Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1206 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e299810cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1206 @@
+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*-
+ *
+ * This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsNSSCallbacks.h"
+
+#include "NSSSocketControl.h"
+#include "PSMRunnable.h"
+#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
+#include "SharedCertVerifier.h"
+#include "SharedSSLState.h"
+#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h"
+#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
+#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
+#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
+#include "mozilla/RefPtr.h"
+#include "mozilla/ScopeExit.h"
+#include "mozilla/Span.h"
+#include "mozilla/SpinEventLoopUntil.h"
+#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
+#include "mozilla/Unused.h"
+#include "mozilla/intl/Localization.h"
+#include "nsContentUtils.h"
+#include "nsIChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannel.h"
+#include "nsIHttpChannelInternal.h"
+#include "nsIPrompt.h"
+#include "nsIProtocolProxyService.h"
+#include "nsISupportsPriority.h"
+#include "nsIStreamLoader.h"
+#include "nsIUploadChannel.h"
+#include "nsIWebProgressListener.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertHelper.h"
+#include "nsNSSCertificate.h"
+#include "nsNSSComponent.h"
+#include "nsNSSHelper.h"
+#include "nsNSSIOLayer.h"
+#include "nsNetUtil.h"
+#include "nsProxyRelease.h"
+#include "nsStringStream.h"
+#include "mozpkix/pkixtypes.h"
+#include "ssl.h"
+#include "sslproto.h"
+#include "SSLTokensCache.h"
+
+#include "TrustOverrideUtils.h"
+#include "TrustOverride-SymantecData.inc"
+#include "TrustOverride-AppleGoogleDigiCertData.inc"
+
+using namespace mozilla;
+using namespace mozilla::pkix;
+using namespace mozilla::psm;
+
+extern LazyLogModule gPIPNSSLog;
+
+static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
+                                  const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo);
+
+namespace {
+
+// Bits in bit mask for SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING telemetry probe
+// These bits are numbered so that the least subtle issues have higher values.
+// This should make it easier for us to interpret the results.
+const uint32_t POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE = 4;
+const uint32_t POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE = 2;
+const uint32_t KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED = 1;
+
+}  // namespace
+
+class OCSPRequest final : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver, public nsIRunnable {
+ public:
+  OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
+              const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+              const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
+              size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout);
+
+  NS_DECL_THREADSAFE_ISUPPORTS
+  NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLOADEROBSERVER
+  NS_DECL_NSIRUNNABLE
+
+  nsresult DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
+  nsresult GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response);
+
+ private:
+  ~OCSPRequest() = default;
+
+  static void OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure);
+  nsresult NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& proofOfLock);
+
+  // mMonitor provides the memory barrier protecting these member variables.
+  // What happens is the originating thread creates an OCSPRequest object with
+  // the information necessary to perform an OCSP request. It sends the object
+  // to the main thread and waits on the monitor for the operation to complete.
+  // On the main thread, a channel is set up to perform the request. This gets
+  // dispatched to necko. At the same time, a timeout timer is initialized. If
+  // the necko request completes, the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone
+  // is set to true, and the monitor is notified. The original thread then wakes
+  // up and continues with the results that have been filled out. If the request
+  // times out, again the response data is filled out, mNotifiedDone is set to
+  // true, and the monitor is notified. The first of these two events wins. That
+  // is, if the timeout timer fires but the request completes shortly after, the
+  // caller will see the request as having timed out.
+  // When the request completes (i.e. OnStreamComplete runs), the timer will be
+  // cancelled. This is how we know the closure in OnTimeout is valid. If the
+  // timer fires before OnStreamComplete runs, it should be safe to not cancel
+  // the request because necko has a strong reference to it.
