=' (in policy) -->
+    <style nonce="foobar">p#inline-style-valid-hash-invalid-nonce { color: green; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha256-KaHZgPd4nC4S8BVLT/9WjzdPDtunGWojR83C2whbd50=' (not in policy) -->
+    <style nonce="foobar">p#inline-style-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce { color: red; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha512-EpcDbSuvFv0HIyKtU5tQMN7UtBMeEbljz1dWPfy7PNCa1RYdHKwdJWT1tie41evq/ZUL1rzadSVdEzq3jl6Twg==' (in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-valid-sha512-hash { color: green; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha384-c5W8ON4WyeA2zEOGdrOGhRmRYI8+2UzUUmhGQFjUFP6yiPZx9FGEV3UOiQ+tIshF' (in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-valid-sha384-hash { color: green; }</style>
+    <!-- 'sha1-T/+b4sxCIiJxDr6XS9dAEyHKt2M=' (in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-valid-sha1-hash { color: red; }</style>
+    <!-- 'md5-oNrgrtzOZduwDYYi1yo12g==' (in policy) -->
+    <style>p#inline-style-valid-md5-hash { color: red; }</style>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..785d63391e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_hash_source.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'sha256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI=' 'nonce-jPRxvuRHbiQnCWVuoCMAvQ==' 'sha256-z7rzCkbOJqi08lga3CVQ3b+3948ZbJWaSxsBs8zPliE=' 'sha512-tMLuv22jJ5RHkvLNlv0otvA2fgw6PF16HKu6wy0ZDQ3M7UKzoygs1uxIMSfjMttgWrB5WRvIr35zrTZppMYBVw==' 'sha384-XjAD+FxZfipkxna4id1JrR2QP6OYUZfAxpn9+yHOmT1VSLVa9SQR/dz7CEb7jw7w' 'sha1-LHErkMxKGcSpa/znpzmKYkKnI30=' 'md5-/m4wX3YU+IHs158KwKOBWg=='; style-src 'sha256-UpNH6x+Ux99QTW1fJikQsVbBERJruIC98et0YDVKKHQ=' 'nonce-ftL2UbGHlSEaZTLWMwtA5Q==' 'sha256-0IPbWW5IDJ/juvETq60oTnhC+XzOqdYp5/UBsBKCaOY=' 'sha512-EpcDbSuvFv0HIyKtU5tQMN7UtBMeEbljz1dWPfy7PNCa1RYdHKwdJWT1tie41evq/ZUL1rzadSVdEzq3jl6Twg==' 'sha384-c5W8ON4WyeA2zEOGdrOGhRmRYI8+2UzUUmhGQFjUFP6yiPZx9FGEV3UOiQ+tIshF' 'sha1-T/+b4sxCIiJxDr6XS9dAEyHKt2M=' 'md5-oNrgrtzOZduwDYYi1yo12g==';
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_parent_location_js.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_parent_location_js.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d980f9925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_parent_location_js.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test setting parent location to javascript:</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  parent.window.location ="javascript:location.href";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_document_write.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_document_write.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3a0952941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_document_write.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+  function doStuff() {
+    var beforePrincipal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).nodePrincipal;
+    document.open();
+    document.write("rewritten sandboxed document");
+    document.close();
+    var afterPrincipal = SpecialPowers.wrap(document).nodePrincipal;
+    ok(beforePrincipal.equals(afterPrincipal),
+       "document.write() does not change underlying principal");
+  }
+</script>
+<body onLoad='doStuff();'>
+  sandboxed with allow-scripts
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bc700ed68f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1073952 - CSP should restrict scripts in srcdoc iframe even if sandboxed</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe srcdoc="<img src=x onerror='parent.postMessage({result: `unexpected-csp-violation`}, `*`);'>"
+        sandbox="allow-scripts"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf869e07d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+content-security-policy: default-src *;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_srcdoc.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_srcdoc.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f8774e4cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_srcdoc.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1073952
+
+"use strict";
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const SCRIPT = `
+  <script>
+    parent.parent.postMessage({result: &quot;allowed&quot;}, &quot;*&quot;);
+  </script>`;
+
+const SIMPLE_IFRAME_SRCDOC =
+  `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc="` +
+  SCRIPT +
+  `"></iframe>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const INNER_SRCDOC_IFRAME = `
+  <iframe sandbox='allow-scripts' srcdoc='<script>
+      parent.parent.parent.postMessage({result: &quot;allowed&quot;}, &quot;*&quot;);
+    </script>'>
+  </iframe>`;
+
+const NESTED_IFRAME_SRCDOC =
+  `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc="` +
+  INNER_SRCDOC_IFRAME +
+  `"></iframe>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const INNER_DATAURI_IFRAME = `
+  <iframe sandbox='allow-scripts' src='data:text/html,<script>
+      parent.parent.parent.postMessage({result: &quot;allowed&quot;}, &quot;*&quot;);
+    </script>'>
+  </iframe>`;
+
+const NESTED_IFRAME_SRCDOC_DATAURI =
+  `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe sandbox="allow-scripts" srcdoc="` +
+  INNER_DATAURI_IFRAME +
+  `"></iframe>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  if (typeof query.get("csp") === "string") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", query.get("csp"), false);
+  }
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "simple_iframe_srcdoc") {
+    response.write(SIMPLE_IFRAME_SRCDOC);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "nested_iframe_srcdoc") {
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_SRCDOC);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "nested_iframe_srcdoc_datauri") {
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_SRCDOC_DATAURI);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..773184201c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1004703 - ignore 'unsafe-inline' if nonce- or hash-source specified</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">a</div>
+
+<!-- first script allowlisted by 'unsafe-inline' -->
+<script type="application/javascript">
+document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML += 'b';
+</script>
+
+<!-- second script allowlisted by hash -->
+<!-- sha256-uJXAPKP5NZxnVMZMUkDofh6a9P3UMRc1CRTevVPS/rI= -->
+<script type="application/javascript">
+document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML += 'c';
+</script>
+
+<!-- thrid script allowlisted by nonce -->
+<script type="application/javascript" nonce="FooNonce">
+document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML += 'd';
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline_multiple_policies_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline_multiple_policies_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40301b3cc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_unsafe_inline_multiple_policies_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+// custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of:
+// * Bug 1004703 - ignore 'unsafe-inline' if nonce- or hash-source specified
+// * Bug 1198422: should not block inline script if default-src is not specified
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+function loadHTMLFromFile(path) {
+  // Load the HTML to return in the response from file.
+  // Since it's relative to the cwd of the test runner, we start there and
+  // append to get to the actual path of the file.
+  var testHTMLFile = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+  var dirs = path.split("/");
+  for (var i = 0; i < dirs.length; i++) {
+    testHTMLFile.append(dirs[i]);
+  }
+  var testHTMLFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+  testHTMLFileStream.init(testHTMLFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  var testHTML = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+    testHTMLFileStream,
+    testHTMLFileStream.available()
+  );
+  return testHTML;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var csp1 = query.csp1 ? unescape(query.csp1) : "";
+  var csp2 = query.csp2 ? unescape(query.csp2) : "";
+  var file = unescape(query.file);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // deliver the CSP encoded in the URI
+  // please note that comma separation of two policies
+  // acts like sending *two* separate policies
+  var csp = csp1;
+  if (csp2 !== "") {
+    csp += ", " + csp2;
+  }
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", csp, false);
+
+  // Send HTML to test allowed/blocked behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  response.write(loadHTMLFromFile(file));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6746a3adba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1024557: Ignore x-frame-options if CSP with frame-ancestors exists</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="cspmessage">Ignoring XFO because of CSP</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e93f9e3ecb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors http://mochi.test:8888
+X-Frame-Options: deny
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52c591798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c727854d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_document_pixel.png^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src https://bug1627235.test.com
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d57bb8372
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+  <meta charset='utf-8'>
+  <title>Bug 1355801: Nonce should not apply to images</title>
+  </head>
+<body>
+
+<img id='matchingNonce' src='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png?a' nonce='abc'></img>
+<img id='nonMatchingNonce' src='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png?b' nonce='bca'></img>
+<img id='noNonce' src='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png?c'></img>
+
+<script type='application/javascript'>
+  var matchingNonce = document.getElementById('matchingNonce');
+  matchingNonce.onload = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-with-matching-nonce-loaded'}, '*');
+  };
+  matchingNonce.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-with-matching-nonce-blocked'}, '*');
+  }
+
+  var nonMatchingNonce = document.getElementById('nonMatchingNonce');
+  nonMatchingNonce.onload = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-with_non-matching-nonce-loaded'}, '*');
+  };
+  nonMatchingNonce.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-with_non-matching-nonce-blocked'}, '*');
+  }
+
+  var noNonce = document.getElementById('noNonce');
+  noNonce.onload = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-without-nonce-loaded'}, '*');
+  };
+  noNonce.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-without-nonce-blocked'}, '*');
+  }
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d63558c46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_image_nonce.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: img-src 'nonce-abc';
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_independent_iframe_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_independent_iframe_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0581f5ea85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_independent_iframe_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1419222 - iFrame CSP should not affect parent document CSP</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="connect-src *; style-src * 'unsafe-inline'; "/>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <script>
+    var getCspObj = function(doc) {
+      var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(doc);
+      var cspJSON = contentDoc.cspJSON;
+      var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(cspJSON);
+      return cspOBJ;
+    }
+
+    // Add an iFrame, add an additional CSP directive to that iFrame, and
+    // return the CSP object of that iFrame.
+    var addIFrame = function() {
+      var frame = document.createElement("iframe");
+      frame.id = "nestedframe";
+      document.body.appendChild(frame);
+      var metaTag = document.createElement("meta");
+      metaTag.setAttribute("http-equiv", "Content-Security-Policy");
+      metaTag.setAttribute("content", "img-src 'self' data:;");
+      frame.contentDocument.head.appendChild(metaTag);
+      return getCspObj(frame.contentDocument);
+    }
+
+    // Get the CSP objects of the parent document before and after adding the
+    // iFrame, as well as of the iFram itself.
+    var parentBeginCspObj = getCspObj(document);
+    var iFrameCspObj = addIFrame();
+    var parentEndCspObj = getCspObj(document);
+
+    // Post a message containing the three CSP objects to the test context.
+    window.parent.postMessage(
+      {result: [parentBeginCspObj, iFrameCspObj, parentEndCspObj]},
+      "*"
+    );
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinescript.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinescript.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55a9b9b180
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinescript.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>

+<head>

+  <title>CSP inline script tests</title>

+</head>

+<body onload="window.parent.postMessage('body-onload-fired', '*')">

+  <script type="text/javascript">

+    window.parent.postMessage("text-node-fired", "*");

+  </script>

+

+  <iframe src='javascript:window.parent.parent.postMessage("javascript-uri-fired", "*")'></iframe>

+

+  <a id='anchortoclick' href='javascript:window.parent.postMessage("javascript-uri-anchor-fired", "*")'>testlink</a>

+

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a0d2969883
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>CSP inline script tests</title>
+    <!-- content= "div#linkstylediv { color: #0f0; }" -->
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?type=text/css&content=div%23linkstylediv%20%7B%20color%3A%20%230f0%3B%20%7D' />
+    <!-- content= "div#modifycsstextdiv { color: #0f0; }" -->
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?type=text/css&content=div%23modifycsstextdiv%20%7B%20color%3A%20%23f00%3B%20%7D' />
+    <script>
+      function cssTest() {
+        var elem = document.getElementById('csstextstylediv');
+        elem.style.cssText = "color: #00FF00;";
+        getComputedStyle(elem, null).color;
+
+        document.styleSheets[1].cssRules[0].style.cssText = "color: #00FF00;";
+        elem = document.getElementById('modifycsstextdiv');
+        getComputedStyle(elem, null).color;
+      }
+    </script>
+  </head>
+  <body onload='cssTest()'>
+
+    <style type="text/css">
+      div#inlinestylediv {
+        color: #FF0000;
+      }
+    </style>
+
+    <div id='linkstylediv'>Link tag (external) stylesheet test (should be green)</div>
+    <div id='inlinestylediv'>Inline stylesheet test (should be black)</div>
+    <div id='attrstylediv' style="color: #FF0000;">Attribute stylesheet test (should be black)</div>
+    <div id='csstextstylediv'>cssText test (should be black)</div>
+    <div id='modifycsstextdiv'> modify rule from style sheet via cssText(should be green) </div>
+
+    <!-- tests for SMIL stuff - animations -->
+    <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
+         xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
+         width="100%"
+         height="100px">
+
+      <!-- Animates XML attribute, which is mapped into style. -->
+      <text id="xmlTest" x="0" y="15">
+         This shouldn't be red since the animation should be blocked by CSP.
+
+        <animate attributeName="fill" attributeType="XML"
+                  values="red;orange;red" dur="2s"
+                  repeatCount="indefinite" />
+      </text>
+
+      <!-- Animates override value for CSS property. -->
+      <text id="cssOverrideTest" x="0" y="35">
+         This shouldn't be red since the animation should be blocked by CSP.
+
+        <animate attributeName="fill" attributeType="CSS"
+                  values="red;orange;red" dur="2s"
+                  repeatCount="indefinite" />
+      </text>
+
+      <!-- Animates override value for CSS property targeted via ID. -->
+      <text id="cssOverrideTestById" x="0" y="55">
+         This shouldn't be red since the animation should be blocked by CSP.
+      </text>
+      <animate xlink:href="#cssOverrideTestById"
+               attributeName="fill"
+               values="red;orange;red"
+               dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" />
+
+      <!-- Sets value for CSS property targeted via ID. -->
+      <text id="cssSetTestById" x="0" y="75">
+         This shouldn't be red since the &lt;set&gt; should be blocked by CSP.
+      </text>
+      <set xlink:href="#cssSetTestById"
+               attributeName="fill"
+               to="red" />
+    </svg>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b6a251679
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' ; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b533ef074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>CSP inline script tests</title>
+    <!-- content= "div#linkstylediv { color: #0f0; }" -->
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?type=text/css&content=div%23linkstylediv%20%7B%20color%3A%20%230f0%3B%20%7D' />
+    <!-- content= "div#modifycsstextdiv { color: #f00; }" -->
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?type=text/css&content=div%23modifycsstextdiv%20%7B%20color%3A%20%23f00%3B%20%7D' />
+    <script>
+      function cssTest() {
+        // CSSStyleDeclaration.cssText
+        var elem = document.getElementById('csstextstylediv');
+        elem.style.cssText = "color: #00FF00;";
+
+        // If I call getComputedStyle as below, this test passes as the parent page
+        // correctly detects that the text is colored green - if I remove this, getComputedStyle
+        // thinks the text is black when called by the parent page.
+        getComputedStyle(elem, null).color;
+
+        document.styleSheets[1].cssRules[0].style.cssText = "color: #00FF00;";
+        elem = document.getElementById('modifycsstextdiv');
+        getComputedStyle(elem, null).color;
+      }
+    </script>
+  </head>
+  <body onload='cssTest()'>
+
+    <style type="text/css">
+      div#inlinestylediv {
+        color: #00FF00;
+      }
+    </style>
+
+    <div id='linkstylediv'>Link tag (external) stylesheet test (should be green)</div>
+    <div id='inlinestylediv'>Inline stylesheet test (should be green)</div>
+    <div id='attrstylediv' style="color: #00FF00;">Attribute stylesheet test (should be green)</div>
+    <div id='csstextstylediv'>style.cssText test (should be green)</div>
+    <div id='modifycsstextdiv'> modify rule from style sheet via cssText(should be green) </div>
+
+    <!-- tests for SMIL stuff - animations -->
+    <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"
+         xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"
+         width="100%"
+         height="100px">
+
+      <!-- Animates XML attribute, which is mapped into style. -->
+      <text id="xmlTest" x="0" y="15">
+         This should be green since the animation should be allowed by CSP.
+
+        <animate attributeName="fill" attributeType="XML"
+                  values="lime;green;lime" dur="2s"
+                  repeatCount="indefinite" />
+      </text>
+
+      <!-- Animates override value for CSS property. -->
+      <text id="cssOverrideTest" x="0" y="35">
+         This should be green since the animation should be allowed by CSP.
+
+        <animate attributeName="fill" attributeType="CSS"
+                  values="lime;green;lime" dur="2s"
+                  repeatCount="indefinite" />
+      </text>
+
+      <!-- Animates override value for CSS property targeted via ID. -->
+      <text id="cssOverrideTestById" x="0" y="55">
+         This should be green since the animation should be allowed by CSP.
+      </text>
+      <animate xlink:href="#cssOverrideTestById"
+               attributeName="fill"
+               values="lime;green;lime"
+               dur="2s" repeatCount="indefinite" />
+
+      <!-- Sets value for CSS property targeted via ID. -->
+      <text id="cssSetTestById" x="0" y="75">
+         This should be green since the &lt;set&gt; should be allowed by CSP.
+      </text>
+      <set xlink:href="#cssSetTestById"
+               attributeName="fill"
+               to="lime" />
+    </svg>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..621d2536b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' ; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' ; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_invalid_source_expression.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_invalid_source_expression.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83bb0ec0ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_invalid_source_expression.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1086612 - CSP: Let source expression be the empty set in case no valid source can be parsed</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+  <!-- Note, we reuse file_path_matching.js which only updates the testdiv to 'allowed' if loaded !-->
+  <script src="http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_leading_wildcard.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_leading_wildcard.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea5e993447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_leading_wildcard.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1032303 - CSP - Keep FULL STOP when matching *.foo.com to disallow loads from foo.com</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <!-- Please note that both scripts do *not* exist in the file system -->
+  <script src="http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/leading_wildcard_allowed.js" ></script>
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/leading_wildcard_blocked.js" ></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_link_rel_preload.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_link_rel_preload.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8af49a77fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_link_rel_preload.html
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1599791 - Test link rel=preload</title>
+  <!-- Please note that fakeServer does not exist in our testsuite -->
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none'">
+  <link rel="preload" as="script" href="fakeServer?script"></link>
+  <link rel="preload" as="style" href="fakeServer?style"></link>
+  <link rel="preload" as="image" href="fakeServer?image"></link>
+  <link rel="preload" as="fetch" href="fakeServer?fetch"></link>
+  <link rel="preload" as="font" href="fakeServer?font"></link>
+
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="fakeServer?style">
+</head>
+<body>
+<script src="fakeServer?script"></script>
+<img src="fakeServer?image"></img>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ddc8382617
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'
+          href='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=style_bad&type=text/css' />
+    <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css'
+          href='file_CSP.sjs?testid=style_good&type=text/css' />
+
+
+    <style>
+      /* CSS font embedding tests */
+      @font-face {
+        font-family: "arbitrary_good";
+        src: url('file_CSP.sjs?testid=font_good&type=application/octet-stream');
+      }
+      @font-face {
+        font-family: "arbitrary_bad";
+        src: url('http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=font_bad&type=application/octet-stream');
+      }
+
+      .div_arbitrary_good { font-family: "arbitrary_good"; }
+      .div_arbitrary_bad { font-family: "arbitrary_bad"; }
+    </style>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP.  :) -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <audio src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=media_bad&type=audio/vorbis"></audio>
+    <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+    <iframe src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=frame_bad&content=FAIL'></iframe>
+    <object width="10" height="10">
+      <param name="movie" value="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=object_bad&type=application/x-shockwave-flash">
+      <embed src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=object_bad&type=application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
+    </object>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok.  :) -->
+    <img src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_good&type=img/png" />
+    <audio src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=media_good&type=audio/vorbis"></audio>
+    <script src='file_CSP.sjs?testid=script_good&type=text/javascript'></script>
+    <iframe src='file_CSP.sjs?testid=frame_good&content=PASS'></iframe>
+
+    <object width="10" height="10">
+      <param name="movie" value="file_CSP.sjs?testid=object_good&type=application/x-shockwave-flash">
+      <embed src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=object_good&type=application/x-shockwave-flash"></embed>
+    </object>
+
+    <!-- XHR tests... they're taken care of in this script,
+         and since the URI doesn't have any 'testid' values,
+         it will just be ignored by the test framework.  -->
+    <script src='file_main.js'></script>
+
+    <!-- Support elements for the @font-face test -->
+    <div class="div_arbitrary_good">arbitrary good</div>
+    <div class="div_arbitrary_bad">arbitrary_bad</div>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3338de389b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' blob: ; style-src 'unsafe-inline' 'self'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01dd43cbf5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_main.js
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+function doXHR(uri) {
+  try {
+    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("GET", uri);
+    xhr.send();
+  } catch (ex) {}
+}
+
+doXHR(
+  "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=xhr_good"
+);
+doXHR(
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=xhr_bad"
+);
+fetch(
+  "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=fetch_good"
+);
+fetch(
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=fetch_bad"
+);
+navigator.sendBeacon(
+  "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=beacon_good"
+);
+navigator.sendBeacon(
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=beacon_bad"
+);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_element.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_element.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17f19c7c86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_element.html
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
+        content= "img-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; report-uri http://www.example.com; frame-ancestors https:; sandbox allow-scripts">
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via meta tag</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- try to load an image which is forbidden by meta CSP -->
+  <img id="testimage"></img>
+
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myImg = document.getElementById("testimage");
+    myImg.onload = function(e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-loaded"}, "*");
+    };
+    myImg.onerror = function(e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-blocked"}, "*");
+    };
+    //Image should be tried to load only after onload/onerror event declaration.
+    myImg.src = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png";
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_header_dual.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_header_dual.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..445b3e444e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_header_dual.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via meta tag
+
+const HTML_HEAD =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  "<html>" +
+  "<head>" +
+  "<meta charset='utf-8'>" +
+  "<title>Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via <meta> tag</title>";
+
+const HTML_BODY =
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<img id='testimage' src='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png'></img>" +
+  "<script type='application/javascript'>" +
+  "  var myImg = document.getElementById('testimage');" +
+  "  myImg.onload = function(e) {" +
+  "    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-loaded'}, '*');" +
+  "  };" +
+  "  myImg.onerror = function(e) { " +
+  "    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'img-blocked'}, '*');" +
+  "  };" +
+  "</script>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+const META_CSP_BLOCK_IMG =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src \'none\'">';
+
+const META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG =
+  '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src http://mochi.test:8888;">';
+
+const HEADER_CSP_BLOCK_IMG = "img-src 'none';";
+
+const HEADER_CSP_ALLOW_IMG = "img-src http://mochi.test:8888";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString === "test1") {
+    /* load image without any CSP */
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test2") {
+    /* load image where meta denies load */
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_BLOCK_IMG + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test3") {
+    /* load image where meta allows load */
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test4") {
+    /* load image where meta allows but header blocks */
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", HEADER_CSP_BLOCK_IMG, false);
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test5") {
+    /* load image where meta blocks but header allows */
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", HEADER_CSP_ALLOW_IMG, false);
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_BLOCK_IMG + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test6") {
+    /* load image where meta allows and header allows */
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", HEADER_CSP_ALLOW_IMG, false);
+    response.write(HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + HTML_BODY);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test7") {
+    /* load image where meta1 allows but meta2 blocks */
+    response.write(
+      HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + META_CSP_BLOCK_IMG + HTML_BODY
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "test8") {
+    /* load image where meta1 allows and meta2 allows */
+    response.write(
+      HTML_HEAD + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + META_CSP_ALLOW_IMG + HTML_BODY
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case, return
+  // something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_whitespace_skipping.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_whitespace_skipping.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0cfc8cc28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_meta_whitespace_skipping.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <!-- Test all the different space characters within the meta csp:
+       * U+0020 space           | &#x20;
+       * U+0009 tab             | &#x9;        
+       * U+000A line feed       | &#xa;  
+       * U+000C form feed       | &#xc;
+       * U+000D carriage return | &#xd;
+    !-->
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
+        content= "
+        img-src&#x20;       'none'; &#x20;
+        script-src 'unsafe-inline'  &#xd;
+        ;
+        style-src&#x9;&#x9;     https://example.com&#xa;
+        https://foo.com;&#xc;;;;&#xc;;;&#xc;     child-src    foo.com
+        bar.com
+            &#xd;;&#xd;
+                     font-src 'none'">
+  <title>Bug 1261634 - Update whitespace skipping for meta csp</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    // notify the including document that we are done parsing the meta csp
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: "meta-csp-parsed"}, "*");
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3cb415a9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=717511
+-->
+  <body>
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP after fixing bug 717511.  :) -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok after fixing bug 717511.  :) -->
+    <img src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=img_good&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='file_CSP.sjs?testid=script_good&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e1b64a9220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self', default-src *
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3fa6c7ab91
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=717511
+-->
+  <body>
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP after fixing bug 717511.  :) -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script2_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok after fixing bug 717511.  :) -->
+    <img src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2_good&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='file_CSP.sjs?testid=script2_good&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b523073cd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'   ,    default-src *
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_multipart_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multipart_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f59f011ce7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_multipart_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+// SJS file specifically for the needs of bug
+// Bug 1416045/Bug 1223743 - CSP: Check baseChannel for CSP when loading multipart channel
+
+var CSP = "script-src 'unsafe-inline', img-src 'none'";
+var rootCSP = "script-src 'unsafe-inline'";
+var part1CSP = "img-src *";
+var part2CSP = "img-src 'none'";
+var BOUNDARY = "fooboundary";
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+var RESPONSE = `
+  <script>
+  var myImg = new Image;
+  myImg.src = "file_multipart_testserver.sjs?img";
+  myImg.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "rootCSP_test",
+                               "msg": "img-blocked"}, "*");
+  };
+  myImg.onload = function() {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "rootCSP_test",
+                               "msg": "img-loaded"}, "*");
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(myImg);
+  </script>
+`;
+
+var RESPONSE1 = `
+  <body>
+  <script>
+  var triggerNextPartFrame = document.createElement('iframe');
+  var myImg = new Image;
+  myImg.src = "file_multipart_testserver.sjs?img";
+  myImg.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "part1CSP_test",
+                               "msg": "part1-img-blocked"}, "*");
+    triggerNextPartFrame.src = 'file_multipart_testserver.sjs?sendnextpart';
+  };
+  myImg.onload = function() {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "part1CSP_test",
+                               "msg": "part1-img-loaded"}, "*");
+    triggerNextPartFrame.src = 'file_multipart_testserver.sjs?sendnextpart';
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(myImg);
+  document.body.appendChild(triggerNextPartFrame);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+`;
+
+var RESPONSE2 = `
+  <body>
+  <script>
+  var myImg = new Image;
+  myImg.src = "file_multipart_testserver.sjs?img";
+  myImg.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "part2CSP_test",
+                               "msg": "part2-img-blocked"}, "*");
+  };
+  myImg.onload = function() {
+    window.parent.postMessage({"test": "part2CSP_test",
+                               "msg": "part2-img-loaded"}, "*");
+  };
+  document.body.appendChild(myImg);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+`;
+
+function setGlobalState(data, key) {
+  x = {
+    data,
+    QueryInterface(iid) {
+      return this;
+    },
+  };
+  x.wrappedJSObject = x;
+  setObjectState(key, x);
+}
+
+function getGlobalState(key) {
+  var data;
+  getObjectState(key, function(x) {
+    data = x && x.wrappedJSObject.data;
+  });
+  return data;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString == "doc") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", CSP, false);
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Type",
+      "multipart/x-mixed-replace; boundary=" + BOUNDARY,
+      false
+    );
+    response.write(BOUNDARY + "\r\n");
+    response.write(RESPONSE);
+    response.write(BOUNDARY + "\r\n");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString == "partcspdoc") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", rootCSP, false);
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Type",
+      "multipart/x-mixed-replace; boundary=" + BOUNDARY,
+      false
+    );
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.processAsync();
+    response.write("--" + BOUNDARY + "\r\n");
+    sendNextPart(response, 1);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString == "sendnextpart") {
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 204, "No content");
+    var blockedResponse = getGlobalState("root-document-response");
+    if (typeof blockedResponse == "object") {
+      sendNextPart(blockedResponse, 2);
+      sendClose(blockedResponse);
+    } else {
+      dump("Couldn't find the stored response object.");
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString == "img") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here - return something unexpected
+  response.write("d'oh");
+}
+
+function sendClose(response) {
+  response.write("--" + BOUNDARY + "--\r\n");
+  response.finish();
+}
+
+function sendNextPart(response, partNumber) {
+  response.write("Content-type: text/html" + "\r\n");
+  if (partNumber == 1) {
+    response.write("Content-Security-Policy:" + part1CSP + "\r\n");
+    response.write(RESPONSE1);
+    setGlobalState(response, "root-document-response");
+  } else {
+    response.write("Content-Security-Policy:" + part2CSP + "\r\n");
+    response.write(RESPONSE2);
+  }
+  response.write("--" + BOUNDARY + "\r\n");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f6ea36d389
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1529068 Implement CSP 'navigate-to' directive</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+  window.location = "http://www.example.com/";
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d1cffb74cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1529068
+
+"use strict";
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const TEST_NAVIGATION_HEAD = `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1529068 Implement CSP 'navigate-to' directive</title>`;
+
+const TEST_NAVIGATION_AFTER_META = `
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="text/javascript">
+    window.location = "`;
+
+const TEST_NAVIGATION_FOOT = `";
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>
+  `;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  if (query.get("redir")) {
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, "302", "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", query.get("redir"), false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.write(TEST_NAVIGATION_HEAD);
+
+  // We need meta to set multiple CSP headers.
+  if (query.get("csp")) {
+    response.write(
+      '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="' +
+        query.get("csp") +
+        '">'
+    );
+  }
+  if (query.get("csp2")) {
+    response.write(
+      '<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="' +
+        query.get("csp2") +
+        '">'
+    );
+  }
+
+  response.write(
+    TEST_NAVIGATION_AFTER_META + query.get("target") + TEST_NAVIGATION_FOOT
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to_request.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to_request.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f82525599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to_request.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  // The idea with this file is to convert responses into requests. 
+  // This is needed because we don't have 
+  // specialpowers-http-notify-response
+
+  // Response from this file => request to www.example.com => Allowed
+  // CSP error               => Blocked
+  fetch('http://www.example.com/');
+</script>
+<body>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..414c53deb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1722252: "Content Security Policy: Ignoring ‘x-frame-options’ because of ‘frame-ancestors’ directive." warning message even when no "x-frame-options" header present</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="cspmessage">Do not log xfo ignore warning when no xfo is set.</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1fbbf3de99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors http://mochi.test:8888
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirector.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirector.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b56b9ded37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirector.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+// custom *.sjs file for
+// Bug 1469150:Scripts with valid nonce get blocked if URL redirects.
+
+const URL_PATH = "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let queryStr = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryStr === "redirect") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "https://" + URL_PATH + "file_nonce_redirector.sjs?load",
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryStr === "load") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write("console.log('script loaded');");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here - return something unexpected
+  response.write("d'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirects.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirects.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e291164900
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_redirects.html
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+  <meta charset='utf-8'>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src 'nonce-abcd1234'">
+  <title>Bug 1469150:Scripts with valid nonce get blocked if URL redirects</title>
+  </head>
+<body>
+
+<script nonce='abcd1234' id='redirectScript'></script>
+
+<script nonce='abcd1234' type='application/javascript'>
+  var redirectScript = document.getElementById('redirectScript');
+  redirectScript.onload = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'script-loaded'}, '*');
+  };
+  redirectScript.onerror = function(e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: 'script-blocked'}, '*');
+  }
+  redirectScript.src = 'file_nonce_redirector.sjs?redirect';
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_snapshot.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_snapshot.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b114fd87e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_snapshot.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_FRAME = `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+   <html>
+   <body>
+   <script id='myScript' nonce='123456789' type='application/javascript'></script>
+   <script nonce='123456789'>
+     let myScript = document.getElementById('myScript');
+     // 1) start loading the script using the nonce 123456789
+     myScript.src='file_nonce_snapshot.sjs?redir-script';
+     // 2) dynamically change the nonce, load should use initial nonce
+     myScript.setAttribute('nonce','987654321');
+   </script>
+   </body>
+   </html>`;
+
+const SCRIPT = "window.parent.postMessage('script-loaded', '*');";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  let queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString === "load-frame") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy",
+      "script-src 'nonce-123456789'",
+      false
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(TEST_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "redir-script") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "file_nonce_snapshot.sjs?load-script",
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "load-script") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write(SCRIPT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..01d4046c37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <!-- external styles -->
+    <link rel='stylesheet' nonce="correctstylenonce" href="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_style_correct_nonce_good&type=text/css" />
+    <link rel='stylesheet' nonce="incorrectstylenonce" href="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_style_incorrect_nonce_bad&type=text/css" />
+    <link rel='stylesheet' nonce="correctscriptnonce" href="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_style_correct_script_nonce_bad&type=text/css" />
+    <link rel='stylesheet' href="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_style_no_nonce_bad&type=text/css" />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- inline scripts -->
+    <ol>
+      <li id="inline-script-correct-nonce">(inline script with correct nonce) This text should be green.</li>
+      <li id="inline-script-incorrect-nonce">(inline script with incorrect nonce) This text should be black.</li>
+      <li id="inline-script-correct-style-nonce">(inline script with correct nonce for styles, but not for scripts) This text should be black.</li>
+      <li id="inline-script-no-nonce">(inline script with no nonce) This text should be black.</li>
+    </ol>
+    <script nonce="correctscriptnonce">
+      document.getElementById("inline-script-correct-nonce").style.color = "rgb(0, 128, 0)";
+    </script>
+    <script nonce="incorrectscriptnonce">
+      document.getElementById("inline-script-incorrect-nonce").style.color = "rgb(255, 0, 0)";
+    </script>
+    <script nonce="correctstylenonce">
+      document.getElementById("inline-script-correct-style-nonce").style.color = "rgb(255, 0, 0)";
+    </script>
+    <script>
+      document.getElementById("inline-script-no-nonce").style.color = "rgb(255, 0, 0)";
+    </script>
+
+    <!-- external scripts -->
+    <script nonce="correctscriptnonce" src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_correct_nonce_good&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <script nonce="anothercorrectscriptnonce" src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_another_correct_nonce_good&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <script nonce="incorrectscriptnonce" src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_incorrect_nonce_bad&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <script nonce="correctstylenonce" src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_correct_style_nonce_bad&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <script src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_no_nonce_bad&type=text/javascript"></script>
+
+    <!-- This external script has the correct nonce and comes from a allowlisted URI. It should be allowed. -->
+    <script nonce="correctscriptnonce" src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_correct_nonce_correct_uri_good&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <!-- This external script has an incorrect nonce, but comes from a allowlisted URI. It should be allowed. -->
+    <script nonce="incorrectscriptnonce" src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_incorrect_nonce_correct_uri_good&type=text/javascript"></script>
+    <!-- This external script has no nonce and comes from a allowlisted URI. It should be allowed. -->
+    <script src="file_CSP.sjs?testid=external_script_no_nonce_correct_uri_good&type=text/javascript"></script>
+
+    <!-- inline styles -->
+    <ol>
+      <li id=inline-style-correct-nonce>
+        (inline style with correct nonce) This text should be green
+      </li>
+      <li id=inline-style-incorrect-nonce>
+        (inline style with incorrect nonce) This text should be black
+      </li>
+      <li id=inline-style-correct-script-nonce>
+        (inline style with correct script, not style, nonce) This text should be black
+      </li>
+      <li id=inline-style-no-nonce>
+        (inline style with no nonce) This text should be black
+      </li>
+    </ol>
+    <style nonce=correctstylenonce>
+      li#inline-style-correct-nonce { color: green; }
+    </style>
+    <style nonce=incorrectstylenonce>
+      li#inline-style-incorrect-nonce { color: red; }
+    </style>
+    <style nonce=correctscriptnonce>
+      li#inline-style-correct-script-nonce { color: red; }
+    </style>
+    <style>
+      li#inline-style-no-nonce { color: red; }
+    </style>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..865e5fe984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_nonce_source.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' 'nonce-correctscriptnonce' 'nonce-anothercorrectscriptnonce'; style-src 'nonce-correctstylenonce';
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_null_baseuri.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_null_baseuri.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f995688b13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_null_baseuri.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1121857 - document.baseURI should not get blocked if baseURI is null</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    // check the initial base-uri
+    window.parent.postMessage({baseURI: document.baseURI, test: "initial_base_uri"}, "*");
+
+    // append a child and check the base-uri
+    var baseTag = document.head.appendChild(document.createElement('base'));
+    baseTag.href = 'http://www.base-tag.com';
+    window.parent.postMessage({baseURI: document.baseURI, test: "changed_base_uri"}, "*");
+
+    // remove the child and check that the base-uri is back to the initial one
+    document.head.remove(baseTag);
+    window.parent.postMessage({baseURI: document.baseURI, test: "initial_base_uri"}, "*");
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_object_inherit.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_object_inherit.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..76c9764162
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_object_inherit.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1457100: Test OBJECT inherits CSP if needed</title>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content= "img-src https://bug1457100.test.com"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<object id="dataObject" data="data:text/html,object<script>var foo = 0;</script>"></object>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  var dataObject = document.getElementById("dataObject");
+  dataObject.onload = function () {
+    var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(dataObject).contentDocument;
+    var cspJSON = contentDoc.cspJSON;
+    window.parent.postMessage({cspJSON}, "*");
+  }
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_parent_location_js.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_parent_location_js.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c56f49905
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_parent_location_js.html
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test setting parent location to javascript:</title>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src 'nonce-bug1550414'">
+  <script nonce="bug1550414">
+    document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", (e) => {
+      window.parent.postMessage({
+        blockedURI: e.blockedURI,
+        violatedDirective: e.violatedDirective,
+        originalPolicy: e.originalPolicy,
+      }, '*');
+    });
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe src="file_iframe_parent_location_js.html"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..662fbfb8af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 808292 - Implement path-level host-source matching to CSP</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+  <script src="http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js#foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09286d42e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_incl_query.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_incl_query.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50af2b1437
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_incl_query.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1147026 - CSP should ignore query string when checking a resource load</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+  <script src="http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js?val=foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a16cc90ec6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 808292 - Implement path-level host-source matching to CSP</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bed3a1dccf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// Redirect server specifically to handle redirects
+// for path-level host-source matching
+// see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=808292
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var newLocation =
+    "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js";
+
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da5c7f0a6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_pdfjs_not_subject_to_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src 'self' 'nonce-allowPDF'; base-uri 'self'">
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="pdfFrame"></iframe>
+<br/>
+<button id="pdfButton">click to load pdf</button>
+<script nonce="allowPDF">
+  async function loadPDFIntoIframe() {
+    let response = await fetch("dummy.pdf");
+    let blob = await response.blob();
+    var blobUrl = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+    var pdfFrame = document.getElementById("pdfFrame");
+    pdfFrame.src = blobUrl;
+  }
+  let pdfButton = document.getElementById("pdfButton");
+  pdfButton.addEventListener("click", loadPDFIntoIframe);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ping.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ping.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8aaf34cc3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ping.html
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1100181 - CSP: Enforce connect-src when submitting pings</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- we are using an image for the test, but can be anything -->
+  <a id="testlink"
+     href="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png"
+     ping="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png?send-ping">
+     Send ping
+  </a>
+  
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var link = document.getElementById("testlink");
+    link.click();
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a75eef7e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <body>
+    <div id=testdiv>Inline script didn't run</div>
+    <script>
+      document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML = "Inline Script Executed";
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c4ff8ea9fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+content-security-policy-report-only: policy-uri /tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy_policy
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy_policy b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy_policy
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5c610cd7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy_policy
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+default-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9728e2fecc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.js
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+const LOADED = true;
+parent.postMessage({ result: "script-allowed" }, "*");
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..184c6b1041
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+// custom *.sjs for Bug 1224225
+// Punycode in CSP host sources
+
+const HTML_PART1 =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  '<html><head><meta charset="utf-8">' +
+  "<title>Bug 1224225 - CSP source matching should work for punycoded domain names</title>" +
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<script id='script' src='";
+
+// U+00E4 LATIN SMALL LETTER A WITH DIAERESIS, encoded as UTF-8 code units.
+// response.write() writes out the provided string characters truncated to
+// bytes, so "ä" literally would write a literal \xE4 byte, not the desired
+// two-byte UTF-8 sequence.
+const TESTCASE1 = "http://sub2.\xC3\xA4lt.example.org/";
+const TESTCASE2 = "http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org/";
+
+const HTML_PART2 =
+  "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_punycode_host_src.js'></script>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  if (query.get("csp")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", query.get("csp"), false);
+  }
+  if (query.get("action") == "script-unicode-csp-punycode") {
+    response.write(HTML_PART1 + TESTCASE1 + HTML_PART2);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (query.get("action") == "script-punycode-csp-punycode") {
+    response.write(HTML_PART1 + TESTCASE2 + HTML_PART2);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_content.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_content.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1eab21b08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_content.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+// This SJS file serves file_redirect_content.html
+// with a CSP that will trigger a violation and that will report it
+// to file_redirect_report.sjs
+//
+// This handles 301, 302, 303 and 307 redirects. The HTTP status code
+// returned/type of redirect to do comes from the query string
+// parameter passed in from the test_bug650386_* files and then also
+// uses that value in the report-uri parameter of the CSP
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // this gets used in the CSP as part of the report URI.
+  var redirect = request.queryString;
+
+  if (redirect < 301 || (redirect > 303 && redirect <= 306) || redirect > 307) {
+    // if we somehow got some bogus redirect code here,
+    // do a 302 redirect to the same URL as the report URI
+    // redirects to - this will fail the test.
+    var loc = "http://example.com/some/fake/path";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var csp =
+    "default-src 'self';report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_report.sjs?" +
+    redirect;
+
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", csp, false);
+
+  // the actual file content.
+  // this image load will (intentionally) fail due to the CSP policy of default-src: 'self'
+  // specified by the CSP string above.
+  var content =
+    '<!DOCTYPE HTML><html><body><img src = "http://some.other.domain.example.com"></body></html>';
+
+  response.write(content);
+
+  return;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_report.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_report.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9cc7e65486
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_report.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+// This SJS file serves as CSP violation report target
+// and issues a redirect, to make sure the browser does not post to the target
+// of the redirect, per CSP spec.
+// This handles 301, 302, 303 and 307 redirects. The HTTP status code
+// returned/type of redirect to do comes from the query string
+// parameter
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  var redirect = request.queryString;
+
+  var loc = "http://example.com/some/fake/path";
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", redirect, "Found");
+  response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+  return;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_worker.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_worker.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..37c721be24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirect_worker.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// SJS file to serve resources for CSP redirect tests
+// This file redirects to a specified resource.
+const THIS_SITE = "http://mochi.test:8888";
+const OTHER_SITE = "http://example.com";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var resource = query.path;
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  var loc = "";
+
+  // redirect to a resource on this site
+  if (query.redir == "same") {
+    loc = THIS_SITE + resource + "#" + query.page_id;
+  }
+
+  // redirect to a resource on a different site
+  else if (query.redir == "other") {
+    loc = OTHER_SITE + resource + "#" + query.page_id;
+  }
+
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+  response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+
+  response.write(
+    '<html><head><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=' + loc + '">'
+  );
+  return;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_main.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d05af88fe8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>CSP redirect tests</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="container"></div>
+</body>
+
+<script>
+var thisSite = "http://mochi.test:8888";
+var otherSite = "http://example.com";
+var page = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_page.sjs";
+
+var tests = { "font-src": thisSite+page+"?testid=font-src",
+              "frame-src": thisSite+page+"?testid=frame-src",
+              "img-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=img-src",
+              "media-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=media-src",
+              "object-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=object-src",
+              "script-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=script-src",
+              "style-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=style-src",
+              "xhr-src":  thisSite+page+"?testid=xhr-src",
+              "from-worker": thisSite+page+"?testid=from-worker",
+              "from-blob-worker": thisSite+page+"?testid=from-blob-worker",
+              "img-src-from-css":  thisSite+page+"?testid=img-src-from-css",
+            };
+
+var container = document.getElementById("container");
+
+// load each test in its own iframe
+for (tid in tests) {
+  var i = document.createElement("iframe");
+  i.id = tid;
+  i.src = tests[tid];
+  container.appendChild(i);
+}
+</script>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_page.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_page.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7a8b72520
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_page.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+// SJS file for CSP redirect mochitests
+// This file serves pages which can optionally specify a Content Security Policy
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  var resource = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_resource.sjs";
+
+  // CSP header value
+  response.setHeader(
+    "Content-Security-Policy",
+    "default-src 'self' blob: ; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+    false
+  );
+
+  // downloadable font that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "font-src") {
+    var resp =
+      '<style type="text/css"> @font-face { font-family:' +
+      '"Redirecting Font"; src: url("' +
+      resource +
+      '?res=font&redir=other&id=font-src-redir")} #test{font-family:' +
+      '"Redirecting Font"}</style></head><body>' +
+      '<div id="test">test</div></body>';
+    response.write(resp);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // iframe that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "frame-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<iframe src="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=iframe&redir=other&id=frame-src-redir"></iframe>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // image that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "img-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<img src="' + resource + '?res=image&redir=other&id=img-src-redir" />'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // video content that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "media-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<video src="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=media&redir=other&id=media-src-redir"></video>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // object content that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "object-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<object type="text/html" data="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=object&redir=other&id=object-src-redir"></object>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // external script that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "script-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<script src="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=script&redir=other&id=script-src-redir"></script>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // external stylesheet that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "style-src") {
+    response.write(
+      '<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=style&redir=other&id=style-src-redir"></link>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // script that XHR's to a resource that redirects to another site
+  if (query.testid == "xhr-src") {
+    response.write('<script src="' + resource + '?res=xhr"></script>');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // for bug949706
+  if (query.testid == "img-src-from-css") {
+    // loads a stylesheet, which in turn loads an image that redirects.
+    response.write(
+      '<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=cssLoader&id=img-src-redir-from-css">'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.testid == "from-worker") {
+    // loads a script; launches a worker; that worker uses importscript; which then gets redirected
+    // So it's:
+    // <script src="res=loadWorkerThatMakesRequests">
+    //   .. loads Worker("res=makeRequestsWorker")
+    //         .. calls importScript("res=script")
+    //         .. calls xhr("res=xhr-resp")
+    //         .. calls fetch("res=xhr-resp")
+    response.write(
+      '<script src="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=loadWorkerThatMakesRequests&id=from-worker"></script>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.testid == "from-blob-worker") {
+    // loads a script; launches a worker; that worker uses importscript; which then gets redirected
+    // So it's:
+    // <script src="res=loadBlobWorkerThatMakesRequests">
+    //   .. loads Worker("res=makeRequestsWorker")
+    //         .. calls importScript("res=script")
+    //         .. calls xhr("res=xhr-resp")
+    //         .. calls fetch("res=xhr-resp")
+    response.write(
+      '<script src="' +
+        resource +
+        '?res=loadBlobWorkerThatMakesRequests&id=from-blob-worker"></script>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_resource.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_resource.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1bb86c2cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_resource.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+// SJS file to serve resources for CSP redirect tests
+// This file mimics serving resources, e.g. fonts, images, etc., which a CSP
+// can include. The resource may redirect to a different resource, if specified.
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var query = {};
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    query[name] = unescape(value);
+  });
+
+  var thisSite = "http://mochi.test:8888";
+  var otherSite = "http://example.com";
+  var resource = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_redirects_resource.sjs";
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // redirect to a resource on this site
+  if (query.redir == "same") {
+    var loc = thisSite + resource + "?res=" + query.res + "&testid=" + query.id;
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // redirect to a resource on a different site
+  else if (query.redir == "other") {
+    var loc =
+      otherSite + resource + "?res=" + query.res + "&testid=" + query.id;
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // not a redirect.  serve some content.
+  // the content doesn't have to be valid, since we're only checking whether
+  // the request for the content was sent or not.
+
+  // downloadable font
+  if (query.res == "font") {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain", false);
+    response.write("font data...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // iframe with arbitrary content
+  if (query.res == "iframe") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("iframe content...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // image
+  if (query.res == "image") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/gif", false);
+    response.write("image data...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // media content, e.g. Ogg video
+  if (query.res == "media") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "video/ogg", false);
+    response.write("video data...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // plugin content, e.g. <object>
+  if (query.res == "object") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("object data...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // script
+  if (query.res == "script") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write("some script...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // external stylesheet
+  if (query.res == "style") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/css", false);
+    response.write("css data...");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // internal stylesheet that loads an image from an external site
+  if (query.res == "cssLoader") {
+    let bgURL = thisSite + resource + "?redir=other&res=image&id=" + query.id;
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/css", false);
+    response.write("body { background:url('" + bgURL + "'); }");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // script that loads an internal worker that uses importScripts on a redirect
+  // to an external script.
+  if (query.res == "loadWorkerThatMakesRequests") {
+    // this creates a worker (same origin) that imports a redirecting script.
+    let workerURL =
+      thisSite + resource + "?res=makeRequestsWorker&id=" + query.id;
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write("new Worker('" + workerURL + "');");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // script that loads an internal worker that uses importScripts on a redirect
+  // to an external script.
+  if (query.res == "loadBlobWorkerThatMakesRequests") {
+    // this creates a worker (same origin) that imports a redirecting script.
+    let workerURL =
+      thisSite + resource + "?res=makeRequestsWorker&id=" + query.id;
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write(
+      "var x = new XMLHttpRequest(); x.open('GET', '" + workerURL + "'); "
+    );
+    response.write("x.responseType = 'blob'; x.send(); ");
+    response.write(
+      "x.onload = () => { new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(x.response)); };"
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // source for a worker that simply calls importScripts on a script that
+  // redirects.
+  if (query.res == "makeRequestsWorker") {
+    // this is code for a worker that imports a redirected script.
+    let scriptURL =
+      thisSite +
+      resource +
+      "?redir=other&res=script&id=script-src-redir-" +
+      query.id;
+    let xhrURL =
+      thisSite +
+      resource +
+      "?redir=other&res=xhr-resp&id=xhr-src-redir-" +
+      query.id;
+    let fetchURL =
+      thisSite +
+      resource +
+      "?redir=other&res=xhr-resp&id=fetch-src-redir-" +
+      query.id;
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    response.write("try { importScripts('" + scriptURL + "'); } catch(ex) {} ");
+    response.write(
+      "var x = new XMLHttpRequest(); x.open('GET', '" + xhrURL + "'); x.send();"
+    );
+    response.write("fetch('" + fetchURL + "');");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // script that invokes XHR
+  if (query.res == "xhr") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+    var resp =
+      'var x = new XMLHttpRequest();x.open("GET", "' +
+      thisSite +
+      resource +
+      '?redir=other&res=xhr-resp&id=xhr-src-redir", false);\n' +
+      "x.send(null);";
+    response.write(resp);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // response to XHR
+  if (query.res == "xhr-resp") {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("XHR response...");
+    return;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb18af8057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1033424 - Test csp-report properties </title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var foo = "propEscFoo";
+    var bar = "propEscBar";
+    // just verifying that we properly escape newlines and quotes
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_chromescript.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_chromescript.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..32850495df
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_chromescript.js
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["TextDecoder"]);
+
+const reportURI = "http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs";
+
+var openingObserver = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    // subject should be an nsURI
+    if (subject.QueryInterface == undefined) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    var message = { report: "", error: false };
+
+    if (topic == "http-on-opening-request") {
+      var asciiSpec = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel).URI.asciiSpec;
+      if (asciiSpec !== reportURI) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      var reportText = false;
+      try {
+        // Verify that the report was properly formatted.
+        // We'll parse the report text as JSON and verify that the properties
+        // have expected values.
+        var reportText = "{}";
+        var uploadStream = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIUploadChannel)
+          .uploadStream;
+
+        if (uploadStream) {
+          // get the bytes from the request body
+          var binstream = Cc["@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1"].createInstance(
+            Ci.nsIBinaryInputStream
+          );
+          binstream.setInputStream(uploadStream);
+
+          let bytes = NetUtil.readInputStream(binstream);
+
+          // rewind stream as we are supposed to - there will be an assertion later if we don't.
+          uploadStream
+            .QueryInterface(Ci.nsISeekableStream)
+            .seek(Ci.nsISeekableStream.NS_SEEK_SET, 0);
+
+          let textDecoder = new TextDecoder();
+          reportText = textDecoder.decode(bytes);
+        }
+
+        message.report = reportText;
+      } catch (e) {
+        message.error = e.toString();
+      }
+
+      sendAsyncMessage("opening-request-completed", message);
+    }
+  },
+};
+
+Services.obs.addObserver(openingObserver, "http-on-opening-request");
+addMessageListener("finish", function() {
+  Services.obs.removeObserver(openingObserver, "http-on-opening-request");
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-1.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-1.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59b4908f83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-1.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<style>
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "CSP Report Test Font 1";
+  src: url(Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-1);
+}
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "CSP Report Test Font 2";
+  src: url(Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-2);
+}
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "CSP Report Test Font 3";
+  src: url(Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-3);
+}
+.x { font: 24px "CSP Report Test Font 1"; }
+.y { font: 24px "CSP Report Test Font 2"; }
+.z { font: 24px "CSP Report Test Font 3"; }
+</style>
+<p class=x>A</p>
+<p class=y>A</p>
+<p class=z>A</p>
+<script>
+// Wait until the fonts would have been added to the user font cache.
+document.body.offsetWidth;
+document.fonts.ready.then(() => window.parent.postMessage("first-doc-ready", "*"));
+</script>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cea9cea663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<style>
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "CSP Report Test Font 1";
+  src: url(Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-1);
+}
+@font-face {
+  font-family: "CSP Report Test Font 3";
+  src: url(Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-3);
+}
+p { margin-right: 1ex; } /* cause cached CSP check to happen OMT (due to
+                            font metrics lookup) */
+.x { font: 24px "CSP Report Test Font 1"; }
+.y { font: 24px "CSP Report Test Font 3"; }
+</style>
+<p class="x">A</p>
+<script>
+// First flush should dispatch the "Test Font 1" report that is stored
+// in the user font cache.
+document.body.offsetWidth;
+
+// Second flush should dispatch "Test Font 3" report.
+document.querySelector("p").className = "y";
+document.body.offsetWidth;
+</script>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..493f850baa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_font_cache-2.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: font-src 'none'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.css b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b578b77b33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.css
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+@import url("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs?stylesheet");
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..77a36faea1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1048048 - Test sending csp-report when using import in css</title>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="file_report_for_import.css">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  empty body, just testing @import in the included css for bug 1048048
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c540935487
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1048048 - CSP violation report not sent for @import
+
+const CC = Components.Constructor;
+const BinaryInputStream = CC(
+  "@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1",
+  "nsIBinaryInputStream",
+  "setInputStream"
+);
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  // (1) lets process the queryresult request async and
+  // wait till we have received the image request.
+  if (queryString === "queryresult") {
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // (2) handle the csp-report and return the JSON back to
+  // the testfile using the afore stored xml request in (1).
+  if (queryString === "report") {
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      // send the report back to the XML request for verification
+      var report = new BinaryInputStream(request.bodyInputStream);
+      var avail;
+      var bytes = [];
+      while ((avail = report.available()) > 0) {
+        Array.prototype.push.apply(bytes, report.readByteArray(avail));
+      }
+      var data = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, bytes);
+      queryResponse.bodyOutputStream.write(data, data.length);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should not get here ever, but just in case return
+  // something unexpected.
+  response.write("doh!");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e69de29bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f2fdfe9e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: default-src 'self';
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85e7f0092c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1024557: Ignore x-frame-options if CSP with frame-ancestors exists</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="cspmessage">Ignoring XFO because of CSP_RO</div>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ab8366f061
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only: frame-ancestors http://mochi.test:8888
+X-Frame-Options: deny
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_1.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_1.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ce1e80c865
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_1.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox="allow-same-origin" -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img1_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img1a_good&type=img/png" />
+    <!-- should not execute script -->
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_10.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_10.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f934497eee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_10.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img10_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img10a_bad&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_11.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_11.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..087b5651a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_11.html
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with only inline "allow-scripts"
+
+ <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox allow-scripts -->
+
+ <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+ <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img11_bad&type=img/png" />
+ <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img11a_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+ <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script11_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+ <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script11a_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_12.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_12.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..79631bd394
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_12.html
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+</head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+
+    document.getElementById('a_form').submit();
+
+    // trigger the javascript: url test
+    sendMouseEvent({type:'click'}, 'a_link');
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_sandbox_pass.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with "allow-same-origin" and allow-scripts"
+
+
+  <!-- Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-same-origin allow-scripts; default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; -->
+
+  <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+  <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img12_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+  <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script12_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  <form method="get" action="/tests/content/html/content/test/file_iframe_sandbox_form_fail.html" id="a_form">
+    First name: <input type="text" name="firstname">
+    Last name: <input type="text" name="lastname">
+    <input type="submit" onclick="doSubmit()" id="a_button">
+  </form>
+
+  <a href = 'javascript:ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from javascript: URLs");' id='a_link'>click me</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_13.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_13.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..96286db8d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_13.html
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with only inline "allow-scripts"
+
+ <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox allow-scripts -->
+
+ <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+ <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img13_bad&type=img/png" />
+ <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img13a_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+ <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script13_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+ <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script13a_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_2.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b37aa1bcef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img2a_good&type=img/png" />
+    <!-- should not execute script -->
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_3.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_3.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ba808e47d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_3.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox="allow-same-origin" -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img3_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img3a_bad&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_4.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_4.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2d4ed0940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_4.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- sandbox -->
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/base/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img4_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/base/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img4a_bad&type=img/png" />
+    <script src='/tests/dom/base/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_5.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_5.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c08849b689
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_5.html
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with only inline "allow-scripts"
+
+ <!-- sandbox="allow-scripts" -->
+ <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline' -->
+
+ <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+ <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img5_bad&type=img/png" />
+ <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img5a_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+ <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script5_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+ <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script5a_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_6.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_6.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44705f4d2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_6.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+</head>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  function ok(result, desc) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({ok: result, desc}, "*");
+  }
+
+  function doStuff() {
+    ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run inline scripts");
+
+    document.getElementById('a_form').submit();
+
+    // trigger the javascript: url test
+    sendMouseEvent({type:'click'}, 'a_link');
+  }
+</script>
+<script src='file_sandbox_pass.js'></script>
+<body onLoad='ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from event listeners");doStuff();'>
+  I am sandboxed but with "allow-same-origin" and allow-scripts"
+  <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img6_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+  <script src='http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=script6_bad&type=text/javascript'></script>
+
+  <form method="get" action="/tests/content/html/content/test/file_iframe_sandbox_form_fail.html" id="a_form">
+    First name: <input type="text" name="firstname">
+    Last name: <input type="text" name="lastname">
+    <input type="submit" onclick="doSubmit()" id="a_button">
+  </form>
+
+  <a href = 'javascript:ok(true, "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run script from javascript: URLs");' id='a_link'>click me</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_7.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_7.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b249d4101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_7.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; sandbox allow-same-origin -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img7_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img7a_good&type=img/png" />
+    <!-- should not execute script -->
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_8.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_8.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4f9cd89161
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_8.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; default-src 'self' -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img8_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+
+    <!-- these should load ok -->
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img8a_good&type=img/png" />
+    <!-- should not execute script -->
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_9.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_9.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29ffc191cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_9.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<html>
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> </head>
+  <body>
+    <!-- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; sandbox allow-same-origin -->
+
+    <!-- these should be stopped by CSP -->
+    <img src="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img9_bad&type=img/png"> </img>
+    <img src="/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs?testid=img9a_bad&type=img/png" />
+
+    <script src='/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js'></script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..faab9f0fc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+  <meta charset='utf-8'>
+  <title>Bug 1396320: Fix CSP sandbox regression for allow-scripts</title>
+  </head>
+<body>
+<script type='application/javascript'>
+  window.parent.postMessage({result: document.domain }, '*');
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4705ce9ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-scripts;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f43927ddf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_fail.js
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+function ok(result, desc) {
+  window.parent.postMessage({ ok: result, desc }, "*");
+}
+ok(
+  false,
+  "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should NOT be able to run <script src=...>"
+);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_pass.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_pass.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c06341a082
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sandbox_pass.js
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+function ok(result, desc) {
+  window.parent.postMessage({ ok: result, desc }, "*");
+}
+ok(
+  true,
+  "documents sandboxed with allow-scripts should be able to run <script src=...>"
+);
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09286d42e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c32f773484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * Custom *.sjs specifically for the needs of
+ * Bug 921493 - CSP: test allowlisting of scheme-relative sources
+ */
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+  let query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  let scheme = query.get("scheme");
+  let policy = query.get("policy");
+
+  let linkUrl =
+    scheme +
+    "://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.js";
+
+  let html =
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+    "<html>" +
+    "<head>" +
+    "<title>test schemeless sources within CSP</title>" +
+    "</head>" +
+    "<body> " +
+    "<div id='testdiv'>blocked</div>" +
+    // try to load a scheme relative script
+    "<script src='" +
+    linkUrl +
+    "'></script>" +
+    // have an inline script that reports back to the parent whether
+    // the script got loaded or not from within the sandboxed iframe.
+    "<script type='application/javascript'>" +
+    "window.onload = function() {" +
+    "var inner = document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;" +
+    "window.parent.postMessage({ result: inner }, '*');" +
+    "}" +
+    "</script>" +
+    "</body>" +
+    "</html>";
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", policy, false);
+
+  response.write(html);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3819592912
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'unsafe-inline'">
+<template id="a">
+  <script src="file_script_template.js"></script>
+</template>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  var temp = document.getElementsByTagName("template")[0];
+  var clon = temp.content.cloneNode(true);
+  document.body.appendChild(clon);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d75869f763
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_script_template.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+// dummy *.js file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..16196bb19f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <meta charset="utf8">
+    <title>Bug 587377 - CSP keywords "'self'" and "'none'" are easy to confuse with host names "self" and "none"</title>
+    <!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+       - http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..26af7ed9b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' SELF;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_sendbeacon.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sendbeacon.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..13202c65ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_sendbeacon.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content= "connect-src 'none'">
+  <title>Bug 1234813 - sendBeacon should not throw if blocked by Content Policy</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+try {
+  navigator.sendBeacon("http://example.com/sendbeaconintonirvana");
+  window.parent.postMessage({result: "blocked-beacon-does-not-throw"}, "*");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: "blocked-beacon-throws"}, "*");
+  }
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b819946983
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1208559 - ServiceWorker registration not governed by CSP</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  function finish(status) {
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: status}, "*");
+  }
+
+  const promises = [
+    navigator.serviceWorker.ready,
+    navigator.serviceWorker.register("file_service_worker.js", { scope: "." })
+  ];
+
+  Promise.race(promises).then(finish.bind(null, 'allowed'),
+                              finish.bind(null, 'blocked'));
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1bf583f4cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+dump("service workers: hello world");
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_service_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_service_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b262fa10a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_service_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+// dummy file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_shared_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_shared_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56b33f4aef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_shared_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+onconnect = function(e) {
+  var port = e.ports[0];
+  port.addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+    port.postMessage("shared worker is executing");
+  });
+  port.start();
+};
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_worker.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_worker.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..acde7408c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_spawn_worker.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+postMessage("worker is executing");
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09286d42e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ea79e2a96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+<script nonce="foo" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.js"></script>
+
+<img id="testimage" src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png" data-result="blocked">
+<script>
+let img = document.getElementById("testimage");
+img.addEventListener("load", function() {
+  img.dataset.result = "allowed";
+}, { once: true });
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09286d42e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_js_url.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_js_url.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bd53b0adb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_js_url.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1316826 - 'strict-dynamic' blocking DOM event handlers</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<a id="jslink" href='javascript:document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed"'>click me</a>
+<script nonce="foo">
+  document.getElementById("jslink").click();
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c51fefd72e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  // generates a *non* parser inserted script and should be allowed
+  var myScript = document.createElement('script');
+  myScript.src = 'http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js';
+  document.head.appendChild(myScript);
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted_inline.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted_inline.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10a0f32e4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted_inline.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  var dynamicScript = document.createElement('script');
+  dynamicScript.textContent = 'document.getElementById("testdiv").textContent="allowed"';
+  document.head.appendChild(dynamicScript);
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2a3a7d4998
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  // generates a parser inserted script and should be blocked
+  document.write("<script src='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js'><\/script>");
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write_correct_nonce.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write_correct_nonce.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9938ef2dcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write_correct_nonce.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  // generates a parser inserted script with a valid nonce- and should be allowed
+  document.write("<script nonce='foo' src='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js'><\/script>");
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0889583821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1316826 - 'strict-dynamic' blocking DOM event handlers</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+ <img src='/nonexisting.jpg'
+      onerror='document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";'
+      style='display:none'>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events_marquee.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events_marquee.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..701ef32269
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_events_marquee.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1316826 - 'strict-dynamic' blocking DOM event handlers</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<marquee onstart='document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";'>
+  Bug 1316826
+</marquee>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94b6aefb19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+<script nonce="foo" src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic.js"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d17a58f279
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_unsafe_eval.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_unsafe_eval.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0b26da915
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_unsafe_eval.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testdiv">blocked</div>
+
+<script nonce="foo">
+  eval('document.getElementById("testdiv").innerHTML = "allowed";');
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ba970ce84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=702439
+
+This document is a child frame of a CSP document and the
+test verifies that it is permitted to run javascript: URLs
+if the parent has a policy that allows them.
+-->
+<body onload="document.getElementById('a').click()">
+<a id="a" href="javascript:parent.javascript_link_ran = true;
+                parent.checkResult();">click</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..233b359310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src *; script-src 'unsafe-inline'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_base.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_base.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e6fe3699d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_base.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <img src="file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs?svg_inline_style">
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c37b900863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self'">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <img src="file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs?svg_inline_style_csp">
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5acdbbd155
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const SVG_IMG = `<svg width="200" height="200" viewBox="0 0 150 150" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+   <style>
+     circle {
+       fill: orange;
+       stroke: black;
+       stroke-width: 10px;
+     }
+   </style>
+   <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" />
+   </svg>`;
+
+const SVG_IMG_NO_INLINE_STYLE = `<svg width="200" height="200" viewBox="0 0 150 150" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+   <circle cx="50" cy="50" r="40" />
+   </svg>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml", false);
+
+  if (query === "svg_inline_style_csp") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", "default-src 'none'", false);
+    response.write(SVG_IMG);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "svg_inline_style") {
+    response.write(SVG_IMG);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "svg_no_inline_style") {
+    response.write(SVG_IMG_NO_INLINE_STYLE);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb12e4efd0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+    <meta charset="UTF-8">
+    <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+    <meta http-equiv="X-UA-Compatible" content="ie=edge">
+    <title>Document</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+    <h1>Test-Document</h1>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e138f234fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_test_browser_bookmarklets.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'none'
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0363fc2c7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// SJS file for CSP mochitests
+"use strict";
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+function loadHTMLFromFile(path) {
+  // Load the HTML to return in the response from file.
+  // Since it's relative to the cwd of the test runner, we start there and
+  // append to get to the actual path of the file.
+  const testHTMLFile = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"
+  ]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+
+  const testHTMLFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+
+  path
+    .split("/")
+    .filter(path => path)
+    .reduce((file, path) => {
+      testHTMLFile.append(path);
+      return testHTMLFile;
+    }, testHTMLFile);
+  testHTMLFileStream.init(testHTMLFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  const isAvailable = testHTMLFileStream.available();
+  return NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(testHTMLFileStream, isAvailable);
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // Deliver the CSP policy encoded in the URL
+  if (query.has("csp")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", query.get("csp"), false);
+  }
+
+  // Deliver the CSP report-only policy encoded in the URI
+  if (query.has("cspRO")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only",
+      query.get("cspRO"),
+      false
+    );
+  }
+
+  // Deliver the CORS header in the URL
+  if (query.has("cors")) {
+    response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", query.get("cors"), false);
+  }
+
+  // Send HTML to test allowed/blocked behaviors
+  let type = "text/html";
+  if (query.has("type")) {
+    type = query.get("type");
+  }
+
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", type, false);
+  if (query.has("file")) {
+    response.write(loadHTMLFromFile(query.get("file")));
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..28263e9db7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests">
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// 1) same origin navigation
+window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html");
+
+// 2) same origin navigation
+window.open("http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html");
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..65762f1c71
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+just a dummy page to check uir applies to top level navigations
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+window.onload = function() {
+  window.opener.parent.postMessage({result: window.location.href}, "*");
+  window.close();
+}
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c4ba597f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure.html
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- style -->
+  <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' href='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?style' media='screen' />
+
+  <!-- font -->
+  <style>
+    @font-face {
+      font-family: "foofont";
+      src: url('http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?font');
+    }
+    .div_foo { font-family: "foofont"; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- images: -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img"></img>
+
+  <!-- redirects: upgrade http:// to https:// redirect to http:// and then upgrade to https:// again -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?redirect-image"></img>
+
+  <!-- script: -->
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?script"></script>
+
+  <!-- media: -->
+  <audio src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?media"></audio>
+
+  <!-- objects: -->
+  <object width="10" height="10" data="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?object"></object>
+
+  <!-- font: (apply font loaded in header to div) -->
+  <div class="div_foo">foo</div>
+
+  <!-- iframe: (same origin) -->
+  <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?iframe">
+    <!-- within that iframe we load an image over http and make sure the requested gets upgraded to https -->
+  </iframe>
+
+  <!-- xhr: -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    myXHR.open("GET", "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?xhr");
+    myXHR.send(null);
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- websockets: upgrade ws:// to wss://-->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    // WebSocket tests are not supported on Android yet. Bug 1566168
+    const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+      "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+    );
+    if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+      var mySocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure");
+      mySocket.onopen = function(e) {
+        if (mySocket.url.includes("wss://")) {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-ok"}, "*");
+        }
+        else {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-error"}, "*");
+        }
+        mySocket.close();
+      };
+      mySocket.onerror = function(e) {
+        // debug information for Bug 1316305
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (mySocket): " + mySocket + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (mySocket.url): " + mySocket.url + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (e): " + e + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (e.message): " + e.message + "\n");
+        window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-unexpected-error"}, "*");
+      };
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- form action: (upgrade POST from http:// to https://) -->
+  <iframe name='formFrame' id='formFrame'></iframe>
+  <form target="formFrame" action="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?form" method="POST">
+    <input name="foo" value="foo">
+    <input type="submit" id="submitButton" formenctype='multipart/form-data' value="Submit form">
+  </form>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var submitButton = document.getElementById('submitButton');
+    submitButton.click();
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e675c62e9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors.html
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  // === TEST 1
+  var url1 = "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?test1";
+  var xhr1 = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr1.open("GET", url1, true);
+  xhr1.onload = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage(xhr1.response, "*");
+  };
+  xhr1.onerror = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage("test1-failed", "*");
+  };
+  xhr1.send();
+
+  // === TEST 2
+  var url2 = "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?test2";
+  var xhr2 = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr2.open("GET", url2, true);
+  xhr2.onload = function() {
+    window.parent.postMessage(xhr2.response, "*");
+  };
+  xhr2.onerror = function() {
+    window.parent.postMessage("test2-failed", "*");
+  };
+  xhr2.send();
+
+  // === TEST 3
+  var url3 = "http://test2.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?test3";
+  var xhr3 = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr3.open("GET", url3, true);
+  xhr3.onload = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage(xhr3.response, "*");
+  };
+  xhr3.onerror = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage("test3-failed", "*");
+  };
+  xhr3.send();
+
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..83957560c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // perform sanity check and make sure that all requests get upgraded to use https
+  if (request.scheme !== "https") {
+    response.write("request not https");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  // TEST 1
+  if (queryString === "test1") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?redir-test1";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "redir-test1") {
+    response.write("test1-no-cors-ok");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // TEST 2
+  if (queryString === "test2") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://test1.example.com:443/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?redir-test2";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "redir-test2") {
+    response.write("test2-no-cors-diffport-ok");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // TEST 3
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "content-type", false);
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "POST, GET", false);
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+
+  if (queryString === "test3") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs?redir-test3";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "redir-test3") {
+    response.write("test3-cors-ok");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should not get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("d'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a7fb0a2176
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// custom *.sjs for Bug 1273430
+// META CSP: upgrade-insecure-requests
+
+// important: the IFRAME_URL is *http* and needs to be upgraded to *https* by upgrade-insecure-requests
+const IFRAME_URL =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs?docwriteframe";
+
+const TEST_FRAME =
+  `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>TEST_FRAME</title>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    document.write('<iframe src="` +
+  IFRAME_URL +
+  `"/>');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+// doc.write(iframe) sends a post message to the parent indicating the current
+// location so the parent can make sure the request was upgraded to *https*.
+const DOC_WRITE_FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html><head><meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>DOC_WRITE_FRAME</title>
+  </head>
+  <body onload="window.parent.parent.postMessage({result: document.location.href}, '*');">
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString === "testframe") {
+    response.write(TEST_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "docwriteframe") {
+    response.write(DOC_WRITE_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b824604b6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1447784 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  // === TEST 1
+  var url1 = "http://127.0.0.1:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_server.sjs?test1";
+  var xhr1 = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr1.open("GET", url1, true);
+  xhr1.onload = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage(xhr1.response, "*");
+  };
+  xhr1.onerror = function() {
+  	window.parent.postMessage("test1-failed", "*");
+  };
+  xhr1.send();
+
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_form.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_form.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ed6b3b8542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_form.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1661423 - don't apply upgrade-insecure-requests on form submissions to localhost</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<form id="form" action="http://127.0.0.1/bug-1661423-dont-upgrade-localhost">
+  <input type="submit">
+</form>>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+
+    form.submit();
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ff7931a1d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1447784 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "content-type", false);
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET", false);
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // perform sanity check and make sure that all requests get upgraded to use https
+  if (request.scheme !== "https") {
+    response.write("request-not-https");
+    return;
+  } else {
+    response.write("request-is-https");
+  }
+
+  // we should not get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("d'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a84a8c254d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests; default-src https: wss: 'unsafe-inline'; form-action https:;">
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- style -->
+  <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' href='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?style' media='screen' />
+
+  <!-- font -->
+  <style>
+    @font-face {
+      font-family: "foofont";
+      src: url('http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?font');
+    }
+    .div_foo { font-family: "foofont"; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- images: -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img"></img>
+
+  <!-- redirects: upgrade http:// to https:// redirect to http:// and then upgrade to https:// again -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?redirect-image"></img>
+
+  <!-- script: -->
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?script"></script>
+
+  <!-- media: -->
+  <audio src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?media"></audio>
+
+  <!-- objects: -->
+  <object width="10" height="10" data="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?object"></object>
+
+  <!-- font: (apply font loaded in header to div) -->
+  <div class="div_foo">foo</div>
+
+  <!-- iframe: (same origin) -->
+  <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?iframe">
+    <!-- within that iframe we load an image over http and make sure the requested gets upgraded to https -->
+  </iframe>
+
+  <!-- xhr: -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    myXHR.open("GET", "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?xhr");
+    myXHR.send(null);
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- websockets: upgrade ws:// to wss://-->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    // WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+    const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+      "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+    );
+    if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+      var mySocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure");
+      mySocket.onopen = function(e) {
+        if (mySocket.url.includes("wss://")) {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-ok"}, "*");
+        }
+        else {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-error"}, "*");
+        }
+        mySocket.close();
+      };
+      mySocket.onerror = function(e) {
+        window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-unexpected-error"}, "*");
+      };
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- form action: (upgrade POST from http:// to https://) -->
+  <iframe name='formFrame' id='formFrame'></iframe>
+  <form target="formFrame" action="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?form" method="POST">
+    <input name="foo" value="foo">
+    <input type="submit" id="submitButton" formenctype='multipart/form-data' value="Submit form">
+  </form>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var submitButton = document.getElementById('submitButton');
+    submitButton.click();
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51afa39bf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1271173
+
+"use strict";
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const TEST_NAVIGATIONAL_UPGRADE = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+  <a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs?action=framenav" id="testlink">clickme</a>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    // before navigating the current frame we open the window and check that uir applies
+    var myWin = window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs?action=docnav");
+
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage, false);
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      myWin.close();
+      var link = document.getElementById('testlink');
+      link.click();
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const FRAME_NAV = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    parent.postMessage({result: document.documentURI}, "*");
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const DOC_NAV = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    // call back to the main testpage signaling whether the upgraded succeeded
+    window.opener.parent.postMessage({result: document.documentURI}, "*");
+    // let the opener (iframe) now that we can now close the window and move on with the test.
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: "readyToMoveOn"}, "*");
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  if (query.get("csp")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", query.get("csp"), false);
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "perform_navigation") {
+    response.write(TEST_NAVIGATIONAL_UPGRADE);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "framenav") {
+    response.write(FRAME_NAV);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.get("action") === "docnav") {
+    response.write(DOC_NAV);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f7f8158e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const FINAL_DOCUMENT = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  final document
+  <script>
+  window.onload = function() {
+    let docURI =  document.documentURI;
+    window.opener.parent.postMessage({docURI}, "*");
+    window.close();
+  }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  if (query === "same_origin_redirect") {
+    let newLocation =
+      "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs?finaldoc_same_origin_redirect";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "cross_origin_redirect") {
+    let newLocation =
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs?finaldoc_cross_origin_redirect";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (
+    query === "finaldoc_same_origin_redirect" ||
+    query === "finaldoc_cross_origin_redirect"
+  ) {
+    response.write(FINAL_DOCUMENT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_cross_origin.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_cross_origin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dff2c9faf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_cross_origin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs?cross_origin_redirect");
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_same_origin.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_same_origin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..811850e08c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_same_origin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script>
+  window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs?same_origin_redirect");
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c78e9a784d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- upgrade img from http:// to https:// -->
+  <img id="testimage" src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs?img"></img>
+
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myImg = document.getElementById("testimage");
+    myImg.onload = function(e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-ok"}, "*");
+    };
+    myImg.onerror = function(e) {
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "img-error"}, "*");
+    };
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6cc2086fe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// Custom *.sjs specifically for the needs of Bug
+// Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const REPORT_URI =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs?report";
+const POLICY = "upgrade-insecure-requests; default-src https: 'unsafe-inline'";
+const POLICY_RO =
+  "default-src https: 'unsafe-inline'; report-uri " + REPORT_URI;
+
+function loadHTMLFromFile(path) {
+  // Load the HTML to return in the response from file.
+  // Since it's relative to the cwd of the test runner, we start there and
+  // append to get to the actual path of the file.
+  var testHTMLFile = Components.classes["@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+  var dirs = path.split("/");
+  for (var i = 0; i < dirs.length; i++) {
+    testHTMLFile.append(dirs[i]);
+  }
+  var testHTMLFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+  testHTMLFileStream.init(testHTMLFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  var testHTML = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+    testHTMLFileStream,
+    testHTMLFileStream.available()
+  );
+  return testHTML;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // (1) Store the query that will report back whether the violation report was received
+  if (request.queryString == "queryresult") {
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // (2) We load a page using a CSP and a report only CSP
+  if (request.queryString == "toplevel") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy", POLICY, false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only", POLICY_RO, false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(
+      loadHTMLFromFile(
+        "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html"
+      )
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // (3) Return the image back to the client
+  if (request.queryString == "img") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // (4) Finally we receive the report, let's return the request from (1)
+  // signaling that we received the report correctly
+  if (request.queryString == "report") {
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      queryResponse.write("report-ok");
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case ...
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
+  response.write("doh!");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d884a9000d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive
+
+const TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS = 11;
+
+const IFRAME_CONTENT =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  "<html>" +
+  "<head><meta charset='utf-8'>" +
+  "<title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>" +
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<img src='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?nested-img'></img>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+const expectedQueries = [
+  "script",
+  "style",
+  "img",
+  "iframe",
+  "form",
+  "xhr",
+  "media",
+  "object",
+  "font",
+  "img-redir",
+  "nested-img",
+];
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  // initialize server variables and save the object state
+  // of the initial request, which returns async once the
+  // server has processed all requests.
+  if (queryString == "queryresult") {
+    setState("totaltests", TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS.toString());
+    setState("receivedQueries", "");
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // handle img redirect (https->http)
+  if (queryString == "redirect-image") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img-redir";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // just in case error handling for unexpected queries
+  if (expectedQueries.indexOf(queryString) == -1) {
+    response.write("doh!");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // make sure all the requested queries are indeed https
+  queryString += request.scheme == "https" ? "-ok" : "-error";
+
+  var receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+
+  // images, scripts, etc. get queried twice, do not
+  // confuse the server by storing the preload as
+  // well as the actual load. If either the preload
+  // or the actual load is not https, then we would
+  // append "-error" in the array and the test would
+  // fail at the end.
+  if (receivedQueries.includes(queryString)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // append the result to the total query string array
+  if (receivedQueries != "") {
+    receivedQueries += ",";
+  }
+  receivedQueries += queryString;
+  setState("receivedQueries", receivedQueries);
+
+  // keep track of how many more requests the server
+  // is expecting
+  var totaltests = parseInt(getState("totaltests"));
+  totaltests -= 1;
+  setState("totaltests", totaltests.toString());
+
+  // return content (img) for the nested iframe to test
+  // that subresource requests within nested contexts
+  // get upgraded as well. We also have to return
+  // the iframe context in case of an error so we
+  // can test both, using upgrade-insecure as well
+  // as the base case of not using upgrade-insecure.
+  if (queryString == "iframe-ok" || queryString == "iframe-error") {
+    response.write(IFRAME_CONTENT);
+  }
+
+  // if we have received all the requests, we return
+  // the result back.
+  if (totaltests == 0) {
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      var receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+      queryResponse.write(receivedQueries);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7159c742b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+def web_socket_do_extra_handshake(request):
+    pass
+
+
+def web_socket_transfer_data(request):
+    pass
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f6a67460e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.html
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<meta charset=utf-8>
+<head>
+<link rel="manifest" href="file_web_manifest.json">
+</head>
+<h1>Support Page for Web Manifest Tests</h1>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..917ab73ef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name": "loaded"}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e0e00c4be0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://example.org
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0ff9ef853
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.html
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<meta charset=utf-8>
+<link rel="manifest" href="https://example.com:443/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.json">
+<h1>Support Page for Web Manifest Tests</h1>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.json b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..917ab73ef2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_https.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"name": "loaded"}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55f17c0f92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<meta charset=utf-8>
+<head>
+<link
+  rel="manifest"
+  href="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?file=/test/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json&amp;cors=*">
+</head>
+<h1>Support Page for Web Manifest Tests</h1>
+<p>Used to try to load a resource over an insecure connection to trigger mixed content blocking.</p>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_remote.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_remote.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ecf8eec43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest_remote.html
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<meta charset=utf-8>
+<link rel="manifest"
+      crossorigin
+	  href="//mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?file=/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_web_manifest.json&amp;cors=*">
+
+<h1>Support Page for Web Manifest Tests</h1>
+<p>Loads a manifest from mochi.test:8888 with CORS set to "*".</p>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_csp_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_csp_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9302a6e637
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_csp_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <meta charset="utf-8">

+  <title>Bug 1729897: Allow unsecure websocket from localhost page with CSP: upgrade-insecure </title>

+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests">

+</head>

+<body>

+  <script type="application/javascript">

+    /* load socket using ws */

+    var wsSocket = new WebSocket("ws://localhost/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self");

+    wsSocket.onopen = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-ws-loaded", url: wsSocket.url}, "*");

+    };

+    wsSocket.onerror = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-ws-blocked"}, "*");

+    };

+  </script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_explicit.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_explicit.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51462ab741
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_explicit.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <meta charset="utf-8">

+  <title>Bug 1345615: Allow websocket schemes when using 'self' in CSP</title>

+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="connect-src ws:">

+</head>

+<body>

+  <script type="application/javascript">

+    /* load socket using ws */

+    var wsSocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self");

+    wsSocket.onopen = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "explicit-ws-loaded"}, "*");

+      wsSocket.close();

+    };

+    wsSocket.onerror = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "explicit-ws-blocked"}, "*");

+    };

+

+    /* load socket using wss */

+    var wssSocket = new WebSocket("wss://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self");

+    wssSocket.onopen = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "explicit-wss-loaded"}, "*");

+      wssSocket.close();

+    };

+    wssSocket.onerror = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "explicit-wss-blocked"}, "*");

+    };

+  </script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ff5f05580
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <meta charset="utf-8">

+  <title>Bug 1345615: Allow websocket schemes when using 'self' in CSP</title>

+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="connect-src 'self'">

+</head>

+<body>

+  <script type="application/javascript">

+    /* load socket using ws */

+    var wsSocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self");

+    wsSocket.onopen = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-ws-loaded"}, "*");

+      wsSocket.close();

+    };

+    wsSocket.onerror = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-ws-blocked"}, "*");

+    };

+

+    /* load socket using wss */

+    var wssSocket = new WebSocket("wss://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self");

+    wssSocket.onopen = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-wss-loaded"}, "*");

+      wssSocket.close();

+    };

+    wssSocket.onerror = function(e) {

+      window.parent.postMessage({result: "self-wss-blocked"}, "*");

+    };

+  </script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self_wsh.py b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self_wsh.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb45e224f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_websocket_self_wsh.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+def web_socket_do_extra_handshake(request):

+    pass

+

+

+def web_socket_transfer_data(request):