+  Monitor mMonitor MOZ_UNANNOTATED;
+  bool mNotifiedDone;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIStreamLoader> mLoader;
+  const nsCString mAIALocation;
+  const OriginAttributes mOriginAttributes;
+  const mozilla::Span<const char> mPOSTData;
+  const TimeDuration mTimeout;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer;
+  TimeStamp mStartTime;
+  nsresult mResponseResult;
+  Vector<uint8_t> mResponseBytes;
+};
+
+NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(OCSPRequest, nsIStreamLoaderObserver, nsIRunnable)
+
+OCSPRequest::OCSPRequest(const nsACString& aiaLocation,
+                         const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+                         const uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH],
+                         size_t ocspRequestLength, TimeDuration timeout)
+    : mMonitor("OCSPRequest.mMonitor"),
+      mNotifiedDone(false),
+      mLoader(nullptr),
+      mAIALocation(aiaLocation),
+      mOriginAttributes(originAttributes),
+      mPOSTData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ocspRequest), ocspRequestLength),
+      mTimeout(timeout),
+      mTimeoutTimer(nullptr),
+      mStartTime(),
+      mResponseResult(NS_ERROR_FAILURE),
+      mResponseBytes() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(ocspRequestLength <= OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH);
+}
+
+nsresult OCSPRequest::DispatchToMainThreadAndWait() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
+  nsresult rv = NS_DispatchToMainThread(this);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return rv;
+  }
+  while (!mNotifiedDone) {
+    lock.Wait();
+  }
+
+  TimeStamp endTime = TimeStamp::Now();
+  // CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT:
+  // 0: request timed out
+  // 1: request succeeded
+  // 2: request failed
+  // 3: internal error
+  // If mStartTime was never set, we consider this an internal error.
+  // Otherwise, we managed to at least send the request.
+  if (mStartTime.IsNull()) {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 3);
+  } else if (mResponseResult == NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT) {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 0);
+    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
+        Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_CANCELED_TIME, mStartTime,
+        endTime);
+  } else if (NS_SUCCEEDED(mResponseResult)) {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 1);
+    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
+        Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_SUCCEEDED_TIME, mStartTime,
+        endTime);
+  } else {
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_RESULT, 2);
+    Telemetry::AccumulateTimeDelta(
+        Telemetry::CERT_VALIDATION_HTTP_REQUEST_FAILED_TIME, mStartTime,
+        endTime);
+  }
+  return rv;
+}
+
+nsresult OCSPRequest::GetResponse(/*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& response) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
+  if (!mNotifiedDone) {
+    return NS_ERROR_IN_PROGRESS;
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(mResponseResult)) {
+    return mResponseResult;
+  }
+  response.clear();
+  if (!response.append(mResponseBytes.begin(), mResponseBytes.length())) {
+    return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+  }
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE = "application/ocsp-request"_ns;
+static constexpr auto OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD = "POST"_ns;
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+OCSPRequest::Run() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetIOService();
+  if (!ios) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri;
+  nsresult rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(uri), mAIALocation);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
+  }
+  nsAutoCString scheme;
+  rv = uri->GetScheme(scheme);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  if (!scheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("http")) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI, lock);
+  }
+
+  // See bug 1219935.
+  // We should not send OCSP request if the PAC is still loading.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIProtocolProxyService> pps =
+      do_GetService(NS_PROTOCOLPROXYSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+
+  if (pps->GetIsPACLoading()) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel;
+  rv = ios->NewChannel(mAIALocation, nullptr, nullptr,
+                       nullptr,  // aLoadingNode
+                       nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(),
+                       nullptr,  // aTriggeringPrincipal
+                       nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL,
+                       nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, getter_AddRefs(channel));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+
+  // Security operations scheduled through normal HTTP channels are given
+  // high priority to accommodate real time OCSP transactions.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsISupportsPriority> priorityChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
+  if (priorityChannel) {
+    priorityChannel->AdjustPriority(nsISupportsPriority::PRIORITY_HIGHEST);
+  }
+
+  channel->SetLoadFlags(
+      nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS | nsIRequest::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
+      nsIRequest::INHIBIT_CACHING | nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_SERVICE_WORKER |
+      nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_URL_CLASSIFIER);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = channel->LoadInfo();
+
+  // Prevent HTTPS-Only Mode from upgrading the OCSP request.
+  uint32_t httpsOnlyStatus = loadInfo->GetHttpsOnlyStatus();
+  httpsOnlyStatus |= nsILoadInfo::HTTPS_ONLY_EXEMPT;
+  loadInfo->SetHttpsOnlyStatus(httpsOnlyStatus);
+
+  // allow deprecated HTTP request from SystemPrincipal
+  loadInfo->SetAllowDeprecatedSystemRequests(true);
+
+  // For OCSP requests, only the first party domain and private browsing id
+  // aspects of origin attributes are used. This means that:
+  // a) if first party isolation is enabled, OCSP requests will be isolated
+  // according to the first party domain of the original https request
+  // b) OCSP requests are shared across different containers as long as first
+  // party isolation is not enabled and none of the containers are in private
+  // browsing mode.
+  if (mOriginAttributes != OriginAttributes()) {
+    OriginAttributes attrs;
+    attrs.mFirstPartyDomain = mOriginAttributes.mFirstPartyDomain;
+    attrs.mPrivateBrowsingId = mOriginAttributes.mPrivateBrowsingId;
+
+    rv = loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs);
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+    }
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIInputStream> uploadStream;
+  rv = NS_NewByteInputStream(getter_AddRefs(uploadStream), mPOSTData,
+                             NS_ASSIGNMENT_COPY);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel> uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(channel));
+  if (!uploadChannel) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+  rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(uploadStream, OCSP_REQUEST_MIME_TYPE, -1);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  // Do not use SPDY or HTTP3 for internal security operations. It could result
+  // in the silent upgrade to ssl, which in turn could require an SSL
+  // operation to fulfill something like an OCSP fetch, which is an
+  // endless loop.
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannelInternal> internalChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel);
+  if (!internalChannel) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  rv = internalChannel->SetAllowSpdy(false);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  rv = internalChannel->SetAllowHttp3(false);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  rv = internalChannel->SetIsOCSP(true);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(channel);
+  if (!hchan) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+  rv = hchan->SetAllowSTS(false);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  rv = hchan->SetRequestMethod(OCSP_REQUEST_METHOD);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+
+  rv = NS_NewStreamLoader(getter_AddRefs(mLoader), this);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+
+  rv = NS_NewTimerWithFuncCallback(
+      getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer), OCSPRequest::OnTimeout, this,
+      mTimeout.ToMilliseconds(), nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT, "OCSPRequest::Run");
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  rv = hchan->AsyncOpen(this->mLoader);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now();
+  return NS_OK;
+}
+
+nsresult OCSPRequest::NotifyDone(nsresult rv, MonitorAutoLock& lock) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  if (mNotifiedDone) {
+    return mResponseResult;
+  }
+  mLoader = nullptr;
+  mResponseResult = rv;
+  if (mTimeoutTimer) {
+    Unused << mTimeoutTimer->Cancel();
+  }
+  mNotifiedDone = true;
+  lock.Notify();
+  return rv;
+}
+
+NS_IMETHODIMP
+OCSPRequest::OnStreamComplete(nsIStreamLoader* aLoader, nsISupports* aContext,
+                              nsresult aStatus, uint32_t responseLen,
+                              const uint8_t* responseBytes) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  MonitorAutoLock lock(mMonitor);
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIRequest> req;
+  nsresult rv = aLoader->GetRequest(getter_AddRefs(req));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+
+  if (NS_FAILED(aStatus)) {
+    return NotifyDone(aStatus, lock);
+  }
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> hchan = do_QueryInterface(req);
+  if (!hchan) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+
+  bool requestSucceeded;
+  rv = hchan->GetRequestSucceeded(&requestSucceeded);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  if (!requestSucceeded) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+
+  unsigned int rcode;
+  rv = hchan->GetResponseStatus(&rcode);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return NotifyDone(rv, lock);
+  }
+  if (rcode != 200) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_FAILURE, lock);
+  }
+
+  mResponseBytes.clear();
+  if (!mResponseBytes.append(responseBytes, responseLen)) {
+    return NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY, lock);
+  }
+  mResponseResult = aStatus;
+
+  return NotifyDone(NS_OK, lock);
+}
+
+void OCSPRequest::OnTimeout(nsITimer* timer, void* closure) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // We know the OCSPRequest is still alive because if the request had completed
+  // (i.e. OnStreamComplete ran), the timer would have been cancelled in
+  // NotifyDone.