+    pass

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_win_open_blocked.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_win_open_blocked.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d0828a872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_win_open_blocked.html
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+<script>
+  window.opener.postMessage('window-opened', '*');
+</script>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_frameA.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_frameA.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e544142ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_frameA.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+frame A<br/>
+<iframe name='frameB' src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeB.html"></iframe>
+<iframe name='frameC' src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeC.html"></iframe>
+<iframe name='frameD' src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeD.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+window.onload = function() {
+  frameB.openWin();
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeB.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeB.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e7ef422313
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeB.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+subFrame B
+
+<script>
+function openWin() {
+  parent.frameC.open.call(parent.frameD, "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_win_open.html");
+}
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeC.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeC.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b97c40432e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeC.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="upgrade-insecure-requests">
+</head>
+<body>
+subFrame C
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeD.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeD.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f778ea4cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_subframeD.html
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+subFrame D
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_win_open.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_win_open.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0237e49377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_win_open.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+Opened Window<br/>
+
+<script>
+
+window.onload = function() {
+  window.opener.parent.parent.postMessage({result: window.location.href}, "*");
+  window.close();
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src.js b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf45ba4ec3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src.js
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+var mySharedWorker = new SharedWorker("file_spawn_shared_worker.js");
+mySharedWorker.port.onmessage = function(ev) {
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "shared-worker-allowed",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+  mySharedWorker.port.close();
+};
+mySharedWorker.onerror = function(evt) {
+  evt.preventDefault();
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "shared-worker-blocked",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+  mySharedWorker.port.close();
+};
+mySharedWorker.port.start();
+mySharedWorker.port.postMessage("foo");
+
+// --------------------------------------------
+
+let myWorker = new Worker("file_spawn_worker.js");
+myWorker.onmessage = function(event) {
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "worker-allowed",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+};
+myWorker.onerror = function(event) {
+  parent.postMessage(
+    {
+      result: "worker-blocked",
+      href: document.location.href,
+    },
+    "*"
+  );
+};
+
+// --------------------------------------------
+
+navigator.serviceWorker
+  .register("file_spawn_service_worker.js")
+  .then(function(reg) {
+    // registration worked
+    reg.unregister().then(function() {
+      parent.postMessage(
+        {
+          result: "service-worker-allowed",
+          href: document.location.href,
+        },
+        "*"
+      );
+    });
+  })
+  .catch(function(error) {
+    // registration failed
+    parent.postMessage(
+      {
+        result: "service-worker-blocked",
+        href: document.location.href,
+      },
+      "*"
+    );
+  });
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_child_governs.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_child_governs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ca8a683aac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_child_governs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="child-src https://example.com; script-src 'nonce-foo'">";
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="text/javascript" src="file_worker_src.js" nonce="foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_script_governs.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_script_governs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0385fee57c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_script_governs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="script-src 'nonce-foo' https://example.com">";
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="text/javascript" src="file_worker_src.js" nonce="foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_worker_governs.html b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_worker_governs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93c8f61225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_worker_src_worker_governs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="worker-src https://example.com; child-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-foo'">";
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="text/javascript" src="file_worker_src.js" nonce="foo"></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a6d99c3081
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_xslt_inherits_csp.xsl"?>
+
+<root>
+    <t>This is some Title</t>
+</root>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..635af0a4d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self'
+Cache-Control: no-cache
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xsl b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xsl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82a4b0ad97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/file_xslt_inherits_csp.xsl
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" version="1.1">
+    <xsl:output method="html"/>
+    <xsl:variable name="title" select="/root/t"/>
+    <xsl:template match="/">
+    <html>
+        <head>
+            <title>
+                <xsl:value-of select="$title"/>
+            </title>
+            <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"/>
+        </head>
+        <body>
+            <p>
+                Below is some inline JavaScript generating some red text.
+            </p>
+
+            <p id="bug"/>
+            <script>
+               document.body.append("JS DID EXCECUTE");
+            </script>
+
+            <a onClick='document.body.append("JS DID EXCECUTE");' href="#">link with lineOnClick</a>
+        </body>
+    </html>
+    </xsl:template>
+</xsl:stylesheet>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8957e3fd25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1475849: Test CSP worker inheritance</title>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <script type="application/javascript" src="worker_helper.js"></script>
+
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      const SJS = "worker.sjs";
+      const SAME_BASE = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs";
+      const CROSS_BASE = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_CSP.sjs";
+
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+      /* test data format :
+        {
+          id: test id, short description of test,
+          base: URL of the request in worker,
+          action: type of request in worker (fetch, xhr, importscript)
+          type: how do we create the worker, from URL or Blob,
+          csp: csp of worker,
+          child: how do we create the child worker, from URL or Blob,
+          childCsp: csp of child worker
+          expectedBlock: result when CSP policy, true or false
+        }
+      */
+
+      // Document's CSP is defined in main_csp_worker.html^headers^
+      // Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' blob: 'unsafe-inline'
+      var tests = [
+        // create new Worker(url), worker's csp should be deliveried from header.
+        // csp should be: default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src CROSS_BASE
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_fetch_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_importScripts_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_xhr_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_fetch_cross_good",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_xhr_cross_good",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+
+        // create new Worker(blob:), worker's csp should be inherited from
+        // document.
+        // csp should be : default-src 'self' blob: 'unsafe-inline'
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_fetch_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_xhr_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_importScripts_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_fetch_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_xhr_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+
+        // create parent worker from url, child worker from blob,
+        // Parent delivery csp then propagate to child
+        // csp should be: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_fetch_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_importScripts_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_xhr_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_fetch_cross_good",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_blob_xhr_cross_godd",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob: ; connect-src 'self' http://example.com",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+
+
+        // create parent worker from blob, child worker from blob,
+        // Csp: document->parent->child
+        // csp should be : default-src 'self' blob: 'unsafe-inline'
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_fetch_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_xhr_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_importScripts_same_good",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: false
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_fetch_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_xhr_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_blob_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "blob",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+
+        // create parent worker from url, child worker from url,
+        // child delivery csp from header
+        // csp should be : default-src 'none'
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_fetch_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_xhr_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_fetch_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "fetch",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_xhr_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_url_child_url_importScripts_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "url",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+
+        // create parent worker from blob, child worker from url,
+        // child delivery csp from header
+        // csp should be : default-src 'none'
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_fetch_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_xhr_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_importScripts_cross_bad",
+          base: CROSS_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_fetch_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "fetch",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_xhr_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          action: "xhr",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+        {
+          id: "worker_blob_child_url_importScripts_same_bad",
+          base: SAME_BASE,
+          action: "importScripts",
+          child: "url",
+          childCsp: "default-src 'none'",
+          type: "blob",
+          csp: "default-src 'self' blob:",
+          expectBlocked: true
+        },
+
+
+      ];
+
+      async function runWorkerTest(data) {
+        let src = SJS;
+        src += "?base=" + escape(data.base);
+        src += "&action=" + escape(data.action);
+        src += "&csp=" + escape(data.csp);
+        src += "&id=" + escape(data.id);
+
+        if (data.child) {
+          src += "&child=" + escape(data.child);
+        }
+
+        if (data.childCsp) {
+          src += "&childCsp=" + escape(data.childCsp);
+        }
+
+        switch (data.type) {
+          case "url":
+            new Worker(src);
+            break;
+
+          case "blob":
+            new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(await doXHRGetBlob(src)));
+            break;
+
+          default:
+            throw "Unsupport type";
+        }
+
+        let checkUri = data.base + "?id=" + data.id;
+        await assertCSPBlock(checkUri, data.expectBlocked);
+        runNextTest();
+      };
+
+      tests.forEach(function(test) {
+        addAsyncTest(async function() {
+          runWorkerTest(test);
+        });
+      });
+
+      runNextTest();
+    </script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4597e01040
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/main_csp_worker.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' blob: 'unsafe-inline'
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/csp/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..552fdf90f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,473 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_base_uri_server.sjs
+  file_blob_data_schemes.html
+  file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html
+  file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html^headers^
+  file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html
+  file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html^headers^
+  file_connect-src.html
+  file_connect-src-fetch.html
+  file_CSP.css
+  file_CSP.sjs
+  file_dummy_pixel.png
+  file_allow_https_schemes.html
+  file_bug663567.xsl
+  file_bug663567_allows.xml
+  file_bug663567_allows.xml^headers^
+  file_bug663567_blocks.xml
+  file_bug663567_blocks.xml^headers^
+  file_bug802872.html
+  file_bug802872.html^headers^
+  file_bug802872.js
+  file_bug802872.sjs
+  file_bug885433_allows.html
+  file_bug885433_allows.html^headers^
+  file_bug885433_blocks.html
+  file_bug885433_blocks.html^headers^
+  file_bug888172.html
+  file_bug888172.sjs
+  file_evalscript_main.js
+  file_evalscript_main_allowed.js
+  file_evalscript_main.html
+  file_evalscript_main.html^headers^
+  file_evalscript_main_allowed.html
+  file_evalscript_main_allowed.html^headers^
+  file_frameancestors_main.html
+  file_frameancestors_main.js
+  file_frameancestors.sjs
+  file_frameancestors_userpass.html
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_a.html
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_b.html
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_c.html^headers^
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html
+  file_frameancestors_userpass_frame_d.html^headers^
+  file_inlinescript.html
+  file_inlinestyle_main.html
+  file_inlinestyle_main.html^headers^
+  file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html
+  file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html^headers^
+  file_invalid_source_expression.html
+  file_main.html
+  file_main.html^headers^
+  file_main.js
+  file_web_manifest.html
+  file_web_manifest_remote.html
+  file_web_manifest_https.html
+  file_web_manifest.json
+  file_web_manifest.json^headers^
+  file_web_manifest_https.json
+  file_web_manifest_mixed_content.html
+  file_bug836922_npolicies.html
+  file_bug836922_npolicies.html^headers^
+  file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs
+  file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs
+  file_bug886164.html
+  file_bug886164.html^headers^
+  file_bug886164_2.html
+  file_bug886164_2.html^headers^
+  file_bug886164_3.html
+  file_bug886164_3.html^headers^
+  file_bug886164_4.html
+  file_bug886164_4.html^headers^
+  file_bug886164_5.html
+  file_bug886164_5.html^headers^
+  file_bug886164_6.html
+  file_bug886164_6.html^headers^
+  file_redirects_main.html
+  file_redirects_page.sjs
+  file_redirects_resource.sjs
+  file_bug910139.sjs
+  file_bug910139.xml
+  file_bug910139.xsl
+  file_bug909029_star.html
+  file_bug909029_star.html^headers^
+  file_bug909029_none.html
+  file_bug909029_none.html^headers^
+  file_bug1229639.html
+  file_bug1229639.html^headers^
+  file_bug1312272.html
+  file_bug1312272.js
+  file_bug1312272.html^headers^
+  file_bug1452037.html
+  file_bug1505412.sjs
+  file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs
+  file_bug1505412_frame.html
+  file_bug1505412_frame.html^headers^
+  file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html
+  file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html^headers^
+  file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy_policy
+  file_nonce_source.html
+  file_nonce_source.html^headers^
+  file_nonce_redirects.html
+  file_nonce_redirector.sjs
+  file_bug941404.html
+  file_bug941404_xhr.html
+  file_bug941404_xhr.html^headers^
+  file_frame_ancestors_ro.html
+  file_frame_ancestors_ro.html^headers^
+  file_hash_source.html
+  file_dual_header_testserver.sjs
+  file_hash_source.html^headers^
+  file_scheme_relative_sources.js
+  file_scheme_relative_sources.sjs
+  file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html
+  file_ignore_unsafe_inline_multiple_policies_server.sjs
+  file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html
+  file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html^headers^
+  file_empty_directive.html
+  file_empty_directive.html^headers^
+  file_path_matching.html
+  file_path_matching_incl_query.html
+  file_path_matching.js
+  file_path_matching_redirect.html
+  file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs
+  file_testserver.sjs
+  file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html
+  file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html^headers^
+  file_report.html
+  file_report_chromescript.js
+  file_redirect_content.sjs
+  file_redirect_report.sjs
+  file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html
+  file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html^headers^
+  file_leading_wildcard.html
+  file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html
+  file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html^headers^
+  file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html
+  file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html^headers^
+  file_null_baseuri.html
+  file_form-action.html
+  referrerdirective.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
+  file_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure_cors.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_cors_server.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_form.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_server.sjs
+  file_report_for_import.css
+  file_report_for_import.html
+  file_report_for_import_server.sjs
+  file_service_worker.html
+  file_service_worker.js
+  file_child-src_iframe.html
+  file_child-src_inner_frame.html
+  file_child-src_worker.html
+  file_child-src_worker_data.html
+  file_child-src_worker-redirect.html
+  file_child-src_worker.js
+  file_child-src_service_worker.html
+  file_child-src_service_worker.js
+  file_child-src_shared_worker.html
+  file_child-src_shared_worker_data.html
+  file_child-src_shared_worker-redirect.html
+  file_child-src_shared_worker.js
+  file_redirect_worker.sjs
+  file_meta_element.html
+  file_meta_header_dual.sjs
+  file_docwrite_meta.html
+  file_doccomment_meta.html
+  file_docwrite_meta.css
+  file_docwrite_meta.js
+  file_multipart_testserver.sjs
+  file_fontloader.sjs
+  file_fontloader.woff
+  file_block_all_mcb.sjs
+  file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation1.html
+  file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation2.html
+  file_form_action_server.sjs
+  !/image/test/mochitest/blue.png
+  file_meta_whitespace_skipping.html
+  file_ping.html
+  test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html^headers^
+  file_iframe_sandbox_document_write.html
+  file_sandbox_pass.js
+  file_sandbox_fail.js
+  file_sandbox_1.html
+  file_sandbox_2.html
+  file_sandbox_3.html
+  file_sandbox_4.html
+  file_sandbox_5.html
+  file_sandbox_6.html
+  file_sandbox_7.html
+  file_sandbox_8.html
+  file_sandbox_9.html
+  file_sandbox_10.html
+  file_sandbox_11.html
+  file_sandbox_12.html
+  file_sandbox_13.html
+  file_sendbeacon.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs
+  file_data-uri_blocked.html
+  file_data-uri_blocked.html^headers^
+  file_strict_dynamic_js_url.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_script_events.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_script_events_marquee.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html
+  file_strict_dynamic.js
+  file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write_correct_nonce.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted_inline.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_unsafe_eval.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_default_src.html
+  file_strict_dynamic_default_src.js
+  file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs
+  file_punycode_host_src.sjs
+  file_punycode_host_src.js
+  file_iframe_srcdoc.sjs
+  file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html
+  file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html^headers^
+  file_websocket_self.html
+  file_websocket_csp_upgrade.html
+  file_websocket_explicit.html
+  file_websocket_self_wsh.py
+  file_win_open_blocked.html
+  file_image_nonce.html
+  file_image_nonce.html^headers^
+  file_ignore_xfo.html
+  file_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
+  file_ro_ignore_xfo.html
+  file_ro_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
+  file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html
+  file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html^headers^
+  file_data_csp_inheritance.html
+  file_data_csp_merge.html
+  file_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html
+  file_report_font_cache-1.html
+  file_report_font_cache-2.html
+  file_report_font_cache-2.html^headers^
+  Ahem.ttf
+  file_independent_iframe_csp.html
+prefs =
+  security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content=false
+  javascript.options.experimental.shadow_realms=true
+
+[test_base-uri.html]
+[test_blob_data_schemes.html]
+[test_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html]
+skip-if = xorigin && os == "linux" && (asan || tsan) # alert should be blocked by CSP - got false, expected true
+[test_bug1777572.html]
+support-files = file_bug1777572.html
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # This unusual window.close/open test times out on Android.
+[test_connect-src.html]
+[test_CSP.html]
+[test_bug1452037.html]
+[test_allow_https_schemes.html]
+[test_bug663567.html]
+skip-if =
+  fission && xorigin && debug && os == "win"  # Bug 1716406 - New fission platform triage
+[test_bug802872.html]
+[test_bug885433.html]
+[test_bug888172.html]
+[test_bug1505412.html]
+skip-if = !debug
+[test_evalscript.html]
+[test_evalscript_blocked_by_strict_dynamic.html]
+[test_evalscript_allowed_by_strict_dynamic.html]
+[test_frameancestors.html]
+skip-if = xorigin # JavaScript error: http://mochi.xorigin-test:8888/tests/SimpleTest/TestRunner.js, line 157: SecurityError: Permission denied to access property "wrappedJSObject" on cross-origin object
+[test_frameancestors_userpass.html]
+[test_inlinescript.html]
+[test_inlinestyle.html]
+[test_invalid_source_expression.html]
+[test_bug836922_npolicies.html]
+skip-if = verify
+[test_bug886164.html]
+[test_redirects.html]
+[test_bug910139.html]
+skip-if = verify
+[test_bug909029.html]
+[test_bug1229639.html]
+[test_bug1579094.html]
+[test_frame_ancestors_ro.html]
+[test_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html]
+[test_nonce_source.html]
+[test_nonce_redirects.html]
+[test_bug941404.html]
+[test_form-action.html]
+[test_hash_source.html]
+skip-if =
+  fission && xorigin && debug  # Bug 1716406 - New fission platform triage
+[test_scheme_relative_sources.html]
+[test_ignore_unsafe_inline.html]
+skip-if = xorigin # JavaScript error: http://mochi.xorigin-test:8888/tests/SimpleTest/TestRunner.js, line 157: SecurityError: Permission denied to access property "wrappedJSObject" on cross-origin object, [Child 3789, Main Thread] WARNING: NS_ENSURE_TRUE(request) failed: file /builds/worker/checkouts/gecko/netwerk/base/nsLoadGroup.cpp, line 591
+[test_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html]
+[test_empty_directive.html]
+[test_path_matching.html]
+[test_path_matching_redirect.html]
+[test_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html]
+[test_report.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_301_redirect.html]
+[test_302_redirect.html]
+[test_303_redirect.html]
+[test_307_redirect.html]
+[test_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html]
+[test_leading_wildcard.html]
+[test_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html]
+[test_null_baseuri.html]
+[test_dual_header.html]
+[test_win_open_blocked.html]
+[test_upgrade_insecure.html]
+skip-if =
+  os == 'linux' && bits == 64 # Bug 1620516
+  os == "android" # Bug 1777028
+[test_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html]
+[test_upgrade_insecure_cors.html]
+[test_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html]
+[test_report_for_import.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_blocked_uri_in_reports.html]
+[test_service_worker.html]
+[test_child-src_worker.html]
+[test_child-src_worker_data.html]
+[test_child-src_worker-redirect.html]
+[test_child-src_iframe.html]
+[test_meta_element.html]
+[test_meta_header_dual.html]
+[test_docwrite_meta.html]
+[test_multipartchannel.html]
+[test_fontloader.html]
+[test_block_all_mixed_content.html]
+tags = mcb
+[test_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation.html]
+tags = mcb
+[test_form_action_blocks_url.html]
+[test_meta_whitespace_skipping.html]
+[test_iframe_sandbox.html]
+skip-if =
+  fission && xorigin && debug && (os == "win" || os == "linux")  # Bug 1716406 - New fission platform triage
+[test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html]
+[test_sandbox.html]
+skip-if = true # Bug 1657934
+[test_ping.html]
+[test_sendbeacon.html]
+[test_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.html]
+[test_bug1242019.html]
+[test_bug1312272.html]
+[test_strict_dynamic.html]
+[test_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted.html]
+[test_strict_dynamic_default_src.html]
+[test_upgrade_insecure_navigation.html]
+[test_punycode_host_src.html]
+[test_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html]
+skip-if =
+  fission && xorigin && debug && os == "win"  # Bug 1716406 - New fission platform triage
+[test_iframe_srcdoc.html]
+[test_image_nonce.html]
+[test_websocket_self.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no websocket support Bug 982828
+[test_websocket_localhost.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no websocket support Bug 982828
+[test_ignore_xfo.html]
+skip-if = xorigin # JavaScript error: http://mochi.xorigin-test:8888/tests/SimpleTest/TestRunner.js, line 157: SecurityError: Permission denied to access property "wrappedJSObject" on cross-origin object
+[test_data_csp_inheritance.html]
+[test_data_csp_merge.html]
+[test_report_font_cache.html]
+[test_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html]
+[test_meta_csp_self.html]
+[test_uir_top_nav.html]
+support-files =
+  file_uir_top_nav.html
+  file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html
+[test_sandbox_allow_scripts.html]
+support-files =
+  file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html
+  file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html^headers^
+[test_worker_src.html]
+support-files =
+  file_worker_src_worker_governs.html
+  file_worker_src_child_governs.html
+  file_worker_src_script_governs.html
+  file_worker_src.js
+  file_spawn_worker.js
+  file_spawn_shared_worker.js
+  file_spawn_service_worker.js
+[test_frame_src.html]
+support-files =
+  file_frame_src_frame_governs.html
+  file_frame_src_child_governs.html
+  file_frame_src.js
+  file_frame_src_inner.html
+[test_security_policy_violation_event.html]
+[test_csp_worker_inheritance.html]
+support-files =
+  worker.sjs
+  worker_helper.js
+  main_csp_worker.html
+  main_csp_worker.html^headers^
+[test_nonce_snapshot.html]
+support-files =
+  file_nonce_snapshot.sjs
+[test_uir_windowwatcher.html]
+support-files =
+  file_windowwatcher_frameA.html
+  file_windowwatcher_subframeB.html
+  file_windowwatcher_subframeC.html
+  file_windowwatcher_subframeD.html
+  file_windowwatcher_win_open.html
+[test_script_template.html]
+support-files =
+  file_script_template.html
+  file_script_template.js
+[test_parent_location_js.html]
+support-files =
+  file_parent_location_js.html
+  file_iframe_parent_location_js.html
+[test_navigate_to.html]
+support-files =
+  file_navigate_to.sjs
+  file_navigate_to_request.html
+[test_independent_iframe_csp.html]
+[test_xslt_inherits_csp.html]
+support-files =
+  file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml
+  file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml^headers^
+  file_xslt_inherits_csp.xsl
+[test_object_inherit.html]
+support-files =
+  file_object_inherit.html
+[test_link_rel_preload.html]
+support-files =
+  file_link_rel_preload.html
+[test_image_document.html]
+support-files =
+  file_image_document_pixel.png
+  file_image_document_pixel.png^headers^
+[test_svg_inline_style.html]
+support-files =
+  file_svg_inline_style_base.html
+  file_svg_inline_style_csp.html
+  file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs
+[test_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.html]
+support-files =
+  file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_same_origin.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_cross_origin.html
+[test_csp_style_src_empty_hash.html]
+[test_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html]
+support-files =
+  file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html
+  file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html^headers^
+[test_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html]
+support-files =
+  file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html
+  file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html^headers^
+  file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src_server.sjs
+[test_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html]
+support-files =
+  file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html
+  file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs
+[test_bug1738418.html]
+support-files =
+  file_bug1738418_parent.html
+  file_bug1738418_parent.html^headers^
+  file_bug1738418_child.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/referrerdirective.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/referrerdirective.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..071def0cdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/referrerdirective.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// Used for bug 965727 to serve up really simple scripts reflecting the
+// referrer sent to load this back to the loader.
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // skip speculative loads.
+
+  var splits = request.queryString.split("&");
+  var params = {};
+  splits.forEach(function(v) {
+    let parts = v.split("=");
+    params[parts[0]] = unescape(parts[1]);
+  });
+
+  var loadType = params.type;
+  var referrerLevel = "error";
+
+  if (request.hasHeader("Referer")) {
+    var referrer = request.getHeader("Referer");
+    if (referrer.indexOf("file_testserver.sjs") > -1) {
+      referrerLevel = "full";
+    } else {
+      referrerLevel = "origin";
+    }
+  } else {
+    referrerLevel = "none";
+  }
+
+  var theScript =
+    'window.postResult("' + loadType + '", "' + referrerLevel + '");';
+  response.setHeader(
+    "Content-Type",
+    "application/javascript; charset=utf-8",
+    false
+  );
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.method != "OPTIONS") {
+    response.write(theScript);
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_301_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_301_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0aaed5bcf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_301_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+Test that CSP violation reports are not sent when a 301 redirect is encountered
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 650386</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386">Mozilla Bug 650386</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+<iframe id = "content_iframe"></iframe>
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+/** Test for Bug 650386 **/
+
+// This is used to watch the redirect of the report POST get blocked
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // this is used to fail the test - if we see the POST to the target of the redirect
+      // we know this is a fail
+      var uri = data;
+      if (uri == "http://example.com/some/fake/path")
+        window.done(false);
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // something was blocked, but we are looking specifically for the redirect being blocked
+      if (data == "denied redirect while sending violation report")
+        window.done(true);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// result == true if we saw the redirect blocked notify, false if we saw the post
+// to the redirect target go out
+window.done = function(result) {
+  ok(result, "a 301 redirect when posting violation report should be blocked");
+
+  // clean up observers and finish the test
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('content_iframe').src = 'file_redirect_content.sjs?301';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_302_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_302_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..330c1a64e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_302_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+Test that CSP violation reports are not sent when a 302 redirect is encountered
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 650386</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386">Mozilla Bug 650386</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+<iframe id = "content_iframe"></iframe>
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+/** Test for Bug 650386 **/
+
+// This is used to watch the redirect of the report POST get blocked
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // this is used to fail the test - if we see the POST to the target of the redirect
+      // we know this is a fail
+      var uri = data;
+      if (uri == "http://example.com/some/fake/path")
+        window.done(false);
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // something was blocked, but we are looking specifically for the redirect being blocked
+      if (data == "denied redirect while sending violation report")
+        window.done(true);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// result == true if we saw the redirect blocked notify, false if we saw the post
+// to the redirect target go out
+window.done = function(result) {
+  ok(result, "a 302 redirect when posting violation report should be blocked");
+
+  // clean up observers and finish the test
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('content_iframe').src = 'file_redirect_content.sjs?302';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_303_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_303_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ecff523967
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_303_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+Test that CSP violation reports are not sent when a 303 redirect is encountered
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 650386</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386">Mozilla Bug 650386</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+<iframe id = "content_iframe"></iframe>
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+/** Test for Bug 650386 **/
+
+// This is used to watch the redirect of the report POST get blocked
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // this is used to fail the test - if we see the POST to the target of the redirect
+      // we know this is a fail
+      var uri = data;
+      if (uri == "http://example.com/some/fake/path")
+        window.done(false);
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // something was blocked, but we are looking specifically for the redirect being blocked
+      if (data == "denied redirect while sending violation report")
+        window.done(true);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// result == true if we saw the redirect blocked notify, false if we saw the post
+// to the redirect target go out
+window.done = function(result) {
+  ok(result, "a 303 redirect when posting violation report should be blocked");
+
+  // clean up observers and finish the test
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('content_iframe').src = 'file_redirect_content.sjs?303';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_307_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_307_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40ebd592b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_307_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386
+Test that CSP violation reports are not sent when a 307 redirect is encountered
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 650386</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=650386">Mozilla Bug 650386</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+<iframe id = "content_iframe"></iframe>
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+/** Test for Bug 650386 **/
+
+// This is used to watch the redirect of the report POST get blocked
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // this is used to fail the test - if we see the POST to the target of the redirect
+      // we know this is a fail
+      var uri = data;
+      if (uri == "http://example.com/some/fake/path")
+        window.done(false);
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // something was blocked, but we are looking specifically for the redirect being blocked
+      if (data == "denied redirect while sending violation report")
+        window.done(true);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// result == true if we saw the redirect blocked notify, false if we saw the post
+// to the redirect target go out
+window.done = function(result) {
+  ok(result, "a 307 redirect when posting violation report should be blocked");
+
+  // clean up observers and finish the test
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('content_iframe').src = 'file_redirect_content.sjs?307';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_CSP.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_CSP.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..babb9db9bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_CSP.html
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy Connections</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+window.tests = {
+  img_good: -1,
+  img_bad: -1,
+  style_good: -1,
+  style_bad: -1,
+  frame_good: -1,
+  frame_bad: -1,
+  script_good: -1,
+  script_bad: -1,
+  xhr_good: -1,
+  xhr_bad: -1,
+  fetch_good: -1,
+  fetch_bad: -1,
+  beacon_good: -1,
+  beacon_bad: -1,
+  media_good: -1,
+  media_bad: -1,
+  font_good: -1,
+  font_bad: -1,
+  object_good: -1,
+  object_bad: -1,
+};
+
+SpecialPowers.registerObservers("csp-on-violate-policy");
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be stopped!
+
+    // This is a special observer topic that is proxied from
+    // http-on-modify-request in the parent process to inform us when a URI is
+    // loaded
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_good/.test(testid),
+                        uri + " allowed by csp");
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy" ||
+        topic === "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_bad/.test(testid),
+                        asciiSpec + " blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+  // test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.tests[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  ok(testname in window.tests, "It's a real test");
+  window.tests[testname] = result;
+  is(result, true, testname + ' test: ' + msg);
+
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in window.tests)
+    if(tests[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+  {'set':[// On a cellular connection the default preload value is 0 ("preload
+          // none"). Our Android emulators emulate a cellular connection, and
+          // so by default preload no media data. This causes the media_* tests
+          // to timeout. We set the default used by cellular connections to the
+          // same as used by non-cellular connections in order to get
+          // consistent behavior across platforms/devices.
+          ["media.preload.default", 2],
+          ["media.preload.default.cellular", 2]]},
+    function() {
+      // save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+      // ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+      document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_main.html';
+    });
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_allow_https_schemes.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_allow_https_schemes.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be1f030fb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_allow_https_schemes.html
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 826805 - Allow http and https for scheme-less sources</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We are loading the following url (including a fragment portion):
+ *   https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js#foo
+ * using different policies that lack specification of a scheme.
+ *
+ * Since the file is served over http:, the upgrade to https should be
+ * permitted by CSP in case no port is specified.
+ */
+
+var policies = [
+  ["allowed", "example.com"],
+  ["allowed", "example.com:443"],
+  ["allowed", "example.com:80"],
+  ["allowed", "http://*:80"],
+  ["allowed", "https://*:443"],
+  // our testing framework only supports :80 and :443, but
+  // using :8000 in a policy does the trick for the test.
+  ["blocked", "example.com:8000"],
+]
+
+var counter = 0;
+var policy;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == policies.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+  else {
+    policy = policies[counter++];
+    var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+    // append the file that should be served
+    src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_allow_https_schemes.html");
+    // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+    src += "&csp=" + escape("default-src 'none'; script-src " + policy[1]);
+
+    document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+  }
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, policy[0], "should be " + policy[0] + " in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_base-uri.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_base-uri.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d5c5504af
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_base-uri.html
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1045897 - Test CSP base-uri directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load a page in an iframe (served over http://example.com) that tries to
+ * modify the 'base' either through setting or also removing the base-uri. We
+ * load that page using different policies and verify that setting the base-uri
+ * is correctly blocked by CSP.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  { csp: "base-uri http://mochi.test;",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "",
+    action: "enforce-csp",
+    result: "http://mochi.test",
+    desc: "CSP allows base uri" 
+  },
+  { csp: "base-uri http://example.com;",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "",
+    action: "enforce-csp",
+    result: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "CSP blocks base uri"
+  },
+  { csp: "base-uri https:",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "",
+    action: "enforce-csp",
+    result: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "CSP blocks http base"
+  },
+  { csp: "base-uri 'none'",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "",
+    action: "enforce-csp",
+    result: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "CSP allows no base modification"
+  },
+  { csp: "",
+    base1: "http://foo:foo/",
+    base2: "",
+    action: "enforce-csp",
+    result: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "Invalid base should be ignored"
+  },
+  { csp: "base-uri http://mochi.test",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "http://test1.example.com",
+    action: "remove-base1",
+    result: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "Removing first base should result in fallback base"
+  },
+  { csp: "",
+    base1: "http://mochi.test",
+    base2: "http://test1.example.com",
+    action: "remove-base1",
+    result: "http://test1.example.com",
+    desc: "Removing first base should result in the second base"
+  },
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  var result = event.data.result;
+  // we only care about the base uri, so instead of comparing the complete uri
+  // we just make sure that the base is correct which is sufficient here.
+  ok(result.startsWith(tests[counter].result), 
+     `${tests[counter].desc}: Expected a base URI that starts
+      with ${tests[counter].result} but got ${result}`);
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  var src = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_base_uri_server.sjs";
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  // please note that we have to include 'unsafe-inline' to permit sending the postMessage
+  src += "?csp=" + escape("script-src 'unsafe-inline'; " + tests[counter].csp);
+  // append potential base tags
+  src += "&base1=" + escape(tests[counter].base1);
+  src += "&base2=" + escape(tests[counter].base2);
+  // append potential action
+  src += "&action=" + escape(tests[counter].action);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_data_schemes.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_data_schemes.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..37a22db050
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_data_schemes.html
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1086999 - Wildcard should not match blob:, data:</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an image using a data: and a blob: scheme and make
+ * sure a CSP containing a single ASTERISK (*) does not allowlist
+ * those loads. The single ASTERISK character should not match a
+ * URI's scheme of a type designating globally unique identifier
+ * (such as blob:, data:, or filesystem:)
+ */
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    policy : "default-src 'unsafe-inline' blob: data:",
+    expected : "allowed",
+  },
+  {
+    policy : "default-src 'unsafe-inline' *",
+    expected : "blocked"
+  }
+];
+
+var testIndex = 0;
+var messageCounter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+// onError handler is over-reporting, hence we make sure that
+// we get an error for both testcases: data and blob before we
+// move on to the next test.
+var dataRan = false;
+var blobRan = false;
+
+// a postMessage handler to communicate the results back to the parent.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event)
+{
+  is(event.data.result, curTest.expected, event.data.scheme + " should be " + curTest.expected);
+
+  if (event.data.scheme === "data") {
+    dataRan = true;
+  }
+  if (event.data.scheme === "blob") {
+    blobRan = true;
+  }
+  if (dataRan && blobRan) {
+    loadNextTest();
+  }
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (testIndex === tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  dataRan = false;
+  blobRan = false;
+
+  curTest = tests[testIndex++];
+  // reset the messageCounter to make sure we receive all the postMessages from the iframe
+  messageCounter = 0;
+
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blob_data_schemes.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f8de94ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1432170  - Block alert box and new window open as per the sandbox
+         allow-scripts CSP</title>
+  <script type="application/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js">
+  </script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script>
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We apply the sanbox allow-scripts CSP to the blob iframe and check
+ * if the alert box and new window open is blocked correctly by the CSP.
+ */
+var testsToRun = {
+  block_window_open_test: false,
+  block_alert_test: false,
+  block_top_nav_alert_test: false,
+};
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that alert dialogue is blocked");
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  switch (event.data.test) {
+    case "block_window_open_test":
+      testsToRun.block_window_open_test = true;
+      break;
+    case "block_alert_test":
+      is(event.data.msg, "alert blocked by CSP", "alert blocked by CSP");
+      testsToRun.block_alert_test = true;
+      break;
+    case "block_top_nav_alert_test":
+      testsToRun.block_top_nav_alert_test = true;
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+var w;
+// Set "privacy.partition.bloburl_per_agent_cluster" to false until Bug 1667348 is fixed.
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  set: [["privacy.partition.bloburl_per_agent_cluster", false]]}, () => {
+    // start the test
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_blob_uri_blocks_modals.html";
+    w = window.open("file_blob_top_nav_block_modals.html");
+});
+
+// If alert window is not blocked by CSP then event message is not recieved and
+// test fails after setTimeout interval of 1 second.
+setTimeout(function () {
+    is(testsToRun.block_top_nav_alert_test, true,
+      "blob top nav alert should be blocked by CSP");
+    testsToRun.block_top_nav_alert_test = true;
+    is(testsToRun.block_alert_test, true,
+      "alert should be blocked by CSP");
+    testsToRun.block_alert_test = true;
+    checkTestsCompleted();
+  },1000);
+
+function checkTestsCompleted() {
+  for (var prop in testsToRun) {
+    // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+    if (!testsToRun[prop]) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  w.close();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d60f904b6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content.html
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the tests:
+ * Test 1:
+ * We load mixed display content in a frame using the CSP
+ * directive 'block-all-mixed-content' and observe that the image is blocked.
+ *
+ * Test 2:
+ * We load mixed display content in a frame using a CSP that allows the load
+ * and observe that the image is loaded.
+ *
+ * Test 3:
+ * We load mixed display content in a frame not using a CSP at all
+ * and observe that the image is loaded.
+ *
+ * Test 4:
+ * We load mixed display content in a frame using the CSP
+ * directive 'block-all-mixed-content' and observe that the image is blocked.
+ * Please note that Test 3 loads the image we are about to load in Test 4 into
+ * the img cache. Let's make sure the cached (mixed display content) image is
+ * not allowed to be loaded.
+ */
+
+const BASE_URI = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+const tests = [
+  { // Test 1
+    query: "csp-block",
+    expected: "img-blocked",
+    description: "(csp-block) block-all-mixed content should block mixed display content"
+  },
+  { // Test 2
+    query: "csp-allow",
+    expected: "img-loaded",
+    description: "(csp-allow) mixed display content should be loaded"
+  },
+  { // Test 3
+    query: "no-csp",
+    expected: "img-loaded",
+    description: "(no-csp) mixed display content should be loaded"
+  },
+  { // Test 4
+    query: "csp-block",
+    expected: "img-blocked",
+    description: "(csp-block) block-all-mixed content should block insecure cache loads"
+  },
+  { // Test 5
+    query: "cspro-block",
+    expected: "img-loaded",
+    description: "(cspro-block) block-all-mixed in report only mode should not block"
+  },
+];
+
+var curTest;
+var counter = -1;
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  is(result, curTest.expected, curTest.description);
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = tests[counter];
+  testframe.src =   BASE_URI + "file_block_all_mcb.sjs?" + curTest.query;
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+  { 'set': [["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", false]] },
+  function() { loadNextTest(); }
+);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b32c1fccd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ *
+ * http://a.com embeds https://b.com.
+ * https://b.com has a CSP using 'block-all-mixed-content'.
+ *   | site | http://a.com
+ *   | embeds | https://b.com (uses block-all-mixed-content)
+ *
+ * The user navigates the embedded frame from
+ * https://b.com -> http://c.com.
+ * The test makes sure that such a navigation is not blocked
+ * by block-all-mixed-content.
+ */
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  is(result, "frame-navigated", "frame should be allowed to be navigated");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+// http://a.com loads https://b.com
+document.getElementById("testframe").src =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_block_all_mixed_content_frame_navigation1.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_reports.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_reports.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f40d98efc5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_reports.html
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1069762 - Check blocked-uri in csp-reports after redirect</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We try to load a script from:
+ *   http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs
+ * which gets redirected to:
+ *  http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security//test/csp/file_path_matching.js
+ *
+ * The blocked-uri in the csp-report should be the original URI:
+ *   http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs
+ * instead of the redirected URI:
+ *  http://test1.example.com/tests/com/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js
+ *
+ * see also: http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP/#violation-reports
+ *
+ * Note, that we reuse the test-setup from
+ * test_path_matching_redirect.html
+ */
+
+const reportURI = "http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs";
+const policy = "script-src http://example.com; report-uri " + reportURI;
+const testfile = "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect.html";
+
+var chromeScriptUrl = SimpleTest.getTestFileURL("file_report_chromescript.js");
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(chromeScriptUrl);
+
+script.addMessageListener('opening-request-completed', function ml(msg) {
+  if (msg.error) {
+    ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + msg.error + ")");
+  } else {
+    try {
+      var reportObj = JSON.parse(msg.report);
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "Could not parse JSON (exception: " + e + ")");
+    }
+    try {
+      var cspReport = reportObj["csp-report"];
+      // blocked-uri should only be the asciiHost instead of:
+      // http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js
+      is(cspReport["blocked-uri"], "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect_server.sjs", "Incorrect blocked-uri");
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + e + ")");
+    }
+  }
+
+  script.removeMessageListener('opening-request-completed', ml);
+  script.sendAsyncMessage("finish");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function runTest() {
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape(testfile);
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("cspframe").src = src;
+}
+
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6965cbeb92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1542194 - Check blockedURI in violation reports after redirects</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe id='testframe'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let seenViolations = 0;
+let expectedViolations = 3;
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+
+  seenViolations++;
+
+  let blockedURI = event.data.blockedURI;
+
+  if (blockedURI.includes("test1")) {
+    is(blockedURI,
+       "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.sjs?test1a",
+       "Test 1 should be the URI before redirect");
+  } else if (blockedURI.includes("test2")) {
+    is(blockedURI,
+      "http://test2.example.com",
+      "Test 2 should be the redirected pre-path URI");
+  } else if (blockedURI.includes("test3")) {
+    is(blockedURI,
+      "http://test3.example.com",
+      "Test 3 should be the redirected pre-path URI");
+  } else {
+  	ok(false, "sanity: how can we end up here?");
+  }
+
+  if (seenViolations < expectedViolations) {
+  	return;
+  }
+
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+// This has to be same-origin with the test1 URL.
+testframe.src = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_blocked_uri_in_violation_event_after_redirects.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a946718bc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1687342 - Check blocked-uri in csp-reports after frame redirect</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe id='testframe'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+ /* Description of the test:
+  * We load a document from http://mochi.test with a CSP of `frame-src example.com`.
+  * We then load an iframe from example.com which redirects to test1.example.com and
+  * ensure that the report-uri is the origin of the frame before the blocked redirect.
+  */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const BLOCKED_URI = "http://example.com";
+
+var chromeScriptUrl = SimpleTest.getTestFileURL("file_report_chromescript.js");
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(chromeScriptUrl);
+
+script.addMessageListener('opening-request-completed', function ml(msg) {
+  if (msg.error) {
+    ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + msg.error + ")");
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    var reportObj = JSON.parse(msg.report);
+  } catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Could not parse JSON (exception: " + e + ")");
+  }
+  try {
+    var cspReport = reportObj["csp-report"];
+    is(cspReport["blocked-uri"], BLOCKED_URI, "Incorrect blocked-uri");
+  } catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + e + ")");
+  }
+
+  script.removeMessageListener('opening-request-completed', ml);
+  script.sendAsyncMessage("finish");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function runTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = "file_blocked_uri_redirect_frame_src.html";
+}
+
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1229639.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1229639.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e224fe1ffb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1229639.html
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1229639 - Percent encoded CSP path matching.</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (data === 'http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/%24.js') {
+      is(topic, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+      this.remove();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_bug1229639.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1242019.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1242019.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..14e8f74baa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1242019.html
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242019
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 1242019</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1242019">Mozilla Bug 1242019</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+
+<iframe id="cspframe"></iframe>
+
+<pre id="test">
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+function cleanup() {
+  SpecialPowers.postConsoleSentinel();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+};
+
+var expectedURI = ""
+
+SpecialPowers.registerConsoleListener(function ConsoleMsgListener(aMsg) {
+  // look for the message with data uri and see the data uri is truncated to 40 chars
+  data_start = aMsg.message.indexOf(expectedURI) 
+  if (data_start > -1) {
+    data_uri = "";
+    data_uri = aMsg.message.substr(data_start);
+    // this will either match the elipsis after the URI or the . at the end of the message
+    data_uri = data_uri.substr(0, data_uri.indexOf("…"));
+    if (data_uri == "") {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    ok(data_uri.length == 40, "Data URI only shows 40 characters in the console");
+    SimpleTest.executeSoon(cleanup);
+  }
+});
+
+// set up and start testing
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_data-uri_blocked.html';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1312272.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1312272.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b06b08d092
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1312272.html
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+
+  <title>Test for bug 1312272</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="cspframe" style="width:100%"></iframe>
+
+<script type="text/javascript">
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+function handler(evt) {
+  console.log(evt);
+  if (evt.data === "finish") {
+    ok(true, 'Other events continue to work fine.')
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    //removeEventListener('message', handler);
+  } else {
+    ok(false, "Should not get any other message")
+  }
+}
+var cspframe = document.getElementById("cspframe");
+cspframe.src = "file_bug1312272.html";
+addEventListener("message", handler);
+console.log("assignign frame");
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1388015.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1388015.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ca0605688
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1388015.html
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+    <title>Bug 1388015 - Test if Firefox respect Port in Wildcard Host </title>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src https://*:443">
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+    <img alt="Should be Blocked">
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+        SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+        let image = document.querySelector("img");
+
+        Promise.race([
+            new Promise((res) => {
+                window.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", () => res(true), {once:true});
+            }),
+            new Promise((res) => {
+                image.addEventListener("load", () => res(false),{once:true});
+            })])
+        .then((result) => {
+                ok(result, " CSP did block Image with wildcard and mismatched Port");
+        })
+        .then(()=> Promise.race([
+            new Promise((res) => {
+                window.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", () => res(false), {once:true});
+            }),
+            new Promise((res) => {
+                image.addEventListener("load", () => res(true),{once:true});
+                requestIdleCallback(()=>{
+                    image.src = "https://example.com:443/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_dummy_pixel.png"
+                })
+            })]))
+        .then((result) => {
+                ok(result, " CSP did load the Image with wildcard and  matching Port");
+                SimpleTest.finish();
+        })
+        image.src = "file_dummy_pixel.png" // mochi.test:8888
+    </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1452037.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1452037.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fa46e91291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1452037.html
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test if "script-src: sha-... " Allowlists "javascript:" URIs</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+    <iframe></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody">
+      SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+      let frame = document.querySelector("iframe");
+
+      window.addEventListener("message", (msg) => {
+        ok(false, "The CSP did not block javascript:uri");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      });
+
+      document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", () => {
+        ok(true, "The CSP did block javascript:uri");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      });
+
+      frame.addEventListener("load", () => {
+        let link = frame.contentWindow.document.querySelector("a");
+        frame.contentWindow.document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", () => {
+          ok(true, "The CSP did block javascript:uri");
+          SimpleTest.finish();
+        })
+        link.click();
+      });
+      frame.src = "file_bug1452037.html";
+
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1505412.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1505412.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..717af2054b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1505412.html
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+    <title> Bug 1505412 CSP-RO reports violations in inline-scripts with nonce</title>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js" nonce="foobar"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+
+
+<body>
+    <p id="display"></p>
+    <div id="content" style="display: none">
+    </div>
+
+    <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1505412">Test for 1505412 </a>
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript" nonce="foobar">
+        /* Description of the test:
+            1:  We setup a Proxy that will cause the Test to Fail
+                if Firefox sends a CSP-Report to /report
+            2:  We Load an iframe with has a Script pointing to
+                file_bug1505412.sjs 
+            3:  The Preloader will fetch the file and Gets redirected
+            4:  If correct, the File should be loaded and no CSP-Report 
+                should be send.  
+        */
+
+
+
+        SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+        SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();
+        SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(2); // Or might fail for Linux-Debug in some cases.
+        var script;
+      
+       window.addEventListener("load",()=>{
+        let t = document.querySelector("#target");
+        t.src = "file_bug1505412_frame.html";
+        t.addEventListener("load",async  () => {
+            let reportCount = await fetch("file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs?state").then(r => r.text());
+            info(reportCount);
+            ok(reportCount == 0 , "Script Loaded without CSP beeing triggered");
+            await fetch("file_bug1505412_reporter.sjs?flush"); 
+            SimpleTest.finish();
+        });
+       })
+
+    </script>
+    <iframe id="target" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+</body>
+
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1579094.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1579094.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3568586d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1579094.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test if Wildcard CSP supports ExternalProtocol</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  <meta meta http-equiv="Content-security-policy" content="frame-src SomeExternalProto://*">
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+    document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation",()=>{
+        ok(false, "Error: ExternalProtocol Was blocked");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+    });
+
+    window.addEventListener("load", ()=>{
+        ok(true, "Error: ExternalProtocol was passed");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+    });
+</script>
+
+<iframe src="SomeExternalProto:foo@bar.com">
+
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1738418.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1738418.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fdc723b80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1738418.html
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1738418: CSP sandbox for embed/object frames</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var elements = new Set(["iframe", "embed", "object"]);
+
+window.addEventListener("message", event => {
+  is(event.data.domain, "", `document in <${event.data.element}> should have sandboxed origin`);
+  elements.delete(event.data.element);
+  if (elements.size == 0) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+});
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_bug1738418_parent.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1777572.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1777572.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f735f4fb6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug1777572.html
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>bug 1777572</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script>
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  async function testCSPInheritance(closeOpenerWindow) {
+    let url = "file_bug1777572.html";
+    if (closeOpenerWindow) {
+      url += "?close";
+    }
+    let win = window.open(url);
+    return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+        ok(event.data.includes("img-src"), "Got expected data " + event.data);
+        resolve();
+      }, { once: true});
+    });
+  }
+
+  async function run() {
+    // Test that CSP inheritance to the initial about:blank works the same way
+    // whether or not the opener is already closed when window.open is called.
+    await testCSPInheritance(false);
+    await testCSPInheritance(true);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body onload="run()">
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+<pre id="test"></pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug663567.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug663567.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..137d459654
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug663567.html
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test if XSLT stylesheet is subject to document's CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='xsltframe'></iframe>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='xsltframe2'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// define the expected output of this test
+var header = "this xml file should be formatted using an xsl file(lower iframe should contain xml dump)!";
+
+var finishedTests = 0;
+var numberOfTests = 2;
+
+var checkExplicitFinish = function() {
+  finishedTests++;
+  if (finishedTests == numberOfTests) {
+     SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+function checkAllowed () {
+  /*   The policy for this test is:
+   *   Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
+   *
+   *   we load the xsl file using:
+   *   <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug663467.xsl"?>
+   */
+  try {
+    var cspframe = document.getElementById('xsltframe');
+    var xsltAllowedHeader = cspframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('xsltheader').innerHTML;
+    is(xsltAllowedHeader, header, "XSLT loaded from 'self' should be allowed!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Error: could not access content in xsltframe!")
+  }
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}
+
+function checkBlocked () {
+  /*   The policy for this test is:
+   *   Content-Security-Policy: default-src *.example.com
+   *
+   *   we load the xsl file using:
+   *   <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug663467.xsl"?>
+   */
+  try {
+    var cspframe = document.getElementById('xsltframe2');
+    var xsltBlockedHeader = cspframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('xsltheader');
+    is(xsltBlockedHeader, null, "XSLT loaded from different host should be blocked!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Error: could not access content in xsltframe2!")
+  }
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById('xsltframe').addEventListener('load', checkAllowed);
+document.getElementById('xsltframe').src = 'file_bug663567_allows.xml';
+
+document.getElementById('xsltframe2').addEventListener('load', checkBlocked);
+document.getElementById('xsltframe2').src = 'file_bug663567_blocks.xml';
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug802872.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug802872.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..956159ddcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug802872.html
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 802872</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='eventframe'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var finishedTests = 0;
+var numberOfTests = 2;
+
+var checkExplicitFinish = function () {
+  finishedTests++;
+  if (finishedTests == numberOfTests) {
+     SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+// add event listeners for CSP-permitted EventSrc callbacks
+addEventListener('allowedEventSrcCallbackOK', function (e) {
+  ok(true, "OK: CSP allows EventSource for allowlisted domain!");
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}, false);
+addEventListener('allowedEventSrcCallbackFailed', function (e) {
+  ok(false, "Error: CSP blocks EventSource for allowlisted domain!");
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}, false);
+
+// add event listeners for CSP-blocked EventSrc callbacks
+addEventListener('blockedEventSrcCallbackOK', function (e) {
+  ok(false, "Error: CSP allows EventSource to not allowlisted domain!");
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}, false);
+addEventListener('blockedEventSrcCallbackFailed', function (e) {
+  ok(true, "OK: CSP blocks EventSource for not allowlisted domain!");
+  checkExplicitFinish();
+}, false);
+
+// load it
+document.getElementById('eventframe').src = 'file_bug802872.html';
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug836922_npolicies.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug836922_npolicies.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e418969e3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug836922_npolicies.html
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy multiple policy support (regular and Report-Only mode)</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+// These are test results: verified indicates whether or not the test has run.
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+window.loads = {
+  css_self: {expected: true, verified: false},
+  img_self: {expected: false, verified: false},
+  script_self: {expected: true, verified: false},
+};
+
+window.violation_reports = {
+  css_self:
+  {expected: 0, expected_ro: 0},  /* totally fine */
+  img_self:
+  {expected: 1, expected_ro: 0},  /* violates enforced CSP */
+  script_self:
+  {expected: 0, expected_ro: 1},  /* violates report-only */
+};
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.  This also watches for violation reports to go out.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+
+      // violation reports don't come through here, but the requested resources do
+      // if the test has already finished, move on.  Some things throw multiple
+      // requests (preloads and such)
+      try {
+        if (window.loads[testid].verified) return;
+      } catch(e) { return; }
+
+      // these are requests that were allowed by CSP
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid, 'allowed', uri + " allowed by csp");
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // if the violated policy was report-only, the resource will still be
+      // loaded even if this topic is notified.
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                        "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+
+      // if the test has already finished, move on.
+      try {
+        if (window.loads[testid].verified) return;
+      } catch(e) { return; }
+
+      // record the ones that were supposed to be blocked, but don't use this
+      // as an indicator for tests that are not blocked but do generate reports.
+      // We skip recording the result if the load is expected since a
+      // report-only policy will generate a request *and* a violation note.
+      if (!window.loads[testid].expected) {
+        window.testResult(testid,
+                          'blocked',
+                          asciiSpec + " blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+      }
+    }
+
+    // if any test is unverified, keep waiting
+    for (var v in window.loads) {
+      if(!window.loads[v].verified) {
+        return;
+      }
+    }
+
+    window.bug836922examiner.remove();
+    window.resultPoller.pollForFinish();
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.bug836922examiner = new examiner();
+
+
+// Poll for results and see if enough reports came in.  Keep trying
+// for a few seconds before failing with lack of reports.
+// Have to do this because there's a race between the async reporting
+// and this test finishing, and we don't want to win the race.
+window.resultPoller = {
+
+  POLL_ATTEMPTS_LEFT: 14,
+
+  pollForFinish() {
+    var vr = resultPoller.tallyReceivedReports();
+    if (resultPoller.verifyReports(vr, resultPoller.POLL_ATTEMPTS_LEFT < 1)) {
+      // report success condition.
+      resultPoller.resetReportServer();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    } else {
+      resultPoller.POLL_ATTEMPTS_LEFT--;
+      // try again unless we reached the threshold.
+      setTimeout(resultPoller.pollForFinish, 100);
+    }
+  },
+
+  resetReportServer() {
+    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    var xhr_ro = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("GET", "file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs?reset", false);
+    xhr_ro.open("GET", "file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs?reset", false);
+    xhr.send(null);
+    xhr_ro.send(null);
+  },
+
+  tallyReceivedReports() {
+    var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    var xhr_ro = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("GET", "file_bug836922_npolicies_violation.sjs?results", false);
+    xhr_ro.open("GET", "file_bug836922_npolicies_ro_violation.sjs?results", false);
+    xhr.send(null);
+    xhr_ro.send(null);
+
+    var received = JSON.parse(xhr.responseText);
+    var received_ro = JSON.parse(xhr_ro.responseText);
+
+    var results = {enforced: {}, reportonly: {}};
+    for (var r in window.violation_reports) {
+      results.enforced[r] = 0;
+      results.reportonly[r] = 0;
+    }
+
+    for (var r in received) {
+      results.enforced[r] += received[r];
+    }
+    for (var r in received_ro) {
+      results.reportonly[r] += received_ro[r];
+    }
+
+    return results;
+  },
+
+  verifyReports(receivedCounts, lastAttempt) {
+    for (var r in window.violation_reports) {
+      var exp = window.violation_reports[r].expected;
+      var exp_ro = window.violation_reports[r].expected_ro;
+      var rec = receivedCounts.enforced[r];
+      var rec_ro = receivedCounts.reportonly[r];
+
+      // if this test breaks, these are helpful dumps:
+      //dump(">>> Verifying " + r + "\n");
+      //dump("  > Expected: " + exp + " / " + exp_ro + " (ro)\n");
+      //dump("  > Received: " + rec + " / " + rec_ro + " (ro) \n");
+
+      // in all cases, we're looking for *at least* the expected number of
+      // reports of each type (there could be more in some edge cases).
+      // If there are not enough, we keep waiting and poll the server again
+      // later.  If there are enough, we can successfully finish.
+
+      if (exp == 0)
+        is(rec, 0,
+          "Expected zero enforced-policy violation " +
+          "reports for " + r + ", got " + rec);
+      else if (lastAttempt)
+        ok(rec >= exp,
+          "Received (" + rec + "/" + exp + ") " +
+          "enforced-policy reports for " + r);
+      else if (rec < exp)
+        return false; // continue waiting for more
+
+      if(exp_ro == 0)
+        is(rec_ro, 0,
+          "Expected zero report-only-policy violation " +
+          "reports for " + r + ", got " + rec_ro);
+      else if (lastAttempt)
+        ok(rec_ro >= exp_ro,
+          "Received (" + rec_ro + "/" + exp_ro + ") " +
+          "report-only-policy reports for " + r);
+      else if (rec_ro < exp_ro)
+        return false; // continue waiting for more
+    }
+
+    // if we complete the loop, we've found all of the violation
+    // reports we expect.
+    if (lastAttempt) return true;
+
+    // Repeat successful tests once more to record successes via ok()
+    return resultPoller.verifyReports(receivedCounts, true);
+  }
+};
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+  // otherwise, make sure the allowed ones are expected and blocked ones are not.
+  if (window.loads[testname].expected) {
+    is(result, 'allowed', ">> " + msg);
+  } else {
+    is(result, 'blocked', ">> " + msg);
+  }
+  window.loads[testname].verified = true;
+}
+
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("untriaged");
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'http://mochi.test:8888' + path + 'file_bug836922_npolicies.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug885433.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug885433.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7c17d25b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug885433.html
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy inline stylesheets stuff</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id='cspframe2'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// utilities for check functions
+// black means the style wasn't applied, applied styles are green
+var green = 'rgb(0, 128, 0)';
+var black = 'rgb(0, 0, 0)';
+
+// We test both script and style execution by observing changes in computed styles
+function checkAllowed () {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe');
+  var color;
+
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-inline-script-allowed')).color;
+  ok(color === green, "Inline script should be allowed");
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-eval-script-allowed')).color;
+  ok(color === green, "Eval should be allowed");
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-inline-style-allowed')).color;
+  ok(color === green, "Inline style should be allowed");
+
+  document.getElementById('cspframe2').src = 'file_bug885433_blocks.html';
+  document.getElementById('cspframe2').addEventListener('load', checkBlocked);
+}
+
+function checkBlocked () {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe2');
+  var color;
+
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-inline-script-blocked')).color;
+  ok(color === black, "Inline script should be blocked");
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-eval-script-blocked')).color;
+  ok(color === black, "Eval should be blocked");
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('unsafe-inline-style-blocked')).color;
+  ok(color === black, "Inline style should be blocked");
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_bug885433_allows.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe').addEventListener('load', checkAllowed);
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug886164.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug886164.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5347d42ed8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug886164.html
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 886164 - Enforce CSP in sandboxed iframe</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'  sandbox="allow-same-origin"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe2' sandbox></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe3' sandbox="allow-same-origin"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe4' sandbox></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe5' sandbox="allow-scripts"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe6' sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+
+var path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+window.tests = {
+  // sandbox allow-same-origin; 'self'
+  img_good: -1, // same origin
+  img_bad: -1, //example.com
+
+  // sandbox; 'self'
+  img2_bad: -1, //example.com
+  img2a_good: -1, // same origin & is image
+
+  // sandbox allow-same-origin; 'none'
+  img3_bad: -1,
+  img3a_bad: -1,
+
+  // sandbox; 'none'
+  img4_bad: -1,
+  img4a_bad: -1,
+
+  // sandbox allow-scripts; 'none' 'unsafe-inline'
+  img5_bad: -1,
+  img5a_bad: -1,
+  script5_bad: -1,
+  script5a_bad: -1,
+
+  // sandbox allow-same-origin allow-scripts; 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+  img6_bad: -1,
+  script6_bad: -1,
+};
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to communicate pass/fail back to this main page.
+// it expects to be called with an object like {ok: true/false, desc:
+// <description of the test> which it then forwards to ok()
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event)
+{
+  ok_wrapper(event.data.ok, event.data.desc);
+}
+
+var cspTestsDone = false;
+var iframeSandboxTestsDone = false;
+
+// iframe related
+var completedTests = 0;
+var passedTests = 0;
+
+function ok_wrapper(result, desc) {
+  ok(result, desc);
+
+  completedTests++;
+
+  if (result) {
+    passedTests++;
+  }
+
+  if (completedTests === 5) {
+    iframeSandboxTestsDone = true;
+    if (cspTestsDone) {
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+
+//csp related
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be stopped!
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      //these things were allowed by CSP
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_good/.test(testid),
+                        uri + " allowed by csp");
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_bad/.test(testid),
+                        asciiSpec + " blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.tests[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  window.tests[testname] = result;
+  ok(result, testname + ' test: ' + msg);
+
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in window.tests)
+    if(tests[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  cspTestsDone = true;
+  if (iframeSandboxTestsDone) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_bug886164.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe2').src = 'file_bug886164_2.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe3').src = 'file_bug886164_3.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe4').src = 'file_bug886164_4.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe5').src = 'file_bug886164_5.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe6').src = 'file_bug886164_6.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug888172.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug888172.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a78258e21f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug888172.html
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 888172 - CSP 1.0 does not process 'unsafe-inline' or 'unsafe-eval' for default-src</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id='testframe1'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id='testframe2'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id='testframe3'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// utilities for check functions
+// black means the style wasn't applied, applied styles are green
+var green = 'rgb(0, 128, 0)';
+var black = 'rgb(0, 0, 0)';
+
+function getElementColorById(doc, id) {
+  return window.getComputedStyle(doc.contentDocument.getElementById(id)).color;
+}
+
+// We test both script and style execution by observing changes in computed styles
+function checkDefaultSrcOnly() {
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe1');
+
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-script') === green, "Inline script should be allowed");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-eval-script')  === green, "Eval should be allowed");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-style') === green, "Inline style should be allowed");
+
+  document.getElementById('testframe2').src = 'file_bug888172.sjs?csp=' +
+    escape("default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; script-src 'self'");
+  document.getElementById('testframe2').addEventListener('load', checkDefaultSrcWithScriptSrc);
+}
+
+function checkDefaultSrcWithScriptSrc() {
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe2');
+
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-script') === black, "Inline script should be blocked");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-eval-script')  === black, "Eval should be blocked");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-style') === green, "Inline style should be allowed");
+
+  document.getElementById('testframe3').src = 'file_bug888172.sjs?csp=' +
+    escape("default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'; style-src 'self'");
+  document.getElementById('testframe3').addEventListener('load', checkDefaultSrcWithStyleSrc);
+}
+
+function checkDefaultSrcWithStyleSrc() {
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe3');
+
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-script') === green, "Inline script should be allowed");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-eval-script')  === green, "Eval should be allowed");
+  ok(getElementColorById(testframe, 'unsafe-inline-style') === black, "Inline style should be blocked");
+
+  // last test calls finish
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById('testframe1').src = 'file_bug888172.sjs?csp=' +
+  escape("default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'");
+document.getElementById('testframe1').addEventListener('load', checkDefaultSrcOnly);
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug909029.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug909029.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a3ac81a1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug909029.html
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 909029 - CSP source-lists ignore some source expressions like 'unsafe-inline' when * or 'none' are used (e.g., style-src, script-src)</title>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <div id=content style="visibility:hidden">
+      <iframe id=testframe1></iframe>
+      <iframe id=testframe2></iframe>
+    </div>
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+window.tests = {
+  starExternalStylesLoaded: -1,
+  starExternalImgLoaded: -1,
+  noneExternalStylesBlocked: -1,
+  noneExternalImgLoaded: -1,
+  starInlineStyleAllowed: -1,
+  starInlineScriptBlocked: -1,
+  noneInlineStyleAllowed: -1,
+  noneInlineScriptBlocked: -1
+}
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-zA-Z]+)");
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /Loaded/.test(testid),
+                        "resource loaded");
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      // try because the subject could be an nsIURI or an nsISupportsCString
+      try {
+        var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+        if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+        var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+        window.testResult(testid,
+                          /Blocked/.test(testid),
+                          "resource blocked by CSP");
+      } catch(e) {
+        // if that fails, the subject is probably a string. Strings are only
+        // reported for inline and eval violations. Since we are testing those
+        // via the observed effects of script on CSSOM, we can simply ignore
+        // these subjects.
+      }
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+  //dump("in testResult: testname = " + testname + "\n");
+
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.tests[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  window.tests[testname] = result;
+  is(result, true, testname + ' test: ' + msg);
+
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in window.tests)
+    if(tests[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// Helpers for inline script/style checks
+var black = 'rgb(0, 0, 0)';
+var green = 'rgb(0, 128, 0)';
+function getElementColorById(doc, id) {
+  return window.getComputedStyle(doc.contentDocument.getElementById(id)).color;
+}
+
+function checkInlineWithStar() {
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe1');
+  window.testResult("starInlineStyleAllowed",
+                    getElementColorById(testframe, 'inline-style') === green,
+                    "Inline styles should be allowed (style-src 'unsafe-inline' with star)");
+  window.testResult("starInlineScriptBlocked",
+                    getElementColorById(testframe, 'inline-script') === black,
+                    "Inline scripts should be blocked (style-src 'unsafe-inline' with star)");
+}
+
+function checkInlineWithNone() {
+  // If a directive has 'none' in addition to other sources, 'none' is ignored
+  // and the other sources are used. 'none' is only a valid source if it is
+  // used by itself.
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe2');
+  window.testResult("noneInlineStyleAllowed",
+                    getElementColorById(testframe, 'inline-style') === green,
+                    "Inline styles should be allowed (style-src 'unsafe-inline' with none)");
+  window.testResult("noneInlineScriptBlocked",
+                    getElementColorById(testframe, 'inline-script') === black,
+                    "Inline scripts should be blocked (style-src 'unsafe-inline' with none)");
+}
+
+document.getElementById('testframe1').src = 'file_bug909029_star.html';
+document.getElementById('testframe1').addEventListener('load', checkInlineWithStar);
+document.getElementById('testframe2').src = 'file_bug909029_none.html';
+document.getElementById('testframe2').addEventListener('load', checkInlineWithNone);
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug910139.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug910139.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bbebedf877
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug910139.html
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>CSP should block XSLT as script, not as style</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='xsltframe'></iframe>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='xsltframe2'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// define the expected output of this test
+var header = "this xml file should be formatted using an xsl file(lower iframe should contain xml dump)!";
+
+function checkAllowed () {
+  /*   The policy for this test is:
+   *   Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'
+   *
+   *   we load the xsl file using:
+   *   <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug910139.xsl"?>
+   */
+  try {
+    var cspframe = document.getElementById('xsltframe');
+    var xsltAllowedHeader = cspframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('xsltheader').innerHTML;
+    is(xsltAllowedHeader, header, "XSLT loaded from 'self' should be allowed!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Error: could not access content in xsltframe!")
+  }
+
+  // continue with the next test
+  document.getElementById('xsltframe2').addEventListener('load', checkBlocked);
+  document.getElementById('xsltframe2').src = 'file_bug910139.sjs';
+}
+
+function checkBlocked () {
+  /*   The policy for this test is:
+   *   Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src *.example.com
+   *
+   *   we load the xsl file using:
+   *   <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="file_bug910139.xsl"?>
+   */
+  try {
+    var cspframe = document.getElementById('xsltframe2');
+    var xsltBlockedHeader = cspframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('xsltheader');
+    is(xsltBlockedHeader, null, "XSLT loaded from different host should be blocked!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Error: could not access content in xsltframe2!")
+  }
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById('xsltframe').addEventListener('load', checkAllowed);
+document.getElementById('xsltframe').src = 'file_bug910139.sjs';
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug941404.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug941404.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7c35c38aa1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_bug941404.html
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 941404 - Data documents should not set CSP</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+
+
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+
+var path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+window.tests = {
+  img_good: -1,
+  img2_good: -1,
+};
+
+
+//csp related
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be stopped!
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      //these things were allowed by CSP
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_good/.test(testid),
+                        uri + " allowed by csp");
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_bad/.test(testid),
+                        asciiSpec + " blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.tests[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  window.tests[testname] = result;
+  is(result, true, testname + ' test: ' + msg);
+
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in window.tests)
+    if(tests[v] == -1) {
+      console.log(v + " is not complete");
+      return;
+    }
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_bug941404.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2b85e280bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that child frames and workers are correctly
+ *   evaluated through the "child-src" directive.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var IFRAME_SRC="file_child-src_iframe.html"
+
+var tests = {
+  'same-src': {
+    id: "same-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+  },
+  'star-src': {
+    id: "star-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+  },
+  'other-src': {
+    id: "other-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "default-src http://mochi.test:8888; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://www.example.com"
+  },
+  'same-src-by-frame-src': {
+    id: "same-src-by-frame-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'none'; frame-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+  },
+  'star-src-by-frame-src': {
+    id: "star-src-by-frame-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'none'; frame-src *"
+  },
+  'other-src-by-frame-src': {
+    id: "other-src-by-frame-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888; frame-src http://www.example.com"
+  },
+  'none-src-by-frame-src': {
+    id: "none-src-by-frame-src",
+    file: IFRAME_SRC,
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888; frame-src 'none'"
+  }
+};
+
+finished = {};
+
+function checkFinished() {
+  if (Object.keys(finished).length == Object.keys(tests).length) {
+    window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+function recvMessage(ev) {
+  is(ev.data.message, tests[ev.data.id].result, "CSP child-src test " + ev.data.id);
+  finished[ev.data.id] = ev.data.message;
+
+  checkFinished();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  for (item in tests) {
+    test = tests[item];
+    var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+    // append the file that should be served
+    src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + test.file);
+    // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+    src += "&csp=" + escape(test.policy);
+    // add our identifier
+    src += "#" + escape(test.id);
+
+    content = document.getElementById('content');
+    testframe = document.createElement("iframe");
+    testframe.setAttribute('id', test.id);
+    content.appendChild(testframe);
+    testframe.src = src;
+  }
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker-redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker-redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a1b1c9c2b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker-redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+    <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="display"></p>
+    <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    </div>
+
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+      /*
+       * Description of the test:
+       *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that child frames and workers are correctly
+       *   evaluated through the "child-src" directive.
+       */
+
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+      var WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_worker-redirect.html";
+      var SHARED_WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_shared_worker-redirect.html";
+
+      var tests = {
+        'same-src-worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "same-src-worker_redir-same",
+          file: WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          redir: "same",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'same-src-worker_redir-other': {
+          id: "same-src-worker_redir-other",
+          file: WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          redir: "other",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'star-src-worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "star-src-worker_redir-same",
+          file: WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          redir: "same",
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'other-src-worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "other-src-worker_redir-same",
+          file: WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          redir: "same",
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+        /* shared workers */
+        'same-src-shared_worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "same-src-shared_worker_redir-same",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          redir: "same",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'same-src-shared_worker_redir-other': {
+          id: "same-src-shared_worker_redir-other",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          redir: "other",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'star-src-shared_worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "star-src-shared_worker_redir-same",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          redir: "same",
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'other-src-shared_worker_redir-same': {
+          id: "other-src-shared_worker_redir-same",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_REDIRECT_TEST_FILE,
+          redir: "same",
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+      };
+
+      finished = {};
+
+      function recvMessage(ev) {
+        is(ev.data.message, tests[ev.data.id].result, "CSP child-src worker test " + ev.data.id);
+        finished[ev.data.id] = ev.data.message;
+
+        if (Object.keys(finished).length == Object.keys(tests).length) {
+          window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+          SimpleTest.finish();
+        }
+      }
+
+      window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+
+      function loadNextTest() {
+        for (item in tests) {
+          test = tests[item];
+          var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+          // append the file that should be served
+          src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + test.file);
+          // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+          src += "&csp=" + escape(test.policy);
+          // add whether redirect is to same or different
+          src += "&redir=" + escape(test.policy);
+          // add our identifier
+          src += "#" + escape(test.id);
+
+          content = document.getElementById('content');
+          testframe = document.createElement("iframe");
+          testframe.setAttribute('id', test.id);
+          content.appendChild(testframe);
+          testframe.src = src;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // start running the tests
+      loadNextTest();
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..154e533551
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+    <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="display"></p>
+    <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    </div>
+
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+      /*
+       * Description of the test:
+       *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that child frames and workers are correctly
+       *   evaluated through the "child-src" directive.
+       */
+
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+      var WORKER_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_worker.html";
+      var SERVICE_WORKER_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_service_worker.html";
+      var SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_shared_worker.html";
+
+      var tests = {
+        'same-src-worker': {
+          id: "same-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'same-src-service_worker': {
+          id: "same-src-service_worker",
+          file: SERVICE_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'same-src-shared_worker': {
+          id: "same-src-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+        },
+        'star-src-worker': {
+          id: "star-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'star-src-service_worker': {
+          id: "star-src-service_worker",
+          file: SERVICE_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'star-src-shared_worker': {
+          id: "star-src-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'other-src-worker': {
+          id: "other-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+        'other-src-service_worker': {
+          id: "other-src-service_worker",
+          file: SERVICE_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+        'other-src-shared_worker': {
+          id: "other-src-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+        'script-src-worker': {
+          id: "script-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.example.org 'unsafe-inline'"
+        },
+        'script-src-service_worker': {
+          id: "script-src-service_worker",
+          file: SERVICE_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.example.org 'unsafe-inline'"
+        },
+        'script-src-self-shared_worker': {
+          id: "script-src-self-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src https://www.example.org 'unsafe-inline'"
+        },
+      };
+
+      finished = {};
+
+      function recvMessage(ev) {
+        is(ev.data.message, tests[ev.data.id].result, "CSP child-src worker test " + ev.data.id);
+        finished[ev.data.id] = ev.data.message;
+
+        if (Object.keys(finished).length == Object.keys(tests).length) {
+          window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+          SimpleTest.finish();
+        }
+      }
+
+      window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+
+      function loadNextTest() {
+        for (item in tests) {
+          test = tests[item];
+          var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+          // append the file that should be served
+          src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + test.file);
+          // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+          src += "&csp=" + escape(test.policy);
+          // add our identifier
+          src += "#" + escape(test.id);
+
+          content = document.getElementById('content');
+          testframe = document.createElement("iframe");
+          testframe.setAttribute('id', test.id);
+          content.appendChild(testframe);
+          testframe.src = src;
+        }
+      }
+
+      onload = function() {
+        SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
+          ["dom.serviceWorkers.exemptFromPerDomainMax", true],
+          ["dom.serviceWorkers.enabled", true],
+          ["dom.serviceWorkers.testing.enabled", true],
+          ["dom.caches.enabled", true]
+        ]}, loadNextTest);
+      };
+
+      // start running the tests
+      //loadNextTest();
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker_data.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker_data.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9d36e73e0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_child-src_worker_data.html
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1045891</title>
+    <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="display"></p>
+    <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    </div>
+
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+      /*
+       * Description of the test:
+       *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that child frames and workers are correctly
+       *   evaluated through the "child-src" directive.
+       */
+
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+      var WORKER_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_worker_data.html";
+      var SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE = "file_child-src_shared_worker_data.html";
+
+      var tests = {
+        'same-src-worker-no-data': {
+          id: "same-src-worker-no-data",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'self'"
+        },
+        'same-src-worker': {
+          id: "same-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'self' data:"
+        },
+        'same-src-shared_worker-no-data': {
+          id: "same-src-shared_worker-no-data",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'self'"
+        },
+        'same-src-shared_worker': {
+          id: "same-src-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src 'self' data:"
+        },
+        'star-src-worker': {
+          id: "star-src-worker",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src * data:"
+        },
+        'star-src-worker-no-data': {
+          id: "star-src-worker-no-data",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'star-src-shared_worker-no-data': {
+          id: "star-src-shared_worker-no-data",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src *"
+        },
+        'star-src-shared_worker': {
+          id: "star-src-shared_worker",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "allowed",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src * data:"
+        },
+        'other-src-worker-no-data': {
+          id: "other-src-worker-no-data",
+          file: WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+        'other-src-shared_worker-no-data': {
+          id: "other-src-shared_worker-no-data",
+          file: SHARED_WORKER_TEST_FILE,
+          result : "blocked",
+          policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src https://www.example.org"
+        },
+      };
+
+      finished = {};
+
+      function recvMessage(ev) {
+        is(ev.data.message, tests[ev.data.id].result, "CSP child-src worker test " + ev.data.id);
+        finished[ev.data.id] = ev.data.message;
+
+        if (Object.keys(finished).length == Object.keys(tests).length) {
+          window.removeEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+          SimpleTest.finish();
+        }
+      }
+
+      window.addEventListener('message', recvMessage);
+
+      function loadNextTest() {
+        for (item in tests) {
+          test = tests[item];
+          var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+          // append the file that should be served
+          src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + test.file);
+          // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+          src += "&csp=" + escape(test.policy);
+          // add our identifier
+          src += "#" + escape(test.id);
+
+          content = document.getElementById('content');
+          testframe = document.createElement("iframe");
+          testframe.setAttribute('id', test.id);
+          content.appendChild(testframe);
+          testframe.src = src;
+        }
+      }
+
+      // start running the tests
+      loadNextTest();
+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_connect-src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_connect-src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1ae4482dd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_connect-src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1031530 and Bug 1139667 - Test mapping of XMLHttpRequest and fetch() to connect-src</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that XMLHttpRequests and fetches are correctly
+ *   evaluated through the "connect-src" directive. All XMLHttpRequests are served
+ *   using http://mochi.test:8888, which allows the requests to succeed for the first
+ *   two policies and to fail for the last policy. Please note that we have to add
+ *   'unsafe-inline' so we can run the JS test code in file_connect-src.html.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src.html",
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none' script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+  },
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src.html",
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src *"
+  },
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src.html",
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src http://www.example.com"
+  },
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src-fetch.html",
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none' script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src http://mochi.test:8888"
+  },
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src-fetch.html",
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src *"
+  },
+  {
+    file: "file_connect-src-fetch.html",
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src http://www.example.com"
+  }
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function checkResult(aResult) {
+  is(aResult, tests[counter].result, "should be " + tests[counter].result + " in test " + counter + "!");
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// We use the examiner to identify requests that hit the wire and requests
+// that are blocked by CSP and bubble up the result to the including iframe
+// document (parent).
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+   if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something other
+      // then the request in question.
+      if (!data.includes("file_testserver.sjs?foo")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("allowed");
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something other
+      // then the request in question.
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                        "asciiSpec");
+
+      if (!asciiSpec.includes("file_testserver.sjs?foo")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("blocked");
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.ConnectSrcExaminer = new examiner();
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.ConnectSrcExaminer.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + tests[counter].file);
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(tests[counter].policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8f57d9e133
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1668071 - CSP frame-ancestors in about:blank</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We dynamically load an about:blank iframe which then loads a testframe
+ * including a CSP frame-ancestors directive which matches the including
+ * security context. We make sure that we not incorrectly block on
+ * about:blank which should inherit the security context.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let aboutBlankFrame = document.createElement("iframe");
+document.body.appendChild(aboutBlankFrame);
+
+aboutBlankFrame.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "aboutBlankFrame onload should fire");
+  let aboutBlankDoc = aboutBlankFrame.contentDocument;
+  is(aboutBlankDoc.documentURI, "about:blank",
+    "sanity: aboutBlankFrame URI should be about:blank");
+
+  let testframe = aboutBlankDoc.createElement("iframe");
+  aboutBlankDoc.body.appendChild(testframe);
+  testframe.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "testframe onload should fire");
+    let testDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(testframe.contentDocument);
+    ok(testDoc.documentURI.endsWith("file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html"),
+       "sanity: document in testframe should be the testfile");
+
+    let cspJSON = testDoc.cspJSON;
+    ok(cspJSON.includes("frame-ancestors"), "found frame-ancestors directive");
+    ok(cspJSON.includes("http://mochi.test:8888"), "found frame-ancestors value");
+
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  testframe.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "testframe onerror should not fire");
+  }
+  testframe.src = "file_csp_frame_ancestors_about_blank.html";
+}
+
+aboutBlankFrame.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "aboutBlankFrame onerror should not be called");
+}
+aboutBlankFrame.src = "about:blank";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_style_src_empty_hash.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_style_src_empty_hash.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b500c196e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_style_src_empty_hash.html
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1609122 - Empty Style Element with valid style-src hash </title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="style-src 'sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=';">
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We try to load a stylesheet that is empty with a matching hash
+ * sha256-47DEQpj8HBSa+/TImW+5JCeuQeRkm5NMpJWZG3hSuFU=' should match ""
+ * thus allow the style to be accessed
+ */
+
+
+var s = document.head.appendChild(document.createElement("style"));
+s.disabled = true;
+
+is(s.disabled, true, "Empty Stylesheet with matching Hash was not blocked");
+SimpleTest.finish();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_worker_inheritance.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_worker_inheritance.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ebf6bea8a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_csp_worker_inheritance.html
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/**
+ * Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+ * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
+ */
+
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Test for Bug 1475849</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <p id="display"></p>
+    <div id="content" style="display: none">
+    </div>
+    <iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+        <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+          document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'main_csp_worker.html';
+        </script>
+
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_inheritance.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_inheritance.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd7f3174a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_inheritance.html
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1381761 - Treating 'data:' documents as unique, opaque origins should still inherit the CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an iframe using a meta CSP which includes another iframe
+ * using a data: URI. We make sure the CSP gets inherited into
+ * the data: URI iframe.
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  // toplevel CSP should apply to data: URI iframe hence resulting
+  // in 1 applied policy.
+  is(event.data.result, 1,
+     "data: URI iframe inherits CSP from including context");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_data_csp_inheritance.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_merge.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_merge.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..87219c406d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_csp_merge.html
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1386183 - Meta CSP on data: URI iframe should be merged with toplevel CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an iframe using a meta CSP which includes another iframe
+ * using a data: URI which also defines a meta CSP. We make sure the
+ * CSP from the including document gets merged with the data: URI
+ * CSP and applies to the data: URI iframe.
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  // toplevel CSP + data: URI iframe meta CSP => 2 CSP policies
+  is(event.data.result, 2,
+     "CSP on data: URI iframe gets merged with CSP from including context");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_data_csp_merge.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6f0a3fbbf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1382869: data document should ignore meta csp</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an iframe creating a new data document which defines
+ * a meta csp. We make sure the meta CSP is ignored and does not
+ * apply to the actual iframe document.
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  is(event.data.result, "dataDocCreated", "sanity: received msg from loaded frame");
+
+  var frame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame).contentDocument;
+  var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(contentDoc.cspJSON);
+  // make sure we got no policy attached
+  var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+  is(policies.length, 0, "there should be no CSP attached to the iframe");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_data_doc_ignore_meta_csp.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_docwrite_meta.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_docwrite_meta.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..776f1bb32f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_docwrite_meta.html
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via meta tag</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="writemetacspframe"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="commentmetacspframe"></iframe>
+
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load two frames, where the first frame does doc.write(meta csp) and
+ * the second does doc.write(comment out meta csp).
+ * We make sure to reuse/invalidate preloads depending on the policy.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var writemetacspframe = document.getElementById("writemetacspframe");
+var commentmetacspframe = document.getElementById("commentmetacspframe");
+var seenResults = 0;
+
+function checkTestsDone() {
+  seenResults++;
+  if (seenResults < 2) {
+    return;
+  }
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// document.write(<meta csp ...>) should block resources from being included in the doc
+function checkResultsBlocked() {
+  writemetacspframe.removeEventListener('load', checkResultsBlocked);
+
+  // stylesheet: default background color within FF is transparent
+  var bgcolor = window.getComputedStyle(writemetacspframe.contentDocument.body)
+                      .getPropertyValue("background-color");
+  is(bgcolor, "rgba(0, 0, 0, 0)", "inital background value in FF should be 'transparent'");
+
+  // image: make sure image is blocked
+  var img = writemetacspframe.contentDocument.getElementById("testimage");
+  is(img.naturalWidth, 0, "image width should be 0");
+  is(img.naturalHeight, 0, "image height should be 0");
+
+  // script: make sure defined variable in external script is undefined
+  is(writemetacspframe.contentDocument.myMetaCSPScript, undefined, "myMetaCSPScript should be 'undefined'");
+
+  checkTestsDone();
+}
+
+// document.write(<--) to comment out meta csp should allow resources to be loaded
+// after the preload failed
+function checkResultsAllowed() {
+  commentmetacspframe.removeEventListener('load', checkResultsAllowed);
+
+  // stylesheet: should be applied; bgcolor should be red
+  var bgcolor = window.getComputedStyle(commentmetacspframe.contentDocument.body).getPropertyValue("background-color");
+  is(bgcolor, "rgb(255, 0, 0)", "background should be red/rgb(255, 0, 0)");
+
+  // image: should be completed
+  var img = commentmetacspframe.contentDocument.getElementById("testimage");
+  ok(img.complete, "image should not be loaded");
+
+  // script: defined variable in external script should be accessible
+  is(commentmetacspframe.contentDocument.myMetaCSPScript, "external-JS-loaded", "myMetaCSPScript should be 'external-JS-loaded'");
+
+  checkTestsDone();
+}
+
+// doc.write(meta csp) should should allow preloads but should block actual loads
+writemetacspframe.src = 'file_docwrite_meta.html';
+writemetacspframe.addEventListener('load', checkResultsBlocked);
+
+// commenting out a meta CSP should result in loaded image, script, style
+commentmetacspframe.src = 'file_doccomment_meta.html';
+commentmetacspframe.addEventListener('load', checkResultsAllowed);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_dual_header.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_dual_header.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cfea86103b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_dual_header.html
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1036399 - Multiple CSP policies should be combined towards an intersection</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We have two tests where each tests serves a page using two CSP policies:
+ *   a) * default-src 'self'
+ *      * default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+ *
+ *   b) * default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+ *      * default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+ *
+ * We make sure the inline script is *blocked* for test (a) but *allowed* for test (b).
+ * Multiple CSPs should be combined towards an intersection and it shouldn't be possible
+ * to open up (loosen) a CSP policy.
+ */
+
+const TESTS = [
+  { query: "tight", result: "blocked" },
+  { query: "loose", result: "allowed" }
+];
+var testCounter = -1;
+
+function ckeckResult() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', ckeckResult);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, curTest.result, "should be 'blocked'!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "error: could not access content in div container!");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  testCounter++;
+  if (testCounter >= TESTS.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = TESTS[testCounter];
+  var src = "file_dual_header_testserver.sjs?" + curTest.query;
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", ckeckResult);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_empty_directive.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_empty_directive.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5957f99062
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_empty_directive.html
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1439425
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 1439425</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1439425">Mozilla Bug 1439425</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+
+<iframe id="cspframe"></iframe>
+
+<pre id="test">
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+let consoleCount = 0;
+
+function cleanup() {
+  SpecialPowers.postConsoleSentinel();
+}
+
+function finish() {
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.registerConsoleListener(function ConsoleMsgListener(aMsg) {
+  if (aMsg.message == "SENTINEL") {
+    is(consoleCount, 0);
+    SimpleTest.executeSoon(finish);
+  } else if (aMsg.message.includes("Content Security Policy")) {
+    ++consoleCount;
+    ok(false, "Must never see a console warning here");
+  }
+});
+
+// set up and start testing
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+let frame = document.getElementById('cspframe');
+frame.onload = () => {
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(cleanup);
+};
+frame.src = 'file_empty_directive.html';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf1621f81e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript.html
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy "no eval" base restriction</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe2'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var evalScriptsThatRan = 0;
+var evalScriptsBlocked = 0;
+var evalScriptsTotal = 19;
+
+// called by scripts that run
+var scriptRan = function(shouldrun, testname, data) {
+  evalScriptsThatRan++;
+  ok(shouldrun, 'EVAL SCRIPT RAN: ' + testname + '(' + data + ')');
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+// called when a script is blocked
+var scriptBlocked = function(shouldrun, testname, data) {
+  evalScriptsBlocked++;
+  ok(!shouldrun, 'EVAL SCRIPT BLOCKED: ' + testname + '(' + data + ')');
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+var verifyZeroRetVal = function(val, testname) {
+  ok(val === 0, 'RETURN VALUE SHOULD BE ZERO, was ' + val + ': ' + testname);
+}
+
+// Check to see if all the tests have run
+var checkTestResults = function() {
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  if (evalScriptsTotal - evalScriptsBlocked - evalScriptsThatRan > 0)
+    return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_evalscript_main.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe2').src = 'file_evalscript_main_allowed.html';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_allowed_by_strict_dynamic.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_allowed_by_strict_dynamic.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29c3e87287
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_allowed_by_strict_dynamic.html
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" 
+        content="script-src 'nonce-foobar' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-eval'">
+  <title>Bug 1439330  - CSP: eval is not blocked if 'strict-dynamic' is enabled
+  </title>
+  <script nonce="foobar" type="application/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js">
+  </script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script nonce="foobar">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We apply the script-src 'nonce-foobar' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-eval' CSP and
+ * check if the eval function is allowed correctly by the CSP.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// start the test
+try {
+  eval("1");
+  ok(true, "eval allowed by CSP");
+}
+catch (ex) {
+  ok(false, "eval should be allowed by CSP");
+}
+
+SimpleTest.finish();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_blocked_by_strict_dynamic.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_blocked_by_strict_dynamic.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..179e865459
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_evalscript_blocked_by_strict_dynamic.html
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" 
+        content="script-src 'nonce-foobar' 'strict-dynamic'">
+  <title>Bug 1439330  - CSP: eval is not blocked if 'strict-dynamic' is enabled
+  </title>
+  <script nonce="foobar" type="application/javascript" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js">
+  </script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script nonce="foobar">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We apply the script-src 'nonce-foobar' 'strict-dynamic' CSP and
+ * check if the eval function is blocked correctly by the CSP.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// start the test
+try {
+  eval("1");
+  ok(false, "eval should be blocked by CSP");
+}
+catch (ex) {
+  ok(true, "eval blocked by CSP");
+}
+
+SimpleTest.finish();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_fontloader.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_fontloader.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f68223af1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_fontloader.html
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1122236 - CSP: Implement block-all-mixed-content</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <!-- Including WindowSnapshot.js so we can take screenshots of containers !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/WindowSnapshot.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body onload="setupTests()">
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="baselineframe"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the tests:
+ * We load a baselineFrame and compare the testFrame using
+ * compareSnapshots whether the font got loaded or blocked.
+ * Test 1: Use font-src 'none' so font gets blocked
+ * Test 2: Use font-src * so font gets loaded
+ * Test 3: Use no csp so font gets loaded
+ * Test 4: Use font-src 'none' so font gets blocked
+ *         Makes sure the cache gets invalidated.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const BASE_URI = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+const tests = [
+  { // test 1
+    query: "csp-block",
+    expected: true, // frames should be equal since font is *not* allowed to load
+    description: "font should be blocked by csp (csp-block)"
+  },
+  { // test 2
+    query: "csp-allow",
+    expected: false, // frames should *not* be equal since font is loaded
+    description: "font should load and apply (csp-allow)"
+  },
+  { // test 3
+    query: "no-csp",
+    expected: false, // frames should *not* be equals since font is loaded
+    description: "font should load and apply (no-csp)"
+  },
+  { // test 4
+    query: "csp-block",
+    expected: true, // frames should be equal since font is *not* allowed to load
+    description: "font should be blocked by csp (csp-block) [apply csp to cache]"
+  }
+];
+
+var curTest;
+var counter = -1;
+var baselineframe = document.getElementById("baselineframe");
+var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+
+async function checkResult() {
+  testframe.removeEventListener('load', checkResult);
+  try {
+    ok(compareSnapshots(await snapshotWindow(baselineframe.contentWindow),
+                        await snapshotWindow(testframe.contentWindow),
+                        curTest.expected)[0],
+                        curTest.description);
+  } catch(err) {
+    ok(false, "error: " + err.message);
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = tests[counter];
+  testframe.addEventListener("load", checkResult);
+  testframe.src = BASE_URI + "file_fontloader.sjs?" + curTest.query;
+}
+
+// once the baselineframe is loaded we can start running tests
+function startTests() {
+  baselineframe.removeEventListener('load', startTests);
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// make sure the main page is loaded before we start the test
+function setupTests() {
+  baselineframe.addEventListener("load", startTests);
+  baselineframe.src = BASE_URI + "file_fontloader.sjs?baseline";
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_form-action.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_form-action.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7bbc52a116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_form-action.html
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 529697 - Test mapping of form submission to form-action</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that form submissions are correctly
+ *   evaluated through the "form-action" directive.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    page   : "file_form-action.html",
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "form-action 'self'"
+  },
+  {
+    page   : "file_form-action.html",
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "form-action 'none'"
+  }
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function checkResult(aResult) {
+  is(aResult, tests[counter].result, "should be " + tests[counter].result + " in test " + counter + "!");
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// We use the examiner to identify requests that hit the wire and requests
+// that are blocked by CSP and bubble up the result to the including iframe
+// document (parent).
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+   if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something other
+      // then the request in question.
+      if (!data.includes("submit-form")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("allowed");
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something other
+      // then the request in question.
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                        "asciiSpec");
+      if (!asciiSpec.includes("submit-form")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("blocked");
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.FormActionExaminer = new examiner();
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.FormActionExaminer.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + tests[counter].page);
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(tests[counter].policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_form_action_blocks_url.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_form_action_blocks_url.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f835504ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_form_action_blocks_url.html
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1251043 - Test form-action blocks URL</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+ <iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) Let's load a form into an iframe which uses a CSP of: form-action 'none';
+ * 2) Let's hit the submit button and make sure the form is not submitted.
+ *
+ * Since a blocked form submission does not fire any event handler, we have to
+ * use timeout triggered function that verifies that the form didn't get submitted.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout(
+  "Form submission blocked by CSP does not fire any events " +
+  "hence we have to check back after 300ms to make sure the form " +
+  "is not submitted");
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const FORM_SUBMITTED = "form submission succeeded";
+var timeOutId;
+var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+
+// In case the form gets submitted, the test would receive an 'load'
+// event and would trigger the test to fail early.
+function logFormSubmittedError() {
+  clearTimeout(timeOutId);
+  testframe.removeEventListener('load', logFormSubmittedError);
+  ok(false, "form submission should be blocked");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// After 300ms we verify the form did not get submitted.
+function verifyFormNotSubmitted() {
+  clearTimeout(timeOutId);
+  var frameContent = testframe.contentWindow.document.body.innerHTML;
+  isnot(frameContent.indexOf("CONTROL-TEXT"), -1,
+       "form should not be submitted and still contain the control text");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function submitForm() {
+  // Part 1: The form has loaded in the testframe
+  // unregister the current event handler
+  testframe.removeEventListener('load', submitForm);
+
+  // Part 2: Register a new load event handler. In case the
+  // form gets submitted, this load event fires and we can
+  // fail the test right away.
+  testframe.addEventListener("load", logFormSubmittedError);
+
+  // Part 3: Since blocking the form does not throw any kind of error;
+  // Firefox just logs the CSP error to the console we have to register
+  // this timeOut function which then verifies that the form didn't
+  // get submitted.
+  timeOutId = setTimeout(verifyFormNotSubmitted, 300);
+
+  // Part 4: We are ready, let's hit the submit button of the form.
+  var submitButton = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('submitButton');
+  submitButton.click();
+}
+
+testframe.addEventListener("load", submitForm);
+testframe.src = "file_form_action_server.sjs?loadframe";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_ancestors_ro.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_ancestors_ro.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1cfe6be1cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_ancestors_ro.html
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for frame-ancestors support in Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width: 100%" id="cspframe"></iframe>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+const docUri = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_frame_ancestors_ro.html";
+const frame = document.getElementById("cspframe");
+
+let testResults = {
+  reportFired: false,
+  frameLoaded: false
+};
+
+function checkResults(reportObj) {
+  let cspReport = reportObj["csp-report"];
+  is(cspReport["document-uri"], docUri, "Incorrect document-uri");
+
+  // we can not test for the whole referrer since it includes platform specific information
+  is(cspReport.referrer, document.location.toString(), "Incorrect referrer");
+  is(cspReport["blocked-uri"], document.location.toString(), "Incorrect blocked-uri");
+  is(cspReport["violated-directive"], "frame-ancestors", "Incorrect violated-directive");
+  is(cspReport["original-policy"], "frame-ancestors 'none'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs", "Incorrect original-policy");
+  testResults.reportFired = true;
+}
+
+let chromeScriptUrl = SimpleTest.getTestFileURL("file_report_chromescript.js");
+let script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(chromeScriptUrl);
+
+script.addMessageListener('opening-request-completed', function ml(msg) {
+  if (msg.error) {
+    ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + msg.error + ")");
+  } else {
+    try {
+      let reportObj = JSON.parse(msg.report);
+      // test for the proper values in the report object
+      checkResults(reportObj);
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "Error verifying report object (exception: " + e + ")");
+    }
+  }
+
+  script.removeMessageListener('opening-request-completed', ml);
+  script.sendAsyncMessage("finish");
+  checkTestResults();
+});
+
+frame.addEventListener( 'load', () => {
+  // Make sure the frame is still loaded
+  testResults.frameLoaded = true;
+  checkTestResults()
+} );
+
+function checkTestResults() {
+  if( testResults.reportFired && testResults.frameLoaded ) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+frame.src = docUri;
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f87549b72b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frame_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1302667 - Test frame-src</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page inlcuding a frame a CSP of:
+ *   >> frame-src https://example.com; child-src 'none'
+ * and make sure that frame-src governs frames correctly. In addition,
+ * we make sure that child-src is discarded in case frame-src is specified.
+ */
+
+const ORIGIN_1 = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+const ORIGIN_2 = "https://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+let TESTS = [
+  // frame-src tests
+  ORIGIN_1 + "file_frame_src_frame_governs.html",
+  ORIGIN_2 + "file_frame_src_frame_governs.html",
+  // child-src tests
+  ORIGIN_1 + "file_frame_src_child_governs.html",
+  ORIGIN_2 + "file_frame_src_child_governs.html",
+];
+
+let testIndex = 0;
+
+function checkFinish() {
+  if (testIndex >= TESTS.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  runNextTest();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let href = event.data.href;
+  let result = event.data.result;
+
+  if (href.startsWith("https://example.com")) {
+  	if (result == "frame-allowed") {
+  	  ok(true, "allowing frame from https://example.com (" + result + ")");
+  	}
+  	else {
+  	  ok(false, "blocking frame from https://example.com (" + result + ")");
+  	}
+  }
+  else if (href.startsWith("https://test1.example.com")) {
+  	if (result == "frame-blocked") {
+  	  ok(true, "blocking frame from https://test1.example.com (" + result + ")");
+  	}
+  	else {
+  	  ok(false, "allowing frame from https://test1.example.com (" + result + ")");
+  	}
+  }
+  else {
+    // sanity check, we should never enter that branch, bust just in case...
+  	ok(false, "unexpected result: " + result);
+  }
+  checkFinish();
+}
+
+function runNextTest() {
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = TESTS[testIndex];
+  testIndex++;
+}
+
+// fire up the tests
+runNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8b44ba72fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors.html
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy Frame Ancestors directive</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+var framesThatShouldLoad = {
+  aa_allow: -1,    /* innermost frame allows a *
+  //aa_block: -1,    /* innermost frame denies a */
+  ab_allow: -1,    /* innermost frame allows a */
+  //ab_block: -1,    /* innermost frame denies a */
+  aba_allow: -1,   /* innermost frame allows b,a */
+  //aba_block: -1,   /* innermost frame denies b */
+  //aba2_block: -1,  /* innermost frame denies a */
+  abb_allow: -1,   /* innermost frame allows b,a */
+  //abb_block: -1,   /* innermost frame denies b */
+  //abb2_block: -1,  /* innermost frame denies a */
+};
+
+// we normally expect _6_ violations (6 test cases that cause blocks), but many
+// of the cases cause violations due to the // origin of the test harness (same
+// as 'a'). When the violation is cross-origin, the URI passed to the observers
+// is null (see bug 846978).  This means we can't tell if it's part of the test
+// case or if it is the test harness frame (also origin 'a').
+// As a result, we'll get an extra violation for the following cases:
+//  ab_block    "frame-ancestors 'none'" (outer frame and test harness)
+//  aba2_block  "frame-ancestors b" (outer frame and test harness)
+//  abb2_block   "frame-ancestors b" (outer frame and test harness)
+//
+// and while we can detect the test harness check for this one case since
+// the violations are not cross-origin and we get the URI:
+//  aba2_block  "frame-ancestors b" (outer frame and test harness)
+//
+// we can't for these other ones:
+//  ab_block    "frame-ancestors 'none'" (outer frame and test harness)
+//  abb2_block   "frame-ancestors b" (outer frame and test harness)
+//
+// so that results in 2 extra violation notifications due to the test harness.
+// expected = 6, total = 8
+//
+// Number of tests that pass for this file should be 12 (8 violations 4 loads)
+var expectedViolationsLeft = 8;
+
+// CSP frame-ancestor checks happen in the parent, hence we have to
+// proxy the csp violation notifications.
+SpecialPowers.registerObservers("csp-on-violate-policy");
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    // subject should be an nsURI... though could be null since CSP
+    // prohibits cross-origin URI reporting during frame ancestors checks.
+    if (subject && !SpecialPowers.can_QI(subject))
+      return;
+
+    var asciiSpec = subject;
+
+    try {
+      asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                    SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                    "asciiSpec");
+
+      // skip checks on the test harness -- can't do this skipping for
+      // cross-origin blocking since the observer doesn't get the URI.  This
+      // can cause this test to over-succeed (but only in specific cases).
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("test_frameancestors.html")) {
+        return;
+      }
+    } catch (ex) {
+      // was not an nsIURI, so it was probably a cross-origin report.
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      window.frameBlocked(asciiSpec, data);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+// called when a frame is loaded
+// -- if it's not enumerated above, it should not load!
+var frameLoaded = function(testname, uri) {
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.framesThatShouldLoad[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  if (typeof window.framesThatShouldLoad[testname] === 'undefined') {
+    // uh-oh, we're not expecting this frame to load!
+    ok(false, testname + ' framed site should not have loaded: ' + uri);
+  } else {
+    framesThatShouldLoad[testname] = true;
+    ok(true, testname + ' framed site when allowed by csp (' + uri + ')');
+  }
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+// called when a frame is blocked
+// -- we can't determine *which* frame was blocked, but at least we can count them
+var frameBlocked = function(uri, policy) {
+  ok(true, 'a CSP policy blocked frame from being loaded: ' + policy);
+  expectedViolationsLeft--;
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+
+// Check to see if all the tests have run
+var checkTestResults = function() {
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in framesThatShouldLoad)
+    if(window.framesThatShouldLoad[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  if (window.expectedViolationsLeft > 0)
+    return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  if (event.data.call && event.data.call == 'frameLoaded')
+    frameLoaded(event.data.testname, event.data.uri);
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_frameancestors_main.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors_userpass.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors_userpass.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..332318fe17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_frameancestors_userpass.html
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Userpass in Frame Ancestors directive</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+var framesThatShouldLoad = {
+  frame_a: -1,    /* frame a allowed */
+  frame_b: -1,    /* frame b allowed */
+};
+
+// Number of tests that pass for this file should be 1
+var expectedViolationsLeft = 1;
+
+// CSP frame-ancestor checks happen in the parent, hence we have to
+// proxy the csp violation notifications.
+SpecialPowers.registerObservers("csp-on-violate-policy");
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    // subject should be an nsURI... though could be null since CSP
+    // prohibits cross-origin URI reporting during frame ancestors checks.
+    if (subject && !SpecialPowers.can_QI(subject))
+      return;
+
+    var asciiSpec = subject;
+
+    try {
+      asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                    SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                    "asciiSpec");
+
+      // skip checks on the test harness -- can't do this skipping for
+      // cross-origin blocking since the observer doesn't get the URI.  This
+      // can cause this test to over-succeed (but only in specific cases).
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("test_frameancestors_userpass.html")) {
+        return;
+      }
+    } catch (ex) {
+      // was not an nsIURI, so it was probably a cross-origin report.
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      window.frameBlocked(asciiSpec, data);
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+// called when a frame is loaded
+// -- if it's not enumerated above, it should not load!
+var frameLoaded = function(testname, uri) {
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.framesThatShouldLoad[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  if (typeof window.framesThatShouldLoad[testname] === 'undefined') {
+    // uh-oh, we're not expecting this frame to load!
+    ok(false, testname + ' framed site should not have loaded: ' + uri);
+  } else {
+    //Check if @ symbol is there in URI.
+    if (uri.includes('@')) {
+      ok(false, ' URI contains userpass. Fetched URI is ' + uri);
+    } else {
+      framesThatShouldLoad[testname] = true;
+      ok(true, ' URI doesn\'t contain userpass. Fetched URI is ' + uri);
+    }
+  }
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+// called when a frame is blocked
+// -- we can't determine *which* frame was blocked, but at least we can count them
+var frameBlocked = function(uri, policy) {
+
+  //Check if @ symbol is there in URI or in csp policy.
+  // Bug 1557712: Intermittent failure -> not sure why the 'uri' might ever
+  // be non existing at this point, however if there is no uri, there can
+  // also be no userpass!
+  if (policy.includes('@') ||
+      (typeof uri === 'string' && uri.includes('@'))) {
+    ok(false, ' a CSP policy blocked frame from being loaded. But contains' +
+      ' userpass. Policy is: ' + policy + ';URI is: ' + uri );
+  } else {
+    ok(true, ' a CSP policy blocked frame from being loaded. Doesn\'t contain'+
+      ' userpass. Policy is: ' + policy + ';URI is: ' + uri );
+  }
+  expectedViolationsLeft--;
+  checkTestResults();
+}
+
+
+// Check to see if all the tests have run
+var checkTestResults = function() {
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in framesThatShouldLoad)
+    if(window.framesThatShouldLoad[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  if (window.expectedViolationsLeft > 0)
+    return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  if (event.data.call && event.data.call == 'frameLoaded')
+    frameLoaded(event.data.testname, event.data.uri);
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_frameancestors_userpass.html';
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_hash_source.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_hash_source.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2334ae0101
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_hash_source.html
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test CSP 1.1 hash-source for inline scripts and styles</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="visibility:hidden">
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+</div>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+function cleanup() {
+  // finish the tests
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkInline () {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe').contentDocument;
+
+  var inlineScriptTests = {
+    'inline-script-valid-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'allowed',
+      message:  'Inline script with valid hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-script-invalid-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'blocked',
+      message: 'Inline script with invalid hash should be blocked'
+    },
+    'inline-script-invalid-hash-valid-nonce': {
+      shouldBe: 'allowed',
+      message: 'Inline script with invalid hash and valid nonce should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-script-valid-hash-invalid-nonce': {
+      shouldBe: 'allowed',
+      message: 'Inline script with valid hash and invalid nonce should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-script-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce': {
+      shouldBe: 'blocked',
+      message: 'Inline script with invalid hash and invalid nonce should be blocked'
+    },
+    'inline-script-valid-sha512-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'allowed',
+      message: 'Inline script with a valid sha512 hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-script-valid-sha384-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'allowed',
+      message: 'Inline script with a valid sha384 hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-script-valid-sha1-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'blocked',
+      message: 'Inline script with a valid sha1 hash should be blocked, because sha1 is not a valid hash function'
+    },
+    'inline-script-valid-md5-hash': {
+      shouldBe: 'blocked',
+      message: 'Inline script with a valid md5 hash should be blocked, because md5 is not a valid hash function'
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (testId in inlineScriptTests) {
+    var test = inlineScriptTests[testId];
+    is(cspframe.getElementById(testId).innerHTML, test.shouldBe, test.message);
+  }
+
+  // Inline style tries to change an element's color to green. If blocked, the
+  // element's color will be the default black.
+  var green = "rgb(0, 128, 0)";
+  var black = "rgb(0, 0, 0)";
+
+  var getElementColorById = function (id) {
+    return window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.getElementById(id)).color;
+  };
+
+  var inlineStyleTests = {
+    'inline-style-valid-hash': {
+      shouldBe: green,
+      message: 'Inline style with valid hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-style-invalid-hash': {
+      shouldBe: black,
+      message: 'Inline style with invalid hash should be blocked'
+    },
+    'inline-style-invalid-hash-valid-nonce': {
+      shouldBe: green,
+      message: 'Inline style with invalid hash and valid nonce should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-style-valid-hash-invalid-nonce': {
+      shouldBe: green,
+      message: 'Inline style with valid hash and invalid nonce should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-style-invalid-hash-invalid-nonce' : {
+      shouldBe: black,
+      message: 'Inline style with invalid hash and invalid nonce should be blocked'
+    },
+    'inline-style-valid-sha512-hash': {
+      shouldBe: green,
+      message: 'Inline style with a valid sha512 hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-style-valid-sha384-hash': {
+      shouldBe: green,
+      message: 'Inline style with a valid sha384 hash should be allowed'
+    },
+    'inline-style-valid-sha1-hash': {
+      shouldBe: black,
+      message: 'Inline style with a valid sha1 hash should be blocked, because sha1 is not a valid hash function'
+    },
+    'inline-style-valid-md5-hash': {
+      shouldBe: black,
+      message: 'Inline style with a valid md5 hash should be blocked, because md5 is not a valid hash function'
+    }
+  }
+
+  for (testId in inlineStyleTests) {
+    var test = inlineStyleTests[testId];
+    is(getElementColorById(testId), test.shouldBe, test.message);
+  }
+
+  cleanup();
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_hash_source.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe').addEventListener('load', checkInline);
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cd7417bc8b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox.html
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671389
+Bug 671389 - Implement CSP sandbox directive
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 671389</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  // Check if two sandbox flags are the same, ignoring case-sensitivity.
+  // getSandboxFlags returns a list of sandbox flags (if any) or
+  // null if the flag is not set.
+  // This function checks if two flags are the same, i.e., they're
+  // either not set or have the same flags.
+  function eqFlags(a, b) {
+    if (a === null && b === null) { return true; }
+    if (a === null || b === null) { return false; }
+    if (a.length !== b.length) {  return false; }
+    var a_sorted = a.map(function(e) { return e.toLowerCase(); }).sort();
+    var b_sorted = b.map(function(e) { return e.toLowerCase(); }).sort();
+    for (var i in a_sorted) {
+      if (a_sorted[i] !== b_sorted[i]) {
+        return false;
+      }
+    }
+    return true;
+  }
+
+  // Get the sandbox flags of document doc.
+  // If the flag is not set sandboxFlagsAsString returns null,
+  // this function also returns null.
+  // If the flag is set it may have some flags; in this case
+  // this function returns the (potentially empty) list of flags.
+  function getSandboxFlags(doc) {
+    var flags = doc.sandboxFlagsAsString;
+    if (flags === null) { return null; }
+    return flags? flags.split(" "):[];
+  }
+
+  // Constructor for a CSP sandbox flags test. The constructor
+  // expectes a description 'desc' and set of options 'opts':
+  //  - sandboxAttribute: [null] or string corresponding to the iframe sandbox attributes
+  //  - csp: [null] or string corresponding to the CSP sandbox flags
+  //  - cspReportOnly: [null] or string corresponding to the CSP report-only sandbox flags
+  //  - file: [null] or string corresponding to file the server should serve
+  // Above, we use [brackets] to denote default values.
+  function CSPFlagsTest(desc, opts) {
+    function ifundef(x, v) {
+      return (x !== undefined) ? x : v;
+    }
+
+    function intersect(as, bs) { // Intersect two csp attributes:
+      as = as === null ? null
+                       : as.split(' ').filter(function(x) { return !!x; });
+      bs = bs === null ? null
+                       : bs.split(' ').filter(function(x) { return !!x; });
+
+      if (as === null) { return bs; }
+      if (bs === null) { return as; }
+
+      var cs = [];
+      as.forEach(function(a) {
+        if (a && bs.includes(a))
+          cs.push(a);
+      });
+      return cs;
+    }
+
+    this.desc     = desc || "Untitled test";
+    this.attr     = ifundef(opts.sandboxAttribute, null);
+    this.csp      = ifundef(opts.csp, null);
+    this.cspRO    = ifundef(opts.cspReportOnly, null);
+    this.file     = ifundef(opts.file, null);
+    this.expected = intersect(this.attr, this.csp);
+  }
+
+  // Return function that checks that the actual flags are the same as the
+  // expected flags
+  CSPFlagsTest.prototype.checkFlags = function(iframe) {
+    var this_ = this;
+    return function() {
+      try {
+        var actual = getSandboxFlags(SpecialPowers.wrap(iframe).contentDocument);
+        ok(eqFlags(actual, this_.expected),
+           this_.desc + ' - expected: "' + this_.expected + '", got: "' + actual + '"');
+      } catch (e) {
+        ok(false,
+           this_.desc + ' - expected: "' + this_.expected + '", failed with: "' + e + '"');
+      }
+      runNextTest();
+     };
+  };
+
+  // Set the iframe src and sandbox attribute
+  CSPFlagsTest.prototype.runTest = function () {
+    var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');
+    document.getElementById("content").appendChild(iframe);
+    iframe.onload = this.checkFlags(iframe);
+
+    // set sandbox attribute
+    if (this.attr === null) {
+      iframe.removeAttribute('sandbox');
+    } else {
+      iframe.sandbox = this.attr;
+    }
+
+    // set query string
+    var src = 'http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs';
+
+    var delim = '?';
+
+    if (this.csp !== null) {
+      src += delim + 'csp=' + escape('sandbox ' + this.csp);
+      delim = '&';
+    }
+
+    if (this.cspRO !== null) {
+      src += delim + 'cspRO=' + escape('sandbox ' + this.cspRO);
+      delim = '&';
+    }
+
+    if (this.file !== null) {
+      src += delim + 'file=' + escape(this.file);
+      delim = '&';
+    }
+
+    iframe.src = src;
+    iframe.width = iframe.height = 10;
+
+  }
+
+  testCases = [
+    {
+      desc: "Test 1: Header should not override attribute",
+      sandboxAttribute: "",
+      csp: "allow-forms aLLOw-POinter-lock alLOW-popups aLLOW-SAME-ORIGin ALLOW-SCRIPTS allow-top-navigation"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 2: Attribute should not override header",
+      sandboxAttribute: "sandbox allow-forms allow-pointer-lock allow-popups allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-top-navigation",
+      csp: ""
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 3: Header and attribute intersect",
+      sandboxAttribute: "allow-same-origin allow-scripts",
+      csp: "allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-scripts"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 4: CSP sandbox sets the right flags (pt 1)",
+      csp: "alLOW-FORms ALLOW-pointer-lock allow-popups allow-same-origin allow-scripts ALLOW-TOP-NAVIGation"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 5: CSP sandbox sets the right flags (pt 2)",
+      csp: "allow-same-origin allow-TOP-navigation"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 6: CSP sandbox sets the right flags (pt 3)",
+      csp: "allow-FORMS ALLOW-scripts"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 7: CSP sandbox sets the right flags (pt 4)",
+      csp: ""
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 8: CSP sandbox sets the right flags (pt 5)",
+      csp: null
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 9: Read-only header should not override attribute",
+      sandboxAttribute: "",
+      cspReportOnly: "allow-forms ALLOW-pointer-lock allow-POPUPS allow-same-origin ALLOW-scripts allow-top-NAVIGATION"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 10: Read-only header should not override CSP header",
+      csp: "allow-forms allow-scripts",
+      cspReportOnly: "allow-forms aLlOw-PoInTeR-lOcK aLLow-pOPupS aLLoW-SaME-oRIgIN alLow-scripts allow-tOp-navigation"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 11: Read-only header should not override attribute or CSP header",
+      sandboxAttribute: "allow-same-origin allow-scripts",
+      csp: "allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-scripts",
+      cspReportOnly: "allow-forms allow-pointer-lock allow-popups allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-top-navigation"
+    },
+    {
+      desc: "Test 12: CSP sandbox not affected by document.write()",
+      csp: "allow-scripts",
+      file: 'tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_iframe_sandbox_document_write.html'
+    },
+  ].map(function(t) { return (new CSPFlagsTest(t.desc,t)); });
+
+
+  var testCaseIndex = 0;
+
+  // Track ok messages from iframes
+  var childMessages = 0;
+  var totalChildMessages = 1;
+
+
+  // Check to see if we ran all the tests and received all messges
+  // from child iframes. If so, finish.
+  function tryFinish() {
+    if (testCaseIndex === testCases.length && childMessages === totalChildMessages){
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+
+  function runNextTest() {
+
+    tryFinish();
+
+    if (testCaseIndex < testCases.length) {
+      testCases[testCaseIndex].runTest();
+      testCaseIndex++;
+    }
+  }
+
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    ok(event.data.ok, event.data.desc);
+    childMessages++;
+    tryFinish();
+  }
+
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  addLoadEvent(runNextTest);
+</script>
+<body>
+  <a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671389">Mozilla Bug 671389</a> - Implement CSP sandbox directive
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content">
+  </div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c36aa5447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1073952 - CSP should restrict scripts in srcdoc iframe even if sandboxed</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display">Bug 1073952</p>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      var violationString = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.
+                             do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsISupportsCString"), "data");
+      // the violation subject for inline script violations is unfortunately vague,
+      // all we can do is match the string.
+      if (!violationString.includes("Inline Script")) {
+        return
+      }
+      ok(true, "CSP inherited into sandboxed srcdoc iframe, script blocked.");
+      window.testFinished();
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+function testFinished() {
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+addEventListener("message", function(e) {
+  ok(false, "We should not execute JS in srcdoc iframe.");
+  window.testFinished();
+})
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_iframe_sandbox_srcdoc.html';
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c1ade7ac6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671389
+Bug 671389 - Implement CSP sandbox directive
+
+Tests CSP sandbox attribute on top-level page.
+
+Minimal flags: allow-same-origin allow-scripts:
+Since we need to load the SimpleTest files, we have to set the
+allow-same-origin flag. Additionally, we set the allow-scripts flag
+since we need JS to check the flags.
+
+Though not necessary, for this test we also set the allow-forms flag.
+We may later wish to extend the testing suite with sandbox_csp_top_*
+tests that set different permutations of the flags.
+
+CSP header: Content-Security-Policy: sandbox allow-forms allow-scripts allow-same-origin
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 671389</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// Check if two sandbox flags are the same.
+// getSandboxFlags returns a list of sandbox flags (if any) or
+// null if the flag is not set.
+// This function checks if two flags are the same, i.e., they're
+// either not set or have the same flags.
+function eqFlags(a, b) {
+  if (a === null && b === null) { return true; }
+  if (a === null || b === null) { return false; }
+  if (a.length !== b.length) { return false; }
+  var a_sorted = a.sort();
+  var b_sorted = b.sort();
+  for (var i in a_sorted) {
+    if (a_sorted[i] !== b_sorted[i]) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+// Get the sandbox flags of document doc.
+// If the flag is not set sandboxFlagsAsString returns null,
+// this function also returns null.
+// If the flag is set it may have some flags; in this case
+// this function returns the (potentially empty) list of flags.
+function getSandboxFlags(doc) {
+  var flags = doc.sandboxFlagsAsString;
+  if (flags === null) { return null; }
+  return flags? flags.split(" "):[];
+}
+
+function checkFlags(expected) {
+  try {
+    var flags = getSandboxFlags(SpecialPowers.wrap(document));
+    ok(eqFlags(flags, expected), name + ' expected: "' + expected + '", got: "' + flags + '"');
+  } catch (e) {
+    ok(false, name + ' expected "' + expected + ', but failed with ' + e);
+  }
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+
+<body onLoad='checkFlags(["allow-forms", "allow-scripts", "allow-same-origin"]);'>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=671389">Mozilla Bug 671389</a> - Implement CSP sandbox directive
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content">
+  I am a top-level page sandboxed with "allow-scripts allow-forms
+  allow-same-origin".
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html^headers^ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9cd0606e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_sandbox_top_1.html^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Security-Policy: sAnDbOx aLLow-FOrms aLlOw-ScRiPtS ALLOW-same-origin
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_srcdoc.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_srcdoc.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..04694aa5e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_iframe_srcdoc.html
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1073952 - Test CSP enforcement within iframe srcdoc</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * (1) We serve a site which makes use of script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc
+ *     and make sure that CSP applies to the nested browsing context
+ *     within the iframe.
+ *     [PAGE WITH CSP [IFRAME SANDBOX SRCDOC [SCRIPT]]]
+ *
+ * (2) We serve a site which nests script within an script-allowed sandboxed
+ *     iframe srcdoc within another script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc and
+ *     make sure that CSP applies to the nested browsing context
+ *     within the iframe*s*.
+ *     [PAGE WITH CSP [IFRAME SANDBOX SRCDOC [IFRAME SANDBOX SRCDOC [SCRIPT]]]]
+ *
+ * Please note that the test relies on the "csp-on-violate-policy" observer.
+ * Whenever the script within the iframe is blocked observers are notified.
+ * In turn, this renders the 'result' within tests[] unused. In case the script
+ * would execute however, the postMessageHandler would bubble up 'allowed' and
+ * the test would fail.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  // [PAGE *WITHOUT* CSP [IFRAME SRCDOC [SCRIPT]]]
+  { csp: "",
+    result: "allowed",
+    query: "simple_iframe_srcdoc",
+    desc: "No CSP should run script within script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc"
+  },
+  { csp: "script-src https://test1.com",
+    result: "blocked",
+    query: "simple_iframe_srcdoc",
+    desc: "CSP should block script within script-allowed sandboxediframe srcdoc"
+  },
+  // [PAGE *WITHOUT* CSP [IFRAME SRCDOC [IFRAME SRCDOC [SCRIPT]]]]
+  { csp: "",
+    result: "allowed",
+    query: "nested_iframe_srcdoc",
+    desc: "No CSP should run script within script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc nested within another script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc"
+  },
+  // [PAGE WITH CSP [IFRAME SRCDOC ]]
+  { csp: "script-src https://test2.com",
+    result: "blocked",
+    query: "nested_iframe_srcdoc",
+    desc: "CSP should block script within script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc nested within another script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc"
+  },
+  { csp: "",
+    result: "allowed",
+    query: "nested_iframe_srcdoc_datauri",
+    desc: "No CSP, should run script within script-allowed sandboxed iframe src with data URL nested within another script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc"
+  },
+  { csp: "script-src https://test3.com",
+    result: "blocked",
+    query: "nested_iframe_srcdoc_datauri",
+    desc: "CSP should block script within script-allowed sandboxed iframe src with data URL nested within another script-allowed sandboxed iframe srcdoc"
+  },
+
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  var result = event.data.result;
+  testComplete(result, tests[counter].result, tests[counter].desc);
+}
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      var violationString = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.
+                             do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsISupportsCString"), "data");
+      // the violation subject for inline script violations is unfortunately vague,
+      // all we can do is match the string.
+      if (!violationString.includes("Inline Script")) {
+        return
+      }
+      testComplete("blocked", tests[counter].result, tests[counter].desc);
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+function testComplete(result, expected, desc) {
+  is(result, expected, desc);
+  // ignore cases when we get csp violations and postMessage from  the same frame.
+  var frameURL = new URL(document.getElementById("testframe").src);
+  var params = new URLSearchParams(frameURL.search);
+  var counterInFrame = params.get("counter");
+  if (counterInFrame == counter) {
+    loadNextTest();
+  }
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  var src = "file_iframe_srcdoc.sjs";
+  src += "?csp=" + escape(tests[counter].csp);
+  src += "&action=" + escape(tests[counter].query);
+  src += "&counter=" + counter;
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_unsafe_inline.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_unsafe_inline.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..09d08157da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_unsafe_inline.html
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1004703 - ignore 'unsafe-inline' if nonce- or hash-source specified</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page that contains three scripts using different policies
+ * and make sure 'unsafe-inline' is ignored within script-src if hash-source
+ * or nonce-source is specified.
+ *
+ * The expected output of each test is a sequence of chars.
+ * E.g. the default char we expect is 'a', depending on what inline scripts
+ * are allowed to run we also expect 'b', 'c', 'd'.
+ *
+ * The test also covers the handling of multiple policies where the second
+ * policy makes use of a directive that should *not* fallback to
+ * default-src, see Bug 1198422.
+ */
+
+const POLICY_PREFIX = "default-src 'none'; script-src ";
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    policy1: POLICY_PREFIX + "'unsafe-inline'",
+    policy2: "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+    description: "'unsafe-inline' allows all scripts to execute",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "abcd",
+  },
+  {
+    policy1: POLICY_PREFIX + "'unsafe-inline' 'sha256-uJXAPKP5NZxnVMZMUkDofh6a9P3UMRc1CRTevVPS/rI='",
+    policy2: "base-uri http://mochi.test",
+    description: "defining a hash should only allow one script to execute",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "ac",
+  },
+  {
+    policy1: POLICY_PREFIX + "'unsafe-inline' 'nonce-FooNonce'",
+    policy2: "form-action 'none'",
+    description: "defining a nonce should only allow one script to execute",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "ad",
+  },
+  {
+    policy1: POLICY_PREFIX + "'unsafe-inline' 'sha256-uJXAPKP5NZxnVMZMUkDofh6a9P3UMRc1CRTevVPS/rI=' 'nonce-FooNonce'",
+    policy2: "upgrade-insecure-requests",
+    description: "defining hash and nonce should allow two scripts to execute",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "acd",
+  },
+  {
+    policy1: POLICY_PREFIX + "'unsafe-inline' 'sha256-uJXAPKP5NZxnVMZMUkDofh6a9P3UMRc1CRTevVPS/rI=' 'nonce-FooNonce' 'unsafe-inline'",
+    policy2: "referrer origin",
+    description: "defining hash, nonce and 'unsafe-inline' twice should still only allow two scripts to execute",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "acd",
+  },
+  {
+    policy1: "default-src 'unsafe-inline' 'sha256-uJXAPKP5NZxnVMZMUkDofh6a9P3UMRc1CRTevVPS/rI=' 'nonce-FooNonce' ",
+    policy2: "sandbox allow-scripts allow-same-origin",
+    description: "unsafe-inline should be ignored within default-src when a hash or nonce is specified",
+    file: "file_ignore_unsafe_inline.html",
+    result: "acd",
+  },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener("load", test);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "file_ignore_unsafe_inline_multiple_policies_server.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + curTest.file);
+
+  // append the first CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp1=" + escape(curTest.policy1);
+  // append the second CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp2=" + escape(curTest.policy2);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    // sort the characters to make sure the result is in ascending order
+    // in case handlers run out of order
+    divcontent = divcontent.split('').sort().join('');
+
+    is(divcontent, curTest.result, curTest.description);
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "error: could not access content for test " + curTest.description + "!");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_xfo.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_xfo.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..73c0dea44f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ignore_xfo.html
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1024557: Ignore x-frame-options if CSP with frame-ancestors exists</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="csp_testframe"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="csp_testframe_no_xfo"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="csp_ro_testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * We load two frames using:
+ *   x-frame-options: deny
+ * where the first frame uses a csp and the second a csp_ro including frame-ancestors.
+ * We make sure that xfo is ignored for regular csp but not for csp_ro.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+/* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  let ignoreCount = 0;
+  function listener(msg) {
+    if(msg.message.includes("Content Security Policy: Ignoring ‘x-frame-options’ because of ‘frame-ancestors’ directive.")) {
+      ignoreCount++;
+      if(ignoreCount == 2) {
+        ok(false, 'The "Content Security Policy: Ignoring ‘x-frame-options’ because of ‘frame-ancestors’ directive." warning should only appear once for the csp_testframe.');
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  Services.console.registerListener(listener);
+
+  addMessageListener("cleanup", () => {
+    Services.console.unregisterListener(listener);
+  });
+});
+
+SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(async () => {
+  await script.sendQuery("cleanup");
+});
+
+var testcounter = 0;
+function checkFinished() {
+  testcounter++;
+  if (testcounter < 4) {
+    return;
+  }
+  // remove the listener and we are done.
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// X-Frame-Options checks happen in the parent, hence we have to
+// proxy the xfo violation notifications.
+SpecialPowers.registerObservers("xfo-on-violate-policy");
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-xfo-on-violate-policy");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+
+    is(asciiSpec, "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_ro_ignore_xfo.html", "correct subject");  
+    ok(topic.endsWith("xfo-on-violate-policy"), "correct topic");
+    is(data, "deny", "correct data");
+    checkFinished();
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-xfo-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// 1) test XFO with CSP
+var csp_testframe = document.getElementById("csp_testframe");
+csp_testframe.onload = function() {
+  var msg = csp_testframe.contentDocument.getElementById("cspmessage");
+  is(msg.innerHTML, "Ignoring XFO because of CSP", "Loading frame with with XFO and CSP");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_testframe.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: should not fire onerror for csp_testframe");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_testframe.src = "file_ignore_xfo.html";
+
+// 2) test XFO with CSP_RO
+var csp_ro_testframe = document.getElementById("csp_ro_testframe");
+// If XFO denies framing then the onload event should fire.
+csp_ro_testframe.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: should fire onload for csp_ro_testframe");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_ro_testframe.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: should not fire onerror for csp_ro_testframe");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_ro_testframe.src = "file_ro_ignore_xfo.html";
+
+var csp_testframe_no_xfo = document.getElementById("csp_testframe_no_xfo");
+csp_testframe_no_xfo.onload = function() {
+  var msg = csp_testframe_no_xfo.contentDocument.getElementById("cspmessage");
+  is(msg.innerHTML, "Do not log xfo ignore warning when no xfo is set.", "Loading frame with with no XFO and CSP");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_testframe_no_xfo.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: should not fire onerror for csp_testframe_no_xfo");
+  checkFinished();
+}
+csp_testframe_no_xfo.src = "file_no_log_ignore_xfo.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_document.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_document.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eba83f95a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_document.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1627235: Test CSP for images loaded as iframe</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+
+testframe.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: should fire onload for image document");
+  
+  let contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(testframe.contentDocument);
+  let cspJSON = contentDoc.cspJSON;
+  ok(cspJSON.includes("default-src"), "found default-src directive");
+  ok(cspJSON.includes("https://bug1627235.test.com"), "found default-src value");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+testframe.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: should not fire onerror for image document");
+}
+testframe.src = "file_image_document_pixel.png";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_nonce.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_nonce.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd6bc13922
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_image_nonce.html
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load three images: (a) with a matching nonce,
+                         (b) with a non matching nonce,
+ *                       (c) with no nonce
+ * and make sure that all three images get blocked because
+ * "img-src nonce-bla" should not allow an image load, not
+ * even if the nonce matches*.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var counter = 0;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(aResult) {
+  counter++;
+  if (aResult === "img-with-matching-nonce-blocked" ||
+      aResult === "img-with_non-matching-nonce-blocked" ||
+      aResult === "img-without-nonce-blocked") {
+    ok (true, "correct result for: " + aResult);
+  }
+  else {
+    ok(false, "unexpected result: " + aResult + "\n\n");
+  }
+  if (counter < 3) {
+    return;
+  }
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_image_nonce.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_independent_iframe_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_independent_iframe_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9549263a11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_independent_iframe_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1419222 - iFrame CSP should not affect parent document CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe" src="file_independent_iframe_csp.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+  /* Description of the test:
+    This test makes sure adding a CSP directive to an iFrame does not propagate
+    the new directive to the parent document.
+
+    The test page records it's own CSP before and after adding an iFrame
+    with an additional CSP directive.
+
+    CSPs before and after adding the iFrame are compared to make sure they do
+    not differ.
+   */
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  function finishTest() {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", compareCSPs);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  function compareCSPs(event) {
+    try {
+      var beginCspObj = event.data.result[0];
+      var iFrameCspObj = event.data.result[1];
+      var endCspObj = event.data.result[2];
+
+      // make sure the parent document had one policy from the start.
+      var beginPolicies = beginCspObj["csp-policies"];
+      is(beginPolicies.length, 1, "The parent doc should start with one policy applied.");
+
+      // make sure the parent document still has one policy after adding the iFrame.
+      var endPolicies = endCspObj["csp-policies"];
+      is(endPolicies.length, 1, "The parent doc should still have one policy applied after adding the iFrame.");
+
+      // make sure the iFrame has an additional CSP policy.
+      var iFramePolicies = iFrameCspObj["csp-policies"];
+      is(iFramePolicies.length, 2, "The iFrame should have two policies applied");
+
+      var beginDirs = [];
+      var endDirs = [];
+      for (var dir in beginPolicies[0]) {
+        beginDirs.push(dir);
+      }
+      for (var dir in endPolicies[0]) {
+        endDirs.push(dir);
+      }
+      // Check correct number of CSP diretives.
+      is(beginDirs.length, 3, "The parent's CSP policy should contain 3 directives.");
+      // Compare the parent'S CSP directives before and after adding the iFrame.
+      ok((beginDirs.length == endDirs.length && beginDirs.every((value, index) => value == endDirs[index])),
+       "Begin and end CSP directives of the parent should not differ");
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "uuh, something went wrong within independent iFrame csp test");
+    }
+
+    finishTest();
+  }
+
+  // a postMessage handler to initiate the checks after the iFrame was added to
+  // the test page.
+  window.addEventListener("message", compareCSPs);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinescript.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinescript.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99b055f0c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinescript.html
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy Frame Ancestors directive</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='testframe'></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    /* test allowed */
+    csp: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
+    results: ["body-onload-fired", "text-node-fired",
+              "javascript-uri-fired", "javascript-uri-anchor-fired"],
+    desc: "allow inline scripts",
+    received: 0, // counter to make sure we received all 4 reports
+  },
+  {
+    /* test blocked */
+    csp: "default-src 'self'",
+    results: ["inline-script-blocked"],
+    desc: "block inline scripts",
+    received: 0, // counter to make sure we received all 4 reports
+  }
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic !== "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    var what = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.
+                             do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsISupportsCString"), "data");
+
+    if (!what.includes("Inline Script had invalid hash") &&
+        !what.includes("Inline Scripts will not execute")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    window.checkResults("inline-script-blocked");
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// Check to see if all the tests have run
+var checkResults = function(result) {
+  var index = curTest.results.indexOf(result);
+  isnot(index, -1, "should find result (" + result +") within test: " + curTest.desc);
+  if (index > -1) {
+    curTest.received += 1;
+  }
+
+  // make sure we receive all the 4 reports for the 4 inline scripts
+  if (curTest.received < 4) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (counter < tests.length) {
+    loadNextTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used to bubble up results from the testframe
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data);
+}
+
+function clickit() {
+  document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', clickit);
+  var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe');
+  var a = testframe.contentDocument.getElementById('anchortoclick');
+  sendMouseEvent({type:'click'}, a, testframe.contentWindow);
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_inlinescript.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.csp);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", clickit);
+}
+
+// set up the test and go
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinestyle.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinestyle.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc15dc5078
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_inlinestyle.html
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Content Security Policy inline stylesheets stuff</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe1'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id='cspframe2'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var done = 0;
+
+// When a CSP 1.0 compliant policy is specified we should block inline
+// styles applied by <style> element, style attribute, and SMIL <animate> and <set> tags
+// (when it's not explicitly allowed.)
+function checkStyles(evt) {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe1');
+  var color;
+
+  // black means the style wasn't applied.  green colors are used for styles
+  //expected to be applied.  A color is red if a style is erroneously applied
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('linkstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'External Stylesheet (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('inlinestylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'Inline Style TAG (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('attrstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'Style Attribute (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('csstextstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'cssText (' + color + ')');
+  // SMIL tests
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('xmlTest',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'XML Attribute styling (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssOverrideTest',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'CSS Override styling (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssOverrideTestById',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'CSS Override styling via ID lookup (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssSetTestById',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 0, 0)' === color, 'CSS Set Element styling via ID lookup (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('modifycsstextdiv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'Modify loaded style sheet via cssText (' + color + ')');
+
+  checkIfDone();
+}
+
+// When a CSP 1.0 compliant policy is specified we should allow inline
+// styles when it is explicitly allowed.
+function checkStylesAllowed(evt) {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe2');
+  var color;
+
+  // black means the style wasn't applied.  green colors are used for styles
+  // expected to be applied.  A color is red if a style is erroneously applied
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('linkstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'External Stylesheet (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('inlinestylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'Inline Style TAG (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('attrstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'Style Attribute (' + color + ')');
+
+  // Note that the below test will fail if "script-src: 'unsafe-inline'" breaks,
+  // since it relies on executing script to set .cssText
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('csstextstylediv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'style.cssText (' + color + ')');
+  // SMIL tests
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('xmlTest',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'XML Attribute styling (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssOverrideTest',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'CSS Override styling (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssOverrideTestById',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'CSS Override styling via ID lookup (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('cssSetTestById',null)).fill;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'CSS Set Element styling via ID lookup (SMIL) (' + color + ')');
+
+  color = window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById('modifycsstextdiv')).color;
+  ok('rgb(0, 255, 0)' === color, 'Modify loaded style sheet via cssText (' + color + ')');
+
+  checkIfDone();
+}
+
+function checkIfDone() {
+  done++;
+  if (done == 2)
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe1').src = 'file_inlinestyle_main.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe1').addEventListener('load', checkStyles);
+document.getElementById('cspframe2').src = 'file_inlinestyle_main_allowed.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe2').addEventListener('load', checkStylesAllowed);
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_invalid_source_expression.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_invalid_source_expression.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c170dc2a27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_invalid_source_expression.html
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1086612 - CSP: Let source expression be the empty set in case no valid source can be parsed</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We try to parse a policy:
+ *   script-src bankid:/*
+ * where the source expression (bankid:/*) is invalid. In that case the source-expression
+ * should be the empty set ('none'), see: http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-parsing
+ * We confirm that the script is blocked by CSP.
+ */
+
+const policy = "script-src bankid:/*";
+
+function runTest() {
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_invalid_source_expression.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, "blocked", "should be 'blocked'!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content!");
+  }
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_leading_wildcard.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_leading_wildcard.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53994b0013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_leading_wildcard.html
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1032303 - CSP - Keep FULL STOP when matching *.foo.com to disallow loads from foo.com</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a CSP that allows scripts to be loaded from *.example.com.
+ *   On that page we try to load two scripts:
+ *     a) [allowed] leading_wildcard_allowed.js which is served from test1.example.com
+ *     b) [blocked] leading_wildcard_blocked.js which is served from example.com
+ *
+ *   We verify that only the allowed script executes by registering observers which listen
+ *   to CSP violations and http-notifications. Please note that both scripts do *not* exist
+ *   in the file system. The test just verifies that CSP blocks correctly.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var policy =  "default-src 'none' script-src *.example.com";
+var testsExecuted = 0;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  if (++testsExecuted < 2) {
+    return;
+  }
+  window.wildCardExaminer.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// We use the examiner to identify requests that hit the wire and requests
+// that are blocked by CSP.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+
+   // allowed requests
+   if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      if (data.includes("leading_wildcard_allowed.js")) {
+        ok (true, "CSP should allow file_leading_wildcard_allowed.js!");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+      if (data.includes("leading_wildcard_blocked.js")) {
+        ok(false, "CSP should not allow file_leading_wildcard_blocked.js!");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+    }
+
+    // blocked requests
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                        "asciiSpec");
+
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("leading_wildcard_allowed.js")) {
+        ok (false, "CSP should not block file_leading_wildcard_allowed.js!");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("leading_wildcard_blocked.js")) {
+        ok (true, "CSP should block file_leading_wildcard_blocked.js!");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.wildCardExaminer = new examiner();
+
+function runTest() {
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_leading_wildcard.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_link_rel_preload.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_link_rel_preload.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18f236d56a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_link_rel_preload.html
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+<!doctype html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1599791 - Test link rel=preload</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id=testframe></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// Please note that 'fakeServer' does not exist because the test relies
+// on "csp-on-violate-policy" , and "specialpowers-http-notify-request"
+// which fire if either the request is blocked or fires. The test does
+// not rely on the result of the load.
+
+let TOTAL_TESTS = 3; // script, style, image
+let seenTests = 0;
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      let asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                       SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                       "asciiSpec");
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer?script") ||
+          asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer?style") ||
+          asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer?fetch") ||
+          asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer?font") ||
+          asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer?image")) {
+        let type = asciiSpec.substring(asciiSpec.indexOf("?") + 1);
+        ok (true, type + " should be blocked by CSP");
+        checkFinished();
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      if (data.includes("fakeServer?script") ||
+          data.includes("fakeServer?style") ||
+          data.includes("fakeServer?fetch") ||
+          data.includes("fakeServer?font") ||
+          data.includes("fakeServer?image")) {
+        let type = data.substring(data.indexOf("?") + 1);
+        ok (false, type + " should not be loaded");
+        checkFinished();
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+function checkFinished() {
+  seenTests++;
+  if (seenTests == TOTAL_TESTS) {
+    window.examiner.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+  {'set':[["network.preload", true]]},
+  function() {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_link_rel_preload.html";
+  });
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_csp_self.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_csp_self.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8d7d5812a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_csp_self.html
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1387871 - CSP: Test 'self' within meta csp in  data: URI iframe</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a data: URI into an iframe which provides a meta-csp
+ * including the keyword 'self'. We make sure 'self' does not
+ * allow a data: image to load.
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  is(event.data.result, "dataFrameReady", "sanity: received msg from loaded frame");
+
+  var frame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+
+  // make sure the img was blocked
+  var img = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame).contentDocument.getElementById("testimg");
+  is(img.naturalWidth, 0, "img should be blocked -  width should be 0");
+  is(img.naturalHeight, 0, "img should be blocked - height should be 0");
+
+  // sanity check, make sure 'self' translates into data
+  var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame).contentDocument;
+  // parse the cspJSON in a csp-object
+  var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(contentDoc.cspJSON);
+  ok(cspOBJ, "sanity: was able to parse the CSP JSON");
+
+  // make sure we only got one policy
+  var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+  is(policies.length, 1, "sanity: received one CSP policy");
+
+  var policy = policies[0];
+  var val = policy['img-src'];
+  is(val.toString(), "'self'", "'self' should translate into data");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+let DATA_URI = `data:text/html,
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src 'self'">
+  </head>
+  <body onload="parent.postMessage({result:'dataFrameReady'},'*');">
+    data: URI frame with meta-csp including 'self'<br/>
+    <img id="testimg" src="" />
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = DATA_URI;
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_element.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_element.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..42cddbacbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_element.html
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via <meta> tag</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe" src="file_meta_element.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * The test is twofold:
+ * First, by loading a page using meta csp (into an iframe) we make sure that
+ * images get correctly blocked as the csp policy includes "img-src 'none'";
+ *
+ * Second, we make sure meta csp ignores the following directives:
+ *   * report-uri
+ *   * frame-ancestors
+ *   * sandbox
+ *
+ * Please note that the CSP sanbdox directive (bug 671389) has not landed yet.
+ * Once bug 671389 lands this test will fail and needs to be updated.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+const EXPECTED_DIRS = ["img-src", "script-src"];
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  is(result, "img-blocked", "loading images should be blocked by meta csp");
+
+  try {
+    // get the csp in JSON notation from the principal
+    var frame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame.contentDocument);
+    var cspJSON = contentDoc.cspJSON;
+    
+    ok(cspJSON, "CSP applied through meta element");
+
+    // parse the cspJSON in a csp-object
+    var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(cspJSON);
+    ok(cspOBJ, "was able to parse the JSON");
+
+    // make sure we only got one policy
+    var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+    is(policies.length, 1, "there should be one policy applied");
+
+    // iterate the policy and make sure to only encounter
+    // expected directives.
+    var policy = policies[0];
+    for (var dir in policy) {
+      // special case handling for report-only which is not a directive
+      // but present in the JSON notation of the CSP.
+      if (dir === "report-only") {
+        continue;
+      }
+      var index = EXPECTED_DIRS.indexOf(dir);
+      isnot(index, -1, "meta csp contains directive: " + dir + "!");
+
+      // take the element out of the array so we can make sure
+      // that we have seen all the expected values in the end.
+      EXPECTED_DIRS.splice(index, 1);
+    }
+    is(EXPECTED_DIRS.length, 0, "have seen all the expected values");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "uuh, something went wrong within meta csp test");
+  }
+
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler used to bubble up the onsuccess/onerror state
+// from within the iframe.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_header_dual.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_header_dual.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..679512d068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_header_dual.html
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 663570 - Implement Content Security Policy via meta tag</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We test all sorts of CSPs on documents, including documents with no
+ * CSP, with meta CSP and with meta CSP in combination with a CSP header.
+ */
+
+const TESTS = [
+  {
+    /* load image without any CSP */
+    query: "test1",
+    result: "img-loaded",
+    policyLen: 0,
+    desc: "no CSP should allow load",
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta denies load */
+    query: "test2",
+    result: "img-blocked",
+    policyLen: 1,
+    desc: "meta (img-src 'none') should block load"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta allows load */
+    query: "test3",
+    result: "img-loaded",
+    policyLen: 1,
+    desc: "meta (img-src http://mochi.test) should allow load"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta allows but header blocks */
+    query: "test4", // triggers speculative load
+    result: "img-blocked",
+    policyLen: 2,
+    desc: "meta (img-src http://mochi.test), header (img-src 'none') should block load"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta blocks but header allows */
+    query: "test5", // triggers speculative load
+    result: "img-blocked",
+    policyLen: 2,
+    desc: "meta (img-src 'none'), header (img-src http://mochi.test) should block load"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta allows and header allows */
+    query: "test6", // triggers speculative load
+    result: "img-loaded",
+    policyLen: 2,
+    desc: "meta (img-src http://mochi.test), header (img-src http://mochi.test) should allow load"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta1 allows but meta2 blocks */
+    query: "test7",
+    result: "img-blocked",
+    policyLen: 2,
+    desc: "meta1 (img-src http://mochi.test), meta2 (img-src 'none') should allow blocked"
+  },
+  {
+    /* load image where meta1 allows and meta2 allows */
+    query: "test8",
+    result: "img-loaded",
+    policyLen: 2,
+    desc: "meta1 (img-src http://mochi.test), meta2 (img-src http://mochi.test) should allow allowed"
+  },
+];
+
+var curTest;
+var counter = -1;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  // make sure the image got loaded or blocked
+  is(result, curTest.result, curTest.query + ": " + curTest.desc);
+
+  if (curTest.policyLen != 0) {
+    // make sure that meta policy got not parsed and appended twice
+    try {
+      // get the csp in JSON notation from the principal
+      var frame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+      var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame.contentDocument);
+      var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(contentDoc.cspJSON);
+      // make sure that the speculative policy and the actual policy
+      // are not appended twice.
+      var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+      is(policies.length, curTest.policyLen, curTest.query + " should have: " + curTest.policyLen + " policies");
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "uuh, something went wrong within cspToJSON in " + curTest.query);
+    }
+  }
+  // move on to the next test
+  runNextTest();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler used to bubble up the
+// onsuccess/onerror state from within the iframe.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+function runNextTest() {
+  if (++counter == TESTS.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = TESTS[counter];
+  // load next test
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_meta_header_dual.sjs?" + curTest.query;
+}
+
+// start the test
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+runNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_whitespace_skipping.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_whitespace_skipping.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f622c3a33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_meta_whitespace_skipping.html
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1261634 - Update whitespace skipping for meta csp</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe" src="file_meta_whitespace_skipping.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a site using meta CSP into an iframe. We make sure that all directives
+ * are parsed correclty by the CSP parser even though the directives are separated
+ * not only by whitespace but also by line breaks
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+const EXPECTED_DIRS = [
+  "img-src", "script-src", "style-src", "child-src", "font-src"];
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  // sanity check that the site was loaded and the meta csp was parsed.
+  is(result, "meta-csp-parsed", "loading images should be blocked by meta csp");
+
+  try {
+    // get the csp in JSON notation from the principal
+    var frame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var contentDoc = SpecialPowers.wrap(frame.contentDocument);
+    var cspJSON = contentDoc.cspJSON;
+    ok(cspJSON, "CSP applied through meta element");
+
+    // parse the cspJSON in a csp-object
+    var cspOBJ = JSON.parse(cspJSON);
+    ok(cspOBJ, "was able to parse the JSON");
+
+    // make sure we only got one policy
+    var policies = cspOBJ["csp-policies"];
+    is(policies.length, 1, "there should be one policy applied");
+
+    // iterate the policy and make sure to only encounter
+    // expected directives.
+    var policy = policies[0];
+    for (var dir in policy) {
+      // special case handling for report-only which is not a directive
+      // but present in the JSON notation of the CSP.
+      if (dir === "report-only") {
+        continue;
+      }
+      var index = EXPECTED_DIRS.indexOf(dir);
+      isnot(index, -1, "meta csp contains directive: " + dir + "!");
+
+      // take the element out of the array so we can make sure
+      // that we have seen all the expected values in the end.
+      EXPECTED_DIRS.splice(index, 1);
+    }
+    is(EXPECTED_DIRS.length, 0, "have seen all the expected values");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "uuh, something went wrong within meta csp test");
+  }
+
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cbb981405b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=717511
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 717511</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+
+
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe2'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+// These are test results: -1 means it hasn't run,
+// true/false is the pass/fail result.
+// This is not exhaustive, just double-checking the 'self' vs * policy conflict in the two HTTP headers.
+window.tests = {
+  img_good: -1,
+  img_bad: -1,
+  script_good: -1,
+  script_bad: -1,
+  img2_good: -1,
+  img2_bad: -1,
+  script2_good: -1,
+  script2_bad: -1,
+};
+
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be stopped!
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      //these things were allowed by CSP
+      var asciiSpec = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_good/.test(testid),
+                        asciiSpec + " allowed by csp");
+
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // subject should be an nsIURI for csp-on-violate-policy
+      if (!SpecialPowers.can_QI(subject)) {
+        return;
+      }
+
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                        "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      window.testResult(testid,
+                        /_bad/.test(testid),
+                        asciiSpec + " blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+window.testResult = function(testname, result, msg) {
+
+  //test already complete.... forget it... remember the first result.
+  if (window.tests[testname] != -1)
+    return;
+
+  window.tests[testname] = result;
+  is(result, true, testname + ' test: ' + msg);
+
+  // if any test is incomplete, keep waiting
+  for (var v in window.tests)
+    if(tests[v] == -1)
+      return;
+
+  // ... otherwise, finish
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_multi_policy_injection_bypass.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe2').src = 'file_multi_policy_injection_bypass_2.html';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_multipartchannel.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_multipartchannel.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2708611e6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_multipartchannel.html
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1416045/Bug 1223743 - CSP: Check baseChannel for CSP when loading multipart channel</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testPartCSPframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var testsToRunMultipartCSP = {
+  rootCSP_test: false,
+  part1CSP_test: false,
+  part2CSP_test: false,
+};
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function checkTestsCompleted() {
+  for (var prop in testsToRunMultipartCSP) {
+    // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+    if (!testsToRunMultipartCSP[prop]) {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We apply a CSP to a multipart channel and then try to load an image
+ * within a segment making sure the image is blocked correctly by CSP.
+ * We also provide CSP for each part and try to load an image in each
+ * part and make sure the image is loaded in first part and blocked in
+ * second part correctly based on its CSP accordingly.
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  switch (event.data.test) {
+    case "rootCSP_test":
+      is(event.data.msg, "img-blocked", "image should be blocked");
+      testsToRunMultipartCSP.rootCSP_test = true;
+      break;
+    case "part1CSP_test":
+      is(event.data.msg, "part1-img-loaded", "Part1 image should be loaded");
+      testsToRunMultipartCSP.part1CSP_test = true;
+      break;
+    case "part2CSP_test":
+      is(event.data.msg, "part2-img-blocked", "Part2 image should be blocked");
+      testsToRunMultipartCSP.part2CSP_test = true;
+      break;
+  }
+  checkTestsCompleted();
+}
+
+// start the test
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_multipart_testserver.sjs?doc";
+document.getElementById("testPartCSPframe").src =
+                                    "file_multipart_testserver.sjs?partcspdoc";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_navigate_to.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_navigate_to.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..357b35bb05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_navigate_to.html
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1529068 Implement CSP 'navigate-to' directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that navigations are correctly
+ *   evaluated through the "navigate-to" directive.
+ */
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [["security.csp.enableNavigateTo", true]]});
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// Note: The final website for the navigation chain must always be: www.example.com
+var tests = [
+  {
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "navigate-to www.mozilla.com",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "navigate-to www.example.com",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+    // Test path-sensitivity 
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "navigate-to http://www.example.com/full/path/to/file",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+    // Test scheme
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "navigate-to https://www.example.com/",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+    // Redirect from tracking.example.com to www.example.com
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "navigate-to www.example.com",
+    target : "http://tracking.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs?redir=http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+  // Redirect from tracking.example.com to www.example.com (Explicitly allowed)
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "navigate-to tracking.example.com www.example.com",
+    target : "http://tracking.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs?redir=http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  {
+  // Redirect from tracking.example.com to www.example.com ('unsafe-allow-redirects')
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "navigate-to 'unsafe-allow-redirects' www.example.com",
+    target : "http://tracking.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs?redir=http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  // No path-sensitivity after redirect
+  {
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "navigate-to tracking.example.com http://www.example.com/full/path/to/file",
+    target : "http://tracking.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_navigate_to.sjs?redir=http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  // Multiple CSP directives, first block (origin) second allow
+  {
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "img-src 'none'; navigate-to www.example.com",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  // Multiple CSP directives, first allow (origin) second block
+  {
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "img-src www.example.com mochi.test:8888; navigate-to www.mozilla.com",
+    target : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  // Multiple CSPs, first allow second block
+  {
+    result  : "blocked",
+    policy  : "navigate-to www.example.com",
+    policy2 : "navigate-to www.mozilla.com",
+    target  : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+  // Multiple CSPs, first block second allow
+  {
+    result  : "blocked",
+    policy  : "navigate-to www.mozilla.com",
+    policy2 : "navigate-to www.example.com",
+    target  : "http://www.example.com/"
+  },
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function checkResult(aResult) {
+  is(aResult, tests[counter].result, "should be " + tests[counter].result + " in test " + counter + 
+    "(" + tests[counter].policy + ", " + tests[counter].target + ")!");
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// We use the examiner to identify requests that hit the wire and requests
+// that are blocked by CSP and bubble up the result to the including iframe
+// document (parent).
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy" && data === "navigate-to") {
+      checkResult("blocked");
+    }
+
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+window.NavigationActionExaminer = new examiner();
+// We use iframe onload to check if requests are not blocked by CSP
+var iframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+iframe.onload = function() {
+  checkResult("allowed");
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.NavigationActionExaminer.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var src = "file_navigate_to.sjs";
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "?csp=" + escape(tests[counter].policy);
+  if( tests[counter].policy2 ) {
+     src += "&csp2=" + escape(tests[counter].policy2);
+  }
+  src += "&target=" + escape(tests[counter].target);
+
+  iframe.src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_redirects.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_redirects.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b9e5e347d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_redirects.html
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1469150:Scripts with valid nonce get blocked if URL redirects</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a script with a matching nonce, which redirects
+ * and we make sure that script is allowed.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(aResult) {
+
+  if (aResult === "script-loaded") {
+    ok(true, "expected result: script loaded");
+  }
+  else {
+    ok(false, "unexpected result: script blocked");
+  }
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_nonce_redirects.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_snapshot.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_snapshot.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6670d6868f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_snapshot.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1509738 - Snapshot nonce at load start time</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * a) the test starts loading a script using allowlisted nonce
+ * b) the nonce of the script gets modified
+ * c) the script hits a 302 server side redirect
+ * d) we ensure the script still loads and does not use the modified nonce
+ */
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data, "script-loaded", "script loaded even though nonce was dynamically modified");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+let src = "file_nonce_snapshot.sjs?load-frame";
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_source.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_source.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e11452c6e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_nonce_source.html
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test CSP 1.1 nonce-source for scripts and styles</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="visibility:hidden">
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+</div>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var testsRun = 0;
+var totalTests = 20;
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testid_re = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be blocked!
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testid_re.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testid_re.exec(uri)[1];
+      ok(/_good/.test(testid), "should allow URI with good testid " + testid);
+      ranTests(1);
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      try {
+        // if it is an blocked external load, subject will be the URI of the resource
+        var blocked_uri = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+        if (!testid_re.test(blocked_uri)) return;
+        var testid = testid_re.exec(blocked_uri)[1];
+        ok(/_bad/.test(testid), "should block URI with bad testid " + testid);
+        ranTests(1);
+      } catch (e) {
+        // if the subject is blocked inline, data will be a violation message
+        // we can't distinguish which resources triggered these, so we ignore them
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener, or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  }
+}
+
+function cleanup() {
+  // remove the observer so we don't bork other tests
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  // finish the tests
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function ranTests(num) {
+  testsRun += num;
+  if (testsRun < totalTests) {
+    return;
+  }
+  cleanup();
+}
+
+function checkInlineScriptsAndStyles () {
+  var cspframe = document.getElementById('cspframe');
+  var getElementColorById = function (id) {
+    return window.getComputedStyle(cspframe.contentDocument.getElementById(id)).color;
+  };
+  // Inline style tries to change an element's color to green. If blocked, the
+  // element's color will be the (unchanged) default black.
+  var green = "rgb(0, 128, 0)";
+  var red = "rgb(255,0,0)";
+  var black = "rgb(0, 0, 0)";
+
+  // inline script tests
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-script-correct-nonce'), green,
+     "Inline script with correct nonce should execute");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-script-incorrect-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline script with incorrect nonce should not execute");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-script-correct-style-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline script with correct nonce for styles (but not for scripts) should not execute");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-script-no-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline script with no nonce should not execute");
+
+  // inline style tests
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-style-correct-nonce'), green,
+     "Inline style with correct nonce should be allowed");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-style-incorrect-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline style with incorrect nonce should be blocked");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-style-correct-script-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline style with correct nonce for scripts (but incorrect nonce for styles) should be blocked");
+  is(getElementColorById('inline-style-no-nonce'), black,
+     "Inline style with no nonce should be blocked");
+
+  ranTests(8);
+}
+
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// set up and go
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+// ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_nonce_source.html';
+document.getElementById('cspframe').addEventListener('load', checkInlineScriptsAndStyles);
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_null_baseuri.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_null_baseuri.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..324b644f83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_null_baseuri.html
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1121857 - document.baseURI should not get blocked if baseURI is null</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Creating a 'base' element and appending that element
+ * to document.head. After setting baseTag.href and finally
+ * removing the created element from the head, the baseURI
+ * should be the inital baseURI of the page.
+ */
+
+const TOTAL_TESTS = 3;
+var test_counter = 0;
+
+// a postMessage handler to communicate the results back to the parent.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event)
+{
+  // make sure the base-uri before and after the test is the initial base uri of the page
+  if (event.data.test === "initial_base_uri") {
+    ok(event.data.baseURI.startsWith("http://mochi.test"), "baseURI should be 'http://mochi.test'!");
+  }
+  // check that appending the child and setting the base tag actually affects the base-uri
+  else if (event.data.test === "changed_base_uri") {
+    ok(event.data.baseURI === "http://www.base-tag.com/", "baseURI should be 'http://www.base-tag.com'!");
+  }
+  // we shouldn't get here, but just in case, throw an error.
+  else {
+    ok(false, "unrecognized test!");
+  }
+
+  if (++test_counter === TOTAL_TESTS) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+function startTest() {
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_null_baseuri.html");
+  // using 'unsafe-inline' since we load the testcase using an inline script
+  // within file_null_baseuri.html
+  src += "&csp=" + escape("default-src * 'unsafe-inline';");
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+startTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_object_inherit.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_object_inherit.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d563bde3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_object_inherit.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1457100: Test OBJECT inherits CSP if needed</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  var cspJSON = event.data.cspJSON;
+  ok(cspJSON.includes("img-src"), "found img-src directive");
+  ok(cspJSON.includes("https://bug1457100.test.com"), "found img-src value");
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_object_inherit.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_parent_location_js.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_parent_location_js.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d456c809f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_parent_location_js.html
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1550414: Add CSP test for setting parent location to javascript:</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/**
+ * Description of the test:
+ * Load a document with a CSP of essentially script-src 'none' which includes a
+ * same origin iframe which tries to modify the parent.location using a javascript:
+ * URI -> make sure the javascript: URI is blocked correctly!
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  is(event.data.blockedURI, "inline", "blockedURI");
+  is(event.data.violatedDirective, "script-src-elem", "violatedDirective")
+  is(event.data.originalPolicy, "script-src 'nonce-bug1550414'", "originalPolicy");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// using a postMessage handler to report the result back from
+// within the sandboxed iframe without 'allow-same-origin'.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_parent_location_js.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a54de0a25c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching.html
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 808292 - Implement path-level host-source matching to CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We are loading the following url (including a fragment portion):
+ * http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js#foo
+ * using different policies and verify that the applied policy is accurately enforced.
+ */
+
+var policies = [
+  ["allowed", "*"],
+  ["allowed", "http://*"], // test for bug 1075230, enforcing scheme and wildcard
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js"],
+
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com?foo=val"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/?foo=val"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/?foo=val"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js?foo=val"],
+
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com#foo"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/#foo"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/#foo"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js#foo"],
+
+  ["allowed", "*.example.com"],
+  ["allowed", "*.example.com/"],
+  ["allowed", "*.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/"],
+  ["allowed", "*.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js"],
+
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:80"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:80/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:80/tests/dom/security/test/csp/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:80/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js"],
+
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:*"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:*/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:*/tests/dom/security/test/csp/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.example.com:*/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.js"],
+
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com/tests"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.py"],
+
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com:8888/tests"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.py"],
+
+  // case insensitive matching for scheme and host, but case sensitive matching for paths
+  ["allowed", "HTTP://test1.EXAMPLE.com/tests/"],
+  ["allowed", "test1.EXAMPLE.com/tests/"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/CSP/?foo=val"],
+  ["blocked", "test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/FILE_path_matching.js?foo=val"],
+]
+
+var counter = 0;
+var policy;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == policies.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+  else {
+    policy = policies[counter++];
+    var src = "file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+    // append the file that should be served
+    src += (counter % 2 == 0)
+               // load url including ref: example.com#foo
+             ? escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.html")
+               // load url including query: example.com?val=foo (bug 1147026)
+             : escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_incl_query.html");
+
+    // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+    src += "&csp=" + escape("default-src 'none'; script-src " + policy[1]);
+
+    document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+  }
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, policy[0], "should be " + policy[0] + " in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d3b2771d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_path_matching_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 808292 - Implement path-level host-source matching to CSP (redirects)</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <p id="display"></p>
+  <div id="content" style="visibility: hidden">
+    <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * First, we try to load a script where the *path* does not match.
+ * Second, we try to load a script which is allowed by the CSPs
+ * script-src directive. The script then gets redirected to
+ * an URL where the host matches, but the path wouldn't.
+ * Since 'paths' should not be taken into account after redirects,
+ * that load should succeed. We are using a similar test setup
+ * as described in the spec, see:
+ * http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#source-list-paths-and-redirects
+ */
+
+var policy = "script-src http://example.com http://test1.example.com/CSPAllowsScriptsInThatFolder";
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    // the script in file_path_matching.html
+    // <script src="http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/..">
+    // is not within the allowlisted path by the csp-policy
+    // hence the script is 'blocked' by CSP.
+    expected: "blocked",
+    uri: "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching.html"
+  },
+  {
+    // the script in file_path_matching_redirect.html
+    // <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/..">
+    // gets redirected to: http://test1.example.com/tests/dom
+    // where after the redirect the path of the policy is not enforced
+    // anymore and hence execution of the script is 'allowed'.
+    expected: "allowed",
+    uri: "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_path_matching_redirect.html"
+  },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function checkResult() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', checkResult);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, curTest.expected, "should be blocked in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content in test " + (counter - 1) + "!");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+  else {
+    curTest = tests[counter++];
+    var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+    // append the file that should be served
+    src += "?file=" + escape(curTest.uri);
+    // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+    src += "&csp=" + escape(policy);
+
+    document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", checkResult);
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+  }
+}
+
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_ping.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ping.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f911b7b6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_ping.html
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1100181 - CSP: Enforce connect-src when submitting pings</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *   We load a page with a given CSP and verify that hyperlink auditing
+ *   is correctly evaluated through the "connect-src" directive.
+ */
+
+// Need to pref hyperlink auditing on since it's disabled by default.
+SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("browser.send_pings", true);
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    result : "allowed",
+    policy : "connect-src 'self'"
+  },
+  {
+    result : "blocked",
+    policy : "connect-src 'none'"
+  }
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function checkResult(aResult) {
+  is(aResult, tests[counter].result, "should be " + tests[counter].result + " in test " + counter + "!");
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// We use the examiner to identify requests that hit the wire and requests
+// that are blocked by CSP and bubble up the result to the including iframe
+// document (parent).
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+   if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something
+      // other then the request in question.
+      if (!data.includes("send-ping")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("allowed");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // making sure we do not bubble a result for something
+      // other then the request in question.
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+        SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!asciiSpec.includes("send-ping")) {
+        return;
+      }
+      checkResult("blocked");
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.ConnectSrcExaminer = new examiner();
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.ConnectSrcExaminer.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_ping.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(tests[counter].policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8838f2fc45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 924708</title>
+   <!--
+   test that a report-only policy that uses policy-uri is not incorrectly
+   enforced due to regressions introduced by Bug 836922.
+   -->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='testframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var testframe = document.getElementById('testframe');
+testframe.src = 'file_policyuri_regression_from_multipolicy.html';
+testframe.addEventListener('load', function checkInlineScriptExecuted () {
+  is(this.contentDocument.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML,
+      'Inline Script Executed',
+      'Inline script should execute (it would be blocked by the policy, but the policy is report-only)');
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_punycode_host_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_punycode_host_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3735275d34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_punycode_host_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1224225 - CSP source matching should work for punycoded domain names</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load scripts within an iframe and make sure that the
+ * CSP matching is same for punycode domain names as well as IDNA.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+
+var curTest;
+var counter = -1;
+
+const tests = [
+  { // test 1
+    description: "loads script as sub2.ält.example.org, but allowlist in CSP as sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+    action: "script-unicode-csp-punycode",
+    csp: "script-src http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org;",
+    expected: "script-allowed",
+
+  },
+  { // test 2
+    description: "loads script as sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org, and allowlist in CSP as sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+    action: "script-punycode-csp-punycode",
+    csp: "script-src http://sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org;",
+    expected: "script-allowed",
+
+  },
+    { // test 3
+    description: "loads script as sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org, and allowlist in CSP as sub2.xn--lt-uia.example.org",
+    action: "script-punycode-csp-punycode",
+    csp: "script-src *.xn--lt-uia.example.org;",
+    expected: "script-allowed",
+
+  },
+
+];
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+  is(result, curTest.expected, curTest.description);
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = tests[counter];
+  var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = `file_punycode_host_src.sjs?action=${curTest.action}&csp=${curTest.csp}`;
+}
+
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_redirects.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_redirects.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9cc569ed72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_redirects.html
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Tests for Content Security Policy during redirects</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id="harness"></iframe>
+<pre id="log"></pre>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var path = "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+// debugging
+function log(s) {
+  return;
+  dump("**" + s + "\n");
+  var log = document.getElementById("log");
+  log.textContent = log.textContent+s+"\n";
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.registerObservers("csp-on-violate-policy");
+
+// used to watch if requests are blocked by CSP or allowed through
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9-]+)");
+    var asciiSpec;
+    var testid;
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // request was sent
+      var allowedUri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(allowedUri)) return;
+      testid = testpat.exec(allowedUri)[1];
+      if (testExpectedResults[testid] == "completed") return;
+      log("allowed: "+allowedUri);
+      window.testResult(testid, allowedUri, true);
+    }
+
+    else if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy" || topic === "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      // request was blocked
+      asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      // had to add this check because http-on-modify-request can fire after
+      // csp-on-violate-policy, apparently, even though the request does
+      // not hit the wire.
+      if (testExpectedResults[testid] == "completed") return;
+      log("BLOCKED: "+asciiSpec);
+      window.testResult(testid, asciiSpec, false);
+    }
+  },
+
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+// contains { test_frame_id : expected_result }
+var testExpectedResults = { "font-src": true,
+                            "font-src-redir": false,
+                            "frame-src": true,
+                            "frame-src-redir": false,
+                            "img-src": true,
+                            "img-src-redir": false,
+                            "media-src": true,
+                            "media-src-redir": false,
+                            "object-src": true,
+                            "object-src-redir": false,
+                            "script-src": true,
+                            "script-src-redir": false,
+                            "style-src": true,
+                            "style-src-redir": false,
+                            "xhr-src": true,
+                            "xhr-src-redir": false,
+                            "from-worker": true,
+                            "script-src-redir-from-worker": true, // redir is allowed since policy isn't inherited
+                            "xhr-src-redir-from-worker": true, // redir is allowed since policy isn't inherited
+                            "fetch-src-redir-from-worker": true, // redir is allowed since policy isn't inherited
+                            "from-blob-worker": true,
+                            "script-src-redir-from-blob-worker": false,
+                            "xhr-src-redir-from-blob-worker": false,
+                            "fetch-src-redir-from-blob-worker": false,
+                            "img-src-from-css": true,
+                            "img-src-redir-from-css": false,
+                          };
+
+// takes the name of the test, the URL that was tested, and whether the
+// load occurred
+var testResult = function(testName, url, result) {
+  log("  testName: "+testName+", result: "+result+", expected: "+testExpectedResults[testName]+"\n");
+  is(result, testExpectedResults[testName], testName+" test: "+url);
+
+ // mark test as completed
+  testExpectedResults[testName] = "completed";
+
+  // don't finish until we've run all the tests
+  for (var t in testExpectedResults) {
+    if (testExpectedResults[t] != "completed") {
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+  {'set':[// On a cellular connection the default preload value is 0 ("preload
+          // none"). Our Android emulators emulate a cellular connection, and
+          // so by default preload no media data. This causes the media_* tests
+          // to timeout. We set the default used by cellular connections to the
+          // same as used by non-cellular connections in order to get
+          // consistent behavior across platforms/devices.
+          ["media.preload.default", 2],
+          ["media.preload.default.cellular", 2]]},
+  function() {
+    // save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+    // ... this loads the testbed of good and bad requests.
+    document.getElementById("harness").src = "file_redirects_main.html";
+  });
+</script>
+</pre>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_report.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc10cd0341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report.html
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=548193
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 548193</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We try to load an inline-src using a policy that constrains
+ * all scripts from running (default-src 'none'). We verify that
+ * the generated csp-report contains the expceted values. If any
+ * of the JSON is not formatted properly (e.g. not properly escaped)
+ * then JSON.parse will fail, which allows to pinpoint such errors
+ * in the catch block, and the test will fail. Since we use an
+ * observer, we can set the actual report-uri to a foo value.
+ */
+
+const testfile = "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report.html";
+const reportURI = "http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs";
+const policy = "default-src 'none' 'report-sample'; report-uri " + reportURI;
+const docUri = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs" +
+               "?file=tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report.html" +
+               "&csp=default-src%20%27none%27%20%27report-sample%27%3B%20report-uri%20http%3A//mochi.test%3A8888/foo.sjs";
+
+window.checkResults = function(reportObj) {
+  var cspReport = reportObj["csp-report"];
+
+  // The following uris' fragments should be stripped before reporting:
+  //    * document-uri
+  //    * blocked-uri
+  //    * source-file
+  // see http://www.w3.org/TR/CSP11/#violation-reports
+  is(cspReport["document-uri"], docUri, "Incorrect document-uri");
+
+  // we can not test for the whole referrer since it includes platform specific information
+  ok(cspReport.referrer.startsWith("http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/test_report.html"),
+     "Incorrect referrer");
+
+  is(cspReport["blocked-uri"], "inline", "Incorrect blocked-uri");
+
+  is(cspReport["effective-directive"], "script-src-elem", "Incorrect effective-directive");
+  is(cspReport["violated-directive"], "script-src-elem", "Incorrect violated-directive");
+
+  is(cspReport["original-policy"], "default-src 'none' 'report-sample'; report-uri http://mochi.test:8888/foo.sjs",
+     "Incorrect original-policy");
+
+  is(cspReport.disposition, "enforce", "Incorrect disposition");
+
+  is(cspReport["status-code"], 200, "Incorrect status-code");
+
+  is(cspReport["source-file"], docUri, "Incorrect source-file");
+
+  is(cspReport["script-sample"], "\n    var foo = \"propEscFoo\";\n    var bar…",
+     "Incorrect script-sample");
+
+  is(cspReport["line-number"], 7, "Incorrect line-number");
+}
+
+var chromeScriptUrl = SimpleTest.getTestFileURL("file_report_chromescript.js");
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(chromeScriptUrl);
+
+script.addMessageListener('opening-request-completed', function ml(msg) {
+  if (msg.error) {
+    ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + msg.error + ")");
+  } else {
+    try {
+      var reportObj = JSON.parse(msg.report);
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "Could not parse JSON (exception: " + e + ")");
+    }
+    try {
+      // test for the proper values in the report object
+      window.checkResults(reportObj);
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "Could not query report (exception: " + e + ")");
+    }
+  }
+
+  script.removeMessageListener('opening-request-completed', ml);
+  script.sendAsyncMessage("finish");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// load the resource which will generate a CSP violation report
+// save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+// append the file that should be served
+src += "?file=" + escape(testfile);
+// append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+src += "&csp=" + escape(policy);
+// appending a fragment so we can test that it's correctly stripped
+// for document-uri and source-file.
+src += "#foo";
+document.getElementById("cspframe").src = src;
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_font_cache.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_font_cache.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..40577a1e00
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_font_cache.html
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css">
+<iframe id="f"></iframe>
+
+<script>
+var chromeScriptUrl = SimpleTest.getTestFileURL("file_report_chromescript.js");
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(chromeScriptUrl);
+
+var reportedFont1 = false;
+var reportedFont3 = false;
+
+function reportListener(msg) {
+  if (!msg.error) {
+    // Step 3: Check the specific blocked URLs from the CSP reports.
+    let blocked = JSON.parse(msg.report)["csp-report"]["blocked-uri"]
+                  .replace(/^.*\//, "");
+    switch (blocked) {
+      case "Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-1":
+        ok(!reportedFont1, "should not have already reported Test Font 1");
+        ok(!reportedFont3, "should not have reported Test Font 3 before Test Font 1");
+        reportedFont1 = true;
+        break;
+      case "Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-2":
+        ok(false, "should not have reported Test Font 2");
+        break;
+      case "Ahem.ttf?report_font_cache-3":
+        ok(!reportedFont3, "should not have already reported Test Font 3");
+        reportedFont3 = true;
+        break;
+    }
+    if (reportedFont1 && reportedFont3) {
+      script.removeMessageListener("opening-request-completed", reportListener);
+      script.sendAsyncMessage("finish");
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+script.addMessageListener("opening-request-completed", reportListener);
+
+window.onmessage = function(message) {
+  // Step 2: Navigate to the second document, which will attempt to use the
+  // cached "Test Font 1" and then a new "Test Font 3", both of which will
+  // generate CSP reports.  The "Test Font 2" entry in the user font cache
+  // should not cause a CSP report from this document.
+  is(message.data, "first-doc-ready");
+  f.src = "file_report_font_cache-2.html";
+};
+
+// Step 1: Prime the user font cache with entries for "Test Font 1",
+// "Test Font 2" and "Test Font 3".
+f.src = "file_report_font_cache-1.html";
+</script>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_for_import.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_for_import.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ddeee3b507
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_for_import.html
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=548193
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 548193</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+
+<iframe style="width:200px;height:200px;" id='cspframe'></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We are loading a stylesheet using a csp policy that only allows styles from 'self'
+ * to be loaded. In other words, the *.css file itself should be allowed to load, but
+ * the @import file within the CSS should get blocked. We verify that the generated
+ * csp-report is sent and contains all the expected values.
+ * In detail, the test starts by sending an XHR request to the report-server
+ * which waits on the server side till the report was received and hands the
+ * report in JSON format back to the testfile which then verifies accuracy
+ * of all the different report fields in the CSP report.
+ */
+
+const TEST_FILE = "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.html";
+const REPORT_URI =
+  "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs?report";
+const POLICY = "style-src 'self'; report-uri " + REPORT_URI;
+
+const DOC_URI =
+  "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?" +
+  "file=tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import.html&" +
+  "csp=style-src%20%27self%27%3B%20" +
+  "report-uri%20http%3A//mochi.test%3A8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/" +
+  "file_report_for_import_server.sjs%3Freport";
+
+function checkResults(reportStr) {
+  try {
+    var reportObj = JSON.parse(reportStr);
+    var cspReport = reportObj["csp-report"];
+
+    is(cspReport["document-uri"], DOC_URI, "Incorrect document-uri");
+    is(cspReport.referrer,
+       "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_for_import.html",
+       "Incorrect referrer");
+    is(cspReport["violated-directive"],
+       "style-src-elem",
+       "Incorrect violated-directive");
+    is(cspReport["original-policy"], POLICY, "Incorrect original-policy");
+    is(cspReport["blocked-uri"],
+       "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_report_for_import_server.sjs?stylesheet",
+       "Incorrect blocked-uri");
+
+    // we do not always set the following fields
+    is(cspReport["source-file"], undefined, "Incorrect source-file");
+    is(cspReport["script-sample"], undefined, "Incorrect script-sample");
+    is(cspReport["line-number"], undefined, "Incorrect line-number");
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "Could not parse JSON (exception: " + e + ")");
+  }
+}
+
+function loadTestPageIntoFrame() {
+  // load the resource which will generate a CSP violation report
+  // save this for last so that our listeners are registered.
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape(TEST_FILE);
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(POLICY);
+  // appending a fragment so we can test that it's correctly stripped
+  // for document-uri and source-file.
+  src += "#foo";
+  document.getElementById("cspframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function runTest() {
+  // send an xhr request to the server which is processed async, which only
+  // returns after the server has received the csp report.
+  var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  myXHR.open("GET", "file_report_for_import_server.sjs?queryresult");
+  myXHR.onload = function(e) {
+    checkResults(myXHR.responseText);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+  myXHR.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+  myXHR.send();
+
+  // give it some time and run the testpage
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(loadTestPageIntoFrame);
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0bdfd57bc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=847081
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 847081</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=847081">Mozilla Bug 847081</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none"></div>
+<iframe id="cspframe"></iframe>
+
+<pre id="test">
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+var stringBundleService = SpecialPowers.Cc["@mozilla.org/intl/stringbundle;1"]
+                          .getService(SpecialPowers.Ci.nsIStringBundleService);
+var localizer = stringBundleService.createBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties");
+var warningMsg = localizer.formatStringFromName("reportURInotInReportOnlyHeader", [window.location.origin]);
+
+function cleanup() {
+  SpecialPowers.postConsoleSentinel();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// Since Bug 1584993 we parse the CSP in the parent too, hence the
+// same error message appears twice in the console. 
+var recordConsoleMsgOnce = false;
+
+SpecialPowers.registerConsoleListener(function ConsoleMsgListener(aMsg) {
+  if (aMsg.message.indexOf(warningMsg) > -1) {
+    if (recordConsoleMsgOnce) {
+      return;
+    }
+    recordConsoleMsgOnce = true;
+
+    ok(true, "report-uri not specified in Report-Only should throw a CSP warning.");
+    SimpleTest.executeSoon(cleanup);
+    return;
+  } else {
+    // if some other console message is present, we wait
+    return;
+  }
+});
+
+
+// set up and start testing
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_report_uri_missing_in_report_only_header.html';
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fa123eadf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox.html
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for bugs 886164 and 671389</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content">
+</div>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+var testCases = [
+  {
+    // Test 1: don't load image from non-same-origin; allow loading
+    // images from same-same origin
+    sandboxAttribute: "allow-same-origin",
+    csp: "default-src 'self'",
+    file: "file_sandbox_1.html",
+    results: { img1a_good: -1, img1_bad: -1 }
+    // fails if scripts execute
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 2: don't load image from non-same-origin; allow loading
+    // images from same-same origin, even without allow-same-origin
+    // flag
+    sandboxAttribute: "",
+    csp: "default-src 'self'",
+    file: "file_sandbox_2.html",
+    results: { img2_bad: -1, img2a_good: -1 }
+    // fails if scripts execute
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 3: disallow loading images from any host, even with
+    // allow-same-origin flag set
+    sandboxAttribute: "allow-same-origin",
+    csp: "default-src 'none'",
+    file: "file_sandbox_3.html",
+    results: { img3_bad: -1, img3a_bad: -1 },
+    // fails if scripts execute
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 4: disallow loading images from any host
+    sandboxAttribute: "",
+    csp: "default-src 'none'",
+    file: "file_sandbox_4.html",
+    results: { img4_bad: -1, img4a_bad: -1 }
+    // fails if scripts execute
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 5: disallow loading images or scripts, allow inline scripts
+    sandboxAttribute: "allow-scripts",
+    csp: "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline';",
+    file: "file_sandbox_5.html",
+    results: { img5_bad: -1, img5a_bad: -1, script5_bad: -1, script5a_bad: -1 },
+    nrOKmessages: 2 // sends 2 ok message
+    // fails if scripts execute
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 6: disallow non-same-origin images, allow inline and same origin scripts
+    sandboxAttribute: "allow-same-origin allow-scripts",
+    csp: "default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';",
+    file: "file_sandbox_6.html",
+    results: { img6_bad: -1, script6_bad: -1 },
+    nrOKmessages: 4 // sends 4 ok message
+    // fails if forms are not disallowed
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 7: same as Test 1
+    csp: "default-src 'self'; sandbox allow-same-origin",
+    file: "file_sandbox_7.html",
+    results: { img7a_good: -1, img7_bad: -1 }
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 8: same as Test 2
+    csp: "sandbox allow-same-origin; default-src 'self'",
+    file: "file_sandbox_8.html",
+    results: { img8_bad: -1, img8a_good: -1 }
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 9: same as Test 3
+    csp: "default-src 'none'; sandbox allow-same-origin",
+    file: "file_sandbox_9.html",
+    results: { img9_bad: -1, img9a_bad: -1 }
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 10: same as Test 4
+    csp: "default-src 'none'; sandbox allow-same-origin",
+    file: "file_sandbox_10.html",
+    results: { img10_bad: -1, img10a_bad: -1 }
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 11: same as Test 5
+    csp: "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox allow-scripts allow-same-origin",
+    file: "file_sandbox_11.html",
+    results: { img11_bad: -1, img11a_bad: -1, script11_bad: -1, script11a_bad: -1 },
+    nrOKmessages: 2 // sends 2 ok message
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 12: same as Test 6
+    csp: "sandbox allow-same-origin allow-scripts; default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';",
+    file: "file_sandbox_12.html",
+    results: { img12_bad: -1, script12_bad: -1 },
+    nrOKmessages: 4 // sends 4 ok message
+  },
+  {
+    // Test 13: same as Test 5 and Test 11, but:
+    // * using sandbox flag 'allow-scripts' in CSP and not as iframe attribute
+    // * not using allow-same-origin in CSP (so a new NullPrincipal is created).
+    csp: "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; sandbox allow-scripts",
+    file: "file_sandbox_13.html",
+    results: { img13_bad: -1, img13a_bad: -1, script13_bad: -1, script13a_bad: -1 },
+    nrOKmessages: 2 // sends 2 ok message
+  },
+];
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to communicate pass/fail back to this main page.
+// it expects to be called with an object like:
+//  { ok: true/false,
+//    desc: <description of the test> which it then forwards to ok() }
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  ok_wrapper(event.data.ok, event.data.desc);
+}
+
+var completedTests = 0;
+var passedTests = 0;
+
+var totalTests = (function() {
+    var nrCSPloadTests = 0;
+    for(var i = 0; i < testCases.length; i++) {
+      nrCSPloadTests += Object.keys(testCases[i].results).length;
+      if (testCases[i].nrOKmessages) {
+        // + number of expected postMessages from iframe
+        nrCSPloadTests += testCases[i].nrOKmessages;
+      }
+    }
+    return nrCSPloadTests;
+})();
+
+function ok_wrapper(result, desc) {
+  ok(result, desc);
+
+  completedTests++;
+
+  if (result) {
+    passedTests++;
+  }
+
+  if (completedTests === totalTests) {
+    window.examiner.remove();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+// Set the iframe src and sandbox attribute
+function runTest(test) {
+  var iframe = document.createElement('iframe');
+
+  document.getElementById('content').appendChild(iframe);
+
+  // set sandbox attribute
+  if (test.sandboxAttribute !== undefined) {
+    iframe.sandbox = test.sandboxAttribute;
+  }
+
+  // set query string
+  var src = 'file_testserver.sjs';
+  // path where the files are
+  var path = '/tests/dom/security/test/csp/';
+
+  src += '?file=' + escape(path+test.file);
+
+  if (test.csp !== undefined) {
+    src += '&csp=' + escape(test.csp);
+  }
+
+  iframe.src = src;
+  iframe.width = iframe.height = 10;
+}
+
+// Examiner related
+
+// This is used to watch the blocked data bounce off CSP and allowed data
+// get sent out to the wire.
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    var testpat = new RegExp("testid=([a-z0-9_]+)");
+
+    //_good things better be allowed!
+    //_bad things better be stopped!
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      //these things were allowed by CSP
+      var uri = data;
+      if (!testpat.test(uri)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(uri)[1];
+
+      if(/_good/.test(testid)) {
+        ok_wrapper(true, uri + " is allowed by csp");
+      } else {
+        ok_wrapper(false, uri + " should not be allowed by csp");
+      }
+    }
+
+    if(topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      //these were blocked... record that they were blocked
+      var asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (!testpat.test(asciiSpec)) return;
+      var testid = testpat.exec(asciiSpec)[1];
+      if(/_bad/.test(testid)) {
+        ok_wrapper(true, asciiSpec + " was blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+      } else {
+        ok_wrapper(false, asciiSpec + " should have been blocked by \"" + data + "\"");
+      }
+    }
+  },
+
+  // must eventually call this to remove the listener,
+  // or mochitests might get borked.
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+(function() { // Run tests:
+  for(var i = 0; i < testCases.length; i++) {
+    runTest(testCases[i]);
+  }
+})();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox_allow_scripts.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox_allow_scripts.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..68544a5178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sandbox_allow_scripts.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1396320: Fix CSP sandbox regression for allow-scripts</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Load an iframe using a CSP of 'sandbox allow-scripts' and make sure
+ * the security context of the iframe is sandboxed (cross origin)
+ */
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, "",
+  	"document.domain of sandboxed iframe should be opaque");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+testframe.src = "file_sandbox_allow_scripts.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_scheme_relative_sources.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_scheme_relative_sources.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3de3d98d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_scheme_relative_sources.html
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 921493 - CSP: test allowlisting of scheme-relative sources</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load http and https pages and verify that scheme relative sources
+ * are allowed unless its a downgrade from https -> http.
+ *
+ * Please note that the policy contains 'unsafe-inline' so we can use
+ * an inline script to query the result from within the sandboxed iframe
+ * and report it back to the parent document.
+ */
+
+var POLICY = "default-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-inline' example.com;";
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "http -> http",
+    from: "http",
+    to: "http",
+    result: "allowed",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "http -> https",
+    from: "http",
+    to: "https",
+    result: "allowed",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "https -> https",
+    from: "https",
+    to: "https",
+    result: "allowed",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "https -> http",
+    from: "https",
+    to: "http",
+    result: "blocked",
+  }
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+
+  var src = curTest.from +
+             "://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_scheme_relative_sources.sjs" +
+            "?scheme=" + curTest.to +
+            "&policy=" + escape(POLICY);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+// using a postMessage handler to report the result back from
+// within the sandboxed iframe without 'allow-same-origin'.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+
+  is(event.data.result, curTest.result,
+     "should be " + curTest.result + " in test (" + curTest.description + ")!");
+
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// get the test started
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_script_template.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_script_template.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a71ebfe960
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_script_template.html
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1548385 - CSP: Test script template</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/**
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load a document using a CSP of "default-src 'unsafe-inline'"
+ * and make sure that an external script within a template gets
+ * blocked correctly.
+ */
+
+const CSP_BLOCKED_SUBJECT = "csp-on-violate-policy";
+const CSP_ALLOWED_SUBJECT = "specialpowers-http-notify-request";
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, CSP_BLOCKED_SUBJECT);
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, CSP_ALLOWED_SUBJECT);
+}
+
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic == CSP_BLOCKED_SUBJECT) {
+      let jsFileName = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"), "asciiSpec");
+      if (jsFileName.endsWith("file_script_template.js")) {
+        ok(true, "js file blocked by CSP");
+        this.removeAndFinish();
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (topic == CSP_ALLOWED_SUBJECT) {
+      if (data.endsWith("file_script_template.js")) {
+        ok(false, "js file allowed by CSP");
+        this.removeAndFinish();
+      }
+    }
+  },
+
+  removeAndFinish() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, CSP_BLOCKED_SUBJECT);
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, CSP_ALLOWED_SUBJECT);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+document.getElementById("testframe").src = "file_script_template.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_security_policy_violation_event.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_security_policy_violation_event.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d5cfade9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_security_policy_violation_event.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="img-src 'none'">
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<script>
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+document.addEventListener("securitypolicyviolation", (e) => {
+  SimpleTest.is(e.blockedURI, "http://mochi.test:8888/foo/bar.jpg", "blockedURI");
+  SimpleTest.is(e.violatedDirective, "img-src", "violatedDirective")
+  SimpleTest.is(e.originalPolicy, "img-src 'none'", "originalPolicy");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+</script>
+<img src="http://mochi.test:8888/foo/bar.jpg">
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50627711ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=587377
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 587377</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=587377">Mozilla Bug 587377</a>
+<p id="display"></p>
+
+<iframe id="cspframe"></iframe>
+
+<pre id="test">
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+// Load locale string during mochitest
+var stringBundleService = SpecialPowers.Cc["@mozilla.org/intl/stringbundle;1"]
+                          .getService(SpecialPowers.Ci.nsIStringBundleService);
+var localizer = stringBundleService.createBundle("chrome://global/locale/security/csp.properties");
+var confusionMsg = localizer.formatStringFromName("hostNameMightBeKeyword", ["SELF", "self"]);
+
+function cleanup() {
+  SpecialPowers.postConsoleSentinel();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+};
+
+// To prevent the test from asserting twice and calling SimpleTest.finish() twice,
+// startTest will be marked false as soon as the confusionMsg is detected.
+startTest = false;
+SpecialPowers.registerConsoleListener(function ConsoleMsgListener(aMsg) {
+  if (startTest) {
+    if (aMsg.message.indexOf(confusionMsg) > -1) {
+      startTest = false;
+      ok(true, "CSP header with a hostname similar to keyword should be warned");
+      SimpleTest.executeSoon(cleanup);
+    } else {
+      // don't see the warning yet? wait.
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+});
+
+// set up and start testing
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+document.getElementById('cspframe').src = 'file_self_none_as_hostname_confusion.html';
+startTest = true;
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_sendbeacon.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sendbeacon.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3b0df34c05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_sendbeacon.html
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1234813 - sendBeacon should not throw if blocked by Content Policy</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe" src="file_sendbeacon.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Let's try to fire a sendBeacon which gets blocked by CSP. Let's make sure
+ * sendBeacon does not throw an exception.
+ */
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// a postMessage handler used to bubble up the
+// result from within the iframe.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  var result = event.data.result;
+  is(result, "blocked-beacon-does-not-throw", "sendBeacon should not throw");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_service_worker.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_service_worker.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc3b3b43d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_service_worker.html
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1208559 - ServiceWorker registration not governed by CSP</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Spawning a worker from https://example.com but script-src is 'test1.example.com'
+ * CSP is not consulted
+ */
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    policy: "default-src 'self'; script-src 'unsafe-inline'; child-src test1.example.com;",
+    expected: "blocked"
+  },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, curTest.expected, "Should be (" + curTest.expected + ") in Test " + counter + "!");
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+onload = function() {
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
+    ["dom.serviceWorkers.exemptFromPerDomainMax", true],
+    ["dom.serviceWorkers.enabled", true],
+    ["dom.serviceWorkers.testing.enabled", true],
+    ["dom.caches.enabled", true],
+    ["privacy.partition.serviceWorkers", true],
+  ]}, loadNextTest);
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += "?file=" + escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_service_worker.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f894e6d447
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic.html
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load scripts with a CSP of 'strict-dynamic' with valid
+ * and invalid nonces and make sure scripts are allowed/blocked
+ * accordingly. Different tests load inline and external scripts
+ * also using a CSP including http: and https: making sure
+ * other srcs are invalided by 'strict-dynamic'.
+ */
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with valid nonce should be allowed",
+    result: "allowed",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' https: 'none' 'self'"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with invalid nonce should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-bar' http: http://example.com"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic, allowlist and invalid nonce should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-bar' 'unsafe-inline' http: http://example.com"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with no 'nonce-' should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_extern.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic'"
+  },
+  // inline scripts
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with valid nonce should be allowed",
+    result: "allowed",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' https: 'none' 'self'"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with invalid nonce should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-bar' http: http://example.com"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic, unsafe-inline and invalid nonce should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-bar' 'unsafe-inline' http: http://example.com"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with no 'nonce-' should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_inline.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic'"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with DOM events should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_events.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo'"
+  },
+  {
+    // marquee is a special snowflake
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with DOM events should be blocked (marquee)",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_script_events_marquee.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo'"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "strict-dynamic with JS URLs should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_js_url.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo'"
+  },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + curTest.file)
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, curTest.result, curTest.desc);
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content for test: '" + curTest.desc + "'");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_default_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_default_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53eb899ab2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_default_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load scripts and images with a CSP of 'strict-dynamic' making sure
+ * allowlists get ignored for scripts but not for images when strict-dynamic
+ * appears in default-src.
+ *
+ * Please note that we do not support strict-dynamic within default-src yet,
+ * see Bug 1313937. When updating this test please do not change the
+ * csp policies, but only replace todo_is() with is().
+ */
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test1) script should be allowed because of valid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test1) img should be allowed because of 'self'",
+    script_result: "allowed",
+    img_result: "allowed",
+    policy: "default-src 'strict-dynamic' 'self'; script-src 'nonce-foo'"
+  },
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 2) script should be blocked because of invalid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 2) img should be allowed because of valid scheme-src",
+    script_result: "blocked",
+    img_result: "allowed",
+    policy: "default-src 'strict-dynamic' http:; script-src 'nonce-bar' http:"
+  },
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 3) script should be blocked because of invalid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 3) img should be allowed because of valid host-src",
+    script_result: "blocked",
+    script_enforced: "",
+    img_result: "allowed",
+    policy: "default-src 'strict-dynamic' mochi.test; script-src 'nonce-bar' http:"
+  },
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 4) script should be allowed because of valid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 4) img should be blocked because of default-src 'strict-dynamic'",
+    script_result: "allowed",
+    img_result: "blocked",
+    policy: "default-src 'strict-dynamic'; script-src 'nonce-foo'"
+  },
+  // some reverse order tests (have script-src appear before default-src)
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 5) script should be allowed because of valid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 5) img should be blocked because of default-src 'strict-dynamic'",
+    script_result: "allowed",
+    img_result: "blocked",
+    policy: "script-src 'nonce-foo'; default-src 'strict-dynamic';"
+  },
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 6) script should be allowed because of valid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 6) img should be blocked because of default-src http:",
+    script_result: "blocked",
+    img_result: "blocked",
+    policy: "script-src 'nonce-bar' http:; default-src 'strict-dynamic' http:;"
+  },
+  {
+    script_desc: "(test 7) script should be allowed because of invalid nonce",
+    img_desc: "(test 7) img should be blocked because of image-src http:",
+    script_result: "blocked",
+    img_result: "blocked",
+    policy: "script-src 'nonce-bar' http:; default-src 'strict-dynamic' http:; img-src http:"
+  },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_strict_dynamic_default_src.html");
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", checkResults);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function checkResults() {
+  try {
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    testframe.removeEventListener('load', checkResults);
+
+    // check if script loaded
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    var imgcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testimage').dataset.result;
+    if (curTest.script_result === "blocked") {
+      todo_is(divcontent, curTest.script_result, curTest.script_desc);
+    }
+    else {
+      is(divcontent, curTest.script_result, curTest.script_desc);
+    }
+
+    // check if image loaded
+    var testimg = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById("testimage");
+    if (curTest.img_result === "allowed") {
+      todo_is(imgcontent, curTest.img_result, curTest.img_desc);
+    }
+    else {
+      is(imgcontent, curTest.img_result, curTest.img_desc);
+    }
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content for test: '" + curTest.script_desc + "'");
+  }
+
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63d2c5a256
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted.html
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1299483 - CSP: Implement 'strict-dynamic'</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We loader parser and non parser inserted scripts making sure that
+ * parser inserted scripts are blocked if strict-dynamic is present
+ * and no valid nonce and also making sure that non-parser inserted
+ * scripts are allowed to execute.
+ */
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    desc: "(parser inserted script) using doc.write(<script>) should be blocked",
+    result: "blocked",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' http:"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "(parser inserted script with valid nonce) using doc.write(<script>) should be allowed",
+    result: "allowed",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_parser_inserted_doc_write_correct_nonce.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' https:"
+  },
+  {
+    desc: "(non parser inserted script) using appendChild() should allow external script",
+    result: "allowed",
+    file: "file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted.html",
+    policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' https:"
+  },
+  {
+     desc: "(non parser inserted script) using appendChild() should allow inline script",
+     result: "allowed",
+     file: "file_strict_dynamic_non_parser_inserted_inline.html",
+     policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' https:"
+  },
+  {
+     desc: "strict-dynamic should not invalidate 'unsafe-eval'",
+     result: "allowed",
+     file: "file_strict_dynamic_unsafe_eval.html",
+     policy: "script-src 'strict-dynamic' 'nonce-foo' 'unsafe-eval'"
+   },
+];
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = "file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/" + curTest.file)
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+
+  document.getElementById("testframe").addEventListener("load", test);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function test() {
+  try {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").removeEventListener('load', test);
+    var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    var divcontent = testframe.contentWindow.document.getElementById('testdiv').innerHTML;
+    is(divcontent, curTest.result, curTest.desc);
+  }
+  catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "ERROR: could not access content for test: '" + curTest.desc + "'");
+  }
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+// start running the tests
+loadNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbf5a885cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=702439
+
+This test verifies that child iframes of CSP documents are
+permitted to execute javascript: URLs assuming the policy
+allows this.
+-->
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 702439</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="i"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+var javascript_link_ran = false;
+
+// check that the script in the child frame's javascript: URL ran
+function checkResult()
+{
+  is(javascript_link_ran, true,
+     "javascript URL didn't execute");
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+document.getElementById('i').src = 'file_subframe_run_js_if_allowed.html';
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_svg_inline_style.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_svg_inline_style.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..70adae7275
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_svg_inline_style.html
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1262842: Test CSP inline style within svg image</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/WindowSnapshot.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="img_base"></iframe>
+<iframe id="img_csp"></iframe>
+<iframe id="doc_base"></iframe>
+<iframe id="doc_csp"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// Description of the two tests:
+//  * CSP should not apply to SVGs loaded as images
+//  * CSP should apply to SVGs loaded as document
+// Since we have to test inline styles within SVGs, we loaded the SVGs
+// and then take screenshots to comopare that the two SVGs are identical.
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let img_base = document.getElementById("img_base");
+let img_csp = document.getElementById("img_csp");
+let doc_base = document.getElementById("doc_base");
+let doc_csp = document.getElementById("doc_csp");
+
+let loadedFrames = 0;
+
+async function compareSVGs() {
+  loadedFrames++;
+  if (loadedFrames != 4) {
+    return;
+  }
+  // compare the two iframes where SVGs are loaded as images
+  try {
+    let img_base_snap = await snapshotWindow(img_base.contentWindow);
+    let img_csp_snap = await snapshotWindow(img_csp.contentWindow);
+
+    ok(compareSnapshots(img_base_snap, img_csp_snap, true)[0],
+       "CSP should not apply to SVG loaded as image");
+  } catch(err) {
+    ok(false, "img error: " + err.message);
+  }
+
+  // compare the two iframes where SVGs are loaded as documents
+  try {
+    let doc_base_snap = await snapshotWindow(doc_base.contentWindow);
+    let doc_csp_snap = await snapshotWindow(doc_csp.contentWindow);
+
+    ok(compareSnapshots(doc_base_snap, doc_csp_snap, true)[0],
+       "CSP should apply to SVG loaded as document");
+  } catch(err) {
+    ok(false, "doc error: " + err.message);
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// load SVG as images
+img_base.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: img_base onerror should not fire");
+}
+img_base.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: img_base onload should fire");
+  compareSVGs();
+}
+img_base.src = "file_svg_inline_style_base.html";
+
+img_csp.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: img_csp onerror should not fire");
+}
+img_csp.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: img_csp onload should fire");
+  compareSVGs();
+}
+img_csp.src = "file_svg_inline_style_csp.html";
+
+// load SVG as documnents
+doc_base.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: doc_base onerror should not fire");
+}
+doc_base.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: doc_base onload should fire");
+  compareSVGs();
+}
+doc_base.src = "file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs?svg_no_inline_style";
+
+doc_csp.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: doc_csp onerror should not fire");
+}
+doc_csp.onload = function() {
+  ok(true, "sanity: doc_csp onload should fire");
+  compareSVGs();
+}
+doc_csp.src = "file_svg_inline_style_server.sjs?svg_inline_style_csp";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_top_nav.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_top_nav.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..57005ba6f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_top_nav.html
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1391011: Test uir for toplevel navigations</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an https page which defines upgrade-insecure-requests into an iframe
+ * and perform a same origin and a cross origin toplevel load and make sure that
+ * upgrade-insecure-requests applies to the same origin load.
+ */
+
+let totalTests = 2;
+let testCounter = 0;
+
+function checkResults(aResult) {
+  ok(aResult == "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html" ||
+     aResult == "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav_dummy.html",
+     "same origin should be upgraded to https, cross origin should remain http");
+  if (++testCounter < totalTests) {
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+function startTest() {
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_uir_top_nav.html";
+}
+
+// Don't upgrade to https to test that upgrade-insecure-requests acts correctly and
+// start test
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", false]
+  ]}, startTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_windowwatcher.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_windowwatcher.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f16b3c93a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_uir_windowwatcher.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1529893 - Test upgrade-insecure-requests for opening window through nsWindowWatcher</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe name='frameA' width="100%" src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_frameA.html"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+// The CSP of subframe C should cause the window to be opened to be upgraded from http to https.
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let finalURI = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_windowwatcher_win_open.html";
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, finalURI, "opened window correctly upgraded to https");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0dcdeefd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure.html
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load resources (img, script, sytle, etc) over *http* and make sure
+ * that all the resources get upgraded to use  >> https << when the
+ * csp-directive "upgrade-insecure-requests" is specified. We further
+ * test that subresources within nested contexts (iframes) get upgraded
+ * and also test the handling of server side redirects.
+ *
+ * In detail:
+ * We perform an XHR request to the *.sjs file which is processed async on
+ * the server and waits till all the requests were processed by the server.
+ * Once the server received all the different requests, the server responds
+ * to the initial XHR request with an array of results which must match
+ * the expected results from each test, making sure that all requests
+ * received by the server (*.sjs) were actually *https* requests.
+ */
+
+const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+);
+
+const UPGRADE_POLICY =
+  "upgrade-insecure-requests;" +               // upgrade all http requests to https
+  "block-all-mixed-content;" +                 // upgrade should be enforced before block-all.
+  "default-src https: wss: 'unsafe-inline';" + // only allow https: and wss:
+  "form-action https:;";                       // explicit, no fallback to default-src
+
+const UPGRADE_POLICY_NO_DEFAULT_SRC =
+  "upgrade-insecure-requests;" +               // upgrade all http requests to https
+  "script-src 'unsafe-inline' *";              // we have to allowlist the inline scripts
+                                               // in the test.
+const NO_UPGRADE_POLICY =
+  "default-src http: ws: 'unsafe-inline';" +   // allow http:// and ws://
+  "form-action http:;";                        // explicit, no fallback to default-src
+
+var tests = [
+  { // (1) test that all requests within an >> https << page get updated
+    policy: UPGRADE_POLICY,
+    topLevelScheme: "https://",
+    description: "upgrade all requests on toplevel https",
+    deliveryMethod: "header",
+    results: [
+      "iframe-ok", "script-ok", "img-ok", "img-redir-ok", "font-ok", "xhr-ok", "style-ok",
+      "media-ok", "object-ok", "form-ok", "nested-img-ok"
+    ]
+  },
+  { // (2) test that all requests within an >> http << page get updated
+    policy: UPGRADE_POLICY,
+    topLevelScheme: "http://",
+    description: "upgrade all requests on toplevel http",
+    deliveryMethod: "header",
+    results: [
+      "iframe-ok", "script-ok", "img-ok", "img-redir-ok", "font-ok", "xhr-ok", "style-ok",
+      "media-ok", "object-ok", "form-ok", "nested-img-ok"
+    ]
+  },
+  { // (3) test that all requests within an >> http << page get updated, but do
+    //     not specify a default-src directive.
+    policy: UPGRADE_POLICY_NO_DEFAULT_SRC,
+    topLevelScheme: "http://",
+    description: "upgrade all requests on toplevel http where default-src is not specified",
+    deliveryMethod: "header",
+    results: [
+      "iframe-ok", "script-ok", "img-ok", "img-redir-ok", "font-ok", "xhr-ok", "style-ok",
+      "media-ok", "object-ok", "form-ok", "nested-img-ok"
+    ]
+  },
+  { // (4) test that no requests get updated if >> upgrade-insecure-requests << is not used
+    policy: NO_UPGRADE_POLICY,
+    topLevelScheme: "http://",
+    description: "do not upgrade any requests on toplevel http",
+    deliveryMethod: "header",
+    results: [
+      "iframe-error", "script-error", "img-error", "img-redir-error", "font-error",
+      "xhr-error", "style-error", "media-error", "object-error", "form-error",
+      "nested-img-error"
+    ]
+  },
+  { // (5) test that all requests within an >> https << page using meta CSP get updated
+    // policy: UPGRADE_POLICY, that test uses UPGRADE_POLICY within
+    //                         file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html
+    //                         no need to define it within that object.
+    topLevelScheme: "https://",
+    description: "upgrade all requests on toplevel https using meta csp",
+    deliveryMethod: "meta",
+    results: [
+      "iframe-ok", "script-ok", "img-ok", "img-redir-ok", "font-ok", "xhr-ok", "style-ok",
+      "media-ok", "object-ok", "form-ok", "nested-img-ok"
+    ]
+  },
+];
+
+// TODO: WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+    for (let test of tests) {
+        test.results.push(test.results[0] == "iframe-ok" ? "websocket-ok" : "websocket-error");
+    }
+}
+
+var counter = 0;
+var curTest;
+
+function loadTestPage() {
+  curTest = tests[counter++];
+  var src = curTest.topLevelScheme + "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  if (curTest.deliveryMethod === "header") {
+    // append the file that should be served
+    src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure.html");
+    // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+    src += "&csp=" + escape(curTest.policy);
+  }
+  else {
+    src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_meta.html");
+    // no csp here, since it's in the meta element
+  }
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function checkResults(result) {
+    // try to find the expected result within the results array
+  var index = curTest.results.indexOf(result);
+  isnot(index, -1, curTest.description + " (result: " + result + ")");
+
+  // take the element out the array and continue till the results array is empty
+  if (index != -1) {
+    curTest.results.splice(index, 1);
+  }
+  // lets check if we are expecting more results to bubble up
+  if (curTest.results.length) {
+    return;
+  }
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  runNextTest();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResults(event.data.result);
+}
+
+function runNextTest() {
+  // sends an xhr request to the server which is processed async, which only
+  // returns after the server has received all the expected requests.
+  var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  myXHR.open("GET", "file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?queryresult");
+  myXHR.onload = function(e) {
+    var results = myXHR.responseText.split(",");
+    for (var index in results) {
+      checkResults(results[index]);
+    }
+  }
+  myXHR.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+    finishTest();
+  }
+  myXHR.send();
+
+  // give it some time and run the testpage
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(loadTestPage);
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+runNextTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_cors.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_cors.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ed53d8108
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_cors.html
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page serving two XHR requests (including being redirected);
+ * one that should not require CORS and one that should require cors, in particular:
+ *
+ * Test 1:
+ *   Main page:   https://test1.example.com
+ *   XHR request: http://test1.example.com
+ *   Redirect to: http://test1.example.com
+ *   Description: Upgrade insecure should upgrade from http to https and also
+ *                surpress CORS for that case.
+ *
+ * Test 2:
+ *   Main page:   https://test1.example.com
+ *   XHR request: http://test1.example.com
+ *   Redirect to: http://test1.example.com:443
+ *   Description: Upgrade insecure should upgrade from http to https and also
+ *                prevent CORS for that case.
+ *   Note: If redirecting to a different port, then CORS *should* be enforced (unless
+ *         it's port 443). Unfortunately we can't test that because of the setup of our
+ *         *.sjs files; they only are able to listen to port 443, see:
+ *         http://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/build/pgo/server-locations.txt#98
+ *
+ * Test 3:
+ *   Main page:   https://test1.example.com
+ *   XHR request: http://test2.example.com
+ *   Redirect to: http://test1.example.com
+ *   Description: Upgrade insecure should *not* prevent CORS since
+ *                the page performs a cross origin xhr.
+ *
+ */
+
+const CSP_POLICY = "upgrade-insecure-requests; script-src 'unsafe-inline'";
+var tests = 3;
+
+function loadTest() {
+  var src = "https://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape("tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_cors.html")
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(CSP_POLICY);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function checkResult(result) {
+  if (result === "test1-no-cors-ok" ||
+      result === "test2-no-cors-diffport-ok" ||
+      result === "test3-cors-ok") {
+    ok(true, "'upgrade-insecure-requests' acknowledges CORS (" + result + ")");
+  }
+  else {
+    ok(false, "'upgrade-insecure-requests' acknowledges CORS (" + result + ")");
+  }
+  if (--tests > 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used to bubble up results from
+// within the iframe.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  checkResult(event.data);
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+loadTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc6039ec35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1273430 - Test CSP upgrade-insecure-requests for doc.write(iframe)</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Load an iframe which ships with a CSP of upgrade-insecure-requests.
+ * Within that iframe a script performs doc.write(iframe) using an
+ * *http* URL. Make sure, the URL is upgraded to *https*.
+ *
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ * |                                         |
+ * | http(s); csp: upgrade-insecure-requests |       |
+ * | +---------------------------------+     |
+ * | |                                 |     |
+ * | | doc.write(<iframe src='http'>); | <--------- upgrade to https
+ * | |                                 |     |
+ * | +---------------------------------+     |
+ * |                                         |
+ * +-----------------------------------------+
+ *
+ */
+
+const TEST_FRAME_URL =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs?testframe";
+
+// important: the RESULT should have a scheme of *https*
+const RESULT =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_docwrite_iframe.sjs?docwriteframe";
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, RESULT, "doc.write(iframe) of http should be upgraded to https!");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// start the test
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+testframe.src = TEST_FRAME_URL;
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f72f95215e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1447784 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page that performs a CORS XHR to 127.0.0.1 which shouldn't be upgraded to https:
+ *
+ * Test 1:
+ *   Main page:   https://127.0.0.1:8080
+ *   XHR request: http://127.0.0.1:8080
+ *   No redirect to https://
+ *   Description: Upgrade insecure should *NOT* upgrade from http to https.
+ */
+
+const CSP_POLICY = "upgrade-insecure-requests; script-src 'unsafe-inline'";
+let testFiles = ["tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback.html",
+                 "tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_loopback_form.html"];
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      // we skip looking at other requests that might be observed accidentally
+      // e.g., we saw kinto requests when running this test locally
+      if (data.includes("bug-1661423-dont-upgrade-localhost")) {
+        let urlObj = new URL(data);
+        is(urlObj.protocol, "http:", "Didn't upgrade localhost URL");
+        loadTest();
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+};
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+
+function loadTest() {
+  if (!testFiles.length) {
+    removeAndFinish();
+    return;
+  }
+  var src = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_testserver.sjs?file=";
+  // append the file that should be served
+  src += escape(testFiles.shift())
+  // append the CSP that should be used to serve the file
+  src += "&csp=" + escape(CSP_POLICY);
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+}
+
+function removeAndFinish() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used to bubble up results from
+// within the iframe.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  if (event.data === "request-not-https") {
+    ok(true, "Didn't upgrade 127.0.0.1:8080 to https://");
+    loadTest();
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// By default, proxies don't apply to 127.0.0.1.
+// We need them to for this test (at least on android), though:
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [
+  ["network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost", true]
+]}).then(loadTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5694deb15a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1271173 - Missing spec on Upgrade Insecure Requests(Navigational Upgrades) </title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="sandboxedtestframe"
+        sandbox="allow-scripts allow-top-navigation allow-same-origin allow-pointer-lock allow-popups"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load a page into an iframe that performs a navigational request.
+ * We make sure that upgrade-insecure-requests applies and the page
+ * gets upgraded to https if same origin.
+ * Please note that uir only applies to sandboxed iframes if
+ * the value 'allow-same-origin' is specified.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    csp: "upgrade-insecure-requests;",
+    result: "https",
+    origin: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "upgrade-insecure-requests same origin should upgrade" 
+  },
+  {
+    csp: "",
+    result: "http",
+    origin: "http://example.com",
+    desc: "No upgrade-insecure-requests same origin should not upgrade"
+  },
+  {
+    csp: "upgrade-insecure-requests;",
+    result: "http",
+    origin: "http://mochi.test:8888",
+    desc: "upgrade-insecure-requests cross origin should not upgrade" 
+  },
+  {
+    csp: "",
+    result: "http",
+    origin: "http://mochi.test:8888",
+    desc: "No upgrade-insecure-requests cross origin should not upgrade"
+  },
+];
+
+// initializing to -1 so we start at index 0 when we start the test
+var counter = -1;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+var subtests = 0;
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  var result = event.data.result;
+  // query the scheme from the URL before comparing the result
+  var scheme = result.substring(0, result.indexOf(":"));
+  is(scheme, tests[counter].result, tests[counter].desc);
+
+  // @hardcoded 4:
+  // each test run contains of two subtests (frame and top-level)
+  // and we load each test into a regular iframe and into a
+  // sandboxed iframe. only move on to the next test once all
+  // four results from the subtests have bubbled up.
+  subtests++;
+  if (subtests != 4) {
+    return;
+  }
+  subtests = 0;
+  loadNextTest();
+}
+
+function loadNextTest() {
+  counter++;
+  if (counter == tests.length) {
+    finishTest();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  var src = tests[counter].origin;
+  src += "/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation.sjs";
+  src += "?csp=" + escape(tests[counter].csp);
+  src += "&action=perform_navigation";
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+  document.getElementById("sandboxedtestframe").src = src;
+}
+// Don't upgrade to https to test that upgrade-insecure-requests acts correctly
+// start running the tests
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  set: [["dom.security.https_first", false]]
+}, loadNextTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..af25577cbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1422284 - Upgrade insecure requests should only apply to top-level same-origin redirects </title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="redirect_same_origin_frame"></iframe>
+<iframe id="redirect_cross_origin_frame"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let testCounter = 0;
+
+function checkFinished() {
+  // hardcoded 2 because we have a same-origin and a cross-origin test
+  if (++testCounter == 2) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let docURI = event.data.docURI;
+  let url =  docURI.split('?')[0];
+  let query = docURI.split('?')[1];
+
+  if (query === "finaldoc_same_origin_redirect") {
+    // scheme schould be https
+    is (
+      url,
+      "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs",
+      "upgrade-insecure-requests same origin redirect should upgrade",
+    );
+  }
+  else if (query === "finaldoc_cross_origin_redirect") {
+    // scheme schould be http
+    is (
+      url,
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect.sjs",
+      "upgrade-insecure-requests cross origin redirect should not upgrade",
+    );
+  }
+  else {
+    ok(false, "sanity: how can we ever get here?");
+  }
+  checkFinished();
+}
+
+function startTest() {
+  document.getElementById("redirect_same_origin_frame").src =
+    "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_same_origin.html";
+  document.getElementById("redirect_cross_origin_frame").src =
+    "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_navigation_redirect_cross_origin.html";
+}
+
+// do not upgrade tests by https-first, only by UIR for this test
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["dom.security.https_first", false]]}, startTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4966b8627e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_upgrade_insecure_reporting.html
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1139297 - Implement CSP upgrade-insecure-requests directive</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load an https page which includes an http image. We make sure that
+ * the image request gets upgraded to https but also make sure that a report
+ * is sent when a CSP report only is used which only allows https requests.
+ */
+
+var expectedResults = 2;
+
+function finishTest() {
+  // let's wait till the image was loaded and the report was received
+  if (--expectedResults > 0) {
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function runTest() {
+  // (1) Lets send off an XHR request which will return once the server receives
+  // the violation report from the report only policy.
+  var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  myXHR.open("GET", "file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs?queryresult");
+  myXHR.onload = function(e) {
+    is(myXHR.responseText, "report-ok", "csp-report was sent correctly");
+    finishTest();
+  }
+  myXHR.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "could not query result for csp-report from server (" + e.message + ")");
+    finishTest();
+  }
+  myXHR.send();
+
+  // (2) We load a page that is served using a CSP and a CSP report only which loads
+  // an image over http.
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(function() {
+    document.getElementById("testframe").src =
+      "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/file_upgrade_insecure_reporting_server.sjs?toplevel";
+  });
+}
+
+// a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+// 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  // (3) make sure the image was correctly loaded
+  is(event.data.result, "img-ok", "upgraded insecure image load from http -> https");
+  finishTest();
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_localhost.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_localhost.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6bcc93fceb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_localhost.html
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <meta charset="utf-8">