+  OCSPRequest* self = static_cast<OCSPRequest*>(closure);
+  MonitorAutoLock lock(self->mMonitor);
+  self->mTimeoutTimer = nullptr;
+  self->NotifyDone(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT, lock);
+}
+
+mozilla::pkix::Result DoOCSPRequest(
+    const nsCString& aiaLocation, const OriginAttributes& originAttributes,
+    uint8_t (&ocspRequest)[OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH], size_t ocspRequestLength,
+    TimeDuration timeout, /*out*/ Vector<uint8_t>& result) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_UNKNOWN_CERT;
+  }
+
+  if (ocspRequestLength > OCSP_REQUEST_MAX_LENGTH) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+
+  result.clear();
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("DoOCSPRequest to '%s'", aiaLocation.get()));
+
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIEventTarget> sts =
+      do_GetService(NS_SOCKETTRANSPORTSERVICE_CONTRACTID);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(sts);
+  if (!sts) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+  bool onSTSThread;
+  nsresult rv = sts->IsOnCurrentThread(&onSTSThread);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  MOZ_ASSERT(!onSTSThread);
+  if (onSTSThread) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
+  }
+
+  RefPtr<OCSPRequest> request(new OCSPRequest(
+      aiaLocation, originAttributes, ocspRequest, ocspRequestLength, timeout));
+  rv = request->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::FATAL_ERROR_LIBRARY_FAILURE;
+  }
+  rv = request->GetResponse(result);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    if (rv == NS_ERROR_MALFORMED_URI) {
+      return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_CERT_BAD_ACCESS_LOCATION;
+    }
+    return mozilla::pkix::Result::ERROR_OCSP_SERVER_ERROR;
+  }
+  return Success;
+}
+
+static char* ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIPrompt* prompt) {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  MOZ_ASSERT(slot);
+  MOZ_ASSERT(prompt);
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread() || !slot || !prompt) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  // Dispatch a background task to (eventually) call C_Login. The call will
+  // block until the protected authentication succeeds or fails.
+  Atomic<bool> done;
+  Atomic<SECStatus> result;
+  nsresult rv =
+      NS_DispatchBackgroundTask(NS_NewRunnableFunction(__func__, [&]() mutable {
+        result = PK11_CheckUserPassword(slot, nullptr);
+        done = true;
+      }));
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  nsTArray<nsCString> resIds = {
+      "security/pippki/pippki.ftl"_ns,
+  };
+  RefPtr<mozilla::intl::Localization> l10n =
+      mozilla::intl::Localization::Create(resIds, true);
+  auto l10nId = "protected-auth-alert"_ns;
+  auto l10nArgs = mozilla::dom::Optional<intl::L10nArgs>();
+  l10nArgs.Construct();
+  auto dirArg = l10nArgs.Value().Entries().AppendElement();
+  dirArg->mKey = "tokenName"_ns;
+  dirArg->mValue.SetValue().SetAsUTF8String().Assign(PK11_GetTokenName(slot));
+  nsAutoCString promptString;
+  ErrorResult errorResult;
+  l10n->FormatValueSync(l10nId, l10nArgs, promptString, errorResult);
+  if (NS_FAILED(errorResult.StealNSResult())) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  rv = prompt->Alert(nullptr, NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(promptString).get());
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+
+  MOZ_ALWAYS_TRUE(SpinEventLoopUntil(
+      "ShowProtectedAuthPrompt"_ns, [&]() { return static_cast<bool>(done); }));
+
+  switch (result) {
+    case SECSuccess:
+      return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_AUTHENTICATED));
+    case SECWouldBlock:
+      return ToNewCString(nsDependentCString(PK11_PW_RETRY));
+    default:
+      return nullptr;
+  }
+}
+
+class PK11PasswordPromptRunnable : public SyncRunnableBase {
+ public:
+  PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(PK11SlotInfo* slot, nsIInterfaceRequestor* ir)
+      : mResult(nullptr), mSlot(slot), mIR(ir) {}
+  virtual ~PK11PasswordPromptRunnable() = default;
+
+  char* mResult;  // out
+  virtual void RunOnTargetThread() override;
+
+ private:
+  static bool mRunning;
+
+  PK11SlotInfo* mSlot;
+  nsIInterfaceRequestor* mIR;
+};
+
+bool PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::mRunning = false;
+
+void PK11PasswordPromptRunnable::RunOnTargetThread() {
+  MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
+  if (!NS_IsMainThread()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // If we've reentered due to the nested event loop implicit in using
+  // nsIPrompt synchronously (or indeed the explicit nested event loop in the
+  // protected authentication case), bail early, cancelling the password
+  // prompt. This will probably cause the operation that resulted in the prompt
+  // to fail, but this is better than littering the screen with a bunch of
+  // password prompts that the user will probably just cancel anyway.
+  if (mRunning) {
+    return;
+  }
+  mRunning = true;
+  auto setRunningToFalseOnExit = MakeScopeExit([&]() { mRunning = false; });
+
+  nsresult rv;
+  nsCOMPtr<nsIPrompt> prompt;
+  if (!mIR) {
+    rv = nsNSSComponent::GetNewPrompter(getter_AddRefs(prompt));
+    if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+      return;
+    }
+  } else {
+    prompt = do_GetInterface(mIR);
+    MOZ_ASSERT(prompt, "Interface requestor should implement nsIPrompt");
+  }
+
+  if (!prompt) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  if (PK11_ProtectedAuthenticationPath(mSlot)) {
+    mResult = ShowProtectedAuthPrompt(mSlot, prompt);
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsAutoString promptString;
+  if (PK11_IsInternal(mSlot)) {
+    rv = GetPIPNSSBundleString("CertPasswordPromptDefault", promptString);
+  } else {
+    AutoTArray<nsString, 1> formatStrings = {
+        NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(PK11_GetTokenName(mSlot))};
+    rv = PIPBundleFormatStringFromName("CertPasswordPrompt", formatStrings,
+                                       promptString);
+  }
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  nsString password;
+  bool userClickedOK = false;
+  rv = prompt->PromptPassword(nullptr, promptString.get(),
+                              getter_Copies(password), &userClickedOK);
+  if (NS_FAILED(rv) || !userClickedOK) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  mResult = ToNewUTF8String(password);
+}
+
+char* PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo* slot, PRBool /*retry*/, void* arg) {
+  if (!slot) {
+    return nullptr;
+  }
+  RefPtr<PK11PasswordPromptRunnable> runnable(new PK11PasswordPromptRunnable(
+      slot, static_cast<nsIInterfaceRequestor*>(arg)));
+  runnable->DispatchToMainThreadAndWait();
+  return runnable->mResult;
+}
+
+nsCString getKeaGroupName(uint32_t aKeaGroup) {
+  nsCString groupName;
+  switch (aKeaGroup) {
+    case ssl_grp_ec_secp256r1:
+      groupName = "P256"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ec_secp384r1:
+      groupName = "P384"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ec_secp521r1:
+      groupName = "P521"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ec_curve25519:
+      groupName = "x25519"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_2048:
+      groupName = "FF 2048"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_3072:
+      groupName = "FF 3072"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_none:
+      groupName = "none"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_grp_ffdhe_custom:
+      groupName = "custom"_ns;
+      break;
+    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See namedGroups in
+    // nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
+    default:
+      // This really shouldn't happen!