+  <title>Bug 1729897: Allow unsecure websocket from localhost page with CSP: upgrade-insecure </title>

+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->

+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>

+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />

+</head>

+<body>

+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="test_ws_self_frame"></iframe>

+

+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">

+

+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();

+

+function finishTest() {

+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);

+  SimpleTest.finish();

+}

+

+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);

+function receiveMessage(event) {

+  is(event.data.result, "self-ws-loaded", "websocket loaded");

+  ok(event.data.url.startsWith("ws://"), `scheme must be ws:// but got ${event.data.url}`);

+  finishTest();

+}

+

+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [

+  ["network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost", true],

+  ["network.proxy.testing_localhost_is_secure_when_hijacked", true],

+]}).then(function() {

+  const HOST = "http://localhost/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";

+  var test_ws_self_frame = document.getElementById("test_ws_self_frame");

+  test_ws_self_frame.src = HOST + "file_websocket_csp_upgrade.html";

+});

+

+</script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_self.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_self.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3eae83bfbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_websocket_self.html
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>

+<html>

+<head>

+  <meta charset="utf-8">

+  <title>Bug 1345615: Allow websocket schemes when using 'self' in CSP</title>

+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->

+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>

+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />

+</head>

+<body>

+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="test_ws_self_frame"></iframe>

+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="test_ws_explicit_frame"></iframe>

+

+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">

+

+/* Description of the test:

+ * We load an iframe using connect-src 'self' and one

+ *            iframe using connect-src ws: and make

+ * sure that in both cases ws: as well as wss: is allowed to load.

+ */

+

+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();

+

+function finishTest() {

+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);

+  SimpleTest.finish();

+}

+

+const TOTAL_TESTS = 4;

+var counter = 0;

+

+function checkResults(result) {

+  counter++;

+  if (result === "self-ws-loaded" || result === "self-wss-loaded" ||

+      result === "explicit-ws-loaded" || result === "explicit-wss-loaded") {

+    ok(true, "Evaluating: " + result);

+  }

+  else {

+    ok(false, "Evaluating: " + result);

+  }

+  if (counter < TOTAL_TESTS) {

+    return;

+  }

+  finishTest();

+}

+

+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);

+function receiveMessage(event) {

+  checkResults(event.data.result);

+}

+

+const HOST = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";

+var test_ws_self_frame = document.getElementById("test_ws_self_frame");

+test_ws_self_frame.src = HOST + "file_websocket_self.html";

+

+var test_ws_explicit_frame = document.getElementById("test_ws_explicit_frame");

+test_ws_explicit_frame.src = HOST + "file_websocket_explicit.html";

+

+</script>

+</body>

+</html>

diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_win_open_blocked.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_win_open_blocked.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1335c9d272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_win_open_blocked.html
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <!-- we have to allowlist the actual script that spawns the tests,
+       hence the nonce.-->
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'none';
+                    script-src 'nonce-foo'; style-src 'nonce-foo'">
+  <script nonce="foo" src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js">
+  </script>
+  <link nonce="foo" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"
+                    href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <!-- this script block with window.open and document.open will not
+       be executed, since default-src is none -->
+  <script>
+    let win = window.open('file_default_src_none_csp.html');
+    document.open();
+    document.write("<script type='application/javascript'>" +
+                   "  window.opener.postMessage('document-opened', '*');" +
+                   "<\/script>");
+    document.close();
+  </script>
+  <script nonce="foo">
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that opening a " +
+                                   "new window/document has not succeeded");
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    let checkWindowStatus = false;
+    let checkDocumentStatus = false;
+
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+        if (event.data == "window-opened") {
+          checkWindowStatus = true;
+          win.close();
+        }
+        if (event.data == "document-opened") {
+          checkDocumentStatus = true;
+          doc.close();
+        }
+    }
+    setTimeout(function () {
+        is(checkWindowStatus, false,
+          "window shouldn't be opened");
+        is(checkDocumentStatus, false,
+          "document shouldn't be opened");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+    }, 1500);
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_worker_src.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_worker_src.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5aa8f7bc56
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_worker_src.html
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1302667 - Test worker-src</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(3);
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page inlcuding a worker, a shared worker as well as a
+ * service worker with a CSP of:
+ *   >> worker-src https://example.com; child-src 'none'; script-src 'nonce-foo'
+ * and make sure that worker-src governs these three kinds of workers correctly.
+ * In addition, we make sure that child-src as well as script-src is discarded
+ * in case worker-src is specified. Ideally we would use "script-src 'none'" but
+ * we have to allowlist the actual script that spawns the workers, hence the nonce.
+ */
+
+let ALLOWED_HOST = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+let BLOCKED_HOST = "https://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/csp/";
+
+let TESTS = [
+  // allowed
+  ALLOWED_HOST + "file_worker_src_worker_governs.html",
+  ALLOWED_HOST + "file_worker_src_child_governs.html",
+  ALLOWED_HOST + "file_worker_src_script_governs.html",
+  // blocked
+  BLOCKED_HOST + "file_worker_src_worker_governs.html",
+  BLOCKED_HOST + "file_worker_src_child_governs.html",
+  BLOCKED_HOST + "file_worker_src_script_governs.html",
+];
+
+let numberSubTests = 3; // 1 web worker, 1 shared worker, 1 service worker
+let subTestCounter = 0; // keeps track of how many 
+let testIndex = 0;
+
+function checkFinish() {
+  subTestCounter = 0;
+  testIndex++;
+  if (testIndex < TESTS.length) {
+    runNextTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let href = event.data.href;
+  let result = event.data.result;
+
+  if (href.startsWith("https://example.com")) {
+    if (result == "worker-allowed" ||
+        result == "shared-worker-allowed" ||
+        result == "service-worker-allowed") {
+     ok(true, "allowing worker from https://example.com (" + result + ")");
+    }
+    else {
+     ok(false, "blocking worker from https://example.com (" + result + ")");
+    }
+  }
+  else if (href.startsWith("https://test1.example.com")) {
+    if (result == "worker-blocked" ||
+        result == "shared-worker-blocked" ||
+        result == "service-worker-blocked") {
+      ok(true, "blocking worker from https://test1.example.com (" + result + ")");
+    }
+    else {
+      ok(false, "allowing worker from https://test1.example.com (" + result + ")");
+    }
+  }
+  else {
+    // sanity check, we should never enter that branch, bust just in case...
+    ok(false, "unexpected result: " + result);
+  }
+  subTestCounter++;
+  if (subTestCounter < numberSubTests) {
+    return;
+  }
+  checkFinish();
+}
+
+function runNextTest() {
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = TESTS[testIndex];
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
+  ["dom.serviceWorkers.enabled", true],
+  ["dom.serviceWorkers.testing.enabled", true],
+]}, function() {
+  runNextTest();
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/test_xslt_inherits_csp.html b/dom/security/test/csp/test_xslt_inherits_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..90e8372db1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/test_xslt_inherits_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1597645: Make sure XSLT inherits the CSP r=ckerschb</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<body>
+    <iframe src="file_xslt_inherits_csp.xml"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody">
+    SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+    let frame = document.querySelector("iframe");
+
+    window.addEventListener("load",()=>{
+    let link = frame.contentWindow.document.querySelector("a");
+    link.click(); //
+
+        requestAnimationFrame(()=>{
+            // Wait one Frame to let the browser catch up
+            // before checking the dom.
+            let res = !frame.contentWindow.document.body.innerText.includes("JS DID EXCECUTE");
+            ok(res, "The CSP did block injected JS ");
+            SimpleTest.finish();
+        });
+    })
+</script>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/worker.sjs b/dom/security/test/csp/worker.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e85df3382a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/worker.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const SJS = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/csp/worker.sjs";
+
+function createFetchWorker(url) {
+  return `fetch("${url}");`;
+}
+
+function createXHRWorker(url) {
+  return `
+    try {
+      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      xhr.open("GET", "${url}");
+      xhr.send();
+    } catch(ex) {}
+  `;
+}
+
+function createImportScriptsWorker(url) {
+  return `
+    try {
+      importScripts("${url}");
+    } catch(ex) {}
+  `;
+}
+
+function createChildWorkerURL(params) {
+  let url = SJS + "?" + params.toString();
+  return `new Worker("${url}");`;
+}
+
+function createChildWorkerBlob(params) {
+  let url = SJS + "?" + params.toString();
+  return `
+    try {
+      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      xhr.open("GET", "${url}");
+      xhr.responseType = "blob";
+      xhr.send();
+      xhr.onload = () => {
+        new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(xhr.response));};
+    } catch(ex) {}
+  `;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  let params = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  let id = params.get("id");
+  let base = unescape(params.get("base"));
+  let child = params.has("child") ? params.get("child") : "";
+
+  //avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript");
+
+  // Deliver the CSP policy encoded in the URL
+  if (params.has("csp")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy",
+      unescape(params.get("csp")),
+      false
+    );
+  }
+
+  if (child) {
+    let childCsp = params.has("childCsp") ? params.get("childCsp") : "";
+    params.delete("csp");
+    params.delete("child");
+    params.delete("childCsp");
+    params.append("csp", childCsp);
+
+    switch (child) {
+      case "blob":
+        response.write(createChildWorkerBlob(params));
+        break;
+
+      case "url":
+        response.write(createChildWorkerURL(params));
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 400, "Bad request");
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (params.has("action")) {
+    switch (params.get("action")) {
+      case "fetch":
+        response.write(createFetchWorker(base + "?id=" + id));
+        break;
+
+      case "xhr":
+        response.write(createXHRWorker(base + "?id=" + id));
+        break;
+
+      case "importScripts":
+        response.write(createImportScriptsWorker(base + "?id=" + id));
+        break;
+
+      default:
+        response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 400, "Bad request");
+        break;
+    }
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.write("I don't know action ");
+  return;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/csp/worker_helper.js b/dom/security/test/csp/worker_helper.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6c329fd5f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/csp/worker_helper.js
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+ * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
+ */
+
+var _tests = [];
+function addTest(test) {
+  _tests.push(test);
+}
+
+function addAsyncTest(fn) {
+  _tests.push(() => fn().catch(ok.bind(null, false)));
+}
+
+function runNextTest() {
+  if (!_tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  const fn = _tests.shift();
+  try {
+    fn();
+  } catch (ex) {
+    info(
+      "Test function " +
+        (fn.name ? "'" + fn.name + "' " : "") +
+        "threw an exception: " +
+        ex
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper to perform an XHR then blob response to create worker
+ */
+function doXHRGetBlob(uri) {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("GET", uri);
+    xhr.responseType = "blob";
+    xhr.addEventListener("load", function() {
+      is(
+        xhr.status,
+        200,
+        "doXHRGetBlob load uri='" + uri + "' status=" + xhr.status
+      );
+      resolve(xhr.response);
+    });
+    xhr.send();
+  });
+}
+
+function removeObserver(observer) {
+  SpecialPowers.removeObserver(observer, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  SpecialPowers.removeObserver(observer, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper to perform an assert to check if the request should be blocked or
+ * allowed by CSP
+ */
+function assertCSPBlock(url, shouldBlock) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let observer = {
+      observe(subject, topic, data) {
+        if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+          if (data == url) {
+            is(shouldBlock, false, "Should allow request uri='" + url);
+            removeObserver(observer);
+            resolve();
+          }
+        }
+
+        if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+          let asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+            SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+            "asciiSpec"
+          );
+          if (asciiSpec == url) {
+            is(shouldBlock, true, "Should block request uri='" + url);
+            removeObserver(observer);
+            resolve();
+          }
+        }
+      },
+    };
+
+    SpecialPowers.addObserver(observer, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.addObserver(observer, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  });
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c5f614b36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+[browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js]
+skip-if = (verify && debug && (os == 'mac')) || (debug && (os == 'mac' || os == 'linux')) # Bug 1403815
+support-files =
+  file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
+  file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
+[browser_test_data_download.js]
+support-files =
+  file_data_download.html
+[browser_test_data_text_csv.js]
+support-files =
+  file_data_text_csv.html
+[browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js]
+support-files =
+  file_view_image_data_navigation.html
+  file_view_bg_image_data_navigation.html
+[browser_test_FTP_console_warning.js]
+support-files =
+  file_FTP_console_warning.html
+[browser_test_assert_systemprincipal_documents.js]
+skip-if = !nightly_build
+support-files =
+  file_assert_systemprincipal_documents.html
+  file_assert_systemprincipal_documents_iframe.html
+[browser_test_referrer_loadInOtherProcess.js]
+[browser_test_framing_error_pages.js]
+support-files =
+  file_framing_error_pages_csp.html
+  file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html
+  file_framing_error_pages.sjs
+[browser_test_xfo_embed_object.js]
+support-files =
+  file_framing_xfo_embed.html
+  file_framing_xfo_object.html
+  file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs
+[browser_test_report_blocking.js]
+support-files =
+  file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html
+  file_framing_error_pages_csp.html
+  file_framing_error_pages.sjs
+[browser_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.js]
+support-files =
+  file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs
+[browser_file_nonscript.js]
+support-files =
+  file_loads_nonscript.html
+  file_nonscript
+  file_nonscript.xyz
+  file_nonscript.html
+  file_nonscript.txt
+  file_nonscript.json
+  file_script.js
+[browser_restrict_privileged_about_script.js]
+# This test intentionally asserts when in debug builds. Let's rely on opt builds when in CI.
+skip-if = debug
+support-files =
+  file_about_child.html
+  file_1767581.js
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_file_nonscript.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_file_nonscript.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..052acc49dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_file_nonscript.js
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+   http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */
+
+"use strict";
+
+add_task(async function test_fileurl_nonscript_load() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.block_fileuri_script_with_wrong_mime", true]],
+  });
+
+  let file = getChromeDir(getResolvedURI(gTestPath));
+  file.append("file_loads_nonscript.html");
+  let uriString = Services.io.newFileURI(file).spec;
+
+  let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, uriString);
+  registerCleanupFunction(async function() {
+    BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+  });
+
+  let counter = await SpecialPowers.spawn(tab.linkedBrowser, [], async () => {
+    Cu.exportFunction(Assert.equal.bind(Assert), content.window, {
+      defineAs: "equal",
+    });
+    content.window.postMessage("run", "*");
+
+    await new Promise(resolve => {
+      content.window.addEventListener("message", event => {
+        if (event.data === "done") {
+          resolve();
+        }
+      });
+    });
+
+    return content.window.wrappedJSObject.counter;
+  });
+
+  is(counter, 1, "Only one script should have run");
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_restrict_privileged_about_script.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_restrict_privileged_about_script.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f44ebbaed0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_restrict_privileged_about_script.js
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kChildPage = getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + "file_about_child.html";
+
+const kAboutPagesRegistered = BrowserTestUtils.registerAboutPage(
+  registerCleanupFunction,
+  "test-about-privileged-with-scripts",
+  kChildPage,
+  Ci.nsIAboutModule.ALLOW_SCRIPT |
+    Ci.nsIAboutModule.URI_MUST_LOAD_IN_CHILD |
+    Ci.nsIAboutModule.URI_CAN_LOAD_IN_PRIVILEGEDABOUT_PROCESS |
+    Ci.nsIAboutModule.URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT |
+    Ci.nsIAboutModule.IS_SECURE_CHROME_UI
+);
+
+add_task(async function test_principal_click() {
+  await kAboutPagesRegistered;
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.skip_about_page_has_csp_assert", true]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    "about:test-about-privileged-with-scripts",
+    async function(browser) {
+      // Wait for page to fully load
+      info("Waiting for tab to be loaded..");
+      // let's look into the fully loaded about page
+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+        let channel = content.docShell.currentDocumentChannel;
+        is(
+          channel.originalURI.asciiSpec,
+          "about:test-about-privileged-with-scripts",
+          "sanity check - make sure we test the principal for the correct URI"
+        );
+
+        let triggeringPrincipal = channel.loadInfo.triggeringPrincipal;
+        ok(
+          triggeringPrincipal.isSystemPrincipal,
+          "loading about: from privileged page must have a triggering of System"
+        );
+
+        let contentPolicyType = channel.loadInfo.externalContentPolicyType;
+        is(
+          contentPolicyType,
+          Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+          "sanity check - loading a top level document"
+        );
+
+        let loadingPrincipal = channel.loadInfo.loadingPrincipal;
+        is(
+          loadingPrincipal,
+          null,
+          "sanity check - load of TYPE_DOCUMENT must have a null loadingPrincipal"
+        );
+        ok(
+          !content.document.nodePrincipal.isSystemPrincipal,
+          "sanity check - loaded about page does not have the system principal"
+        );
+        isnot(
+          content.testResult,
+          "fail-script-was-loaded",
+          "The script from https://example.com shouldn't work in an about: page."
+        );
+      });
+    }
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f647e8c97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.js
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const HTTPS_PATH = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+const HTTP_PATH = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+function checkCookies(expectedCookies = {}) {
+  info(JSON.stringify(expectedCookies));
+  return SpecialPowers.spawn(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    [expectedCookies],
+    async function(expectedCookies) {
+      let cookies = content.document.getElementById("msg").innerHTML;
+      info(cookies);
+      for (const [cookie, expected] of Object.entries(expectedCookies)) {
+        if (expected) {
+          ok(cookies.includes(cookie), `${cookie} should be sent`);
+        } else {
+          ok(!cookies.includes(cookie), `${cookie} should not be sent`);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+add_task(async function bug1748693() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+    gBrowser,
+    `${HTTPS_PATH}file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs?setcookies`
+  );
+  await loaded;
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+    gBrowser,
+    `${HTTP_PATH}file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs`
+  );
+  await loaded;
+
+  await checkCookies({ auth: true, auth_secure: false });
+
+  finish();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_FTP_console_warning.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_FTP_console_warning.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9384f5ddd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_FTP_console_warning.js
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// Description of the test:
+//   Ensure that FTP subresource loads trigger a warning in the webconsole.
+"use strict";
+
+// These files don't actually exist, we are just looking for messages
+// that indicate that loading those files would have been blocked.
+var seen_files = ["a.html", "b.html", "c.html", "d.png"];
+
+function on_new_message(msgObj) {
+  let text = msgObj.message;
+  if (
+    text.includes("Loading FTP subresource within http(s) page not allowed")
+  ) {
+    // Remove the file in the message from the list.
+    seen_files = seen_files.filter(file => {
+      return !text.includes(file);
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://mochi.test:8888"
+);
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_FTP_console_warning.html";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_message);
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, kTestURI);
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => seen_files.length === 0);
+  is(seen_files.length, 0, "All FTP subresources should be blocked");
+
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_message);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_assert_systemprincipal_documents.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_assert_systemprincipal_documents.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..08abdb7705
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_assert_systemprincipal_documents.js
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+//"use strict"
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath);
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_assert_systemprincipal_documents.html";
+
+add_setup(async function() {
+  // We expect the assertion in function
+  // CheckSystemPrincipalLoads as defined in
+  // file dom/security/nsContentSecurityManager.cpp
+  SimpleTest.expectAssertions(1);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.disallow_non_local_systemprincipal_in_tests", true],
+      ["security.allow_unsafe_parent_loads", true],
+    ],
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function open_test_iframe_in_tab() {
+  // This looks at the iframe (load type SUBDOCUMENT)
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: kTestURI },
+    async browser => {
+      await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async function() {
+        let outerPrincipal = content.document.nodePrincipal;
+        ok(
+          outerPrincipal.isSystemPrincipal,
+          "Sanity: Using SystemPrincipal for test file on chrome://"
+        );
+        const iframeDoc = content.document.getElementById("testframe")
+          .contentDocument;
+        is(
+          iframeDoc.body.innerHTML,
+          "",
+          "iframe with systemprincipal should be empty document"
+        );
+      });
+    }
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5ba7877222
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_download.html";
+
+function addWindowListener(aURL) {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    Services.wm.addListener({
+      onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) {
+        info("window opened, waiting for focus");
+        Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+        var domwindow = aXULWindow.docShell.domWindow;
+        waitForFocus(function() {
+          is(
+            domwindow.document.location.href,
+            aURL,
+            "should have seen the right window open"
+          );
+          resolve(domwindow);
+        }, domwindow);
+      },
+      onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) {},
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function waitDelay(delay) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    /* eslint-disable mozilla/no-arbitrary-setTimeout */
+    window.setTimeout(resolve, delay);
+  });
+}
+
+function promisePanelOpened() {
+  if (DownloadsPanel.panel && DownloadsPanel.panel.state == "open") {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(DownloadsPanel.panel, "popupshown");
+}
+
+add_task(async function test_with_downloads_pref_disabled() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true],
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", true],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", false],
+    ],
+  });
+  let windowPromise = addWindowListener(
+    "chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xhtml"
+  );
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, kTestURI);
+  let win = await windowPromise;
+
+  is(
+    win.document.getElementById("location").value,
+    "data-foo.html",
+    "file name of download should match"
+  );
+
+  let mainWindowActivated = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(window, "activate");
+  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);
+  await mainWindowActivated;
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_with_always_ask_pref_disabled() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true],
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", false],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+    ],
+  });
+  let downloadsPanelPromise = promisePanelOpened();
+  let downloadsPromise = Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, kTestURI);
+  // wait until downloadsPanel opens before continuing with test
+  await downloadsPanelPromise;
+  let downloadList = await downloadsPromise;
+
+  is(DownloadsPanel.isPanelShowing, true, "DownloadsPanel should be open.");
+  is(
+    downloadList._downloads.length,
+    1,
+    "File should be successfully downloaded."
+  );
+
+  let [download] = downloadList._downloads;
+  is(download.contentType, "text/html", "File contentType should be correct.");
+  is(
+    download.source.url,
+    "data:text/html,<body>data download</body>",
+    "File name should be correct."
+  );
+
+  info("cleaning up downloads");
+  try {
+    if (Services.appinfo.OS === "WINNT") {
+      // We need to make the file writable to delete it on Windows.
+      await IOUtils.setPermissions(download.target.path, 0o600);
+    }
+    await IOUtils.remove(download.target.path);
+  } catch (error) {
+    info("The file " + download.target.path + " is not removed, " + error);
+  }
+
+  await downloadList.remove(download);
+  await download.finalize();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac29a63491
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_data_text_csv.js
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+const kTestURI = kTestPath + "file_data_text_csv.html";
+
+function addWindowListener(aURL, aCallback) {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    Services.wm.addListener({
+      onOpenWindow(aXULWindow) {
+        info("window opened, waiting for focus");
+        Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+        var domwindow = aXULWindow.docShell.domWindow;
+        waitForFocus(function() {
+          is(
+            domwindow.document.location.href,
+            aURL,
+            "should have seen the right window open"
+          );
+          resolve(domwindow);
+        }, domwindow);
+      },
+      onCloseWindow(aXULWindow) {},
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+function promisePanelOpened() {
+  if (DownloadsPanel.panel && DownloadsPanel.panel.state == "open") {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(DownloadsPanel.panel, "popupshown");
+}
+
+add_task(async function test_with_pref_enabled() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true],
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", true],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", false],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  let windowPromise = addWindowListener(
+    "chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xhtml"
+  );
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, kTestURI);
+  let win = await windowPromise;
+
+  let expectedValue = "index.csv";
+  is(
+    win.document.getElementById("location").value,
+    expectedValue,
+    "file name of download should match"
+  );
+  let mainWindowActivated = BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(window, "activate");
+  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);
+  await mainWindowActivated;
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_with_pref_disabled() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true],
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", false],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+    ],
+  });
+  let downloadsPanelPromise = promisePanelOpened();
+  let downloadsPromise = Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  let sourceURLBit = "text/csv;foo,bar,foobar";
+
+  info("Loading URI for pref enabled");
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, kTestURI);
+  info("Waiting for downloads panel to open");
+  await downloadsPanelPromise;
+  info("Getting downloads info after opening downloads panel");
+  let downloadList = await downloadsPromise;
+
+  is(DownloadsPanel.isPanelShowing, true, "DownloadsPanel should be open.");
+  is(
+    downloadList._downloads.length,
+    1,
+    "File should be successfully downloaded."
+  );
+
+  let [download] = downloadList._downloads;
+  is(download.contentType, "text/csv", "File contentType should be correct.");
+  is(
+    download.source.url,
+    `data:${sourceURLBit}`,
+    "File name should be correct."
+  );
+
+  info("Cleaning up downloads");
+  try {
+    if (Services.appinfo.OS === "WINNT") {
+      // We need to make the file writable to delete it on Windows.
+      await IOUtils.setPermissions(download.target.path, 0o600);
+    }
+    await IOUtils.remove(download.target.path);
+  } catch (ex) {
+    info("The file " + download.target.path + " is not removed, " + ex);
+  }
+
+  await downloadList.remove(download);
+  await download.finalize();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_framing_error_pages.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_framing_error_pages.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c49494669
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_framing_error_pages.js
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+const kTestXFrameOptionsURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html";
+const kTestXFrameOptionsURIFrame =
+  kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages.sjs?xfo";
+
+const kTestFrameAncestorsURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages_csp.html";
+const kTestFrameAncestorsURIFrame =
+  kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages.sjs?csp";
+
+add_task(async function open_test_xfo_error_page() {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+      browser,
+      true,
+      kTestXFrameOptionsURIFrame,
+      true
+    );
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, kTestXFrameOptionsURI);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async function() {
+      const iframeDoc = content.document.getElementById("testframe")
+        .contentDocument;
+      let errorPage = iframeDoc.body.innerHTML;
+      ok(errorPage.includes("csp-xfo-error-title"), "xfo error page correct");
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function open_test_csp_frame_ancestor_error_page() {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+      browser,
+      true,
+      kTestFrameAncestorsURIFrame,
+      true
+    );
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, kTestFrameAncestorsURI);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async function() {
+      const iframeDoc = content.document.getElementById("testframe")
+        .contentDocument;
+      let errorPage = iframeDoc.body.innerHTML;
+      ok(errorPage.includes("csp-xfo-error-title"), "csp error page correct");
+    });
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_referrer_loadInOtherProcess.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_referrer_loadInOtherProcess.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d25f3e0802
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_referrer_loadInOtherProcess.js
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+const TEST_PAGE =
+  "https://example.org/browser/browser/base/content/test/general/dummy_page.html";
+const TEST_REFERRER = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+
+const ReferrerInfo = Components.Constructor(
+  "@mozilla.org/referrer-info;1",
+  "nsIReferrerInfo",
+  "init"
+);
+
+let referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(
+  Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.ORIGIN,
+  true,
+  Services.io.newURI(TEST_REFERRER)
+);
+let deReferrerInfo = E10SUtils.serializeReferrerInfo(referrerInfo);
+
+var checkResult = async function(isRemote, browserKey, uri) {
+  is(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser.isRemoteBrowser,
+    isRemote,
+    "isRemoteBrowser should be correct"
+  );
+
+  is(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser.permanentKey,
+    browserKey,
+    "browser.permanentKey should be correct"
+  );
+
+  if (SpecialPowers.Services.appinfo.sessionHistoryInParent) {
+    let sessionHistory =
+      gBrowser.selectedBrowser.browsingContext.sessionHistory;
+    let entry = sessionHistory.getEntryAtIndex(sessionHistory.count - 1);
+    let args = { uri, referrerInfo: deReferrerInfo, isRemote };
+    Assert.equal(entry.URI.spec, args.uri, "Uri should be correct");
+
+    // Main process like about:mozilla does not trigger the real network request.
+    // So we don't store referrerInfo in sessionHistory in that case.
+    // Besides, the referrerInfo stored in sessionHistory was computed, we only
+    // check pre-computed things.
+    if (args.isRemote) {
+      let resultReferrerInfo = entry.referrerInfo;
+      let expectedReferrerInfo = E10SUtils.deserializeReferrerInfo(
+        args.referrerInfo
+      );
+
+      Assert.equal(
+        resultReferrerInfo.originalReferrer.spec,
+        expectedReferrerInfo.originalReferrer.spec,
+        "originalReferrer should be correct"
+      );
+      Assert.equal(
+        resultReferrerInfo.sendReferrer,
+        expectedReferrerInfo.sendReferrer,
+        "sendReferrer should be correct"
+      );
+      Assert.equal(
+        resultReferrerInfo.referrerPolicy,
+        expectedReferrerInfo.referrerPolicy,
+        "referrerPolicy should be correct"
+      );
+    } else {
+      Assert.equal(entry.referrerInfo, null, "ReferrerInfo should be correct");
+    }
+
+    return;
+  }
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    [{ uri, referrerInfo: deReferrerInfo, isRemote }],
+    async function(args) {
+      let webNav = content.docShell.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIWebNavigation);
+      let sessionHistory = webNav.sessionHistory;
+      let entry = sessionHistory.legacySHistory.getEntryAtIndex(
+        sessionHistory.count - 1
+      );
+
+      var { E10SUtils } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+        "resource://gre/modules/E10SUtils.jsm"
+      );
+
+      Assert.equal(entry.URI.spec, args.uri, "Uri should be correct");
+
+      // Main process like about:mozilla does not trigger the real network request.
+      // So we don't store referrerInfo in sessionHistory in that case.
+      // Besides, the referrerInfo stored in sessionHistory was computed, we only
+      // check pre-computed things.
+      if (args.isRemote) {
+        let resultReferrerInfo = entry.referrerInfo;
+        let expectedReferrerInfo = E10SUtils.deserializeReferrerInfo(
+          args.referrerInfo
+        );
+
+        Assert.equal(
+          resultReferrerInfo.originalReferrer.spec,
+          expectedReferrerInfo.originalReferrer.spec,
+          "originalReferrer should be correct"
+        );
+        Assert.equal(
+          resultReferrerInfo.sendReferrer,
+          expectedReferrerInfo.sendReferrer,
+          "sendReferrer should be correct"
+        );
+        Assert.equal(
+          resultReferrerInfo.referrerPolicy,
+          expectedReferrerInfo.referrerPolicy,
+          "referrerPolicy should be correct"
+        );
+      } else {
+        Assert.equal(
+          entry.referrerInfo,
+          null,
+          "ReferrerInfo should be correct"
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  );
+};
+var waitForLoad = async function(uri) {
+  info("waitForLoad " + uri);
+  let loadURIOptions = {
+    triggeringPrincipal: Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal(),
+    referrerInfo,
+  };
+  gBrowser.selectedBrowser.webNavigation.loadURI(uri, loadURIOptions);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.browserStopped(gBrowser, uri);
+};
+
+// Tests referrerInfo when navigating from a page in the remote process to main
+// process and vice versa.
+add_task(async function test_navigation() {
+  // Navigate from non remote to remote
+  gBrowser.selectedTab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, "about:blank");
+  let testURI = TEST_PAGE;
+  let { permanentKey } = gBrowser.selectedBrowser;
+  await waitForLoad(testURI);
+  await checkResult(true, permanentKey, testURI);
+  gBrowser.removeCurrentTab();
+
+  // Navigate from remote to non-remote
+  gBrowser.selectedTab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, TEST_PAGE);
+  // Wait for the non-blank page to finish loading
+  await BrowserTestUtils.browserStopped(gBrowser, TEST_PAGE);
+  testURI = "about:mozilla";
+  permanentKey = gBrowser.selectedBrowser.permanentKey;
+  await waitForLoad(testURI);
+  await checkResult(false, permanentKey, testURI);
+
+  gBrowser.removeCurrentTab();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_report_blocking.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_report_blocking.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..712330216a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_report_blocking.js
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const { TelemetryArchiveTesting } = ChromeUtils.importESModule(
+  "resource://testing-common/TelemetryArchiveTesting.sys.mjs"
+);
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+const kTestXFrameOptionsURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html";
+const kTestCspURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages_csp.html";
+const kTestXFrameOptionsURIFrame =
+  kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages.sjs?xfo";
+const kTestCspURIFrame = kTestPath + "file_framing_error_pages.sjs?csp";
+
+const kTestExpectedPingXFO = [
+  [["payload", "error_type"], "xfo"],
+  [["payload", "xfo_header"], "deny"],
+  [["payload", "csp_header"], ""],
+  [["payload", "frame_hostname"], "example.com"],
+  [["payload", "top_hostname"], "example.com"],
+  [
+    ["payload", "frame_uri"],
+    "https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs",
+  ],
+  [
+    ["payload", "top_uri"],
+    "https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html",
+  ],
+];
+
+const kTestExpectedPingCSP = [
+  [["payload", "error_type"], "csp"],
+  [["payload", "xfo_header"], ""],
+  [["payload", "csp_header"], "'none'"],
+  [["payload", "frame_hostname"], "example.com"],
+  [["payload", "top_hostname"], "example.com"],
+  [
+    ["payload", "frame_uri"],
+    "https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs",
+  ],
+  [
+    ["payload", "top_uri"],
+    "https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_csp.html",
+  ],
+];
+
+const TEST_CASES = [
+  {
+    type: "xfo",
+    test_uri: kTestXFrameOptionsURI,
+    frame_uri: kTestXFrameOptionsURIFrame,
+    expected_ping: kTestExpectedPingXFO,
+  },
+  {
+    type: "csp",
+    test_uri: kTestCspURI,
+    frame_uri: kTestCspURIFrame,
+    expected_ping: kTestExpectedPingCSP,
+  },
+];
+
+add_setup(async function() {
+  Services.telemetry.setEventRecordingEnabled("security.ui.xfocsperror", true);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.xfocsp.errorReporting.enabled", true],
+      ["security.xfocsp.errorReporting.automatic", false],
+    ],
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function testReportingCases() {
+  for (const test of TEST_CASES) {
+    await testReporting(test);
+  }
+});
+
+async function testReporting(test) {
+  // Clear telemetry event before testing.
+  Services.telemetry.clearEvents();
+
+  let telemetryChecker = new TelemetryArchiveTesting.Checker();
+  await telemetryChecker.promiseInit();
+
+  let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(
+    gBrowser,
+    "about:blank"
+  );
+  let browser = tab.linkedBrowser;
+
+  let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+    browser,
+    true,
+    test.frame_uri,
+    true
+  );
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, test.test_uri);
+  await loaded;
+
+  let { type } = test;
+
+  let frameBC = await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async _ => {
+    const iframe = content.document.getElementById("testframe");
+    return iframe.browsingContext;
+  });
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(frameBC, [type], async obj => {
+    // Wait until the reporting UI is visible.
+    await ContentTaskUtils.waitForCondition(() => {
+      let reportUI = content.document.getElementById("blockingErrorReporting");
+      return ContentTaskUtils.is_visible(reportUI);
+    });
+
+    let reportCheckBox = content.document.getElementById(
+      "automaticallyReportBlockingInFuture"
+    );
+    is(
+      reportCheckBox.checked,
+      false,
+      "The checkbox of the reporting ui should be not checked."
+    );
+
+    // Click on the checkbox.
+    await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(reportCheckBox, {}, content);
+  });
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+
+  // Open the error page again
+  tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, "about:blank");
+  browser = tab.linkedBrowser;
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, true, test.frame_uri, true);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, test.test_uri);
+  await loaded;
+
+  frameBC = await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async _ => {
+    const iframe = content.document.getElementById("testframe");
+    return iframe.browsingContext;
+  });
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(frameBC, [], async _ => {
+    // Wait until the reporting UI is visible.
+    await ContentTaskUtils.waitForCondition(() => {
+      let reportUI = content.document.getElementById("blockingErrorReporting");
+      return ContentTaskUtils.is_visible(reportUI);
+    });
+
+    let reportCheckBox = content.document.getElementById(
+      "automaticallyReportBlockingInFuture"
+    );
+    is(
+      reportCheckBox.checked,
+      true,
+      "The checkbox of the reporting ui should be checked."
+    );
+
+    // Click on the checkbox again to disable the reporting.
+    await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(reportCheckBox, {}, content);
+
+    is(
+      reportCheckBox.checked,
+      false,
+      "The checkbox of the reporting ui should be unchecked."
+    );
+  });
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+
+  // Open the error page again to see if the reporting is disabled.
+  tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, "about:blank");
+  browser = tab.linkedBrowser;
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, true, test.frame_uri, true);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, test.test_uri);
+  await loaded;
+
+  frameBC = await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async _ => {
+    const iframe = content.document.getElementById("testframe");
+    return iframe.browsingContext;
+  });
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(frameBC, [], async _ => {
+    // Wait until the reporting UI is visible.
+    await ContentTaskUtils.waitForCondition(() => {
+      let reportUI = content.document.getElementById("blockingErrorReporting");
+      return ContentTaskUtils.is_visible(reportUI);
+    });
+
+    let reportCheckBox = content.document.getElementById(
+      "automaticallyReportBlockingInFuture"
+    );
+    is(
+      reportCheckBox.checked,
+      false,
+      "The checkbox of the reporting ui should be unchecked."
+    );
+  });
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+
+  // Finally, check if the ping has been archived.
+  await new Promise(resolve => {
+    telemetryChecker
+      .promiseFindPing("xfocsp-error-report", test.expected_ping)
+      .then(
+        found => {
+          ok(found, "Telemetry ping submitted successfully");
+          resolve();
+        },
+        err => {
+          ok(false, "Exception finding telemetry ping: " + err);
+          resolve();
+        }
+      );
+  });
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9219047eac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_toplevel_data_navigations.js
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* eslint-disable mozilla/no-arbitrary-setTimeout */
+
+"use strict";
+
+const kDataBody = "toplevel navigation to data: URI allowed";
+const kDataURI = "data:text/html,<body>" + kDataBody + "</body>";
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+const kRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs";
+const kMetaRedirectURI = kTestPath + "file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html";
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(kDataURI, async function(browser) {
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+      gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+      [{ kDataBody }],
+      async function({ kDataBody }) {
+        // eslint-disable-line
+        is(
+          content.document.body.innerHTML,
+          kDataBody,
+          "data: URI navigation from system should be allowed"
+        );
+      }
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_redirect() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+  let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kRedirectURI);
+  registerCleanupFunction(async function() {
+    BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+  });
+  // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    is(
+      content.document.body.innerHTML,
+      "",
+      "data: URI navigation after server redirect should be blocked"
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_nav_data_uri_meta_redirect() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+  let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, kMetaRedirectURI);
+  registerCleanupFunction(async function() {
+    BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+  });
+  // wait to make sure data: URI did not load before checking that it got blocked
+  await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    is(
+      content.document.body.innerHTML,
+      "",
+      "data: URI navigation after meta redirect should be blocked"
+    );
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7279f234b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_view_image_data_navigation.js
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"use strict";
+
+add_task(async function test_principal_right_click_open_link_in_new_tab() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+
+  const TEST_PAGE =
+    getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + "file_view_image_data_navigation.html";
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_PAGE, async function(browser) {
+    let loadPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(gBrowser, null, true);
+
+    // simulate right-click->view-image
+    BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(document, "popupshown", false, event => {
+      // These are operations that must be executed synchronously with the event.
+      document.getElementById("context-viewimage").doCommand();
+      event.target.hidePopup();
+      return true;
+    });
+    BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(
+      "#testimage",
+      { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },
+      gBrowser.selectedBrowser
+    );
+    let tab = await loadPromise;
+
+    let spec = tab.linkedBrowser.currentURI.spec;
+    ok(
+      spec.startsWith("data:image/svg+xml;"),
+      "data:image/svg navigation allowed through right-click view-image"
+    );
+
+    gBrowser.removeTab(tab);
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_right_click_open_bg_image() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+
+  const TEST_PAGE =
+    getRootDirectory(gTestPath) + "file_view_bg_image_data_navigation.html";
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_PAGE, async function(browser) {
+    let loadPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(gBrowser, null, true);
+
+    // simulate right-click->view-image
+    BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(document, "popupshown", false, event => {
+      // These are operations that must be executed synchronously with the event.
+      document.getElementById("context-viewimage").doCommand();
+      event.target.hidePopup();
+      return true;
+    });
+    BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(
+      "#testbody",
+      { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },
+      gBrowser.selectedBrowser
+    );
+    let tab = await loadPromise;
+
+    let spec = tab.linkedBrowser.currentURI.spec;
+    ok(
+      spec.startsWith("data:image/svg+xml;"),
+      "data:image/svg navigation allowed through right-click view-image with background image"
+    );
+
+    gBrowser.removeTab(tab);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_xfo_embed_object.js b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_xfo_embed_object.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7332116066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/browser_test_xfo_embed_object.js
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const kTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+const kTestXFOEmbedURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_xfo_embed.html";
+const kTestXFOObjectURI = kTestPath + "file_framing_xfo_object.html";
+
+const errorMessage = `The loading of “https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs� in a frame is denied by “X-Frame-Options“ directive set to “deny“`;
+
+let xfoBlocked = false;
+
+function onXFOMessage(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+
+  if (message.includes(errorMessage)) {
+    ok(true, "XFO error message logged");
+    xfoBlocked = true;
+  }
+}
+
+add_task(async function open_test_xfo_embed_blocked() {
+  xfoBlocked = false;
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    Services.console.registerListener(onXFOMessage);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, kTestXFOEmbedURI);
+    await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => xfoBlocked);
+    Services.console.unregisterListener(onXFOMessage);
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function open_test_xfo_object_blocked() {
+  xfoBlocked = false;
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    Services.console.registerListener(onXFOMessage);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, kTestXFOObjectURI);
+    await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => xfoBlocked);
+    Services.console.unregisterListener(onXFOMessage);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/bug1277803.html b/dom/security/test/general/bug1277803.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8033551a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/bug1277803.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<html>
+
+<head>
+  <link rel='icon' href='favicon_bug1277803.ico'>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+Nothing to see here...
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/chrome.ini b/dom/security/test/general/chrome.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..35d7e44d89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/chrome.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+    favicon_bug1277803.ico
+    bug1277803.html
+
+[test_innerhtml_sanitizer.html]
+[test_innerhtml_sanitizer.xhtml]
+[test_bug1277803.xhtml]
+skip-if = os == 'android'
+    verify
+
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/closeWindow.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/closeWindow.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..996db36f6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/closeWindow.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+const BODY = `
+  <script>
+  opener.postMessage("ok!", "*");
+  close();
+  </script>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("unset")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "test=wow", true);
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("none")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "test2=wow2; samesite=none", true);
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("lax")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "test3=wow3; samesite=lax", true);
+  }
+
+  response.write(BODY);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/favicon_bug1277803.ico b/dom/security/test/general/favicon_bug1277803.ico
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d44438903b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/favicon_bug1277803.ico
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_1767581.js b/dom/security/test/general/file_1767581.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..259435b1e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_1767581.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.testResult = "fail-script-was-loaded";
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_FTP_console_warning.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_FTP_console_warning.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef711f923f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_FTP_console_warning.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>FTP subresources</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe src="ftp://blocked.test/a.html"></iframe>
+  <iframe srcdoc='<iframe src="ftp://blocked.test/b.html"></iframe>'></iframe>
+  <iframe src='data:text/html,<iframe src="ftp://blocked.test/c.html"></iframe>'></iframe>
+  <img src="ftp://blocked.test/d.png">
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_about_child.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_about_child.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d83e0e4d41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_about_child.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test for Bug 1767581</title>
+  <script id="script" src="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_1767581.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  Just an about page that loads in the privileged about process!
+</body>
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2d7ff4d253
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1543579: Block web documents loading into system land </title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<h1>This page loads documents from the SystemPrincipal (which should be blocked)</h1>
+<iframe type="chrome" id="testframe" src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents_iframe.html"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
+
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..704625a1da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_assert_systemprincipal_documents_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1543579: Block web documents loading into system land </title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<h1>This is the iframe that should not load.</h1>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0025bbfbe8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Custom *.sjs specifically for the needs of:
+// Bug 1288361 - Block scripts with wrong MIME type
+
+"use strict";
+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const WORKER = `
+  onmessage = function(event) {
+    postMessage("worker-loaded");
+  };`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // Set MIME type
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", query.get("mime"), false);
+
+  // Deliver response
+  switch (query.get("type")) {
+    case "script":
+      response.write("");
+      break;
+    case "worker":
+      response.write(WORKER);
+      break;
+    case "worker-import":
+      response.write(
+        `importScripts("file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs?type=script&mime=${query.get(
+          "mime"
+        )}");`
+      );
+      response.write(WORKER);
+      break;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1e312bc810
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+"use strict";
+
+let SCRIPT_DATA = "alert('this alert should be blocked');";
+let WORKER_DATA =
+  "onmessage = function(event) { postMessage('worker-loaded'); }";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+
+  if (query === "script" || query === "modulescript") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "data:text/javascript," + escape(SCRIPT_DATA),
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "worker") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "data:text/javascript," + escape(WORKER_DATA),
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here; just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d6e083a247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test1: clicking data: URI tries to navigate window<br/>
+<!-- postMessage will not be sent if data: URI is blocked -->
+<a id="testlink" href="data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations
+should be blocked</body>">click me</a>
+<script>
+  document.getElementById('testlink').click();
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..957189ce07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test2: data: URI in iframe tries to window.open(data:, _blank);<br/>
+<iframe id="testFrame" src=""></iframe>
+<script>
+  let DATA_URI = `data:text/html,<body><script>
+    var win = window.open("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>", "_blank");
+    <\/script></body>`;
+  document.getElementById('testFrame').src = DATA_URI;
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3743a72034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Toplevel data navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+test3: performing data: URI navigation through win.loc.href<br/>
+<script>
+  // postMessage will not be sent if data: URI is blocked
+  window.location.href = "data:text/html,<body><script>" +
+        "window.opener.postMessage('test3','*');<\/script>toplevel data: URI " +
+        "navigations should be blocked</body>";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c03ace5f23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect
+
+var DATA_URI =
+  "<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+  response.setHeader("Location", "data:text/html," + escape(DATA_URI), false);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c48c8a3bf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+  Helper Server - 
+  Send a Request with ?queryResult - response will be the 
+  queryString of the next request.
+
+*/
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // save the object state of the initial request, which returns
+  // async once the server has processed the img request.
+  if (request.queryString.includes("wait")) {
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("wait", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+
+  // return the result
+  getObjectState("wait", function(queryResponse) {
+    if (!queryResponse) {
+      return;
+    }
+    queryResponse.write("1");
+    queryResponse.finish();
+  });
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..da75986f74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var receivedRequests = parseInt(getState("requests"));
+  if (isNaN(receivedRequests)) {
+    receivedRequests = 0;
+  }
+  if (request.queryString.includes("state")) {
+    response.write(receivedRequests);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.queryString.includes("flush")) {
+    setState("requests", "0");
+    response.write("OK");
+    return;
+  }
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "max-age=999999"); // Force caching
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/css");
+  receivedRequests = receivedRequests + 1;
+  setState("requests", "" + receivedRequests);
+  response.write(`
+        .test{
+            color:red;
+        }
+        .test h1{
+            font-size:200px;
+        }
+    `);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_window.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_window.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59a2ff2ca9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_window.html
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Document</title>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_server.sjs">
+</head>
+<body>
+    <h1>HELLO WORLD!</h1>
+
+    <script>
+      window.addEventListener("load",()=>{
+        fetch("file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs");
+      });
+    </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9ee73ae3c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+// custom *.sjs for Bug 1255240
+
+const TEST_FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset='utf-8'></head>
+  <body>
+  <a id='testlink' target='innerframe' href='file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs?innerframe'>click me</a>
+  <iframe name='innerframe'></iframe>
+  <script type='text/javascript'>
+    var link = document.getElementById('testlink');
+    testlink.click();
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html> `;
+
+const INNER_FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE HTML>
+  <html>
+  <head><meta charset='utf-8'></head>
+  hello world!
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryString === "testframe") {
+    response.write(TEST_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryString === "innerframe") {
+    response.write(INNER_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4cc92fe8f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_download.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test download attribute for data: URI</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a href="data:text/html,<body>data download</body>" download="data-foo.html" id="testlink">download data</a>
+  <script>
+    // click the link to have the downoad panel appear
+    let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+    testlink.click();
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a9ac369d16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_data_text_csv.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test open data:text/csv</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a href="data:text/csv;foo,bar,foobar" id="testlink">test text/csv</a>
+  <script>
+    // click the link to have the downoad panel appear
+    let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+    testlink.click();
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fb62a34bdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  if (query === "xfo") {
+    response.setHeader("x-frame-options", "deny", false);
+    response.write("<html>xfo test loaded</html>");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "csp") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "content-security-policy",
+      "frame-ancestors 'none'",
+      false
+    );
+    response.write("<html>csp test loaded</html>");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  // return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_csp.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2764ed4aa6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+iframe should be blocked <br/>
+<iframe id="testframe" src="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs?csp" height=800 width=800></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82dd1ee459
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages_xfo.html
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+iframe should be blocked <br/>
+<iframe id="testframe" src="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_error_pages.sjs?xfo" height=800 width=800></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5cc761b5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed.html
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+  embed should be blocked <br/>
+  <embed src="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs"></embed>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56616b7930
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("x-frame-options", "deny", false);
+  response.write("<html>doc with x-frame-options: deny</html>");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_object.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_object.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8480a2c42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_object.html
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+  object should be blocked <br/>
+  <object data="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/general/file_framing_xfo_embed_object.sjs"></object>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_gpc_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_gpc_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d0b14215b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_gpc_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  var gpc = request.hasHeader("Sec-GPC") ? request.getHeader("Sec-GPC") : "";
+
+  if (gpc === "1") {
+    response.write("true");
+  } else {
+    response.write("false");
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_loads_nonscript.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_loads_nonscript.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7692b8066
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_loads_nonscript.html
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>File that loads a non-script file-extension as script</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <script>
+    /* global equal */
+
+    const files = ["file_nonscript",
+                   "file_nonscript.xyz",
+                   "file_nonscript.html",
+                   "file_nonscript.txt",
+                   "file_nonscript.json"];
+
+    async function run() {
+      window.counter = 0;
+
+      for (let file of files) {
+        let script = document.createElement("script");
+        let promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+          script.addEventListener("error", resolve, {once: true});
+          script.addEventListener("load", reject, {once: true});
+        });
+        script.src = file;
+        document.body.append(script);
+
+        let event = await promise;
+        equal(event.type, "error");
+        equal(window.counter, 0);
+      }
+
+      let script = document.createElement("script");
+      let promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+        script.addEventListener("load", resolve, {once: true});
+        script.addEventListener("error", reject, {once: true});
+      });
+      script.src = "file_script.js";
+      document.body.append(script);
+
+      let event = await promise;
+      equal(event.type, "load");
+      equal(window.counter, 1);
+
+      window.postMessage("done", "*");
+    }
+    window.addEventListener("message", run, {once: true})
+  </script>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_in_head.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_in_head.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c4c4cd695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_in_head.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer" />
+<title>Bug 1704473 - Remove head requirement for meta name=referrer</title>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  fetch("https://example.com");
+</script>
+</head>
+<body>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_notin_head.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_notin_head.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..55bd38e4c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_notin_head.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<title>Bug 1704473 - Remove head requirement for meta name=referrer</title>
+
+</head>
+<body>
+  <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer" />
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    fetch("https://example.com");
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.json b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.txt b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.xyz b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.xyz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nonscript.xyz
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_navigation.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_navigation.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..20363ceb76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_navigation.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1286861
+
+// small red image
+const IMG = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+// https://stackoverflow.com/questions/17279712/what-is-the-smallest-possible-valid-pdf
+const PDF = `%PDF-1.0
+1 0 obj<</Type/Catalog/Pages 2 0 R>>endobj 2 0 obj<</Type/Pages/Kids[3 0 R]/Count 1>>endobj 3 0 obj<</Type/Page/MediaBox[0 0 3 3]>>endobj
+trailer<</Size 4/Root 1 0 R>>`;
+
+function getSniffableContent(type) {
+  switch (type) {
+    case "xml":
+      return `<?xml version="1.0"?><test/>`;
+    case "html":
+      return `<!Doctype html> <html> <head></head> <body> Test test </body></html>`;
+    case "css":
+      return `*{ color: pink !important; }`;
+    case "json":
+      return `{ 'test':'yes' }`;
+    case "img":
+      return IMG;
+    case "pdf":
+      return PDF;
+  }
+  return "Basic UTF-8 Text";
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+  let query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors (XXXX no sure what this means?)
+  response.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff"); // Disable Sniffing
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", query.get("mime"));
+  response.write(getSniffableContent(query.get("content")));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd35d8ad4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_nosniff_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+"use strict";
+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+const SCRIPT = "var foo = 24;";
+const CSS = "body { background-color: green; }";
+
+// small red image
+const IMG = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // set the nosniff header
+  response.setHeader("X-Content-Type-Options", "  NoSniFF  , foo  ", false);
+
+  if (query.has("cssCorrectType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "teXt/cSs", false);
+    response.write(CSS);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.has("cssWrongType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(CSS);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.has("scriptCorrectType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "appLIcation/jAvaScriPt;blah", false);
+    response.write(SCRIPT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.has("scriptWrongType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(SCRIPT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.has("imgCorrectType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "iMaGe/pnG;blah", false);
+    response.write(IMG);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.has("imgWrongType")) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write(IMG);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..421eb999be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1454721
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const IFRAME_INC = `<iframe src='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs?inclusion'></iframe>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // using startsWith and discard the math random
+  if (request.queryString.startsWith("setSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=mySameSiteAboutCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // navigation tests
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadsrcdocframeNav")) {
+    let FRAME = `
+      <iframe srcdoc="foo"
+       onload="document.location='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs?navigation'">
+      </iframe>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadblankframeNav")) {
+    let FRAME = `
+      <iframe src="about:blank"
+       onload="document.location='http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs?navigation'">
+      </iframe>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // inclusion tets
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadsrcdocframeInc")) {
+    response.write('<iframe srcdoc="' + IFRAME_INC + '"></iframe>');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadblankframeInc")) {
+    let FRAME =
+      `
+      <iframe id="blankframe" src="about:blank"></iframe>
+      <script>
+        document.getElementById("blankframe").contentDocument.write(\"` +
+      IFRAME_INC +
+      `\");
+      <\/script>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("navigation")) {
+    const cookies = request.hasHeader("Cookie")
+      ? request.getHeader("Cookie")
+      : "";
+    response.write(`
+      <!DOCTYPE html>
+      <html>
+      <body>
+        <script type="application/javascript">
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "${cookies}" }, '*');
+        </script>
+      </body>
+      </html>
+    `);
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("inclusion")) {
+    const cookies = request.hasHeader("Cookie")
+      ? request.getHeader("Cookie")
+      : "";
+    response.write(`
+      <!DOCTYPE html>
+      <html>
+      <body>
+        <script type="application/javascript">
+          window.parent.parent.parent.postMessage({result: "${cookies}" }, '*');
+        </script>
+      </body>
+      </html>
+    `);
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3456f0b90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+  // simply passing on the message from the child to parent
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: event.data.result}, '*');
+  }
+
+  const NESTED_IFRAME_INCLUSION = `
+    <html>
+    <body>
+      <script type="application/javascript">
+      window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+      function receiveMessage(event) {
+        window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+        window.parent.postMessage({result: event.data.result}, '*');
+      }
+      <\/script>
+      <iframe src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></iframe>
+    </body>
+    </html>`;
+  
+  let NESTED_BLOB_IFRAME_INCLUSION = new Blob([NESTED_IFRAME_INCLUSION], {type:'text/html'});
+
+  // query the testframe and set blob URL
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = window.URL.createObjectURL(NESTED_BLOB_IFRAME_INCLUSION);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..815c6a6bfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+  // simply passing on the message from the child to parent
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    window.parent.postMessage({result: event.data.result}, '*');
+  }
+
+  const NESTED_IFRAME_NAVIGATION = `
+    <html>
+    <body>
+      <a id="testlink" href="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></a>
+      <script type="application/javascript">
+        let link = document.getElementById("testlink");
+        link.click();
+      <\/script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+  let NESTED_BLOB_IFRAME_NAVIGATION = new Blob([NESTED_IFRAME_NAVIGATION], {type:'text/html'});
+
+  // query the testframe and set blob URL
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = window.URL.createObjectURL(NESTED_BLOB_IFRAME_NAVIGATION);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..35b6a72cc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_bug1748693.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+const MESSAGE_PAGE = function(msg) {
+  return `
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+  <body>
+    <p id="msg">${msg}</p>
+  <body>
+</html>
+`;
+};
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html");
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setcookies")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "auth_secure=foo; SameSite=None; HttpOnly; Secure",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "auth=foo; HttpOnly;", true);
+    response.write(MESSAGE_PAGE(request.queryString));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const cookies = request.hasHeader("Cookie")
+    ? request.getHeader("Cookie")
+    : "";
+  response.write(MESSAGE_PAGE(cookies));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9103941653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1452496
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1452496 - Do not allow same-site cookies in cross site context</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let cookie = document.cookie;
+      // now reset the cookie for the next test
+      document.cookie = "myKey=;" + "expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT";
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: cookie}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setRegularCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", "myKey=regularCookie;", true);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadFrame")) {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_from_script.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_from_script.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0df217cf45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_from_script.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1452496
+
+const SET_COOKIE_FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1452496 - Do not allow same-site cookies in cross site context</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      document.cookie = "myKey=sameSiteCookieInlineScript;SameSite=strict";
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const GET_COOKIE_FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1452496 - Do not allow same-site cookies in cross site context</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let cookie = document.cookie;
+      // now reset the cookie for the next test
+      document.cookie = "myKey=;" + "expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT";
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: cookie}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setSameSiteCookieUsingInlineScript")) {
+    response.write(SET_COOKIE_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("getCookieFrame")) {
+    response.write(GET_COOKIE_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7b511257c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1454027
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const NESTED_IFRAME_NAVIGATION = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+    <a id="testlink" href="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></a>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let link = document.getElementById("testlink");
+      link.click();
+    <\/script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const NESTED_IFRAME_INCLUSION = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+    // simply passing on the message from the child to parent
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: event.data.result}, '*');
+    }
+    <\/script>
+    <iframe src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></iframe>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // using startsWith and discard the math random
+  if (request.queryString.startsWith("setSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=mySameSiteIframeTestCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // navigation tests
+  if (request.queryString === "nestedIframeNavigation") {
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_NAVIGATION);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "nestedSandboxIframeNavigation") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy",
+      "sandbox allow-scripts",
+      false
+    );
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_NAVIGATION);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // inclusion tests
+  if (request.queryString === "nestedIframeInclusion") {
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_INCLUSION);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "nestedSandboxIframeInclusion") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Security-Policy",
+      "sandbox allow-scripts",
+      false
+    );
+    response.write(NESTED_IFRAME_INCLUSION);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  const cookies = request.hasHeader("Cookie")
+    ? request.getHeader("Cookie")
+    : "";
+  response.write(`
+    <!DOCTYPE html>
+    <html>
+    <head>
+      <title>Bug 1454027 - Update SameSite cookie handling inside iframes</title>
+    </head>
+    <body>
+      <script type="application/javascript">
+        window.parent.postMessage({result: "${cookies}" }, '*');
+      </script>
+    </body>
+    </html>
+  `);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f7451fb504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1453814
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1453814 - Do not allow same-site cookies for cross origin redirect</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let cookie = document.cookie;
+      // now reset the cookie for the next test
+      document.cookie = "myKey=;" + "expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT";
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: cookie}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH =
+  "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs";
+
+const FRAME_META_REFRESH_SAME =
+  `
+  <html><head>
+  <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;
+   url='` +
+  SAME_ORIGIN +
+  PATH +
+  `?loadFrame'">
+  </head></html>`;
+
+const FRAME_META_REFRESH_CROSS =
+  `
+  <html><head>
+  <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;
+   url='` +
+  CROSS_ORIGIN +
+  PATH +
+  `?loadFrame'">
+  </head></html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString === "setSameSiteCookie") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "sameToSameRedirect") {
+    let URL = SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", URL, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "sameToCrossRedirect") {
+    let URL = CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", URL, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "crossToSameRedirect") {
+    let URL = SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", URL, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "sameToCrossRedirectMeta") {
+    response.write(FRAME_META_REFRESH_CROSS);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "crossToSameRedirectMeta") {
+    response.write(FRAME_META_REFRESH_SAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadFrame") {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..004b0c02d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1286861
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1286861 - Add support for same site cookies</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <img src = "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs?checkCookie">
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setStrictSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setLaxSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie; samesite=lax",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // save the object state of the initial request, which returns
+  // async once the server has processed the img request.
+  if (request.queryString.includes("queryresult")) {
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadFrame")) {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("checkCookie")) {
+    var cookie = "unitialized";
+    if (request.hasHeader("Cookie")) {
+      cookie = request.getHeader("Cookie");
+    } else {
+      cookie = "myKey=noCookie";
+    }
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+
+    // return the result
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      queryResponse.write(cookie);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9bbcc09609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1286861
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Bug 1286861 - Add support for same site cookies</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let myWin = window.open("http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs?loadWin");
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const WIN = `
+  <!DOCTYPE html>
+  <html>
+  <body>
+    just a dummy window
+    <script>
+      window.addEventListener("load",()=>{
+        window.close();
+      });
+    </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setStrictSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie; samesite=strict",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("setLaxSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie; samesite=lax",
+      true
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // save the object state of the initial request, which returns
+  // async once the server has processed the img request.
+  if (request.queryString.includes("queryresult")) {
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadFrame")) {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString.includes("loadWin")) {
+    var cookie = "unitialized";
+    if (request.hasHeader("Cookie")) {
+      cookie = request.getHeader("Cookie");
+    } else {
+      cookie = "myKey=noCookie";
+    }
+    response.write(WIN);
+
+    // return the result
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      queryResponse.write(cookie);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..34dfe40e23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1454242
+
+const WIN = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    let newWin = window.open("http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs?loadWinAndSetCookie");
+    newWin.onload = function() {
+      newWin.close();
+    }
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const DUMMY_WIN = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  just a dummy window that sets a same-site=lax cookie
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.opener.postMessage({value: 'testSetupComplete'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const FRAME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    let cookie = document.cookie;
+    // now reset the cookie for the next test
+    document.cookie = "myKey=;" + "expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT";
+    window.parent.postMessage({value: cookie}, 'http://mochi.test:8888');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH =
+  "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadWin") {
+    response.write(WIN);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadWinAndSetCookie") {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie; samesite=lax",
+      true
+    );
+    response.write(DUMMY_WIN);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "checkCookie") {
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.write("D'oh");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_script.js b/dom/security/test/general/file_script.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c339e45d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_script.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+window.counter++;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e94a61ed48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_meta_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<html>
+<body>
+<head>
+  <meta http-equiv="refresh"
+        content="0; url='data:text/html,<body>toplevel meta redirect to data: URI should be blocked</body>'">
+</head>
+<body>
+Meta Redirect to data: URI
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..57c4b527dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_toplevel_data_navigations.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug:
+// Bug 1394554 - Block toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect
+
+var DATA_URI =
+  "data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations after redirect should be blocked</body>";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+  response.setHeader("Location", DATA_URI, false);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_view_bg_image_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_bg_image_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d9aa6ca8b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_bg_image_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1658244: Test navigation for right-click view-bg-image on ");
+    color: #ccc;
+}
+</style>
+</head>
+<body id="testbody">
+  This page has an inline SVG image as a background.
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a3f9acfb4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_view_image_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1407891: Test navigation for right-click view-image on "></img>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/file_xfo_error_page.sjs b/dom/security/test/general/file_xfo_error_page.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1fa33cbd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/file_xfo_error_page.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  response.setHeader("x-frame-options", "deny", false);
+  response.write("<html>xfo test loaded</html>");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d315d1f50c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs
+  file_nosniff_testserver.sjs
+  file_nosniff_navigation.sjs
+  file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs
+  file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
+  file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html
+  file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html
+  file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs
+  file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_from_script.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html
+  file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html
+  file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs
+  file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs
+  file_cache_splitting_server.sjs
+  file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs
+  file_cache_splitting_window.html
+  window_nosniff_navigation.html
+
+[test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html]
+[test_nosniff.html]
+[test_cache_split.html]
+[test_nosniff_navigation.html]
+[test_block_script_wrong_mime.html]
+[test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html]
+[test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html]
+[test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no pdf reader on Android
+[test_allow_opening_data_json.html]
+[test_block_subresource_redir_to_data.html]
+[test_same_site_cookies_subrequest.html]
+fail-if = xorigin # Cookies set incorrectly
+[test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.html]
+[test_same_site_cookies_from_script.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_same_site_cookies_redirect.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.html]
+fail-if = xorigin # Cookies not set
+[test_same_site_cookies_iframe.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_same_site_cookies_about.html]
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_assert_about_page_no_csp.html]
+skip-if = !debug
+[test_same_site_cookies_laxByDefault.html]
+skip-if =  debug
+support-files = closeWindow.sjs
+[test_xfo_error_page.html]
+support-files = file_xfo_error_page.sjs
+[test_bug1450853.html]
+[test_meta_referrer.html]
+support-files =
+  file_meta_referrer_in_head.html
+  file_meta_referrer_notin_head.html
+[test_bug1660452_http.html]
+[test_bug1660452_https.html]
+scheme = https
+[test_gpc.html]
+support-files = file_gpc_server.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b37931e1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_json.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1403814: Allow toplevel data URI navigation data:application/json</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function test_toplevel_data_json() {
+  const DATA_JSON = "data:application/json,{'my_json_key':'my_json_value'}";
+
+  let win = window.open(DATA_JSON);
+  let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win);
+
+  // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the JSON has loaded or not using some
+  // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that
+  // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure.
+  var jsonLoaded = setInterval(function() {
+    if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/json")) {
+      clearInterval(jsonLoaded);
+      ok(true, "navigating to data:application/json allowed");
+      wrappedWin.close();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }, 200);
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]]
+}, test_toplevel_data_json);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..007b3e8801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_allow_opening_data_pdf.html
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1398692: Allow toplevel navigation to a data:application/pdf</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+function test_toplevel_data_pdf() {
+  // The PDF contains one page and it is a 3/72" square, the minimum allowed by the spec
+  const DATA_PDF =
+    "data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjANCjEgMCBvYmo8PC9UeXBlL0NhdGFsb2cvUGFnZXMgMiAwIFI+PmVuZG9iaiAyIDAgb2JqPDwvVHlwZS9QYWdlcy9LaWRzWzMgMCBSXS9Db3VudCAxPj5lbmRvYmogMyAwIG9iajw8L1R5cGUvUGFnZS9NZWRpYUJveFswIDAgMyAzXT4+ZW5kb2JqDQp4cmVmDQowIDQNCjAwMDAwMDAwMDAgNjU1MzUgZg0KMDAwMDAwMDAxMCAwMDAwMCBuDQowMDAwMDAwMDUzIDAwMDAwIG4NCjAwMDAwMDAxMDIgMDAwMDAgbg0KdHJhaWxlcjw8L1NpemUgNC9Sb290IDEgMCBSPj4NCnN0YXJ0eHJlZg0KMTQ5DQolRU9G";
+
+  let win = window.open(DATA_PDF);
+  let wrappedWin = SpecialPowers.wrap(win);
+
+  // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the PDF has loaded or not using some
+  // event, hence we are constantly polling location.href till we see that
+  // the data: URI appears. Test times out on failure.
+  var pdfLoaded = setInterval(function() {
+    if (wrappedWin.document.location.href.startsWith("data:application/pdf")) {
+      clearInterval(pdfLoaded);
+      ok(true, "navigating to data:application/pdf allowed");
+      wrappedWin.close();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }, 200);
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]]
+}, test_toplevel_data_pdf);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_assert_about_page_no_csp.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_assert_about_page_no_csp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06be4ce460
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_assert_about_page_no_csp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1490977: Test Assertion if content privileged about: page has no CSP</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+  // Test Setup: The test overrules the allowlist of about: pages that are allowed to load
+  // without a CSP and makes sure to hit the assertion within AssertAboutPageHasCSP().
+
+  SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("dom.security.skip_about_page_csp_allowlist_and_assert", true);
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  SimpleTest.expectAssertions(0, 1);
+
+  ok(true, "sanity: prefs flipped and test runs");
+  let myFrame = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  myFrame.src = "about:blank";
+  // booom :-)
+
+  SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("dom.security.skip_about_page_csp_allowlist_and_assert", false);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+</script>
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_script_wrong_mime.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_script_wrong_mime.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..93a4b9d220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_script_wrong_mime.html
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1288361 - Block scripts with incorrect MIME type</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+const MIMETypes = [
+  ["application/javascript", true],
+  ["text/javascript", true],
+
+  ["audio/mpeg", false],
+  ["audio/", false],
+  ["image/jpeg", false],
+  ["image/", false],
+  ["video/mpeg", false],
+  ["video/", false],
+  ["text/csv", false],
+];
+
+// <script src="">
+function testScript([mime, shouldLoad]) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let script = document.createElement("script");
+    script.onload = () => {
+      document.body.removeChild(script);
+      ok(shouldLoad, `script with mime '${mime}' should load`);
+      resolve();
+    };
+    script.onerror = () => {
+      document.body.removeChild(script);
+      ok(!shouldLoad, `script with wrong mime '${mime}' should be blocked`);
+      resolve();
+    };
+    script.src = "file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs?type=script&mime="+mime;
+    document.body.appendChild(script);
+  });
+}
+
+// new Worker()
+function testWorker([mime, shouldLoad]) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let worker = new Worker("file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs?type=worker&mime="+mime);
+    worker.onmessage = (event) => {
+      ok(shouldLoad, `worker with mime '${mime}' should load`)
+      is(event.data, "worker-loaded", "worker should send correct message");
+      resolve();
+    };
+    worker.onerror = (error) => {
+      ok(!shouldLoad, `worker with wrong mime '${mime}' should be blocked`);
+      error.preventDefault();
+      resolve();
+    }
+    worker.postMessage("dummy");
+  });
+}
+
+// new Worker() with importScripts()
+function testWorkerImportScripts([mime, shouldLoad]) {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    let worker = new Worker("file_block_script_wrong_mime_server.sjs?type=worker-import&mime="+mime);
+    worker.onmessage = (event) => {
+      ok(shouldLoad, `worker/importScripts with mime '${mime}' should load`)
+      is(event.data, "worker-loaded", "worker should send correct message");
+      resolve();
+    };
+    worker.onerror = (error) => {
+      ok(!shouldLoad, `worker/importScripts with wrong mime '${mime}' should be blocked`);
+      error.preventDefault();
+      resolve();
+    }
+    worker.postMessage("dummy");
+  });
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+Promise.all(MIMETypes.map(testScript)).then(() => {
+  return Promise.all(MIMETypes.map(testWorker));
+}).then(() => {
+  return Promise.all(MIMETypes.map(testWorkerImportScripts));
+}).then(() => {
+  return SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+}).then(SimpleTest.finish);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_subresource_redir_to_data.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_subresource_redir_to_data.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eafb6b5d83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_subresource_redir_to_data.html
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1428793: Block insecure redirects to data: URIs</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script id="testScriptRedirectToData"></script>
+<script id="testModuleScriptRedirectToData" type="module"></script>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+const NUM_TESTS = 3;
+
+var testCounter = 0;
+function checkFinish() {
+  testCounter++;
+  if (testCounter === NUM_TESTS) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+// --- test regular scripts
+let testScriptRedirectToData = document.getElementById("testScriptRedirectToData");
+testScriptRedirectToData.onerror = function() {
+  ok(true, "script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+  checkFinish();
+}
+testScriptRedirectToData.onload = function() {
+  ok(false, "script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+  checkFinish();
+}
+testScriptRedirectToData.src = "file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs?script";
+
+// --- test workers
+let worker = new Worker("file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs?worker");
+worker.onerror = function() {
+  // please note that workers need to be same origin, hence the data: URI
+  // redirect is blocked by worker code and not the content security manager!
+  ok(true, "worker script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+  checkFinish();
+}
+worker.onmessage = function() {
+  ok(false, "worker script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+  checkFinish();
+};
+worker.postMessage("dummy");
+
+// --- test script modules
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["dom.moduleScripts.enabled", true]]}, function() {
+  let testModuleScriptRedirectToData = document.getElementById("testModuleScriptRedirectToData");
+  testModuleScriptRedirectToData.onerror = function() {
+    ok(true, "module script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  testModuleScriptRedirectToData.onload = function() {
+    ok(false, "module script that redirects to data: URI should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  testModuleScriptRedirectToData.src = "file_block_subresource_redir_to_data.sjs?modulescript";
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07e46b1f2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_img_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1396798: Do not block toplevel data: navigation to image (except svgs)</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true);
+SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(() => {
+  SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations");
+});
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that top level data:image loading is blocked/allowed");
+
+function test_toplevel_data_image() {
+  const DATA_PNG =
+    "";
+  let win1 = window.open(DATA_PNG);
+  let wrappedWin1 = SpecialPowers.wrap(win1);
+  setTimeout(function () {
+    let images = wrappedWin1.document.getElementsByTagName('img'); 
+    is(images.length, 1, "Loading data:image/png should be allowed");
+    is(images[0].src, DATA_PNG, "Sanity: img src matches");
+    wrappedWin1.close();
+    test_toplevel_data_image_svg();
+  }, 1000);
+}
+
+function test_toplevel_data_image_svg() {
+  const DATA_SVG =
+    "";
+  let win2 = window.open(DATA_SVG);
+  // Unfortunately we can't detect whether the window was closed using some event,
+  // hence we are constantly polling till we see that win == null.
+  // Test times out on failure.
+  var win2Closed = setInterval(function() {
+    if (win2 == null || win2.closed) {
+      clearInterval(win2Closed);
+      ok(true, "Loading data:image/svg+xml should be blocked");
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }, 200);
+}
+// fire up the tests
+test_toplevel_data_image();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d61b6c7110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1331351 - Block top level window data: URI navigations</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+async function expectBlockedToplevelData() {
+  await SpecialPowers.spawnChrome([], async () => {
+    let progressListener;
+    let bid = await new Promise(resolve => {
+      let bcs = [];
+      progressListener = {
+        QueryInterface: ChromeUtils.generateQI(["nsIWebProgressListener", "nsISupportsWeakReference"]),
+        onStateChange(webProgress, request, stateFlags, status) {
+          if (!(request instanceof Ci.nsIChannel) || !webProgress.isTopLevel ||
+              !(stateFlags & Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_IS_WINDOW) ||
+              !(stateFlags & Ci.nsIWebProgressListener.STATE_STOP)) {
+            return;
+          }
+
+          if (ChromeUtils.getXPCOMErrorName(status) != "NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI") {
+            isnot(request.URI.scheme, "data");
+            return;
+          }
+
+          // We can't check for the scheme to be "data" because in the case of a
+          // redirected load, we'll get a `NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI` load error
+          // before observing the redirect, cancelling the load. Instead we just
+          // wait for any load to error with `NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI`.
+          for (let bc of bcs) {
+            try {
+              bc.webProgress.removeProgressListener(progressListener);
+            } catch(e) { }
+          }
+          bcs = [];
+          Services.obs.removeObserver(observer, "browsing-context-attached");
+          resolve(webProgress.browsingContext.browserId);
+        }
+      };
+
+      function observer(subject, topic) {
+        if (!bcs.includes(subject.webProgress)) {
+          bcs.push(subject.webProgress);
+          subject.webProgress.addProgressListener(progressListener, Ci.nsIWebProgress.NOTIFY_ALL);
+        }
+      }
+      Services.obs.addObserver(observer, "browsing-context-attached");
+    });
+    return bid;
+  });
+}
+
+async function expectBlockedURIWarning() {
+  await SpecialPowers.spawnChrome([], async () => {
+    return new Promise(resolve => {
+      Services.console.registerListener(function onConsoleMessage(msg) {
+        info("Seeing console message: " + msg.message);
+        if (!(msg instanceof Ci.nsIScriptError)) {
+          return;
+        }
+        if (msg.category != "DATA_URI_BLOCKED") {
+          return;
+        }
+
+        Services.console.unregisterListener(onConsoleMessage);
+        resolve();
+      });
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function expectBrowserDiscarded(browserId) {
+  await SpecialPowers.spawnChrome([browserId], async (browserId) => {
+    return new Promise(resolve => {
+      function check() {
+        if (!BrowsingContext.getCurrentTopByBrowserId(browserId)) {
+          ok(true, `BrowserID ${browserId} discarded`);
+          resolve();
+          Services.obs.removeObserver(check, "browsing-context-discarded");
+        }
+      }
+      Services.obs.addObserver(check, "browsing-context-discarded");
+      check();
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function popupTest(uri, expectClose) {
+  info(`Running expect blocked test for ${uri}`);
+  let reqBlockedPromise = expectBlockedToplevelData();
+  let warningPromise = expectBlockedURIWarning();
+  let win = window.open(uri);
+  let browserId = await reqBlockedPromise;
+  await warningPromise;
+  if (expectClose) {
+    await expectBrowserDiscarded(browserId);
+  }
+  win.close();
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.data_uri.block_toplevel_data_uri_navigations", true]],
+  });
+
+  // simple data: URI click navigation should be prevented
+  await popupTest("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation.html", false);
+
+  // data: URI in iframe which opens data: URI in _blank should be blocked
+  await popupTest("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation2.html", false);
+
+  // navigating to a data: URI using window.location.href should be blocked
+  await popupTest("file_block_toplevel_data_navigation3.html", false);
+
+  // navigating to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked
+  await popupTest("data:text/html,<body>toplevel data: URI navigations should be blocked</body>", false);
+
+  // navigating to a URI which redirects to a data: URI using window.open() should be blocked
+  await popupTest("file_block_toplevel_data_redirect.sjs", false);
+
+  // navigating to a data: URI without a Content Type should be blocked
+  await popupTest("data:,DataURIsWithNoContentTypeShouldBeBlocked", false);
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1277803.xhtml b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1277803.xhtml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..30cc82310b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1277803.xhtml
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://global/skin" type="text/css"?>
+<?xml-stylesheet href="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" type="text/css"?>
+
+<window title="Bug 1277803 test"
+        xmlns="http://www.mozilla.org/keymaster/gatekeeper/there.is.only.xul"
+        width="600"
+        height="600"
+        onload="runTest();">
+
+  <script src="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"/>
+
+  <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+  </body>
+
+  <script type="application/javascript"><![CDATA[
+    SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();
+
+    const BASE_URI = "http://mochi.test:8888/chrome/dom/security/test/general/";
+    const FAVICON_URI = BASE_URI + "favicon_bug1277803.ico";
+    const LOADING_URI = BASE_URI + "bug1277803.html";
+    let testWindow; //will be used to trigger favicon load
+
+    let expectedPrincipal = Services.scriptSecurityManager
+        .createContentPrincipal(Services.io.newURI(LOADING_URI), {});
+    let systemPrincipal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal();
+
+    function runTest() {
+      // Register our observer to intercept favicon requests.
+      function observer(aSubject, aTopic, aData) {
+        // Make sure this is a favicon request.
+        let httpChannel = aSubject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+        if (FAVICON_URI != httpChannel.URI.spec) {
+          return;
+        }
+
+        // Ensure the topic is the one we set an observer for.
+        is(aTopic, "http-on-modify-request", "Expected observer topic");
+
+        // Check for the correct loadingPrincipal, triggeringPrincipal.
+        let triggeringPrincipal = httpChannel.loadInfo.triggeringPrincipal;
+        let loadingPrincipal = httpChannel.loadInfo.loadingPrincipal;
+
+        ok(loadingPrincipal.equals(expectedPrincipal), "Should be loading with the expected principal.");
+        ok(triggeringPrincipal.equals(expectedPrincipal), "Should be triggered with the expected principal.");
+
+        Services.obs.removeObserver(this, "http-on-modify-request");
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      }
+      Services.obs.addObserver(observer, "http-on-modify-request");
+
+      // Now that the observer is set up, trigger a favicon load with navigation
+      testWindow = window.open(LOADING_URI);
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    SimpleTest.registerCleanupFunction(function() {
+      if (testWindow) {
+        testWindow.close();
+      }
+    });
+  ]]></script>
+
+  <browser type="content" primary="true" flex="1" id="content" src="about:blank"/>
+</window>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1450853.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1450853.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e6b61ecce0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1450853.html
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450853
+-->
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<title>Test for Cross-origin resouce status leak via MediaError</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/ChromeTask.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+<audio autoplay id="audio"></audio>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+/** Test for Bug 1450853 **/
+var CONST_GENERIC_ERROR_MESSAGE = "Failed to open media";
+
+add_task(function() {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      let audioElement = document.getElementById("audio");
+
+      audioElement.onerror = function() {
+      let err = this.error;
+      let message = err.message;
+
+      info(`Got Audio Error -> ${message}`);
+      ok(message.includes("404"), "Same-Origin Error Message should contain status data");
+      resolve();
+    };
+  audioElement.src = "http://mochi.test:8888/media/test.mp3";
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(function() {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      let audioElement = document.getElementById("audio");
+
+      audioElement.onerror = function() {
+      let err = this.error;
+      let message = err.message;
+
+      info(`Got Audio Error -> ${message}`);
+      is(message, CONST_GENERIC_ERROR_MESSAGE, "Cross-Origin Same-Site Error Message should be generic");
+      resolve();
+    };
+  audioElement.src = "http://mochi.test:9999/media/test.mp3";
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(function() {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      let audioElement = document.getElementById("audio");
+
+      audioElement.onerror = function() {
+      let err = this.error;
+      let message = err.message;
+
+      info(`Got Audio Error -> ${message}`);
+      is(message, CONST_GENERIC_ERROR_MESSAGE, "Cross-Origin Same-Site Error Message should be generic");
+      resolve();
+    };
+  audioElement.src = "http://sub.mochi.test:8888/media/test.mp3";
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(function() {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+      let audioElement = document.getElementById("audio");
+
+      audioElement.onerror = function() {
+      let err = this.error;
+      let message = err.message;
+
+      info(`Got Audio Error -> ${message}`);
+      is(message, CONST_GENERIC_ERROR_MESSAGE, "Cross-Origin Error Message should be generic");
+      resolve();
+    };
+  audioElement.src = "https://example.com/media/test.mp3";
+  });
+});
+
+</script>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+    <a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1450853">Mozilla Bug 1450853</a>
+    <iframe width="0" height="0"></iframe>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_http.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_http.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a6512da21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_http.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1660452: NullPrincipals need to know whether they were spun off of a Secure Context</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+ok(!window.isSecureContext, "top level should not be a secure context");
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line
+let newWin = window.open("data:text/html,<script><"+"/script>");
+ok(!newWin.isSecureContext, "data uri window should not be a secure context");
+newWin.close();
+
+window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    ok(!event.data.isSecureContext, "data uri frames should not be a secure context");
+    if(event.data.finish) {
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+        return;
+    }
+    let f2 = document.createElement("iframe");
+    // eslint-disable-next-line
+    f2.src = "data:text/html,<iframe src=\"data:text/html,<script>parent.parent.postMessage({isSecureContext: window.isSecureContext, finish: true}, '*');<"+"/script>\"></iframe>";
+    document.body.appendChild(f2);
+});
+
+let f = document.createElement("iframe");
+// eslint-disable-next-line
+f.src = "data:text/html,<script>parent.postMessage({isSecureContext: window.isSecureContext}, '*');<"+"/script>";
+document.body.appendChild(f);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_https.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_https.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1aed356a21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_bug1660452_https.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1660452: NullPrincipals need to know whether they were spun off of a Secure Context</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+ok(window.isSecureContext, "top level should be a secure context");
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line
+let newWin = window.open("data:text/html,<script><"+"/script>");
+ok(newWin.isSecureContext, "data uri window should be a secure context");
+newWin.close();
+
+window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    ok(event.data.isSecureContext, "data uri frames should be a secure context");
+    if(event.data.finish) {
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+        return;
+    }
+    let f2 = document.createElement("iframe");
+    // eslint-disable-next-line
+    f2.src = "data:text/html,<iframe src=\"data:text/html,<script>parent.parent.postMessage({isSecureContext: window.isSecureContext, finish: true}, '*');<"+"/script>\"></iframe>";
+    document.body.appendChild(f2);
+});
+
+let f = document.createElement("iframe");
+// eslint-disable-next-line
+f.src = "data:text/html,<script>parent.postMessage({isSecureContext: window.isSecureContext}, '*');<"+"/script>";
+document.body.appendChild(f);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_cache_split.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_cache_split.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f0fc056bce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_cache_split.html
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+    <meta charset="utf-8">
+    <title>Bug 1454721 - Add same-site cookie test for about:blank and about:srcdoc</title>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/ChromeTask.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+    <img id="cookieImage">
+    <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+        SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+        const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+        const SAME_ORIGIN= "https://example.com/";
+        const PATH = "file_cache_splitting_server.sjs";
+
+        async function getCount() {
+            return fetch(`${PATH}?state`).then(r => r.text());
+        }
+        async function resetCount() {
+            return fetch(`${PATH}?flush`).then(r => r.text());
+        }
+        async function ensureLoaded() {
+            // This Fetch is geting the Response "1", once file_cache_splitting_isloaded
+            // gets a request without a query String issued from the cache_splitting_window.html
+            info("Waiting for Pageload");
+            let result = await fetch("file_cache_splitting_isloaded.sjs?wait").then(r => r.text);
+            info("Page has been Loaded");
+            return result;
+        }
+
+
+        async function openAndLoadWindow(origin) {
+            let isLoaded =  ensureLoaded();
+            let url = `${origin}tests/dom/security/test/general/file_cache_splitting_window.html`;
+            let w = window.open(url);
+            // let ew = SpecialPowers.wrap(w);
+            await isLoaded;
+            return w;
+        }
+
+        async function checkStep(step = [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], name) {
+            info(`Doing Step ${JSON.stringify(step)}`);
+            let url = step[0];
+            let should_count = step[1];
+            let w = await openAndLoadWindow(url);
+            let count = await getCount();
+            ok(
+                count == should_count,
+                `${name} req to: ${
+                url == SAME_ORIGIN ? "Same Origin" : "Cross Origin"
+                } expected ${should_count} request to Server, got ${count}`
+            );
+            w.close()
+        }
+        async function clearCache(){
+            info("Clearing Cache");
+            SpecialPowers.DOMWindowUtils.clearSharedStyleSheetCache();
+            await ChromeTask.spawn(null,(()=>{
+                Services.cache2.clear();
+            }));
+        }
+        async function runTest(test) {
+            info(`Starting Job with - ${test.steps.length} - Requests`);
+            await resetCount();
+            let { prefs, steps, name } = test;
+            await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(prefs);
+            for (let step of steps) {
+                await checkStep(step, name);
+            }
+            await clearCache();
+        };
+
+
+        add_task(
+            async () =>
+                runTest({
+                    name: `Isolated Cache`,
+                    steps: [[SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [CROSS_ORIGIN, 2]],
+                    prefs: {
+                        set: [
+                            ["privacy.partition.network_state", true]
+                        ],
+                    },
+                })
+        );
+        // Negative Test: The CROSS_ORIGIN should be able to
+        // acess the cache of SAME_ORIGIN
+        add_task(
+            async () =>
+                runTest({
+                    name: `Non Isolated Cache`,
+                    steps: [[SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [CROSS_ORIGIN, 1]],
+                    prefs: {
+                        set: [
+                            ["privacy.partition.network_state", false]
+                        ],
+                    },
+                })
+        );
+        // Test that FPI does not affect Cache Isolation
+        add_task(
+            async () =>
+                runTest({
+                    name: `FPI interaction`,
+                    steps: [[SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [CROSS_ORIGIN, 2]],
+                    prefs: {
+                        set: [
+                            ["privacy.firstparty.isolate", true],
+                            ["privacy.partition.network_state", false],
+                        ],
+                    },
+                })
+        );
+        // Test that cookieBehavior does not affect Cache Isolation
+        for (let i = 0; i < SpecialPowers.Ci.nsICookieService.BEHAVIOR_LAST ; i++) {
+            add_task(
+                async () =>
+                    runTest({
+                        name: `cookieBehavior interaction ${i}`,
+                        steps: [[SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [CROSS_ORIGIN, 2]],
+                        prefs: {
+                            set: [
+                                ["privacy.firstparty.isolate", false],
+                                ["network.cookie.cookieBehavior", i],
+                                ["privacy.partition.network_state", true],
+                            ],
+                        },
+                    })
+            );
+        }
+        add_task(
+            async () =>
+                runTest({
+                    name: `FPI interaction - 2`,
+                    steps: [[SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [SAME_ORIGIN, 1], [CROSS_ORIGIN, 2]],
+                    prefs: {
+                        set: [
+                          ["privacy.firstparty.isolate", true],
+                          ["privacy.partition.network_state", false],
+                        ],
+                    },
+                })
+        );
+
+    </script>
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99620d06f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1255240 - Test content policy types within content policies for targeted links in iframes</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/* Description of the test:
+ * Let's load a link into a targeted iframe and make sure the content policy
+ * type used for content policy checks is of TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT.
+ */
+
+function createChromeScript() {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  const POLICYNAME = "@mozilla.org/testpolicy;1";
+  const POLICYID = Components.ID("{6cc95ef3-40e1-4d59-87f0-86f100373227}");
+  const EXPECTED_URL =
+        "http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs?innerframe";
+
+  var policy = {
+    // nsISupports implementation
+    QueryInterface: ChromeUtils.generateQI([
+       "nsIFactory",
+       "nsIContentPolicy",
+    ]),
+
+    // nsIFactory implementation
+    createInstance(iid) {
+      return this.QueryInterface(iid);
+    },
+
+    // nsIContentPolicy implementation
+    shouldLoad(contentLocation, loadInfo, mimeTypeGuess) {
+      if (contentLocation.asciiSpec === EXPECTED_URL) {
+        sendAsyncMessage("loadBlocked", { policyType: loadInfo.externalContentPolicyType});
+        Services.catMan.deleteCategoryEntry(
+          "content-policy",
+          POLICYNAME,
+          false
+        );
+        componentManager.unregisterFactory(POLICYID, policy);
+        return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.REJECT_REQUEST;
+      }
+      return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+    },
+
+    shouldProcess(contentLocation, loadInfo, mimeTypeGuess) {
+      return Ci.nsIContentPolicy.ACCEPT;
+    }
+  };
+
+  // Register content policy
+  var componentManager = Components.manager.QueryInterface(
+    Ci.nsIComponentRegistrar
+  );
+
+  componentManager.registerFactory(
+    POLICYID,
+    "Test content policy",
+    POLICYNAME,
+    policy
+  );
+  Services.catMan.addCategoryEntry(
+    "content-policy",
+    POLICYNAME,
+    POLICYNAME,
+    false,
+    true
+  );
+
+  // Adding a new category dispatches an event to update
+  // caches, so we need to also dispatch an event to make
+  // sure we don't start the load until after that happens.
+  Services.tm.dispatchToMainThread(() => {
+    sendAsyncMessage("setupComplete");
+  });
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  let chromeScript = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(createChromeScript);
+  await chromeScript.promiseOneMessage("setupComplete");
+
+  var testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src =
+      "file_contentpolicytype_targeted_link_iframe.sjs?testframe";
+
+  let result = await chromeScript.promiseOneMessage("loadBlocked");
+
+  is(result.policyType, SpecialPowers.Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT,
+     "content policy type should TYPESUBDOCUMENT");
+
+  chromeScript.destroy();
+});
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_gpc.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_gpc.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7efccef0d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_gpc.html
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Global Privacy Control headers</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="application/javascript">
+
+add_task(async function testGlobalPrivacyControlDisabled() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["privacy.globalprivacycontrol.enabled", false],
+    ["privacy.globalprivacycontrol.functionality.enabled", true],
+  ]});
+  await fetch("file_gpc_server.sjs")
+  .then((response) => response.text())
+  .then((response) => {
+    is(response, "false", "GPC disabled so header unsent");
+    is(navigator.globalPrivacyControl, false, "GPC disabled so navigator property is 0");
+  });
+});
+
+add_task(async function testGlobalPrivacyControlEnabled() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["privacy.globalprivacycontrol.enabled", true],
+    ["privacy.globalprivacycontrol.functionality.enabled", true],
+  ]});
+  await fetch("file_gpc_server.sjs")
+  .then((response) => response.text())
+  .then((response) => {
+    is(response, "true", "GPC enabled so header sent and received");
+    is(navigator.globalPrivacyControl, true, "GPC enabled so navigator property is 1");
+  });
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4a4e4efed1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset=utf-8>
+  <title>Test for Bug 1667113</title>
+  <script src="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1667113">Mozilla Bug 1667113</a>
+<div></div>
+<script>
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// Please note that 'fakeServer' does not exist because the test relies
+// on "csp-on-violate-policy" , and "specialpowers-http-notify-request"
+// which fire if either the request is blocked or fires. The test does
+// not rely on the result of the load.
+
+function fail() {
+  ok(false, "Should not call this")
+}
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      let asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                       SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                       "asciiSpec");
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer")) {
+        ok (false, "Should not attempt fetch, not even blocked by CSP.");
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      if (data.includes("fakeServer")) {
+        ok (false, "Should not try fetch");
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+let div = document.getElementsByTagName("div")[0];
+div.innerHTML = "<svg><style><title><audio src=fakeServer onerror=fail() onload=fail()>";
+
+let svg = div.firstChild;
+is(svg.nodeName, "svg", "Node name should be svg");
+
+let style = svg.firstChild;
+if (style) {
+  is(style.firstChild, null, "Style should not have child nodes.");
+} else {
+  ok(false, "Should have gotten a node.");
+}
+
+
+SimpleTest.executeSoon(function() {
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.xhtml b/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.xhtml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d938bc23b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_innerhtml_sanitizer.xhtml
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+<head>
+  <title>Test for Bug 1667113</title>
+  <script src="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="chrome://mochikit/content/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1667113">Mozilla Bug 1667113</a>
+<div></div>
+<script><![CDATA[
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+// Please note that 'fakeServer' does not exist because the test relies
+// on "csp-on-violate-policy" , and "specialpowers-http-notify-request"
+// which fire if either the request is blocked or fires. The test does
+// not rely on the result of the load.
+
+function fail() {
+  ok(false, "Should not call this")
+}
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic === "csp-on-violate-policy") {
+      let asciiSpec = SpecialPowers.getPrivilegedProps(
+                       SpecialPowers.do_QueryInterface(subject, "nsIURI"),
+                       "asciiSpec");
+      if (asciiSpec.includes("fakeServer")) {
+        ok (false, "Should not attempt fetch, not even blocked by CSP.");
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      if (data.includes("fakeServer")) {
+        ok (false, "Should not try fetch");
+      }
+    }
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "csp-on-violate-policy");
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+
+window.examiner = new examiner();
+
+let div = document.getElementsByTagName("div")[0];
+div.innerHTML = "<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg'><style><title><audio xmlns='http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml' src='fakeServer' onerror='fail()' onload='fail()'></audio></title></style></svg>";
+
+let svg = div.firstChild;
+is(svg.nodeName, "svg", "Node name should be svg");
+
+let style = svg.firstChild;
+if (style) {
+  is(style.firstChild, null, "Style should not have child nodes.");
+} else {
+  ok(false, "Should have gotten a node.");
+}
+
+
+SimpleTest.executeSoon(function() {
+  window.examiner.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+]]></script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_meta_referrer.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_meta_referrer.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5e8b649f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_meta_referrer.html
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1704473 - Remove head requirement for meta name=referrer</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe id="frame_meta_in_head"></iframe>
+<iframe id="frame_meta_notin_head"></iframe>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let testCounter = 0;
+function checkTestsDone() {
+  testCounter++;
+  if(testCounter == 2) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  let counter = 0;
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com") || counter >= 2) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let refererHeaderSet = false;
+    try {
+      channel.getRequestHeader("referer");
+      refererHeaderSet = true;
+    } catch (e) {
+      refererHeaderSet = false;
+    }
+    ok(!refererHeaderSet, "the referer header should not be set");
+    counter++;
+    sendAsyncMessage("checked-referer-header");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("checked-referer-header", checkTestsDone);
+
+let frame1 = document.getElementById("frame_meta_in_head");
+frame1.src = "/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_in_head.html";
+let frame2 = document.getElementById("frame_meta_notin_head");
+frame2.src = "/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_meta_referrer_notin_head.html";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a22386aea0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff.html
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 471020 - Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff support to Firefox</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+
+  <!-- add the two css tests -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" id="cssCorrectType">
+  <link rel="stylesheet" id="cssWrongType">
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<!-- add the two script tests -->
+<script id="scriptCorrectType"></script>
+<script id="scriptWrongType"></script>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load 2 css files, 2 script files and 2 image files, where
+ * the sever either responds with the right mime type or
+ * the wrong mime type for each test.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+const NUM_TESTS = 4;
+
+var testCounter = 0;
+function checkFinish() {
+	testCounter++;
+	if (testCounter === NUM_TESTS) {
+		SimpleTest.finish();
+	}
+}
+
+  // 1) Test CSS with correct mime type
+  var cssCorrectType = document.getElementById("cssCorrectType");
+  cssCorrectType.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "style nosniff correct type should load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  cssCorrectType.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "style nosniff correct type should load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  cssCorrectType.href = "file_nosniff_testserver.sjs?cssCorrectType";
+
+  // 2) Test CSS with wrong mime type
+  var cssWrongType = document.getElementById("cssWrongType");
+  cssWrongType.onload = function() {
+    ok(false, "style nosniff wrong type should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  cssWrongType.onerror = function() {
+    ok(true, "style nosniff wrong type should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  cssWrongType.href = "file_nosniff_testserver.sjs?cssWrongType";
+
+  // 3) Test SCRIPT with correct mime type
+  var scriptCorrectType = document.getElementById("scriptCorrectType");
+  scriptCorrectType.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "script nosniff correct type should load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  scriptCorrectType.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "script nosniff correct type should load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  scriptCorrectType.src = "file_nosniff_testserver.sjs?scriptCorrectType";
+
+  // 4) Test SCRIPT with wrong mime type
+  var scriptWrongType = document.getElementById("scriptWrongType");
+  scriptWrongType.onload = function() {
+    ok(false, "script nosniff wrong type should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  scriptWrongType.onerror = function() {
+    ok(true, "script nosniff wrong type should not load");
+    checkFinish();
+  }
+  scriptWrongType.src = "file_nosniff_testserver.sjs?scriptWrongType";
+
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6710f4f5b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_nosniff_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1428473 Support X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff when navigating</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+  <!-- add the two script tests -->
+  <script id="scriptCorrectType"></script>
+  <script id="scriptWrongType"></script>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+    /* Description of the test:
+     * We're testing if Firefox respects the nosniff Header for Top-Level 
+     * Navigations.
+     * If Firefox cant Display the Page, it will prompt a download 
+     * and the URL of the Page will be about:blank.
+     * So we will try to open different content send with
+     * no-mime, mismatched-mime and garbage-mime types.
+     * 
+     */
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+    window.addEventListener("load", async () => {
+      window.open("window_nosniff_navigation.html");
+    });
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_about.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_about.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..faf2caab9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_about.html
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1454721 - Add same-site cookie test for about:blank and about:srcdoc</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://mochi.test which sets a same site cookie
+ * 2) We then load the following iframes:
+ *    (a) cross-origin iframe
+ *    (b) same-origin iframe
+ *    which both load a:
+ *     * nested about:srcdoc frame and nested about:blank frame
+ *     * navigate about:srcdoc frame and navigate about:blank frame
+ * 3) We evaluate that the same-site cookie is available in the same-origin case.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/"
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_about.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  // NAVIGATION TESTS
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe about:srcdoc navigation [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> about:srcdoc -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadsrcdocframeNav",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteAboutCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe about:srcdoc navigation [mochi.test -> example.com -> about:srcdoc -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadsrcdocframeNav",
+    result: "", // no same-site cookie should be available
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe about:blank navigation [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> about:blank -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadblankframeNav",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteAboutCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe about:blank navigation [mochi.test -> example.com -> about:blank -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadblankframeNav",
+    result: "", // no same-site cookie should be available
+  },
+  // INCLUSION TESTS
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe about:srcdoc inclusion [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> about:srcdoc -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadsrcdocframeInc",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteAboutCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe about:srcdoc inclusion [mochi.test -> example.com -> about:srcdoc -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadsrcdocframeInc",
+    result: "", // no same-site cookie should be available
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe about:blank inclusion [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> about:blank -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadblankframeInc",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteAboutCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe about:blank inclusion [mochi.test -> example.com -> about:blank -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadblankframeInc",
+    result: "", // no same-site cookie should be available
+  },
+];
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = tests[curTest].frameSRC + curTest;
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "trying to set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not load image for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  cookieImage.src = SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie" + curTest;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9294a3d030
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.html
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1452496 - Do not allow same-site cookies in cross site context</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://example.com which tries to 
+ *    a) a same site cookie
+ *    b) a regular cookie
+ *    in the context of http://mochi.test
+ * 2) We load an iframe from http://example.com and check if the cookie
+ *    is available.
+ * 3) We observe that:
+ *    (a) same site cookie has been discarded in a cross origin context.
+ *    (b) the regular cookie is available.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_cross_origin_context.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "regular cookie in cross origin context",
+    imgSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setRegularCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=regularCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie in cross origin context",
+    imgSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+];
+
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = tests[curTest].frameSRC + curTest;
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "trying to set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not load image for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  cookieImage.src =  tests[curTest].imgSRC + curTest;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  "set": [
+    // Bug 1617611: Fix all the tests broken by "cookies SameSite=lax by default"
+    ["network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault", false],
+  ]
+}, setCookieAndInitTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_from_script.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_from_script.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..74c38b6249
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_from_script.html
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1452496 - Do not allow same-site cookies in cross site context</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe id="setCookieFrame"></iframe>
+<iframe id="getCookieFrame"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an iframe which tries to set a same site cookie using an
+ *    inline script in top-level context of http://mochi.test.
+ * 2) We load an iframe from http://example.com and check if the cookie
+ *    is available.
+ * 3) We observe that:
+ *    (a) same site cookie is available in same origin context.
+ *    (a) same site cookie has been discarded in a cross origin context.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_from_script.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie inline script within same-site context",
+    setCookieSrc: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookieUsingInlineScript",
+    getCookieSrc: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?getCookieFrame",
+    result: "myKey=sameSiteCookieInlineScript",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie inline script within cross-site context",
+    setCookieSrc: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookieUsingInlineScript",
+    getCookieSrc: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?getCookieFrame",
+    result: "", // same-site cookie should be discarded in cross site context
+  },
+];
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  let getCookieFrame = document.getElementById("getCookieFrame");
+  getCookieFrame.src = tests[curTest].getCookieSrc + curTest;
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var setCookieFrame = document.getElementById("setCookieFrame");
+  setCookieFrame.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "trying to set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  setCookieFrame.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not load image for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  setCookieFrame.src =  tests[curTest].setCookieSrc + curTest;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45d5d5830a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1454027 - Update SameSite cookie handling inside iframes</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://mochi.test which sets a same site cookie
+ * 2) We then load the following iframes:
+ *    (a) cross-origin iframe
+ *    (b) sandboxed iframe
+ *    (c) data: URI iframe
+ *    (d) same origin iframe which loads blob: URI iframe (to simulate same origin blobs)
+ *    (e) cross origin iframe which loads blob: URI iframe (to simulate cross origin blobs)
+ *    which all:
+ *    * navigate the iframe to http://mochi.test
+ *    * include another iframe from http://mochi.test
+ * 3) We observe that none of the nested iframes have access to the same-site cookie.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/"
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/";
+const SERVER_FILE = "file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs";
+
+const NESTED_DATA_IFRAME_NAVIGATION = `
+  data:text/html,
+  <html>
+  <body>
+    <a id="testlink" href="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></a>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let link = document.getElementById("testlink");
+      link.click();
+    <\/script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const NESTED_DATA_IFRAME_INCLUSION = `
+  data:text/html,
+  <html>
+  <body>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+      window.parent.postMessage({result: event.data.result}, '*');
+    }
+    <\/script>
+    <iframe src="http://mochi.test:8888/tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_iframe.sjs"></iframe>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  // NAVIGATION TESTS
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe navigation [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedIframeNavigation",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteIframeTestCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe navigation [mochi.test -> example.com -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedIframeNavigation",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested sandboxed iframe navigation [mochi.test -> sandbox -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedSandboxIframeNavigation",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested data iframe navigation [mochi.test -> data: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: NESTED_DATA_IFRAME_NAVIGATION,
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested same site blob iframe navigation [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> blob: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteIframeTestCookie", // cookie should be set, blobs inherit security context
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross site blob iframe navigation [mochi.test -> example.com -> blob: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_navigation.html",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  // INCLUSION TESTS
+  {
+    description: "nested same origin iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedIframeInclusion",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteIframeTestCookie", // cookie should be set for baseline test
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested cross origin iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> example.com -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedIframeInclusion",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested sandboxed iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> sandbox -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?nestedSandboxIframeInclusion",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested data iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> data: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: NESTED_DATA_IFRAME_INCLUSION,
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "nested same site blob iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> mochi.test -> blob: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html",
+    result: "myKey=mySameSiteIframeTestCookie", // cookie should be set, blobs inherit security context
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie, nested cross site blob iframe inclusion [mochi.test -> example.com -> blob: -> mochi.test]",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "file_same_site_cookies_blob_iframe_inclusion.html",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+];
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = tests[curTest].frameSRC;
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "trying to set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not load image for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  // appending math.random to avoid any unexpected caching behavior
+  cookieImage.src = SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + SERVER_FILE + "?setSameSiteCookie" + Math.random();
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_laxByDefault.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_laxByDefault.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9fd0d0b704
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_laxByDefault.html
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1551798 - SameSite=lax by default</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/closeWindow.sjs";
+
+async function realTest(noneRequiresSecure) {
+  let types = ["unset", "lax", "none"];
+  for (let i = 0; i < types.length; ++i) {
+    info("Loading a new top-level page (" + types[i] + ")");
+    await new Promise(resolve => {
+      window.addEventListener("message", _ => {
+        resolve();
+      }, { once: true });
+      window.open(CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?" + types[i]);
+    });
+  }
+
+  info("Check cookies");
+  let chromeScript = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+    /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+    const {sendAsyncMessage} = this;
+    let cookies = { test: null, test2: null, test3: null };
+
+    for (let cookie of Services.cookies.cookies) {
+      if (cookie.host != "example.com") continue;
+
+      if (cookie.name == "test" && cookie.value == "wow") {
+        cookies.test = cookie.sameSite == Ci.nsICookie.SAMESITE_LAX ? 'lax' : 'none';
+      }
+
+      if (cookie.name == "test2" && cookie.value == "wow2") {
+        cookies.test2 = cookie.sameSite == Ci.nsICookie.SAMESITE_LAX ? 'lax' : 'none';
+      }
+
+      if (cookie.name == "test3" && cookie.value == "wow3") {
+        cookies.test3 = cookie.sameSite == Ci.nsICookie.SAMESITE_LAX ? 'lax' : 'none';
+      }
+    }
+
+    Services.cookies.removeAll();
+    sendAsyncMessage('result', cookies);
+  });
+
+  let cookies = await new Promise(resolve => {
+    chromeScript.addMessageListener('result', cookies => {
+      chromeScript.destroy();
+      resolve(cookies);
+    });
+  });
+
+  is(cookies.test, "lax", "Cookie set without samesite is lax by default");
+  if (noneRequiresSecure) {
+    is(cookies.test2, null, "Cookie set with samesite none, but not secure");
+  } else {
+    is(cookies.test2, "none", "Cookie set with samesite none");
+  }
+  is(cookies.test3, "lax", "Cookie set with samesite lax");
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
+  ["network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault", true],
+  ["network.cookie.sameSite.noneRequiresSecure", false],
+]}).then(_ => {
+  return realTest(false);
+}).then(_ => {
+  return SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": [
+    ["network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault", true],
+    ["network.cookie.sameSite.noneRequiresSecure", true]]});
+}).then(_ => {
+  return realTest(true);
+}).then(SimpleTest.finish);
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59f98b2263
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1453814 - Do not allow same-site cookies for cross origin redirect</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://mochi.test which set a same site cookie
+ * 2) We then load an iframe that redirects
+ *    (a) from same-origin to cross-origin
+ *    (b) from cross-origin to same-origin
+ * 3) We observe that in both cases same-site cookies should not be send
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = location.origin + "/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_redirect.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "baseline: same-site cookie, redirect same-site to same-site",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?sameToSameRedirect",
+    result: "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie, redirect same-site to cross-site",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?sameToCrossRedirect",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie, redirect cross-site to same-site",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?crossToSameRedirect",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie, meta redirect same-site to cross-site",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?sameToCrossRedirectMeta",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same-site cookie, meta redirect cross-site to same-site",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?crossToSameRedirectMeta",
+    result: "", // no cookie should be set
+  },
+];
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  is(event.data.result, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = tests[curTest].frameSRC;
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "trying to set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not load image for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  cookieImage.src =  tests[curTest].imgSRC;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_subrequest.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_subrequest.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..304dbafa9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_subrequest.html
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1286861 - Test same site cookies on subrequests</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://mochi.test which sets a same site cookie
+ * 2) We load an iframe from:
+ *    * http://mochi.test which loads another image from http://mochi.test
+ *    * http://example.com which loads another image from http://mochi.test
+ * 3) We observe that the same site cookie is sent in the same origin case,
+ *    but not in the cross origin case.
+ *
+ * In detail:
+ * We perform an XHR request to the *.sjs file which is processed async on
+ * the server and waits till the image request has been processed by the server.
+ * Once the image requets was processed, the server responds to the initial
+ * XHR request with the expecuted result (the cookie value).
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "same origin site using cookie policy 'samesite=strict'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setStrictSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "cross origin site using cookie policy 'samesite=strict'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setStrictSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=noCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same origin site using cookie policy 'samesite=lax'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setLaxSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "cross origin site using cookie policy 'samesite=lax'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setLaxSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=noCookie",
+  },
+];
+
+function checkResult(aCookieVal) {
+  is(aCookieVal, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  myXHR.open("GET", "file_same_site_cookies_subrequest.sjs?queryresult" + curTest);
+  myXHR.onload = function(e) {
+    checkResult(myXHR.responseText);
+  }
+  myXHR.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+  }
+  myXHR.send();
+
+  // give it some time and load the test frame
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(function() {
+    let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    testframe.src = tests[curTest].frameSRC + curTest;
+  });
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  cookieImage.src = tests[curTest].imgSRC + curTest;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aba825916b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.html
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1286861 - Test same site cookies on top-level navigations</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load an image from http://mochi.test which sets a same site cookie
+ * 2) We open a new window to
+ *    * a same origin location
+ *    * a cross origin location
+ * 3) We observe that the same site cookie is sent in the same origin case,
+ *    but not in the cross origin case, unless the policy = 'lax', which should
+ *    send the cookie in a top-level navigation case.
+ *
+ * In detail:
+ * We perform an XHR request to the *.sjs file which is processed async on
+ * the server and waits till the image request has been processed by the server.
+ * Once the image requets was processed, the server responds to the initial
+ * XHR request with the expecuted result (the cookie value).
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs";
+
+let curTest = 0;
+
+let currentWindow;
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "same origin navigation using cookie policy 'samesite=strict'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setStrictSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=strictSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "cross origin navigation using cookie policy 'samesite=strict'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setStrictSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=noCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "same origin navigation using cookie policy 'samesite=lax'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setLaxSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "cross origin navigation using cookie policy 'samesite=lax'",
+    imgSRC: SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?setLaxSameSiteCookie",
+    frameSRC: CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadFrame",
+    result: "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie",
+  },
+];
+
+function checkResult(aCookieVal) {
+  if(currentWindow){
+    currentWindow.close();
+    currentWindow= null;
+  }
+  is(aCookieVal, tests[curTest].result, tests[curTest].description);
+  curTest += 1;
+
+  // lets see if we ran all the tests
+  if (curTest == tests.length) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // otherwise it's time to run the next test
+  setCookieAndInitTest();
+}
+
+function setupQueryResultAndRunTest() {
+  var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  myXHR.open("GET", "file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_nav.sjs?queryresult" + curTest);
+  myXHR.onload = function(e) { 
+    checkResult( myXHR.responseText);
+  }
+  myXHR.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+  }
+  myXHR.send();
+
+  // give it some time and load the test window
+  SimpleTest.executeSoon(function() {
+    currentWindow = window.open(tests[curTest].frameSRC + curTest);
+  });
+}
+
+function setCookieAndInitTest() {
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    ok(true, "set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+    setupQueryResultAndRunTest();
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    ok(false, "could not set cookie for test (" + tests[curTest].description + ")");
+  }
+  cookieImage.src = tests[curTest].imgSRC + curTest;
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+setCookieAndInitTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cae2a6174e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.html
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1454242: Setting samesite cookie should not rely on CookieCommons::IsSameSiteForeign</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * 1) We load a window from example.com which loads a window from mochi.test
+ *    which then sets a same-site cookie for mochi.test.
+ * 2) We load an iframe from mochi.test.
+ * 3) We observe that the cookie within (1) was allowed to be set and
+ *    is available for mochi.test.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://mochi.test:8888/"
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/";
+const PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/general/file_same_site_cookies_toplevel_set_cookie.sjs";
+
+let testWin = null;
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  // once the second window (which sets the cookie) loaded, we get a notification
+  // that the test setup is correct and we can now try to query the same-site cookie
+  if (event.data.value === "testSetupComplete") {
+    ok(true, "cookie setup worked");
+    let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+    testframe.src = SAME_ORIGIN + PATH + "?checkCookie";
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // thie second message is the cookie value from verifying the
+  // cookie has been set correctly.
+  is(event.data.value, "myKey=laxSameSiteCookie",
+     "setting same-site cookie on cross origin top-level page");
+
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  testWin.close();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+// fire up the test
+testWin = window.open(CROSS_ORIGIN + PATH + "?loadWin");
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/test_xfo_error_page.html b/dom/security/test/general/test_xfo_error_page.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..218413b4f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/test_xfo_error_page.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1626249: Ensure correct display of neterror page for XFO</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="xfo_testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const XFO_ERROR_PAGE_MSG = "This page has an X-Frame-Options policy that prevents it from being loaded in this context";
+
+let xfo_testframe = document.getElementById("xfo_testframe");
+
+xfo_testframe.onload = function() {
+  let wrappedXFOFrame = SpecialPowers.wrap(xfo_testframe.contentWindow);
+  let frameContentXFO = wrappedXFOFrame.document.body.innerHTML;
+  ok(frameContentXFO.includes(XFO_ERROR_PAGE_MSG), "xfo error page correct");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+xfo_testframe.onerror = function() {
+  ok(false, "sanity: should not fire onerror for xfo_testframe");
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+xfo_testframe.src = "file_xfo_error_page.sjs";
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/general/window_nosniff_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/general/window_nosniff_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1287e451b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/general/window_nosniff_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1428473 Support X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff when navigating</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+  <style>
+    iframe{
+      border: 1px solid orange;
+    }
+  </style>
+
+  <!-- Using Content-Type: */* -->
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=xml"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=html"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=css" ></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=json"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=img"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*&content=pdf"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="no-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=*%2F*"></iframe>
+  <hr>
+  <!-- Using Content-Type: image/png -->
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=xml"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=html"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=css"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=json"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=img"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng&content=pdf"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="mismatch-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=image%2Fpng"></iframe>
+  <hr>
+  <!-- Using Content-Type: garbage/garbage -->
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=xml"> </iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=html"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=css" ></iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=json"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=img"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage&content=pdf"></iframe>
+  <iframe class="garbage-mime" src="file_nosniff_navigation.sjs?mime=garbage%2Fgarbage"></iframe>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+<!-- add the two script tests -->
+<script id="scriptCorrectType"></script>
+<script id="scriptWrongType"></script>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We're testing if Firefox respects the nosniff Header for Top-Level
+ * Navigations.
+ * If Firefox cant Display the Page, it will prompt a download
+ * and the URL of the Page will be about:blank.
+ * So we will try to open different content send with
+ * no-mime, mismatched-mime and garbage-mime types.
+ *
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+window.addEventListener("load", ()=>{
+  let noMimeFrames = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(".no-mime"));
+  noMimeFrames.forEach(frame => {
+    let doc = frame.contentWindow.document;
+    // In case of no Provided Content Type, not rendering or assuming text/plain is valid
+    let result = doc.URL == "about:blank" || doc.contentType == "text/plain";
+    let sniffTarget = (new URL(frame.src)).searchParams.get("content");
+    window.opener.ok(result, `${sniffTarget} without MIME - was not sniffed`);
+  });
+
+  let mismatchedMimes = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(".mismatch-mime"));
+  mismatchedMimes.forEach(frame => {
+    // In case the Server mismatches the Mime Type (sends content X as image/png)
+    // assert that we do not sniff and correct this.
+    let result = frame.contentWindow.document.contentType == "image/png";
+    let sniffTarget = (new URL(frame.src)).searchParams.get("content");
+    window.opener.ok(result, `${sniffTarget} send as image/png - was not Sniffed`);
+  });
+
+  let badMimeFrames = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(".garbage-mime"));
+  badMimeFrames.forEach(frame => {
+    // In the case we got a bogous mime, assert that we dont sniff.
+    // We must not default here to text/plain
+    // as the Server at least provided a mime type.
+    let result = frame.contentWindow.document.URL == "about:blank";
+    let sniffTarget = (new URL(frame.src)).searchParams.get("content");
+    window.opener.ok(result, `${sniffTarget} send as garbage/garbage - was not Sniffed`);
+  });
+
+  window.opener.SimpleTest.finish();
+  this.close();
+});
+</script>
+</body>
+
+</html>
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/TestCSPParser.cpp b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestCSPParser.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..735a6c7502
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestCSPParser.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1155 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "nsIContentSecurityPolicy.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/nsCSPContext.h"
+#include "mozilla/gtest/MozAssertions.h"
+#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
+#include "nsIPrefBranch.h"
+#include "nsIPrefService.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+/*
+ * Testing the parser is non trivial, especially since we can not call
+ * parser functionality directly in compiled code tests.
+ * All the tests (except the fuzzy tests at the end) follow the same schemata:
+ *   a) create an nsIContentSecurityPolicy object
+ *   b) set the selfURI in SetRequestContextWithPrincipal
+ *   c) append one or more policies by calling AppendPolicy
+ *   d) check if the policy count is correct by calling GetPolicyCount
+ *   e) compare the result of the policy with the expected output
+ *      using the struct PolicyTest;
+ *
+ * In general we test:
+ * a) policies that the parser should accept
+ * b) policies that the parser should reject
+ * c) policies that are randomly generated (fuzzy tests)
+ *
+ * Please note that fuzzy tests are *DISABLED* by default and shold only
+ * be run *OFFLINE* whenever code in nsCSPParser changes.
+ * To run fuzzy tests, flip RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS to 1.
+ *
+ */
+
+#define RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS 0
+
+/*
+ * Offline tests are separated in three different groups:
+ *  * TestFuzzyPolicies - complete random ASCII input
+ *  * TestFuzzyPoliciesIncDir - a directory name followed by random ASCII
+ *  * TestFuzzyPoliciesIncDirLimASCII - a directory name followed by limited
+ * ASCII which represents more likely user input.
+ *
+ *  We run each of this categories |kFuzzyRuns| times.
+ */
+
+#if RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS
+static const uint32_t kFuzzyRuns = 10000;
+#endif
+
+// For fuzzy testing we actually do not care about the output,
+// we just want to make sure that the parser can handle random
+// input, therefore we use kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount to return early.
+static const uint32_t kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount = 111;
+
+static const uint32_t kMaxPolicyLength = 96;
+
+struct PolicyTest {
+  char policy[kMaxPolicyLength];
+  char expectedResult[kMaxPolicyLength];
+};
+
+nsresult runTest(
+    uint32_t aExpectedPolicyCount,  // this should be 0 for policies which
+                                    // should fail to parse
+    const char* aPolicy, const char* aExpectedResult) {
+  nsresult rv;
+
+  // we init the csp with http://www.selfuri.com
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> selfURI;
+  rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(selfURI), "http://www.selfuri.com");
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> selfURIPrincipal;
+  mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs;
+  selfURIPrincipal =
+      mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(selfURI, attrs);
+  NS_ENSURE_TRUE(selfURIPrincipal, NS_ERROR_FAILURE);
+
+  // create a CSP object
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityPolicy> csp =
+      do_CreateInstance(NS_CSPCONTEXT_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // for testing the parser we only need to set a principal which is needed
+  // to translate the keyword 'self' into an actual URI.
+  rv =
+      csp->SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(selfURIPrincipal, selfURI, u""_ns, 0);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // append a policy
+  nsString policyStr;
+  policyStr.AssignASCII(aPolicy);
+  rv = csp->AppendPolicy(policyStr, false, false);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  // when executing fuzzy tests we do not care about the actual output
+  // of the parser, we just want to make sure that the parser is not crashing.
+  if (aExpectedPolicyCount == kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // verify that the expected number of policies exists
+  uint32_t actualPolicyCount;
+  rv = csp->GetPolicyCount(&actualPolicyCount);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  if (actualPolicyCount != aExpectedPolicyCount) {
+    EXPECT_TRUE(false)
+        << "Actual policy count not equal to expected policy count ("
+        << actualPolicyCount << " != " << aExpectedPolicyCount
+        << ") for policy: " << aPolicy;
+    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+  }
+
+  // if the expected policy count is 0, we can return, because
+  // we can not compare any output anyway. Used when parsing
+  // errornous policies.
+  if (aExpectedPolicyCount == 0) {
+    return NS_OK;
+  }
+
+  // compare the parsed policy against the expected result
+  nsString parsedPolicyStr;
+  // checking policy at index 0, which is the one what we appended.
+  rv = csp->GetPolicyString(0, parsedPolicyStr);
+  NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+
+  if (!NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(parsedPolicyStr).EqualsASCII(aExpectedResult)) {
+    EXPECT_TRUE(false) << "Actual policy does not match expected policy ("
+                       << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(parsedPolicyStr).get()
+                       << " != " << aExpectedResult << ")";
+    return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// ============================= run Tests ========================
+
+nsresult runTestSuite(const PolicyTest* aPolicies, uint32_t aPolicyCount,
+                      uint32_t aExpectedPolicyCount) {
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+  bool navigateTo = false;
+  bool wasmUnsafeEval = false;
+  if (prefs) {
+    prefs->GetBoolPref("security.csp.enableNavigateTo", &navigateTo);
+    prefs->SetBoolPref("security.csp.enableNavigateTo", true);
+    prefs->GetBoolPref("security.csp.wasm-unsafe-eval.enabled",
+                       &wasmUnsafeEval);
+    prefs->SetBoolPref("security.csp.wasm-unsafe-eval.enabled", true);
+  }
+
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < aPolicyCount; i++) {
+    rv = runTest(aExpectedPolicyCount, aPolicies[i].policy,
+                 aPolicies[i].expectedResult);
+    NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv);
+  }
+
+  if (prefs) {
+    prefs->SetBoolPref("security.csp.enableNavigateTo", navigateTo);
+    prefs->SetBoolPref("security.csp.wasm-unsafe-eval.enabled", wasmUnsafeEval);
+  }
+
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+// ============================= TestDirectives ========================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, Directives)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "connect-src xn--mnchen-3ya.de",
+      "connect-src http://xn--mnchen-3ya.de"},
+    { "default-src http://www.example.com",
+      "default-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "object-src http://www.example.com",
+      "object-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "style-src http://www.example.com",
+      "style-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "img-src http://www.example.com",
+      "img-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "media-src http://www.example.com",
+      "media-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "frame-src http://www.example.com",
+      "frame-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "font-src http://www.example.com",
+      "font-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "connect-src http://www.example.com",
+      "connect-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "report-uri http://www.example.com",
+      "report-uri http://www.example.com/" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-correctscriptnonce'",
+      "script-src 'nonce-correctscriptnonce'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-a'",
+      "script-src 'nonce-a'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-a'",
+      "script-src 'sha256-a'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI='",
+      "script-src 'sha256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI='" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'unsafe-inline' ",
+      "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'unsafe-inline'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-inline' https:  ",
+      "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-inline' https:" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-inline' 'report-sample' https:  ",
+      "script-src 'nonce-foo' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-inline' 'report-sample' https:" },
+    { "default-src 'sha256-siVR8' 'strict-dynamic' 'unsafe-inline' https:  ",
+      "default-src 'sha256-siVR8' 'unsafe-inline' https:" },
+    { "worker-src https://example.com",
+      "worker-src https://example.com" },
+    { "worker-src http://worker.com; frame-src http://frame.com; child-src http://child.com",
+      "worker-src http://worker.com; frame-src http://frame.com; child-src http://child.com" },
+    { "navigate-to http://example.com",
+      "navigate-to http://example.com"},
+    { "navigate-to 'unsafe-allow-redirects' http://example.com",
+      "navigate-to 'unsafe-allow-redirects' http://example.com"},
+    { "script-src 'unsafe-allow-redirects' http://example.com",
+      "script-src http://example.com"},
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ============================= TestKeywords ========================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, Keywords)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "script-src 'self'",
+      "script-src 'self'" },
+    { "script-src 'unsafe-inline'",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-inline'" },
+    { "script-src 'unsafe-eval'",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-eval'" },
+    { "script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'" },
+    { "script-src 'none'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'wasm-unsafe-eval'",
+      "script-src 'wasm-unsafe-eval'" },
+    { "img-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; default-src 'self'",
+      "img-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; default-src 'self'" },
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// =================== TestIgnoreUpperLowerCasePolicies ==============
+
+TEST(CSPParser, IgnoreUpperLowerCasePolicies)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "script-src 'SELF'",
+      "script-src 'self'" },
+    { "sCriPt-src 'Unsafe-Inline'",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-inline'" },
+    { "SCRIPT-src 'unsafe-eval'",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-eval'" },
+    { "default-SRC 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'",
+      "default-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'" },
+    { "script-src 'NoNe'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-sRc 'noNe'; scrIpt-src 'unsafe-EVAL' 'UNSAFE-inline'; deFAULT-src 'Self'",
+      "img-src 'none'; script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline'; default-src 'self'" },
+    { "default-src HTTP://www.example.com",
+      "default-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "default-src HTTP://WWW.EXAMPLE.COM",
+      "default-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "default-src HTTPS://*.example.COM",
+      "default-src https://*.example.com" },
+    { "script-src 'none' test.com;",
+      "script-src http://test.com" },
+    { "script-src 'NoNCE-correctscriptnonce'",
+      "script-src 'nonce-correctscriptnonce'" },
+    { "script-src 'NoncE-NONCENEEDSTOBEUPPERCASE'",
+      "script-src 'nonce-NONCENEEDSTOBEUPPERCASE'" },
+    { "script-src 'SHA256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI='",
+      "script-src 'sha256-siVR8vAcqP06h2ppeNwqgjr0yZ6yned4X2VF84j4GmI='" },
+    { "upgrade-INSECURE-requests",
+      "upgrade-insecure-requests" },
+    { "sanDBox alloW-foRMs",
+      "sandbox allow-forms"},
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ========================= TestPaths ===============================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, Paths)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com#foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com?foo=bar",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:8888#foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:8888" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:8888?foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:8888" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/#foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/?foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js#foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js?foo",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js?foo#bar",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1/file.js" },
+    { "report-uri http://www.example.com/",
+      "report-uri http://www.example.com/" },
+    { "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/asdf",
+      "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/asdf" },
+    { "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/path_1/path_2",
+      "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/path_1/path_2" },
+    { "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/path_1/path_2/report.sjs&301",
+      "report-uri http://www.example.com:8888/path_1/path_2/report.sjs&301" },
+    { "report-uri /examplepath",
+      "report-uri http://www.selfuri.com/examplepath" },
+    { "connect-src http://www.example.com/foo%3Bsessionid=12%2C34",
+      "connect-src http://www.example.com/foo;sessionid=12,34" },
+    { "connect-src http://www.example.com/foo%3bsessionid=12%2c34",
+      "connect-src http://www.example.com/foo;sessionid=12,34" },
+    { "connect-src http://test.com/pathIncludingAz19-._~!$&'()*+=:@",