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid key exchange group.");
+      groupName = "unknown group"_ns;
+  }
+  return groupName;
+}
+
+nsCString getSignatureName(uint32_t aSignatureScheme) {
+  nsCString signatureName;
+  switch (aSignatureScheme) {
+    case ssl_sig_none:
+      signatureName = "none"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha256:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA256"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha384:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA384"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha512:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA512"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256:
+      signatureName = "ECDSA-P256-SHA256"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384:
+      signatureName = "ECDSA-P384-SHA384"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512:
+      signatureName = "ECDSA-P521-SHA512"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha256:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA256"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha384:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA384"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pss_sha512:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PSS-SHA512"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_ecdsa_sha1:
+      signatureName = "ECDSA-SHA1"_ns;
+      break;
+    case ssl_sig_rsa_pkcs1_sha1md5:
+      signatureName = "RSA-PKCS1-SHA1MD5"_ns;
+      break;
+    // All other groups are not enabled in Firefox. See sEnabledSignatureSchemes
+    // in nsNSSIOLayer.cpp.
+    default:
+      // This really shouldn't happen!
+      MOZ_ASSERT_UNREACHABLE("Invalid signature scheme.");
+      signatureName = "unknown signature"_ns;
+  }
+  return signatureName;
+}
+
+static void PreliminaryHandshakeDone(PRFileDesc* fd) {
+  NSSSocketControl* socketControl = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;
+  if (!socketControl) {
+    return;
+  }
+  if (socketControl->IsPreliminaryHandshakeDone()) {
+    return;
+  }
+
+  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
+  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
+    return;
+  }
+  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
+  if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
+                             sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
+    return;
+  }
+  socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeInfo(channelInfo, cipherInfo);
+  socketControl->SetSSLVersionUsed(channelInfo.protocolVersion);
+  socketControl->SetEarlyDataAccepted(channelInfo.earlyDataAccepted);
+  socketControl->SetKEAUsed(channelInfo.keaType);
+  socketControl->SetKEAKeyBits(channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
+  socketControl->SetMACAlgorithmUsed(cipherInfo.macAlgorithm);
+
+  // Get the NPN value.
+  SSLNextProtoState state;
+  unsigned char npnbuf[256];
+  unsigned int npnlen;
+
+  if (SSL_GetNextProto(fd, &state, npnbuf, &npnlen,
+                       AssertedCast<unsigned int>(ArrayLength(npnbuf))) ==
+      SECSuccess) {
+    if (state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_NEGOTIATED ||
+        state == SSL_NEXT_PROTO_SELECTED) {
+      socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(
+          BitwiseCast<char*, unsigned char*>(npnbuf), npnlen);
+    } else {
+      socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
+    }
+    mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_NPN_TYPE, state);
+  } else {
+    socketControl->SetNegotiatedNPN(nullptr, 0);
+  }
+
+  socketControl->SetPreliminaryHandshakeDone();
+}
+
+SECStatus CanFalseStartCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data,
+                                PRBool* canFalseStart) {
+  *canFalseStart = false;
+
+  NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;
+  if (!infoObject) {
+    PR_SetError(PR_INVALID_STATE_ERROR, 0);
+    return SECFailure;
+  }
+
+  infoObject->SetFalseStartCallbackCalled();
+
+  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);
+
+  uint32_t reasonsForNotFalseStarting = 0;
+
+  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
+  if (SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
+  if (SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
+                             sizeof(cipherInfo)) != SECSuccess) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
+             " KEA %d\n",
+             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
+    return SECSuccess;
+  }
+
+  // Prevent version downgrade attacks from TLS 1.2, and avoid False Start for
+  // TLS 1.3 and later. See Bug 861310 for all the details as to why.