+      "connect-src http://test.com/pathIncludingAz19-._~!$&'()*+=:@" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88/.js",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com:88/.js" },
+    { "script-src https://foo.com/_abc/abc_/_/_a_b_c_",
+      "script-src https://foo.com/_abc/abc_/_/_a_b_c_" }
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ======================== TestSimplePolicies =======================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, SimplePolicies)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "frame-src intent:",
+      "frame-src intent:" },
+    { "frame-src intent://host.name",
+      "frame-src intent://host.name" },
+    { "frame-src intent://my.host.link/",
+      "frame-src intent://my.host.link/" },
+    { "default-src *",
+      "default-src *" },
+    { "default-src https:",
+      "default-src https:" },
+    { "default-src https://*",
+      "default-src https://*" },
+    { "default-src *:*",
+      "default-src http://*:*" },
+    { "default-src *:80",
+      "default-src http://*:80" },
+    { "default-src http://*:80",
+      "default-src http://*:80" },
+    { "default-src javascript:",
+      "default-src javascript:" },
+    { "default-src data:",
+      "default-src data:" },
+    { "script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' http://www.example.com",
+      "script-src 'unsafe-eval' 'unsafe-inline' http://www.example.com" },
+    { "object-src 'self'",
+      "object-src 'self'" },
+    { "style-src http://www.example.com 'self'",
+      "style-src http://www.example.com 'self'" },
+    { "media-src http://www.example.com http://www.test.com",
+      "media-src http://www.example.com http://www.test.com" },
+    { "connect-src http://www.test.com example.com *.other.com;",
+      "connect-src http://www.test.com http://example.com http://*.other.com"},
+    { "connect-src example.com *.other.com",
+      "connect-src http://example.com http://*.other.com"},
+    { "style-src *.other.com example.com",
+      "style-src http://*.other.com http://example.com"},
+    { "default-src 'self'; img-src *;",
+      "default-src 'self'; img-src *" },
+    { "object-src media1.example.com media2.example.com *.cdn.example.com;",
+      "object-src http://media1.example.com http://media2.example.com http://*.cdn.example.com" },
+    { "script-src trustedscripts.example.com",
+      "script-src http://trustedscripts.example.com" },
+    { "script-src 'self' ; default-src trustedscripts.example.com",
+      "script-src 'self'; default-src http://trustedscripts.example.com" },
+    { "default-src 'none'; report-uri http://localhost:49938/test",
+      "default-src 'none'; report-uri http://localhost:49938/test" },
+    { "   ;   default-src abc",
+      "default-src http://abc" },
+    { " ; ; ; ;     default-src            abc    ; ; ; ;",
+      "default-src http://abc" },
+    { "script-src 'none' 'none' 'none';",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1//",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1//" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1//path_2",
+      "script-src http://www.example.com/path-1//path_2" },
+    { "default-src 127.0.0.1",
+      "default-src http://127.0.0.1" },
+    { "default-src 127.0.0.1:*",
+      "default-src http://127.0.0.1:*" },
+    { "default-src -; ",
+      "default-src http://-" },
+    { "script-src 1",
+      "script-src http://1" },
+    { "upgrade-insecure-requests",
+      "upgrade-insecure-requests" },
+    { "upgrade-insecure-requests https:",
+      "upgrade-insecure-requests" },
+    { "sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms  ",
+      "sandbox allow-scripts allow-forms" },
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// =================== TestPoliciesWithInvalidSrc ====================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, PoliciesWithInvalidSrc)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "script-src 'self'; SCRIPT-SRC http://www.example.com",
+      "script-src 'self'" },
+    { "script-src 'none' test.com; script-src example.com",
+      "script-src http://test.com" },
+    { "default-src **",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src 'self",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src 'unsafe-inlin' ",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src */",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src 'unsafe-inlin' ",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "default-src :88",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src abc::::::88",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src *.*:*",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src *::88",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "object-src http://localhost:",
+      "object-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src test..com",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src sub1.sub2.example+",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com//",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88path-1/",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88//",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88//path-1",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88//path-1",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:88.js",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*.js",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src http://www.example.com:*.",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-{invalid}'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-{invalid}'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-in$valid'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-in$valid'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-invalid==='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-invalid==='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-==='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-==='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-=='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-=='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-='",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'nonce-'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src 'sha256-'",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "connect-src http://www.example.com/foo%zz;",
+      "connect-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src https://foo.com/%$",
+      "script-src 'none'" },
+    { "sandbox    foo",
+      "sandbox"},
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  // amount of tests - 1, because the latest should be ignored.
+  uint32_t policyCount = (sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest)) - 1;
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ============================= TestBadPolicies =======================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, BadPolicies)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "script-sr 'self", "" },
+    { "", "" },
+    { "; ; ; ; ; ; ;", "" },
+    { "defaut-src asdf", "" },
+    { "default-src: aaa", "" },
+    { "asdf http://test.com", ""},
+    { "report-uri", ""},
+    { "report-uri http://:foo", ""},
+    { "require-sri-for", ""},
+    { "require-sri-for style", ""},
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 0));
+}
+
+// ======================= TestGoodGeneratedPolicies =================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, GoodGeneratedPolicies)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "default-src 'self'; img-src *",
+      "default-src 'self'; img-src *" },
+    { "report-uri /policy",
+      "report-uri http://www.selfuri.com/policy"},
+    { "img-src *",
+      "img-src *" },
+    { "media-src foo.bar",
+      "media-src http://foo.bar" },
+    { "frame-src *.bar",
+      "frame-src http://*.bar" },
+    { "font-src com",
+      "font-src http://com" },
+    { "connect-src f00b4r.com",
+      "connect-src http://f00b4r.com" },
+    { "script-src *.a.b.c",
+      "script-src http://*.a.b.c" },
+    { "object-src *.b.c",
+      "object-src http://*.b.c" },
+    { "style-src a.b.c",
+      "style-src http://a.b.c" },
+    { "img-src a.com",
+      "img-src http://a.com" },
+    { "media-src http://abc.com",
+      "media-src http://abc.com" },
+    { "frame-src a2-c.com",
+      "frame-src http://a2-c.com" },
+    { "font-src https://a.com",
+      "font-src https://a.com" },
+    { "connect-src *.a.com",
+      "connect-src http://*.a.com" },
+    { "default-src a.com:23",
+      "default-src http://a.com:23" },
+    { "script-src https://a.com:200",
+      "script-src https://a.com:200" },
+    { "object-src data:",
+      "object-src data:" },
+    { "style-src javascript:",
+      "style-src javascript:" },
+    { "frame-src https://foobar.com:443",
+      "frame-src https://foobar.com:443" },
+    { "font-src https://a.com:443",
+      "font-src https://a.com:443" },
+    { "connect-src http://a.com:80",
+      "connect-src http://a.com:80" },
+    { "default-src http://foobar.com",
+      "default-src http://foobar.com" },
+    { "script-src https://foobar.com",
+      "script-src https://foobar.com" },
+    { "style-src 'none'",
+      "style-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src foo.bar:21 https://ras.bar",
+      "img-src http://foo.bar:21 https://ras.bar" },
+    { "media-src http://foo.bar:21 https://ras.bar:443",
+      "media-src http://foo.bar:21 https://ras.bar:443" },
+    { "frame-src http://self.com:80",
+      "frame-src http://self.com:80" },
+    { "font-src http://self.com",
+      "font-src http://self.com" },
+    { "connect-src https://foo.com http://bar.com:88",
+      "connect-src https://foo.com http://bar.com:88" },
+    { "default-src * https://bar.com 'none'",
+      "default-src * https://bar.com" },
+    { "script-src *.foo.com",
+      "script-src http://*.foo.com" },
+    { "object-src http://b.com",
+      "object-src http://b.com" },
+    { "style-src http://bar.com:88",
+      "style-src http://bar.com:88" },
+    { "img-src https://bar.com:88",
+      "img-src https://bar.com:88" },
+    { "media-src http://bar.com:443",
+      "media-src http://bar.com:443" },
+    { "frame-src https://foo.com:88",
+      "frame-src https://foo.com:88" },
+    { "font-src http://foo.com",
+      "font-src http://foo.com" },
+    { "connect-src http://x.com:23",
+      "connect-src http://x.com:23" },
+    { "default-src http://barbaz.com",
+      "default-src http://barbaz.com" },
+    { "script-src http://somerandom.foo.com",
+      "script-src http://somerandom.foo.com" },
+    { "default-src *",
+      "default-src *" },
+    { "style-src http://bar.com:22",
+      "style-src http://bar.com:22" },
+    { "img-src https://foo.com:443",
+      "img-src https://foo.com:443" },
+    { "script-src https://foo.com; ",
+      "script-src https://foo.com" },
+    { "img-src bar.com:*",
+      "img-src http://bar.com:*" },
+    { "font-src https://foo.com:400",
+      "font-src https://foo.com:400" },
+    { "connect-src http://bar.com:400",
+      "connect-src http://bar.com:400" },
+    { "default-src http://evil.com",
+      "default-src http://evil.com" },
+    { "script-src https://evil.com:100",
+      "script-src https://evil.com:100" },
+    { "default-src bar.com; script-src https://foo.com",
+      "default-src http://bar.com; script-src https://foo.com" },
+    { "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://*:*",
+      "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' https://*:*" },
+    { "img-src http://self.com:34",
+      "img-src http://self.com:34" },
+    { "media-src http://subd.self.com:34",
+      "media-src http://subd.self.com:34" },
+    { "default-src 'none'",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "connect-src http://self",
+      "connect-src http://self" },
+    { "default-src http://foo",
+      "default-src http://foo" },
+    { "script-src http://foo:80",
+      "script-src http://foo:80" },
+    { "object-src http://bar",
+      "object-src http://bar" },
+    { "style-src http://three:80",
+      "style-src http://three:80" },
+    { "img-src https://foo:400",
+      "img-src https://foo:400" },
+    { "media-src https://self:34",
+      "media-src https://self:34" },
+    { "frame-src https://bar",
+      "frame-src https://bar" },
+    { "font-src http://three:81",
+      "font-src http://three:81" },
+    { "connect-src https://three:81",
+      "connect-src https://three:81" },
+    { "script-src http://self.com:80/foo",
+      "script-src http://self.com:80/foo" },
+    { "object-src http://self.com/foo",
+      "object-src http://self.com/foo" },
+    { "report-uri /report.py",
+      "report-uri http://www.selfuri.com/report.py"},
+    { "img-src http://foo.org:34/report.py",
+      "img-src http://foo.org:34/report.py" },
+    { "media-src foo/bar/report.py",
+      "media-src http://foo/bar/report.py" },
+    { "report-uri /",
+      "report-uri http://www.selfuri.com/"},
+    { "font-src https://self.com/report.py",
+      "font-src https://self.com/report.py" },
+    { "connect-src https://foo.com/report.py",
+      "connect-src https://foo.com/report.py" },
+    { "default-src *; report-uri  http://www.reporturi.com/",
+      "default-src *; report-uri http://www.reporturi.com/" },
+    { "default-src http://first.com",
+      "default-src http://first.com" },
+    { "script-src http://second.com",
+      "script-src http://second.com" },
+    { "object-src http://third.com",
+      "object-src http://third.com" },
+    { "style-src https://foobar.com:4443",
+      "style-src https://foobar.com:4443" },
+    { "img-src http://foobar.com:4443",
+      "img-src http://foobar.com:4443" },
+    { "media-src bar.com",
+      "media-src http://bar.com" },
+    { "frame-src http://bar.com",
+      "frame-src http://bar.com" },
+    { "font-src http://self.com/",
+      "font-src http://self.com/" },
+    { "script-src 'self'",
+      "script-src 'self'" },
+    { "default-src http://self.com/foo.png",
+      "default-src http://self.com/foo.png" },
+    { "script-src http://self.com/foo.js",
+      "script-src http://self.com/foo.js" },
+    { "object-src http://bar.com/foo.js",
+      "object-src http://bar.com/foo.js" },
+    { "style-src http://FOO.COM",
+      "style-src http://foo.com" },
+    { "img-src HTTP",
+      "img-src http://http" },
+    { "media-src http",
+      "media-src http://http" },
+    { "frame-src 'SELF'",
+      "frame-src 'self'" },
+    { "DEFAULT-src 'self';",
+      "default-src 'self'" },
+    { "default-src 'self' http://FOO.COM",
+      "default-src 'self' http://foo.com" },
+    { "default-src 'self' HTTP://foo.com",
+      "default-src 'self' http://foo.com" },
+    { "default-src 'NONE'",
+      "default-src 'none'" },
+    { "script-src policy-uri ",
+      "script-src http://policy-uri" },
+    { "img-src 'self'; ",
+      "img-src 'self'" },
+    { "frame-ancestors foo-bar.com",
+      "frame-ancestors http://foo-bar.com" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://a.com",
+      "frame-ancestors http://a.com" },
+    { "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+      "frame-ancestors 'self'" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://self.com:88",
+      "frame-ancestors http://self.com:88" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.x.com",
+      "frame-ancestors http://a.b.c.d.e.f.g.h.i.j.k.l.x.com" },
+    { "frame-ancestors https://self.com:34",
+      "frame-ancestors https://self.com:34" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://sampleuser:samplepass@example.com",
+      "frame-ancestors 'none'" },
+    { "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'",
+      "default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'self'" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://self:80",
+      "frame-ancestors http://self:80" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://self.com/bar",
+      "frame-ancestors http://self.com/bar" },
+    { "default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'",
+      "default-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'self'" },
+    { "frame-ancestors http://bar.com/foo.png",
+      "frame-ancestors http://bar.com/foo.png" },
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ==================== TestBadGeneratedPolicies ====================
+
+TEST(CSPParser, BadGeneratedPolicies)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "foo.*.bar", ""},
+    { "foo!bar.com", ""},
+    { "x.*.a.com", ""},
+    { "a#2-c.com", ""},
+    { "http://foo.com:bar.com:23", ""},
+    { "f!oo.bar", ""},
+    { "ht!ps://f-oo.bar", ""},
+    { "https://f-oo.bar:3f", ""},
+    { "**", ""},
+    { "*a", ""},
+    { "http://username:password@self.com/foo", ""},
+    { "http://other:pass1@self.com/foo", ""},
+    { "http://user1:pass1@self.com/foo", ""},
+    { "http://username:password@self.com/bar", ""},
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 0));
+}
+
+// ============ TestGoodGeneratedPoliciesForPathHandling =============
+
+TEST(CSPParser, GoodGeneratedPoliciesForPathHandling)
+{
+  // Once bug 808292 (Implement path-level host-source matching to CSP)
+  // lands we have to update the expected output to include the parsed path
+
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/file_1.js" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/file-2.js" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.js" },
+    { "img-src *.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js",
+      "img-src http://*.example.com/path-1/path_2/f.oo.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/f.ile.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/path-1/path_2/f.ile.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/file.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/file.js" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/f.ile.js",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:*/path-1/path_2/f.ile.js" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com/abc//",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com/abc//" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc/def//",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc/def//" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc/def/ghi//",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc/def/ghi//" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/abc//",
+      "img-src http://test1.example.com:80/abc//" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com:80/abc/def//",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com:80/abc/def//" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com:80/abc/def/ghi//",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com:80/abc/def/ghi//" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc////////////def/",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc////////////def/" },
+    { "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc////////////",
+      "img-src https://test1.example.com/abc////////////" },
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ============== TestBadGeneratedPoliciesForPathHandling ============
+
+TEST(CSPParser, BadGeneratedPoliciesForPathHandling)
+{
+  static const PolicyTest policies[] = {
+      // clang-format off
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:88path-1/",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:80.js",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*.js",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src test1.example.com:*.",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com//",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com:80//",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+    { "img-src http://test1.example.com:80abc",
+      "img-src 'none'" },
+      // clang-format on
+  };
+
+  uint32_t policyCount = sizeof(policies) / sizeof(PolicyTest);
+  ASSERT_NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(policies, policyCount, 1));
+}
+
+// ======================== TestFuzzyPolicies ========================
+
+// Use a policy, eliminate one character at a time,
+// and feed it as input to the parser.
+
+TEST(CSPParser, ShorteningPolicies)
+{
+  char pol[] =
+      "default-src http://www.sub1.sub2.example.com:88/path1/path2/ "
+      "'unsafe-inline' 'none'";
+  uint32_t len = static_cast<uint32_t>(sizeof(pol));
+
+  PolicyTest testPol[1];
+  memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength * sizeof(char));
+
+  while (--len) {
+    memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength * sizeof(char));
+    memcpy(&testPol[0].policy, &pol, len * sizeof(char));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(testPol, 1, kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount)));
+  }
+}
+
+// ============================= TestFuzzyPolicies ===================
+
+// We generate kFuzzyRuns inputs by (pseudo) randomly picking from the 128
+// ASCII characters; feed them to the parser and verfy that the parser
+// handles the input gracefully.
+//
+// Please note, that by using srand(0) we get deterministic results!
+
+#if RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS
+
+TEST(CSPParser, FuzzyPolicies)
+{
+  // init srand with 0 so we get same results
+  srand(0);
+
+  PolicyTest testPol[1];
+  memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength);
+
+  for (uint32_t index = 0; index < kFuzzyRuns; index++) {
+    // randomly select the length of the next policy
+    uint32_t polLength = rand() % kMaxPolicyLength;
+    // reset memory of the policy string
+    memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength * sizeof(char));
+
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < polLength; i++) {
+      // fill the policy array with random ASCII chars
+      testPol[0].policy[i] = static_cast<char>(rand() % 128);
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(testPol, 1, kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount)));
+  }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+// ======================= TestFuzzyPoliciesIncDir ===================
+
+// In a similar fashion as in TestFuzzyPolicies, we again (pseudo) randomly
+// generate input for the parser, but this time also include a valid directive
+// followed by the random input.
+
+#if RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS
+
+TEST(CSPParser, FuzzyPoliciesIncDir)
+{
+  // init srand with 0 so we get same results
+  srand(0);
+
+  PolicyTest testPol[1];
+  memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength);
+
+  char defaultSrc[] = "default-src ";
+  int defaultSrcLen = sizeof(defaultSrc) - 1;
+  // copy default-src into the policy array
+  memcpy(&testPol[0].policy, &defaultSrc, (defaultSrcLen * sizeof(char)));
+
+  for (uint32_t index = 0; index < kFuzzyRuns; index++) {
+    // randomly select the length of the next policy
+    uint32_t polLength = rand() % (kMaxPolicyLength - defaultSrcLen);
+    // reset memory of the policy string, but leave default-src.
+    memset((&(testPol[0].policy) + (defaultSrcLen * sizeof(char))), '\0',
+           (kMaxPolicyLength - defaultSrcLen) * sizeof(char));
+
+    // do not start at index 0 so we do not overwrite 'default-src'
+    for (uint32_t i = defaultSrcLen; i < polLength; i++) {
+      // fill the policy array with random ASCII chars
+      testPol[0].policy[i] = static_cast<char>(rand() % 128);
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(testPol, 1, kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount)));
+  }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+// ====================== TestFuzzyPoliciesIncDirLimASCII ============
+
+// Same as TestFuzzyPoliciesIncDir() but using limited ASCII,
+// which represents more likely input.
+
+#if RUN_OFFLINE_TESTS
+
+TEST(CSPParser, FuzzyPoliciesIncDirLimASCII)
+{
+  char input[] =
+      "1234567890"
+      "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+      "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWZYZ"
+      "!@#^&*()-+_=";
+
+  // init srand with 0 so we get same results
+  srand(0);
+
+  PolicyTest testPol[1];
+  memset(&testPol[0].policy, '\0', kMaxPolicyLength);
+
+  char defaultSrc[] = "default-src ";
+  int defaultSrcLen = sizeof(defaultSrc) - 1;
+  // copy default-src into the policy array
+  memcpy(&testPol[0].policy, &defaultSrc, (defaultSrcLen * sizeof(char)));
+
+  for (uint32_t index = 0; index < kFuzzyRuns; index++) {
+    // randomly select the length of the next policy
+    uint32_t polLength = rand() % (kMaxPolicyLength - defaultSrcLen);
+    // reset memory of the policy string, but leave default-src.
+    memset((&(testPol[0].policy) + (defaultSrcLen * sizeof(char))), '\0',
+           (kMaxPolicyLength - defaultSrcLen) * sizeof(char));
+
+    // do not start at index 0 so we do not overwrite 'default-src'
+    for (uint32_t i = defaultSrcLen; i < polLength; i++) {
+      // fill the policy array with chars from the pre-defined input
+      uint32_t inputIndex = rand() % sizeof(input);
+      testPol[0].policy[i] = input[inputIndex];
+    }
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        NS_SUCCEEDED(runTestSuite(testPol, 1, kFuzzyExpectedPolicyCount)));
+  }
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/TestFilenameEvalParser.cpp b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestFilenameEvalParser.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..60683007ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestFilenameEvalParser.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,453 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+#include "mozilla/ExtensionPolicyService.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/ScriptSettings.h"
+#include "mozilla/dom/SimpleGlobalObject.h"
+#include "mozilla/extensions/WebExtensionPolicy.h"
+
+static constexpr auto kChromeURI = "chromeuri"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kResourceURI = "resourceuri"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kBlobUri = "bloburi"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kDataUri = "dataurl"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kAboutUri = "abouturi"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kSingleString = "singlestring"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kMozillaExtensionFile = "mozillaextension_file"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kExtensionURI = "extension_uri"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kSuspectedUserChromeJS = "suspectedUserChromeJS"_ns;
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsURL = "sanitizedWindowsURL"_ns;
+static constexpr auto kSanitizedWindowsPath = "sanitizedWindowsPath"_ns;
+#endif
+static constexpr auto kOther = "other"_ns;
+
+#define ASSERT_AND_PRINT(first, second, condition)                      \
+  fprintf(stderr, "First: %s\n", first.get());                          \
+  fprintf(stderr, "Second: %s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(second).get()); \
+  ASSERT_TRUE((condition));
+// Usage: ASSERT_AND_PRINT(ret.first, ret.second.value(), ...
+
+#define ASSERT_AND_PRINT_FIRST(first, condition) \
+  fprintf(stderr, "First: %s\n", (first).get()); \
+  ASSERT_TRUE((condition));
+// Usage: ASSERT_AND_PRINT_FIRST(ret.first, ...
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, ResourceChrome)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"chrome://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kChromeURI && ret.second.isSome() &&
+                ret.second.value() == str);
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"resource://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kResourceURI && ret.second.isSome() &&
+                ret.second.value() == str);
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, BlobData)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"blob://000-000"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kBlobUri && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"blob:000-000"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kBlobUri && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"data://blahblahblah"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kDataUri && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"data:blahblahblah"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kDataUri && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, MozExtension)
+{
+  {  // Test shield.mozilla.org replacing
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"jar:file:///c:/users/bob/appdata/roaming/mozilla/firefox/profiles/"
+        u"foo/"
+        "extensions/federated-learning@shield.mozilla.org.xpi!/experiments/"
+        "study/api.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kMozillaExtensionFile &&
+                ret.second.value() ==
+                    u"federated-learning@s!/experiments/study/api.js"_ns);
+  }
+  {  // Test mozilla.org replacing
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"jar:file:///c:/users/bob/appdata/roaming/mozilla/firefox/profiles/"
+        u"foo/"
+        "extensions/federated-learning@shigeld.mozilla.org.xpi!/experiments/"
+        "study/api.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        ret.first == kMozillaExtensionFile &&
+        ret.second.value() ==
+            nsLiteralString(
+                u"federated-learning@shigeld.m!/experiments/study/api.js"));
+  }
+  {  // Test truncating
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"jar:file:///c:/users/bob/appdata/roaming/mozilla/firefox/profiles/"
+        u"foo/"
+        "extensions/federated-learning@shigeld.mozilla.org.xpi!/experiments/"
+        "study/apiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kMozillaExtensionFile &&
+                ret.second.value() ==
+                    u"federated-learning@shigeld.m!/experiments/"
+                    "study/apiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii"_ns);
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, UserChromeJS)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures/content/browser.uc.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSuspectedUserChromeJS && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures/content/browser.uc.js?"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSuspectedUserChromeJS && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures/content/browser.uc.js?243244224"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSuspectedUserChromeJS && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"file:///b:/fxprofiles/mark/chrome/"
+        "addbookmarkherewithmiddleclick.uc.js?1558444389291"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSuspectedUserChromeJS && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, SingleFile)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"browser.uc.js?2456"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSingleString && ret.second.isSome() &&
+                ret.second.value() == str);
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"debugger"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSingleString && ret.second.isSome() &&
+                ret.second.value() == str);
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, Other)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures--content"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"gallop://thing/fire"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsURL &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"gallop"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"gallop://fire"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsURL &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"gallop"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures/content"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsPath &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"content"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"firegestures\\content"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsPath &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"content"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"/home/tom/files/thing"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsPath &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"thing"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"file://c/uers/tom/file.txt"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsURL &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"file://.../file.txt"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"c:/uers/tom/file.txt"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsPath &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"file.txt"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"http://example.com/"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsURL &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"http"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"http://example.com/thing.html"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kSanitizedWindowsURL &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"http"_ns);
+#else
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kOther && !ret.second.isSome());
+#endif
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, WebExtensionPathParser)
+{
+  {
+    // Set up an Extension and register it so we can test against it.
+    mozilla::dom::AutoJSAPI jsAPI;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsAPI.Init(xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope()));
+    JSContext* cx = jsAPI.cx();
+
+    mozilla::dom::GlobalObject go(cx, xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope());
+    auto* wEI = new mozilla::extensions::WebExtensionInit();
+
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> func(
+        cx, (JSObject*)JS_NewFunction(cx, (JSNative)1, 0, 0, "customMethodA"));
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> tempGlobalRoot(cx, JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(cx));
+    wEI->mLocalizeCallback = new mozilla::dom::WebExtensionLocalizeCallback(
+        cx, func, tempGlobalRoot, nullptr);
+
+    wEI->mAllowedOrigins =
+        mozilla::dom::OwningMatchPatternSetOrStringSequence();
+    nsString* slotPtr =
+        wEI->mAllowedOrigins.SetAsStringSequence().AppendElement(
+            mozilla::fallible);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(slotPtr != nullptr);
+    nsString& slot = *slotPtr;
+    slot.Truncate();
+    slot = u"http://example.com"_ns;
+
+    wEI->mName = u"gtest Test Extension"_ns;
+    wEI->mId = u"gtesttestextension@mozilla.org"_ns;
+    wEI->mBaseURL = u"file://foo"_ns;
+    wEI->mMozExtensionHostname = "e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856"_ns;
+
+    mozilla::ErrorResult eR;
+    RefPtr<mozilla::WebExtensionPolicy> w =
+        mozilla::extensions::WebExtensionPolicy::Constructor(go, *wEI, eR);
+    w->SetActive(true, eR);
+
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"moz-extension://e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856/path/to/file.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, true);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kExtensionURI &&
+                ret.second.value() ==
+                    u"moz-extension://[gtesttestextension@mozilla.org: "
+                    "gtest Test Extension]P=0/path/to/file.js"_ns);
+
+    w->SetActive(false, eR);
+
+    delete wEI;
+  }
+  {
+    // Set up an Extension and register it so we can test against it.
+    mozilla::dom::AutoJSAPI jsAPI;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsAPI.Init(xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope()));
+    JSContext* cx = jsAPI.cx();
+
+    mozilla::dom::GlobalObject go(cx, xpc::PrivilegedJunkScope());
+    auto wEI = new mozilla::extensions::WebExtensionInit();
+
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> func(
+        cx, (JSObject*)JS_NewFunction(cx, (JSNative)1, 0, 0, "customMethodA"));
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> tempGlobalRoot(cx, JS::CurrentGlobalOrNull(cx));
+    wEI->mLocalizeCallback = new mozilla::dom::WebExtensionLocalizeCallback(
+        cx, func, tempGlobalRoot, NULL);
+
+    wEI->mAllowedOrigins =
+        mozilla::dom::OwningMatchPatternSetOrStringSequence();
+    nsString* slotPtr =
+        wEI->mAllowedOrigins.SetAsStringSequence().AppendElement(
+            mozilla::fallible);
+    nsString& slot = *slotPtr;
+    slot.Truncate();
+    slot = u"http://example.com"_ns;
+
+    wEI->mName = u"gtest Test Extension"_ns;
+    wEI->mId = u"gtesttestextension@mozilla.org"_ns;
+    wEI->mBaseURL = u"file://foo"_ns;
+    wEI->mMozExtensionHostname = "e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856"_ns;
+    wEI->mIsPrivileged = true;
+
+    mozilla::ErrorResult eR;
+    RefPtr<mozilla::WebExtensionPolicy> w =
+        mozilla::extensions::WebExtensionPolicy::Constructor(go, *wEI, eR);
+    w->SetActive(true, eR);
+
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"moz-extension://e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856/path/to/file.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, true);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kExtensionURI &&
+                ret.second.value() ==
+                    u"moz-extension://[gtesttestextension@mozilla.org: "
+                    "gtest Test Extension]P=1/path/to/file.js"_ns);
+
+    w->SetActive(false, eR);
+
+    delete wEI;
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"moz-extension://e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856/path/to/file.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kExtensionURI && !ret.second.isSome());
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"moz-extension://e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856/file.js"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, true);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        ret.first == kExtensionURI &&
+        ret.second.value() ==
+            nsLiteralString(
+                u"moz-extension://[failed finding addon by host]/file.js"));
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str =
+        u"moz-extension://e37c3c08-beac-a04b-8032-c4f699a1a856/path/to/"
+        "file.js?querystringx=6"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, true);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kExtensionURI &&
+                ret.second.value() ==
+                    u"moz-extension://[failed finding addon "
+                    "by host]/path/to/file.js"_ns);
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(FilenameEvalParser, AboutPageParser)
+{
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"about:about"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kAboutUri &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"about:about"_ns);
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"about:about?hello"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kAboutUri &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"about:about"_ns);
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"about:about#mom"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kAboutUri &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"about:about"_ns);
+  }
+  {
+    constexpr auto str = u"about:about?hello=there#mom"_ns;
+    FilenameTypeAndDetails ret =
+        nsContentSecurityUtils::FilenameToFilenameType(str, false);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(ret.first == kAboutUri &&
+                ret.second.value() == u"about:about"_ns);
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSecureContext.cpp b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSecureContext.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..189bd0b64b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSecureContext.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.h"
+#include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h"
+#include "mozilla/NullPrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+
+static const uint32_t kURIMaxLength = 64;
+
+struct TestExpectations {
+  char uri[kURIMaxLength];
+  bool expectedResult;
+};
+
+class MOZ_RAII AutoRestoreBoolPref final {
+ public:
+  AutoRestoreBoolPref(const char* aPref, bool aValue) : mPref(aPref) {
+    Preferences::GetBool(mPref, &mOldValue);
+    Preferences::SetBool(mPref, aValue);
+  }
+
+  ~AutoRestoreBoolPref() { Preferences::SetBool(mPref, mOldValue); }
+
+ private:
+  const char* mPref = nullptr;
+  bool mOldValue = false;
+};
+
+// ============================= TestDirectives ========================
+
+TEST(SecureContext, IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthyWithContentPrincipal)
+{
+  // boolean isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal);
+
+  AutoRestoreBoolPref savedPref("network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost",
+                                false);
+
+  static const TestExpectations uris[] = {
+      {"http://example.com/", false},
+      {"https://example.com/", true},
+      {"ws://example.com/", false},
+      {"wss://example.com/", true},
+      {"file:///xyzzy", true},
+      {"ftp://example.com", false},
+      {"about:config", false},
+      {"http://localhost", true},
+      {"http://localhost.localhost", true},
+      {"http://a.b.c.d.e.localhost", true},
+      {"http://xyzzy.localhost", true},
+      {"http://127.0.0.1", true},
+      {"http://127.0.0.2", true},
+      {"http://127.1.0.1", true},
+      {"http://128.0.0.1", false},
+      {"http://[::1]", true},
+      {"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]", false},
+      {"http://[::ffff:127.0.0.2]", false},
+      {"http://[::ffff:7f00:1]", false},
+      {"http://[::ffff:7f00:2]", false},
+      {"resource://xyzzy", true},
+      {"moz-extension://xyzzy", true},
+      {"data:data:text/plain;charset=utf-8;base64,eHl6enk=", false},
+      {"blob://unique-id", false},
+      {"mailto:foo@bar.com", false},
+      {"moz-icon://example.com", false},
+      {"javascript:42", false},
+  };
+
+  uint32_t numExpectations = sizeof(uris) / sizeof(TestExpectations);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIContentSecurityManager> csManager =
+      do_GetService(NS_CONTENTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!!csManager);
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  for (uint32_t i = 0; i < numExpectations; i++) {
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> prin;
+    nsAutoCString uri(uris[i].uri);
+    rv = nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager()
+             ->CreateContentPrincipalFromOrigin(uri, getter_AddRefs(prin));
+    ASSERT_EQ(rv, NS_OK);
+    bool isPotentiallyTrustworthy = prin->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy();
+    ASSERT_EQ(isPotentiallyTrustworthy, uris[i].expectedResult)
+        << uris[i].uri << uris[i].expectedResult;
+  }
+}
+
+TEST(SecureContext, IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthyWithSystemPrincipal)
+{
+  RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager =
+      nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager();
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!!ssManager);
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> sysPrin = nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal();
+  bool isPotentiallyTrustworthy = sysPrin->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy();
+  ASSERT_TRUE(isPotentiallyTrustworthy);
+}
+
+TEST(SecureContext, IsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthyWithNullPrincipal)
+{
+  RefPtr<nsScriptSecurityManager> ssManager =
+      nsScriptSecurityManager::GetScriptSecurityManager();
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!!ssManager);
+
+  RefPtr<NullPrincipal> nullPrin =
+      NullPrincipal::CreateWithoutOriginAttributes();
+  bool isPotentiallyTrustworthy;
+  nsresult rv =
+      nullPrin->GetIsOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy(&isPotentiallyTrustworthy);
+  ASSERT_EQ(rv, NS_OK);
+  ASSERT_TRUE(!isPotentiallyTrustworthy);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSmartCrashTrimmer.cpp b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSmartCrashTrimmer.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2238c0d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestSmartCrashTrimmer.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsTString.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
+
+#define ASSERT_STRCMP(first, second) ASSERT_TRUE(strcmp(first, second) == 0);
+
+#define ASSERT_STRCMP_AND_PRINT(first, second)             \
+  fprintf(stderr, "First: %s\n", first);                   \
+  fprintf(stderr, "Second: %s\n", second);                 \
+  fprintf(stderr, "strcmp = %i\n", strcmp(first, second)); \
+  ASSERT_EQUAL(first, second);
+
+TEST(SmartCrashTrimmer, Test)
+{
+  static_assert(sPrintfCrashReasonSize == 1024);
+  {
+    auto ret = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+        std::string(1025, '.').c_str());
+    ASSERT_EQ(strlen(ret), 1023ul);
+  }
+
+  {
+    auto ret = nsContentSecurityUtils::SmartFormatCrashString(
+        std::string(1025, '.').c_str(), std::string(1025, 'A').c_str(),
+        "Hello %s world %s!");
+    char expected[1025];
+    SprintfLiteral(expected, "Hello %s world AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA!",
+                   std::string(984, '.').c_str());
+    ASSERT_STRCMP(ret.get(), expected);
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/TestUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads.cpp b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..772e4bd353
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/TestUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "core/TelemetryEvent.h"
+#include "gtest/gtest.h"
+#include "js/Array.h"               // JS::GetArrayLength
+#include "js/PropertyAndElement.h"  // JS_GetElement, JS_GetProperty
+#include "js/TypeDecls.h"
+#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h"
+#include "mozilla/Maybe.h"
+#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
+#include "TelemetryFixture.h"
+#include "TelemetryTestHelpers.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "nsContentSecurityManager.h"
+#include "nsContentSecurityUtils.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIContentPolicy.h"
+#include "nsILoadInfo.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsStringFwd.h"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace TelemetryTestHelpers;
+
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksChecked;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sJSHacksPresent;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksChecked;
+extern Atomic<bool, mozilla::Relaxed> sCSSHacksPresent;
+
+TEST_F(TelemetryTestFixture, UnexpectedPrivilegedLoadsTelemetryTest) {
+  // Disable JS/CSS Hacks Detection, which would consider this current profile
+  // as uninteresting for our measurements:
+  bool origJSHacksPresent = sJSHacksPresent;
+  bool origJSHacksChecked = sJSHacksChecked;
+  sJSHacksPresent = false;
+  sJSHacksChecked = true;
+  bool origCSSHacksPresent = sCSSHacksPresent;
+  bool origCSSHacksChecked = sCSSHacksChecked;
+  sCSSHacksPresent = false;
+  sCSSHacksChecked = true;
+
+  struct testResults {
+    nsCString fileinfo;
+    nsCString extraValueContenttype;
+    nsCString extraValueRemotetype;
+    nsCString extraValueFiledetails;
+    nsCString extraValueRedirects;
+  };
+
+  struct testCasesAndResults {
+    nsCString urlstring;
+    nsContentPolicyType contentType;
+    nsCString remoteType;
+    testResults expected;
+  };
+
+  AutoJSContextWithGlobal cx(mCleanGlobal);
+  // Make sure we don't look at events from other tests.
+  Unused << mTelemetry->ClearEvents();
+
+  // required for telemetry lookups
+  constexpr auto category = "security"_ns;
+  constexpr auto method = "unexpectedload"_ns;
+  constexpr auto object = "systemprincipal"_ns;
+  constexpr auto extraKeyContenttype = "contenttype"_ns;
+  constexpr auto extraKeyRemotetype = "remotetype"_ns;
+  constexpr auto extraKeyFiledetails = "filedetails"_ns;
+  constexpr auto extraKeyRedirects = "redirects"_ns;
+
+  // some cases from TestFilenameEvalParser
+  // no need to replicate all scenarios?!
+  testCasesAndResults myTestCases[] = {
+      {"chrome://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"chromeuri"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns,
+        "chrome://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {"resource://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"resourceuri"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns,
+        "resource://firegestures/content/browser.js"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {// test that we don't report blob details
+       // ..and test that we strip of URLs from remoteTypes
+       "blob://000-000"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "webIsolated=https://blob.example/"_ns,
+       {"bloburi"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "webIsolated"_ns, "unknown"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {// test for cases where finalURI is null, due to a broken nested URI
+       // .. like malformed moz-icon URLs
+       "moz-icon:blahblah"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"other"_ns, "TYPE_DOCUMENT"_ns, "web"_ns, "unknown"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {// we dont report data urls
+       // ..and test that we strip of URLs from remoteTypes
+       "data://blahblahblah"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "webCOOP+COEP=https://data.example"_ns,
+       {"dataurl"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "webCOOP+COEP"_ns, "unknown"_ns,
+        ""_ns}},
+      {// handle data URLs for webextension content scripts differently
+       // .. by noticing their annotation
+       "data:text/css;extension=style;charset=utf-8,/* some css here */"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_STYLESHEET,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"dataurl-extension-contentstyle"_ns, "TYPE_STYLESHEET"_ns, "web"_ns,
+        "unknown"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {// we only report file URLs on windows, where we can easily sanitize
+       "file://c/users/tom/file.txt"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {
+#if defined(XP_WIN)
+           "sanitizedWindowsURL"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns,
+           "file://.../file.txt"_ns, ""_ns
+
+#else
+           "other"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns, "unknown"_ns, ""_ns
+#endif
+       }},
+      {// test for one redirect
+       "moz-extension://abcdefab-1234-4321-0000-abcdefabcdef/js/assets.js"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"extension_uri"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns,
+        // the extension-id is made-up, so the extension will report failure
+        "moz-extension://[failed finding addon by host]/js/assets.js"_ns,
+        "https"_ns}},
+      {// test for cases where finalURI is empty
+       ""_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_STYLESHEET,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"other"_ns, "TYPE_STYLESHEET"_ns, "web"_ns, "unknown"_ns, ""_ns}},
+      {// test for cases where finalURI is null, due to the struct layout, we'll
+       // override the URL with nullptr in loop below.
+       "URLWillResultInNullPtr"_ns,
+       nsContentPolicyType::TYPE_SCRIPT,
+       "web"_ns,
+       {"other"_ns, "TYPE_SCRIPT"_ns, "web"_ns, "unknown"_ns, ""_ns}},
+  };
+
+  int i = 0;
+  for (auto const& currentTest : myTestCases) {
+    nsresult rv;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+
+    // special-casing for a case where the uri is null
+    if (!currentTest.urlstring.Equals("URLWillResultInNullPtr")) {
+      NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), currentTest.urlstring);
+    }
+
+    // We can't create channels for chrome: URLs unless they are in a chrome
+    // registry that maps them into the actual destination URL (usually
+    // file://). It seems that gtest don't have chrome manifest registered, so
+    // we'll use a mockChannel with a mockUri.
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mockUri;
+    rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(mockUri), "http://example.com"_ns);
+    ASSERT_EQ(rv, NS_OK) << "Could not create mockUri";
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mockChannel;
+    nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> service = do_GetIOService();
+    if (!service) {
+      ASSERT_TRUE(false)
+      << "Couldn't initialize IOService";
+    }
+    rv = service->NewChannelFromURI(
+        mockUri, nullptr, nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(),
+        nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(), 0, currentTest.contentType,
+        getter_AddRefs(mockChannel));
+    ASSERT_EQ(rv, NS_OK) << "Could not create a mock channel";
+    nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> mockLoadInfo = mockChannel->LoadInfo();
+
+    // We're adding a redirect entry for one specific test
+    if (currentTest.urlstring.EqualsASCII(
+            "moz-extension://abcdefab-1234-4321-0000-abcdefabcdef/js/"
+            "assets.js")) {
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> redirUri;
+      NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(redirUri),
+                "https://www.analytics.example/analytics.js"_ns);
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> redirPrincipal =
+          BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(redirUri, OriginAttributes());
+      nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> redirectChannel;
+      Unused << service->NewChannelFromURI(redirUri, nullptr, redirPrincipal,
+                                           nullptr, 0, currentTest.contentType,
+                                           getter_AddRefs(redirectChannel));
+
+      mockLoadInfo->AppendRedirectHistoryEntry(redirectChannel, false);
+    }
+
+    // this will record the event
+    nsContentSecurityManager::MeasureUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads(
+        mockLoadInfo, uri, currentTest.remoteType);
+
+    // let's inspect the recorded events
+
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> eventsSnapshot(cx.GetJSContext());
+    GetEventSnapshot(cx.GetJSContext(), &eventsSnapshot);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(EventPresent(cx.GetJSContext(), eventsSnapshot, category,
+                             method, object))
+    << "Test event with value and extra must be present.";
+
+    // Convert eventsSnapshot into array/object
+    JSContext* aCx = cx.GetJSContext();
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> arrayObj(aCx, &eventsSnapshot.toObject());
+
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> eventRecord(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(JS_GetElement(aCx, arrayObj, i++, &eventRecord))
+    << "Must be able to get record.";  // record is already undefined :-/
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(!eventRecord.isUndefined())
+    << "eventRecord should not be undefined";
+
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> recordArray(aCx, &eventRecord.toObject());
+    uint32_t recordLength;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(JS::GetArrayLength(aCx, recordArray, &recordLength))
+    << "Event record array must have length.";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(recordLength == 6)
+    << "Event record must have 6 elements.";
+
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> str(aCx);
+    nsAutoJSString jsStr;
+    // The fileinfo string is at index 4
+    ASSERT_TRUE(JS_GetElement(aCx, recordArray, 4, &str))
+    << "Must be able to get value.";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsStr.init(aCx, str))
+    << "Value must be able to be init'd to a jsstring.";
+
+    ASSERT_STREQ(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get(),
+                 currentTest.expected.fileinfo.get())
+        << "Reported fileinfo '" << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get()
+        << " 'equals expected value: " << currentTest.expected.fileinfo.get();
+
+    // Extra is at index 5
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> obj(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(JS_GetElement(aCx, recordArray, 5, &obj))
+    << "Must be able to get extra data";
+    JS::Rooted<JSObject*> extraObj(aCx, &obj.toObject());
+    // looking at remotetype extra for content type
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> extraValC(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        JS_GetProperty(aCx, extraObj, extraKeyContenttype.get(), &extraValC))
+    << "Must be able to get the extra key's value for contenttype";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsStr.init(aCx, extraValC))
+    << "Extra value contenttype must be able to be init'd to a jsstring.";
+    ASSERT_STREQ(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get(),
+                 currentTest.expected.extraValueContenttype.get())
+        << "Reported value for extra contenttype '"
+        << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get()
+        << "' should equals supplied value"
+        << currentTest.expected.extraValueContenttype.get();
+    // and again for remote type
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> extraValP(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        JS_GetProperty(aCx, extraObj, extraKeyRemotetype.get(), &extraValP))
+    << "Must be able to get the extra key's value for remotetype";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsStr.init(aCx, extraValP))
+    << "Extra value remotetype must be able to be init'd to a jsstring.";
+    ASSERT_STREQ(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get(),
+                 currentTest.expected.extraValueRemotetype.get())
+        << "Reported value for extra remotetype '"
+        << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get()
+        << "' should equals supplied value: "
+        << currentTest.expected.extraValueRemotetype.get();
+    // repeating the same for filedetails extra
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> extraValF(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+        JS_GetProperty(aCx, extraObj, extraKeyFiledetails.get(), &extraValF))
+    << "Must be able to get the extra key's value for filedetails";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsStr.init(aCx, extraValF))
+    << "Extra value filedetails must be able to be init'd to a jsstring.";
+    ASSERT_STREQ(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get(),
+                 currentTest.expected.extraValueFiledetails.get())
+        << "Reported value for extra filedetails '"
+        << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get() << "'should equals supplied value"
+        << currentTest.expected.extraValueFiledetails.get();
+    // checking the extraKeyRedirects match
+    JS::Rooted<JS::Value> extraValRedirects(aCx);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(JS_GetProperty(aCx, extraObj, extraKeyRedirects.get(),
+                               &extraValRedirects))
+    << "Must be able to get the extra value for redirects";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(jsStr.init(aCx, extraValRedirects))
+    << "Extra value redirects must be able to be init'd to a jsstring";
+    ASSERT_STREQ(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get(),
+                 currentTest.expected.extraValueRedirects.get())
+        << "Reported value for extra redirect '"
+        << NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(jsStr).get()
+        << "' should equals supplied value: "
+        << currentTest.expected.extraValueRedirects.get();
+  }
+
+  // Re-store JS/CSS hacks detection state
+  sJSHacksPresent = origJSHacksPresent;
+  sJSHacksChecked = origJSHacksChecked;
+  sCSSHacksPresent = origCSSHacksPresent;
+  sCSSHacksChecked = origCSSHacksChecked;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/gtest/moz.build b/dom/security/test/gtest/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9ab4dcece
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/gtest/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+    "TestCSPParser.cpp",
+    "TestFilenameEvalParser.cpp",
+    "TestSecureContext.cpp",
+    "TestSmartCrashTrimmer.cpp",
+]
+
+if CONFIG["OS_TARGET"] != "Android":
+    UNIFIED_SOURCES += [
+        "TestUnexpectedPrivilegedLoads.cpp",
+    ]
+
+FINAL_LIBRARY = "xul-gtest"
+
+LOCAL_INCLUDES += [
+    "/caps",
+    "/toolkit/components/telemetry/",
+    "/toolkit/components/telemetry/tests/gtest",
+]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e355423dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+[browser_httpsfirst.js]
+support-files =
+  file_httpsfirst_timeout_server.sjs
+[browser_httpsfirst_console_logging.js]
+[browser_upgrade_onion.js]
+[browser_mixed_content_console.js]
+support-files =
+  file_mixed_content_console.html
+[browser_downgrade_view_source.js]
+support-files = file_downgrade_view_source.sjs
+[browser_navigation.js]
+support-files = file_navigation.html
+[browser_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.js]
+support-files = file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html
+[browser_download_attribute.js]
+support-files = file_download_attribute.html
+                file_download_attribute.sjs
+
+[browser_mixed_content_download.js]
+skip-if = win10_2004 && debug # Bug 1723573
+support-files =
+  download_page.html
+  download_server.sjs
+[browser_slow_download.js]
+support-files =
+  file_slow_download.html
+  file_slow_download.sjs
+[browser_downgrade_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_console.js]
+support-files =
+  file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade.html
+  pass.png
+  test.ogv
+  test.wav
+[browser_beforeunload_permit_http.js]
+support-files = file_beforeunload_permit_http.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_beforeunload_permit_http.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_beforeunload_permit_http.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..78e19e2846
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_beforeunload_permit_http.js
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const { PromptTestUtils } = ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://testing-common/PromptTestUtils.jsm"
+);
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  // eslint-disable-next-line @microsoft/sdl/no-insecure-url
+  "http://nocert.example.com/"
+);
+/*
+ * Description of Tests:
+ *
+ * Test load page and reload:
+ * 1. Enable HTTPS-First and the pref to trigger beforeunload by user interaction
+ * 2. Open an HTTP site. HTTPS-First will try to upgrade it to https - but since it has no cert that try will fail
+ * 3. Then simulated user interaction and reload the page with a reload flag.
+ * 4. That should lead to a beforeUnload prompt that asks for users permission to perform reload. HTTPS-First should not try to upgrade the reload again
+ *
+ * Test Navigation:
+ * 1. Enable HTTPS-First and the pref to trigger beforeunload by user interaction
+ * 2. Open an http site. HTTPS-First will try to upgrade it to https - but since it has no cert for https that try will fail
+ * 3. Then simulated user interaction and navigate to another http page. Again HTTPS-First will try to upgrade to HTTPS
+ * 4. This attempted navigation leads to a prompt which askes for permission to leave page - accept it
+ * 5. Since the site is not using a valid HTTPS cert HTTPS-First will downgrade the request back to HTTP
+ * 6. User should NOT get asked again for permission to unload
+ *
+ * Test Session History Navigation:
+ * 1. Enable HTTPS-First and the pref to trigger beforeunload by user interaction
+ * 2. Open an http site. HTTPS-First will try to upgrade it to https - but since it has no cert for https that try will fail
+ * 3. Then navigate to another http page and simulated a user interaction.
+ * 4. Trigger a session history navigation by clicking the "back button".
+ * 5. This attempted navigation leads to a prompt which askes for permission to leave page - accept it
+ */
+add_setup(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      ["dom.require_user_interaction_for_beforeunload", true],
+    ],
+  });
+});
+const TESTS = [
+  {
+    name: "Normal Reload (No flag)",
+    reloadFlag: Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_NONE,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Bypass Cache Reload",
+    reloadFlag: Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_BYPASS_CACHE,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Bypass Proxy Reload",
+    reloadFlag: Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_BYPASS_PROXY,
+  },
+  {
+    name: "Bypass Cache and Proxy Reload",
+    reloadFlag:
+      Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_BYPASS_CACHE |
+      Ci.nsIWebNavigation.LOAD_FLAGS_BYPASS_PROXY,
+  },
+];
+
+add_task(async function testReloadFlags() {
+  for (let index = 0; index < TESTS.length; index++) {
+    const testCase = TESTS[index];
+    // The onbeforeunload dialog should appear
+    let dialogPromise = PromptTestUtils.waitForPrompt(null, {
+      modalType: Services.prompt.MODAL_TYPE_CONTENT,
+      promptType: "confirmEx",
+    });
+    let reloadPromise = loadPageAndReload(testCase);
+    let dialog = await dialogPromise;
+    Assert.ok(true, "Showed the beforeunload dialog.");
+    await PromptTestUtils.handlePrompt(dialog, { buttonNumClick: 0 });
+    await reloadPromise;
+  }
+});
+
+add_task(async function testNavigation() {
+  // The onbeforeunload dialog should appear
+  let dialogPromise = PromptTestUtils.waitForPrompt(null, {
+    modalType: Services.prompt.MODAL_TYPE_CONTENT,
+    promptType: "confirmEx",
+  });
+
+  let openPagePromise = openPage();
+  let dialog = await dialogPromise;
+  Assert.ok(true, "Showed the beforeunload dialog.");
+  await PromptTestUtils.handlePrompt(dialog, { buttonNumClick: 0 });
+  await openPagePromise;
+});
+
+add_task(async function testSessionHistoryNavigation() {
+  // The onbeforeunload dialog should appear
+  let dialogPromise = PromptTestUtils.waitForPrompt(null, {
+    modalType: Services.prompt.MODAL_TYPE_CONTENT,
+    promptType: "confirmEx",
+  });
+
+  let openPagePromise = loadPagesAndUseBackButton();
+  let dialog = await dialogPromise;
+  Assert.ok(true, "Showed the beforeunload dialog.");
+  await PromptTestUtils.handlePrompt(dialog, { buttonNumClick: 0 });
+  await openPagePromise;
+});
+
+async function openPage() {
+  // Open about:blank in a new tab
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
+    async function(browser) {
+      // Load http page
+      BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+        browser,
+        `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_beforeunload_permit_http.html`
+      );
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      // Interact with page such that unload permit will be necessary
+      await BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouse("body", 2, 2, {}, browser);
+      let hasInteractedWith = await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+        browser,
+        [""],
+        function() {
+          return content.document.userHasInteracted;
+        }
+      );
+
+      is(true, hasInteractedWith, "Simulated successfully user interaction");
+      // And then navigate away to another site which proves that user won't be asked twice to permit a reload (otherwise the test get timed out)
+      // eslint-disable-next-line @microsoft/sdl/no-insecure-url
+      BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, "http://self-signed.example.com/");
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      Assert.ok(true, "Navigated successfully.");
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+async function loadPageAndReload(testCase) {
+  // Load initial site
+  // Open about:blank in a new tab
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
+    async function(browser) {
+      BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+        browser,
+        `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_beforeunload_permit_http.html`
+      );
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      // Interact with page such that unload permit will be necessary
+      await BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouse("body", 2, 2, {}, browser);
+
+      let hasInteractedWith = await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+        browser,
+        [""],
+        function() {
+          return content.document.userHasInteracted;
+        }
+      );
+      is(true, hasInteractedWith, "Simulated successfully user interaction");
+      BrowserReloadWithFlags(testCase.reloadFlag);
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      is(true, true, `reload with flag ${testCase.name} was successful`);
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+async function loadPagesAndUseBackButton() {
+  // Load initial site
+  // Open about:blank in a new tab
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
+    async function(browser) {
+      BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+        browser,
+        `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_beforeunload_permit_http.html`
+      );
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+
+      BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+        browser,
+        `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_beforeunload_permit_http.html?getASessionHistoryEntry`
+      );
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      // Interact with page such that unload permit will be necessary
+      await BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouse("body", 2, 2, {}, browser);
+
+      let hasInteractedWith = await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+        browser,
+        [""],
+        function() {
+          return content.document.userHasInteracted;
+        }
+      );
+      is(true, hasInteractedWith, "Simulated successfully user interaction");
+      // Go back one site by clicking the back button
+      info("Clicking back button");
+      let backButton = document.getElementById("back-button");
+      backButton.click();
+      await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+      is(true, true, `Got back successful`);
+    }
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_console.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_console.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3d41807bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_console.js
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+// Bug 1673574 - Improve Console logging for mixed content auto upgrading
+"use strict";
+
+const testPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://httpsfirst.com"
+);
+
+let tests = [
+  {
+    description: "Top-Level upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: ["Upgrading insecure request", "to use", "httpsfirst.com"],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Top-Level upgrade failure should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure request",
+      "failed",
+      "httpsfirst.com",
+      "Downgrading to",
+    ],
+  },
+];
+
+const kTestURI = testPath + "file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade.html";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable ML2 and HTTPS-First Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content", true],
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_message);
+  // 1. Upgrade page to https://
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, kTestURI);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => tests.length === 0);
+
+  // Clean up
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_message);
+});
+
+function on_new_message(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  const logLevel = msgObj.logLevel;
+
+  // The console message is:
+  // Should only show HTTPS-First messages
+
+  if (message.includes("Mixed Content:")) {
+    ok(
+      !message.includes("Upgrading insecure display request"),
+      "msg included a mixed content upgrade"
+    );
+  }
+  if (message.includes("HTTPS-First Mode:")) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < tests.length; i++) {
+      const testCase = tests[i];
+      // Check if log-level matches
+      if (logLevel !== testCase.expectLogLevel) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if all substrings are included
+      if (testCase.expectIncludes.some(str => !message.includes(str))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ok(true, testCase.description);
+      tests.splice(i, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_view_source.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_view_source.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dee3d8db31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_downgrade_view_source.js
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// This test ensures that view-source:https falls back to view-source:http
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTPS = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+async function runTest(desc, url, expectedURI, excpectedContent) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, null, true);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, url);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+      browser,
+      [desc, expectedURI, excpectedContent],
+      async function(desc, expectedURI, excpectedContent) {
+        let loadedURI = content.document.documentURI;
+        is(loadedURI, expectedURI, desc);
+        let loadedContent = content.document.body.textContent;
+        is(loadedContent, excpectedContent, desc);
+      }
+    );
+  });
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+
+  await runTest(
+    "URL with query 'downgrade' should be http:",
+    `view-source:${TEST_PATH_HTTP}/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs?downgrade`,
+    `view-source:${TEST_PATH_HTTP}/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs?downgrade`,
+    "view-source:http://"
+  );
+
+  await runTest(
+    "URL with query 'upgrade' should be https:",
+    `view-source:${TEST_PATH_HTTP}/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs?upgrade`,
+    `view-source:${TEST_PATH_HTTPS}/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs?upgrade`,
+    "view-source:https://"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_download_attribute.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_download_attribute.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..21682f7a60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_download_attribute.js
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+"use strict";
+
+// Create a uri for an http site
+//(in that case a site without cert such that https-first isn't upgrading it)
+const insecureTestPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://nocert.example.com"
+);
+const insecureTestURI = insecureTestPath + "file_download_attribute.html";
+
+function promisePanelOpened() {
+  if (DownloadsPanel.panel && DownloadsPanel.panel.state == "open") {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(DownloadsPanel.panel, "popupshown");
+}
+
+const CONSOLE_UPGRADE_TRY_MESSAGE = "Upgrading insecure request";
+const CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE = "Downgrading to “http� again";
+const DOWNLOAD_PAGE_URL =
+  "nocert.example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.html";
+const DOWNLOAD_LINK_URL =
+  "nocert.example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.sjs";
+
+// Verifys that https-first tried to upgrade the download
+// - and that the upgrade attempt failed.
+// We will receive 4 messages. Two for upgrading and downgrading
+// the download page and another two for upgrading and downgrading
+// the download.
+let msgCounter = 0;
+function shouldConsoleTryUpgradeAndError() {
+  // Waits until CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE was logged.
+  // Checks if download was tried via http://
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    function listener(msgObj) {
+      let text = msgObj.message;
+      // Verify upgrade messages
+      if (
+        text.includes(CONSOLE_UPGRADE_TRY_MESSAGE) &&
+        text.includes("http://")
+      ) {
+        if (msgCounter == 0) {
+          ok(
+            text.includes(DOWNLOAD_PAGE_URL),
+            "Tries to upgrade nocert example to https"
+          );
+        } else {
+          ok(
+            text.includes(DOWNLOAD_LINK_URL),
+            "Tries to upgrade download to https"
+          );
+        }
+        msgCounter++;
+      }
+      // Verify downgrade messages
+      if (text.includes(CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE) && msgCounter > 0) {
+        if (msgCounter == 1) {
+          ok(
+            text.includes("https://" + DOWNLOAD_PAGE_URL),
+            "Downgrades nocert example to http"
+          );
+          msgCounter++;
+        } else {
+          ok(
+            text.includes("https://" + DOWNLOAD_LINK_URL),
+            "Downgrades download to http"
+          );
+          Services.console.unregisterListener(listener);
+          resolve();
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    Services.console.registerListener(listener);
+  });
+}
+
+// Test https-first download of an html file from an http site.
+// Test description:
+// 1. https-first tries to upgrade site to https
+// 2. upgrade fails because site has no certificate
+// 3. https-first downgrades to http and starts download via http
+// 4. Successfully completes download
+add_task(async function test_with_downloads_pref_enabled() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      // ensure that download panel gets opened - Bug 1746434
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+    ],
+  });
+  let checkPromise = shouldConsoleTryUpgradeAndError();
+  let downloadsPanelPromise = promisePanelOpened();
+  let downloadsPromise = Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, insecureTestURI);
+  // wait for downloadsPanel to open before continuing with test
+  await downloadsPanelPromise;
+  let downloadList = await downloadsPromise;
+  await checkPromise;
+  is(DownloadsPanel.isPanelShowing, true, "DownloadsPanel should be open.");
+  is(
+    downloadList._downloads.length,
+    1,
+    "File should be successfully downloaded."
+  );
+
+  let [download] = downloadList._downloads;
+  is(download.contentType, "text/html", "File contentType should be correct.");
+  // ensure https-first didn't upgrade the scheme.
+  is(
+    download.source.url,
+    insecureTestPath + "file_download_attribute.sjs",
+    "Scheme should be http."
+  );
+
+  info("cleaning up downloads");
+  try {
+    if (Services.appinfo.OS === "WINNT") {
+      // We need to make the file writable to delete it on Windows.
+      await IOUtils.setPermissions(download.target.path, 0o600);
+    }
+    await IOUtils.remove(download.target.path);
+  } catch (error) {
+    info("The file " + download.target.path + " is not removed, " + error);
+  }
+
+  await downloadList.remove(download);
+  await download.finalize();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7f484f87de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst.js
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+const TIMEOUT_PAGE_URI_HTTP =
+  TEST_PATH_HTTP + "file_httpsfirst_timeout_server.sjs";
+
+async function runPrefTest(aURI, aDesc, aAssertURLStartsWith) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    const loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, null, true);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, aURI);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await ContentTask.spawn(browser, { aDesc, aAssertURLStartsWith }, function({
+      aDesc,
+      aAssertURLStartsWith,
+    }) {
+      ok(
+        content.document.location.href.startsWith(aAssertURLStartsWith),
+        aDesc
+      );
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", false]],
+  });
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    "http://example.com",
+    "HTTPS-First disabled; Should not upgrade",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    "http://example.com",
+    "Should upgrade upgradeable website",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    "http://httpsfirst.com",
+    "Should downgrade after error.",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    "http://domain.does.not.exist",
+    "Should not downgrade on dnsNotFound error.",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    TIMEOUT_PAGE_URI_HTTP,
+    "Should downgrade after timeout.",
+    "http://"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_console_logging.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_console_logging.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d0ae7439d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_console_logging.js
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// Bug 1658924 - HTTPS-First Mode - Tests for console logging
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1658924
+// This test makes sure that the various console messages from the HTTPS-First
+// mode get logged to the console.
+"use strict";
+
+// Test Cases
+// description:    Description of what the subtests expects.
+// expectLogLevel: Expected log-level of a message.
+// expectIncludes: Expected substrings the message should contain.
+let tests = [
+  {
+    description: "Top-Level upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: ["Upgrading insecure request", "to use", "httpsfirst.com"],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Top-Level upgrade failure should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure request",
+      "failed",
+      "httpsfirst.com",
+      "Downgrading to",
+    ],
+  },
+];
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable HTTPS-First Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_message);
+  // 1. Upgrade page to https://
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    "http://httpsfirst.com"
+  );
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => tests.length === 0);
+
+  // Clean up
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_message);
+});
+
+function on_new_message(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  const logLevel = msgObj.logLevel;
+
+  if (message.includes("HTTPS-First Mode:")) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < tests.length; i++) {
+      const testCase = tests[i];
+      // Check if log-level matches
+      if (logLevel !== testCase.expectLogLevel) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if all substrings are included
+      if (testCase.expectIncludes.some(str => !message.includes(str))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ok(true, testCase.description);
+      tests.splice(i, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0d5f6c7e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.js
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+let console_messages = [
+  {
+    description: "Speculative Connection should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure speculative TCP connection",
+      "to use",
+      "example.com",
+      "file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure request",
+      "to use",
+      "example.com",
+      "file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html",
+    ],
+  },
+];
+
+function on_new_console_messages(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  const logLevel = msgObj.logLevel;
+
+  if (message.includes("HTTPS-First Mode:")) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < console_messages.length; i++) {
+      const testCase = console_messages[i];
+      // Check if log-level matches
+      if (logLevel !== testCase.expectLogLevel) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if all substrings are included
+      if (testCase.expectIncludes.some(str => !message.includes(str))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ok(true, testCase.description);
+      console_messages.splice(i, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_console_messages);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html`
+  );
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => console_messages.length === 0);
+
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_console_messages);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_console.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_console.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6663525e43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_console.js
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+// Bug 1713593: HTTPS-First: Add test for mixed content blocker.
+"use strict";
+
+const testPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+const UPGRADE_DISPLAY_CONTENT =
+  "security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content";
+
+let threeMessagesArrived = 0;
+let messageImageSeen = false;
+
+const kTestURI = testPath + "file_mixed_content_console.html";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable HTTPS-First Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_console_message);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, kTestURI);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => threeMessagesArrived === 3);
+
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_console_message);
+});
+
+function on_console_message(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+
+  // The first console message is:
+  // "HTTPS-First Mode: Upgrading insecure request
+  // ‘http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_console.html’ to use ‘https’"
+  if (message.includes("HTTPS-First Mode: Upgrading insecure request")) {
+    ok(message.includes("Upgrading insecure request"), "request got upgraded");
+    ok(
+      message.includes(
+        "“http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_console.html� to use “https�."
+      ),
+      "correct top-level request"
+    );
+    threeMessagesArrived++;
+  }
+  // If security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content is enabled:
+  // The second console message is about upgrading the insecure image
+  else if (
+    Services.prefs.getBoolPref(UPGRADE_DISPLAY_CONTENT) &&
+    message.includes("Mixed Content: Upgrading")
+  ) {
+    ok(
+      message.includes("insecure display request"),
+      "display content got load"
+    );
+    ok(
+      message.includes(
+        "‘http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/auto_upgrading_identity.png’ to use ‘https’"
+      ),
+      "img loaded secure"
+    );
+    threeMessagesArrived++;
+    messageImageSeen = true;
+  }
+  // Else:
+  //  The second console message is about blocking the image:
+  // Message: "Loading mixed (insecure) display content
+  // “http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/auto_upgrading_identity.png� on a secure page".
+  // Since the message is send twice, prevent reading the image message two times
+  else if (message.includes("Loading mixed") && !messageImageSeen) {
+    ok(
+      message.includes("Loading mixed (insecure) display content"),
+      "display content got load"
+    );
+    ok(
+      message.includes(
+        "“http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/auto_upgrading_identity.png� on a secure page"
+      ),
+      "img loaded insecure"
+    );
+    threeMessagesArrived++;
+    messageImageSeen = true;
+  }
+  // The third message is:
+  // "Blocked loading mixed active content
+  // "http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/barfoo""
+  else if (message.includes("Blocked loading")) {
+    ok(
+      message.includes("Blocked loading mixed active content"),
+      "script got blocked"
+    );
+    ok(
+      message.includes(
+        "http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/barfoo"
+      ),
+      "the right script got blocked"
+    );
+    threeMessagesArrived++;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_download.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..622c085ca8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_mixed_content_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+ChromeUtils.defineESModuleGetters(this, {
+  Downloads: "resource://gre/modules/Downloads.sys.mjs",
+  DownloadsCommon: "resource:///modules/DownloadsCommon.sys.mjs",
+});
+
+const HandlerService = Cc[
+  "@mozilla.org/uriloader/handler-service;1"
+].getService(Ci.nsIHandlerService);
+
+const MIMEService = Cc["@mozilla.org/mime;1"].getService(Ci.nsIMIMEService);
+
+let SECURE_BASE_URL =
+  getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+    "chrome://mochitests/content/",
+    "https://example.com/"
+  ) + "download_page.html";
+
+/**
+ * Waits until a download is triggered.
+ * It waits until a prompt is shown,
+ * saves and then accepts the dialog.
+ * @returns {Promise} Resolved once done.
+ */
+
+function shouldTriggerDownload() {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    Services.wm.addListener({
+      onOpenWindow(xulWin) {
+        Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+        let win = xulWin.docShell.domWindow;
+        waitForFocus(() => {
+          if (
+            win.location ==
+            "chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xhtml"
+          ) {
+            let dialog = win.document.getElementById("unknownContentType");
+            let button = dialog.getButton("accept");
+            let actionRadio = win.document.getElementById("save");
+            actionRadio.click();
+            button.disabled = false;
+            dialog.acceptDialog();
+            resolve();
+          } else {
+            reject();
+          }
+        }, win);
+      },
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+const CONSOLE_UPGRADE_MESSAGE = "Upgrading insecure request";
+const CONSOLE_DOWNGRADE_MESSAGE = "Downgrading to “http� again.";
+const DOWNLOAD_URL =
+  "example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/download_server.sjs";
+// Verifies that https-first tries to upgrade download,
+// falls back since download is not available via https
+let msgCounter = 0;
+function shouldConsoleError() {
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    function listener(msgObj) {
+      let text = msgObj.message;
+      if (text.includes(CONSOLE_UPGRADE_MESSAGE) && msgCounter == 0) {
+        ok(
+          text.includes("http://" + DOWNLOAD_URL),
+          "Https-first tries to upgrade download to https"
+        );
+        msgCounter++;
+      }
+      if (text.includes(CONSOLE_DOWNGRADE_MESSAGE) && msgCounter == 1) {
+        ok(
+          text.includes("https://" + DOWNLOAD_URL),
+          "Https-first downgrades download to http."
+        );
+        resolve();
+        Services.console.unregisterListener(listener);
+      }
+    }
+    Services.console.registerListener(listener);
+  });
+}
+
+async function resetDownloads() {
+  // Removes all downloads from the download List
+  const types = new Set();
+  let publicList = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  let downloads = await publicList.getAll();
+  for (let download of downloads) {
+    if (download.contentType) {
+      types.add(download.contentType);
+    }
+    publicList.remove(download);
+    await download.finalize(true);
+  }
+
+  if (types.size) {
+    // reset handlers for the contentTypes of any files previously downloaded
+    for (let type of types) {
+      const mimeInfo = MIMEService.getFromTypeAndExtension(type, "");
+      info("resetting handler for type: " + type);
+      HandlerService.remove(mimeInfo);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+async function runTest(url, link, checkFunction, description) {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", true],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", false],
+    ],
+  });
+  requestLongerTimeout(2);
+  await resetDownloads();
+
+  let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, url);
+  gBrowser.selectedTab = tab;
+
+  let browser = gBrowser.getBrowserForTab(tab);
+  await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+  is(
+    gBrowser.currentURI.schemeIs("https"),
+    true,
+    "Scheme of opened tab should be https"
+  );
+  info("Checking: " + description);
+
+  let checkPromise = checkFunction();
+  // Click the Link to trigger the download
+  SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [link], contentLink => {
+    content.document.getElementById(contentLink).click();
+  });
+  await checkPromise;
+  ok(true, description);
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+}
+
+//Test description:
+// 1. Open "https://example.com"
+// 2. From "https://example.com" download something, but that download is only available via http.
+// 3. Https-first tries to upgrade the download.
+// 4. Upgrading fails - so http-first downgrade download to http.
+
+add_task(async function test_mixed_download() {
+  await runTest(
+    SECURE_BASE_URL,
+    "insecure",
+    () => Promise.all([shouldTriggerDownload(), shouldConsoleError()]),
+    "Secure -> Insecure should Error"
+  );
+  // remove downloaded file
+  let downloadsPromise = Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  let downloadList = await downloadsPromise;
+  let [download] = downloadList._downloads;
+  await downloadList.remove(download);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_navigation.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_navigation.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f2c3b9128
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_navigation.js
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://httpsfirst.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/";
+
+async function promiseGetHistoryIndex(browser) {
+  if (!SpecialPowers.Services.appinfo.sessionHistoryInParent) {
+    return SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], function() {
+      let shistory =
+        docShell.browsingContext.childSessionHistory.legacySHistory;
+      return shistory.index;
+    });
+  }
+
+  let shistory = browser.browsingContext.sessionHistory;
+  return shistory.index;
+}
+
+async function testNavigations() {
+  // Load initial site
+
+  let url1 = REQUEST_URL + "file_navigation.html?foo1";
+  let url2 = REQUEST_URL + "file_navigation.html?foo2";
+  let url3 = REQUEST_URL + "file_navigation.html?foo3";
+
+  let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, url1);
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Load another site
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    [url2],
+    async url => (content.location.href = url)
+  );
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Load another site
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    [url3],
+    async url => (content.location.href = url)
+  );
+  await loaded;
+  is(
+    await promiseGetHistoryIndex(gBrowser.selectedBrowser),
+    2,
+    "correct session history index after load 3"
+  );
+
+  // Go back one site by clicking the back button
+  info("Clicking back button");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForLocationChange(gBrowser, url2);
+  let backButton = document.getElementById("back-button");
+  backButton.click();
+  await loaded;
+  is(
+    await promiseGetHistoryIndex(gBrowser.selectedBrowser),
+    1,
+    "correct session history index after going back for the first time"
+  );
+
+  // Go back again
+  info("Clicking back button again");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForLocationChange(gBrowser, url1);
+  backButton.click();
+  await loaded;
+  is(
+    await promiseGetHistoryIndex(gBrowser.selectedBrowser),
+    0,
+    "correct session history index after going back for the second time"
+  );
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_first", true]],
+  });
+
+  await testNavigations();
+
+  // If fission is enabled we also want to test the navigations with the bfcache
+  // in the parent.
+  if (SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("fission.autostart")) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]],
+    });
+
+    await testNavigations();
+  }
+
+  finish();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_slow_download.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_slow_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8766e12f34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_slow_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+"use strict";
+
+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyModuleGetters(this, {
+  BrowserWindowTracker: "resource:///modules/BrowserWindowTracker.jsm",
+});
+// Create a uri for an https site
+const testPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+const TEST_URI = testPath + "file_slow_download.html";
+const EXPECTED_DOWNLOAD_URL =
+  "example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.sjs";
+
+// Since the server send the complete download file after 3 seconds we need an longer timeout
+requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+function promisePanelOpened() {
+  if (DownloadsPanel.panel && DownloadsPanel.panel.state == "open") {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(DownloadsPanel.panel, "popupshown");
+}
+
+/**
+ * Waits for a download to finish, in case it has not finished already.
+ *
+ * @param aDownload
+ *        The Download object to wait upon.
+ *
+ * @return {Promise}
+ * @resolves When the download has finished successfully.
+ * @rejects JavaScript exception if the download failed.
+ */
+function promiseDownloadStopped(aDownload) {
+  if (!aDownload.stopped) {
+    // The download is in progress, wait for the current attempt to finish and
+    // report any errors that may occur.
+    return aDownload.start();
+  }
+
+  if (aDownload.succeeded) {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+
+  // The download failed or was canceled.
+  return Promise.reject(aDownload.error || new Error("Download canceled."));
+}
+
+// Verifys that no background request was send
+let requestCounter = 0;
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+
+examiner.prototype = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic !== "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      return;
+    }
+    // On Android we have other requests appear here as well. Let's make
+    // sure we only evaluate requests triggered by the test.
+    if (
+      !data.startsWith("http://example.com") &&
+      !data.startsWith("https://example.com")
+    ) {
+      return;
+    }
+    ++requestCounter;
+    if (requestCounter == 1) {
+      is(data, TEST_URI, "Download start page is https");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 2) {
+      // The specialpowers-http-notify-request fires before the internal redirect( /upgrade) to
+      // https happens.
+      is(
+        data,
+        "http://" + EXPECTED_DOWNLOAD_URL,
+        "First download request is http (internal)"
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 3) {
+      is(
+        data,
+        "https://" + EXPECTED_DOWNLOAD_URL,
+        "Download got upgraded to https"
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    ok(false, "we should never get here, but just in case");
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  },
+};
+
+// Test description:
+// 1. Open https://example.com
+// 2. Start download - location of download is http
+// 3. https-first upgrades to https
+// 4. Server send first part of download and after 3 seconds the rest
+// 5. Complete download of text file
+add_task(async function test_slow_download() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      // ensure that download panel gets opened
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  // remove all previous downloads
+  let downloadsList = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  await downloadsList.removeFinished();
+
+  // add observer to ensure that the background request gets canceled for the upgraded Download
+  this.examiner = new examiner();
+
+  let downloadsPanelPromise = promisePanelOpened();
+  let downloadsPromise = Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, TEST_URI);
+  // wait for downloadsPanel to open before continuing with test
+  await downloadsPanelPromise;
+  let downloadList = await downloadsPromise;
+  is(DownloadsPanel.isPanelShowing, true, "DownloadsPanel should be open.");
+  is(downloadList._downloads.length, 1, "File should be downloaded.");
+  let [download] = downloadList._downloads;
+  // wait for download to finish (with success or error)
+  await promiseDownloadStopped(download);
+  is(download.contentType, "text/plain", "File contentType should be correct.");
+  // ensure https-first did upgrade the scheme.
+  is(
+    download.source.url,
+    "https://" + EXPECTED_DOWNLOAD_URL,
+    "Scheme should be https."
+  );
+  // ensure that no background request was send
+  is(
+    requestCounter,
+    3,
+    "three requests total (download page, download http, download https/ upgraded)"
+  );
+  // ensure that downloaded is complete
+  is(download.target.size, 25, "Download size is correct");
+  //clean up
+  this.examiner.remove();
+  info("cleaning up downloads");
+  try {
+    if (Services.appinfo.OS === "WINNT") {
+      // We need to make the file writable to delete it on Windows.
+      await IOUtils.setPermissions(download.target.path, 0o600);
+    }
+    await IOUtils.remove(download.target.path);
+  } catch (error) {
+    info("The file " + download.target.path + " is not removed, " + error);
+  }
+
+  await downloadList.remove(download);
+  await download.finalize();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_upgrade_onion.js b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_upgrade_onion.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c8ab29bd1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/browser_upgrade_onion.js
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+// This test ensures that various configurable upgrade exceptions work
+"use strict";
+
+async function runTest(desc, url, expectedURI) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, null, true);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, url);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [desc, expectedURI], async function(
+      desc,
+      expectedURI
+    ) {
+      // XXX ckerschb: generally we use the documentURI, but our test infra
+      // can not handle .onion, hence we use the URI of the failed channel
+      // stored on the docshell to see if the scheme was upgraded to https.
+      let loadedURI = content.document.documentURI;
+      if (loadedURI.startsWith("about:neterror")) {
+        loadedURI = content.docShell.failedChannel.URI.spec;
+      }
+      is(loadedURI, expectedURI, desc);
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+// by default local addresses and .onion should *not* get upgraded
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode", false],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_local", false],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion", false],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  await runTest(
+    "Hosts ending with .onion should be be exempt from HTTPS-First upgrades by default",
+    "http://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion/",
+    "http://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion/"
+  );
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode", false],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_local", false],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion", true],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  await runTest(
+    "Hosts ending with .onion should get upgraded when 'dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion' is set to true",
+    "http://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion/",
+    "https://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion/"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/download_page.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/download_page.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a828ee07db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/download_page.html
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Test mixed content download by https-first</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    hi
+
+    <script>
+      const host = window.location.host;
+      const path = location.pathname.replace("download_page.html","download_server.sjs");
+
+      const insecureLink = document.createElement("a");
+      insecureLink.href=`http://${host}${path}`;
+      insecureLink.download="true";
+      insecureLink.id="insecure";
+      insecureLink.textContent="Not secure Link";
+
+      document.body.append(insecureLink);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/download_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/download_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7af5722e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/download_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // Only answer to http, in case request is in https let the reply time out.
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  // Send some file, e.g. an image
+  response.setHeader(
+    "Content-Disposition",
+    "attachment; filename=some-file.png"
+  );
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+  response.write("Success!");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_bad_cert.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_bad_cert.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a8ae08a86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_bad_cert.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, downgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'downgraded', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'Error', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  // if the received request is not http send an error
+  if (request.scheme === "http") {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here; just in case, return something unexpected
+  response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_beforeunload_permit_http.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_beforeunload_permit_http.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50459d6006
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_beforeunload_permit_http.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html><html>
+<body>
+    <script>
+    window.onbeforeunload = function() {
+      return "stop";
+    }
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb64c59e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const REDIRECT_URI =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?verify";
+const DOWNGRADE_URI =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_with_different_path.sjs";
+const RESPONSE_ERROR = "unexpected-query";
+
+// An onload postmessage to window opener
+const RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-https'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-http'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  if (query == "downgrade") {
+    // send same-origin downgrade from https: to http: with a different path.
+    // we don't consider it's an endless upgrade downgrade loop in this case.
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", DOWNGRADE_URI, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // handle the redirect case
+  if ((query >= 301 && query <= 303) || query == 307) {
+    // send same-origin downgrade from https: to http: again simluating
+    // and endless upgrade downgrade loop.
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, query, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_URI, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if scheme is http:// or https://
+  if (query == "verify") {
+    let response_content =
+      request.scheme === "https" ? RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME : RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME;
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.write(response_content);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should never get here, but just in case ...
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 500, "OK");
+  response.write("unexepcted query");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_data_uri.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_data_uri.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..69133e5079
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_data_uri.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1709069: Test that Data URI which makes a top-level request gets updated in https-first</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  window.onload = (event) => {
+    let myLoc = window.location.href;
+    window.opener.parent.postMessage({location: myLoc}, "*");
+    window.close();
+};
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_500_responses.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_500_responses.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3cfbd79dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_500_responses.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1709552
+"use strict";
+
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, downgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'downgraded', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'Error', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  // if the scheme is not https and it is the initial request
+  // then we rather fall through and display unexpected content
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    if (query === "test1a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 501, "Not Implemented");
+      response.write("Not Implemented\n");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test2a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 504, "Gateway Timeout");
+      response.write("Gateway Timeout\n");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test3a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 521, "Web Server Is Down");
+      response.write("Web Server Is Down\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query === "test4a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 530, "Railgun Error");
+      response.write("Railgun Error\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query === "test5a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 560, "Unauthorized");
+      response.write("Unauthorized\n");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // We should never arrive here, just in case send something unexpected
+    response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should arrive here when the redirection was downraded successful
+  response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_bad_responses.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_bad_responses.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a6eea2dd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_bad_responses.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1709552
+"use strict";
+
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, downgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'downgraded', scheme: 'http'}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'Error', scheme: 'http'}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  // if the scheme is not https and it is the initial request
+  // then we rather fall through and display unexpected content
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    if (query === "test1a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 400, "Bad Request");
+      response.write("Bad Request\n");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test2a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 403, "Forbidden");
+      response.write("Forbidden\n");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test3a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 404, "Not Found");
+      response.write("Not Found\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query === "test4a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 416, "Requested Range Not Satisfiable");
+      response.write("Requested Range Not Satisfiable\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query === "test5a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 418, "I'm a teapot");
+      response.write("I'm a teapot\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query == "test6a") {
+      // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+      response.processAsync();
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // We should never arrive here, just in case send something unexpected
+    response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should arrive here when the redirection was downraded successful
+  response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6004d57eaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1706126
+"use strict";
+// subdomain of example.com
+const REDIRECT_302 =
+  "http://www.redirect-example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs";
+
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, upgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  // if the scheme is https and it is the initial request time it out
+  if (request.scheme === "https" && request.host === "redirect-example.com") {
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.scheme === "http" && request.host === "redirect-example.com") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_302, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  // if the request was sent to subdomain
+  if (request.host.startsWith("www.")) {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+    return;
+  }
+  // We should never arrive here, just in case send 'error'
+  response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..44fe4d99d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_view_source.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  let scheme = request.scheme;
+
+  if (scheme === "https") {
+    if (query === "downgrade") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 400, "Bad Request");
+      response.write("Bad Request\n");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (query === "upgrade") {
+      response.write("view-source:https://");
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (scheme === "http" && query === "downgrade") {
+    response.write("view-source:http://");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should arrive here when the redirection was downraded successful
+  response.write("unexpected");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_with_different_path.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_with_different_path.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7450313d98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_with_different_path.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+"use strict";
+
+// An onload postmessage to window opener
+const RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-https'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-http'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  let response_content =
+    request.scheme === "https" ? RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME : RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME;
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+  response.write(response_content);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..453bf408b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test download attribute for http site</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a href="http://nocert.example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.sjs" download="some.html" id="testlink">download by attribute</a>
+  <script>
+    // click the link to start download
+    let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+    testlink.click();
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8941da1a41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_download_attribute.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // Only answer to http, in case request is in https let the reply time out.
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", "attachment; filename=some.html");
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html");
+  response.write("success!");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_form_submission.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_form_submission.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63b248d773
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_form_submission.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+const CC = Components.Constructor;
+const BinaryInputStream = CC(
+  "@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1",
+  "nsIBinaryInputStream",
+  "setInputStream"
+);
+
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, downgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      const loc = document.location.href;
+      window.opener.postMessage({location: loc, scheme: scheme, form:"test=success" }, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const POST_FORMULAR = `
+<html>
+    <body>
+        <form action="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_form_submission.sjs?" method="POST" id="POSTForm">
+            <div>
+             <label id="submit">Submit</label>
+             <input name="test" id="form" value="success">
+            </div>
+        </form>
+        <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+            document.getElementById("POSTForm").submit();
+        </script>
+    </body>
+</html>
+`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let queryString = request.queryString;
+  if (request.scheme === "https" && queryString === "test=1") {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (
+    request.scheme === "https" &&
+    (queryString === "test=2" || queryString === "test=4")
+  ) {
+    // time out request
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.scheme === "http" && queryString === "test=2") {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (queryString === "test=3" || queryString === "test=4") {
+    // send post form
+    response.write(POST_FORMULAR);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.method == "POST") {
+    // extract form parameters
+    let body = new BinaryInputStream(request.bodyInputStream);
+    let avail;
+    let bytes = [];
+    while ((avail = body.available()) > 0) {
+      Array.prototype.push.apply(bytes, body.readByteArray(avail));
+    }
+    let requestBodyContents = String.fromCharCode.apply(null, bytes);
+
+    response.write(`
+    <html>
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      const loc = document.location.href;
+      window.opener.postMessage({location: loc, scheme: scheme, form: '${requestBodyContents}'}, '*');
+    </script>
+  </html>`);
+
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here; just in case, return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4d042ebc15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<script>
+
+function beforeunload(){
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "before-unload",
+    result: window.location.hash,
+    button: false,
+  }, "*");
+}
+
+window.onload = function (){
+  let button = window.document.getElementById("clickMeButton");
+  let buttonExist = button !== null;
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "onload",
+    result: window.location.href,
+    button: buttonExist,
+  }, "*");
+  button.click();
+
+}
+
+// after button clicked and paged scrolled sends URL of current window
+window.onscroll = function(){
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "scrolled-to-foo",
+    result: window.location.hash,
+    button: true,
+  }, "*");
+ }
+
+
+</script>
+<body onbeforeunload="/*just to notify if we load a new page*/ beforeunload()";>
+  <a id="clickMeButton" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html#foo">Click me</a>
+  <div style="height: 1000px; border: 1px solid black;"> space</div>
+  <a name="foo" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html">foo</a>
+  <div style="height: 1000px; border: 1px solid black;">space</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6542884191
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_speculative_connect.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<html><body>dummy file for speculative https-first upgrade test</body></html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_timeout_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_timeout_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..81c4c0328b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_httpsfirst_timeout_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    // async and *never* return anything!
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here; just in case, return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dda8909a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1673574 - Improve Console logging for mixed content auto upgrading</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+   <!--upgradeable resources--->
+  <img src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/pass.png">
+  <video src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/test.ogv">
+  <audio src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/test.wav">
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_console.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_console.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..631ac0b40f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_mixed_content_console.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1713593: HTTPS-First: Add test for mixed content blocker.</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- Test that image gets loaded (insecure) - the *.png does not actually exist because we only care for the console message to appear-->
+  <img type="image/png" id="testimage" src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/auto_upgrading_identity.png" />
+  <!-- Test that the script gets blocked. The script does not actually exist because we only care for the console message to appear-->
+  <script type="text/javascript"  src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/barfoo" >
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..49098ccdb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"use strict";
+
+// redirection uri
+const REDIRECT_URI =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs?redirect";
+const REDIRECT_URI_HTTP =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs?verify";
+const REDIRECT_URI_HTTPS =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs?verify";
+
+const RESPONSE_ERROR = "unexpected-query";
+
+// An onload postmessage to window opener
+const RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-https'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'scheme-http'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function sendRedirection(query, response) {
+  // send a redirection to an http uri
+  if (query.includes("test1")) {
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_URI_HTTP, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  // send a redirection to an https uri
+  if (query.includes("test2")) {
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_URI_HTTPS, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  // send a redirection to an http uri with hsts header
+  if (query.includes("test3")) {
+    response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=60");
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_URI_HTTP, false);
+  }
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  // if the query contains a test query start first test
+  if (query.startsWith("test")) {
+    // send a 302 redirection
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_URI + query, false);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Send a redirection
+  if (query.includes("redirect")) {
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 302, "Found");
+    sendRedirection(query, response);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Reset the HSTS policy, prevent influencing other tests
+  if (request.queryString === "reset") {
+    response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=0");
+    let response_content =
+      request.scheme === "https" ? RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME : RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME;
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.write(response_content);
+  }
+  // Check if scheme is http:// or https://
+  if (query == "verify") {
+    let response_content =
+      request.scheme === "https" ? RESPONSE_HTTPS_SCHEME : RESPONSE_HTTP_SCHEME;
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.write(response_content);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should never get here, but just in case ...
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 500, "OK");
+  response.write("unexepcted query");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_navigation.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_navigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..02d366291b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_navigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+  <body>
+    <p>Blank page</p>
+  <body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2042bcbc88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+//https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1706351
+
+// Step 1. Send request with redirect queryString (eg. file_redirect.sjs?302)
+// Step 2. Server responds with corresponding redirect code to http://example.com/../file_redirect.sjs?check
+// Step 3. Response from ?check indicates whether the redirected request was secure or not.
+
+const RESPONSE_ERROR = "unexpected-query";
+
+// An onload postmessage to window opener
+const RESPONSE_SECURE = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  send onload message...
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'secure'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_INSECURE = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  send onload message...
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'insecure'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  // Send redirect header
+  if ((query >= 301 && query <= 303) || query == 307) {
+    // needs to be a cross site redirect to http://example.com otherwise
+    // our upgrade downgrade endless loop break mechanism kicks in
+    const loc =
+      "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect.sjs?check";
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, query, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if scheme is http:// or https://
+  if (query == "check") {
+    const secure =
+      request.scheme == "https" ? RESPONSE_SECURE : RESPONSE_INSECURE;
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.write(secure);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // This should not happen
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 500, "OK");
+  response.write(RESPONSE_ERROR);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a31c8cb99b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1707856
+"use strict";
+
+const REDIRECT_META = `
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs?testEnd'">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    META REDIRECT
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const REDIRECT_JS = `
+  <html>
+   <body>
+     JS REDIRECT
+     <script>
+       let url= "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs?testEnd";
+       window.location = url;
+     </script>
+   </body>
+   </html>`;
+
+const REDIRECT_302 =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs?testEnd";
+
+const RESPONSE_SUCCESS = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, downgraded
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'downgraded', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let scheme = document.location.protocol;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', scheme: scheme}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  // if the scheme is not https and it is the initial request
+  // then we rather fall through and display unexpected content
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    if (query === "test1a") {
+      response.write(REDIRECT_META);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test2a") {
+      response.write(REDIRECT_JS);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test3a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+      response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_302, false);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should arrive here when the redirection was downraded successful
+  if (query == "testEnd") {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_SUCCESS);
+    return;
+  }
+  // We should never arrive here, just in case send 'error'
+  response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..282f7ba09f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+const RESPONSE_ERROR = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  Error occurred...
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'ERROR'}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+const RESPONSE_POLICY = `
+<html>
+<body>
+Send policy onload...
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  const loc = document.location.href;
+  window.opener.postMessage({result: document.referrer, location: loc}, "*");
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>`;
+
+const expectedQueries = [
+  "no-referrer",
+  "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+  "origin",
+  "origin-when-cross-origin",
+  "same-origin",
+  "strict-origin",
+  "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+  "unsafe-url",
+];
+function readQuery(testCase) {
+  let twoValues = testCase.split("-");
+  let upgradeRequest = twoValues[0] === "https" ? 1 : 0;
+  let httpsResponse = twoValues[1] === "https" ? 1 : 0;
+  return [upgradeRequest, httpsResponse];
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+  let query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+  // Downgrade to test http/https -> HTTP referrer policy
+  if (query.has("sendMe2") && request.scheme === "https") {
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (query.has("sendMe") || query.has("sendMe2")) {
+    response.write(RESPONSE_POLICY);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Get the referrer policy that we want to set
+  let referrerPolicy = query.get("rp");
+  //If the query contained one of the expected referrer policies send a request with the given policy,
+  // else send error
+  if (expectedQueries.includes(referrerPolicy)) {
+    // Determine the test case, e.g. don't upgrade request but send response in https
+    let testCase = readQuery(query.get("upgrade"));
+    let httpsRequest = testCase[0];
+    let httpsResponse = testCase[1];
+    // Downgrade to http if upgrade equals 0
+    if (httpsRequest === 0 && request.scheme === "https") {
+      // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+      response.processAsync();
+      return;
+    }
+    // create js redirection that request with the given (related to the query) referrer policy
+    const SEND_REQUEST_HTTPS = `
+      <html>
+      <head>
+        <meta name="referrer" content=${referrerPolicy}>
+      </head>
+      <body>
+      JS REDIRECT
+      <script>
+        let url = 'https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs?sendMe';
+        window.location = url;
+      </script>
+      </body>
+      </html>`;
+    const SEND_REQUEST_HTTP = `
+      <html>
+      <head>
+        <meta name="referrer" content=${referrerPolicy}>
+      </head>
+      <body>
+      JS REDIRECT
+      <script>
+        let url = 'http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs?sendMe2';
+        window.location = url;
+      </script>
+      </body>
+      </html>`;
+    let respond = httpsResponse === 1 ? SEND_REQUEST_HTTPS : SEND_REQUEST_HTTP;
+    response.write(respond);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should never get here but in case we send an error
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 500, "OK");
+  response.write(RESPONSE_ERROR);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..084977607d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.html
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Test slow download from an http site that gets upgraded to https</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a href="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.sjs" download="large-dummy-file.txt" id="testlink">download by attribute</a>
+  <script>
+    // click the link to start download
+    let testlink = document.getElementById("testlink");
+    testlink.click();
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e4f109068
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_slow_download.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+"use strict";
+let timer;
+
+// Send a part of the file then wait for 3 second before sending the rest.
+// If download isn't exempt from background timer of https-only/-first then the download
+// gets cancelled before it completed.
+const DELAY_MS = 3500;
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.processAsync();
+  timer = Cc["@mozilla.org/timer;1"].createInstance(Ci.nsITimer);
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader(
+    "Content-Disposition",
+    "attachment; filename=large-dummy-file.txt"
+  );
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain");
+  response.write("Begin the file");
+  timer.init(
+    () => {
+      response.write("End of file");
+      response.finish();
+    },
+    DELAY_MS,
+    Ci.nsITimer.TYPE_ONE_SHOT
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dd9f7c0909
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1711453
+"use strict";
+
+// small red image
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+const IFRAME_INC = `<iframe id="testframeinc"></iframe>`;
+
+// Sets an image sends cookie and location after loading
+const SET_COOKIE_IMG = `
+<html>
+<body>
+<img id="cookieImage">
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  var cookieImage = document.getElementById("cookieImage");
+  cookieImage.onload = function() {
+    let myLocation = window.location.href;
+    let myCookie = document.cookie;
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', loc: myLocation, cookie: myCookie}, '*');
+  }
+  cookieImage.onerror = function() {
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error'}, '*');
+  }
+  // Add the last number of the old query to the new query to set cookie properly
+  cookieImage.src = window.location.origin + "/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?setSameSiteCookie"
+   + window.location.href.charAt(window.location.href.length -1);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
+`;
+
+// Load blank frame navigation sends cookie and location after loading
+const LOAD_BLANK_FRAME_NAV = `
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script>
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.onload = function() {
+    let myLocation = window.location.href;
+    let myCookie = document.cookie;
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', loc: myLocation, cookie: myCookie}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.onerror = function() {
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', loc: 'error', cookie: ''}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.src = window.location.origin + "/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?loadblankframeNav";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
+`;
+
+// Load frame navigation sends cookie and location after loading
+const LOAD_FRAME_NAV = `
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script>
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.onload = function() {
+    let myLocation = window.location.href;
+    let myCookie = document.cookie;
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', loc: myLocation, cookie: myCookie}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.onerror = function() {
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', loc: 'error', cookie: ''}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.src = window.location.origin + "/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?loadsrcdocframeNav";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
+
+`;
+// blank frame sends cookie and location after loading
+const LOAD_BLANK_FRAME = `
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script>
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.onload = function() {
+    let myLocation = window.location.href;
+    let myCookie = document.cookie;
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', loc: myLocation, cookie: myCookie}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.onerror = function() {
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', loc: 'error', cookie: ''}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.src = window.location.origin + "/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?loadblankframeInc";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
+`;
+// frame sends cookie and location after loading
+const LOAD_FRAME = `
+<html>
+<body>
+<iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script>
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.onload = function() {
+    let myLocation = window.location.href;
+    let myCookie = document.cookie;
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'upgraded', loc: myLocation, cookie: myCookie}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.onerror = function() {
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', loc: 'error', cookie: ''}, '*');
+  }
+  testframe.src = window.location.origin + "/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?loadsrcdocframeInc";
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
+`;
+
+const RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED = `
+  <html>
+    <body>
+      send message, error
+    <script type="application/javascript">
+      let myLocation = document.location.href;
+      window.opener.postMessage({result: 'error', loc: myLocation}, '*');
+    </script>
+    </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+function setCookie(name, query) {
+  let cookie = name + "=";
+  if (query.includes("0")) {
+    cookie += "0;Domain=.example.com;sameSite=none";
+    return cookie;
+  }
+  if (query.includes("1")) {
+    cookie += "1;Domain=.example.com;sameSite=strict";
+    return cookie;
+  }
+  if (query.includes("2")) {
+    cookie += "2;Domain=.example.com;sameSite=none;secure";
+    return cookie;
+  }
+  if (query.includes("3")) {
+    cookie += "3;Domain=.example.com;sameSite=strict;secure";
+    return cookie;
+  }
+  return cookie + "error";
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  if (query.includes("setImage")) {
+    response.write(SET_COOKIE_IMG);
+    return;
+  }
+  // using startsWith and discard the math random
+  if (query.includes("setSameSiteCookie")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", setCookie("setImage", query), true);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+    response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // navigation tests
+  if (query.includes("loadNavBlank")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", setCookie("loadNavBlank", query), true);
+    response.write(LOAD_BLANK_FRAME_NAV);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadblankframeNav") {
+    let FRAME = `
+      <iframe src="about:blank"
+        // nothing happens here
+      </iframe>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.includes("loadNav")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", setCookie("loadNav", query), true);
+    response.write(LOAD_FRAME_NAV);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query === "loadsrcdocframeNav") {
+    let FRAME = `
+      <iframe srcdoc="foo"
+       // nothing happens here
+      </iframe>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // inclusion tests
+  if (query.includes("loadframeIncBlank")) {
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Set-Cookie",
+      setCookie("loadframeIncBlank", query),
+      true
+    );
+    response.write(LOAD_BLANK_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadblankframeInc") {
+    let FRAME =
+      ` <iframe id="blankframe" src="about:blank"></iframe>
+      <script>
+        document.getElementById("blankframe").contentDocument.write("` +
+      IFRAME_INC +
+      `");
+      <\script>`;
+    response.write(FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (query.includes("loadframeInc")) {
+    response.setHeader("Set-Cookie", setCookie("loadframeInc", query), true);
+    response.write(LOAD_FRAME);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (request.queryString === "loadsrcdocframeInc") {
+    response.write('<iframe srcdoc="' + IFRAME_INC + '"></iframe>');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We should never arrive here, just in case send 'error'
+  response.write(RESPONSE_UNEXPECTED);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..af306d2a16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure.html
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1704454 - HTTPS FIRST Mode</title>
+  <!-- style -->
+  <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' href='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?style' media='screen' />
+
+  <!-- font -->
+  <style>
+    @font-face {
+      font-family: "foofont";
+      src: url('http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?font');
+    }
+    .div_foo { font-family: "foofont"; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- images: -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img"></img>
+
+  <!-- redirects: upgrade http:// to https:// redirect to http:// and then upgrade to https:// again -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?redirect-image"></img>
+
+  <!-- script: -->
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?script"></script>
+
+  <!-- media: -->
+  <audio src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?media"></audio>
+
+  <!-- objects: -->
+  <object width="10" height="10" data="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?object"></object>
+
+  <!-- font: (apply font loaded in header to div) -->
+  <div class="div_foo">foo</div>
+
+  <!-- iframe: (same origin) -->
+  <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?iframe">
+    <!-- within that iframe we load an image over http and make sure the requested gets upgraded to https -->
+  </iframe>
+
+  <!-- toplevel: -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    let myWin = window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?top-level");
+    //close right after opening
+    myWin.onunload = function(){
+      myWin.close();
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- xhr: -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    myXHR.open("GET", "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?xhr");
+    myXHR.send(null);
+  </script>
+
+
+  <!-- form action: (upgrade POST from http:// to https://) -->
+  <iframe name='formFrame' id='formFrame'></iframe>
+  <form target="formFrame" action="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?form" method="POST">
+    <input name="foo" value="foo">
+    <input type="submit" id="submitButton" formenctype='multipart/form-data' value="Submit form">
+  </form>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var submitButton = document.getElementById('submitButton');
+    submitButton.click();
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f14dc635d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+// SJS file for https-first Mode mochitests
+// Bug 1704454  - HTTPS First Mode
+
+const TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS = 12;
+
+const IFRAME_CONTENT =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  "<html>" +
+  "<head><meta charset='utf-8'>" +
+  "<title>Bug 1704454 - Test HTTPS First Mode</title>" +
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<img src='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?nested-img'></img>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+const expectedQueries = [
+  "script",
+  "style",
+  "img",
+  "iframe",
+  "form",
+  "xhr",
+  "media",
+  "object",
+  "font",
+  "img-redir",
+  "nested-img",
+  "top-level",
+];
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  // initialize server variables and save the object state
+  // of the initial request, which returns async once the
+  // server has processed all requests.
+  if (queryString == "queryresult") {
+    setState("totaltests", TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS.toString());
+    setState("receivedQueries", "");
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // handle img redirect (https->http)
+  if (queryString == "redirect-image") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img-redir";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // just in case error handling for unexpected queries
+  if (!expectedQueries.includes(queryString)) {
+    response.write("unexpected-response");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // make sure all the requested queries aren't upgraded to https
+  // except of toplevel requests
+  if (queryString === "top-level") {
+    queryString += request.scheme === "https" ? "-ok" : "-error";
+  } else {
+    queryString += request.scheme === "http" ? "-ok" : "-error";
+  }
+  var receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+
+  // images, scripts, etc. get queried twice, do not
+  // confuse the server by storing the preload as
+  // well as the actual load. If either the preload
+  // or the actual load is not https, then we would
+  // append "-error" in the array and the test would
+  // fail at the end.
+
+  // append the result to the total query string array
+  if (receivedQueries != "") {
+    receivedQueries += ",";
+  }
+  receivedQueries += queryString;
+  setState("receivedQueries", receivedQueries);
+
+  // keep track of how many more requests the server
+  // is expecting
+  var totaltests = parseInt(getState("totaltests"));
+  totaltests -= 1;
+  setState("totaltests", totaltests.toString());
+
+  // return content (img) for the nested iframe to test
+  // that subresource requests within nested contexts
+  // get upgraded as well. We also have to return
+  // the iframe context in case of an error so we
+  // can test both, using upgrade-insecure as well
+  // as the base case of not using upgrade-insecure.
+  if (queryString == "iframe-ok" || queryString == "iframe-error") {
+    response.write(IFRAME_CONTENT);
+  }
+
+  // if we have received all the requests, we return
+  // the result back.
+  if (totaltests == 0) {
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      var receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+      queryResponse.write(receivedQueries);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/https-first/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..504f8856b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+
+[test_fragment.html]
+support-files = file_fragment.html
+[test_resource_upgrade.html]
+scheme=https
+support-files =
+  file_upgrade_insecure.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
+skip-if = true # Bug 1727101, Bug 1727925
+[test_redirect_upgrade.html]
+scheme=https
+support-files =
+  file_redirect.sjs
+[test_redirect_downgrade.html]
+support-files = file_redirect_downgrade.sjs
+[test_data_uri.html]
+support-files =
+  file_data_uri.html
+  [test_toplevel_cookies.html]
+support-files =
+  file_toplevel_cookies.sjs
+[test_downgrade_bad_responses.html]
+support-files= file_downgrade_bad_responses.sjs
+[test_referrer_policy.html]
+support-files= file_referrer_policy.sjs
+[test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html]
+support-files =
+  file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
+  file_downgrade_with_different_path.sjs
+[test_multiple_redirection.html]
+support-files =
+  file_multiple_redirection.sjs
+[test_form_submission.html]
+support-files =
+  file_form_submission.sjs
+[test_bad_cert.html]
+support-files =
+  file_bad_cert.sjs
+[test_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.html]
+support-files = file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs
+[test_downgrade_500_responses.html]
+support-files = file_downgrade_500_responses.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/pass.png b/dom/security/test/https-first/pass.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2fa1e0ac06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/pass.png
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test.ogv b/dom/security/test/https-first/test.ogv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0f83996e5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test.ogv
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test.wav b/dom/security/test/https-first/test.wav
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..85dc1ea904
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test.wav
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_bad_cert.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_bad_cert.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d7e9296d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_bad_cert.html
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1719309
+Test that bad cert sites won't get upgraded by https-first
+-->
+
+<head>
+  <title>HTTPS-FirstMode - Bad Certificates</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-First Mode</h1>
+  <p>Test: Downgrade bad certificates without warning page </p>
+  <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1706351">Bug 1719309</a>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  "use strict";
+  /*
+   * We perform the following tests:
+   * 1. Request nocert.example.com which is a site without a certificate
+   * 2. Request a site with self-signed cert (self-signed.example.com)
+   * 3. Request a site with an untrusted cert (untrusted.example.com)
+   * 4. Request a site with an expired cert
+   * 5. Request a site with an untrusted and expired cert
+   * 6. Request a site with no subject alternative dns name matching
+   *
+   * Expected result: Https-first tries to upgrade each request. Receives for each one an SSL_ERROR_*
+   * and downgrades back to http.
+   */
+  const badCertificates = ["nocert","self-signed", "untrusted","expired","untrusted-expired", "no-subject-alt-name"];
+  let currentTest = 0;
+  let testWin;
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  // Receive message and verify that it is from an http site.
+  // Verify that we got the correct message and an http scheme
+  async function receiveMessage(event) {
+    let data = event.data;
+    let currentBadCert = badCertificates[currentTest];
+    ok(data.result === "downgraded", "Downgraded request " + currentBadCert);
+    ok(data.scheme === "http:", "Received 'http' for " + currentBadCert);
+    testWin.close();
+    if (++currentTest < badCertificates.length) {
+      startTest();
+      return;
+    }
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  async function startTest() {
+    const currentCode = badCertificates[currentTest];
+    // make a request to a subdomain of example.com with a bad certificate
+    testWin = window.open(`http://${currentCode}.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_bad_cert.sjs`);
+  }
+
+  // Set preference and start test
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+  ]}, startTest);
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7d239350a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1715253
+Test that same origin redirect does not cause endless loop with https-first enabled
+-->
+
+<head>
+  <title>HTTPS-First-Mode - Break endless upgrade downgrade redirect loop</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-First Mode</h1>
+  <p>Upgrade Test for insecure redirects.</p>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  "use strict";
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  const redirectCodes = ["301", "302","303","307"];
+  let currentTest = 0;
+  let testWin;
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  // receive message from loaded site verifying the scheme of
+  // the loaded document.
+  async function receiveMessage(event) {
+    let currentRedirectCode = redirectCodes[currentTest];
+    is(event.data.result,
+       "scheme-http",
+       "same-origin redirect results in 'http' for " + currentRedirectCode
+    );
+    testWin.close();
+    if (++currentTest < redirectCodes.length) {
+      startTest();
+      return;
+    }
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessageForDifferentPathTest);
+    testDifferentPath();
+  }
+
+  async function receiveMessageForDifferentPathTest(event) {
+    is(event.data.result,
+       "scheme-https",
+       "scheme should be https when the path is different"
+    );
+    testWin.close();
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessageForDifferentPathTest);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  async function startTest() {
+    const currentCode = redirectCodes[currentTest];
+    // Load an http:// window which gets upgraded to https://
+    let uri =
+      `http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?${currentCode}`;
+    testWin = window.open(uri);
+  }
+
+  async function testDifferentPath() {
+    // Load an https:// window which gets downgraded to http://
+    let uri =
+      `https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?downgrade`;
+    testWin = window.open(uri);
+  }
+
+  // Set preference and start test
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false],
+    ["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", false],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_check_path_upgrade_downgrade_endless_loop", true],
+  ]}, startTest);
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_data_uri.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_data_uri.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b9891260db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_data_uri.html
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1709069: Test that Data URI which makes a top-level request gets updated in https-first</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+// HTML site which makes a top-level http request
+const HTML = `
+<html>
+<body>
+  DATA HTML
+<script>
+ window.open("http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_data_uri.html");
+<\/script>
+<\/body>
+<\/html>
+`;
+
+const DATA_HTML = "data:text/html, " + HTML;
+
+// Verify that data uri top-level request got upgraded to https and
+// the reached location is correct
+async function receiveMessage(event){
+  let data = event.data;
+  is(data.location, "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_data_uri.html",
+   "Reached the correct location");
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function test_toplevel_https() {
+  document.getElementById("testframe").src = DATA_HTML;
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+  ]}, test_toplevel_https);
+
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_500_responses.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_500_responses.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3943c9095c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_500_responses.html
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1747673 : HTTPS First fallback to http for non-standard 5xx status code responses</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * Perform five tests where https-first receives an
+ * 5xx status code (standard and non-standard 5xx status) if request is send to site by https.
+ * Expected behaviour: https-first fallbacks to http after receiving 5xx error.
+ * Test 1: 501 Response
+ * Test 2: 504 Response
+ * Test 3: 521 Response
+ * Test 4: 530 Response
+ * Test 5: 560 Response
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_500_responses.sjs";
+
+const redirectQueries = ["?test1a", "?test2a","?test3a", "?test4a", "?test5a"];
+let currentTest = 0;
+let testWin;
+let currentQuery;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+// Receive message and verify that it is from an http site.
+// When the message is 'downgraded' then it was send by an http site
+// and the redirection worked.
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  ok(data.result === "downgraded", "Redirected successful to 'http' for " + currentQuery);
+  is(data.scheme, "http:", "scheme is 'http' for " + currentQuery );
+  testWin.close();
+  if (++currentTest < redirectQueries.length) {
+    runTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  testWin = window.open(REQUEST_URL + currentQuery, "_blank");
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true]
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_bad_responses.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_bad_responses.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..39cef7f26a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_bad_responses.html
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1709552 : HTTPS-First: Add downgrade tests for bad responses to https request </title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We perform five tests where we expect https-first to detect
+ * that the target site only supports http
+ * Test 1: 400 Response
+ * Test 2: 401 Response
+ * Test 3: 403 Response
+ * Test 4: 416 Response
+ * Test 5: 418 Response
+ * Test 6: Timeout
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_bad_responses.sjs";
+
+const redirectQueries = ["?test1a", "?test2a","?test3a", "?test4a", "?test5a", "?test6a"];
+let currentTest = 0;
+let testWin;
+let currentQuery;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+// Receive message and verify that it is from an http site.
+// When the message is 'downgraded' then it was send by an http site
+// and the redirection worked.
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  ok(data.result === "downgraded", "Redirected successful to 'http' for " + currentQuery);
+  ok(data.scheme === "http", "scheme is 'http' for " + currentQuery );
+  testWin.close();
+  if (++currentTest < redirectQueries.length) {
+    runTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  testWin = window.open(REQUEST_URL + currentQuery, "_blank");
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true]
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b659636ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.html
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title> Bug 1706126: Test https-first, downgrade first request and then upgrade redirection to subdomain</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * First we request http://redirect-example.com which HTTPS-First upgrades to https://redirect-example.com.
+ * The request https://redirect-example.com doesn't receive an answer (timeout), so we send a background
+ * request.
+ * The background request receives an answer. So the request https://redirect-example.com gets downgraded
+ * to http://redirect-example.com by the exempt flag.
+ * The request http://redirect-example.com gets redirected to http://wwww.redirect-example.com. At that stage
+ * HTTPS-First should clear the exempt flag and upgrade the redirection to https://wwww.redirect-example.com.
+ *
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://redirect-example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_downgrade_request_upgrade_request.sjs";
+
+let testWin;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+// Receive message and verify that it is from an https site.
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  ok(data.result === "upgraded", "Redirected successful to 'https' for subdomain ");
+  is(data.scheme,"https:", "scheme is 'https' for subdomain");
+  testWin.close();
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  testWin = window.open(REQUEST_URL, "_blank");
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true]
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_form_submission.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_form_submission.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a68c3501c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_form_submission.html
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1720103 - Https-first: Do not upgrade form submissions (for now)</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We test https-first behaviour with forms.
+ * We perform each test with once with same origin and the second time
+ * with a cross origin. We perform two GET form requests and two POST
+ * form requests.
+ * In more detail:
+ *
+ * 1. Test: Request that gets upgraded to https, GET form submission.
+ *
+ * 2. Test: Request that gets upgraded to https, that upgraded request
+ *          gets timed out, so https-first send an http request, GET form submission.
+ *
+ * 3. Test: request that gets upgraded to https, and sends a POST form
+ *          to http://example.com.
+ *
+ * 4. Test: Request where the https upgrade get timed out -> http, and sends a POST form
+ *          to http://example.com,
+ *
+ */
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_form_submission.sjs";
+const CROSS_ORIGIN = SAME_ORIGIN.replace(".com", ".org");
+const Tests = [{
+  // 1. Test GET, gets upgraded
+    query: "?test=1",
+    scheme: "https:",
+    method: "GET",
+    value: "test=success",
+},
+{
+  // 2. Test GET, initial request will be downgraded
+    query:"?test=2",
+    scheme: "http:",
+    method: "GET",
+    value: "test=success"
+},
+{  // 3. Test POST formular, gets upgraded
+    query: "?test=3",
+    scheme: "http:",
+    method: "POST",
+    value: "test=success"
+},
+{   // 4. Test POST formular, request will be downgraded
+    query: "?test=4",
+    scheme: "http:",
+    method: "POST",
+    value: "test=success"
+},
+];
+let currentTest;
+let counter = 0;
+let testWin;
+let sameOrigin = true;
+
+// Verify that top-level request got the expected scheme and reached the correct location.
+async function receiveMessage(event){
+  let data = event.data;
+  let origin = sameOrigin? SAME_ORIGIN : CROSS_ORIGIN
+  const expectedLocation = origin.replace("http:", currentTest.scheme);
+  // If GET request check that form was transfered by url
+  if (currentTest.method === "GET") {
+    is(data.location, expectedLocation + currentTest.query,
+   "Reached the correct location for " + currentTest.query );
+  } else {
+    // Since the form is always send to example.com we expect it here as location
+    is(data.location.includes(SAME_ORIGIN.replace("http:", currentTest.scheme)), true,
+   "Reached the correct location for " + currentTest.query );
+  }
+  is(data.scheme, currentTest.scheme,`${currentTest.query} upgraded or downgraded to ` + currentTest.scheme);
+  // Check that the form value is correct
+  is(data.form, currentTest.value, "Form was transfered");
+  testWin.close();
+  // Flip origin flag
+  sameOrigin ^= true;
+  // Only go to next test if already sent same and cross origin request for current test
+  if (sameOrigin) {
+    counter++;
+  }
+  // Check if we have test left, if not finish the testing
+  if (counter >= Tests.length) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  // If we didn't reached the end yet, run next test
+  runTest();
+}
+
+function runTest() {
+  currentTest = Tests[counter];
+  // If sameOrigin flag is set make a origin request, else a cross origin request
+  if (sameOrigin) {
+    testWin= window.open(SAME_ORIGIN + currentTest.query, "_blank");
+  } else {
+    testWin= window.open(CROSS_ORIGIN + currentTest.query, "_blank");
+  }
+}
+
+// Set prefs and start test
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ["security.warn_submit_secure_to_insecure", false]
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_fragment.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_fragment.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..63a7affee2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_fragment.html
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1706577: Have https-first mode account for fragment navigations</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * Have https-first detect a fragment navigation rather than navigating away
+ * from the page.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_fragment.html";
+const EXPECT_URL = REQUEST_URL.replace("http://", "https://");
+
+let winTest = null;
+let checkButtonClicked = false;
+
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  if (!checkButtonClicked) {
+    ok(data.result == EXPECT_URL, "location is correct");
+    ok(data.button, "button is clicked");
+    ok(data.info == "onload", "Onloading worked");
+    checkButtonClicked = true;
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Once the button was clicked we know the tast has finished
+  ok(data.button, "button is clicked");
+  ok(data.result == "#foo", "location (hash) is correct");
+  ok(data.info == "scrolled-to-foo","Scrolled successfully without reloading!");
+  window.removeEventListener("message",receiveMessage);
+  winTest.close();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+  ]});
+  winTest = window.open(REQUEST_URL);
+}
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_multiple_redirection.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_multiple_redirection.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d631f140e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_multiple_redirection.html
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1721410
+Test multiple redirects using https-first and ensure the entire redirect chain is using https
+-->
+
+<head>
+  <title>HTTPS-First-Mode - Test for multiple redirections</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  "use strict";
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  const testCase = [
+    // test 1: https-first upgrades http://example.com/test1 -> https://example.com/test1
+    //         that's redirect to https://example.com/.../redirect which then redirects
+    //         to http://example.com/../verify. Since the last redirect is http, and the
+    //         the redirection chain contains already example.com we expect https-first
+    //         to downgrade the request.
+    {name: "test last redirect HTTP", result: "scheme-http", query: "test1" },
+    // test 2: https-first upgrades http://example.com/test2 -> https://example.com/test2
+    //         that's redirect to https://example.com/.../redirect which then redirects
+    //         to https://example.com/../verify. Since the last redirect is https, we
+    //         expect to reach an https website.
+    {name: "test last redirect HTTPS", result: "scheme-https", query: "test2"},
+    // test 3: https-first upgrades http://example.com/test3 -> https://example.com/test3
+    //         that's redirect to https://example.com/.../hsts which then sets an hsts header
+    //         and redirects to http://example.com/../verify. Since an hsts header was set
+    //         we expect that to reach an https site
+    {name: "test last redirect HSTS", result: "scheme-https", query: "test3"},
+    // reset: reset hsts header for example.com
+    {name: "reset HSTS header", result: "scheme-https", query: "reset"},
+  ]
+  let currentTest = 0;
+  let testWin;
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  // receive message from loaded site verifying the scheme of
+  // the loaded document.
+  async function receiveMessage(event) {
+    let test = testCase[currentTest];
+      is(event.data.result,
+       test.result,
+       "same-origin redirect results in " + test.name
+    );
+    testWin.close();
+    if (++currentTest < testCase.length) {
+      startTest();
+      return;
+    }
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  async function startTest() {
+    const test = testCase[currentTest];
+    // Load an http:// window which gets upgraded to https://
+    let uri =
+      `http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_multiple_redirection.sjs?${test.query}`;
+    testWin = window.open(uri);
+  }
+
+  // Set preference and start test
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+  ]}, startTest);
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_downgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_downgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07f998c085
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_downgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1707856: Test redirect downgrades with https-first</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We perform three tests where we expect https-first to detect
+ * that the target site only supports http
+ * Test 1: Meta Refresh
+ * Test 2: JS Redirect
+ * Test 3: 302 redirect
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect_downgrade.sjs";
+
+const redirectQueries = ["?test1a", "?test2a","?test3a"];
+let currentTest = 0;
+let testWin;
+let currentQuery;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+// Receive message and verify that it is from an https site.
+// When the message is 'downgraded' then it was send by an http site
+// and the redirection worked.
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  ok(data.result === "downgraded", "Redirected successful to 'http' for " + currentQuery);
+  ok(data.scheme === "http:", "scheme is 'http' for " + currentQuery );
+  testWin.close();
+  if (++currentTest < redirectQueries.length) {
+    runTest();
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  testWin = window.open(REQUEST_URL + currentQuery, "_blank");
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true]
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6cccf6af67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_redirect_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1706351
+Test that 302 redirect requests get upgraded to https:// with HTTPS-First Mode enabled
+-->
+
+<head>
+  <title>HTTPS-FirstMode - Redirect Upgrade</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-First Mode</h1>
+  <p>Upgrade Test for insecure redirects.</p>
+  <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1706351">Bug 1706351</a>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+  "use strict";
+
+  const redirectCodes = ["301", "302","303","307"];
+  let currentTest = 0;
+  let testWin;
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  // Receive message and verify that it is from an https site.
+  // When the message is 'secure' then it was send by an https site.
+  async function receiveMessage(event) {
+    let data = event.data;
+    let currentRedirectCode = redirectCodes[currentTest];
+    ok(data.result === "secure", "Received 'https' for " + currentRedirectCode);
+    testWin.close();
+    if (++currentTest < redirectCodes.length) {
+      startTest();
+      return;
+    }
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+
+  async function startTest() {
+    const currentCode = redirectCodes[currentTest];
+    // Make a request to a site (eg. https://file_redirect.sjs?301), which will redirect to http://file_redirect.sjs?check.
+    // The response will either be secure-ok, if the request has been upgraded to https:// or secure-error if it didn't.
+    testWin = window.open(`https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_redirect.sjs?${currentCode}`);
+  }
+
+  // Set preference and start test
+  SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false],
+    ["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", false],
+  ]}, startTest);
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_referrer_policy.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_referrer_policy.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..61521e2351
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_referrer_policy.html
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1716706 : Write referrer-policy tests for https-first </title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We perform each test with 8 different settings.
+ * The first is a same origin request from an http site to an https site.
+ * The second is a same origin request from an https -> https.
+ * The third is a cross-origin request from an http -> https.
+ * The fourth is a cross-origin request from an https -> https.
+ * The fifth is a same origin request from an http -> http site.
+ * The sixth is a same origin request from an https -> http.
+ * The seventh is a cross-origin request from an http -> http.
+ * The last is a cross-origin request from an https -> http.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+// This test performs a lot of requests and checks (64 requests).
+// So to prevent to get a timeout before executing all test request longer timeout.
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(2);
+const SAME_ORIGIN =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs?";
+// SAME ORIGIN with "https" instead of "http"
+const SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS = SAME_ORIGIN.replace("http", "https");
+
+const CROSS_ORIGIN =
+  "http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_referrer_policy.sjs?";
+// CROSS ORIGIN with "https" instead of "http"
+const CROSS_ORIGIN_HTTPS = CROSS_ORIGIN.replace("http", "https");
+
+// Define test cases. Query equals the test case referrer policy.
+// We will set in the final request the url parameters such that 'rp=' equals the referrer policy
+//and 'upgrade=' equals '1' if the request should be https.
+// For a 'upgrade=0' url parameter the server lead to a timeout such that https-first downgrades
+// the request to http.
+const testCases = [
+  {
+    query: "no-referrer",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: "",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:"",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown: "",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=http-https",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp: CROSS_ORIGIN + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=http-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp: CROSS_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown: CROSS_ORIGIN + "rp=no-referrer-when-downgrade&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "origin",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: "https://example.com/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"https://example.org/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "https://example.com/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"https://example.org/",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=origin-when-cross-origin&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"https://example.org/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=origin-when-cross-origin&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "https://example.com/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"https://example.org/",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "same-origin",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=same-origin&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=same-origin&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "strict-origin",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: "https://example.com/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"https://example.org/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: "http://example.com/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp: SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=strict-origin-when-cross-origin&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp:"https://example.org/",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=strict-origin-when-cross-origin&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: "",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:"http://example.org/",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:"",
+  },
+  {
+    query: "unsafe-url",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownUp: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=http-https",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpUp:  SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp: CROSS_ORIGIN + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=http-https",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp: CROSS_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=https-https",
+    expectedResultSameOriginDownDown: SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultSameOriginUpDown: SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=https-http",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown:CROSS_ORIGIN + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=http-http",
+    expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown:CROSS_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "rp=unsafe-url&upgrade=https-http",
+  },
+];
+
+
+let currentTest = 0;
+let sameOriginRequest = true;
+let testWin;
+let currentQuery;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+let currentRun = 0;
+// All combinations, HTTP -> HTTPS, HTTPS -> HTTPS, HTTP -> HTTP, HTTPS -> HTTP
+const ALL_COMB = ["http-https", "https-https" ,"http-http", "https-http"];
+
+// Receive message and verify that we receive the expected referrer header
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  currentQuery = testCases[currentTest].query;
+  let currentComb = ALL_COMB[currentRun];
+  // if request was http -> https
+  if (currentComb === "http-https") {
+    if (sameOriginRequest){
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultSameOriginDownUp ,
+      "We received for the downgraded same site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "sendMe","Opened correct location");
+    } else {
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultCrossOriginDownUp ,
+      "We received for the downgraded cross site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "sendMe", "Opened correct location");
+    }
+  // if request was https -> https
+  } else if (currentComb === "https-https") {
+    if (sameOriginRequest){
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultSameOriginUpUp ,
+      "We received for the upgraded same site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "sendMe", "Opened correct location");
+    } else {
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultCrossOriginUpUp,
+      "We received for the upgraded cross site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN_HTTPS + "sendMe", "Opened correct location");
+    }
+  } else if (currentComb === "http-http") {
+    if (sameOriginRequest){
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultSameOriginDownDown ,
+      "We received for the upgraded same site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN + "sendMe2","Opened correct location for" + currentQuery + currentComb);
+    } else {
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultCrossOriginDownDown,
+      "We received for the upgraded cross site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN + "sendMe2", "Opened correct location " + currentQuery + currentComb);
+    }
+  } else if (currentComb === "https-http") {
+    if (sameOriginRequest){
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultSameOriginUpDown ,
+      "We received for the upgraded same site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN + "sendMe2","Opened correct location " + currentQuery + currentComb);
+    } else {
+      is(data.result, testCases[currentTest].expectedResultCrossOriginUpDown,
+      "We received for the upgraded cross site request with referrer policy: " + currentQuery + " the correct referrer");
+      is(data.location, SAME_ORIGIN + "sendMe2", "Opened correct location " + currentQuery + currentComb);
+    }
+  }
+  testWin.close();
+  currentRun++;
+  if (currentTest >= testCases.length -1  && currentRun === ALL_COMB.length && !sameOriginRequest) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  runTest();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  currentQuery = testCases[currentTest].query;
+  // send same origin request
+  if (sameOriginRequest && currentRun < ALL_COMB.length) {
+    // if upgrade = 0 downgrade request, else upgrade
+    testWin = window.open(SAME_ORIGIN + "rp=" +currentQuery + "&upgrade=" + ALL_COMB[currentRun], "_blank");
+  } else {
+    // if same origin isn't set, check if we need to send cross origin requests
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-lonely-if
+    if (!sameOriginRequest && currentRun < ALL_COMB.length ) {
+    // if upgrade = 0 downgrade request, else upgrade
+    testWin = window.open(CROSS_ORIGIN + "rp=" +currentQuery + "&upgrade=" + ALL_COMB[currentRun], "_blank");
+    } // else we completed all test case of the current query for the current origin. Prepare and call next test
+    else {
+      // reset currentRun and go to next query
+      currentRun = 0;
+      if(!sameOriginRequest){
+        currentTest++;
+      }
+      // run same test again for crossOrigin or start new test with sameOrigin
+      sameOriginRequest = !sameOriginRequest;
+      currentQuery = testCases[currentTest].query;
+      runTest();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", false],
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_resource_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_resource_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c71879ac42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_resource_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>HTTPS-First Mode - Resource Upgrade</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-First Mode</h1>
+  <p>Upgrade Test for various resources</p>
+  <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1704454">Bug 1704454/a>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+    /* Description of the test:
+     * We load resources (img, script, sytle, etc) over *http* and
+     * make sure they do not get upgraded to *https* because
+     * https-first only applies to top-level requests.
+     *
+     * In detail:
+     * We perform an XHR request to the *.sjs file which is processed async on
+     * the server and waits till all the requests were processed by the server.
+     * Once the server received all the different requests, the server responds
+     * to the initial XHR request with an array of results which must match
+     * the expected results from each test, making sure that all requests
+     * received by the server (*.sjs) were actually *http* requests.
+     */
+
+    const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+      "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+    );
+    const splitRegex = /^(.*)-(.*)$/
+    const testConfig = {
+      topLevelScheme: "http://",
+      results: [
+        "iframe", "script", "img", "img-redir", "font", "xhr", "style",
+        "media", "object", "form", "nested-img","top-level"
+      ]
+    }
+
+
+    function runTest() {
+      // sends an xhr request to the server which is processed async, which only
+      // returns after the server has received all the expected requests.
+      var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      myXHR.open("GET", "file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?queryresult");
+      myXHR.onload = function (e) {
+        var results = myXHR.responseText.split(",");
+        for (var index in results) {
+          checkResult(results[index]);
+        }
+      }
+      myXHR.onerror = function (e) {
+        ok(false, "Could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+      myXHR.send();
+
+      // give it some time and run the testpage
+      SimpleTest.executeSoon(() => {
+        var src = testConfig.topLevelScheme + "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_upgrade_insecure.html";
+        document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+      });
+    }
+
+    // a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+    // 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      checkResult(event.data.result);
+    }
+
+    function finishTest() {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+
+    function checkResult(response) {
+      // A response looks either like this "iframe-ok" or "[key]-[result]"
+      const [, key, result] = splitRegex.exec(response)
+      // try to find the expected result within the results array
+      var index = testConfig.results.indexOf(key);
+
+      // If the response is not even part of the results array, something is super wrong
+      if (index == -1) {
+        ok(false, `Unexpected response from server (${response})`);
+        finishTest();
+      }
+
+      // take the element out the array and continue till the results array is empty
+      if (index != -1) {
+        testConfig.results.splice(index, 1);
+      }
+
+      // Check if the result was okay or had an error
+      is(result, 'ok', `Upgrade all requests on toplevel http for '${key}' came back with: '${result}'`)
+
+      // If we're not expecting any more resulsts, finish the test
+      if (!testConfig.results.length) {
+        finishTest();
+      }
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    // Set preference and start test
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+      ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false],
+      ["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", false]
+    ] }, runTest);
+
+  </script>
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-first/test_toplevel_cookies.html b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_toplevel_cookies.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2c0c64db46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-first/test_toplevel_cookies.html
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1711453 : HTTPS-First: Add test for cookies </title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We perform each test with 4 different cookie settings and
+ * expect https-first to detect which cookie is same origin and
+ * which is cross origin. The cookies are in an image or in a frame.
+ * The 4 cookie settings differ in two flags which are set or not.
+ * The first call is always with secure flag not set and sameSite=none
+ * In the second call we don't set the secure flag but sameSite=strict
+ * In the third call we set the secure flag and sameSite=none
+ * In the forth call we set the secure flag and sameSite=strict
+ * More detailed:
+ * We run the tests in the following order.
+ * Test 1a: Image is loaded with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * Test 1b: Image is loaded with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=strict
+ * Test 1c: Image is loaded with cookie same-origin, secure and sameSite=none
+ * Test 1d: Image is loaded with cookie same-origin, secure and sameSite=strict
+ * Test 1e: Image is loaded with cookie cross-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * Test 1f: Image is loaded with cookie cross-origin, not secure and sameSite=strict
+ * Test 2a: Load frame navigation with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * ...
+ * Test 3a: Load frame navigation blank with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * ...
+ * Test 4a: Load frame Inc with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * ...
+ * Test 5a: Load frame Inc Blank with cookie same-origin, not secure and sameSite=none
+ * ...
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const SAME_ORIGIN =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?";
+
+const CROSS_ORIGIN =
+  "http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/https-first/file_toplevel_cookies.sjs?";
+
+const redirectQueries = ["setImage", "loadNav", "loadNavBlank","loadframeInc", "loadframeIncBlank"];
+let currentTest = 0;
+let sameOriginRequest = true;
+let testWin;
+let currentQuery;
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+let currentRun = 0;
+// All possible cookie attribute combinations
+// cookie attributes are secure=set/not set and sameSite= none/ strict
+const ALL_COOKIE_COMB = ["notSecure,none", "notSecure,strict", "secure,none", "secure,strict"]
+
+// Receive message and verify that it is from an https site.
+// When the message is 'upgraded' then it was send by an https site
+// and validate that we received the right cookie. Verify that for a cross
+//origin request we didn't receive a cookie.
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  ok(data.result === "upgraded", "Upgraded successful to https for " + currentQuery);
+  ok(data.loc.includes("https"), "scheme is 'https' for " + currentQuery );
+  if (!sameOriginRequest) {
+    ok(data.cookie === "", "Cookie from cross-Origin site shouldn't be accepted " + currentQuery + " " + ALL_COOKIE_COMB[currentRun]);
+  } else {
+    is(data.cookie.includes(currentQuery +  "=" + currentRun), true, "Cookie successfully arrived for " + currentQuery + " " + ALL_COOKIE_COMB[currentRun]);
+  }
+  testWin.close();
+  currentRun++;
+  if (currentTest >= redirectQueries.length -1  && currentRun === ALL_COOKIE_COMB.length && !sameOriginRequest) {
+    window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    SpecialPowers.clearUserPref("network.cookie.sameSite.laxByDefault");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+    return;
+  }
+  runTest();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+  // send same origin request
+  if (sameOriginRequest && currentRun < ALL_COOKIE_COMB.length) {
+    testWin = window.open(SAME_ORIGIN + currentQuery + currentRun, "_blank");
+  } else {
+    // if same origin isn't set, check if we need to send cross origin requests
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-lonely-if
+    if (!sameOriginRequest && currentRun < ALL_COOKIE_COMB.length ) {
+    testWin = window.open(CROSS_ORIGIN + currentQuery +  currentRun, "_blank");
+    } // else we completed all test case of the current query for the current origin. Prepare and call next test
+    else {
+      // reset currentRun and go to next query
+      currentRun = 0;
+      if(!sameOriginRequest){
+        currentTest++;
+      }
+      // run same test again for crossOrigin or start new test with sameOrigin
+      sameOriginRequest = !sameOriginRequest;
+      currentQuery = redirectQueries[currentTest];
+      runTest();
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_first", true],
+    ["network.cookie.sameSite.noneRequiresSecure", false],
+  ]}, runTest);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e163791023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+prefs =
+  dom.security.https_first=false
+
+[browser_console_logging.js]
+support-files =
+  file_console_logging.html
+[browser_upgrade_exceptions.js]
+[browser_httpsonly_prefs.js]
+[browser_cors_mixedcontent.js]
+support-files =
+  file_cors_mixedcontent.html
+[browser_iframe_test.js]
+skip-if =
+  os == 'linux' && bits == 64 # Bug 1735565
+  os == 'win' && bits == 64 # Bug 1735565
+  os == "win" && os_version == "6.1" # Skip on Azure - frequent failure
+support-files =
+  file_iframe_test.sjs
+[browser_triggering_principal_exemption.js]
+[browser_background_redirect.js]
+support-files =
+  file_background_redirect.sjs
+[browser_user_gesture.js]
+support-files =
+  file_user_gesture.html
+[browser_hsts_host.js]
+support-files =
+  hsts_headers.sjs
+[browser_httpsonly_speculative_connect.js]
+support-files = file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html
+[browser_websocket_exceptions.js]
+skip-if = (toolkit == 'android') # WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+support-files =
+  file_websocket_exceptions.html
+  file_websocket_exceptions_iframe.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_background_redirect.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_background_redirect.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6585ef0faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_background_redirect.js
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+"use strict";
+/* Description of the test:
+ * We load a page which gets upgraded to https. HTTPS-Only Mode then
+ * sends an 'http' background request which we redirect (using the
+ * web extension API) to 'same-origin' https. We ensure the HTTPS-Only
+ * Error page does not occur, but we https page gets loaded.
+ */
+
+let extension = null;
+
+add_task(async function test_https_only_background_request_redirect() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test since we have to wait
+  // at least 3 seconds for the https-only background request to happen.
+  requestLongerTimeout(10);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+
+  extension = ExtensionTestUtils.loadExtension({
+    manifest: {
+      permissions: ["webRequest", "webRequestBlocking", "http://example.com/*"],
+    },
+    background() {
+      let { browser } = this;
+      browser.webRequest.onBeforeRequest.addListener(
+        details => {
+          if (details.url === "http://example.com/") {
+            browser.test.sendMessage("redir-handled");
+            let redirectUrl = "https://example.com/";
+            return { redirectUrl };
+          }
+          return undefined;
+        },
+        { urls: ["http://example.com/*"] },
+        ["blocking"]
+      );
+    },
+  });
+
+  await extension.startup();
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, null, true);
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+      browser,
+      "http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_background_redirect.sjs?start"
+    );
+
+    await extension.awaitMessage("redir-handled");
+
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async function() {
+      let innerHTML = content.document.body.innerHTML;
+      ok(
+        innerHTML.includes("Test Page for Bug 1683015 loaded"),
+        "No https-only error page"
+      );
+    });
+  });
+
+  await extension.unload();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_console_logging.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_console_logging.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..473d2ec2f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_console_logging.js
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+// Bug 1625448 - HTTPS Only Mode - Tests for console logging
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1625448
+// This test makes sure that the various console messages from the HTTPS-Only
+// mode get logged to the console.
+"use strict";
+
+// Test Cases
+// description:    Description of what the subtests expects.
+// expectLogLevel: Expected log-level of a message.
+// expectIncludes: Expected substrings the message should contain.
+let tests = [
+  {
+    description: "Top-Level upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "HTTPS-Only Mode: Upgrading insecure request",
+      "to use",
+      "file_console_logging.html",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "iFrame upgrade failure should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.error,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "HTTPS-Only Mode: Upgrading insecure request",
+      "failed",
+      "file_console_logging.html",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "WebSocket upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "HTTPS-Only Mode: Upgrading insecure request",
+      "to use",
+      "ws://does.not.exist",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Sub-Resource upgrade for file_1 should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: ["Upgrading insecure", "request", "file_1.jpg"],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Sub-Resource upgrade for file_2 should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: ["Upgrading insecure", "request", "to use", "file_2.jpg"],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Exempt request for file_exempt should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.info,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Not upgrading insecure request",
+      "because it is exempt",
+      "file_exempt.jpg",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Sub-Resource upgrade failure for file_2 should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.error,
+    expectIncludes: ["Upgrading insecure request", "failed", "file_2.jpg"],
+  },
+];
+
+const testPathUpgradeable = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+// DNS errors are not logged as HTTPS-Only Mode upgrade failures, so we have to
+// upgrade to a domain that exists but fails.
+const testPathNotUpgradeable = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://self-signed.example.com"
+);
+const kTestURISuccess = testPathUpgradeable + "file_console_logging.html";
+const kTestURIFail = testPathNotUpgradeable + "file_console_logging.html";
+const kTestURIExempt = testPathUpgradeable + "file_exempt.jpg";
+
+const UPGRADE_DISPLAY_CONTENT =
+  "security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable HTTPS-Only Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_message);
+  // 1. Upgrade page to https://
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, kTestURISuccess);
+  // 2. Make an exempt http:// request
+  let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr.open("GET", kTestURIExempt, true);
+  xhr.channel.loadInfo.httpsOnlyStatus |= Ci.nsILoadInfo.HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+  xhr.send();
+  // 3. Make Websocket request
+  new WebSocket("ws://does.not.exist");
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => tests.length === 0);
+
+  // Clean up
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_message);
+});
+
+function on_new_message(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  const logLevel = msgObj.logLevel;
+
+  // Bools about message and pref
+  const isMCL2Enabled = Services.prefs.getBoolPref(UPGRADE_DISPLAY_CONTENT);
+  const isHTTPSOnlyModeLog = message.includes("HTTPS-Only Mode:");
+  const isMCLog = message.includes("Mixed Content:");
+
+  // Check for messages about HTTPS-only upgrades (those should be unrelated to mixed content upgrades)
+  // or for mixed content upgrades which should only occur if security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content is enabled
+  // (unrelated to https-only logs).
+  if (
+    (isHTTPSOnlyModeLog && !isMCLog) ||
+    (isMCLog && isMCL2Enabled && !isHTTPSOnlyModeLog)
+  ) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < tests.length; i++) {
+      const testCase = tests[i];
+      // If security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content is enabled, the mixed content control mechanism is upgrading file2.jpg
+      // and HTTPS-Only mode is not failing upgrading file2.jpg, so it won't be logged.
+      // so skip last test case
+      if (
+        testCase.description ==
+          "Sub-Resource upgrade failure for file_2 should get logged" &&
+        isMCL2Enabled
+      ) {
+        tests.splice(i, 1);
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if log-level matches
+      if (logLevel !== testCase.expectLogLevel) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if all substrings are included
+      if (testCase.expectIncludes.some(str => !message.includes(str))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ok(true, testCase.description);
+      tests.splice(i, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_cors_mixedcontent.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_cors_mixedcontent.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6b3059aebe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_cors_mixedcontent.js
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// Bug 1659505 - Https-Only: CORS and MixedContent tests
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/bug/1659505
+"use strict";
+
+// > How does this test work?
+// We open a page, that makes two fetch-requests to example.com (same-origin)
+// and example.org (cross-origin). When both fetch-calls have either failed or
+// succeeded, the site dispatches an event with the results.
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // HTTPS-Only Mode disabled
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTP and HOM disabled",
+    topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "success", // ok
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // CORS
+  });
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTPS and HOM disabled",
+    topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "error", // Mixed Content
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // Mixed Content
+  });
+
+  // HTTPS-Only Mode disabled and MixedContent blocker disabled
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false]],
+  });
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTPS; HOM and MixedContent blocker disabled",
+    topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "error", // CORS
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // CORS
+  });
+  await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+
+  // HTTPS-Only Mode enabled, no exception
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTP and HOM enabled",
+    topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "success", // ok
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // CORS
+  });
+
+  // HTTPS-Only enabled, with exception
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: "http://example.com",
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTP, HOM enabled but site exempt",
+    topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "success", // ok
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // CORS
+  });
+
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: "https://example.com",
+    },
+  ]);
+  await runTest({
+    description: "Load site with HTTPS, HOM enabled but site exempt",
+    topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+    expectedSameOrigin: "error", // Mixed Content
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "error", // Mixed Content
+  });
+
+  // Remove permission again (has to be done manually for some reason?)
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+});
+
+const SERVER_URL = scheme =>
+  `${scheme}://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_cors_mixedcontent.html`;
+
+async function runTest(test) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, SERVER_URL(test.topLevelScheme));
+
+    await loaded;
+
+    // eslint-disable-next-line no-shadow
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [test], async function(test) {
+      const promise = new Promise(resolve => {
+        content.addEventListener("FetchEnded", resolve, {
+          once: true,
+        });
+      });
+
+      content.dispatchEvent(new content.Event("StartFetch"));
+
+      const { detail } = await promise;
+
+      is(
+        detail.comResult,
+        test.expectedSameOrigin,
+        `${test.description} (same-origin)`
+      );
+      is(
+        detail.orgResult,
+        test.expectedCrossOrigin,
+        `${test.description} (cross-origin)`
+      );
+    });
+  });
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_hsts_host.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_hsts_host.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67c8cf6601
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_hsts_host.js
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+// Bug 1722489 - HTTPS-Only Mode - Tests evaluation order
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1722489
+// This test ensures that an http request to an hsts host
+// gets upgraded by hsts and not by https-only.
+"use strict";
+
+// Set bools to track that tests ended.
+let readMessage = false;
+let testFinished = false;
+// Visit a secure site that sends an HSTS header to set up the rest of the
+// test.
+add_task(async function see_hsts_header() {
+  let setHstsUrl =
+    getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+      "chrome://mochitests/content",
+      "https://example.com"
+    ) + "hsts_headers.sjs";
+  Services.obs.addObserver(observer, "http-on-examine-response");
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, setHstsUrl);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => readMessage);
+  // Clean up
+  Services.obs.removeObserver(observer, "http-on-examine-response");
+});
+
+// Test that HTTPS_Only is not performed if HSTS host is visited.
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable HTTPS-Only Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(onNewMessage);
+  const RESOURCE_LINK =
+    getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+      "chrome://mochitests/content",
+      "http://example.com"
+    ) + "hsts_headers.sjs";
+
+  // 1. Upgrade page to https://
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, RESOURCE_LINK);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => testFinished);
+
+  // Clean up
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(onNewMessage);
+});
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // Reset HSTS header
+  readMessage = false;
+  let clearHstsUrl =
+    getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+      "chrome://mochitests/content",
+      "https://example.com"
+    ) + "hsts_headers.sjs?reset";
+
+  Services.obs.addObserver(observer, "http-on-examine-response");
+  // reset hsts header
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, clearHstsUrl);
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => readMessage);
+  // Clean up
+  Services.obs.removeObserver(observer, "http-on-examine-response");
+});
+
+function observer(subject, topic, state) {
+  info("observer called with " + topic);
+  if (topic == "http-on-examine-response") {
+    onExamineResponse(subject);
+  }
+}
+
+function onExamineResponse(subject) {
+  let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  // If message was already read or is not related to "example.com",
+  // don't examine it.
+  if (!channel.URI.spec.includes("example.com") || readMessage) {
+    return;
+  }
+  info("onExamineResponse with " + channel.URI.spec);
+  if (channel.URI.spec.includes("reset")) {
+    try {
+      let hsts = channel.getResponseHeader("Strict-Transport-Security");
+      is(hsts, "max-age=0", "HSTS header is not set");
+    } catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "HSTS header still set");
+    }
+    readMessage = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  try {
+    let hsts = channel.getResponseHeader("Strict-Transport-Security");
+    let csp = channel.getResponseHeader("Content-Security-Policy");
+    // Check that HSTS and CSP upgrade headers are set
+    is(hsts, "max-age=60", "HSTS header is set");
+    is(csp, "upgrade-insecure-requests", "CSP header is set");
+  } catch (e) {
+    ok(false, "No header set");
+  }
+  readMessage = true;
+}
+
+function onNewMessage(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  // ensure that request is not upgraded HTTPS-Only.
+  if (message.includes("Upgrading insecure request")) {
+    ok(false, "Top-Level upgrade shouldn't get logged");
+    testFinished = true;
+  } else if (
+    message.includes("Upgrading insecure speculative TCP connection")
+  ) {
+    // TODO: Check assertion
+    // https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1735683
+    ok(true, "Top-Level upgrade shouldn't get logged");
+    testFinished = true;
+  } else if (gBrowser.selectedBrowser.currentURI.scheme === "https") {
+    ok(true, "Top-Level upgrade shouldn't get logged");
+    testFinished = true;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_prefs.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_prefs.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e6ae06bb29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_prefs.js
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+"use strict";
+
+async function runPrefTest(
+  aHTTPSOnlyPref,
+  aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM,
+  aExecuteFromPBM,
+  aDesc,
+  aAssertURLStartsWith
+) {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode", aHTTPSOnlyPref],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode_pbm", aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    await ContentTask.spawn(
+      browser,
+      { aExecuteFromPBM, aDesc, aAssertURLStartsWith },
+      // eslint-disable-next-line no-shadow
+      async function({ aExecuteFromPBM, aDesc, aAssertURLStartsWith }) {
+        const responseURL = await new Promise(resolve => {
+          let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+          xhr.timeout = 1200;
+          xhr.open("GET", "http://example.com");
+          if (aExecuteFromPBM) {
+            xhr.channel.loadInfo.originAttributes = {
+              privateBrowsingId: 1,
+            };
+          }
+          xhr.onreadystatechange = () => {
+            // We don't care about the result and it's possible that
+            // the requests might even succeed in some testing environments
+            if (
+              xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.OPENED ||
+              xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.UNSENT
+            ) {
+              // Let's make sure this function does not get called anymore
+              xhr.onreadystatechange = undefined;
+              resolve(xhr.responseURL);
+            }
+          };
+          xhr.send();
+        });
+        ok(responseURL.startsWith(aAssertURLStartsWith), aDesc);
+      }
+    );
+  });
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    false,
+    false,
+    false,
+    "Setting no prefs should not upgrade",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    true,
+    false,
+    false,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPref should upgrade",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    false,
+    true,
+    false,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM should not upgrade",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    false,
+    false,
+    true,
+    "Setting aPBM should not upgrade",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    true,
+    true,
+    false,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPref and aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM should should upgrade",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    true,
+    false,
+    true,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPref and aPBM should upgrade",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    false,
+    true,
+    true,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM and aPBM should upgrade",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  await runPrefTest(
+    true,
+    true,
+    true,
+    "Setting aHTTPSOnlyPref and aHTTPSOnlyPrefPBM and aPBM should upgrade",
+    "https://"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_speculative_connect.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_speculative_connect.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d07f335b99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_httpsonly_speculative_connect.js
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.org"
+);
+
+let console_messages = [
+  {
+    description: "Speculative Connection should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure speculative TCP connection",
+      "to use",
+      "example.org",
+      "file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html",
+    ],
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Upgrade should get logged",
+    expectLogLevel: Ci.nsIConsoleMessage.warn,
+    expectIncludes: [
+      "Upgrading insecure request",
+      "to use",
+      "example.org",
+      "file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html",
+    ],
+  },
+];
+
+function on_new_console_messages(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+  const logLevel = msgObj.logLevel;
+
+  if (message.includes("HTTPS-Only Mode:")) {
+    for (let i = 0; i < console_messages.length; i++) {
+      const testCase = console_messages[i];
+      // Check if log-level matches
+      if (logLevel !== testCase.expectLogLevel) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Check if all substrings are included
+      if (testCase.expectIncludes.some(str => !message.includes(str))) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      ok(true, testCase.description);
+      console_messages.splice(i, 1);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_new_console_messages);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html`
+  );
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => console_messages.length === 0);
+
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_new_console_messages);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_iframe_test.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_iframe_test.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67a3974c96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_iframe_test.js
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// Bug 1658264 - Https-Only: HTTPS-Only and iFrames
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1658264
+"use strict";
+
+// > How does this test work?
+// We're sending a request to file_iframe_test.sjs with various
+// browser-configurations. The sjs-file returns a website with two iFrames
+// loading the same sjs-file again. One iFrame is same origin (example.com) and
+// the other cross-origin (example.org) Each request gets saved in a semicolon
+// seperated list of strings. The sjs-file gets initialized with the
+// query-string "setup" and the result string can be polled with "results". Each
+// string has this format: {top/com/org}-{queryString}-{scheme}. In the end
+// we're just checking if all expected requests were recorded and had the
+// correct scheme. Requests that are meant to fail should explicitly not be
+// contained in the list of results.
+
+// The test loads all tabs and evaluates when all have finished loading
+// it may take quite a long time.
+// This requires more twice as much as the default 45 seconds per test:
+requestLongerTimeout(2);
+SimpleTest.requestCompleteLog();
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await setup();
+
+  // Using this variable to parallelize and collect tests
+  let testSet = [];
+
+  /*
+   * HTTPS-Only Mode disabled
+   */
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", false]],
+  });
+
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTP
+  // NOTE(freddyb): Test case temporarily disabled. See bug 1735565
+  /*testSet.push(
+    runTest({
+      queryString: "test1.1",
+      topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+      expectedTopLevel: "http",
+      expectedSameOrigin: "http",
+      expectedCrossOrigin: "http",
+    })
+  );*/
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTPS
+  testSet.push(
+    runTest({
+      queryString: "test1.2",
+      topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+      expectedTopLevel: "https",
+      expectedSameOrigin: "fail",
+      expectedCrossOrigin: "fail",
+    })
+  );
+
+  await Promise.all(testSet);
+  testSet = [];
+  /*
+   * HTTPS-Only Mode enabled, no exception
+   */
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTP
+  testSet.push(
+    runTest({
+      queryString: "test2.1",
+      topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+      expectedTopLevel: "https",
+      expectedSameOrigin: "https",
+      expectedCrossOrigin: "https",
+    })
+  );
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTPS
+  testSet.push(
+    runTest({
+      queryString: "test2.2",
+      topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+      expectedTopLevel: "https",
+      expectedSameOrigin: "https",
+      expectedCrossOrigin: "https",
+    })
+  );
+
+  await Promise.all(testSet);
+  testSet = [];
+
+  /*
+   * HTTPS-Only enabled, with exceptions
+   * for http://example.org and http://example.com
+   */
+  // Exempting example.org (cross-site) should not affect anything
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: "http://example.org",
+    },
+  ]);
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: "http://example.com",
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTP
+  await runTest({
+    queryString: "test3.1",
+    topLevelScheme: "http",
+
+    expectedTopLevel: "http",
+    expectedSameOrigin: "http",
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "http",
+  });
+
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: "https://example.com",
+    },
+  ]);
+  // Top-Level scheme: HTTPS
+  await runTest({
+    queryString: "test3.2",
+    topLevelScheme: "https",
+
+    expectedTopLevel: "https",
+    expectedSameOrigin: "fail",
+    expectedCrossOrigin: "fail",
+  });
+
+  // Remove permissions again (has to be done manually for some reason?)
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+
+  await evaluate();
+});
+
+const SERVER_URL = scheme =>
+  `${scheme}://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs?`;
+let shouldContain = [];
+let shouldNotContain = [];
+
+async function setup() {
+  info(`TEST-CASE-setup - A`);
+  const response = await fetch(SERVER_URL("https") + "setup");
+  info(`TEST-CASE-setup - B`);
+  const txt = await response.text();
+  info(`TEST-CASE-setup - C`);
+  if (txt != "ok") {
+    ok(false, "Failed to setup test server.");
+    finish();
+  }
+}
+
+async function evaluate() {
+  info(`TEST-CASE-evaluate - A`);
+  const response = await fetch(SERVER_URL("https") + "results");
+  info(`TEST-CASE-evaluate - B`);
+  const requestResults = (await response.text()).split(";");
+  info(`TEST-CASE-evaluate - C`);
+
+  shouldContain.map(str =>
+    ok(requestResults.includes(str), `Results should contain '${str}'.`)
+  );
+  shouldNotContain.map(str =>
+    ok(!requestResults.includes(str), `Results shouldn't contain '${str}'.`)
+  );
+}
+
+async function runTest(test) {
+  const queryString = test.queryString;
+  info(`TEST-CASE-${test.queryString} - runTest BEGIN`);
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+      browser,
+      false, // includeSubFrames
+      SERVER_URL(test.expectedTopLevel) + queryString,
+      false // maybeErrorPage
+    );
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(
+      browser,
+      SERVER_URL(test.topLevelScheme) + queryString
+    );
+    info(`TEST-CASE-${test.queryString} - Before 'await loaded'`);
+    await loaded;
+    info(`TEST-CASE-${test.queryString} - After 'await loaded'`);
+  });
+  info(`TEST-CASE-${test.queryString} - After 'await withNewTab'`);
+
+  if (test.expectedTopLevel !== "fail") {
+    shouldContain.push(`top-${queryString}-${test.expectedTopLevel}`);
+  } else {
+    shouldNotContain.push(`top-${queryString}-http`);
+    shouldNotContain.push(`top-${queryString}-https`);
+  }
+
+  if (test.expectedSameOrigin !== "fail") {
+    shouldContain.push(`com-${queryString}-${test.expectedSameOrigin}`);
+  } else {
+    shouldNotContain.push(`com-${queryString}-http`);
+    shouldNotContain.push(`com-${queryString}-https`);
+  }
+
+  if (test.expectedCrossOrigin !== "fail") {
+    shouldContain.push(`org-${queryString}-${test.expectedCrossOrigin}`);
+  } else {
+    shouldNotContain.push(`org-${queryString}-http`);
+    shouldNotContain.push(`org-${queryString}-https`);
+  }
+  info(`TEST-CASE-${test.queryString} - runTest END`);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_triggering_principal_exemption.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_triggering_principal_exemption.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d2d4038ac8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_triggering_principal_exemption.js
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+// Bug 1662359 - Don't upgrade subresources whose triggering principal is exempt from HTTPS-Only mode.
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/bug/1662359
+"use strict";
+
+const TRIGGERING_PAGE = "http://example.org";
+const LOADED_RESOURCE = "http://example.com";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // Enable HTTPS-Only Mode
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+
+  await runTest(
+    "Request with not exempt triggering principal should get upgraded.",
+    "https://"
+  );
+
+  // Now exempt the triggering page
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+    {
+      type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+      allow: true,
+      context: TRIGGERING_PAGE,
+    },
+  ]);
+
+  await runTest(
+    "Request with exempt triggering principal should not get upgraded.",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+});
+
+async function runTest(desc, startsWith) {
+  const responseURL = await new Promise(resolve => {
+    let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.open("GET", LOADED_RESOURCE);
+
+    // Replace loadinfo with one whose triggeringPrincipal is a content
+    // principal for TRIGGERING_PAGE.
+    const triggeringPrincipal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipalFromOrigin(
+      TRIGGERING_PAGE
+    );
+    let dummyURI = Services.io.newURI(LOADED_RESOURCE);
+    let dummyChannel = NetUtil.newChannel({
+      uri: dummyURI,
+      triggeringPrincipal,
+      loadingPrincipal: xhr.channel.loadInfo.loadingPrincipal,
+      securityFlags: xhr.channel.loadInfo.securityFlags,
+      contentPolicyType: xhr.channel.loadInfo.externalContentPolicyType,
+    });
+    xhr.channel.loadInfo = dummyChannel.loadInfo;
+
+    xhr.onreadystatechange = () => {
+      // We don't care about the result, just if Firefox upgraded the URL
+      // internally.
+      if (
+        xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.OPENED ||
+        xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.UNSENT
+      ) {
+        // Let's make sure this function doesn't get called anymore
+        xhr.onreadystatechange = undefined;
+        resolve(xhr.responseURL);
+      }
+    };
+    xhr.send();
+  });
+  ok(responseURL.startsWith(startsWith), desc);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_upgrade_exceptions.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_upgrade_exceptions.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d1916b3552
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_upgrade_exceptions.js
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+// Bug 1625448 - HTTPS Only Mode - Exceptions for loopback and local IP addresses
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1631384
+// This test ensures that various configurable upgrade exceptions work
+"use strict";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  requestLongerTimeout(2);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+
+  // Loopback test
+  await runTest(
+    "Loopback IP addresses should always be exempt from upgrades (localhost)",
+    "http://localhost",
+    "http://"
+  );
+  await runTest(
+    "Loopback IP addresses should always be exempt from upgrades (127.0.0.1)",
+    "http://127.0.0.1",
+    "http://"
+  );
+  // Default local-IP and onion tests
+  await runTest(
+    "Local IP addresses should be exempt from upgrades by default",
+    "http://10.0.250.250",
+    "http://"
+  );
+  await runTest(
+    "Hosts ending with .onion should be be exempt from HTTPS-Only upgrades by default",
+    "http://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion",
+    "http://"
+  );
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_local", true],
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion", true],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  // Local-IP and onion tests with upgrade enabled
+  await runTest(
+    "Local IP addresses should get upgraded when 'dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_local' is set to true",
+    "http://10.0.250.250",
+    "https://"
+  );
+  await runTest(
+    "Hosts ending with .onion should get upgraded when 'dom.security.https_only_mode.upgrade_onion' is set to true",
+    "http://grocery.shopping.for.one.onion",
+    "https://"
+  );
+  // Local-IP request with HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT flag
+  await runTest(
+    "The HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT flag should overrule upgrade-prefs",
+    "http://10.0.250.250",
+    "http://",
+    true
+  );
+});
+
+async function runTest(desc, url, startsWith, exempt = false) {
+  const responseURL = await new Promise(resolve => {
+    let xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    xhr.timeout = 1200;
+    xhr.open("GET", url);
+    if (exempt) {
+      xhr.channel.loadInfo.httpsOnlyStatus |= Ci.nsILoadInfo.HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+    }
+    xhr.onreadystatechange = () => {
+      // We don't care about the result and it's possible that
+      // the requests might even succeed in some testing environments
+      if (
+        xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.OPENED ||
+        xhr.readyState !== XMLHttpRequest.UNSENT
+      ) {
+        // Let's make sure this function doesn't get caled anymore
+        xhr.onreadystatechange = undefined;
+        resolve(xhr.responseURL);
+      }
+    };
+    xhr.send();
+  });
+  ok(responseURL.startsWith(startsWith), desc);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_user_gesture.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_user_gesture.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0e0878e93c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_user_gesture.js
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+// Bug 1725026 - HTTPS Only Mode - Test if a load triggered by a user gesture
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1725026
+// Test if a load triggered by a user gesture can be upgraded to HTTPS
+// successfully.
+
+"use strict";
+
+const testPathUpgradeable = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://example.com"
+);
+
+const kTestURI = testPathUpgradeable + "file_user_gesture.html";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // Enable HTTPS-Only Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]],
+  });
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    const loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, null, true);
+    // 1. Upgrade a page to https://
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, kTestURI);
+    await loaded;
+    await ContentTask.spawn(browser, {}, async args => {
+      ok(
+        content.document.location.href.startsWith("https://"),
+        "Should be https"
+      );
+
+      // 2. Trigger a load by clicking button.
+      // The scheme of the link url is `http` and the load should be able to
+      // upgraded to `https` because of HTTPS-only mode.
+      let button = content.document.getElementById("httpLinkButton");
+      await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(
+        button,
+        { type: "mousedown" },
+        content
+      );
+      await EventUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(
+        button,
+        { type: "mouseup" },
+        content
+      );
+      await ContentTaskUtils.waitForCondition(() => {
+        return content.document.location.href.startsWith("https://");
+      });
+      ok(
+        content.document.location.href.startsWith("https://"),
+        "Should be https"
+      );
+    });
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_websocket_exceptions.js b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_websocket_exceptions.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3c908e2aba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/browser_websocket_exceptions.js
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH_HTTP = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "http://localhost:9898"
+);
+
+let WEBSOCKET_DOC_URL = `${TEST_PATH_HTTP}file_websocket_exceptions.html`;
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // Here is a sequence of how this test works:
+  // 1. Dynamically inject a localhost iframe
+  // 2. Add an exemption for localhost
+  // 3. Fire up Websocket
+  // Generally local IP addresses are exempt from https-only, but if we do not add
+  // an exemption for localhost, then the TriggeringPrincipal of the WebSocket is
+  // `not` exempt and we would upgrade ws to wss.
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+      ["network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost", true],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab("about:blank", async function(browser) {
+    let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+
+    BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, WEBSOCKET_DOC_URL);
+    await loaded;
+
+    await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [], async function() {
+      // Part 1:
+      let myIframe = content.document.createElement("iframe");
+      content.document.body.appendChild(myIframe);
+      myIframe.src =
+        "http://localhost:9898/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions_iframe.html";
+
+      myIframe.onload = async function() {
+        // Part 2:
+        await SpecialPowers.pushPermissions([
+          {
+            type: "https-only-load-insecure",
+            allow: true,
+            context: "http://localhost:9898",
+          },
+        ]);
+        // Part 3.
+        myIframe.contentWindow.postMessage({ myMessage: "runWebSocket" }, "*");
+      };
+
+      const promise = new Promise(resolve => {
+        content.addEventListener("WebSocketEnded", resolve, {
+          once: true,
+        });
+      });
+
+      const { detail } = await promise;
+
+      is(detail.state, "onopen", "sanity: websocket loaded");
+      ok(
+        detail.url.startsWith("ws://example.com/tests"),
+        "exempt websocket should not be upgraded to wss://"
+      );
+    });
+  });
+  await SpecialPowers.popPermissions();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_background_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_background_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45e01797e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_background_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1683015
+"use strict";
+
+let { setTimeout } = ChromeUtils.importESModule(
+  "resource://gre/modules/Timer.sys.mjs"
+);
+
+async function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  let query = request.queryString;
+  if (request.scheme === "https" && query === "start") {
+    // Simulating long repsonse time by processing the https request
+    // using a 5 seconds delay. Note that the http background request
+    // gets send after 3 seconds
+    response.processAsync();
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 200, "OK");
+      response.write(
+        "<html><body>Test Page for Bug 1683015 loaded</body></html>"
+      );
+      response.finish();
+    }, 5000); /* wait 5 seconds */
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, but just in case return something unexpected
+  response.setStatusLine("1.1", 404, "Not Found");
+  response.write("<html><body>SHOULDN'T DISPLAY THIS PAGE</body></html>");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a8a9083ef3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1691888
+"use strict";
+
+const REDIRECT_META = `
+  <html>
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?test1b'">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    META REDIRECT
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+const REDIRECT_JS = `
+  <html>
+   <body>
+     JS REDIRECT
+     <script>
+       let url= "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?test2b";
+       window.location = url;
+     </script>
+   </body>
+   </html>`;
+
+const REDIRECT_302 =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs?test3b";
+
+const REDIRECT_302_DIFFERENT_PATH =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_user_gesture.html";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  // if the scheme is not https, meaning that the initial request did not
+  // get upgraded, then we rather fall through and display unexpected content.
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    let query = request.queryString;
+
+    if (query === "test1a") {
+      response.write(REDIRECT_META);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test2a") {
+      response.write(REDIRECT_JS);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test3a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+      response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_302, false);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (query === "test4a") {
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+      response.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_302_DIFFERENT_PATH, false);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here, just in case,
+  // let's return something unexpected
+  response.write("<html><body>DO NOT DISPLAY THIS</body></html>");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_console_logging.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_console_logging.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..94e07cddd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_console_logging.html
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1625448 - HTTPS Only Mode - Tests for console logging</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- These files don't exist since we only care if the webserver can respond. -->
+  <!-- This request can get upgraded. -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/file_1.jpg">
+  <!-- This request can't get upgraded -->
+  <img src="http://self-signed.example.com/file_2.jpg">
+
+  <iframe src="http://self-signed.example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_console_logging.html"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_cors_mixedcontent.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_cors_mixedcontent.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50d32954ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_cors_mixedcontent.html
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+
+  <script>
+    addEventListener("StartFetch", async function() {
+      let comResult;
+      let orgResult;
+
+      await Promise.all([
+        fetch("http://example.com/")
+          .then(() => {
+            comResult = "success";
+          })
+          .catch(() => {
+            comResult = "error";
+          }),
+        fetch("http://example.org/")
+          .then(() => {
+            orgResult = "success";
+          })
+          .catch(() => {
+            orgResult = "error";
+          }),
+      ]);
+
+      window.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("FetchEnded", {
+        detail: { comResult, orgResult }
+      }));
+
+      })
+  </script>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h2>Https-Only: CORS and MixedContent tests</h2>
+  <p><a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/bug/1659505">Bug 1659505</a></p>
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10a9973a37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<script>
+// sends url of current window and onbeforeunloadMessage
+// when we enter here test failed.
+function beforeunload(){
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "before-unload",
+    result: window.location.hash,
+    button: false,
+  }, "*");
+}
+
+// sends url of current window and then click on button
+window.onload = function (){
+  // get button by ID
+  let button = window.document.getElementById("clickMeButton");
+  // if getting button was successful, buttonExist = true
+  let buttonExist = button !== null;
+  // send loading message
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "onload",
+    result: window.location.href,
+    button: buttonExist,
+  }, "*");
+  // click button
+  button.click();
+
+}
+// after button clicked and paged scrolled sends URL of current window
+window.onscroll = function(){
+  window.opener.postMessage({
+    info: "scrolled-to-foo",
+    result: window.location.hash,
+    button: true,
+  }, "*");
+ }
+
+
+</script>
+<body onbeforeunload="/*just to notify if we load a new page*/ beforeunload()";>
+  <a id="clickMeButton" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html#foo">Click me</a>
+  <div style="height: 1000px; border: 1px solid black;"> space</div>
+  <a name="foo" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html">foo</a>
+  <div style="height: 1000px; border: 1px solid black;">space</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_auth_request.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_auth_request.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80fc8ffcf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_auth_request.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1665062
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html;charset=utf-8", false);
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 401, "Unauthorized");
+    response.setHeader("WWW-Authenticate", 'Basic realm="bug1665062"');
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // we should never get here; just in case, return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_request.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_request.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ef0e2ce5bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_request.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// Custom *.sjs file specifically for the needs of Bug 1663396
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    // async and *never* return anything!
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  // we should never get here; just in case, return something unexpected
+  response.write("do'h");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..46a10401f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_httpsonly_speculative_connect.html
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+<html><body>dummy file for speculative https-only upgrade test</body></html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..611870c87c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+// Bug 1658264 - HTTPS-Only and iFrames
+// see browser_iframe_test.js
+
+const IFRAME_CONTENT = `
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>Helo Friend!</body>
+</html>`;
+const DOCUMENT_CONTENT = q => `
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head><meta charset="utf-8"></head>
+  <body>
+    <iframe src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs?com-${q}"></iframe>
+    <iframe src="http://example.org/browser/dom/security/test/https-only/file_iframe_test.sjs?org-${q}"></iframe>
+  </body>
+</html>`;
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let queryString = request.queryString;
+  const queryScheme = request.scheme;
+
+  // Setup the state with an empty string and return "ok"
+  if (queryString == "setup") {
+    setState("receivedQueries", "");
+    response.write("ok");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  let receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+
+  // Return result-string
+  if (queryString == "results") {
+    response.write(receivedQueries);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Add semicolon to seperate strings
+  if (receivedQueries !== "") {
+    receivedQueries += ";";
+  }
+
+  // Requests from iFrames start with com or org
+  if (queryString.startsWith("com-") || queryString.startsWith("org-")) {
+    receivedQueries += queryString;
+    setState("receivedQueries", `${receivedQueries}-${queryScheme}`);
+    response.write(IFRAME_CONTENT);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Everything else has to be a top-level request
+  receivedQueries += `top-${queryString}`;
+  setState("receivedQueries", `${receivedQueries}-${queryScheme}`);
+  response.write(DOCUMENT_CONTENT(queryString));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_insecure_reload.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_insecure_reload.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a48ec4e20f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_insecure_reload.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1702001
+
+// An onload postmessage to window opener
+const ON_LOAD = `
+  <html>
+  <body>
+  send onload message...
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    window.opener.postMessage({result: 'you entered the http page', historyLength: history.length}, '*');
+  </script>
+  </body>
+  </html>`;
+
+// When an https request is sent, cause a timeout so that the https-only error
+// page is displayed.
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  if (request.scheme === "https") {
+    // Simulating a timeout by processing the https request
+    // async and *never* return anything!
+    response.processAsync();
+    return;
+  }
+  if (request.scheme === "http") {
+    response.write(ON_LOAD);
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c66cbaa226
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1613063
+
+// Step 1. Send request with redirect queryString (eg. file_redirect.sjs?302)
+// Step 2. Server responds with corresponding redirect code to http://example.com/../file_redirect.sjs?check
+// Step 3. Response from ?check indicates whether the redirected request was secure or not.
+
+const RESPONSE_SECURE = "secure-ok";
+const RESPONSE_INSECURE = "secure-error";
+const RESPONSE_ERROR = "unexpected-query";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  const query = request.queryString;
+
+  // Send redirect header
+  if ((query >= 301 && query <= 303) || query == 307) {
+    const loc =
+      "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_redirect.sjs?check";
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, query, "Moved");
+    response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // Check if scheme is http:// oder https://
+  if (query == "check") {
+    const secure =
+      request.scheme == "https" ? RESPONSE_SECURE : RESPONSE_INSECURE;
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.write(secure);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // This should not happen
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 500, "OK");
+  response.write(RESPONSE_ERROR);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d230a4fd9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure.html
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1613063 - HTTPS Only Mode</title>
+  <!-- style -->
+  <link rel='stylesheet' type='text/css' href='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?style' media='screen' />
+
+  <!-- font -->
+  <style>
+    @font-face {
+      font-family: "foofont";
+      src: url('http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?font');
+    }
+    .div_foo { font-family: "foofont"; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+  <!-- images: -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img"></img>
+
+  <!-- redirects: upgrade http:// to https:// redirect to http:// and then upgrade to https:// again -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?redirect-image"></img>
+
+  <!-- script: -->
+  <script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?script"></script>
+
+  <!-- media: -->
+  <audio src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?media"></audio>
+
+  <!-- objects: -->
+  <object width="10" height="10" data="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?object"></object>
+
+  <!-- font: (apply font loaded in header to div) -->
+  <div class="div_foo">foo</div>
+
+  <!-- iframe: (same origin) -->
+  <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?iframe">
+    <!-- within that iframe we load an image over http and make sure the requested gets upgraded to https -->
+  </iframe>
+
+  <!-- xhr: -->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+    myXHR.open("GET", "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?xhr");
+    myXHR.send(null);
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- websockets: upgrade ws:// to wss://-->
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    // WebSocket tests are not supported on Android yet. Bug 1566168
+    const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+      "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+    );
+    if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+      var mySocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure");
+      mySocket.onopen = function(e) {
+        if (mySocket.url.includes("wss://")) {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-ok"}, "*");
+        }
+        else {
+          window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-error"}, "*");
+        }
+        mySocket.close();
+      };
+      mySocket.onerror = function(e) {
+        // debug information for Bug 1316305
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (mySocket): " + mySocket + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (mySocket.url): " + mySocket.url + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (e): " + e + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: (e.message): " + e.message + "\n");
+        dump("  xxx mySocket.onerror: This might be related to Bug 1316305!\n");
+        window.parent.postMessage({result: "websocket-unexpected-error"}, "*");
+      };
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- form action: (upgrade POST from http:// to https://) -->
+  <iframe name='formFrame' id='formFrame'></iframe>
+  <form target="formFrame" action="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?form" method="POST">
+    <input name="foo" value="foo">
+    <input type="submit" id="submitButton" formenctype='multipart/form-data' value="Submit form">
+  </form>
+  <script type="text/javascript">
+    var submitButton = document.getElementById('submitButton');
+    submitButton.click();
+  </script>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aaa1f62d80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+// SJS file for HTTPS-Only Mode mochitests
+// Bug 1613063 - HTTPS Only Mode
+
+const TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS = 11;
+
+const IFRAME_CONTENT =
+  "<!DOCTYPE HTML>" +
+  "<html>" +
+  "<head><meta charset='utf-8'>" +
+  "<title>Bug 1613063 - HTTPS Only Mode</title>" +
+  "</head>" +
+  "<body>" +
+  "<img src='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?nested-img'></img>" +
+  "</body>" +
+  "</html>";
+
+const expectedQueries = [
+  "script",
+  "style",
+  "img",
+  "iframe",
+  "form",
+  "xhr",
+  "media",
+  "object",
+  "font",
+  "img-redir",
+  "nested-img",
+];
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  var queryString = request.queryString;
+
+  // initialize server variables and save the object state
+  // of the initial request, which returns async once the
+  // server has processed all requests.
+  if (queryString == "queryresult") {
+    setState("totaltests", TOTAL_EXPECTED_REQUESTS.toString());
+    setState("receivedQueries", "");
+    response.processAsync();
+    setObjectState("queryResult", response);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // handle img redirect (https->http)
+  if (queryString == "redirect-image") {
+    var newLocation =
+      "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?img-redir";
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader("Location", newLocation, false);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // just in case error handling for unexpected queries
+  if (!expectedQueries.includes(queryString)) {
+    response.write("unexpected-response");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // make sure all the requested queries are indeed https
+  queryString += request.scheme == "https" ? "-ok" : "-error";
+
+  var receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+
+  // images, scripts, etc. get queried twice, do not
+  // confuse the server by storing the preload as
+  // well as the actual load. If either the preload
+  // or the actual load is not https, then we would
+  // append "-error" in the array and the test would
+  // fail at the end.
+  if (receivedQueries.includes(queryString)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // append the result to the total query string array
+  if (receivedQueries != "") {
+    receivedQueries += ",";
+  }
+  receivedQueries += queryString;
+  setState("receivedQueries", receivedQueries);
+
+  // keep track of how many more requests the server
+  // is expecting
+  var totaltests = parseInt(getState("totaltests"));
+  totaltests -= 1;
+  setState("totaltests", totaltests.toString());
+
+  // return content (img) for the nested iframe to test
+  // that subresource requests within nested contexts
+  // get upgraded as well. We also have to return
+  // the iframe context in case of an error so we
+  // can test both, using upgrade-insecure as well
+  // as the base case of not using upgrade-insecure.
+  if (queryString == "iframe-ok" || queryString == "iframe-error") {
+    response.write(IFRAME_CONTENT);
+  }
+
+  // if we have received all the requests, we return
+  // the result back.
+  if (totaltests == 0) {
+    getObjectState("queryResult", function(queryResponse) {
+      if (!queryResponse) {
+        return;
+      }
+      receivedQueries = getState("receivedQueries");
+      queryResponse.write(receivedQueries);
+      queryResponse.finish();
+    });
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7159c742b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+def web_socket_do_extra_handshake(request):
+    pass
+
+
+def web_socket_transfer_data(request):
+    pass
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_user_gesture.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_user_gesture.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac67064bf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_user_gesture.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Bug 1725026 - HTTPS Only Mode - Test if a load triggered by a user gesture can be upgraded to HTTPS</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <button id="httpLinkButton" onclick="location.href='http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_console_logging.html'" type="button">
+    button</button>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6c6ba07480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+</head>
+<body>
+  Dummy file which gets iframe injected<br/>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..23c6af2d45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/file_websocket_exceptions_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta charset="utf-8">
+<script>
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+  var mySocket = new WebSocket("ws://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure");
+  mySocket.onopen = function(e) {
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("WebSocketEnded", {
+      detail: { url: mySocket.url, state: "onopen" }
+    }));
+    mySocket.close();
+  };
+  mySocket.onerror = function(e) {
+    parent.dispatchEvent(new CustomEvent("WebSocketEnded", {
+      detail: { url: mySocket.url, state: "onerror" }
+    }));
+    mySocket.close();
+  };
+}
+</script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  Https-Only: WebSocket exemption test in iframe</br>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/hsts_headers.sjs b/dom/security/test/https-only/hsts_headers.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..72e82caaf3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/hsts_headers.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+ * http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  if (request.queryString === "reset") {
+    // Reset the HSTS policy, prevent influencing other tests
+    response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200, "OK");
+    response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", "max-age=0");
+    response.write("Resetting HSTS");
+    return;
+  }
+  let hstsHeader = "max-age=60";
+  response.setHeader("Strict-Transport-Security", hstsHeader);
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+  // Set header for csp upgrade
+  response.setHeader(
+    "Content-Security-Policy",
+    "upgrade-insecure-requests",
+    false
+  );
+  response.setStatusLine(request.httpVersion, 200);
+  response.write("<!DOCTYPE html><html><body><h1>Ok!</h1></body></html>");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/https-only/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8916e0b0e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_redirect.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure.html
+  file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs
+  file_upgrade_insecure_wsh.py
+prefs =
+  dom.security.https_first=false
+  security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content=false
+
+[test_resource_upgrade.html]
+scheme=https
+[test_redirect_upgrade.html]
+scheme=https
+fail-if = xorigin
+[test_http_background_request.html]
+support-files = file_http_background_request.sjs
+[test_http_background_auth_request.html]
+support-files = file_http_background_auth_request.sjs
+[test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html]
+skip-if = (toolkit == 'android') # no support for error pages, Bug 1697866
+support-files =
+  file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs
+  file_user_gesture.html
+[test_user_suggestion_box.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no https-only errorpage support in android
+[test_fragment.html]
+support-files = file_fragment.html
+[test_insecure_reload.html]
+support-files = file_insecure_reload.sjs
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no https-only errorpage support in android
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..847a71f378
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.html
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1691888: Break endless upgrade downgrade loops when using https-only</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We perform three tests where our upgrade/downgrade redirect loop detector should break the
+ * endless loop:
+ * Test 1: Meta Refresh
+ * Test 2: JS Redirect
+ * Test 3: 302 redirect
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("We need to wait for the HTTPS-Only error page to appear");
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(10);
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_break_endless_upgrade_downgrade_loop.sjs";
+
+function resolveAfter6Seconds() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      resolve();
+    }, 6000);
+  });
+}
+
+async function verifyResult(aTestName) {
+  let errorPageL10nId = "about-httpsonly-title-alert";
+  let innerHTML = content.document.body.innerHTML;
+  ok(innerHTML.includes(errorPageL10nId), "the error page should be shown for " + aTestName);
+}
+
+async function verifyTest4Result() {
+  let pathname = content.document.location.pathname;
+  ok(
+    pathname === "/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_user_gesture.html",
+     "the http:// page should be loaded"
+  );
+}
+
+async function runTests() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_break_upgrade_downgrade_endless_loop", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_check_path_upgrade_downgrade_endless_loop", true],
+  ]});
+
+  // Test 1: Meta Refresh Redirect
+  let winTest1 = window.open(REQUEST_URL + "?test1a", "_blank");
+  // Test 2: JS win.location Redirect
+  let winTest2 = window.open(REQUEST_URL + "?test2a", "_blank");
+  // Test 3: 302 Redirect
+  let winTest3 = window.open(REQUEST_URL + "?test3a", "_blank");
+  // Test 4: 302 Redirect with a different path
+  let winTest4 = window.open(REQUEST_URL + "?test4a", "_blank");
+
+  // provide enough time for:
+  // the redirects to occur, and the error page to be displayed
+  await resolveAfter6Seconds();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(winTest1, ["test1"], verifyResult);
+  winTest1.close();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(winTest2, ["test2"], verifyResult);
+  winTest2.close();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(winTest3, ["test3"], verifyResult);
+  winTest3.close();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(winTest4, ["test4"], verifyTest4Result);
+  winTest4.close();
+
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+runTests();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_fragment.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_fragment.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..445905c550
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_fragment.html
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1694932: Https-only mode reloads the page in certain cases when there should be just a fragment navigation </title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * Perform a test where a button click leads to scroll the page. Test if https-only detects
+ * that the redirection address of the button is on the same page. Instead of a reload https-only
+ * should only scroll.
+ *
+ * Test:
+ * Enable https-only and load the url
+ * Load: http://mozilla.pettay.fi/moztests/fragment.html
+ * Click "Click me"
+ * The page should be  scrolled down to 'foo' without a reload
+ * It shouldn't receive a message 'before unload' because the on before unload
+ *  function in file_fragment.html should not be called
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html";
+let winTest = null;
+let checkButtonClicked = false;
+
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  let data = event.data;
+  // checks if click was successful
+  if (!checkButtonClicked){
+    // expected window location ( expected URL)
+    ok(data.result == "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_fragment.html", "location is correct");
+    ok(data.button, "button is clicked");
+    // checks if loading was successful
+    ok(data.info == "onload", "Onloading worked");
+    // button was clicked
+    checkButtonClicked = true;
+    return;
+  }
+  // if Button was clicked once -> test finished
+  // check if hash exist and if hash of location is correct
+  ok(data.button, "button is clicked");
+  ok(data.result == "#foo", "location (hash) is correct");
+  // check that page is scrolled not reloaded
+  ok(data.info == "scrolled-to-foo","Scrolled successfully without reloading!");
+  // complete test and close window
+  window.removeEventListener("message",receiveMessage);
+  winTest.close();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+async function runTest() {
+  //Test: With https-only mode activated
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+  ]});
+  winTest = window.open(REQUEST_URL);
+}
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_auth_request.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_auth_request.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7fc800c388
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_auth_request.html
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1665062 - HTTPS-Only: Do not cancel channel if auth is in progress</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We send a top-level request which results in a '401 - Unauthorized' and ensure that the
+ * http background request does not accidentally treat that request as a potential timeout.
+ * We make sure that ther HTTPS-Only Mode Error Page does *NOT* show up.
+ */
+
+const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+);
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("When Auth is in progress, HTTPS-Only page should not show up");
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(10);
+
+const EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST =
+  "http://test1.example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_auth_request.sjs?foo";
+const EXPECTED_UPGRADE_REQUEST = EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST.replace("http://", "https://");
+let EXPECTED_BG_REQUEST = "http://test1.example.com/";
+let requestCounter = 0;
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic !== "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // On Android we have other requests appear here as well. Let's make
+    // sure we only evaluate requests triggered by the test.
+    if (!data.startsWith("http://test1.example.com") &&
+        !data.startsWith("https://test1.example.com")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    ++requestCounter;
+    if (requestCounter == 1) {
+      is(data, EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST, "kick off request needs to be http");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 2) {
+      is(data, EXPECTED_UPGRADE_REQUEST, "upgraded request needs to be https");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 3) {
+      is(data, EXPECTED_BG_REQUEST, "background request needs to be http and no sensitive info");
+      return;
+    }
+    ok(false, "we should never get here, but just in case");
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.AuthBackgroundRequestExaminer = new examiner();
+
+// https-only top-level background request occurs after 3 seconds, hence
+// we use 4 seconds to make sure the background request did not happen.
+function resolveAfter4Seconds() { 
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      resolve();
+    }, 4000);
+  });
+}
+
+async function runTests() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_send_http_background_request", true],
+  ]});
+
+  let testWin = window.open(EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST, "_blank");
+
+  // Give the Auth Process and background request some time before moving on.
+  await resolveAfter4Seconds();
+
+  if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+    is(requestCounter, 3, "three requests total (kickoff, upgraded, background)");
+  } else {
+    // On Android, the auth request resolves and hence the background request
+    // is not even kicked off - nevertheless, the error page should not appear!
+    is(requestCounter, 2, "two requests total (kickoff, upgraded)");
+  }
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(testWin, [], () => {
+    let innerHTML = content.document.body.innerHTML;
+    is(innerHTML, "", "expection page should not be displayed");
+  });
+
+  testWin.close();
+
+  window.AuthBackgroundRequestExaminer.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+runTests();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_request.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_request.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5dff0a5fdb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_http_background_request.html
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1663396: Test HTTPS-Only-Mode top-level background request not leaking sensitive info</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * Send a top-level request and make sure that the the top-level https-only background request
+ * (a) does only use pre-path information
+ * (b) does not happen if the pref is set to false
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("have to test that https-only mode background request does not happen");
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(8);
+
+const SJS_PATH = "tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_http_background_request.sjs?sensitive";
+
+const EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST = "http://example.com/" + SJS_PATH;
+const EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST_LOCAL = "http://localhost:8/" + SJS_PATH;
+const EXPECTED_UPGRADE_REQUEST = EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST.replace("http://", "https://");
+let expectedBackgroundRequest = "";
+let requestCounter = 0;
+
+function examiner() {
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+}
+examiner.prototype  = {
+  observe(subject, topic, data) {
+    if (topic !== "specialpowers-http-notify-request") {
+      return;
+    }
+    // On Android we have other requests appear here as well. Let's make
+    // sure we only evaluate requests triggered by the test.
+    if (!data.startsWith("http://example.com") &&
+        !data.startsWith("https://example.com") &&
+        !data.startsWith("http://localhost:8") &&
+        !data.startsWith("https://localhost:8")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    ++requestCounter;
+    if (requestCounter == 1) {
+      ok(
+        data === EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST || data === EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST_LOCAL,
+        "kick off request needs to be http"
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 2) {
+      is(data, EXPECTED_UPGRADE_REQUEST, "upgraded request needs to be https");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (requestCounter == 3) {
+      is(data, expectedBackgroundRequest, "background request needs to be http and no sensitive info like path");
+       return;
+    }
+    ok(false, "we should never get here, but just in case");
+  },
+  remove() {
+    SpecialPowers.removeObserver(this, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+  }
+}
+window.BackgroundRequestExaminer = new examiner();
+
+// https-only top-level background request occurs after 3 seconds, hence
+// we use 4 seconds to make sure the background request did not happen.
+function resolveAfter4Seconds() { 
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      resolve();
+    }, 4000);
+  });
+}
+
+async function runTests() {
+  // (a) Test http background request to only use prePath information
+  expectedBackgroundRequest = "http://example.com/";
+  requestCounter = 0;
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_send_http_background_request", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_error_page_user_suggestions", false],
+  ]});
+  let testWin = window.open(EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST, "_blank");
+  await resolveAfter4Seconds();
+  is(requestCounter, 3, "three requests total (kickoff, upgraded, background)");
+  testWin.close();
+
+  // (x) Test no http background request happens when localhost
+  expectedBackgroundRequest = "";
+  requestCounter = 0;
+  testWin = window.open(EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST_LOCAL, "_blank");
+  await resolveAfter4Seconds();
+  is(requestCounter, 1, "one requests total (kickoff, no upgraded, no background)");
+  testWin.close();
+
+  // (b) Test no http background request happens if pref is set to false
+  expectedBackgroundRequest = "";
+  requestCounter = 0;
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_send_http_background_request", false],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_error_page_user_suggestions", false],
+  ]});
+  testWin = window.open(EXPECTED_KICK_OFF_REQUEST, "_blank");
+  await resolveAfter4Seconds();
+  is(requestCounter, 2, "two requests total (kickoff, upgraded, no background)");
+  testWin.close();
+
+  // clean up and finish tests
+  window.BackgroundRequestExaminer.remove();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+runTests();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_insecure_reload.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_insecure_reload.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d143c9080b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_insecure_reload.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1702001: Https-only mode does not reload pages after clicking "Continue to HTTP Site", when url contains navigation </title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ *
+ *   Load a page including a fragment portion which does not support https and make
+ *   sure that exempting the page from https-only-mode does not result in a fragment
+ *   navigation.
+ */
+
+
+ function resolveAfter6Seconds() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      resolve();
+    }, 6000);
+  });
+}
+
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("We need to wait for the HTTPS-Only error page to appear");
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let winTest = null;
+let TEST_URL = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_insecure_reload.sjs#nav";
+
+// verify that https-only page appeared
+async function verifyErrorPage() {
+  let errorPageL10nId = "about-httpsonly-title-alert";
+  let innerHTML = content.document.body.innerHTML;
+  ok(innerHTML.includes(errorPageL10nId), "the error page should be shown for ");
+  let button = content.document.getElementById("openInsecure");
+  // Click "Continue to HTTP Site"
+  ok(button, "button exist");
+  if(button) {
+    button.click();
+  }
+}
+// verify that you entered the page and are not still displaying
+// the https-only error page
+async function receiveMessage(event) {
+  // read event
+  let { result, historyLength } = event.data;
+  is(result, "you entered the http page", "The requested page should be shown");
+  is(historyLength, 1, "History should contain one item");
+  window.removeEventListener("message",receiveMessage);
+  winTest.close();
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+
+async function runTest() {
+  //Test: With https-only mode activated
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+  ]});
+  winTest = window.open(TEST_URL);
+  await resolveAfter6Seconds();
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(winTest,[],verifyErrorPage);
+}
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+runTest();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_redirect_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_redirect_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..59f02f96d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_redirect_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1613063
+Test that 302 redirect requests get upgraded to https:// with HTTPS-Only Mode enabled
+-->
+
+<head>
+  <title>HTTPS-Only Mode - XHR Redirect Upgrade</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-Only Mode</h1>
+  <p>Upgrade Test for insecure XHR redirects.</p>
+  <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1613063">Bug 1613063</a>
+
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+
+    const redirectCodes = ["301", "302", "303", "307"]
+    let currentTest = 0
+
+    function startTest() {
+      const currentCode = redirectCodes[currentTest];
+
+      const myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      // Make a request to a site (eg. https://file_redirect.sjs?301), which will redirect to http://file_redirect.sjs?check.
+      // The response will either be secure-ok, if the request has been upgraded to https:// or secure-error if it didn't.
+      myXHR.open("GET", `https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_redirect.sjs?${currentCode}`);
+      myXHR.onload = (e) => {
+        is(myXHR.responseText, "secure-ok", `a ${currentCode} redirect when posting violation report should be blocked`)
+        testDone();
+      }
+      // This should not happen
+      myXHR.onerror = (e) => {
+        ok(false, `Could not query results from server for ${currentCode}-redirect test (" + e.message + ")`);
+        testDone();
+      }
+      myXHR.send();
+    }
+
+    function testDone() {
+      // Check if there are remaining tests
+      if (++currentTest < redirectCodes.length) {
+        startTest()
+      } else {
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      }
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    // Set preference and start test
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]] }, startTest);
+
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_resource_upgrade.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_resource_upgrade.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5fb9b6cad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_resource_upgrade.html
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>HTTPS-Only Mode - Resource Upgrade</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <h1>HTTPS-Only Mode</h1>
+  <p>Upgrade Test for various resources</p>
+  <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1613063">Bug 1613063</a>
+  <iframe style="width:100%;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+  <script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+    /* Description of the test:
+     * We load resources (img, script, sytle, etc) over *http* and make sure
+     * that all the resources get upgraded to use >> https << when the
+     * preference "dom.security.https_only_mode" is set to true. We further
+     * test that subresources within nested contexts (iframes) get upgraded
+     * and also test the handling of server side redirects.
+     *
+     * In detail:
+     * We perform an XHR request to the *.sjs file which is processed async on
+     * the server and waits till all the requests were processed by the server.
+     * Once the server received all the different requests, the server responds
+     * to the initial XHR request with an array of results which must match
+     * the expected results from each test, making sure that all requests
+     * received by the server (*.sjs) were actually *https* requests.
+     */
+
+    const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+      "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+    );
+    const splitRegex = /^(.*)-(.*)$/
+    const testConfig = {
+      topLevelScheme: "http://",
+      results: [
+        "iframe", "script", "img", "img-redir", "font", "xhr", "style",
+        "media", "object", "form", "nested-img"
+      ]
+    }
+    // TODO: WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+    if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+      testConfig.results.push("websocket");
+    }
+
+
+    function runTest() {
+      // sends an xhr request to the server which is processed async, which only
+      // returns after the server has received all the expected requests.
+      var myXHR = new XMLHttpRequest();
+      myXHR.open("GET", "file_upgrade_insecure_server.sjs?queryresult");
+      myXHR.onload = function (e) {
+        var results = myXHR.responseText.split(",");
+        for (var index in results) {
+          checkResult(results[index]);
+        }
+      }
+      myXHR.onerror = function (e) {
+        ok(false, "Could not query results from server (" + e.message + ")");
+        finishTest();
+      }
+      myXHR.send();
+
+      // give it some time and run the testpage
+      SimpleTest.executeSoon(() => {
+        var src = testConfig.topLevelScheme + "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/https-only/file_upgrade_insecure.html";
+        document.getElementById("testframe").src = src;
+      });
+    }
+
+    // a postMessage handler that is used by sandboxed iframes without
+    // 'allow-same-origin' to bubble up results back to this main page.
+    window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+    function receiveMessage(event) {
+      checkResult(event.data.result);
+    }
+
+    function finishTest() {
+      window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+
+    function checkResult(response) {
+      // A response looks either like this "iframe-ok" or "[key]-[result]"
+      const [, key, result] = splitRegex.exec(response)
+      // try to find the expected result within the results array
+      var index = testConfig.results.indexOf(key);
+
+      // If the response is not even part of the results array, something is super wrong
+      if (index == -1) {
+        ok(false, `Unexpected response from server (${response})`);
+        finishTest();
+      }
+
+      // take the element out the array and continue till the results array is empty
+      if (index != -1) {
+        testConfig.results.splice(index, 1);
+      }
+
+      // Check if the result was okay or had an error
+      is(result, 'ok', `Upgrade all requests on toplevel http for '${key}' came back with: '${result}'`)
+
+      // If we're not expecting any more resulsts, finish the test
+      if (!testConfig.results.length) {
+        finishTest();
+      }
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+    // Set preference and start test
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [["dom.security.https_only_mode", true]] }, runTest);
+
+  </script>
+</body>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/https-only/test_user_suggestion_box.html b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_user_suggestion_box.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1feabcd003
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/https-only/test_user_suggestion_box.html
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+    <title>Bug 1665057 - Add www button on https-only error page</title>
+    <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+    <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+"use strict";
+
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We send a top-level request to a http-page in https-only mode
+ * The page has a bad certificate and can't be updated so the error page appears
+ * If there is a secure connection possible to www the suggestion-box on the error page
+ * should appear and have a link to that secure www-page
+ * if the original-pagerequest already has a www or there is no secure www connection
+ * the suggestion box should not appear
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.requestFlakyTimeout("We need to wait for the HTTPS-Only error page to appear and for the additional 'www' request to provide a suggestion.");
+SimpleTest.requestLongerTimeout(10);
+
+// urls of server locations with bad cert -> https-only should display error page
+const KICK_OFF_REQUEST_WITH_SUGGESTION = "http://suggestion-example.com";
+const KICK_OFF_REQUEST_WITHOUT_SUGGESTION = "http://no-suggestion-example.com";
+
+// l10n ids to compare html to
+const ERROR_PAGE_L10N_ID = "about-httpsonly-title-alert";
+const SUGGESTION_BOX_L10N_ID = "about-httpsonly-suggestion-box-www-text";
+
+// the error page needs to be build and a background https://www request needs to happen
+// we use 4 seconds to make sure these requests did happen.
+function resolveAfter4Seconds() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      resolve();
+    }, 4000);
+  });
+}
+
+async function runTests(aMessage) {
+  let errorPageL10nId = "about-httpsonly-title-alert";
+  let suggestionBoxL10nId = "about-httpsonly-suggestion-box-www-text";
+
+  let innerHTML = content.document.body.innerHTML;
+
+  if (aMessage === "with_suggestion") {
+    // test if the page with suggestion shows the error page and the suggestion box
+    ok(innerHTML.includes(errorPageL10nId), "the error page should be shown.");
+    ok(innerHTML.includes(suggestionBoxL10nId), "the suggestion box should be shown.");
+  } else if (aMessage === "without_suggestion") {
+    // test if the page without suggestion shows the error page but not the suggestion box
+    ok(innerHTML.includes(errorPageL10nId), "the error page should be shown.");
+    ok(!innerHTML.includes(suggestionBoxL10nId), "the suggestion box should not be shown.");
+  } else {
+    ok(false, "we should never get here");
+  }
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: [
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode", true],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_send_http_background_request", false],
+    ["dom.security.https_only_mode_error_page_user_suggestions", true],
+  ]});
+  let testWinSuggestion = window.open(KICK_OFF_REQUEST_WITH_SUGGESTION, "_blank");
+  let testWinWithoutSuggestion = window.open(KICK_OFF_REQUEST_WITHOUT_SUGGESTION, "_blank");
+
+  await resolveAfter4Seconds();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(testWinSuggestion, ["with_suggestion"], runTests);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(testWinWithoutSuggestion, ["without_suggestion"], runTests);
+
+  testWinSuggestion.close();
+  testWinWithoutSuggestion.close();
+});
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d843b7fae1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset='utf-8'>
+  <title>Bug 1674341: Test SiteIdentity when auto-upgrading mixed content</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- needs to be http: image for mixed content and auto-upgrading -->
+  <img type="image/png" id="testimage" src="http://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.png" />
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.png b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.png
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52c591798e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/auto_upgrading_identity.png
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e68e0680e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+prefs =
+  dom.security.https_first=false
+support-files =
+  download_page.html
+  download_server.sjs
+
+[browser_test_mixed_content_download.js]
+skip-if = win10_2004 && debug # Bug 1723573
+[browser_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.js]
+support-files = file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.html
+[browser_auto_upgrading_identity.js]
+support-files =
+  auto_upgrading_identity.html
+  auto_upgrading_identity.png
+[browser_mixed_content_auth_download.js]
+support-files =
+  file_auth_download_page.html
+  file_auth_download_server.sjs
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_auto_upgrading_identity.js b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_auto_upgrading_identity.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3ae924a4dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_auto_upgrading_identity.js
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+const TEST_TOPLEVEL_URI = TEST_PATH + "auto_upgrading_identity.html";
+
+// auto upgrading mixed content should not indicate passive mixed content loaded
+add_task(async () => {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content", true]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_TOPLEVEL_URI, async function(browser) {
+    await ContentTask.spawn(browser, {}, async function() {
+      let testImg = content.document.getElementById("testimage");
+      ok(
+        testImg.src.includes("auto_upgrading_identity.png"),
+        "sanity: correct image is loaded"
+      );
+    });
+    // Ensure the identiy handler does not show mixed content!
+    ok(
+      !gIdentityHandler._isMixedPassiveContentLoaded,
+      "Auto-Upgrading Mixed Content: Identity should note indicate mixed content"
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+// regular mixed content test should indicate passive mixed content loaded
+add_task(async () => {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content", false]],
+  });
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(TEST_TOPLEVEL_URI, async function(browser) {
+    await ContentTask.spawn(browser, {}, async function() {
+      let testImg = content.document.getElementById("testimage");
+      ok(
+        testImg.src.includes("auto_upgrading_identity.png"),
+        "sanity: correct image is loaded"
+      );
+    });
+    // Ensure the identiy handler does show mixed content!
+    ok(
+      gIdentityHandler._isMixedPassiveContentLoaded,
+      "Regular Mixed Content: Identity should indicate mixed content"
+    );
+  });
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auth_download.js b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auth_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..492317e6ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auth_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+/* Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+ * https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */
+
+"use strict";
+
+ChromeUtils.defineESModuleGetters(this, {
+  Downloads: "resource://gre/modules/Downloads.sys.mjs",
+  DownloadsCommon: "resource:///modules/DownloadsCommon.sys.mjs",
+});
+
+const { PromptTestUtils } = ChromeUtils.import(
+  "resource://testing-common/PromptTestUtils.jsm"
+);
+
+let authPromptModalType = Services.prefs.getIntPref(
+  "prompts.modalType.httpAuth"
+);
+
+const downloadMonitoringView = {
+  _listeners: [],
+  onDownloadAdded(download) {
+    for (let listener of this._listeners) {
+      listener(download);
+    }
+    this._listeners = [];
+  },
+  waitForDownload(listener) {
+    this._listeners.push(listener);
+  },
+};
+
+let SECURE_BASE_URL =
+  getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+    "chrome://mochitests/content/",
+    "https://example.com/"
+  ) + "file_auth_download_page.html";
+
+/**
+ * Waits until a download is triggered.
+ * It waits until a prompt is shown,
+ * saves and then accepts the dialog.
+ * @returns {Promise} Resolved once done.
+ */
+
+function shouldTriggerDownload() {
+  return new Promise(res => {
+    downloadMonitoringView.waitForDownload(res);
+  });
+}
+function shouldNotifyDownloadUI() {
+  return new Promise(res => {
+    downloadMonitoringView.waitForDownload(async aDownload => {
+      let { error } = aDownload;
+      if (
+        error.becauseBlockedByReputationCheck &&
+        error.reputationCheckVerdict == Downloads.Error.BLOCK_VERDICT_INSECURE
+      ) {
+        // It's an insecure Download, now Check that it has been cleaned up properly
+        if ((await IOUtils.stat(aDownload.target.path)).size != 0) {
+          throw new Error(`Download target is not empty!`);
+        }
+        if ((await IOUtils.stat(aDownload.target.path)).size != 0) {
+          throw new Error(`Download partFile was not cleaned up properly`);
+        }
+        // Assert that the Referrer is present
+        if (!aDownload.source.referrerInfo) {
+          throw new Error("The Blocked download is missing the ReferrerInfo");
+        }
+
+        res(aDownload);
+      } else {
+        ok(false, "No error for download that was expected to error!");
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function resetDownloads() {
+  // Removes all downloads from the download List
+  const types = new Set();
+  let publicList = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);
+  let downloads = await publicList.getAll();
+  for (let download of downloads) {
+    if (download.contentType) {
+      types.add(download.contentType);
+    }
+    publicList.remove(download);
+    await download.finalize(true);
+  }
+}
+
+async function runTest(url, link, checkFunction, description) {
+  await resetDownloads();
+  let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, url);
+  is(
+    gBrowser.currentURI.schemeIs("https"),
+    true,
+    "Scheme of opened tab should be https"
+  );
+  info("Checking: " + description);
+
+  let checkPromise = checkFunction();
+  // Click the Link to trigger the download
+  SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [link], contentLink => {
+    content.document.getElementById(contentLink).click();
+  });
+  // Wait for the auth prompt, enter the login details and close the prompt
+  await PromptTestUtils.handleNextPrompt(
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser,
+    { modalType: authPromptModalType, promptType: "promptUserAndPass" },
+    { buttonNumClick: 0, loginInput: "user", passwordInput: "pass" }
+  );
+  await checkPromise;
+  ok(true, description);
+  // Close download panel
+  DownloadsPanel.hidePanel();
+  is(DownloadsPanel.panel.state, "closed", "Panel should be closed");
+  await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+}
+
+add_setup(async function() {
+  let list = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);
+  list.addView(downloadMonitoringView);
+  registerCleanupFunction(() => list.removeView(downloadMonitoringView));
+  // Ensure to delete all cached credentials before running test
+  await new Promise(resolve => {
+    Services.clearData.deleteData(Ci.nsIClearDataService.CLEAR_ALL, resolve);
+  });
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+      ["dom.block_download_insecure", true],
+    ],
+  });
+});
+//Test description:
+// 1. Open "https://example.com".
+// 2. From "https://example.com" download something, but that download is only available via http
+//    and with authentication.
+// 3. Login and start download.
+// 4. Mixed-content blocker blocks download.
+// 5. Unblock download and verify the downloaded file.
+add_task(async function test_auth_download() {
+  await runTest(
+    SECURE_BASE_URL,
+    "insecure",
+    async () => {
+      let [, download] = await Promise.all([
+        shouldTriggerDownload(),
+        shouldNotifyDownloadUI(),
+      ]);
+      await download.unblock();
+      ok(download.error == null, "There should be no error after unblocking");
+      info(
+        "Start download to be able to validate the size and the success of the download"
+      );
+      await download.start();
+      is(
+        download.contentType,
+        "text/html",
+        "File contentType should be correct."
+      );
+      ok(download.succeeded, "Download succeeded!");
+      is(download.target.size, 27, "Download has correct size");
+    },
+    "A locked Download from an auth server should succeeded to Download after a Manual unblock"
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.js b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1da3e770a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.js
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+// Bug 1673574 - Improve Console logging for mixed content auto upgrading
+"use strict";
+
+const testPath = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+let seenAutoUpgradeMessage = false;
+
+const kTestURI =
+  testPath + "file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.html";
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  // A longer timeout is necessary for this test than the plain mochitests
+  // due to opening a new tab with the web console.
+  requestLongerTimeout(4);
+
+  // Enable HTTPS-Only Mode and register console-listener
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content", true]],
+  });
+  Services.console.registerListener(on_auto_upgrade_message);
+
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, kTestURI);
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.waitForCondition(() => seenAutoUpgradeMessage);
+
+  Services.console.unregisterListener(on_auto_upgrade_message);
+});
+
+function on_auto_upgrade_message(msgObj) {
+  const message = msgObj.message;
+
+  // The console message is:
+  // "Mixed Content: Upgrading insecure display request
+  // ‘http://example.com/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.jpg’ to use ‘https’"
+
+  if (!message.includes("Mixed Content:")) {
+    return;
+  }
+  ok(
+    message.includes("Upgrading insecure display request"),
+    "msg includes info"
+  );
+  ok(
+    message.includes("file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.jpg"),
+    "msg includes file"
+  );
+  seenAutoUpgradeMessage = true;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_test_mixed_content_download.js b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_test_mixed_content_download.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..18405adee5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/browser_test_mixed_content_download.js
@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+ChromeUtils.defineESModuleGetters(this, {
+  Downloads: "resource://gre/modules/Downloads.sys.mjs",
+  DownloadsCommon: "resource:///modules/DownloadsCommon.sys.mjs",
+});
+
+const HandlerService = Cc[
+  "@mozilla.org/uriloader/handler-service;1"
+].getService(Ci.nsIHandlerService);
+
+const MIMEService = Cc["@mozilla.org/mime;1"].getService(Ci.nsIMIMEService);
+
+let INSECURE_BASE_URL =
+  getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+    "chrome://mochitests/content/",
+    "http://example.com/"
+  ) + "download_page.html";
+let SECURE_BASE_URL =
+  getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+    "chrome://mochitests/content/",
+    "https://example.com/"
+  ) + "download_page.html";
+
+function promiseFocus() {
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    waitForFocus(resolve);
+  });
+}
+
+function promisePanelOpened() {
+  if (DownloadsPanel.panel && DownloadsPanel.panel.state == "open") {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+  return BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(DownloadsPanel.panel, "popupshown");
+}
+
+async function task_openPanel() {
+  await promiseFocus();
+
+  let promise = promisePanelOpened();
+  DownloadsPanel.showPanel();
+  await promise;
+}
+
+const downloadMonitoringView = {
+  _listeners: [],
+  onDownloadAdded(download) {
+    for (let listener of this._listeners) {
+      listener(download);
+    }
+    this._listeners = [];
+  },
+  waitForDownload(listener) {
+    this._listeners.push(listener);
+  },
+};
+
+/**
+ * Waits until a download is triggered.
+ * Unless the always_ask_before_handling_new_types pref is true, the download
+ * will simply be saved, so resolve when the view is notified of the new
+ * download. Otherwise, it waits until a prompt is shown, selects the choosen
+ * <action>, then accepts the dialog
+ * @param [action] Which action to select, either:
+ *        "handleInternally", "save" or "open".
+ * @returns {Promise} Resolved once done.
+ */
+
+function shouldTriggerDownload(action = "save") {
+  if (
+    Services.prefs.getBoolPref(
+      "browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types"
+    )
+  ) {
+    return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+      Services.wm.addListener({
+        onOpenWindow(xulWin) {
+          Services.wm.removeListener(this);
+          let win = xulWin.docShell.domWindow;
+          waitForFocus(() => {
+            if (
+              win.location ==
+              "chrome://mozapps/content/downloads/unknownContentType.xhtml"
+            ) {
+              let dialog = win.document.getElementById("unknownContentType");
+              let button = dialog.getButton("accept");
+              let actionRadio = win.document.getElementById(action);
+              actionRadio.click();
+              button.disabled = false;
+              dialog.acceptDialog();
+              resolve();
+            } else {
+              reject();
+            }
+          }, win);
+        },
+      });
+    });
+  }
+  return new Promise(res => {
+    downloadMonitoringView.waitForDownload(res);
+  });
+}
+
+const CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE = "Blocked downloading insecure content";
+
+function shouldConsoleError() {
+  // Waits until CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE was logged
+  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
+    function listener(msgObj) {
+      let text = msgObj.message;
+      if (text.includes(CONSOLE_ERROR_MESSAGE)) {
+        Services.console.unregisterListener(listener);
+        resolve();
+      }
+    }
+    Services.console.registerListener(listener);
+  });
+}
+
+async function resetDownloads() {
+  // Removes all downloads from the download List
+  const types = new Set();
+  let publicList = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.PUBLIC);
+  let downloads = await publicList.getAll();
+  for (let download of downloads) {
+    if (download.contentType) {
+      types.add(download.contentType);
+    }
+    publicList.remove(download);
+    await download.finalize(true);
+  }
+
+  if (types.size) {
+    // reset handlers for the contentTypes of any files previously downloaded
+    for (let type of types) {
+      const mimeInfo = MIMEService.getFromTypeAndExtension(type, "");
+      info("resetting handler for type: " + type);
+      HandlerService.remove(mimeInfo);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+function shouldNotifyDownloadUI() {
+  return new Promise(res => {
+    downloadMonitoringView.waitForDownload(async aDownload => {
+      let { error } = aDownload;
+      if (
+        error.becauseBlockedByReputationCheck &&
+        error.reputationCheckVerdict == Downloads.Error.BLOCK_VERDICT_INSECURE
+      ) {
+        // It's an insecure Download, now Check that it has been cleaned up properly
+        if ((await IOUtils.stat(aDownload.target.path)).size != 0) {
+          throw new Error(`Download target is not empty!`);
+        }
+        if ((await IOUtils.stat(aDownload.target.path)).size != 0) {
+          throw new Error(`Download partFile was not cleaned up properly`);
+        }
+        // Assert that the Referrer is presnt
+        if (!aDownload.source.referrerInfo) {
+          throw new Error("The Blocked download is missing the ReferrerInfo");
+        }
+
+        res(aDownload);
+      } else {
+        ok(false, "No error for download that was expected to error!");
+      }
+    });
+  });
+}
+
+async function runTest(url, link, checkFunction, description) {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.block_download_insecure", true]],
+  });
+  await resetDownloads();
+
+  let tab = BrowserTestUtils.addTab(gBrowser, url);
+  gBrowser.selectedTab = tab;
+
+  let browser = gBrowser.getBrowserForTab(tab);
+  await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser);
+
+  info("Checking: " + description);
+
+  let checkPromise = checkFunction();
+  // Click the Link to trigger the download
+  SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [link], contentLink => {
+    content.document.getElementById(contentLink).click();
+  });
+
+  await checkPromise;
+
+  ok(true, description);
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+}
+
+add_setup(async () => {
+  let list = await Downloads.getList(Downloads.ALL);
+  list.addView(downloadMonitoringView);
+  registerCleanupFunction(() => list.removeView(downloadMonitoringView));
+});
+
+// Test Blocking
+add_task(async function test_blocking() {
+  for (let prefVal of [true, false]) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [
+        ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", prefVal],
+        ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", !prefVal],
+      ],
+    });
+    await runTest(
+      INSECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "insecure",
+      shouldTriggerDownload,
+      "Insecure -> Insecure should download"
+    );
+    await runTest(
+      INSECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "secure",
+      shouldTriggerDownload,
+      "Insecure -> Secure should download"
+    );
+    await runTest(
+      SECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "insecure",
+      () =>
+        Promise.all([
+          shouldTriggerDownload(),
+          shouldNotifyDownloadUI(),
+          shouldConsoleError(),
+        ]),
+      "Secure -> Insecure should Error"
+    );
+    await runTest(
+      SECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "secure",
+      shouldTriggerDownload,
+      "Secure -> Secure should Download"
+    );
+    await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+  }
+});
+
+// Test Manual Unblocking
+add_task(async function test_manual_unblocking() {
+  for (let prefVal of [true, false]) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [
+        ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", prefVal],
+        ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", !prefVal],
+      ],
+    });
+    await runTest(
+      SECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "insecure",
+      async () => {
+        let [, download] = await Promise.all([
+          shouldTriggerDownload(),
+          shouldNotifyDownloadUI(),
+        ]);
+        await download.unblock();
+        ok(download.error == null, "There should be no error after unblocking");
+      },
+      "A Blocked Download Should succeeded to Download after a Manual unblock"
+    );
+    await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+  }
+});
+
+// Test Unblock Download Visible
+add_task(async function test_unblock_download_visible() {
+  for (let prefVal of [true, false]) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [
+        ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", prefVal],
+        ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", !prefVal],
+      ],
+    });
+    // Focus, open and close the panel once
+    // to make sure the panel is loaded and ready
+    await promiseFocus();
+    await runTest(
+      SECURE_BASE_URL,
+      "insecure",
+      async () => {
+        let panelHasOpened = promisePanelOpened();
+        info("awaiting that the download is triggered and added to the list");
+        await Promise.all([shouldTriggerDownload(), shouldNotifyDownloadUI()]);
+        info("awaiting that the Download list shows itself");
+        await panelHasOpened;
+        DownloadsPanel.hidePanel();
+        ok(true, "The Download Panel should have opened on blocked download");
+      },
+      "A Blocked Download Should open the Download Panel"
+    );
+    await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+  }
+});
+
+// Test Download an insecure svg and choose "Open with Firefox"
+add_task(async function download_open_insecure_SVG() {
+  const mimeInfo = MIMEService.getFromTypeAndExtension("image/svg+xml", "svg");
+  mimeInfo.alwaysAskBeforeHandling = false;
+  mimeInfo.preferredAction = mimeInfo.handleInternally;
+  HandlerService.store(mimeInfo);
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["browser.download.always_ask_before_handling_new_types", false],
+      ["browser.download.improvements_to_download_panel", true],
+    ],
+  });
+  await promiseFocus();
+  await runTest(
+    SECURE_BASE_URL,
+    "insecureSVG",
+    async () => {
+      info("awaiting that the download is triggered and added to the list");
+      let [_, download] = await Promise.all([
+        shouldTriggerDownload("handleInternally"),
+        shouldNotifyDownloadUI(),
+      ]);
+
+      let newTabPromise = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewTab(gBrowser);
+      await download.unblock();
+      ok(download.error == null, "There should be no error after unblocking");
+
+      let tab = await newTabPromise;
+
+      ok(
+        tab.linkedBrowser._documentURI.filePath.includes(".svg"),
+        "The download target was opened"
+      );
+      BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+      ok(true, "The Content was opened in a new tab");
+      await SpecialPowers.popPrefEnv();
+    },
+    "A Blocked SVG can be opened internally"
+  );
+
+  HandlerService.remove(mimeInfo);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_page.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_page.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..86f605c478
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_page.html
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=676619
+-->
+  <head>
+
+    <title>Test for the download attribute</title>
+
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    hi
+
+    <script>
+      const host = window.location.host;
+      const path = location.pathname.replace("download_page.html","download_server.sjs");
+
+      const secureLink = document.createElement("a");
+      secureLink.href=`https://${host}/${path}`;
+      secureLink.download="true";
+      secureLink.textContent="Secure Link";
+      secureLink.id="secure";
+
+      const insecureLink = document.createElement("a");        
+      insecureLink.href=`http://${host}/${path}`;
+      insecureLink.download="true";
+      insecureLink.id="insecure";
+      insecureLink.textContent="Not secure Link";
+
+      const insecureSVG = document.createElement("a");        
+      insecureSVG.href=`http://${host}/${path}?type=image/svg+xml&name=example.svg`;
+      insecureSVG.download="true";
+      insecureSVG.id="insecureSVG";
+      insecureSVG.textContent="Not secure Link to SVG";
+
+      document.body.append(insecureSVG);
+      document.body.append(secureLink);
+      document.body.append(insecureLink);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e659df2f40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/download_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+// force the Browser to Show a Download Prompt
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  let type = "image/png";
+  let filename = "hello.png";
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(val => {
+    var [key, value] = val.split("=");
+    if (key == "type") {
+      type = value;
+    }
+    if (key == "name") {
+      filename = value;
+    }
+  });
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Disposition", `attachment; filename=${filename}`);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", type);
+  response.write("🙈🙊�🙊");
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_page.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_page.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..931d9d00ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_page.html
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <title>Test mixed content download with auth header by https-first</title>
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    hi
+
+    <script>
+      const host = window.location.host;
+      const path = location.pathname.replace("file_auth_download_page.html","file_auth_download_server.sjs");
+
+      const insecureLink = document.createElement("a");
+      insecureLink.href = `http://${host}${path}?user=user&pass=pass`;
+      insecureLink.download = "true";
+      insecureLink.id = "insecure";
+      insecureLink.textContent = "Not secure Link";
+
+      document.body.append(insecureLink);
+  </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d28625abb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_auth_download_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+"use strict";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  let match;
+
+  // Allow the caller to drive how authentication is processed via the query.
+  // Eg, http://localhost:8888/authenticate.sjs?user=foo&realm=bar
+  // The extra ? allows the user/pass/realm checks to succeed if the name is
+  // at the beginning of the query string.
+  Components.utils.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+  let query = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+
+  let expected_user = query.get("user");
+  let expected_pass = query.get("pass");
+  let realm = query.get("realm");
+
+  // Look for an authentication header, if any, in the request.
+  //
+  // EG: Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==
+  //
+  // This test only supports Basic auth. The value sent by the client is
+  // "username:password", obscured with base64 encoding.
+
+  let actual_user = "",
+    actual_pass = "",
+    authHeader;
+  if (request.hasHeader("Authorization")) {
+    authHeader = request.getHeader("Authorization");
+    match = /Basic (.+)/.exec(authHeader);
+    if (match.length != 2) {
+      throw new Error("Couldn't parse auth header: " + authHeader);
+    }
+    // Decode base64 to string
+    let userpass = atob(match[1]);
+    match = /(.*):(.*)/.exec(userpass);
+    if (match.length != 3) {
+      throw new Error("Couldn't decode auth header: " + userpass);
+    }
+    actual_user = match[1];
+    actual_pass = match[2];
+  }
+
+  // Don't request authentication if the credentials we got were what we
+  // expected.
+  let requestAuth =
+    expected_user != actual_user || expected_pass != actual_pass;
+
+  if (requestAuth) {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.0", 401, "Authentication required");
+    response.setHeader("WWW-Authenticate", 'basic realm="' + realm + '"', true);
+    response.write("Authentication required");
+  } else {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.0", 200, "OK");
+    response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Content-Disposition",
+      "attachment; filename=dummy-file.html"
+    );
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html");
+    response.write("<p id='success'>SUCCESS</p>");
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug1551886.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug1551886.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..41c46b5273
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug1551886.html
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+<script>
+    let f = document.createElement("iframe");
+    f.src = "data:text/html,<iframe src='http://example.com' onload=\"parent.postMessage({status:'loaded', type: 'http'}, 'https://example.com')\" onerror=\"parent.postMessage({status:'blocked', type: 'http'}, 'https://example.com')\"></iframe>";
+    window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+        parent.postMessage(event.data, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+
+        // Only create second iframe once
+        if(event.data.type === "https") {
+            return;
+        }
+
+        let f2 = document.createElement("iframe");
+        f2.src = "data:text/html,<iframe src='https://example.com' onload=\"parent.postMessage({status:'loaded', type: 'https'}, 'https://example.com')\" onerror=\"parent.postMessage({status:'blocked', type: 'https'}, 'https://example.com')\"></iframe>";
+        document.body.appendChild(f2);
+    });
+    document.body.appendChild(f);
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug803225_test_mailto.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug803225_test_mailto.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f1459d3667
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug803225_test_mailto.html
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker - Mailto Protocol Compose Page
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=803225
+-->
+<head> <meta charset="utf-8"> 
+</head>
+<body>
+Hello
+<script>window.close();</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd9ea23178
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker related to navigating children, grandchildren, etc
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=840388
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Mixed Content Frame Navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testContent"></div>
+
+<script>
+  var baseUrlHttps = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html";
+
+  // For tests that require setTimeout, set the maximum polling time to 50 x 100ms = 5 seconds.
+  var MAX_COUNT = 50;
+  var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+
+  var testContent = document.getElementById("testContent");
+
+  // Test 1: Navigate secure iframe to insecure iframe on an insecure page
+  var iframe_test1 = document.createElement("iframe");
+  var counter_test1 = 0;
+  iframe_test1.src = baseUrlHttps + "?insecurePage_navigate_child";
+  iframe_test1.setAttribute("id", "test1");
+  iframe_test1.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_child", "msg": "got an onerror alert when loading or navigating testing iframe"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  };
+  testContent.appendChild(iframe_test1);
+
+  function navigationStatus(iframe_test1)
+  {
+    // When the page is navigating, it goes through about:blank and we will get a permission denied for loc.
+    // Catch that specific exception and return
+    try {
+      var loc = document.getElementById("test1").contentDocument.location;
+    } catch(e) {
+      if (e.name === "SecurityError") {
+        // We received an exception we didn't expect.
+        throw e;
+      }
+      counter_test1++;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (loc == "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_child_response") {
+      return;
+    }
+    else {
+      if(counter_test1 < MAX_COUNT) {
+        counter_test1++;
+        setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, iframe_test1);
+      }
+      else {
+        // After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume navigating the iframe is blocked
+        parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_child", "msg": "navigating to insecure iframe blocked on insecure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, iframe_test1);
+
+  // Test 2: Navigate secure grandchild iframe to insecure grandchild iframe on a page that has no secure parents
+  var iframe_test2 = document.createElement("iframe");
+  iframe_test2.src = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_grandchild.html"
+  iframe_test2.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild", "msg": "got an on error alert when loading or navigating testing iframe"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  };
+  testContent.appendChild(iframe_test2);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_blankTarget.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_blankTarget.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c4502ce8d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_blankTarget.html
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker - Opening link with _blank target in an https iframe.
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=841850
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Mixed Content Frame Navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?blankTarget" id="blankTarget" target="_blank" rel="opener">Go to http site</a>
+
+<script>
+  var blankTarget = document.getElementById("blankTarget");
+  blankTarget.click();
+
+  var observer = {
+    observe(subject, topic, data) {
+     if (topic === "specialpowers-http-notify-request" &&
+         data === "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?blankTarget") {
+        parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "blankTarget", "msg": "opened an http link with target=_blank from a secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+        SpecialPowers.removeObserver(observer, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // This is a special observer topic that is proxied from http-on-modify-request
+  // in the parent process to inform us when a URI is loaded
+  SpecialPowers.addObserver(observer, "specialpowers-http-notify-request");
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_grandchild.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_grandchild.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10cf1e4d90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_grandchild.html
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker - Navigating Grandchild frames when a secure parent doesn't exist
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=840388
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Mixed Content Frame Navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<iframe src="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_grandchild" id="child"></iframe>
+
+<script>
+  // For tests that require setTimeout, set the maximum polling time to 100 x 100ms = 10 seconds.
+  var MAX_COUNT = 50;
+  var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+  var counter = 0;
+
+  var child = document.getElementById("child");
+  function navigationStatus(child)
+  {
+    // When the page is navigating, it goes through about:blank and we will get a permission denied for loc.
+    // Catch that specific exception and return
+    try {
+      var loc;
+      if (child.contentDocument) {
+        loc = child.contentDocument.location;
+      }
+    } catch(e) {
+      if (e.message && !e.message.includes("Permission denied to access property")) {
+        // We received an exception we didn't expect.
+        throw e;
+      }
+      counter++;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (loc == "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_grandchild_response") {
+      return;
+    }
+    else {
+      if(counter < MAX_COUNT) {
+        counter++;
+        setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, child);
+      }
+      else {
+        // After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume navigating the iframe is blocked
+        parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild", "msg": "navigating to insecure grandchild iframe blocked on insecure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, child);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..251bb73e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<body>
+<div id="content"></div>
+<script>
+  // get the case from the query string
+  var type = location.search.substring(1);
+
+  function clickLink() {
+    // If we don't reflow before clicking the link, the test will fail intermittently. The reason is still unknown. We'll track this issue in bug 1259715.
+    requestAnimationFrame(function() {
+      setTimeout(function() {
+        document.getElementById("link").click();
+      }, 0);
+    });
+  }
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case "insecurePage_navigate_child":
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML =
+        '<a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_child_response" id="link">Testing\<\/a>';
+      clickLink();
+      break;
+
+    case "insecurePage_navigate_child_response":
+      parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_child", "msg": "navigated to insecure iframe on insecure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML = "Navigated from secure to insecure frame on an insecure page";
+      break;
+
+    case "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild":
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML =
+        '<a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_grandchild_response" id="link">Testing\<\/a>';
+      clickLink();
+      break;
+
+    case "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild_response":
+      parent.parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild", "msg": "navigated to insecure grandchild iframe on insecure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML = "Navigated from secure to insecure grandchild frame on an insecure page";
+      break;
+
+    case "securePage_navigate_child":
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML =
+        '<a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?securePage_navigate_child_response" id="link">Testing\<\/a>';
+      clickLink();
+      break;
+
+    case "securePage_navigate_child_response":
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML = "<p>Navigated from secure to insecure frame on a secure page</p>";
+      parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "securePage_navigate_child", "msg": "navigated to insecure iframe on secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      break;
+
+    case "securePage_navigate_grandchild":
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML=
+        '<a href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?securePage_navigate_grandchild_response" id="link">Testing\<\/a>';
+      clickLink();
+      break;
+
+    case "securePage_navigate_grandchild_response":
+      parent.parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "securePage_navigate_grandchild", "msg": "navigated to insecure grandchild iframe on secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML = "<p>Navigated from secure to insecure grandchild frame on a secure page</p>";
+      break;
+
+    case "blankTarget":
+      window.close();
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      document.getElementById("content").innerHTML = "Hello";
+      break;
+   }
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..692d542067
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure.html
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker related to navigating children, grandchildren, etc
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=840388
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Mixed Content Frame Navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testContent"></div>
+
+<script>
+  var baseUrl = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html";
+
+  // For tests that require setTimeout, set the maximum polling time to 50 x 100ms = 5 seconds.
+  var MAX_COUNT = 50;
+  var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+
+  var testContent = document.getElementById("testContent");
+
+  // Test 1: Navigate secure iframe to insecure iframe on a secure page
+  var iframe_test1 = document.createElement("iframe");
+  var counter_test1 = 0;
+  iframe_test1.setAttribute("id", "test1");
+  iframe_test1.src = baseUrl + "?securePage_navigate_child";
+  iframe_test1.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "securePage_navigate_child", "msg": "navigating to insecure iframe blocked on secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  };
+  testContent.appendChild(iframe_test1);
+
+  function navigationStatus(iframe_test1)
+  {
+    // When the page is navigating, it goes through about:blank and we will get a permission denied for loc.
+    // Catch that specific exception and return
+    try {
+      var loc = document.getElementById("test1").contentDocument.location;
+    } catch(e) {
+      if (e.name === "SecurityError") {
+        // We received an exception we didn't expect.
+        throw e;
+      }
+      counter_test1++;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (loc == "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?insecurePage_navigate_child_response") {
+      return;
+    } else {
+      if(counter_test1 < MAX_COUNT) {
+        counter_test1++;
+        setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, iframe_test1);
+      }
+      else {
+        // After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume navigating the iframe is blocked
+        parent.postMessage({"test": "securePage_navigate_child", "msg": "navigating to insecure iframe blocked on secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, iframe_test1);
+
+  // Test 2: Open an http page in a new tab from a link click with target=_blank.
+  var iframe_test3 = document.createElement("iframe");
+  iframe_test3.src = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_blankTarget.html";
+  iframe_test3.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "blankTarget", "msg": "got an onerror event when loading or navigating testing iframe"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  };
+  testContent.appendChild(iframe_test3);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure_grandchild.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure_grandchild.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..235ac0055e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure_grandchild.html
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker - Navigating Grandchild Frames when a secure parent exists
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=840388
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Mixed Content Frame Navigation</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<iframe src="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?securePage_navigate_grandchild" id="child"></iframe>
+<script>
+  // For tests that require setTimeout, set the maximum polling time to 50 x 100ms = 5 seconds.
+  var MAX_COUNT = 50;
+  var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+  var counter = 0;
+
+  var child = document.getElementById("child");
+  function navigationStatus(child)
+  {
+    var loc;
+    // When the page is navigating, it goes through about:blank and we will get a permission denied for loc.
+    // Catch that specific exception and return
+    try {
+      loc = document.getElementById("child").contentDocument.location;
+    } catch(e) {
+      if (e.message && !e.message.includes("Permission denied to access property")) {
+        // We received an exception we didn't expect.
+        throw e;
+      }
+      counter++;
+      return;
+    }
+    if (loc == "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_innermost.html?securePage_navigate_grandchild_response") {
+      return;
+    }
+    else {
+      if(counter < MAX_COUNT) {
+        counter++;
+        setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, child);
+      }
+      else {
+        // After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume navigating the iframe is blocked
+        dump("\nThe current location of the grandchild iframe is: "+loc+".\n");
+        dump("\nWe have past the maximum timeout.  Navigating a grandchild iframe from an https location to an http location on a secure page failed.  We are about to post message to the top level page\n");
+        parent.parent.postMessage({"test": "securePage_navigate_grandchild", "msg": "navigating to insecure grandchild iframe blocked on secure page"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+        dump("\nAttempted postMessage\n");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  setTimeout(navigationStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, child);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e4a2d8d08b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62178
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 62178</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testContent"></div>
+
+<!-- types the Mixed Content Blocker can block
+     /*
+  switch (aContentType) {
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SCRIPT:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_STYLESHEET:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_XMLHTTPREQUEST:
+
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_FONT: - NO TEST:
+    Load events for external fonts are not detectable by javascript.
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_WEBSOCKET: - NO TEST:
+    websocket connections over https require an encrypted websocket protocol (wss:)
+
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGE:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_IMAGESET:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_MEDIA:
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_PING:
+    our ping implementation is off by default and does not comply with the current spec (bug 786347)
+  case nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_BEACON:
+
+  }
+     */
+-->
+
+<script>
+  function ok(a, msg) {
+    parent.postMessage({msg, check: true, status: !!a}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+
+  function is(a, b, msg) {
+    ok(a == b, msg);
+  }
+
+  function report(type, msg) {
+    parent.postMessage({test: type, msg}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+
+  function uniqueID() {
+    return Math.floor(Math.random() * 100000)
+  }
+  function uniqueIDParam(id) {
+    return "&uniqueID=" + id;
+  }
+
+  async function init() {
+    var baseUrl = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_server.sjs";
+    var checkLastRequestUrl = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_server.sjs?lastRequest=true";
+
+    //For tests that require setTimeout, set the maximum polling time to 100 x 100ms = 10 seconds.
+    var MAX_COUNT = 100;
+    var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+
+    var testContent = document.getElementById("testContent");
+
+    async function checkLastRequest() {
+      const response = await fetch(checkLastRequestUrl);
+      return response.json();
+    }
+
+    /* Part 1: Mixed Script tests */
+
+    // Test 1a: insecure object
+    var object = document.createElement("object");
+    var objectId = uniqueID();
+    object.data = baseUrl + "?type=object" + uniqueIDParam(objectId);
+    object.type = "image/png";
+    object.width = "200";
+    object.height = "200";
+
+    testContent.appendChild(object);
+
+    var objectCount = 0;
+
+    function objectStatus(object) {
+      // Expose our privileged bits on the object.  We will match the MIME type to the one
+      // provided by file_server.sjs
+      object = SpecialPowers.wrap(object);
+      var typeIsSet = object.actualType && (object.actualType !== '');
+      var isLoaded = typeIsSet && object.actualType === 'application/x-test-match';
+      if (isLoaded) {
+        //object loaded
+        report("object", "insecure object loaded");
+      }
+      else {
+        if(!typeIsSet && objectCount < MAX_COUNT) {
+          objectCount++;
+          setTimeout(objectStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, object);
+        }
+        else {
+          //After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume object is blocked
+          report("object", "insecure object blocked");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // object does not have onload and onerror events. Hence we need a setTimeout to check the object's status
+    setTimeout(objectStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, object);
+
+    // Test 1b: insecure script
+    var script = document.createElement("script");
+    var scriptId = uniqueID();
+    var scriptLoad = false;
+    var scriptCount = 0;
+    script.src = baseUrl + "?type=script" + uniqueIDParam(scriptId);
+    script.onload = function(e) {
+      report("script", "insecure script loaded");
+      scriptLoad = true;
+    }
+    testContent.appendChild(script);
+
+    function scriptStatus(script)
+    {
+      if(scriptLoad) {
+        return;
+      }
+      else {
+        if(scriptCount < MAX_COUNT) {
+          scriptCount++;
+          setTimeout(scriptStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, script);
+        }
+        else {
+          //After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume script is blocked
+          report("script", "insecure script blocked");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // scripts blocked by Content Policy's do not have onerror events (see bug 789856).  Hence we need a setTimeout to check the script's status
+    setTimeout(scriptStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, script);
+
+
+    // Test 1c: insecure stylesheet
+    var cssStyleSheet = document.createElement("link");
+    var cssStyleSheetId = uniqueID();
+    cssStyleSheet.rel = "stylesheet";
+    cssStyleSheet.href = baseUrl + "?type=stylesheet" + uniqueIDParam(cssStyleSheetId);
+    cssStyleSheet.type = "text/css";
+    testContent.appendChild(cssStyleSheet);
+
+    var styleCount = 0;
+
+    function styleStatus(cssStyleSheet) {
+      if( cssStyleSheet.sheet || cssStyleSheet.styleSheet || cssStyleSheet.innerHTML ) {
+        report("stylesheet", "insecure stylesheet loaded");
+      }
+      else {
+        if(styleCount < MAX_COUNT) {
+          styleCount++;
+          setTimeout(styleStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, cssStyleSheet);
+        }
+        else {
+          //After we have called setTimeout the maximum number of times, assume stylesheet is blocked
+          report("stylesheet", "insecure stylesheet blocked");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // link does not have onload and onerror events. Hence we need a setTimeout to check the link's status
+    window.setTimeout(styleStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL, cssStyleSheet);
+
+    // Test 1d: insecure iframe
+    var iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
+    var iframeId = uniqueID();
+    iframe.src = baseUrl + "?type=iframe" + uniqueIDParam(iframeId);
+    iframe.onload = function() {
+      report("iframe", "insecure iframe loaded");
+    }
+    iframe.onerror = function() {
+      report("iframe", "insecure iframe blocked");
+    };
+    testContent.appendChild(iframe);
+
+
+    // Test 1e: insecure xhr
+    await new Promise((resolve) => {
+      var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest;
+      var xhrId = uniqueID();
+      try {
+        xhr.open("GET", baseUrl + "?type=xhr" + uniqueIDParam(xhrId), true);
+        xhr.send();
+        xhr.onloadend = function (oEvent) {
+          if (xhr.status == 200) {
+            report("xhr", "insecure xhr loaded");
+            resolve();
+          }
+          else {
+            report("xhr", "insecure xhr blocked");
+            resolve();
+          }
+        }
+      } catch(ex) {
+         report("xhr", "insecure xhr blocked");
+        resolve();
+      }
+    });
+
+    /* Part 2: Mixed Display tests */
+
+    // Shorthand for all image test variants
+    async function imgHandlers(img, test, uniqueID) {
+      await new Promise((resolve) => {
+        img.onload = async () => {
+          const lastRequest = await checkLastRequest();
+          is(lastRequest.uniqueID, uniqueID, "UniqueID for the last request matches");
+          let message = "insecure image loaded";
+          if (lastRequest.scheme == "https") {
+            message = "secure image loaded after upgrade";
+          }
+          report(test, message);
+          resolve();
+        }
+        img.onerror = async () => {
+          let message = "insecure image blocked";
+          report(test, message);
+          resolve();
+        }
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Test 2a: insecure image
+    var img = document.createElement("img");
+    var imgId = uniqueID();
+    img.src = baseUrl + "?type=img" + uniqueIDParam(imgId);
+    await imgHandlers(img, "image", imgId);
+    // We don't need to append the image to the document. Doing so causes the image test to run twice.
+
+    // Test 2b: insecure media
+    var media = document.createElement("video");
+    var mediaId = uniqueID();
+    media.src = baseUrl + "?type=media" + uniqueIDParam(mediaId);
+    media.width = "320";
+    media.height = "200";
+    media.type = "video/ogg";
+    await new Promise(res => {
+      media.onloadeddata = async () => {
+        const lastRequest = await checkLastRequest();
+        is(lastRequest.uniqueID, mediaId, "UniqueID for the last request matches");
+        let message = "insecure media loaded";
+        if (lastRequest.scheme == "https") {
+          message = "secure media loaded after upgrade";
+        }
+        report("media", message);
+        res();
+      }
+      media.onerror = function() {
+        report("media", "insecure media blocked");
+        res();
+      }
+    });
+    // We don't need to append the video to the document. Doing so causes the image test to run twice.
+
+    /* Part 3: Mixed Active Tests for Image srcset */
+
+    // Test 3a: image with srcset
+    var imgA = document.createElement("img");
+    var imgAId = uniqueID();
+    imgA.srcset = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageSrcset" + uniqueIDParam(imgAId);
+    await imgHandlers(imgA, "imageSrcset", imgAId);
+
+    // Test 3b: image with srcset, using fallback from src, should still use imageset policy
+    var imgB = document.createElement("img");
+    var imgBId = uniqueID();
+    imgB.srcset = " ";
+    imgB.src = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageSrcSetFallback" + uniqueIDParam(imgBId);
+    await imgHandlers(imgB, "imageSrcsetFallback", imgBId);
+
+    // Test 3c: image in <picture>
+    var imgC = document.createElement("img");
+    var pictureC = document.createElement("picture");
+    var sourceC = document.createElement("source");
+    var sourceCId = uniqueID();
+    sourceC.srcset = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imagePicture" + uniqueIDParam(sourceCId);
+    pictureC.appendChild(sourceC);
+    pictureC.appendChild(imgC);
+    await imgHandlers(imgC, "imagePicture", sourceCId);
+
+    // Test 3d: Loaded basic image switching to a <picture>, loading
+    //          same source, should still redo the request with new
+    //          policy.
+    var imgD = document.createElement("img");
+    var imgDId = uniqueID();
+    var sourceDId = uniqueID();
+    imgD.src = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageJoinPicture" + uniqueIDParam(imgDId);
+    await new Promise(res => {
+      imgD.onload = imgD.onerror = function() {
+        // Whether or not it loads, we want to now append it to a picture and observe
+        var pictureD = document.createElement("picture");
+        var sourceD = document.createElement("source");
+        sourceD.srcset = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageJoinPicture2" + uniqueIDParam(sourceDId);
+        pictureD.appendChild(sourceD);
+        pictureD.appendChild(imgD);
+        res();
+      }
+    });
+    await imgHandlers(imgD, "imageJoinPicture", sourceDId);
+
+    // Test 3e: img load from <picture> source reverts to img.src as it
+    //          is removed -- the new request should revert to mixed
+    //          display policy
+    var imgE = document.createElement("img");
+    var pictureE = document.createElement("picture");
+    var pictureEId = uniqueID();
+    var sourceE = document.createElement("source");
+    var sourceEId = uniqueID();
+    sourceE.srcset = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageLeavePicture" + uniqueIDParam(sourceEId);
+    pictureE.appendChild(sourceE);
+    pictureE.appendChild(imgE);
+    imgE.src = baseUrl + "?type=img&subtype=imageLeavePicture2" + uniqueIDParam(pictureEId);
+    await new Promise(res => {
+      imgE.onload = imgE.onerror = function() {
+        // Whether or not it loads, remove it from the picture and observe
+        pictureE.removeChild(imgE)
+        res();
+      }
+    });
+    await imgHandlers(imgE, "imageLeavePicture", pictureEId);
+  }
+
+  init();
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3404e54471
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225.html
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker - Allowed Protocols
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=803225
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 62178</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/EventUtils.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+<div id="testContent"></div>
+
+<!-- Test additional schemes the Mixed Content Blocker should not block
+     "about" protocol URIs that are URI_SAFE_FOR_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT (moz-safe-about; see nsAboutProtocolHandler::NewURI
+     "data",
+     "javascript",
+     "mailto",
+     "resource",
+     "wss"
+-->
+
+<script>
+  const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+    "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+  );
+
+  //For tests that require setTimeout, set the timeout interval
+  var TIMEOUT_INTERVAL = 100;
+
+  var testContent = document.getElementById("testContent");
+
+  // Test 1 & 2: about and javascript protcols within an iframe
+  var data = Array(2,2);
+  var protocols = [
+                    ["about", ""], //When no source is specified, the frame gets a source of about:blank
+                    ["javascript", "javascript:document.open();document.write='<h1>SUCCESS</h1>';document.close();"],
+                  ];
+  for(var i=0; i < protocols.length; i++)
+  {
+    var generic_frame = document.createElement("iframe");
+    generic_frame.src = protocols[i][1];
+    generic_frame.name="generic_protocol";
+
+    generic_frame.onload = function(i) {
+      data = {"test": protocols[i][0], "msg": "resource with " + protocols[i][0] + " protocol loaded"};
+      parent.postMessage(data, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+    }.bind(generic_frame, i)
+
+    generic_frame.onerror = function(i) {
+      data = {"test": protocols[i][0], "msg": "resource with " + protocols[i][0] + " protocol did not load"};
+      parent.postMessage(data, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+    }.bind(generic_frame, i);
+
+    testContent.appendChild(generic_frame, i);
+  }
+
+  // Test 3: for resource within a script tag
+  // Note: the script we load throws an exception, but the script element's
+  // onload listener is called after we successfully fetch the script,
+  // independently of whether it throws an exception.
+  var resource_script=document.createElement("script");
+  resource_script.src = "resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.sys.mjs";
+  resource_script.name = "resource_protocol";
+  resource_script.onload = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "resource", "msg": "resource with resource protocol loaded"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+  resource_script.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "resource", "msg": "resource with resource protocol did not load"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+
+  testContent.appendChild(resource_script);
+
+  // Test 4: about unsafe protocol within an iframe
+  var unsafe_about_frame = document.createElement("iframe");
+  unsafe_about_frame.src = "about:config";
+  unsafe_about_frame.name = "unsafe_about_protocol";
+  unsafe_about_frame.onload = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "unsafe_about", "msg": "resource with unsafe about protocol loaded"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+  unsafe_about_frame.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "unsafe_about", "msg": "resource with unsafe about protocol did not load"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+  testContent.appendChild(unsafe_about_frame);
+
+  // Test 5: data protocol within a script tag
+  var x = 2;
+  var newscript = document.createElement("script");
+  newscript.src= "data:text/javascript,var x = 4;";
+  newscript.onload = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "data_protocol", "msg": "resource with data protocol loaded"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+  newscript.onerror = function() {
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "data_protocol", "msg": "resource with data protocol did not load"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  }
+  testContent.appendChild(newscript);
+
+  // Test 6: mailto protocol
+  let mm = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(function launchHandler() {
+    /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+    var ioService = Cc["@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1"].
+                      getService(Ci.nsIIOService);
+
+    var webHandler = Cc["@mozilla.org/uriloader/web-handler-app;1"].
+                       createInstance(Ci.nsIWebHandlerApp);
+    webHandler.name = "Web Handler";
+    webHandler.uriTemplate = "http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug803225_test_mailto.html?s=%";
+
+    Services.ppmm.addMessageListener("Test:content-ready", function contentReadyListener() {
+      Services.ppmm.removeMessageListener("Test:content-ready", contentReadyListener);
+      sendAsyncMessage("Test:content-ready-forward");
+      Services.ppmm.removeDelayedProcessScript(pScript);
+    })
+
+    var pScript = "data:,new " + function () {
+      /* eslint-env mozilla/process-script */
+      var os = Cc["@mozilla.org/observer-service;1"]
+        .getService(Ci.nsIObserverService);
+      var observer = {
+        observe(subject, topic, data) {
+        if (topic == "content-document-global-created" && data == "http://example.com") {
+           sendAsyncMessage("Test:content-ready");
+           os.removeObserver(observer, "content-document-global-created");
+        }
+      }
+      };
+      os.addObserver(observer, "content-document-global-created");
+    }
+
+    Services.ppmm.loadProcessScript(pScript, true);
+
+    var uri = ioService.newURI("mailto:foo@bar.com");
+    webHandler.launchWithURI(uri);
+  });
+
+  var mailto = false;
+
+  mm.addMessageListener("Test:content-ready-forward", function contentReadyListener() {
+    mm.removeMessageListener("Test:content-ready-forward", contentReadyListener);
+    mailto = true;
+    parent.postMessage({"test": "mailto", "msg": "resource with mailto protocol loaded"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+  });
+
+  function mailtoProtocolStatus() {
+    if(!mailto) {
+      //There is no onerror event associated with the WebHandler, and hence we need a setTimeout to check the status
+      setTimeout(mailtoProtocolStatus, TIMEOUT_INTERVAL);
+    }
+  }
+
+  mailtoProtocolStatus();
+
+  // Test 7: wss protocol
+  // WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+  if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+    var wss;
+    wss = new WebSocket("wss://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225_websocket");
+
+    var status_wss = "started";
+    wss.onopen = function(e) {
+       status_wss = "opened";
+       wss.close();
+    }
+    wss.onclose = function(e) {
+      if(status_wss == "opened") {
+        parent.postMessage({"test": "wss", "msg": "resource with wss protocol loaded"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      } else {
+        parent.postMessage({"test": "wss", "msg": "resource with wss protocol did not load"}, "http://mochi.test:8888");
+      }
+    }
+  }
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225_websocket_wsh.py b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225_websocket_wsh.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7159c742b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225_websocket_wsh.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+def web_socket_do_extra_handshake(request):
+    pass
+
+
+def web_socket_transfer_data(request):
+    pass
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b86fbc9cbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.html
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1673574 - Improve Console logging for mixed content auto upgrading</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- The following file does in fact not exist because we only care if it shows up in the console -->
+  <img src="http://example.com/file_mixed_content_auto_upgrade_display_console.jpg">
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..99e1873791
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug1402363: Test mixed content redirects</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<script type="text/javascript">
+  const PATH = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/";
+
+  // check a fetch redirect from https to https (should be allowed)
+  fetch(PATH + "file_redirect_handler.sjs?https-to-https-redirect", {
+    method: 'get'
+  }).then(function(response) {
+    window.parent.postMessage("https-to-https-loaded", "*");
+  }).catch(function(err) {
+    window.parent.postMessage("https-to-https-blocked", "*");
+  });
+
+  // check a fetch redirect from https to http (should be blocked)
+  fetch(PATH + "file_redirect_handler.sjs?https-to-http-redirect", {
+    method: 'get'
+  }).then(function(response) {
+    window.parent.postMessage("https-to-http-loaded", "*");
+  }).catch(function(err) {
+    window.parent.postMessage("https-to-http-blocked", "*");
+  });
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect_handler.sjs b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect_handler.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c134c00e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_redirect_handler.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+// custom *.sjs file for
+// Bug 1402363: Test Mixed Content Redirect Blocking.
+
+const URL_PATH = "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/";
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  let queryStr = request.queryString;
+
+  if (queryStr === "https-to-https-redirect") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "https://" + URL_PATH + "file_redirect_handler.sjs?load",
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryStr === "https-to-http-redirect") {
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "http://" + URL_PATH + "file_redirect_handler.sjs?load",
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (queryStr === "load") {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+    response.write("foo");
+    return;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_server.sjs b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_server.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a13f4ab8b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_server.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+function ERR(response, msg) {
+  dump("ERROR: " + msg + "\n");
+  response.write("HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request\r\n");
+  response.write("Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\r\n");
+  response.write("Content-Length: " + msg.length + "\r\n");
+  response.write("\r\n");
+  response.write(msg);
+}
+
+function loadContentFromFile(path) {
+  // Load the content to return in the response from file.
+  // Since it's relative to the cwd of the test runner, we start there and
+  // append to get to the actual path of the file.
+  var testContentFile = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/file/directory_service;1"
+  ]
+    .getService(Components.interfaces.nsIProperties)
+    .get("CurWorkD", Components.interfaces.nsIFile);
+  var dirs = path.split("/");
+  for (var i = 0; i < dirs.length; i++) {
+    testContentFile.append(dirs[i]);
+  }
+  var testContentFileStream = Components.classes[
+    "@mozilla.org/network/file-input-stream;1"
+  ].createInstance(Components.interfaces.nsIFileInputStream);
+  testContentFileStream.init(testContentFile, -1, 0, 0);
+  var testContent = NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+    testContentFileStream,
+    testContentFileStream.available()
+  );
+  return testContent;
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  const { scheme, host, path } = request;
+  // get the Content-Type to serve from the query string
+  var contentType = null;
+  var uniqueID = null;
+  var showLastRequest = false;
+  request.queryString.split("&").forEach(function(val) {
+    var [name, value] = val.split("=");
+    if (name == "type") {
+      contentType = unescape(value);
+    }
+    if (name == "uniqueID") {
+      uniqueID = unescape(value);
+    }
+    if (name == "lastRequest") {
+      showLastRequest = true;
+    }
+  });
+
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviors
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+
+  if (showLastRequest) {
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+    // We don't want to expose the same lastRequest multiple times.
+    var state = getState("lastRequest");
+    setState("lastRequest", "");
+
+    if (state == "") {
+      ERR(response, "No last request!");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    response.write(state);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (!uniqueID) {
+    ERR(response, "No uniqueID?!?");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  setState(
+    "lastRequest",
+    JSON.stringify({
+      scheme,
+      host,
+      path,
+      uniqueID,
+      contentType: contentType || "other",
+    })
+  );
+
+  switch (contentType) {
+    case "img":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png", false);
+      response.write(
+        loadContentFromFile("tests/image/test/mochitest/blue.png")
+      );
+      break;
+
+    case "media":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "video/ogg", false);
+      response.write(loadContentFromFile("tests/dom/media/test/320x240.ogv"));
+      break;
+
+    case "iframe":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+      response.write("frame content");
+      break;
+
+    case "script":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/javascript", false);
+      break;
+
+    case "stylesheet":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/css", false);
+      break;
+
+    case "object":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/x-test-match", false);
+      break;
+
+    case "xhr":
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/xml", false);
+      response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "https://example.com");
+      response.write('<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?><test></test>');
+      break;
+
+    default:
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+      response.write("<html><body>Hello World</body></html>");
+      break;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2e322b6392
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+tags = mcb
+prefs =
+  security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content=false
+  dom.security.https_first=false
+support-files =
+  file_bug803225_test_mailto.html
+  file_frameNavigation.html
+  file_frameNavigation_blankTarget.html
+  file_frameNavigation_grandchild.html
+  file_frameNavigation_innermost.html
+  file_frameNavigation_secure.html
+  file_frameNavigation_secure_grandchild.html
+  file_main.html
+  file_main_bug803225.html
+  file_main_bug803225_websocket_wsh.py
+  file_server.sjs
+  !/dom/media/test/320x240.ogv
+  !/image/test/mochitest/blue.png
+  file_redirect.html
+  file_redirect_handler.sjs
+  file_bug1551886.html
+
+[test_main.html]
+skip-if =
+    true
+    toolkit == 'android'
+    (verify && !debug && os == 'linux')  # Android: TIMED_OUT; bug 1402554
+    tsan  # Times out / Memory consumption, bug 1612707
+[test_bug803225.html]
+skip-if = (os=='linux' && bits==32) || headless || tsan # Linux32:bug 1324870; Headless:bug 1405870; tsan:bug 1612707
+[test_frameNavigation.html]
+skip-if =
+    true  # Bug 1424752
+[test_redirect.html]
+[test_bug1551886.html]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug1551886.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug1551886.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..bf128256a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug1551886.html
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+<title>Bug 1551886: Opaque documents aren't considered in the mixed content blocker</title>
+<script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let f = document.createElement("iframe");
+f.src = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_bug1551886.html";
+
+window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+    switch(event.data.type) {
+        case 'http':
+            is(event.data.status, "blocked", "nested load of http://example should get blocked by the MCB");
+            break
+        case 'https':
+            is(event.data.status, "loaded", "nested load of https://example should not get blocked by the MCB");
+            SimpleTest.finish();
+            break;
+    }
+});
+
+document.body.appendChild(f); 
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug803225.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug803225.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..56f5e02e05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_bug803225.html
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Testing Allowlist of Resource Scheme for Mixed Content Blocker
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=803225
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 803225</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+  <script>
+  const { AppConstants } = SpecialPowers.ChromeUtils.import(
+    "resource://gre/modules/AppConstants.jsm"
+  );
+
+  var counter = 0;
+  var settings = [ [true, true], [true, false], [false, true], [false, false] ];
+
+  var blockActive;
+  var blockDisplay;
+
+  //Cycle through 4 different preference settings.
+  function changePrefs(callback) {
+    let newPrefs = [
+      ["security.all_resource_uri_content_accessible", true], // Temporarily allow content to access all resource:// URIs.
+      ["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", settings[counter][0]],
+      ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", settings[counter][1]]
+    ];
+
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": newPrefs}, function () {
+      blockDisplay = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_display_content");
+      blockActive = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+      counter++;
+      callback();
+    });
+  }
+
+  var testsToRun = {
+    /* https - Tests already run as part of bug 62178. */
+    about: false,
+    resource: false,
+    unsafe_about: false,
+    data_protocol: false,
+    javascript: false,
+  };
+
+  if (AppConstants.platform !== "android") {
+    // WebSocket tests are not supported on Android Yet. Bug 1566168.
+    testsToRun.wss = false;
+    testsToRun.mailto = false;
+  }
+
+  function log(msg) {
+    document.getElementById("log").textContent += "\n" + msg;
+  }
+
+  function reloadFrame() {
+    document.getElementById('framediv').innerHTML = '<iframe id="testHarness" src="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main_bug803225.html"></iframe>';
+  }
+
+  function checkTestsCompleted() {
+    for (var prop in testsToRun) {
+      // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+      if (!testsToRun[prop])
+        return;
+    }
+    //if the testsToRun are all completed, change the pref and run the tests again until we have cycled through all the prefs.
+    if(counter < 4) {
+       for (var prop in testsToRun) {
+         testsToRun[prop] = false;
+       }
+      //call to change the preferences
+      changePrefs(function() {
+        log("\nblockDisplay set to "+blockDisplay+", blockActive set to "+blockActive+".");
+        reloadFrame();
+      });
+    }
+    else {
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+
+  var firstTest = true;
+
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    if(firstTest) {
+      log("blockDisplay set to "+blockDisplay+", blockActive set to "+blockActive+".");
+      firstTest = false;
+    }
+
+    log("test: "+event.data.test+", msg: "+event.data.msg + " logging message.");
+    // test that the load type matches the pref for this type of content
+    // (i.e. active vs. display)
+
+    switch(event.data.test) {
+
+      /* Mixed Script tests */
+      case "about":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with about protocol loaded", "resource with about protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.about = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "resource":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with resource protocol loaded", "resource with resource protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.resource = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "unsafe_about":
+        // This one should not load
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with unsafe about protocol did not load", "resource with unsafe about protocol loaded");
+        testsToRun.unsafe_about = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "data_protocol":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with data protocol loaded", "resource with data protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.data_protocol = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "javascript":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with javascript protocol loaded", "resource with javascript protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.javascript = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "wss":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with wss protocol loaded", "resource with wss protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.wss = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "mailto":
+        ok(event.data.msg == "resource with mailto protocol loaded", "resource with mailto protocol did not load");
+        testsToRun.mailto = true;
+        break;
+    }
+    checkTestsCompleted();
+  }
+
+  function startTest() {
+    //Set the first set of settings (true, true) and increment the counter.
+    changePrefs(function() {
+      // listen for a messages from the mixed content test harness
+      window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+      reloadFrame();
+    });
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  </script>
+</head>
+
+<body onload='startTest()'>
+  <div id="framediv"></div>
+  <pre id="log"></pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_frameNavigation.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_frameNavigation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..82e3e715d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_frameNavigation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=840388
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 840388</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+  <script>
+  var counter = 0;
+  var origBlockActive = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+
+  SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content", true);
+  var blockActive = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+
+
+  var testsToRunInsecure = {
+    insecurePage_navigate_child: false,
+    insecurePage_navigate_grandchild: false,
+  };
+
+  var testsToRunSecure = {
+    securePage_navigate_child: false,
+    blankTarget: false,
+  };
+
+  function log(msg) {
+    document.getElementById("log").textContent += "\n" + msg;
+  }
+
+  var secureTestsStarted = false;
+  async function checkTestsCompleted() {
+    for (var prop in testsToRunInsecure) {
+      // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+      if (!testsToRunInsecure[prop])
+        return;
+    }
+    // If we are here, all the insecure tests have run.
+    // If we haven't changed the iframe to run the secure tests, change it now.
+    if (!secureTestsStarted) {
+      document.getElementById('testing_frame').src = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation_secure.html";
+      secureTestsStarted = true;
+    }
+    for (var prop in testsToRunSecure) {
+      // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+      if (!testsToRunSecure[prop])
+        return;
+    }
+    //if the secure and insecure testsToRun are all completed, change the block mixed active content pref and run the tests again.
+    if(counter < 1) {
+       for (var prop in testsToRunSecure) {
+         testsToRunSecure[prop] = false;
+       }
+       for (var prop in testsToRunInsecure) {
+         testsToRunInsecure[prop] = false;
+       }
+      //call to change the preferences
+      counter++;
+      await SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false);
+      blockActive = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+      log("blockActive set to "+blockActive+".");
+      secureTestsStarted = false;
+      document.getElementById('framediv').innerHTML = '<iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation.html" id="testing_frame"></iframe>';
+    }
+    else {
+      //set the prefs back to what they were set to originally
+      SpecialPowers.setBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content", origBlockActive);
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+
+  var firstTestDebugMessage = true;
+
+  // listen for a messages from the mixed content test harness
+  window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    if(firstTestDebugMessage) {
+      log("blockActive set to "+blockActive);
+      firstTestDebugMessage = false;
+    }
+
+    log("test: "+event.data.test+", msg: "+event.data.msg + ".");
+    // test that the load type matches the pref for this type of content
+    // (i.e. active vs. display)
+
+    switch(event.data.test) {
+
+      case "insecurePage_navigate_child":
+        is(event.data.msg, "navigated to insecure iframe on insecure page", "navigating to insecure iframe blocked on insecure page");
+        testsToRunInsecure.insecurePage_navigate_child = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "insecurePage_navigate_grandchild":
+        is(event.data.msg, "navigated to insecure grandchild iframe on insecure page", "navigating to insecure grandchild iframe blocked on insecure page");
+        testsToRunInsecure.insecurePage_navigate_grandchild = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "securePage_navigate_child":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "navigating to insecure iframe blocked on secure page"), "navigated to insecure iframe on secure page");
+        testsToRunSecure.securePage_navigate_child = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "blankTarget":
+        is(event.data.msg, "opened an http link with target=_blank from a secure page", "couldn't open an http link in a new window from a secure page");
+        testsToRunSecure.blankTarget = true;
+        break;
+
+    }
+    checkTestsCompleted();
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+  </script>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+  <div id="framediv">
+    <iframe src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_frameNavigation.html" id="testing_frame"></iframe>
+  </div>
+
+  <pre id="log"></pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_main.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_main.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a13a0853f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_main.html
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<!--
+Tests for Mixed Content Blocker
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=62178
+-->
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Tests for Bug 62178</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+  <script>
+  let counter = 0;
+  // blockDisplay blockActive upgradeDisplay
+  const settings = [
+    [true, true, true],
+    [true, false, true],
+    [false, true, true],
+    [false, false, true],
+    [true, true, false],
+    [true, false, false],
+    [false, true, false],
+    [false, false, false],
+  ];
+
+  let blockActive;
+  let blockDisplay;
+  let upgradeDisplay;
+
+  //Cycle through 8 different preference settings.
+  function changePrefs(otherPrefs, callback) {
+    let basePrefs = [["security.mixed_content.block_display_content", settings[counter][0]],
+                     ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", settings[counter][1]],
+                     ["security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content", settings[counter][2]]];
+    let newPrefs = basePrefs.concat(otherPrefs);
+
+    SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": newPrefs}, function () {
+      blockDisplay = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_display_content");
+      blockActive = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.block_active_content");
+      upgradeDisplay = SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("security.mixed_content.upgrade_display_content");
+      counter++;
+      callback();
+    });
+  }
+
+  let testsToRun = {
+    iframe: false,
+    image: false,
+    imageSrcset: false,
+    imageSrcsetFallback: false,
+    imagePicture: false,
+    imageJoinPicture: false,
+    imageLeavePicture: false,
+    script: false,
+    stylesheet: false,
+    object: false,
+    media: false,
+    xhr: false,
+  };
+
+  function log(msg) {
+    document.getElementById("log").textContent += "\n" + msg;
+  }
+
+  function reloadFrame() {
+    document.getElementById('framediv').innerHTML = '<iframe id="testHarness" src="https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/file_main.html"></iframe>';
+  }
+
+  function checkTestsCompleted() {
+    for (var prop in testsToRun) {
+      // some test hasn't run yet so we're not done
+      if (!testsToRun[prop])
+        return;
+    }
+    //if the testsToRun are all completed, chnage the pref and run the tests again until we have cycled through all the prefs.
+    if(counter < 8) {
+       for (var prop in testsToRun) {
+         testsToRun[prop] = false;
+       }
+      //call to change the preferences
+      changePrefs([], function() {
+        log(`\nblockDisplay set to ${blockDisplay}, blockActive set to ${blockActive}, upgradeDisplay set to ${upgradeDisplay}`);
+        reloadFrame();
+      });
+    }
+    else {
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  }
+
+  var firstTest = true;
+
+  function receiveMessage(event) {
+    if(firstTest) {
+      log(`blockActive set to ${blockActive}, blockDisplay set to ${blockDisplay}, upgradeDisplay set to ${upgradeDisplay}.`);
+      firstTest = false;
+    }
+
+    // Simple check from the iframe.
+    if (event.data.check) {
+      ok(event.data.status, event.data.msg);
+      return;
+    }
+
+    log("test: "+event.data.test+", msg: "+event.data.msg + " logging message.");
+    // test that the load type matches the pref for this type of content
+    // (i.e. active vs. display)
+
+    switch(event.data.test) {
+
+      /* Mixed Script tests */
+      case "iframe":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure iframe blocked"), "iframe did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        testsToRun.iframe = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "object":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure object blocked"), "object did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        testsToRun.object = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "script":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure script blocked"), "script did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        testsToRun.script = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "stylesheet":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure stylesheet blocked"), "stylesheet did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        testsToRun.stylesheet = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "xhr":
+        ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure xhr blocked"), "xhr did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        testsToRun.xhr = true;
+        break;
+
+      /* Mixed Display tests */
+      case "image":
+        //test that the image load matches the pref for display content
+        if (upgradeDisplay) {
+          ok(event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade", "image did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockDisplay == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "image did not follow block_display_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.image = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "media":
+        if (upgradeDisplay) {
+          ok(event.data.msg == "secure media loaded after upgrade", "media did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockDisplay == (event.data.msg == "insecure media blocked"), "media did not follow block_display_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.media = true;
+        break;
+
+      /* Images using the "imageset" policy, from <img srcset> and <picture>, do not get the mixed display exception */
+      case "imageSrcset":
+        // When blockDisplay && blockActive && upgradeDisplay are all true the request is blocked
+        // This appears to be a side effect of blockDisplay taking precedence here.
+        if (event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade") {
+          ok(upgradeDisplay, "imageSrcset did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "imageSrcset did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.imageSrcset = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "imageSrcsetFallback":
+        if (event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade") {
+          ok(upgradeDisplay, "imageSrcsetFallback did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "imageSrcsetFallback did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.imageSrcsetFallback = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "imagePicture":
+        if (event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade") {
+          ok(upgradeDisplay, "imagePicture did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "imagePicture did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.imagePicture = true;
+        break;
+
+      case "imageJoinPicture":
+        if (event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade") {
+          ok(upgradeDisplay, "imageJoinPicture did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockActive == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "imageJoinPicture did not follow block_active_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.imageJoinPicture = true;
+        break;
+
+      // Should return to mixed display mode
+      case "imageLeavePicture":
+        if (event.data.msg == "secure image loaded after upgrade") {
+          ok(upgradeDisplay, "imageLeavePicture did not follow upgrade_display_content pref");
+        } else {
+          ok(blockDisplay == (event.data.msg == "insecure image blocked"), "imageLeavePicture did not follow block_display_content pref");
+        }
+        testsToRun.imageLeavePicture = true;
+        break;
+
+    }
+    checkTestsCompleted();
+  }
+
+  function startTest() {
+    //Set the first set of mixed content settings and increment the counter.
+    changePrefs([], function() {
+      //listen for a messages from the mixed content test harness
+      window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+
+      //Kick off test
+      reloadFrame();
+    });
+  }
+
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  </script>
+</head>
+
+<body onload='startTest()'>
+  <div id="framediv"></div>
+  <pre id="log"></pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3fdd4e2e7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/test_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug1402363: Test mixed content redirects</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body onload='startTest()'>
+<iframe style="width:100%;height:300px;" id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const PATH = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/mixedcontentblocker/";
+let testcounter = 0;
+
+window.addEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+function receiveMessage(event) {
+  if (event.data === "https-to-https-loaded") {
+    ok(true, "https to https fetch redirect should be allowed");
+  }
+  else if (event.data === "https-to-http-blocked") {
+    ok(true, "https to http fetch redirect should be blocked");
+  }
+  else {
+    ok(false, "sanity: we should never enter that branch (" + event.data + ")");
+  }
+  testcounter++;
+  if (testcounter < 2) {
+    return;
+  }
+  window.removeEventListener("message", receiveMessage);
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+}
+
+function startTest() {
+  let testframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  testframe.src = PATH + "file_redirect.html";
+}
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/moz.build b/dom/security/test/moz.build
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ea2127490
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/moz.build
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# -*- Mode: python; indent-tabs-mode: nil; tab-width: 40 -*-
+# vim: set filetype=python:
+# This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+# License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+# file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/.
+
+with Files("cors/**"):
+    BUG_COMPONENT = ("Core", "Networking")
+
+XPCSHELL_TESTS_MANIFESTS += [
+    "unit/xpcshell.ini",
+]
+
+TEST_DIRS += [
+    "gtest",
+]
+
+MOCHITEST_MANIFESTS += [
+    "cors/mochitest.ini",
+    "csp/mochitest.ini",
+    "general/mochitest.ini",
+    "https-first/mochitest.ini",
+    "https-only/mochitest.ini",
+    "mixedcontentblocker/mochitest.ini",
+    "referrer-policy/mochitest.ini",
+    "sec-fetch/mochitest.ini",
+    "sri/mochitest.ini",
+]
+
+MOCHITEST_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [
+    "general/chrome.ini",
+]
+
+BROWSER_CHROME_MANIFESTS += [
+    "cors/browser.ini",
+    "csp/browser.ini",
+    "general/browser.ini",
+    "https-first/browser.ini",
+    "https-only/browser.ini",
+    "mixedcontentblocker/browser.ini",
+    "referrer-policy/browser.ini",
+    "sec-fetch/browser.ini",
+]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4de690c85b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files = referrer_page.sjs
+
+[browser_referrer_disallow_cross_site_relaxing.js]
+[browser_referrer_telemetry.js]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_disallow_cross_site_relaxing.js b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_disallow_cross_site_relaxing.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1094d9a772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_disallow_cross_site_relaxing.js
@@ -0,0 +1,458 @@
+/**
+ * Bug 1720294 - Testing disallow relaxing default referrer policy for
+ *               cross-site requests.
+ */
+
+"use strict";
+
+requestLongerTimeout(6);
+
+const TEST_DOMAIN = "https://example.com/";
+const TEST_SAME_SITE_DOMAIN = "https://test1.example.com/";
+const TEST_SAME_SITE_DOMAIN_HTTP = "http://test1.example.com/";
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN = "https://test1.example.org/";
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN_HTTP = "http://test1.example.org/";
+
+const TEST_PATH = "browser/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/";
+
+const TEST_PAGE = `${TEST_DOMAIN}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+const TEST_SAME_SITE_PAGE = `${TEST_SAME_SITE_DOMAIN}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+const TEST_SAME_SITE_PAGE_HTTP = `${TEST_SAME_SITE_DOMAIN_HTTP}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE = `${TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE_HTTP = `${TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN_HTTP}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+
+const REFERRER_FULL = 0;
+const REFERRER_ORIGIN = 1;
+const REFERRER_NONE = 2;
+
+function getExpectedReferrer(referrer, type) {
+  let res;
+
+  switch (type) {
+    case REFERRER_FULL:
+      res = referrer;
+      break;
+    case REFERRER_ORIGIN:
+      let url = new URL(referrer);
+      res = `${url.origin}/`;
+      break;
+    case REFERRER_NONE:
+      res = "";
+      break;
+    default:
+      ok(false, "unknown type");
+  }
+
+  return res;
+}
+
+async function verifyResultInPage(browser, expected) {
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [expected], value => {
+    is(content.document.referrer, value, "The document.referrer is correct.");
+
+    let result = content.document.getElementById("result");
+    is(result.textContent, value, "The referer header is correct");
+  });
+}
+
+function getExpectedConsoleMessage(expected, isPrefOn, url) {
+  let msg;
+
+  if (isPrefOn) {
+    msg =
+      "Referrer Policy: Ignoring the less restricted referrer policy “" +
+      expected +
+      "� for the cross-site request: " +
+      url;
+  } else {
+    msg =
+      "Referrer Policy: Less restricted policies, including " +
+      "‘no-referrer-when-downgrade’, ‘origin-when-cross-origin’ and " +
+      "‘unsafe-url’, will be ignored soon for the cross-site request: " +
+      url;
+  }
+
+  return msg;
+}
+
+function createConsoleMessageVerificationPromise(expected, isPrefOn, url) {
+  if (!expected) {
+    return Promise.resolve();
+  }
+
+  return new Promise(resolve => {
+    let listener = {
+      observe(msg) {
+        let message = msg.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIScriptError);
+
+        if (message.category.startsWith("Security")) {
+          is(
+            message.errorMessage,
+            getExpectedConsoleMessage(expected, isPrefOn, url),
+            "The console message is correct."
+          );
+          Services.console.unregisterListener(listener);
+          resolve();
+        }
+      },
+    };
+
+    Services.console.registerListener(listener);
+  });
+}
+
+function verifyNoConsoleMessage() {
+  // Verify that there is no referrer policy console message.
+  let allMessages = Services.console.getMessageArray();
+
+  for (let msg of allMessages) {
+    let message = msg.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIScriptError);
+    if (
+      message.category.startsWith("Security") &&
+      message.errorMessage.startsWith("Referrer Policy:")
+    ) {
+      ok(false, "There should be no console message for referrer policy.");
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+const TEST_CASES = [
+  // Testing that the referrer policy can be overridden with less restricted
+  // policy in the same-origin scenario.
+  {
+    policy: "unsafe-url",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_FULL,
+    original: REFERRER_FULL,
+  },
+  // Testing that the referrer policy can be overridden with less restricted
+  // policy in the same-site scenario.
+  {
+    policy: "unsafe-url",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_SAME_SITE_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_FULL,
+    original: REFERRER_FULL,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_SAME_SITE_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_FULL,
+    original: REFERRER_FULL,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_SAME_SITE_PAGE_HTTP,
+    expect: REFERRER_ORIGIN,
+    original: REFERRER_ORIGIN,
+  },
+  // Testing that the referrer policy cannot be overridden with less restricted
+  // policy in the cross-site scenario.
+  {
+    policy: "unsafe-url",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_ORIGIN,
+    expect_console: "unsafe-url",
+    original: REFERRER_FULL,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_ORIGIN,
+    expect_console: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+    original: REFERRER_FULL,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE_HTTP,
+    expect: REFERRER_NONE,
+    expect_console: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+    original: REFERRER_ORIGIN,
+  },
+  // Testing that the referrer policy can still be overridden with more
+  // restricted policy in the cross-site scenario.
+  {
+    policy: "no-referrer",
+    referrer: TEST_PAGE,
+    test_url: TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE,
+    expect: REFERRER_NONE,
+    original: REFERRER_NONE,
+  },
+];
+
+add_setup(async function() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      // Disable mixed content blocking to be able to test downgrade scenario.
+      ["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false],
+    ],
+  });
+});
+
+async function runTestIniFrame(gBrowser, enabled, expectNoConsole) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
+    async browser => {
+      for (let type of ["meta", "header"]) {
+        for (let test of TEST_CASES) {
+          info(`Test iframe: ${test.toSource()}`);
+          let referrerURL = `${test.referrer}?${type}=${test.policy}`;
+          let expected = enabled
+            ? getExpectedReferrer(referrerURL, test.expect)
+            : getExpectedReferrer(referrerURL, test.original);
+
+          let expected_console = expectNoConsole
+            ? undefined
+            : test.expect_console;
+
+          Services.console.reset();
+
+          BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, referrerURL);
+          await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, referrerURL);
+
+          let iframeURL = test.test_url + "?show";
+
+          let consolePromise = createConsoleMessageVerificationPromise(
+            expected_console,
+            enabled,
+            iframeURL
+          );
+          // Create an iframe and load the url.
+          let bc = await SpecialPowers.spawn(
+            browser,
+            [iframeURL],
+            async url => {
+              let iframe = content.document.createElement("iframe");
+              let loadPromise = ContentTaskUtils.waitForEvent(iframe, "load");
+              iframe.src = url;
+              content.document.body.appendChild(iframe);
+
+              await loadPromise;
+
+              return iframe.browsingContext;
+            }
+          );
+
+          await verifyResultInPage(bc, expected);
+          await consolePromise;
+          if (!expected_console) {
+            verifyNoConsoleMessage();
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+async function runTestForLinkClick(gBrowser, enabled, expectNoConsole) {
+  await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(
+    { gBrowser, url: "about:blank" },
+    async browser => {
+      for (let type of ["meta", "header"]) {
+        for (let test of TEST_CASES) {
+          info(`Test link click: ${test.toSource()}`);
+          let referrerURL = `${test.referrer}?${type}=${test.policy}`;
+          let expected = enabled
+            ? getExpectedReferrer(referrerURL, test.expect)
+            : getExpectedReferrer(referrerURL, test.original);
+
+          let expected_console = expectNoConsole
+            ? undefined
+            : test.expect_console;
+
+          Services.console.reset();
+
+          BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(browser, referrerURL);
+          await BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(browser, false, referrerURL);
+
+          let linkURL = test.test_url + "?show";
+
+          let consolePromise = createConsoleMessageVerificationPromise(
+            expected_console,
+            enabled,
+            linkURL
+          );
+
+          // Create the promise to wait for the navigation finishes.
+          let loadedPromise = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+            browser,
+            false,
+            linkURL
+          );
+
+          // Generate the link and click it to navigate.
+          await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [linkURL], async url => {
+            let link = content.document.createElement("a");
+            link.textContent = "Link";
+            link.setAttribute("href", url);
+
+            content.document.body.appendChild(link);
+            link.click();
+          });
+
+          await loadedPromise;
+
+          await verifyResultInPage(browser, expected);
+          await consolePromise;
+          if (!expected_console) {
+            verifyNoConsoleMessage();
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  );
+}
+
+async function toggleETPForPage(gBrowser, url, toggle) {
+  let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab(gBrowser, url);
+
+  // First, Toggle ETP off for the test page.
+  let browserLoadedPromise = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(
+    tab.linkedBrowser,
+    false,
+    url
+  );
+
+  if (toggle) {
+    gProtectionsHandler.enableForCurrentPage();
+  } else {
+    gProtectionsHandler.disableForCurrentPage();
+  }
+
+  await browserLoadedPromise;
+  BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab);
+}
+
+add_task(async function test_iframe() {
+  for (let enabled of [true, false]) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", enabled]],
+    });
+
+    await runTestIniFrame(gBrowser, enabled);
+  }
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_iframe_pbmode() {
+  let win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow({ private: true });
+
+  for (let enabled of [true, false]) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [
+        [
+          "network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault.pbmode",
+          enabled,
+        ],
+      ],
+    });
+
+    await runTestIniFrame(win.gBrowser, enabled);
+  }
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_link_click() {
+  for (let enabled of [true, false]) {
+    for (let enabled_top of [true, false]) {
+      await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+        set: [
+          ["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", enabled],
+          [
+            "network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault.top_navigation",
+            enabled_top,
+          ],
+        ],
+      });
+
+      // We won't show the console message if the strict rule is disabled for
+      // the top navigation.
+      await runTestForLinkClick(gBrowser, enabled && enabled_top, !enabled_top);
+    }
+  }
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_link_click_pbmode() {
+  let win = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewBrowserWindow({ private: true });
+
+  for (let enabled of [true, false]) {
+    for (let enabled_top of [true, false]) {
+      await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+        set: [
+          [
+            "network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault.pbmode",
+            enabled,
+          ],
+          [
+            "network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault.pbmode.top_navigation",
+            enabled_top,
+          ],
+          // Disable https first mode for private browsing mode to test downgrade
+          // cases.
+          ["dom.security.https_first_pbm", false],
+        ],
+      });
+
+      // We won't show the console message if the strict rule is disabled for
+      // the top navigation in the private browsing window.
+      await runTestForLinkClick(
+        win.gBrowser,
+        enabled && enabled_top,
+        !enabled_top
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  await BrowserTestUtils.closeWindow(win);
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_iframe_etp_toggle_off() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", true]],
+  });
+
+  // Open a new tab for the test page and toggle ETP off.
+  await toggleETPForPage(gBrowser, TEST_PAGE, false);
+
+  // Run the test to see if the protection is disabled. We won't send console
+  // message if the protection was disabled by the ETP toggle.
+  await runTestIniFrame(gBrowser, false, true);
+
+  // toggle ETP on again.
+  await toggleETPForPage(gBrowser, TEST_PAGE, true);
+
+  // Run the test again to see if the protection is enabled.
+  await runTestIniFrame(gBrowser, true);
+});
+
+add_task(async function test_link_click_etp_toggle_off() {
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [
+      ["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", true],
+      [
+        "network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault.top_navigation",
+        true,
+      ],
+    ],
+  });
+
+  // Toggle ETP off for the cross site. Note that the cross site is the place
+  // where we test against the ETP permission for top navigation.
+  await toggleETPForPage(gBrowser, TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE, false);
+
+  // Run the test to see if the protection is disabled. We won't send console
+  // message if the protection was disabled by the ETP toggle.
+  await runTestForLinkClick(gBrowser, false, true);
+
+  // toggle ETP on again.
+  await toggleETPForPage(gBrowser, TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE, true);
+
+  // Run the test again to see if the protection is enabled.
+  await runTestForLinkClick(gBrowser, true);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_telemetry.js b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_telemetry.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..409c04c45e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/browser_referrer_telemetry.js
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/**
+ * Bug 1720869 - Testing the referrer policy telemetry.
+ */
+
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_DOMAIN = "https://example.com/";
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN = "https://test1.example.org/";
+
+const TEST_PATH = "browser/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/";
+
+const TEST_PAGE = `${TEST_DOMAIN}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+const TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE = `${TEST_CROSS_SITE_DOMAIN}${TEST_PATH}referrer_page.sjs`;
+
+// This matches to the order in ReferrerPolicy.webidl
+const REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX = {
+  empty: 0,
+  "no-referrer": 1,
+  "no-referrer-when-downgrade": 2,
+  origin: 3,
+  "origin-when-cross-origin": 4,
+  "unsafe-url": 5,
+  "same-origin": 6,
+  "strict-origin": 7,
+  "strict-origin-when-cross-origin": 8,
+};
+
+const TEST_CASES = [
+  {
+    policy: "",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX.empty,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "no-referrer",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["no-referrer"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "no-referrer-when-downgrade",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["no-referrer-when-downgrade"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "origin",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX.origin,
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["origin-when-cross-origin"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "same-origin",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["same-origin"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "strict-origin",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["strict-origin"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "strict-origin-when-cross-origin",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["strict-origin-when-cross-origin"],
+  },
+  {
+    policy: "unsafe-url",
+    expected: REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX["unsafe-url"],
+  },
+];
+
+function clearTelemetry() {
+  Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForHistograms("main", true /* clear */);
+  Services.telemetry.getHistogramById("REFERRER_POLICY_COUNT").clear();
+}
+
+add_setup(async function() {
+  // Clear Telemetry probes before testing.
+  clearTelemetry();
+});
+
+function verifyTelemetry(expected, isSameSite) {
+  // The record of cross-site loads is placed in the second half of the
+  // telemetry.
+  const offset = isSameSite ? 0 : Object.keys(REFERRER_POLICY_INDEX).length;
+
+  let histograms = Services.telemetry.getSnapshotForHistograms(
+    "main",
+    false /* clear */
+  ).parent;
+
+  let referrerPolicyCountProbe = histograms.REFERRER_POLICY_COUNT;
+
+  ok(referrerPolicyCountProbe, "The telemetry probe has been recorded.");
+  is(
+    referrerPolicyCountProbe.values[expected + offset],
+    1,
+    "The telemetry is added correctly."
+  );
+}
+
+add_task(async function run_tests() {
+  for (let test of TEST_CASES) {
+    for (let sameSite of [true, false]) {
+      clearTelemetry();
+      let referrerURL = `${TEST_PAGE}?header=${test.policy}`;
+
+      await BrowserTestUtils.withNewTab(referrerURL, async browser => {
+        let iframeURL = sameSite
+          ? TEST_PAGE + "?show"
+          : TEST_CROSS_SITE_PAGE + "?show";
+
+        // Create an iframe and load the url.
+        await SpecialPowers.spawn(browser, [iframeURL], async url => {
+          let iframe = content.document.createElement("iframe");
+          iframe.src = url;
+
+          await new content.Promise(resolve => {
+            iframe.onload = () => {
+              resolve();
+            };
+
+            content.document.body.appendChild(iframe);
+          });
+        });
+
+        verifyTelemetry(test.expected, sameSite);
+      });
+    }
+  }
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7fcc8d4914
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+var BASE_URL =
+  "example.com/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs";
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+function createTestUrl(aPolicy, aAction, aName, aContent) {
+  var content = aContent || "text";
+  return (
+    "http://" +
+    BASE_URL +
+    "?" +
+    "action=" +
+    aAction +
+    "&" +
+    "policy=" +
+    aPolicy +
+    "&" +
+    "name=" +
+    aName +
+    "&" +
+    "content=" +
+    content
+  );
+}
+
+function createTestPage(aHead, aImgPolicy, aName) {
+  var _createTestUrl = createTestUrl.bind(null, aImgPolicy, "test", aName);
+
+  return (
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+         <html>" +
+    aHead +
+    '<body>\n\
+             <img src="' +
+    _createTestUrl("img") +
+    '" referrerpolicy="' +
+    aImgPolicy +
+    '" id="image"></img>\n\
+             <script>' +
+    // LOAD EVENT (of the test)
+    // fires when the img resource for the page is loaded
+    'window.addEventListener("load", function() {\n\
+                 parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");\n\
+               }.bind(window), false);' +
+    "</script>\n\
+           </body>\n\
+         </html>"
+  );
+}
+
+// Creates the following test cases for the specified referrer
+// policy combination:
+//   <img> with referrer
+function createTest(aPolicy, aImgPolicy, aName) {
+  var headString = "<head>";
+  if (aPolicy) {
+    headString += '<meta name="referrer" content="' + aPolicy + '">';
+  }
+
+  headString += "<script></script>";
+
+  return createTestPage(headString, aImgPolicy, aName);
+}
+
+// testing regular load img with referrer policy
+// speculative parser should not kick in here
+function createTest2(aImgPolicy, name) {
+  return createTestPage("", aImgPolicy, name);
+}
+
+function createTest3(aImgPolicy1, aImgPolicy2, aImgPolicy3, aName) {
+  return (
+    '<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+         <html>\n\
+           <body>\n\
+             <img src="' +
+    createTestUrl(aImgPolicy1, "test", aName + aImgPolicy1) +
+    '" referrerpolicy="' +
+    aImgPolicy1 +
+    '" id="image"></img>\n\
+             <img src="' +
+    createTestUrl(aImgPolicy2, "test", aName + aImgPolicy2) +
+    '" referrerpolicy="' +
+    aImgPolicy2 +
+    '" id="image"></img>\n\
+             <img src="' +
+    createTestUrl(aImgPolicy3, "test", aName + aImgPolicy3) +
+    '" referrerpolicy="' +
+    aImgPolicy3 +
+    '" id="image"></img>\n\
+             <script>\n\
+               var _numLoads = 0;' +
+    // LOAD EVENT (of the test)
+    // fires when the img resource for the page is loaded
+    'window.addEventListener("load", function() {\n\
+                  parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");\n\
+               }.bind(window), false);' +
+    "</script>\n\
+           </body>\n\
+         </html>"
+  );
+}
+
+function createTestPage2(aHead, aPolicy, aName) {
+  return (
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+         <html>" +
+    aHead +
+    '<body>\n\
+             <img src="' +
+    createTestUrl(aPolicy, "test", aName) +
+    '" id="image"></img>\n\
+             <script>' +
+    // LOAD EVENT (of the test)
+    // fires when the img resource for the page is loaded
+    'window.addEventListener("load", function() {\n\
+                 parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");\n\
+               }.bind(window), false);' +
+    "</script>\n\
+           </body>\n\
+         </html>"
+  );
+}
+
+function createTestPage3(aHead, aPolicy, aName) {
+  return (
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+         <html>" +
+    aHead +
+    "<body>\n\
+             <script>" +
+    'var image = new Image();\n\
+               image.src = "' +
+    createTestUrl(aPolicy, "test", aName, "image") +
+    '";\n\
+               image.referrerPolicy = "' +
+    aPolicy +
+    '";\n\
+               image.onload = function() {\n\
+                 window.parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");\n\
+               }\n\
+               document.body.appendChild(image);' +
+    "</script>\n\
+           </body>\n\
+         </html>"
+  );
+}
+
+function createTestPage4(aHead, aPolicy, aName) {
+  return (
+    "<!DOCTYPE HTML>\n\
+         <html>" +
+    aHead +
+    "<body>\n\
+             <script>" +
+    'var image = new Image();\n\
+               image.referrerPolicy = "' +
+    aPolicy +
+    '";\n\
+               image.src = "' +
+    createTestUrl(aPolicy, "test", aName, "image") +
+    '";\n\
+               image.onload = function() {\n\
+                 window.parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");\n\
+               }\n\
+               document.body.appendChild(image);' +
+    "</script>\n\
+           </body>\n\
+         </html>"
+  );
+}
+
+function createSetAttributeTest1(aPolicy, aImgPolicy, aName) {
+  var headString = "<head>";
+  headString += '<meta name="referrer" content="' + aPolicy + '">';
+  headString += "<script></script>";
+
+  return createTestPage3(headString, aImgPolicy, aName);
+}
+
+function createSetAttributeTest2(aPolicy, aImgPolicy, aName) {
+  var headString = "<head>";
+  headString += '<meta name="referrer" content="' + aPolicy + '">';
+  headString += "<script></script>";
+
+  return createTestPage4(headString, aImgPolicy, aName);
+}
+
+function createTest4(aPolicy, aName) {
+  var headString = "<head>";
+  headString += '<meta name="referrer" content="' + aPolicy + '">';
+  headString += "<script></script>";
+
+  return createTestPage2(headString, aPolicy, aName);
+}
+
+function createTest5(aPolicy, aName) {
+  var headString = "<head>";
+  headString += '<meta name="referrer" content="' + aPolicy + '">';
+
+  return createTestPage2(headString, aPolicy, aName);
+}
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var sharedKey = "img_referrer_testserver.sjs";
+  var params = request.queryString.split("&");
+  var action = params[0].split("=")[1];
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8", false);
+
+  if (action === "resetState") {
+    let state = getSharedState(sharedKey);
+    state = {};
+    setSharedState(sharedKey, JSON.stringify(state));
+    response.write("");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "test") {
+    // ?action=test&policy=origin&name=name&content=content
+    let policy = params[1].split("=")[1];
+    let name = params[2].split("=")[1];
+    let content = params[3].split("=")[1];
+    let result = getSharedState(sharedKey);
+
+    if (result === "") {
+      result = {};
+    } else {
+      result = JSON.parse(result);
+    }
+
+    if (!result.tests) {
+      result.tests = {};
+    }
+
+    var referrerLevel = "none";
+    var test = {};
+    if (request.hasHeader("Referer")) {
+      let referrer = request.getHeader("Referer");
+      if (referrer.indexOf("img_referrer_testserver") > 0) {
+        referrerLevel = "full";
+      } else if (referrer == "http://mochi.test:8888/") {
+        referrerLevel = "origin";
+      }
+      test.referrer = request.getHeader("Referer");
+    } else {
+      test.referrer = "";
+    }
+    test.policy = referrerLevel;
+    test.expected = policy;
+
+    result.tests[name] = test;
+
+    setSharedState(sharedKey, JSON.stringify(result));
+
+    if (content === "image") {
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+      response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "get-test-results") {
+    // ?action=get-result
+    response.write(getSharedState(sharedKey));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-img-policy-test") {
+    // ?action=generate-img-policy-test&imgPolicy=b64-encoded-string&name=name&policy=b64-encoded-string
+    let imgPolicy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+    let metaPolicy = "";
+    if (params[3]) {
+      metaPolicy = params[3].split("=")[1];
+    }
+
+    response.write(createTest(metaPolicy, imgPolicy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-img-policy-test2") {
+    // ?action=generate-img-policy-test2&imgPolicy=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let imgPolicy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createTest2(imgPolicy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-img-policy-test3") {
+    // ?action=generate-img-policy-test3&imgPolicy1=b64-encoded-string&imgPolicy2=b64-encoded-string&imgPolicy3=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let imgPolicy1 = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let imgPolicy2 = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+    let imgPolicy3 = unescape(params[3].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[4].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createTest3(imgPolicy1, imgPolicy2, imgPolicy3, name));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-img-policy-test4") {
+    // ?action=generate-img-policy-test4&imgPolicy=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let policy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createTest4(policy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-img-policy-test5") {
+    // ?action=generate-img-policy-test5&policy=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let policy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createTest5(policy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (action === "generate-setAttribute-test1") {
+    // ?action=generate-setAttribute-test1&policy=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let imgPolicy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let policy = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[3].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createSetAttributeTest1(policy, imgPolicy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (action === "generate-setAttribute-test2") {
+    // ?action=generate-setAttribute-test2&policy=b64-encoded-string&name=name
+    let imgPolicy = unescape(params[1].split("=")[1]);
+    let policy = unescape(params[2].split("=")[1]);
+    let name = unescape(params[3].split("=")[1]);
+
+    response.write(createSetAttributeTest2(policy, imgPolicy, name));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.write("I don't know action " + action);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a873a3aeae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  img_referrer_testserver.sjs
+  referrer_header.sjs
+  referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html
+  referrer_helper.js
+  referrer_testserver.sjs
+
+[test_img_referrer.html]
+[test_referrer_header_current_document.html]
+[test_referrer_redirect.html]
+# Please keep alphabetical order.
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header.sjs b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..29c324b8f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", "same-origin");
+  response.write(
+    '<!DOCTYPE HTML><html><body>Loaded</body><script>parent.postMessage(document.referrer, "*");</script></html>'
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5996c8ba8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script>
+    window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+      document.getElementById("link").click();
+    });
+  </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a id="link" href="http://example.org/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header.sjs">Navigate</a>
+</body>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_helper.js b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_helper.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d202ea7836
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_helper.js
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// This helper expects these globals to be defined.
+/* global PARAMS, SJS, testCases */
+
+/*
+ * common functionality for iframe, anchor, and area referrer attribute tests
+ */
+const GET_RESULT = SJS + "ACTION=get-test-results";
+const RESET_STATE = SJS + "ACTION=resetState";
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+var advance = function() {
+  tests.next();
+};
+
+/**
+ * Listen for notifications from the child.
+ * These are sent in case of error, or when the loads we await have completed.
+ */
+window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
+  if (event.data == "childLoadComplete") {
+    // all loads happen, continue the test.
+    advance();
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * helper to perform an XHR
+ * to do checkIndividualResults and resetState
+ */
+function doXHR(aUrl, onSuccess, onFail) {
+  // The server is at http[s]://example.com so we need cross-origin XHR.
+  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest({ mozSystem: true });
+  xhr.responseType = "json";
+  xhr.onload = function() {
+    onSuccess(xhr);
+  };
+  xhr.onerror = function() {
+    onFail(xhr);
+  };
+  xhr.open("GET", "http" + aUrl, true);
+  xhr.send(null);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Grabs the results via XHR and passes to checker.
+ */
+function checkIndividualResults(aTestname, aExpectedReferrer, aName) {
+  var onload = xhr => {
+    var results = xhr.response;
+    info(JSON.stringify(xhr.response));
+    ok(aName in results, aName + " tests have to be performed.");
+    is(
+      results[aName].policy,
+      aExpectedReferrer,
+      aTestname +
+        " --- " +
+        results[aName].policy +
+        " (" +
+        results[aName].referrer +
+        ")"
+    );
+    advance();
+  };
+  var onerror = xhr => {
+    ok(false, "Can't get results from the counter server.");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  };
+  doXHR(GET_RESULT, onload, onerror);
+}
+
+function resetState() {
+  doXHR(RESET_STATE, advance, function(xhr) {
+    ok(false, "error in reset state");
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  });
+}
+
+/**
+ * testing if referrer header is sent correctly
+ */
+var tests = (function*() {
+  yield SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+    { set: [["network.preload", true]] },
+    advance
+  );
+  yield SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+    { set: [["security.mixed_content.block_active_content", false]] },
+    advance
+  );
+  yield SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+    { set: [["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", false]] },
+    advance
+  );
+  yield SpecialPowers.pushPermissions(
+    [{ type: "systemXHR", allow: true, context: document }],
+    advance
+  );
+
+  var iframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+
+  for (var j = 0; j < testCases.length; j++) {
+    if (testCases[j].PREFS) {
+      yield SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({ set: testCases[j].PREFS }, advance);
+    }
+
+    var actions = testCases[j].ACTION;
+    var subTests = testCases[j].TESTS;
+    for (var k = 0; k < actions.length; k++) {
+      var actionString = actions[k];
+      for (var i = 0; i < subTests.length; i++) {
+        yield resetState();
+        var searchParams = new URLSearchParams();
+        searchParams.append("ACTION", actionString);
+        searchParams.append("NAME", subTests[i].NAME);
+        for (var l of PARAMS) {
+          if (subTests[i][l]) {
+            searchParams.append(l, subTests[i][l]);
+          }
+        }
+        var schemeFrom = subTests[i].SCHEME_FROM || "http";
+        yield (iframe.src = schemeFrom + SJS + searchParams.toString());
+        yield checkIndividualResults(
+          subTests[i].DESC,
+          subTests[i].RESULT,
+          subTests[i].NAME
+        );
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // complete.
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+})();
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_page.sjs b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_page.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..62ec634e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_page.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  let params = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+  let referrerPolicyHeader = params.get("header") || "";
+  let metaReferrerPolicy = params.get("meta") || "";
+  let showReferrer = params.has("show");
+
+  if (referrerPolicyHeader) {
+    response.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", referrerPolicyHeader, false);
+  }
+
+  let metaString = "";
+  let resultString = "";
+
+  if (metaReferrerPolicy) {
+    metaString = `<meta name="referrer" content="${metaReferrerPolicy}">`;
+  }
+
+  if (showReferrer) {
+    if (request.hasHeader("Referer")) {
+      resultString = `Referer Header: <a id="result">${request.getHeader(
+        "Referer"
+      )}</a>`;
+    } else {
+      resultString = `Referer Header: <a id="result"></a>`;
+    }
+  }
+
+  response.write(
+    `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+     <html>
+     <head>
+       ${metaString}
+     </head>
+     <body>
+       ${resultString}
+     </body>
+     </html>`
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_testserver.sjs b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_testserver.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10350b5da5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_testserver.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,691 @@
+/*
+ * Test server for iframe, anchor, and area referrer attributes.
+ * https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1175736
+ * Also server for further referrer tests such as redirecting tests
+ * bug 1174913, bug 1175736, bug 1184781
+ */
+
+Cu.importGlobalProperties(["URLSearchParams"]);
+const SJS = "referrer_testserver.sjs?";
+const SJS_PATH = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/";
+const BASE_ORIGIN = "example.com";
+const BASE_URL = BASE_ORIGIN + SJS_PATH + SJS;
+const SHARED_KEY = SJS;
+const SAME_ORIGIN = "mochi.test:8888" + SJS_PATH + SJS;
+const CROSS_ORIGIN_URL = "test1.example.com" + SJS_PATH + SJS;
+
+const IMG_BYTES = atob(
+  "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+    "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg=="
+);
+
+function createTestUrl(
+  aPolicy,
+  aAction,
+  aName,
+  aType,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  crossOrigin,
+  referrerPolicyHeader
+) {
+  var schemeTo = aSchemeTo || "http";
+  var schemeFrom = aSchemeFrom || "http";
+  var rpHeader = referrerPolicyHeader || "";
+  var url = schemeTo + "://";
+  url += crossOrigin ? CROSS_ORIGIN_URL : BASE_URL;
+  url +=
+    "ACTION=" +
+    aAction +
+    "&" +
+    "policy=" +
+    aPolicy +
+    "&" +
+    "NAME=" +
+    aName +
+    "&" +
+    "type=" +
+    aType +
+    "&" +
+    "RP_HEADER=" +
+    rpHeader +
+    "&" +
+    "SCHEME_FROM=" +
+    schemeFrom;
+  return url;
+}
+
+// test page using iframe referrer attribute
+// if aParams are set this creates a test where the iframe url is a redirect
+function createIframeTestPageUsingRefferer(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aAttributePolicy,
+  aNewAttributePolicy,
+  aName,
+  aParams,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  aChangingMethod
+) {
+  var metaString = "";
+  if (aMetaPolicy) {
+    metaString = `<meta name="referrer" content="${aMetaPolicy}">`;
+  }
+  var changeString = "";
+  if (aChangingMethod === "setAttribute") {
+    changeString = `document.getElementById("myframe").setAttribute("referrerpolicy", "${aNewAttributePolicy}")`;
+  } else if (aChangingMethod === "property") {
+    changeString = `document.getElementById("myframe").referrerPolicy = "${aNewAttributePolicy}"`;
+  }
+  var iFrameString = `<iframe src="" id="myframe" ${
+    aAttributePolicy ? ` referrerpolicy="${aAttributePolicy}"` : ""
+  }>iframe</iframe>`;
+  var iframeUrl = "";
+  if (aParams) {
+    aParams.delete("ACTION");
+    aParams.append("ACTION", "redirectIframe");
+    iframeUrl = "http://" + CROSS_ORIGIN_URL + aParams.toString();
+  } else {
+    iframeUrl = createTestUrl(
+      aAttributePolicy,
+      "test",
+      aName,
+      "iframe",
+      aSchemeFrom,
+      aSchemeTo
+    );
+  }
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+           <html>
+             <head>
+             ${metaString}
+             </head>
+             <body>
+               ${iFrameString}
+               <script>
+                 window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+                   ${changeString}
+                   document.getElementById("myframe").onload = function(){
+                    parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");
+                   };
+                   document.getElementById("myframe").src = "${iframeUrl}";
+                 }.bind(window), false);
+               </script>
+             </body>
+           </html>`;
+}
+
+function buildAnchorString(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aReferrerPolicy,
+  aName,
+  aRelString,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo
+) {
+  if (aReferrerPolicy) {
+    return `<a href="${createTestUrl(
+      aReferrerPolicy,
+      "test",
+      aName,
+      "link",
+      aSchemeFrom,
+      aSchemeTo
+    )}" referrerpolicy="${aReferrerPolicy}" id="link" ${aRelString}>${aReferrerPolicy}</a>`;
+  }
+  return `<a href="${createTestUrl(
+    aMetaPolicy,
+    "test",
+    aName,
+    "link",
+    aSchemeFrom,
+    aSchemeTo
+  )}" id="link" ${aRelString}>link</a>`;
+}
+
+function buildAreaString(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aReferrerPolicy,
+  aName,
+  aRelString,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo
+) {
+  var result = `<img src="file_mozfiledataurl_img.jpg" alt="image" usemap="#imageMap">`;
+  result += `<map name="imageMap">`;
+  if (aReferrerPolicy) {
+    result += `<area shape="circle" coords="1,1,1" href="${createTestUrl(
+      aReferrerPolicy,
+      "test",
+      aName,
+      "link",
+      aSchemeFrom,
+      aSchemeTo
+    )}" alt="theArea" referrerpolicy="${aReferrerPolicy}" id="link" ${aRelString}>`;
+  } else {
+    result += `<area shape="circle" coords="1,1,1" href="${createTestUrl(
+      aMetaPolicy,
+      "test",
+      aName,
+      "link",
+      aSchemeFrom,
+      aSchemeTo
+    )}" alt="theArea" id="link" ${aRelString}>`;
+  }
+  result += `</map>`;
+
+  return result;
+}
+
+// test page using anchor or area referrer attribute
+function createAETestPageUsingRefferer(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aAttributePolicy,
+  aNewAttributePolicy,
+  aName,
+  aRel,
+  aStringBuilder,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  aChangingMethod
+) {
+  var metaString = "";
+  if (aMetaPolicy) {
+    metaString = `<head><meta name="referrer" content="${aMetaPolicy}"></head>`;
+  }
+  var changeString = "";
+  if (aChangingMethod === "setAttribute") {
+    changeString = `document.getElementById("link").setAttribute("referrerpolicy", "${aNewAttributePolicy}")`;
+  } else if (aChangingMethod === "property") {
+    changeString = `document.getElementById("link").referrerPolicy = "${aNewAttributePolicy}"`;
+  }
+  var relString = "";
+  if (aRel) {
+    relString = `rel="noreferrer"`;
+  }
+  var elementString = aStringBuilder(
+    aMetaPolicy,
+    aAttributePolicy,
+    aName,
+    relString,
+    aSchemeFrom,
+    aSchemeTo
+  );
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+           <html>
+             ${metaString}
+             <body>
+               ${elementString}
+               <script>
+                 window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+                   ${changeString}
+                   document.getElementById("link").click();
+                 }.bind(window), false);
+               </script>
+             </body>
+           </html>`;
+}
+
+// test page using anchor target=_blank rel=noopener
+function createTargetBlankRefferer(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aName,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  aRpHeader
+) {
+  var metaString = "";
+  if (aMetaPolicy) {
+    metaString = `<head><meta name="referrer" content="${aMetaPolicy}"></head>`;
+  }
+  var elementString = `<a href="${createTestUrl(
+    aMetaPolicy,
+    "test",
+    aName,
+    "link",
+    aSchemeFrom,
+    aSchemeTo,
+    aRpHeader
+  )}" target=_blank rel="noopener" id="link">link</a>`;
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+           <html>
+             ${metaString}
+             <body>
+               ${elementString}
+               <script>
+                 window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+                   let link = document.getElementById("link");
+                   SpecialPowers.wrap(window).parent.postMessage("childLoadReady", "*");
+                   link.click();
+                 }.bind(window), false);
+               </script>
+             </body>
+           </html>`;
+}
+
+// creates test page with img that is a redirect
+function createRedirectImgTestCase(aParams, aAttributePolicy) {
+  var metaString = "";
+  if (aParams.has("META_POLICY")) {
+    metaString = `<meta name="referrer" content="${aParams.get(
+      "META_POLICY"
+    )}">`;
+  }
+  aParams.delete("ACTION");
+  aParams.append("ACTION", "redirectImg");
+  var imgUrl = "http://" + CROSS_ORIGIN_URL + aParams.toString();
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+          <html>
+          <head>
+          <meta charset="utf-8">
+          ${metaString}
+          <title>Test referrer policies on redirect (img)</title>
+          </head>
+          <body>
+          <img id="testImg" src="${imgUrl}" ${
+    aAttributePolicy ? ` referrerpolicy="${aAttributePolicy}"` : ""
+  }>
+          <script>
+            window.addEventListener("load", function() {
+              parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");
+            }.bind(window), false);
+          </script>
+          </body>
+          </html>`;
+}
+
+// test page using link referrer attribute
+function createLinkPageUsingRefferer(
+  aMetaPolicy,
+  aAttributePolicy,
+  aNewAttributePolicy,
+  aName,
+  aRel,
+  aStringBuilder,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  aTestType
+) {
+  var metaString = "";
+  if (aMetaPolicy) {
+    metaString = `<meta name="referrer" content="${aMetaPolicy}">`;
+  }
+
+  var changeString = "";
+  var policy = aAttributePolicy ? aAttributePolicy : aMetaPolicy;
+  var elementString = aStringBuilder(
+    policy,
+    aName,
+    aRel,
+    aSchemeFrom,
+    aSchemeTo,
+    aTestType
+  );
+
+  if (aTestType === "setAttribute") {
+    changeString = `var link = document.getElementById("test_link");
+                    link.setAttribute("referrerpolicy", "${aNewAttributePolicy}");
+                    link.href = "${createTestUrl(
+                      policy,
+                      "test",
+                      aName,
+                      "link_element_" + aRel,
+                      aSchemeFrom,
+                      aSchemeTo
+                    )}";`;
+  } else if (aTestType === "property") {
+    changeString = `var link = document.getElementById("test_link");
+                    link.referrerPolicy = "${aNewAttributePolicy}";
+                    link.href = "${createTestUrl(
+                      policy,
+                      "test",
+                      aName,
+                      "link_element_" + aRel,
+                      aSchemeFrom,
+                      aSchemeTo
+                    )}";`;
+  }
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+           <html>
+             <head>
+               ${metaString}
+             </head>
+             <body>
+                ${elementString}
+                <script>
+                  ${changeString}
+                </script>
+             </body>
+           </html>`;
+}
+
+function createFetchUserControlRPTestCase(
+  aName,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  crossOrigin
+) {
+  var srcUrl = createTestUrl(
+    "",
+    "test",
+    aName,
+    "fetch",
+    aSchemeFrom,
+    aSchemeTo,
+    crossOrigin
+  );
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+          <html>
+          <head>
+          <meta charset="utf-8">
+          <title>Test user control referrer policies</title>
+          </head>
+          <body>
+          <script>
+            fetch("${srcUrl}", {referrerPolicy: ""}).then(function (response) {
+              window.parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");
+            });
+          </script>
+          </body>
+          </html>`;
+}
+
+function buildLinkString(
+  aPolicy,
+  aName,
+  aRel,
+  aSchemeFrom,
+  aSchemeTo,
+  aTestType
+) {
+  var href = "";
+  var onChildComplete = `window.parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");`;
+  var policy = "";
+  var asString = "";
+  var relString = "";
+
+  if (aRel) {
+    relString = `rel="${aRel}"`;
+  }
+
+  if (aPolicy) {
+    policy = `referrerpolicy=${aPolicy}`;
+  }
+
+  if (aRel == "preload") {
+    asString = 'as="image"';
+  }
+
+  if (!aTestType) {
+    href = `href=${createTestUrl(
+      aPolicy,
+      "test",
+      aName,
+      "link_element_" + aRel,
+      aSchemeFrom,
+      aSchemeTo
+    )}`;
+  }
+
+  return `<link ${relString} ${href} ${policy} ${asString} id="test_link" onload='${onChildComplete}' onerror='${onChildComplete}'>`;
+}
+// eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  var params = new URLSearchParams(request.queryString);
+  var action = params.get("ACTION");
+  var schemeFrom = params.get("SCHEME_FROM") || "http";
+  var schemeTo = params.get("SCHEME_TO") || "http";
+  var crossOrigin = params.get("CROSS_ORIGIN") || false;
+  var referrerPolicyHeader = params.get("RP_HEADER") || "";
+
+  response.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*", false);
+  if (referrerPolicyHeader) {
+    response.setHeader("Referrer-Policy", referrerPolicyHeader, false);
+  }
+
+  if (action === "resetState") {
+    setSharedState(SHARED_KEY, "{}");
+    response.write("");
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "get-test-results") {
+    // ?action=get-result
+    response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+    response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/plain", false);
+    response.write(getSharedState(SHARED_KEY));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "redirect") {
+    response.write(
+      '<script>parent.postMessage("childLoadComplete", "http://mochi.test:8888");</script>'
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "redirectImg") {
+    params.delete("ACTION");
+    params.append("ACTION", "test");
+    params.append("type", "img");
+    // 302 found, 301 Moved Permanently, 303 See Other, 307 Temporary Redirect
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "http://" + CROSS_ORIGIN_URL + params.toString(),
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "redirectIframe") {
+    params.delete("ACTION");
+    params.append("ACTION", "test");
+    params.append("type", "iframe");
+    // 302 found, 301 Moved Permanently, 303 See Other, 307 Temporary Redirect
+    response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "found");
+    response.setHeader(
+      "Location",
+      "http://" + CROSS_ORIGIN_URL + params.toString(),
+      false
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "test") {
+    // ?action=test&policy=origin&name=name
+    let policy = params.get("policy");
+    let name = params.get("NAME");
+    let type = params.get("type");
+    let result = getSharedState(SHARED_KEY);
+
+    result = result ? JSON.parse(result) : {};
+
+    var referrerLevel = "none";
+    var test = {};
+    if (request.hasHeader("Referer")) {
+      var referrer = request.getHeader("Referer");
+      if (referrer.indexOf("referrer_testserver") > 0) {
+        referrerLevel = "full";
+      } else if (referrer.indexOf(schemeFrom + "://example.com") == 0) {
+        referrerLevel = "origin";
+      } else {
+        // this is never supposed to happen
+        referrerLevel = "other-origin";
+      }
+      test.referrer = referrer;
+    } else {
+      test.referrer = "";
+    }
+    test.policy = referrerLevel;
+    test.expected = policy;
+
+    result[name] = test;
+
+    setSharedState(SHARED_KEY, JSON.stringify(result));
+
+    if (type === "img" || type == "link_element_preload") {
+      // return image
+      response.setHeader("Content-Type", "image/png");
+      response.write(IMG_BYTES);
+      return;
+    }
+    if (type === "iframe") {
+      // return iframe page
+      response.write("<html><body>I am the iframe</body></html>");
+      return;
+    }
+    if (type === "link") {
+      // forward link click to redirect URL to finish test
+      var loc = "http://" + BASE_URL + "ACTION=redirect";
+      response.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+      response.setHeader("Location", loc, false);
+    }
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8", false);
+
+  // parse test arguments and start test
+  var attributePolicy = params.get("ATTRIBUTE_POLICY") || "";
+  var newAttributePolicy = params.get("NEW_ATTRIBUTE_POLICY") || "";
+  var metaPolicy = params.get("META_POLICY") || "";
+  var rel = params.get("REL") || "";
+  var name = params.get("NAME");
+
+  // anchor & area
+  var _getPage = createAETestPageUsingRefferer.bind(
+    null,
+    metaPolicy,
+    attributePolicy,
+    newAttributePolicy,
+    name,
+    rel
+  );
+  var _getAnchorPage = _getPage.bind(
+    null,
+    buildAnchorString,
+    schemeFrom,
+    schemeTo
+  );
+  var _getAreaPage = _getPage.bind(null, buildAreaString, schemeFrom, schemeTo);
+
+  // aMetaPolicy, aAttributePolicy, aNewAttributePolicy, aName, aChangingMethod, aStringBuilder
+  if (action === "generate-anchor-policy-test") {
+    response.write(_getAnchorPage());
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-anchor-changing-policy-test-set-attribute") {
+    response.write(_getAnchorPage("setAttribute"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-anchor-changing-policy-test-property") {
+    response.write(_getAnchorPage("property"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-area-policy-test") {
+    response.write(_getAreaPage());
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-area-changing-policy-test-set-attribute") {
+    response.write(_getAreaPage("setAttribute"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-area-changing-policy-test-property") {
+    response.write(_getAreaPage("property"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-anchor-target-blank-policy-test") {
+    response.write(
+      createTargetBlankRefferer(
+        metaPolicy,
+        name,
+        schemeFrom,
+        schemeTo,
+        referrerPolicyHeader
+      )
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // iframe
+  _getPage = createIframeTestPageUsingRefferer.bind(
+    null,
+    metaPolicy,
+    attributePolicy,
+    newAttributePolicy,
+    name,
+    "",
+    schemeFrom,
+    schemeTo
+  );
+
+  // aMetaPolicy, aAttributePolicy, aNewAttributePolicy, aName, aChangingMethod
+  if (action === "generate-iframe-policy-test") {
+    response.write(_getPage());
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-iframe-changing-policy-test-set-attribute") {
+    response.write(_getPage("setAttribute"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-iframe-changing-policy-test-property") {
+    response.write(_getPage("property"));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // redirect tests with img and iframe
+  if (action === "generate-img-redirect-policy-test") {
+    response.write(createRedirectImgTestCase(params, attributePolicy));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-iframe-redirect-policy-test") {
+    response.write(
+      createIframeTestPageUsingRefferer(
+        metaPolicy,
+        attributePolicy,
+        newAttributePolicy,
+        name,
+        params,
+        schemeFrom,
+        schemeTo
+      )
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  _getPage = createLinkPageUsingRefferer.bind(
+    null,
+    metaPolicy,
+    attributePolicy,
+    newAttributePolicy,
+    name,
+    rel
+  );
+  var _getLinkPage = _getPage.bind(null, buildLinkString, schemeFrom, schemeTo);
+
+  // link
+  if (action === "generate-link-policy-test") {
+    response.write(_getLinkPage());
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-link-policy-test-set-attribute") {
+    response.write(_getLinkPage("setAttribute"));
+    return;
+  }
+  if (action === "generate-link-policy-test-property") {
+    response.write(_getLinkPage("property"));
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (action === "generate-fetch-user-control-policy-test") {
+    response.write(
+      createFetchUserControlRPTestCase(name, schemeFrom, schemeTo, crossOrigin)
+    );
+    return;
+  }
+
+  response.write("I don't know action " + action);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_img_referrer.html b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_img_referrer.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fcc80929d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_img_referrer.html
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test img policy attribute for Bug 1166910</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+<!--
+Testing that img referrer attribute is honoured correctly
+* Speculative parser loads (generate-img-policy-test)
+* regular loads (generate-img-policy-test2)
+* loading a single image multiple times with different policies (generate-img-policy-test3)
+* testing setAttribute and .referrer (generate-setAttribute-test)
+* regression tests that meta referrer is still working even if attribute referrers are enabled
+https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1166910
+-->
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+var advance = function() { tests.next(); };
+
+/**
+ * Listen for notifications from the child.
+ * These are sent in case of error, or when the loads we await have completed.
+ */
+window.addEventListener("message", function(event) {
+  if (event.data == "childLoadComplete" ||
+      event.data.contains("childLoadComplete")) {
+    advance();
+  }
+});
+
+/**
+ * helper to perform an XHR.
+ */
+function doXHR(aUrl, onSuccess, onFail) {
+  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
+  xhr.responseType = "json";
+  xhr.onload = function () {
+    onSuccess(xhr);
+  };
+  xhr.onerror = function () {
+    onFail(xhr);
+  };
+  xhr.open('GET', aUrl, true);
+  xhr.send(null);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Grabs the results via XHR and passes to checker.
+ */
+function checkIndividualResults(aTestname, aExpectedImg, aName) {
+  doXHR('/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=get-test-results',
+        function(xhr) {
+          var results = xhr.response;
+          info(JSON.stringify(xhr.response));
+
+          for (let i in aName) {
+            ok(aName[i] in results.tests, aName[i] + " tests have to be performed.");
+            is(results.tests[aName[i]].policy, aExpectedImg[i], aTestname + ' --- ' + results.tests[aName[i]].policy + ' (' + results.tests[aName[i]].referrer + ')');
+          }
+
+          advance();
+        },
+        function(xhr) {
+          ok(false, "Can't get results from the counter server.");
+          SimpleTest.finish();
+        });
+}
+
+function resetState() {
+  doXHR('/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=resetState',
+    advance,
+    function(xhr) {
+      ok(false, "error in reset state");
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    });
+}
+
+/**
+ * testing if img referrer attribute is honoured (1165501)
+ */
+var tests = (function*() {
+
+  yield SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv(
+    { set: [["network.http.referer.disallowCrossSiteRelaxingDefault", false]] },
+    advance
+  );
+
+  var iframe = document.getElementById("testframe");
+  var sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test";
+
+  // setting img unsafe-url and meta origin - unsafe-url shall prevail (should use speculative load)
+  yield resetState();
+  var name = 'unsaf-url-with-meta-in-origin';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name + "&policy=" + escape('origin');
+  yield checkIndividualResults("unsafe-url (img) with origin in meta", ["full"], [name]);
+
+  // setting img no-referrer and meta default - no-referrer shall prevail (should use speculative load)
+  yield resetState();
+  name = 'no-referrer-with-meta-in-origin';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('no-referrer')+ "&name=" + name +  "&policy=" + escape('origin');
+  yield checkIndividualResults("no-referrer (img) with default in meta", ["none"], [name]);
+
+  // test referrer policy in regular load
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test2";
+  name = 'regular-load-unsafe-url';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("unsafe-url in img", ["full"], [name]);
+
+  // test referrer policy in regular load with multiple images
+  var policies = ['unsafe-url', 'origin', 'no-referrer'];
+  var expected = ["full", "origin", "none"];
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test3";
+  name = 'multiple-images-'+policies[0]+'-'+policies[1]+'-'+policies[2];
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy1=" + escape(policies[0]) + "&imgPolicy2=" + escape(policies[1]) + "&imgPolicy3=" + escape(policies[2]) + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults(policies[0]+", "+policies[1]+" and "+policies[2]+" in img", expected, [name+policies[0], name+policies[1], name+policies[2]]);
+
+  policies = ['origin', 'no-referrer', 'unsafe-url'];
+  expected = ["origin", "none", "full"];
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test3";
+  name = 'multiple-images-'+policies[0]+'-'+policies[1]+'-'+policies[2];
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy1=" + escape(policies[0]) + "&imgPolicy2=" + escape(policies[1]) + "&imgPolicy3=" + escape(policies[2]) + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults(policies[0]+", "+policies[1]+" and "+policies[2]+" in img", expected, [name+policies[0], name+policies[1], name+policies[2]]);
+
+  policies = ['no-referrer', 'origin', 'unsafe-url'];
+  expected = ["none", "origin", "full"];
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test3";
+  name = 'multiple-images-'+policies[0]+'-'+policies[1]+'-'+policies[2];
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy1=" + escape(policies[0]) + "&imgPolicy2=" + escape(policies[1]) + "&imgPolicy3=" + escape(policies[2]) + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults(policies[0]+", "+policies[1]+" and "+policies[2]+" in img", expected, [name+policies[0], name+policies[1], name+policies[2]]);
+
+  // regression tests that meta referrer is still working even if attribute referrers are enabled
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test4";
+  name = 'regular-load-no-referrer-meta';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&policy=" + escape('no-referrer') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("no-referrer in meta (no img referrer policy), speculative load", ["none"], [name]);
+
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-img-policy-test5";
+  name = 'regular-load-no-referrer-meta';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&policy=" + escape('no-referrer') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("no-referrer in meta (no img referrer policy), regular load", ["none"], [name]);
+
+  //test setAttribute
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-setAttribute-test1";
+  name = 'set-referrer-policy-attribute-before-src';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('no-referrer') + "&policy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("no-referrer in img", ["none"], [name]);
+
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs = "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-setAttribute-test2";
+  name = 'set-referrer-policy-attribute-after-src';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('no-referrer') + "&policy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("no-referrer in img", ["none"], [name]);
+
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs =
+    "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-setAttribute-test2";
+  name = 'set-invalid-referrer-policy-attribute-before-src-invalid';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('invalid') + "&policy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("unsafe-url in meta, invalid in img", ["full"], [name]);
+
+  yield resetState();
+  sjs =
+    "/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/img_referrer_testserver.sjs?action=generate-setAttribute-test2";
+  name = 'set-invalid-referrer-policy-attribute-before-src-invalid';
+  yield iframe.src = sjs + "&imgPolicy=" + escape('default') + "&policy=" + escape('unsafe-url') + "&name=" + name;
+  yield checkIndividualResults("unsafe-url in meta, default in img", ["full"], [name]);
+
+  // complete.
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+})();
+
+</script>
+</head>
+
+<body onload="tests.next();">
+  <iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_header_current_document.html b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_header_current_document.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..27dc54a21f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_header_current_document.html
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test referrer header not affecting document.referrer for current document for Bug 1601743</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+
+  <!--
+  Testing that navigating to a document with Referrer-Policy:same-origin doesn't affect
+  the value of document.referrer for that document.
+  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1601743
+  -->
+
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    function getExpectedReferrer(referrer) {
+      let defaultPolicy = SpecialPowers.getIntPref("network.http.referer.defaultPolicy");
+      SimpleTest.ok([2, 3].indexOf(defaultPolicy) > -1, "default referrer policy should be either strict-origin-when-cross-origin(2) or no-referrer-when-downgrade(3)");
+      if (defaultPolicy == 2) {
+        return referrer.match(/https?:\/\/[^\/]+\/?/i)[0];
+      }
+      return referrer;
+    }
+    const IFRAME_URL = `${location.origin}/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html`;
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    window.addEventListener("message", (event) => {
+      SimpleTest.is(event.data, getExpectedReferrer(IFRAME_URL), "Must have the original iframe as the referrer!");
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }, { once: true });
+  </script>
+</head>
+
+<body>
+<iframe src="referrer_header_current_document_iframe.html"></iframe>
+</body>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_redirect.html b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_redirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e6bd82fced
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/test_referrer_redirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Test anchor and area policy attribute for Bug 1184781</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+
+  <!--
+  Testing referrer headers after redirects.
+  https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1184781
+  -->
+
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+
+  const SJS = "://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_testserver.sjs?";
+  const PARAMS = ["ATTRIBUTE_POLICY", "NEW_ATTRIBUTE_POLICY", "META_POLICY", "RP_HEADER"];
+
+  const testCases = [
+    {ACTION: ["generate-img-redirect-policy-test", "generate-iframe-redirect-policy-test"],
+      TESTS: [
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "no-referrer",
+          NAME: "no-referrer-with-no-meta",
+          DESC: "no-referrer (img/iframe) with no meta",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "origin",
+          NAME: "origin-with-no-meta",
+          DESC: "origin (img/iframe) with no meta",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        },
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "unsafe-url",
+          NAME: "unsafe-url-with-no-meta",
+          DESC: "unsafe-url (img/iframe) with no meta",
+          RESULT: "full"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "unsafe-url",
+          NAME: "unsafe-url-in-meta",
+          DESC: "unsafe-url in meta",
+          RESULT: "full"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "origin",
+          NAME: "origin-in-meta",
+          DESC: "origin in meta",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "no-referrer",
+          NAME: "no-referrer-in-meta",
+          DESC: "no-referrer in meta",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+          NAME: "origin-when-cross-origin-in-meta",
+          DESC: "origin-when-cross-origin in meta",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        },
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "no-referrer",
+          RP_HEADER: "origin",
+          NAME: "no-referrer-with-no-meta-origin-RP-header",
+          DESC: "no-referrer (img/iframe) with no meta, origin Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "origin",
+          RP_HEADER: "no-referrer",
+          NAME: "origin-with-no-meta-no-referrer-RP-header",
+          DESC: "origin (img/iframe) with no meta, no-referrer Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          ATTRIBUTE_POLICY: "unsafe-url",
+          RP_HEADER: "origin",
+          NAME: "unsafe-url-with-no-meta-origin-RP-header",
+          DESC: "unsafe-url (img/iframe) with no meta, origin Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "unsafe-url",
+          RP_HEADER: "origin",
+          NAME: "unsafe-url-in-meta-origin-RP-header",
+          DESC: "unsafe-url in meta, origin Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "origin",
+          RP_HEADER: "no-referrer",
+          NAME: "origin-in-meta-no-referrer-RP-header",
+          DESC: "origin in meta, no-referrer Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "no-referrer",
+          RP_HEADER: "origin",
+          NAME: "no-referrer-in-meta-origin-RP-header",
+          DESC: "no-referrer in meta, origin Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "none"
+        },
+        {
+          META_POLICY: "origin-when-cross-origin",
+          RP_HEADER: "unsafe-url",
+          NAME: "origin-when-cross-origin-in-meta-unsafe-url-RP-header",
+          DESC: "origin-when-cross-origin in meta, unsafe-url Referrer-Policy redirect header",
+          RESULT: "origin"
+        }
+      ]
+    }
+  ];
+  </script>
+  <script type="application/javascript" src="/tests/dom/security/test/referrer-policy/referrer_helper.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body onload="tests.next();">
+  <iframe id="testframe"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
+
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser.ini b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ab9c0b1a7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files = file_no_cache.sjs
+
+[browser_navigation.js]
+[browser_external_loads.js]
+skip-if =
+  os == "win" && os_version == "6.1" # Skip on Azure - frequent failure
+support-files =
+  file_dummy_link.html
+  file_dummy_link_location.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_external_loads.js b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_external_loads.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ea2467d1fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_external_loads.js
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const TEST_PATH = getRootDirectory(gTestPath).replace(
+  "chrome://mochitests/content",
+  "https://example.com"
+);
+
+var gExpectedHeader = {};
+
+function checkSecFetchUser(subject, topic, data) {
+  let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  info(`testing headers for load of ${channel.URI.spec}`);
+
+  const secFetchHeaders = [
+    "sec-fetch-mode",
+    "sec-fetch-dest",
+    "sec-fetch-user",
+    "sec-fetch-site",
+  ];
+
+  secFetchHeaders.forEach(header => {
+    const expectedValue = gExpectedHeader[header];
+    try {
+      is(
+        channel.getRequestHeader(header),
+        expectedValue,
+        `${header} is set to ${expectedValue}`
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (expectedValue) {
+        ok(false, `${header} should be set`);
+      } else {
+        ok(true, `${header} should not be set`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+}
+
+add_task(async function external_load() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+  Services.obs.addObserver(checkSecFetchUser, "http-on-stop-request");
+
+  // Simulate an external load in the *current* window with
+  // Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_EXTERNAL and the system principal.
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-site": "none",
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-user": "?1",
+  };
+
+  let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  window.browserDOMWindow.openURI(
+    makeURI(`${TEST_PATH}file_dummy_link.html`),
+    null,
+    Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_CURRENTWINDOW,
+    Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_EXTERNAL,
+    Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal()
+  );
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Open a link in a *new* window through the context menu.
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-user": "?1",
+  };
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewWindow({
+    url: `${TEST_PATH}file_dummy_link_location.html`,
+  });
+  BrowserTestUtils.waitForEvent(document, "popupshown", false, event => {
+    document.getElementById("context-openlink").doCommand();
+    event.target.hidePopup();
+    return true;
+  });
+  BrowserTestUtils.synthesizeMouseAtCenter(
+    "#dummylink",
+    { type: "contextmenu", button: 2 },
+    gBrowser.selectedBrowser
+  );
+
+  let win = await loaded;
+  win.close();
+
+  // Simulate an external load in a *new* window with
+  // Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_EXTERNAL and the system principal.
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-site": "none",
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-user": "?1",
+  };
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewWindow({
+    url: "https://example.com/newwindow",
+  });
+  window.browserDOMWindow.openURI(
+    makeURI("https://example.com/newwindow"),
+    null,
+    Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_NEWWINDOW,
+    Ci.nsIBrowserDOMWindow.OPEN_EXTERNAL,
+    Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal()
+  );
+  win = await loaded;
+  win.close();
+
+  // Open a *new* window through window.open without user activation.
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+  };
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewWindow({
+    url: "https://example.com/windowopen",
+  });
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], () => {
+    content.window.open(
+      "https://example.com/windowopen",
+      "_blank",
+      "height=500,width=500"
+    );
+  });
+  win = await loaded;
+  win.close();
+
+  // Open a *new* window through window.open with user activation.
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-user": "?1",
+  };
+
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.waitForNewWindow({
+    url: "https://example.com/windowopen_withactivation",
+  });
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], () => {
+    content.document.notifyUserGestureActivation();
+    content.window.open(
+      "https://example.com/windowopen_withactivation",
+      "_blank",
+      "height=500,width=500"
+    );
+    content.document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  });
+  win = await loaded;
+  win.close();
+
+  Services.obs.removeObserver(checkSecFetchUser, "http-on-stop-request");
+  finish();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_navigation.js b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_navigation.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbfb153768
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/browser_navigation.js
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+"use strict";
+
+const REQUEST_URL =
+  "https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs";
+
+let gTestCounter = 0;
+let gExpectedHeader = {};
+
+async function setup() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]],
+  });
+}
+
+function checkSecFetchUser(subject, topic, data) {
+  let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com/")) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  info(`testing headers for load of ${channel.URI.spec}`);
+
+  const secFetchHeaders = [
+    "sec-fetch-mode",
+    "sec-fetch-dest",
+    "sec-fetch-user",
+    "sec-fetch-site",
+  ];
+
+  secFetchHeaders.forEach(header => {
+    const expectedValue = gExpectedHeader[header];
+    try {
+      is(
+        channel.getRequestHeader(header),
+        expectedValue,
+        `${header} is set to ${expectedValue}`
+      );
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (expectedValue) {
+        ok(false, "required headers are set");
+      } else {
+        ok(true, `${header} should not be set`);
+      }
+    }
+  });
+
+  gTestCounter++;
+}
+
+async function testNavigations() {
+  gTestCounter = 0;
+
+  // Load initial site
+  let loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  BrowserTestUtils.loadURI(gBrowser, REQUEST_URL + "?test1");
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Load another site
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+    let test2Button = content.document.getElementById("test2_button");
+    test2Button.click();
+    content.document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+  // Load another site
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+    let test3Button = content.document.getElementById("test3_button");
+    test3Button.click();
+    content.document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+    "sec-fetch-user": "?1",
+  };
+
+  // Register the http request observer.
+  // All following actions should cause requests with the sec-fetch-user header
+  // set.
+  Services.obs.addObserver(checkSecFetchUser, "http-on-stop-request");
+
+  // Go back one site by clicking the back button
+  info("Clicking back button");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+  let backButton = document.getElementById("back-button");
+  backButton.click();
+  document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Reload the site by clicking the reload button
+  info("Clicking reload button");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+  let reloadButton = document.getElementById("reload-button");
+  await TestUtils.waitForCondition(() => {
+    return !reloadButton.disabled;
+  });
+  reloadButton.click();
+  document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Go forward one site by clicking the forward button
+  info("Clicking forward button");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+  let forwardButton = document.getElementById("forward-button");
+  forwardButton.click();
+  document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  await loaded;
+
+  // Testing history.back/forward...
+
+  info("going back with history.back");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+    content.history.back();
+    content.document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+
+  info("going forward with history.forward");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.document.notifyUserGestureActivation(); // simulate user activation
+    content.history.forward();
+    content.document.clearUserGestureActivation();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+
+  gExpectedHeader = {
+    "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+    "sec-fetch-dest": "document",
+    "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+  };
+
+  info("going back with history.back without user activation");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.history.back();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+
+  info("going forward with history.forward without user activation");
+  loaded = BrowserTestUtils.browserLoaded(gBrowser.selectedBrowser);
+  await SpecialPowers.spawn(gBrowser.selectedBrowser, [], async function() {
+    content.history.forward();
+  });
+  await loaded;
+
+  ok(gTestCounter === 7, "testing that all five actions have been tested.");
+
+  Services.obs.removeObserver(checkSecFetchUser, "http-on-stop-request");
+}
+
+add_task(async function() {
+  waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+    set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]],
+  });
+
+  await testNavigations();
+
+  // If fission is enabled we also want to test the navigations with the bfcache
+  // in the parent.
+  if (SpecialPowers.getBoolPref("fission.autostart")) {
+    await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+      set: [["fission.bfcacheInParent", true]],
+    });
+
+    await testNavigations();
+  }
+
+  finish();
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2150054226
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1738694 - Sec-Fetch-User header is missing when opening a link in a new window</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <a id="dummylink" href="file_dummy_link_location.html">Open</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link_location.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link_location.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9f9400e1c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_dummy_link_location.html
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1738694 - Sec-Fetch-User header is missing when opening a link in a new window</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <h1>file_dummy_link_location.html</h1>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5f9779e80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+const MESSAGE_PAGE = function(msg) {
+  return `
+<html>
+<script type="text/javascript">
+window.parent.postMessage({test : "${msg}"},"*");
+</script>
+<script>
+  addEventListener("back", () => {
+	  history.back();
+  });
+  addEventListener("forward", () => {
+	  history.forward();
+  });
+</script>
+<body>
+  <a id="test2_button" href="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs?test2">Click me</a>
+  <a id="test3_button" href="https://example.com/browser/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs?test3">Click me</a>
+<body>
+</html>
+`;
+};
+
+function handleRequest(request, response) {
+  response.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-store");
+  response.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html");
+
+  response.write(MESSAGE_PAGE(request.queryString));
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..84c2c39913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+const SITE_META_REDIRECT = `
+<html>
+  <head>
+    <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url='https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs?redirect302'">
+  </head>
+  <body>
+    META REDIRECT
+  </body>
+</html>
+`;
+
+const REDIRECT_302 =
+  "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs?pageC";
+
+function handleRequest(req, res) {
+  // avoid confusing cache behaviour
+  res.setHeader("Cache-Control", "no-cache", false);
+  res.setHeader("Content-Type", "text/html", false);
+
+  switch (req.queryString) {
+    case "meta":
+      res.write(SITE_META_REDIRECT);
+      return;
+    case "redirect302":
+      res.setStatusLine("1.1", 302, "Found");
+      res.setHeader("Location", REDIRECT_302, false);
+      return;
+    case "pageC":
+      res.write("<html><body>PAGE C</body></html>");
+      return;
+  }
+
+  res.write(`<html><body>THIS SHOULD NEVER BE DISPLAYED</body></html>`);
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_trustworthy_loopback.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_trustworthy_loopback.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..88f9242650
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_trustworthy_loopback.html
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1732069: Sec-Fetch-Site inconsistent on localhost/IPs</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <iframe src="http://localhost:9898/foo"></iframe>
+  <iframe src="http://localhost:9899/foo"></iframe>
+  <iframe src="http://sub.localhost/foo"></iframe>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_websocket_wsh.py b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_websocket_wsh.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b7159c742b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_websocket_wsh.py
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+def web_socket_do_extra_handshake(request):
+    pass
+
+
+def web_socket_transfer_data(request):
+    pass
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a142f210dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_no_cache.sjs
+  file_redirect.sjs
+
+[test_websocket.html]
+skip-if = toolkit == 'android' # no websocket support Bug 982828
+support-files = file_websocket_wsh.py
+[test_iframe_src_metaRedirect.html]
+[test_iframe_srcdoc_metaRedirect.html]
+[test_iframe_window_open_metaRedirect.html]
+[test_iframe_history_manipulation.html]
+[test_trustworthy_loopback.html]
+support-files = file_trustworthy_loopback.html
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_history_manipulation.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_history_manipulation.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d89c3c04a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_history_manipulation.html
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1648825 - Fetch Metadata Headers contain invalid value for Sec-Fetch-Site for history manipulation</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+
+const REQUEST_PATH = 'tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_no_cache.sjs'
+let sendHome = true;
+let testCounter = 0;
+let testFrame;
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    info("request observed: " + channel.URI.spec);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.org")) {
+      return;
+    }
+    let headerPresent = false;
+    try {
+      is(channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site"), "cross-site", "testing sec-fetch-site is cross-site");
+
+      // This should fail and cause the catch clause to be executed.
+      channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-User");
+      headerPresent = true;
+    } catch (e) {
+      headerPresent = false;
+    }
+
+    ok(!headerPresent, "testing sec-fetch-user header is not set");
+
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-pass");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-pass", () => {
+  testCounter++;
+  if(testCounter == 2) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}); 
+
+window.addEventListener("message", function (event) {
+  iframeAction(event.data.test);
+});
+
+function iframeAction(test) {
+  info("received message " + test);
+
+  switch (test) {
+    case 'test':
+      testFrame.contentWindow.location  = `https://example.org/${REQUEST_PATH}?test#bypass`;
+      if(sendHome) {
+        // We need to send the message manually here because there is no request send to the server.
+        window.postMessage({test: "home"}, "*");
+        sendHome = false;
+      }
+
+      break;
+    case 'home':
+      testFrame.contentWindow.location  = `/${REQUEST_PATH}?back`;
+      break;
+    case 'back':
+      testFrame.contentWindow.history.back();
+      break;
+  }
+}
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]]}, async () => {
+  testFrame = document.createElement('iframe');
+  testFrame.src = `https://example.org/${REQUEST_PATH}?test`;
+  document.body.appendChild(testFrame);
+});
+
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_src_metaRedirect.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_src_metaRedirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c58d95233e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_src_metaRedirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1647128 - Fetch Metadata Headers contain invalid value for Sec-Fetch-Site for meta redirects</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load site A that redirects to site B using a meta refresh,
+ * finally site B redirects to site C via a 302 redirect.
+ * The first load of site A is made by an iframe: frame.src = "...".
+ * We check that all requests have the Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs";
+let testPassCounter = 0;
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs")) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // The redirection flow is the following:
+    // http://mochi.test:8888 -> https://example.com?meta -> https://example.com?redirect302 -> https://example.com?pageC
+    // So the Sec-Fetch-* headers for each request should be:
+    const expectedHeaders = {
+        "?meta": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?redirect302": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?pageC": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+    };
+
+    let matchedOne = false;
+    for (const [query, headers] of Object.entries(expectedHeaders)) {
+      if (!channel.URI.spec.endsWith(query)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      matchedOne = true;
+
+      for (const [header, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+        try {
+          is(channel.getRequestHeader(header), value, `testing ${header} for the ${query} query`);
+        } catch (e) {
+          is(header, "Sec-Fetch-User", "testing Sec-Fetch-User");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    ok(matchedOne, "testing expectedHeaders");
+
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-pass");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-pass", async () => {
+  testPassCounter++;
+  if (testPassCounter < 3) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we received "test-pass" 3 times we know that all loads had Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]]}, async () => {
+  let frame = document.createElement("iframe");
+  frame.src = REQUEST_URL + "?meta";
+  document.body.appendChild(frame);
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_srcdoc_metaRedirect.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_srcdoc_metaRedirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e44700541d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_srcdoc_metaRedirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1647128 - Fetch Metadata Headers contain invalid value for Sec-Fetch-Site for meta redirects</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load site A that redirects to site B using a meta refresh,
+ * finally site B redirects to site C via a 302 redirect.
+ * The first load of site A is made by an iframe: frame.srcdoc = "<meta ...".
+ * We check that all requests have the Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs";
+let testPassCounter = 0;
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs")) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // The redirection flow is the following:
+    // http://mochi.test:8888 -> https://example.com?meta -> https://example.com?redirect302 -> https://example.com?pageC
+    // So the Sec-Fetch-* headers for each request should be:
+    const expectedHeaders = {
+        "?meta": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?redirect302": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?pageC": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "iframe",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+    };
+
+    let matchedOne = false;
+    for (const [query, headers] of Object.entries(expectedHeaders)) {
+      if (!channel.URI.spec.endsWith(query)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      matchedOne = true;
+
+      for (const [header, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+        try {
+          is(channel.getRequestHeader(header), value, `testing ${header} for the ${query} query`);
+        } catch (e) {
+          is(header, "Sec-Fetch-User", "testing Sec-Fetch-User");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    ok(matchedOne, "testing expectedHeaders");
+
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-pass");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-pass", async () => {
+  testPassCounter++;
+  if (testPassCounter < 3) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we received "test-pass" 3 times we know that all loads had Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]]}, async () => {
+  let frame = document.createElement("iframe");
+  frame.srcdoc = `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url='${REQUEST_URL}?meta'">`;
+  document.body.appendChild(frame);
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_window_open_metaRedirect.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_window_open_metaRedirect.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b45ed25a6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_iframe_window_open_metaRedirect.html
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1647128 - Fetch Metadata Headers contain invalid value for Sec-Fetch-Site for meta redirects</title>
+  <!-- Including SimpleTest.js so we can use waitForExplicitFinish !-->
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+
+<body>
+
+<script class="testbody" type="text/javascript">
+/*
+ * Description of the test:
+ * We load site A that redirects to site B using a meta refresh,
+ * finally site B redirects to site C via a 302 redirect.
+ * The first load of site A is made through window.open.
+ * We check that all requests have the Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+ */
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+const REQUEST_URL = "https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs";
+let testPassCounter = 0;
+let testWindow;
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_redirect.sjs")) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // The redirection flow is the following:
+    // http://mochi.test:8888 -> https://example.com?meta -> https://example.com?redirect302 -> https://example.com?pageC
+    // So the Sec-Fetch-* headers for each request should be:
+    const expectedHeaders = {
+        "?meta": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "cross-site",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "document",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?redirect302": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "document",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+        "?pageC": {
+          "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate",
+          "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "document",
+          "Sec-Fetch-User": null,
+        },
+    };
+
+    let matchedOne = false;
+    for (const [query, headers] of Object.entries(expectedHeaders)) {
+      if (!channel.URI.spec.endsWith(query)) {
+        continue;
+      }
+      matchedOne = true;
+
+      for (const [header, value] of Object.entries(headers)) {
+        try {
+          is(channel.getRequestHeader(header), value, `testing ${header} for the ${query} query`);
+        } catch (e) {
+          is(header, "Sec-Fetch-User", "testing Sec-Fetch-User");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    ok(matchedOne, "testing expectedHeaders");
+
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-pass");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-pass", async () => {
+  testPassCounter++;
+  if (testPassCounter < 3) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (testWindow) {
+    testWindow.close();
+  }
+
+  // If we received "test-pass" 3 times we know that all loads had Sec-Fetch-* headers set appropriately.
+  SimpleTest.finish();
+});
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]]}, async () => {
+  testWindow = window.open(REQUEST_URL + "?meta");
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_trustworthy_loopback.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_trustworthy_loopback.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..95ecac17ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_trustworthy_loopback.html
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1732069: Sec-Fetch-Site inconsistent on localhost/IPs</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let testsSucceeded = 0;
+
+let win;
+function checkTestsDone() {
+  testsSucceeded++;
+  if (testsSucceeded == 3) {
+    win.close();
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.includes("localhost") ||
+        channel.URI.spec.startsWith("http://localhost:9898/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_trustworthy_loopback.html")) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    const expectedHeaders = {
+      "localhost:9898": {
+        "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+        "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+        "sec-fetch-dest": "iframe",
+      },
+      "sub.localhost:-1": {
+        "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site",
+        "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+        "sec-fetch-dest": "iframe",
+      },
+      "localhost:9899": {
+        "sec-fetch-site": "same-site",
+        "sec-fetch-mode": "navigate",
+        "sec-fetch-dest": "iframe",
+      },
+    };
+
+    info(`checking headers for request to ${channel.URI.spec}`);
+    const expected = expectedHeaders[channel.URI.host + ":" + channel.URI.port];
+    for (let key in expected) {
+      try {
+        is(channel.getRequestHeader(key), expected[key], `${key} header matches`);
+      } catch (e) {
+        ok(false, "failed to check headers");
+      }
+    }
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-end");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-end", () => {
+  checkTestsDone();
+});
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({set: [
+  ["network.proxy.allow_hijacking_localhost", true],
+  ["network.proxy.testing_localhost_is_secure_when_hijacked", true],
+]}).then(function() {
+  win = window.open("http://localhost:9898/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_trustworthy_loopback.html");
+});
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_websocket.html b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_websocket.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..640ccaaf70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/test_websocket.html
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <title>Bug 1628605: Test Sec-Fetch-* header for websockets</title>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css" />
+</head>
+<body>
+<script type="application/javascript">
+
+SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+let testsSucceeded = 0;
+
+function checkTestsDone() {
+  testsSucceeded++;
+  if (testsSucceeded == 2) {
+    SimpleTest.finish();
+  }
+}
+
+var script = SpecialPowers.loadChromeScript(() => {
+  /* eslint-env mozilla/chrome-script */
+  Services.obs.addObserver(function onExamResp(subject, topic, data) {
+    let channel = subject.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+    if (!channel.URI.spec.startsWith("https://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_websocket")) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Sec-Fetch-* Headers should be present for Dest, Mode, Site
+    try {
+      let secFetchDest = channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Dest");
+      is(secFetchDest, "websocket", "testing sec-fetch-dest");
+
+      let secFetchMode = channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Mode");
+      is(secFetchMode, "websocket", "testing sec-fetch-mode");
+
+      let secFetchSite = channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-Site");
+      is(secFetchSite, "cross-site", "testing sec-fetch-site");
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      ok(false, "testing sec-fetch-*");
+    }
+
+    // Sec-Fetch-User should not be present
+    try {
+      channel.getRequestHeader("Sec-Fetch-User");
+      ok(false, "testing sec-fetch-user");
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+      ok(true, "testing sec-fetch-user");
+    }
+    Services.obs.removeObserver(onExamResp, "http-on-stop-request");
+
+    sendAsyncMessage("test-end");
+  }, "http-on-stop-request");
+});
+
+script.addMessageListener("test-end", () => {
+  checkTestsDone();
+});
+
+function test_sec_fetch_websocket() {
+  var wssSocket = new WebSocket("wss://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sec-fetch/file_websocket");
+  wssSocket.onopen = function(e) {
+    ok(true, "sanity: wssSocket onopen");
+    checkTestsDone();
+  };
+  wssSocket.onerror = function(e) {
+    ok(false, "sanity: wssSocket onerror");
+  };
+}
+
+SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({
+  set: [["dom.security.secFetch.enabled", true]]
+}, test_sec_fetch_websocket);
+
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/file_bug_1271796.css b/dom/security/test/sri/file_bug_1271796.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c0928f2cf0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/file_bug_1271796.css
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+/*! Simple test for bug 1271796 */
+p::before { content: "\2014"; }
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_crossdomain.html b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_crossdomain.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe91834db5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_crossdomain.html
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+</head>
+<body>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+</pre>
+
+<script type="application/javascript">
+  SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+  window.hasCORSLoaded = false;
+  window.hasNonCORSLoaded = false;
+
+  function good_nonsriLoaded() {
+    ok(true, "Non-eligible non-SRI resource was loaded correctly.");
+  }
+  function bad_nonsriBlocked() {
+    ok(false, "Non-eligible non-SRI resources should be loaded!");
+  }
+
+  function good_nonCORSInvalidBlocked() {
+    ok(true, "A non-CORS resource with invalid metadata was correctly blocked.");
+  }
+  function bad_nonCORSInvalidLoaded() {
+    ok(false, "Non-CORS resources with invalid metadata should be blocked!");
+  }
+
+  window.onerrorCalled = false;
+  window.onloadCalled = false;
+
+  function bad_onloadCalled() {
+    window.onloadCalled = true;
+  }
+
+  function good_onerrorCalled() {
+    window.onerrorCalled = true;
+  }
+
+  function good_incorrect301Blocked() {
+    ok(true, "A non-CORS load with incorrect hash redirected to a different origin was blocked correctly.");
+  }
+  function bad_incorrect301Loaded() {
+    ok(false, "Non-CORS loads with incorrect hashes redirecting to a different origin should be blocked!");
+  }
+
+  function good_correct301Blocked() {
+    ok(true, "A non-CORS load with correct hash redirected to a different origin was blocked correctly.");
+  }
+  function bad_correct301Loaded() {
+    ok(false, "Non-CORS loads with correct hashes redirecting to a different origin should be blocked!");
+  }
+
+  function good_correctDataLoaded() {
+    ok(true, "Since data: URLs are same-origin, they should be loaded.");
+  }
+  function bad_correctDataBlocked() {
+    todo(false, "We should not block scripts in data: URIs!");
+  }
+  function good_correctDataCORSLoaded() {
+    ok(true, "A data: URL with a CORS load was loaded correctly.");
+  }
+  function bad_correctDataCORSBlocked() {
+    ok(false, "We should not BLOCK scripts!");
+  }
+
+  window.onload = function() {
+    SimpleTest.finish()
+  }
+</script>
+
+<!-- cors-enabled. should be loaded -->
+<script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js"
+        crossorigin=""
+        integrity="sha512-9Tv2DL1fHvmPQa1RviwKleE/jq72jgxj8XGLyWn3H6Xp/qbtfK/jZINoPFAv2mf0Nn1TxhZYMFULAbzJNGkl4Q=="></script>
+
+<!-- not cors-enabled. should be blocked -->
+<script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain2.js"
+        crossorigin="anonymous"
+        integrity="sha256-ntgU2U1xv7HfK1XWMTSWz6vJkyVtGzMrIAxQkux1I94="
+        onload="bad_onloadCalled()"
+        onerror="good_onerrorCalled()"></script>
+
+<!-- non-cors but not actually using SRI. should trigger onload -->
+<script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js"
+        integrity="    "
+        onload="good_nonsriLoaded()"
+        onerror="bad_nonsriBlocked()"></script>
+
+<!-- non-cors with invalid metadata -->
+<script src="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js"
+        integrity="sha256-bogus"
+        onload="bad_nonCORSInvalidLoaded()"
+        onerror="good_nonCORSInvalidBlocked()"></script>
+
+<!-- non-cors that's same-origin initially but redirected to another origin -->
+<script src="script_301.js"
+        integrity="sha384-invalid"
+        onerror="good_incorrect301Blocked()"
+        onload="bad_incorrect301Loaded()"></script>
+
+<!-- non-cors that's same-origin initially but redirected to another origin -->
+<script src="script_301.js"
+        integrity="sha384-1NpiDI6decClMaTWSCAfUjTdx1BiOffsCPgH4lW5hCLwmHk0VyV/g6B9Sw2kD2K3"
+        onerror="good_correct301Blocked()"
+        onload="bad_correct301Loaded()"></script>
+
+<!-- data: URLs are same-origin -->
+<script src="data:,console.log('data:valid');"
+        integrity="sha256-W5I4VIN+mCwOfR9kDbvWoY1UOVRXIh4mKRN0Nz0ookg="
+        onerror="bad_correctDataBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctDataLoaded()"></script>
+
+<!-- not cors-enabled with data: URLs. should trigger onload -->
+<script src="data:,console.log('data:valid');"
+        crossorigin="anonymous"
+        integrity="sha256-W5I4VIN+mCwOfR9kDbvWoY1UOVRXIh4mKRN0Nz0ookg="
+        onerror="bad_correctDataCORSBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctDataCORSLoaded()"></script>
+
+<script>
+  ok(window.hasCORSLoaded, "CORS-enabled resource with a correct hash");
+  ok(!window.hasNonCORSLoaded, "Correct hash, but non-CORS, should be blocked");
+  ok(!window.onloadCalled, "Failed loads should not call onload when they're cross-domain");
+  ok(window.onerrorCalled, "Failed loads should call onerror when they're cross-domain");
+</script>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_sameorigin.html b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_sameorigin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8c1994fec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_script_sameorigin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    window.onload = function() {
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  </script>
+  <script>
+    function good_correctHashLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded when integrity matched")
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with hashes that match!");
+    }
+
+    function good_correctHashArrayLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded when one of the hashes in the integrity attribute matched")
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashArrayBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with at least one hash that match!");
+    }
+
+    function good_emptyIntegrityLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded when the integrity attribute was empty")
+    }
+    function bad_emptyIntegrityBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with empty integrity attributes!");
+    }
+
+    function good_whitespaceIntegrityLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded when the integrity attribute only contained whitespace")
+    }
+    function bad_whitespaceIntegrityBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with integrity attributes containing only whitespace!");
+    }
+
+    function good_incorrectHashBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly blocked, because the hash digest was wrong");
+    }
+    function bad_incorrectHashLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load scripts with hashes that do not match the content!");
+    }
+
+    function good_incorrectHashArrayBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly blocked, because all the hashes were wrong");
+    }
+    function bad_incorrectHashArrayLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load scripts when none of the hashes match the content!");
+    }
+
+    function good_incorrectHashLengthBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly blocked, because the hash length was wrong");
+    }
+    function bad_incorrectHashLengthLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load scripts with hashes that don't have the right length!");
+    }
+
+    function bad_incorrectHashFunctionBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with invalid/unsupported hash functions!");
+    }
+    function good_incorrectHashFunctionLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded, despite the hash function being invalid/unsupported.");
+    }
+
+    function bad_missingHashFunctionBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with missing hash functions!");
+    }
+    function good_missingHashFunctionLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded, despite a missing hash function.");
+    }
+
+    function bad_missingHashValueBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with missing hash digests!");
+    }
+    function good_missingHashValueLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was correctly loaded, despite the missing hash digest.");
+    }
+
+    function good_401Blocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was not loaded because of 401 response.");
+    }
+    function bad_401Loaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should nt load scripts with a 401 response!");
+    }
+
+    function good_valid302Loaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was loaded successfully despite a 302 response.");
+    }
+    function bad_valid302Blocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts with a 302 response and the right hash!");
+    }
+
+    function good_invalid302Blocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was blocked successfully after a 302 response.");
+    }
+    function bad_invalid302Loaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load scripts with a 302 response and the wrong hash!");
+    }
+
+    function good_validBlobLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A script was loaded successfully from a blob: URL.");
+    }
+    function bad_validBlobBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load scripts using blob: URLs with the right hash!");
+    }
+
+    function good_invalidBlobBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A script was blocked successfully from a blob: URL.");
+    }
+    function bad_invalidBlobLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load scripts using blob: URLs with the wrong hash!");
+    }
+</script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <!-- valid hash. should trigger onload -->
+  <!-- the hash value comes from running this command:
+       cat script.js | openssl dgst -sha256 -binary | openssl enc -base64 -A
+  -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="bad_correctHashBlocked()"
+          onload="good_correctHashLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- valid sha512 hash. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha512-mzSqH+vC6qrXX46JX2WEZ0FtY/lGj/5+5yYCBlk0jfYHLm0vP6XgsURbq83mwMApsnwbDLXdgjp5J8E93GT6Mw==?ignore=this"
+          onerror="bad_correctHashBlocked()"
+          onload="good_correctHashLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- one valid sha256 hash. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-rkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA= sha256-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA= sha256-rkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="bad_correctHashArrayBlocked()"
+          onload="good_correctHashArrayLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- empty integrity. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity=""
+          onerror="bad_emptyIntegrityBlocked()"
+          onload="good_emptyIntegrityLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- whitespace integrity. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="  
+	
+"
+          onerror="bad_whitespaceIntegrityBlocked()"
+          onload="good_whitespaceIntegrityLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- invalid sha256 hash but valid sha384 hash. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-bogus sha384-zDCkvKOHXk8mM6Nk07oOGXGME17PA4+ydFw+hq0r9kgF6ZDYFWK3fLGPEy7FoOAo?"
+          onerror="bad_correctHashBlocked()"
+          onload="good_correctHashLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- valid sha256 and invalid sha384. should trigger onerror -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA= sha384-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="good_incorrectHashLengthBlocked()"
+          onload="bad_incorrectHashLengthLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- invalid hash. should trigger onerror -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-rkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="good_incorrectHashBlocked()"
+          onload="bad_incorrectHashLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- invalid hashes. should trigger onerror -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha256-rkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA= sha256-ZkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA= sha256-zkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="good_incorrectHashBlocked()"
+          onload="bad_incorrectHashLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- invalid hash function. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="rot13-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="bad_incorrectHashFunctionBlocked()"
+          onload="good_incorrectHashFunctionLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- missing hash function. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="bad_missingHashFunctionBlocked()"
+          onload="good_missingHashFunctionLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- missing hash value. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script.js"
+          integrity="sha512-"
+          onerror="bad_missingHashValueBlocked()"
+          onload="good_missingHashValueLoaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- 401 response. should trigger onerror -->
+  <script src="script_401.js"
+          integrity="sha256-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="good_401Blocked()"
+          onload="bad_401Loaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- valid sha256 after a redirection. should trigger onload -->
+  <script src="script_302.js"
+          integrity="sha256-RkrQYrxD/HCx+ImVLb51nvxJ6ZHfwuEm7bHppTun9oA="
+          onerror="bad_valid302Blocked()"
+          onload="good_valid302Loaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- invalid sha256 after a redirection. should trigger onerror -->
+  <script src="script_302.js"
+          integrity="sha256-JSi74NSN8WQNr9syBGmNg2APJp9PnHUO5ioZo5hmIiQ="
+          onerror="good_invalid302Blocked()"
+          onload="bad_invalid302Loaded()"></script>
+
+  <!-- valid sha256 for a blob: URL -->
+  <script>
+   var blob = new Blob(["console.log('blob:valid');"],
+                       {type:"application/javascript"});
+   var script = document.createElement('script');
+   script.setAttribute('src', URL.createObjectURL(blob));
+   script.setAttribute('integrity', 'sha256-AwLdXiGfCqOxOXDPUim73G8NVEL34jT0IcQR/tqv/GQ=');
+   script.onerror = bad_validBlobBlocked;
+   script.onload = good_validBlobLoaded;
+   var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head').item(0);
+   head.appendChild(script);
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- invalid sha256 for a blob: URL -->
+  <script>
+   var blob = new Blob(["console.log('blob:invalid');"],
+                       {type:"application/javascript"});
+   var script = document.createElement('script');
+   script.setAttribute('src', URL.createObjectURL(blob));
+   script.setAttribute('integrity', 'sha256-AwLdXiGfCqOxOXDPUim73G8NVEL34jT0IcQR/tqv/GQ=');
+   script.onerror = good_invalidBlobBlocked;
+   script.onload = bad_invalidBlobLoaded;
+   var head = document.getElementsByTagName('head').item(0);
+   head.appendChild(script);
+  </script>
+
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_crossdomain.html b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_crossdomain.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f5eb57cbe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_crossdomain.html
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    function check_styles() {
+      var redText = document.getElementById('red-text');
+      var greenText = document.getElementById('green-text');
+      var blueText = document.getElementById('blue-text');
+      var redTextColor = window.getComputedStyle(redText).getPropertyValue('color');
+      var greenTextColor = window.getComputedStyle(greenText).getPropertyValue('color');
+      var blueTextColor = window.getComputedStyle(blueText).getPropertyValue('color');
+      ok(redTextColor == 'rgb(255, 0, 0)', "The first part should be red.");
+      ok(greenTextColor == 'rgb(0, 255, 0)', "The second part should be green.");
+      ok(blueTextColor == 'rgb(0, 0, 255)', "The third part should be blue.");
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    window.onload = function() {
+      check_styles();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  </script>
+  <script>
+    function good_correctHashCORSLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A CORS cross-domain stylesheet with correct hash was correctly loaded.");
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashCORSBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load CORS cross-domain stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+    function good_correctHashBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A non-CORS cross-domain stylesheet with correct hash was correctly blocked.");
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should block non-CORS cross-domain stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+
+    function good_incorrectHashBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A non-CORS cross-domain stylesheet with incorrect hash was correctly blocked.");
+    }
+    function bad_incorrectHashLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should load non-CORS cross-domain stylesheets with incorrect hashes!");
+    }
+
+    function bad_correctDataBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should not block non-CORS cross-domain stylesheets in data: URI!");
+    }
+    function good_correctDataLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A non-CORS cross-domain stylesheet with data: URI was correctly loaded.");
+    }
+    function bad_correctDataCORSBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should not block CORS stylesheets in data: URI!");
+    }
+    function good_correctDataCORSLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A CORS stylesheet with data: URI was correctly loaded.");
+    }
+
+    function good_correctHashOpaqueBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A non-CORS(Opaque) cross-domain stylesheet with correct hash was correctly blocked.");
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashOpaqueLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load non-CORS(Opaque) cross-domain stylesheets with correct hashes!");
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- valid CORS sha256 hash -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css"
+        crossorigin="anonymous"
+        integrity="sha256-qs8lnkunWoVldk5d5E+652yth4VTSHohlBKQvvgGwa8="
+        onerror="bad_correctHashCORSBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctHashCORSLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid non-CORS sha256 hash -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style_301.css"
+        integrity="sha256-qs8lnkunWoVldk5d5E+652yth4VTSHohlBKQvvgGwa8="
+        onerror="good_correctHashBlocked()"
+        onload="bad_correctHashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- invalid non-CORS sha256 hash -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style_301.css?again"
+        integrity="sha256-bogus"
+        onerror="good_incorrectHashBlocked()"
+        onload="bad_incorrectHashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid non-CORS sha256 hash in a data: URL -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="data:text/css,.green-text{color:rgb(0, 255, 0)}"
+        integrity="sha256-EhVtGGyovvffvYdhyqJxUJ/ekam7zlxxo46iM13cwP0="
+        onerror="bad_correctDataBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctDataLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid CORS sha256 hash in a data: URL -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="data:text/css,.blue-text{color:rgb(0, 0, 255)}"
+        crossorigin="anonymous"
+        integrity="sha256-m0Fs2hNSyPOn1030Dp+c8pJFHNmwpeTbB+8J/DcqLss="
+        onerror="bad_correctDataCORSBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctDataCORSLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid non-CORS sha256 hash -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css"
+        integrity="sha256-qs8lnkunWoVldk5d5E+652yth4VTSHohlBKQvvgGwa8="
+        onerror="good_correctHashOpaqueBlocked()"
+        onload="bad_correctHashOpaqueLoaded()">
+</head>
+<body>
+<p><span id="red-text">This should be red</span> but
+  <span id="green-text" class="green-text">this should be green</span> and
+  <span id="blue-text" class="blue-text">this should be blue</span></p>
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_sameorigin.html b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_sameorigin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..52ebd10d9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/iframe_style_sameorigin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+    function check_styles() {
+      var redText = document.getElementById('red-text');
+      var blueText = document.getElementById('blue-text-element');
+      var blackText1 = document.getElementById('black-text');
+      var blackText2 = document.getElementById('black-text-2');
+      var redTextColor = window.getComputedStyle(redText).getPropertyValue('color');
+      var blueTextColor = window.getComputedStyle(blueText).getPropertyValue('color');
+      var blackTextColor1 = window.getComputedStyle(blackText1).getPropertyValue('color');
+      var blackTextColor2 = window.getComputedStyle(blackText2).getPropertyValue('color');
+      ok(redTextColor == 'rgb(255, 0, 0)', "The first part should be red.");
+      ok(blueTextColor == 'rgb(0, 0, 255)', "The second part should be blue.");
+      ok(blackTextColor1 == 'rgb(0, 0, 0)', "The second last part should still be black.");
+      ok(blackTextColor2 == 'rgb(0, 0, 0)', "The last part should still be black.");
+    }
+
+    SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+    window.onload = function() {
+      check_styles();
+      SimpleTest.finish();
+    }
+  </script>
+  <script>
+    function good_correctHashLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A stylesheet was correctly loaded when integrity matched");
+    }
+    function bad_correctHashBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+
+    function good_emptyIntegrityLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A stylesheet was correctly loaded when the integrity attribute was empty");
+    }
+    function bad_emptyIntegrityBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load stylesheets with empty integrity attributes!");
+    }
+
+    function good_incorrectHashBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A stylesheet was correctly blocked, because the hash digest was wrong");
+    }
+    function bad_incorrectHashLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load stylesheets with hashes that do not match the content!");
+    }
+
+    function good_validBlobLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A stylesheet was loaded successfully from a blob: URL with the right hash.");
+    }
+    function bad_validBlobBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load stylesheets using blob: URLs with the right hash!");
+    }
+    function good_invalidBlobBlocked() {
+      ok(true, "A stylesheet was blocked successfully from a blob: URL with an invalid hash.");
+    }
+    function bad_invalidBlobLoaded() {
+      ok(false, "We should not load stylesheets using blob: URLs when they have the wrong hash!");
+    }
+
+    function good_correctUTF8HashLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A UTF8 stylesheet was correctly loaded when integrity matched");
+    }
+    function bad_correctUTF8HashBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load UTF8 stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+    function good_correctUTF8BOMHashLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A UTF8 stylesheet (with BOM) was correctly loaded when integrity matched");
+    }
+    function bad_correctUTF8BOMHashBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load UTF8 (with BOM) stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+    function good_correctUTF8ishHashLoaded() {
+      ok(true, "A UTF8ish stylesheet was correctly loaded when integrity matched");
+    }
+    function bad_correctUTF8ishHashBlocked() {
+      ok(false, "We should load UTF8ish stylesheets with hashes that match!");
+    }
+  </script>
+
+  <!-- valid sha256 hash. should trigger onload -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style1.css"
+        integrity="sha256-qs8lnkunWoVldk5d5E+652yth4VTSHohlBKQvvgGwa8="
+        onerror="bad_correctHashBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctHashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- empty metadata. should trigger onload -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style2.css"
+        integrity=""
+        onerror="bad_emptyIntegrityBlocked()"
+        onload="good_emptyIntegrityLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- invalid sha256 hash. should trigger onerror -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style3.css"
+        integrity="sha256-bogus"
+        onerror="good_incorrectHashBlocked()"
+        onload="bad_incorrectHashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid sha384 hash of a utf8 file. should trigger onload -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style4.css"
+        integrity="sha384-13rt+j7xMDLhohLukb7AZx8lDGS3hkahp0IoeuyvxSNVPyc1QQmTDcwXGhQZjoMH"
+        onerror="bad_correctUTF8HashBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctUTF8HashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid sha384 hash of a utf8 file with a BOM. should trigger onload -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style5.css"
+        integrity="sha384-udAqVKPIHf/OD1isAYKrgzsog/3Q6lSEL2nKhtLSTmHryiae0+y6x1akeTzEF446"
+        onerror="bad_correctUTF8BOMHashBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctUTF8BOMHashLoaded()">
+
+  <!-- valid sha384 hash of a utf8 file with the wrong charset. should trigger onload -->
+  <link rel="stylesheet" href="style6.css"
+        integrity="sha384-Xli4ROFoVGCiRgXyl7y8jv5Vm2yuqj+8tkNL3cUI7AHaCocna75JLs5xID437W6C"
+        onerror="bad_correctUTF8ishHashBlocked()"
+        onload="good_correctUTF8ishHashLoaded()">
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<!-- valid sha256 for a blob: URL -->
+<script>
+   var blob = new Blob(['.blue-text{color:blue}'],
+                       {type: 'text/css'});
+   var link = document.createElement('link');
+   link.rel = 'stylesheet';
+   link.href = window.URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+   link.setAttribute('integrity', 'sha256-/F+EMVnTWYJOAzN5n7/21idiydu6nRi33LZOISZtwOM=');
+   link.onerror = bad_validBlobBlocked;
+   link.onload = good_validBlobLoaded;
+   document.body.appendChild(link);
+</script>
+
+<!-- invalid sha256 for a blob: URL -->
+<script>
+   var blob = new Blob(['.black-text{color:blue}'],
+                       {type: 'text/css'});
+   var link = document.createElement('link');
+   link.rel = 'stylesheet';
+   link.href = window.URL.createObjectURL(blob);
+   link.setAttribute('integrity', 'sha256-/F+EMVnTWYJOAzN5n7/21idiydu6nRi33LZOISZtwOM=');
+   link.onerror = good_invalidBlobBlocked;
+   link.onload = bad_invalidBlobLoaded;
+   document.body.appendChild(link);
+</script>
+
+<p><span id="red-text">This should be red </span>,
+  <span id="purple-text">this should be purple</span>,
+  <span id="brown-text">this should be brown</span>,
+  <span id="orange-text">this should be orange</span>, and
+  <span class="blue-text" id="blue-text-element">this should be blue.</span>
+  However, <span id="black-text">this should stay black</span> and
+  <span class="black-text" id="black-text-2">this should also stay black.</span>
+</p>
+
+<p id="display"></p>
+<div id="content" style="display: none">
+</div>
+<pre id="test">
+</pre>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/mochitest.ini b/dom/security/test/sri/mochitest.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d6065e5aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/mochitest.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+support-files =
+  file_bug_1271796.css
+  iframe_script_crossdomain.html
+  iframe_script_sameorigin.html
+  iframe_style_crossdomain.html
+  iframe_style_sameorigin.html
+  script_crossdomain1.js
+  script_crossdomain1.js^headers^
+  script_crossdomain2.js
+  script_crossdomain3.js
+  script_crossdomain3.js^headers^
+  script_crossdomain4.js
+  script_crossdomain4.js^headers^
+  script_crossdomain5.js
+  script_crossdomain5.js^headers^
+  script.js
+  script.js^headers^
+  script_301.js
+  script_301.js^headers^
+  script_302.js
+  script_302.js^headers^
+  script_401.js
+  script_401.js^headers^
+  style1.css
+  style1.css^headers^
+  style2.css
+  style3.css
+  style4.css
+  style4.css^headers^
+  style5.css
+  style6.css
+  style6.css^headers^
+  style_301.css
+  style_301.css^headers^
+  style_importing.css
+  style_imported.css
+
+[test_script_sameorigin.html]
+[test_script_crossdomain.html]
+[test_style_crossdomain.html]
+[test_style_sameorigin.html]
+[test_bug_1271796.html]
+[test_bug_1364262.html]
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fd8f96b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+var load=true;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b77232d81d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Cache-control: public
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a95de77cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+var load=false;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..efbfb73346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_301.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+HTTP 301 Moved Permanently
+Location: http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9a95de77cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+var load=false;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..05a545a6a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_302.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+HTTP 302 Found
+Location: /tests/dom/security/test/sri/script.js
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8fd8f96b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+var load=true;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..889fbe081a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_401.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+HTTP 401 Authorization Required
+Cache-control: public
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1f17a6db24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/*
+ * this file should be loaded, because it has CORS enabled.
+*/
+window.hasCORSLoaded = true;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a6a85d894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain1.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://mochi.test:8888
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain2.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain2.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4b0208ab34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain2.js
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+/*
+ * this file should not be loaded, because it does not have CORS
+ * enabled.
+ */
+window.hasNonCORSLoaded = true;
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eed05d59b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+// This script intentionally left blank
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a6a85d894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain3.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://mochi.test:8888
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eed05d59b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+// This script intentionally left blank
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a6a85d894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain4.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://mochi.test:8888
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eed05d59b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+// This script intentionally left blank
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cb762eff80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/script_crossdomain5.js^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7ab9ecffa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#red-text {
+  color: red;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3a6a85d894
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Access-Control-Allow-Origin: http://mochi.test:8888
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style2.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style2.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9eece75e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style2.css
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+; A valid but somewhat uninteresting stylesheet
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style3.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style3.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b64fa3b749
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style3.css
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#black-text {
+  color: green;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eab83656ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/* François was here. */
+#purple-text {
+  color: purple;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e13897f157
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style4.css^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Type: text/css; charset=utf-8
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style5.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style5.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5d59134cc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style5.css
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/* François was here. */
+#orange-text {
+  color: orange;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..569557694d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/* François was here. */
+#brown-text {
+  color: brown;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d866aa5224
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style6.css^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+Content-Type: text/css; charset=iso-8859-8
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c7ab9ecffa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+#red-text {
+  color: red;
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css^headers^ b/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css^headers^
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c5b78ee04b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style_301.css^headers^
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+HTTP 301 Moved Permanently
+Location: http://example.com/tests/dom/security/test/sri/style1.css
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style_imported.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style_imported.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4469e8d78d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style_imported.css
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#text-for-import-test {
+  color: red;
+}
+#text-for-import-test::before {
+  content: 'Test failed';
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/style_importing.css b/dom/security/test/sri/style_importing.css
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..985dd34678
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/style_importing.css
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+/* neither of them should load. trying multiple cases*/
+@import url("style_imported.css");
+@import 'style_imported.css';
+#text-for-import-test { color: blue; }
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1271796.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1271796.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9c74cc64ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1271796.html
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+
+      function good_shouldLoadEncodingProblem() {
+        ok(true, "Problematically encoded file correctly loaded.")
+      };
+      function bad_shouldntEncounterBug1271796() {
+        ok(false, "Problematically encoded should load!")
+      }
+      window.onload = function() {
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      }
+    </script>
+   <link rel="stylesheet" href="file_bug_1271796.css" crossorigin="anonymous"
+         integrity="sha384-8Xl0mTN4S2QZ5xeliG1sd4Ar9o1xMw6JoJy9RNjyHGQDha7GiLxo8l1llwLVgTNG"
+         onload="good_shouldLoadEncodingProblem();"
+         onerror="bad_shouldntEncounterBug1271796();">
+</head>
+<body>
+<a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1271796">Bug 1271796</a><br>
+<p>This text is prepended by emdash if css has loaded</p>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1364262.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1364262.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..cf77c7dac1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_bug_1364262.html
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="/tests/SimpleTest/SimpleTest.js"></script>
+  <link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="/tests/SimpleTest/test.css"/>
+  <script type="application/javascript">
+      SimpleTest.waitForExplicitFinish();
+      SimpleTest.setExpected(["pass", 1]);
+
+      function good_correctlyBlockedStylesheet() {
+        ok(true, "Non-base64 hash blocked the load.")
+      };
+      function bad_shouldNotLoadStylesheet() {
+        ok(false, "Non-base64 hashes should not load!")
+      }
+      window.onload = function() {
+        SimpleTest.finish();
+      }
+
+      let link = document.createElement('link');
+      document.head.appendChild(link);
+      link.setAttribute('rel', 'stylesheet');
+      link.onerror = good_correctlyBlockedStylesheet;
+      link.onload = bad_shouldNotLoadStylesheet;
+      link.integrity = 'sha512-\uD89D\uDF05\uD89D\uDEE6';
+      link.setAttribute('href', 'data:text/css;small[contenteditable^="false"], summary { }');
+    </script>
+</head>
+<body>
+    <a href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1364262">Bug 1364262</a>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_crossdomain.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_crossdomain.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2f9b27bfa4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_crossdomain.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Cross-domain script tests for Bug 992096</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=992096">Mozilla Bug 992096</a>
+<div>
+  <iframe src="iframe_script_crossdomain.html" height="100%" width="90%" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_sameorigin.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_sameorigin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d975132a2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_script_sameorigin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Same-origin script tests for Bug 992096</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=992096">Mozilla Bug 992096</a>
+<div>
+  <iframe src="iframe_script_sameorigin.html" height="100%" width="90%" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_crossdomain.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_crossdomain.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..eb4dac4cc4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_crossdomain.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Cross-domain stylesheet tests for Bug 1196740</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1196740">Mozilla Bug 1196740</a>
+<div>
+  <iframe src="iframe_style_crossdomain.html" height="100%" width="90%" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_sameorigin.html b/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_sameorigin.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9b85eaf71b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/sri/test_style_sameorigin.html
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+<!DOCTYPE HTML>
+<!-- Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+     http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ -->
+<html>
+<head>
+  <meta charset="utf-8">
+  <title>Same-origin stylesheet tests for Bug 992096</title>
+</head>
+<body>
+<a target="_blank" href="https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=992096">Mozilla Bug 992096</a>
+<div>
+  <iframe src="iframe_style_sameorigin.html" height="100%" width="90%" frameborder="0"></iframe>
+</div>
+</body>
+</html>
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_reports.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_reports.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3df7a001d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_reports.js
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+const { HttpServer } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://testing-common/httpd.js");
+
+var httpServer = new HttpServer();
+httpServer.start(-1);
+var testsToFinish = 0;
+
+var principal;
+
+const REPORT_SERVER_PORT = httpServer.identity.primaryPort;
+const REPORT_SERVER_URI = "http://localhost";
+
+/**
+ * Construct a callback that listens to a report submission and either passes
+ * or fails a test based on what it gets.
+ */
+function makeReportHandler(testpath, message, expectedJSON) {
+  return function(request, response) {
+    // we only like "POST" submissions for reports!
+    if (request.method !== "POST") {
+      do_throw("violation report should be a POST request");
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // check content-type of report is "application/csp-report"
+    var contentType = request.hasHeader("Content-Type")
+      ? request.getHeader("Content-Type")
+      : undefined;
+    if (contentType !== "application/csp-report") {
+      do_throw(
+        "violation report should have the 'application/csp-report' " +
+          "content-type, when in fact it is " +
+          contentType.toString()
+      );
+    }
+
+    // obtain violation report
+    var reportObj = JSON.parse(
+      NetUtil.readInputStreamToString(
+        request.bodyInputStream,
+        request.bodyInputStream.available()
+      )
+    );
+
+    // dump("GOT REPORT:\n" + JSON.stringify(reportObj) + "\n");
+    // dump("TESTPATH:    " + testpath + "\n");
+    // dump("EXPECTED:  \n" + JSON.stringify(expectedJSON) + "\n\n");
+
+    for (var i in expectedJSON) {
+      Assert.equal(expectedJSON[i], reportObj["csp-report"][i]);
+    }
+
+    testsToFinish--;
+    httpServer.registerPathHandler(testpath, null);
+    if (testsToFinish < 1) {
+      httpServer.stop(do_test_finished);
+    } else {
+      do_test_finished();
+    }
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Everything created by this assumes it will cause a report.  If you want to
+ * add a test here that will *not* cause a report to go out, you're gonna have
+ * to make sure the test cleans up after itself.
+ */
+function makeTest(id, expectedJSON, useReportOnlyPolicy, callback) {
+  testsToFinish++;
+  do_test_pending();
+
+  // set up a new CSP instance for each test.
+  var csp = Cc["@mozilla.org/cspcontext;1"].createInstance(
+    Ci.nsIContentSecurityPolicy
+  );
+  var policy =
+    "default-src 'none' 'report-sample'; " +
+    "report-uri " +
+    REPORT_SERVER_URI +
+    ":" +
+    REPORT_SERVER_PORT +
+    "/test" +
+    id;
+  var selfuri = NetUtil.newURI(
+    REPORT_SERVER_URI + ":" + REPORT_SERVER_PORT + "/foo/self"
+  );
+
+  dump("Created test " + id + " : " + policy + "\n\n");
+
+  principal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipal(
+    selfuri,
+    {}
+  );
+  csp.setRequestContextWithPrincipal(principal, selfuri, "", 0);
+
+  // Load up the policy
+  // set as report-only if that's the case
+  csp.appendPolicy(policy, useReportOnlyPolicy, false);
+
+  // prime the report server
+  var handler = makeReportHandler("/test" + id, "Test " + id, expectedJSON);
+  httpServer.registerPathHandler("/test" + id, handler);
+
+  // trigger the violation
+  callback(csp);
+}
+
+function run_test() {
+  do_get_profile();
+
+  var selfuri = NetUtil.newURI(
+    REPORT_SERVER_URI + ":" + REPORT_SERVER_PORT + "/foo/self"
+  );
+
+  // test that inline script violations cause a report.
+  makeTest(
+    0,
+    {
+      "blocked-uri": "inline",
+      "effective-directive": "script-src-elem",
+      disposition: "enforce",
+    },
+    false,
+    function(csp) {
+      let inlineOK = true;
+      inlineOK = csp.getAllowsInline(
+        Ci.nsIContentSecurityPolicy.SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE,
+        false, // aHasUnsafeHash
+        "", // aNonce
+        false, // aParserCreated
+        null, // aTriggeringElement
+        null, // nsICSPEventListener
+        "", // aContentOfPseudoScript
+        0, // aLineNumber
+        0
+      ); // aColumnNumber
+
+      // this is not a report only policy, so it better block inline scripts
+      Assert.ok(!inlineOK);
+    }
+  );
+
+  // test that eval violations cause a report.
+  makeTest(
+    1,
+    {
+      "blocked-uri": "eval",
+      // JSON script-sample is UTF8 encoded
+      "script-sample": "\xc2\xa3\xc2\xa5\xc2\xb5\xe5\x8c\x97\xf0\xa0\x9d\xb9",
+      "line-number": 1,
+      "column-number": 2,
+    },
+    false,
+    function(csp) {
+      let evalOK = true,
+        oReportViolation = { value: false };
+      evalOK = csp.getAllowsEval(oReportViolation);
+
+      // this is not a report only policy, so it better block eval
+      Assert.ok(!evalOK);
+      // ... and cause reports to go out
+      Assert.ok(oReportViolation.value);
+
+      if (oReportViolation.value) {
+        // force the logging, since the getter doesn't.
+        csp.logViolationDetails(
+          Ci.nsIContentSecurityPolicy.VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
+          null, // aTriggeringElement
+          null, // nsICSPEventListener
+          selfuri.asciiSpec,
+          // sending UTF-16 script sample to make sure
+          // csp report in JSON is not cut-off, please
+          // note that JSON is UTF8 encoded.
+          "\u00a3\u00a5\u00b5\u5317\ud841\udf79",
+          1, // line number
+          2
+        ); // column number
+      }
+    }
+  );
+
+  makeTest(2, { "blocked-uri": "http://blocked.test/foo.js" }, false, function(
+    csp
+  ) {
+    // shouldLoad creates and sends out the report here.
+    csp.shouldLoad(
+      Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SCRIPT,
+      null, // nsICSPEventListener
+      NetUtil.newURI("http://blocked.test/foo.js"),
+      null,
+      true,
+      null,
+      false
+    );
+  });
+
+  // test that inline script violations cause a report in report-only policy
+  makeTest(
+    3,
+    { "blocked-uri": "inline", disposition: "report" },
+    true,
+    function(csp) {
+      let inlineOK = true;
+      inlineOK = csp.getAllowsInline(
+        Ci.nsIContentSecurityPolicy.SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE,
+        false, // aHasUnsafeHash
+        "", // aNonce
+        false, // aParserCreated
+        null, // aTriggeringElement
+        null, // nsICSPEventListener
+        "", // aContentOfPseudoScript
+        0, // aLineNumber
+        0
+      ); // aColumnNumber
+
+      // this is a report only policy, so it better allow inline scripts
+      Assert.ok(inlineOK);
+    }
+  );
+
+  // test that eval violations cause a report in report-only policy
+  makeTest(4, { "blocked-uri": "eval" }, true, function(csp) {
+    let evalOK = true,
+      oReportViolation = { value: false };
+    evalOK = csp.getAllowsEval(oReportViolation);
+
+    // this is a report only policy, so it better allow eval
+    Assert.ok(evalOK);
+    // ... but still cause reports to go out
+    Assert.ok(oReportViolation.value);
+
+    if (oReportViolation.value) {
+      // force the logging, since the getter doesn't.
+      csp.logViolationDetails(
+        Ci.nsIContentSecurityPolicy.VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL,
+        null, // aTriggeringElement
+        null, // nsICSPEventListener
+        selfuri.asciiSpec,
+        "script sample",
+        4, // line number
+        5
+      ); // column number
+    }
+  });
+
+  // test that only the uri's scheme is reported for globally unique identifiers
+  makeTest(5, { "blocked-uri": "data" }, false, function(csp) {
+    var base64data =
+      "iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAUAAAAFCAYAAACNbyblAAAAHElEQVQI12" +
+      "P4//8/w38GIAXDIBKE0DHxgljNBAAO9TXL0Y4OHwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==";
+    // shouldLoad creates and sends out the report here.
+    csp.shouldLoad(
+      Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+      null, // nsICSPEventListener
+      NetUtil.newURI("data:image/png;base64," + base64data),
+      null,
+      true,
+      null,
+      false
+    );
+  });
+
+  // test that only the uri's scheme is reported for globally unique identifiers
+  makeTest(6, { "blocked-uri": "intent" }, false, function(csp) {
+    // shouldLoad creates and sends out the report here.
+    csp.shouldLoad(
+      Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT,
+      null, // nsICSPEventListener
+      NetUtil.newURI("intent://mymaps.com/maps?um=1&ie=UTF-8&fb=1&sll"),
+      null,
+      true,
+      null,
+      false
+    );
+  });
+
+  // test fragment removal
+  var selfSpec =
+    REPORT_SERVER_URI + ":" + REPORT_SERVER_PORT + "/foo/self/foo.js";
+  makeTest(7, { "blocked-uri": selfSpec }, false, function(csp) {
+    // shouldLoad creates and sends out the report here.
+    csp.shouldLoad(
+      Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SCRIPT,
+      null, // nsICSPEventListener
+      NetUtil.newURI(selfSpec + "#bar"),
+      null,
+      true,
+      null,
+      false
+    );
+  });
+
+  // test scheme of ftp:
+  makeTest(
+    8,
+    { "blocked-uri": "ftp://blocked.test/profile.png" },
+    false,
+    function(csp) {
+      // shouldLoad creates and sends out the report here.
+      csp.shouldLoad(
+        Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SCRIPT,
+        null, // nsICSPEventListener
+        NetUtil.newURI("ftp://blocked.test/profile.png"),
+        null,
+        true,
+        null,
+        false
+      );
+    }
+  );
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_upgrade_insecure_request_header.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_upgrade_insecure_request_header.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..287dc179c5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_csp_upgrade_insecure_request_header.js
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+const { HttpServer } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://testing-common/httpd.js");
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+const { XPCOMUtils } = ChromeUtils.importESModule(
+  "resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.sys.mjs"
+);
+
+// Since this test creates a TYPE_DOCUMENT channel via javascript, it will
+// end up using the wrong LoadInfo constructor. Setting this pref will disable
+// the ContentPolicyType assertion in the constructor.
+Services.prefs.setBoolPref("network.loadinfo.skip_type_assertion", true);
+
+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyGetter(this, "URL", function() {
+  return "http://localhost:" + httpserver.identity.primaryPort;
+});
+
+var httpserver = null;
+var channel = null;
+var curTest = null;
+var testpath = "/footpath";
+
+var tests = [
+  {
+    description: "should not set request header for TYPE_OTHER",
+    expectingHeader: false,
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_OTHER,
+  },
+  {
+    description: "should set request header for TYPE_DOCUMENT",
+    expectingHeader: true,
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+  },
+  {
+    description: "should set request header for TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT",
+    expectingHeader: true,
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT,
+  },
+  {
+    description: "should not set request header for TYPE_IMAGE",
+    expectingHeader: false,
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+  },
+];
+
+function ChannelListener() {}
+
+ChannelListener.prototype = {
+  onStartRequest(request) {},
+  onDataAvailable(request, stream, offset, count) {
+    do_throw("Should not get any data!");
+  },
+  onStopRequest(request, status) {
+    var upgrade_insecure_header = false;
+    try {
+      if (request.getRequestHeader("Upgrade-Insecure-Requests")) {
+        upgrade_insecure_header = true;
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      // exception is thrown if header is not available on the request
+    }
+    // debug
+    // dump("executing test: " + curTest.description);
+    Assert.equal(upgrade_insecure_header, curTest.expectingHeader);
+    run_next_test();
+  },
+};
+
+function setupChannel(aContentType) {
+  var chan = NetUtil.newChannel({
+    uri: URL + testpath,
+    loadUsingSystemPrincipal: true,
+    contentPolicyType: aContentType,
+  });
+  chan.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  chan.requestMethod = "GET";
+  return chan;
+}
+
+function serverHandler(metadata, response) {
+  // no need to perform anything here
+}
+
+function run_next_test() {
+  curTest = tests.shift();
+  if (!curTest) {
+    httpserver.stop(do_test_finished);
+    return;
+  }
+  channel = setupChannel(curTest.contentType);
+  channel.asyncOpen(new ChannelListener());
+}
+
+function run_test() {
+  do_get_profile();
+
+  // set up the test environment
+  httpserver = new HttpServer();
+  httpserver.registerPathHandler(testpath, serverHandler);
+  httpserver.start(-1);
+
+  run_next_test();
+  do_test_pending();
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_deserialization_format_before_100.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_deserialization_format_before_100.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a21ae4838a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_deserialization_format_before_100.js
@@ -0,0 +1,244 @@
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+"use strict";
+
+const ReferrerInfo = Components.Constructor(
+  "@mozilla.org/referrer-info;1",
+  "nsIReferrerInfo",
+  "init"
+);
+
+async function runTest(setupFunc, expected) {
+  let objectOutStream = Cc["@mozilla.org/binaryoutputstream;1"].createInstance(
+    Ci.nsIObjectOutputStream
+  );
+  let pipe = Cc["@mozilla.org/pipe;1"].createInstance(Ci.nsIPipe);
+  pipe.init(
+    false /* non-blocking input */,
+    false /* non-blocking output */,
+    0 /* segment size */,
+    0 /* max segments */
+  );
+  objectOutStream.setOutputStream(pipe.outputStream);
+
+  setupFunc(objectOutStream);
+
+  let objectInStream = Cc["@mozilla.org/binaryinputstream;1"].createInstance(
+    Ci.nsIObjectInputStream
+  );
+  objectInStream.setInputStream(pipe.inputStream);
+
+  let referrerInfo = new ReferrerInfo(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.EMPTY);
+  try {
+    referrerInfo.read(objectInStream);
+  } catch (e) {
+    Assert.ok(false, "Shouldn't fail when deserializing.");
+    return;
+  }
+
+  Assert.ok(true, "Successfully deserialize the referrerInfo.");
+
+  let { referrerPolicy, sendReferrer, computedReferrerSpec } = expected;
+  Assert.equal(
+    referrerInfo.referrerPolicy,
+    referrerPolicy,
+    "The referrerInfo has the expected referrer policy."
+  );
+
+  Assert.equal(
+    referrerInfo.sendReferrer,
+    sendReferrer,
+    "The referrerInfo has the expected sendReferrer value."
+  );
+
+  if (computedReferrerSpec) {
+    Assert.equal(
+      referrerInfo.computedReferrerSpec,
+      computedReferrerSpec,
+      "The referrerInfo has the expected computedReferrerSpec value."
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+// Test deserializing referrer info with the old format.
+add_task(async function test_deserializeOldReferrerInfo() {
+  // Test with a regular old format.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the old format.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // isComputed
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: false,
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with an old format with `sendReferrer` is true.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the old format.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // isComputed
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: true,
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with an old format with a computed Referrer.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the old format with a string.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // isComputed
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // computedReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: false,
+      computedReferrerSpec: "https://example.com/",
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with an old format with a computed Referrer and sendReferrer as true.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the old format with a string.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // isComputed
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // computedReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: true,
+      computedReferrerSpec: "https://example.com/",
+    }
+  );
+});
+
+// Test deserializing referrer info with the current format.
+add_task(async function test_deserializeReferrerInfo() {
+  // Test with a current format.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the new format.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // original policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // isComputed
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: false,
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with a current format with sendReferrer as true.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the new format.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // original policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // isComputed
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: true,
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with a current format with a computedReferrer.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the new format with a string.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // original policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // isComputed
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // computedReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: false,
+      computedReferrerSpec: "https://example.com/",
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with a current format with a computedReferrer and sendReferrer as true.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the new format with a string.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // policy
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN); // original policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // isComputed
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // computedReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.STRICT_ORIGIN_WHEN_CROSS_ORIGIN,
+      sendReferrer: true,
+      computedReferrerSpec: "https://example.com/",
+    }
+  );
+
+  // Test with a current format that the tailing bytes are all zero.
+  await runTest(
+    stream => {
+      // Write to the output stream with the new format with a string.
+      stream.writeBoolean(true); // nonNull
+      stream.writeStringZ("https://example.com/"); // spec
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.EMPTY); // policy
+      stream.write32(Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.EMPTY); // original policy
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // sendReferrer
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // isComputed
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // initialized
+      stream.writeBoolean(false); // overridePolicyByDefault
+    },
+    {
+      referrerPolicy: Ci.nsIReferrerInfo.EMPTY,
+      sendReferrer: false,
+    }
+  );
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_default_port.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_default_port.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8960fd74b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_default_port.js
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+const { HttpServer } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://testing-common/httpd.js");
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+const TEST_PATH = "/https_only_https_first_port";
+var httpserver = null;
+var channel = null;
+var curTest = null;
+
+const TESTS = [
+  {
+    description: "Test 1 - Default Port (scheme: http, port: default)",
+    url: "http://test1.example.com",
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+    expectedPort: -1, // -1 == default
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 2 - Explicit Default Port (scheme: http, port: 80)",
+    url: "http://test1.example.com:80",
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+    expectedPort: -1, // -1 == default
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 3 - Explicit Custom Port (scheme: http, port: 8888)",
+    url: "http://test1.example.com:8888",
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+    expectedPort: 8888,
+  },
+  {
+    description:
+      "Test 4 - Explicit Default Port for https (scheme: https, port: 443)",
+    url: "https://test1.example.com:443",
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+    expectedPort: -1, // -1 == default
+  },
+];
+
+function ChannelListener() {}
+
+ChannelListener.prototype = {
+  onStartRequest(request) {
+    // dummy implementation
+  },
+  onDataAvailable(request, stream, offset, count) {
+    do_throw("Should not get any data!");
+  },
+  onStopRequest(request, status) {
+    var chan = request.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIChannel);
+    let requestURL = chan.URI;
+    Assert.equal(
+      requestURL.scheme,
+      curTest.expectedScheme,
+      curTest.description
+    );
+    Assert.equal(requestURL.port, curTest.expectedPort, curTest.description);
+    Assert.equal(requestURL.host, "test1.example.com", curTest.description);
+    run_next_test();
+  },
+};
+
+function setUpPrefs() {
+  // set up the required prefs
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.security.https_first", true);
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.security.https_only_mode", false);
+}
+
+function setUpChannel() {
+  var chan = NetUtil.newChannel({
+    uri: curTest.url + TEST_PATH,
+    loadingPrincipal: Services.scriptSecurityManager.getSystemPrincipal(),
+    contentPolicyType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    securityFlags: Ci.nsILoadInfo.SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+  });
+  chan.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  chan.requestMethod = "GET";
+  return chan;
+}
+
+function serverHandler(metadata, response) {
+  // dummy implementation
+}
+
+function run_next_test() {
+  curTest = TESTS.shift();
+  if (!curTest) {
+    httpserver.stop(do_test_finished);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  channel = setUpChannel();
+  channel.asyncOpen(new ChannelListener());
+}
+
+function run_test() {
+  do_get_profile();
+  do_test_pending();
+
+  // set up the test environment
+  httpserver = new HttpServer();
+  httpserver.registerPathHandler(TEST_PATH, serverHandler);
+  httpserver.start(-1);
+
+  // set up prefs
+  setUpPrefs();
+
+  // run the tests
+  run_next_test();
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_prefs.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_prefs.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0b2f0cd1dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_https_only_https_first_prefs.js
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+const { HttpServer } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://testing-common/httpd.js");
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+const { XPCOMUtils } = ChromeUtils.importESModule(
+  "resource://gre/modules/XPCOMUtils.sys.mjs"
+);
+
+XPCOMUtils.defineLazyGetter(this, "HTTP_TEST_URL", function() {
+  return "http://test1.example.com";
+});
+
+const TEST_PATH = "/https_only_https_first_path";
+var httpserver = null;
+var channel = null;
+var curTest = null;
+
+const TESTS = [
+  {
+    // Test 1: all prefs to false
+    description: "Test 1 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 1 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 1 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 1 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  // Test 2: https_only true
+  {
+    description: "Test 2 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 2 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 2 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 2 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  // Test 3: https_only_pbm true
+  {
+    description: "Test 3 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: true,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 3 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: true,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 3 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: true,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 3 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: true,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  // Test 4: https_first true
+  {
+    description: "Test 4 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 4 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 4 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 4 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  // Test 5: https_first_pbm true
+  {
+    description: "Test 5 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: true,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 5 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: true,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 5 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: true,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 5 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: false,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: false,
+    https_first_pbm: true,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "http",
+  },
+  // Test 6: https_only overrules https_first
+  {
+    description: "Test 6 - top-level",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 6 - top-level - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_DOCUMENT,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 6 - sub-resource",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: false,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+  {
+    description: "Test 6 - sub-resource - pbm",
+    contentType: Ci.nsIContentPolicy.TYPE_IMAGE,
+    https_only: true,
+    https_only_pbm: false,
+    https_first: true,
+    https_first_pbm: false,
+    pbm: true,
+    expectedScheme: "https",
+  },
+];
+
+function ChannelListener() {}
+
+ChannelListener.prototype = {
+  onStartRequest(request) {
+    // dummy implementation
+  },
+  onDataAvailable(request, stream, offset, count) {
+    do_throw("Should not get any data!");
+  },
+  onStopRequest(request, status) {
+    var chan = request.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIChannel);
+    let requestURL = chan.URI;
+    Assert.equal(
+      requestURL.scheme,
+      curTest.expectedScheme,
+      curTest.description
+    );
+    Assert.equal(requestURL.host, "test1.example.com", curTest.description);
+    Assert.equal(requestURL.filePath, TEST_PATH, curTest.description);
+    run_next_test();
+  },
+};
+
+function setUpPrefs() {
+  // set up the required prefs
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref(
+    "dom.security.https_only_mode",
+    curTest.https_only
+  );
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref(
+    "dom.security.https_only_mode_pbm",
+    curTest.https_only_pbm
+  );
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.security.https_first", curTest.https_first);
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref(
+    "dom.security.https_first_pbm",
+    curTest.https_first_pbm
+  );
+}
+
+function setUpChannel() {
+  // 1) Set up Principal using OA in case of Private Browsing
+  let attr = {};
+  if (curTest.pbm) {
+    attr.privateBrowsingId = 1;
+  }
+  let uri = Services.io.newURI("http://test1.example.com");
+  let principal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipal(
+    uri,
+    attr
+  );
+
+  // 2) Set up Channel
+  var chan = NetUtil.newChannel({
+    uri: HTTP_TEST_URL + TEST_PATH,
+    loadingPrincipal: principal,
+    contentPolicyType: curTest.contentType,
+    securityFlags: Ci.nsILoadInfo.SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+  });
+  chan.QueryInterface(Ci.nsIHttpChannel);
+  chan.requestMethod = "GET";
+  return chan;
+}
+
+function serverHandler(metadata, response) {
+  // dummy implementation
+}
+
+function run_next_test() {
+  curTest = TESTS.shift();
+  if (!curTest) {
+    httpserver.stop(do_test_finished);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  setUpPrefs();
+
+  channel = setUpChannel();
+  channel.asyncOpen(new ChannelListener());
+}
+
+function run_test() {
+  do_get_profile();
+
+  // set up the test environment
+  httpserver = new HttpServer();
+  httpserver.registerPathHandler(TEST_PATH, serverHandler);
+  httpserver.start(-1);
+
+  run_next_test();
+  do_test_pending();
+}
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b218f1438f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* Any copyright is dedicated to the Public Domain.
+   http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ */
+
+/*
+ * Tests the "Is origin potentially trustworthy?" logic from
+ * <https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-secure-contexts/#is-origin-trustworthy>.
+ */
+
+const { NetUtil } = ChromeUtils.import("resource://gre/modules/NetUtil.jsm");
+
+Services.prefs.setCharPref(
+  "dom.securecontext.allowlist",
+  "example.net,example.org"
+);
+
+Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.allowlist_onions", false);
+
+add_task(async function test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy() {
+  for (let [uriSpec, expectedResult] of [
+    ["http://example.com/", false],
+    ["https://example.com/", true],
+    ["http://localhost/", true],
+    ["http://localhost.localhost/", true],
+    ["http://127.0.0.1/", true],
+    ["file:///", true],
+    ["resource:///", true],
+    ["moz-extension://", true],
+    ["wss://example.com/", true],
+    ["about:config", false],
+    ["http://example.net/", true],
+    ["ws://example.org/", true],
+    ["chrome://example.net/content/messenger.xul", false],
+    ["http://1234567890abcdef.onion/", false],
+  ]) {
+    let uri = NetUtil.newURI(uriSpec);
+    let principal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipal(
+      uri,
+      {}
+    );
+    Assert.equal(principal.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy, expectedResult);
+  }
+  // And now let's test whether .onion sites are properly treated when
+  // allowlisted, see bug 1382359.
+  Services.prefs.setBoolPref("dom.securecontext.allowlist_onions", true);
+  let uri = NetUtil.newURI("http://1234567890abcdef.onion/");
+  let principal = Services.scriptSecurityManager.createContentPrincipal(
+    uri,
+    {}
+  );
+  Assert.equal(principal.isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy, true);
+});
diff --git a/dom/security/test/unit/xpcshell.ini b/dom/security/test/unit/xpcshell.ini
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b5da5879e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dom/security/test/unit/xpcshell.ini
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+[DEFAULT]
+head =
+
+[test_csp_reports.js]
+[test_isOriginPotentiallyTrustworthy.js]
+[test_deserialization_format_before_100.js]
+[test_csp_upgrade_insecure_request_header.js]
+[test_https_only_https_first_prefs.js]
+skip-if = debug # assertions in loadinfo; loadinfo is just not xpcshell test friendly
+[test_https_only_https_first_default_port.js]
+skip-if = debug # assertions in loadinfo; loadinfo is just not xpcshell test friendly