+  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
+             "SSL Version must be TLS 1.2, was %x\n",
+             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.protocolVersion)));
+    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_VERSION_DOWNGRADE;
+  }
+
+  // See bug 952863 for why ECDHE is allowed, but DHE (and RSA) are not.
+  if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_ecdh) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - "
+             "unsupported KEA %d\n",
+             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(channelInfo.keaType)));
+    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= KEA_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+  }
+
+  // Prevent downgrade attacks on the symmetric cipher. We do not allow CBC
+  // mode due to BEAST, POODLE, and other attacks on the MAC-then-Encrypt
+  // design. See bug 1109766 for more details.
+  if (cipherInfo.macAlgorithm != ssl_mac_aead) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] failed - non-AEAD cipher used, %d, "
+             "is not supported with False Start.\n",
+             fd, static_cast<int32_t>(cipherInfo.symCipher)));
+    reasonsForNotFalseStarting |= POSSIBLE_CIPHER_SUITE_DOWNGRADE;
+  }
+
+  // XXX: An attacker can choose which protocols are advertised in the
+  // NPN extension. TODO(Bug 861311): We should restrict the ability
+  // of an attacker leverage this capability by restricting false start
+  // to the same protocol we previously saw for the server, after the
+  // first successful connection to the server.
+
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_REASONS_FOR_NOT_FALSE_STARTING,
+                        reasonsForNotFalseStarting);
+
+  if (reasonsForNotFalseStarting == 0) {
+    *canFalseStart = PR_TRUE;
+    infoObject->SetFalseStarted();
+    infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("CanFalseStartCallback [%p] ok\n", fd));
+  }
+
+  return SECSuccess;
+}
+
+static void AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
+                                    uint32_t bits) {
+  unsigned int value = bits < 512      ? 1
+                       : bits == 512   ? 2
+                       : bits < 768    ? 3
+                       : bits == 768   ? 4
+                       : bits < 1024   ? 5
+                       : bits == 1024  ? 6
+                       : bits < 1280   ? 7
+                       : bits == 1280  ? 8
+                       : bits < 1536   ? 9
+                       : bits == 1536  ? 10
+                       : bits < 2048   ? 11
+                       : bits == 2048  ? 12
+                       : bits < 3072   ? 13
+                       : bits == 3072  ? 14
+                       : bits < 4096   ? 15
+                       : bits == 4096  ? 16
+                       : bits < 8192   ? 17
+                       : bits == 8192  ? 18
+                       : bits < 16384  ? 19
+                       : bits == 16384 ? 20
+                                       : 0;
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
+}
+
+// XXX: This attempts to map a bit count to an ECC named curve identifier. In
+// the vast majority of situations, we only have the Suite B curves available.
+// In that case, this mapping works fine. If we were to have more curves
+// available, the mapping would be ambiguous since there could be multiple
+// named curves for a given size (e.g. secp256k1 vs. secp256r1). We punt on
+// that for now. See also NSS bug 323674.
+static void AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::HistogramID probe, uint32_t bits) {
+  unsigned int value = bits == 255   ? 29  // Curve25519
+                       : bits == 256 ? 23  // P-256
+                       : bits == 384 ? 24  // P-384
+                       : bits == 521 ? 25  // P-521
+                                     : 0;  // Unknown
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
+}
+
+static void AccumulateCipherSuite(Telemetry::HistogramID probe,
+                                  const SSLChannelInfo& channelInfo) {
+  uint32_t value;
+  switch (channelInfo.cipherSuite) {
+    // ECDHE key exchange
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+      value = 1;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+      value = 2;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 3;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 4;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 5;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 6;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 7;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 10;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+      value = 11;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+      value = 12;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+      value = 13;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+      value = 14;
+      break;
+    // DHE key exchange
+    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 21;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 22;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 23;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 24;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 25;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 26;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 27;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 28;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 29;
+      break;
+    case TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 30;
+      break;
+    // ECDH key exchange
+    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 41;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 42;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 43;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 44;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 45;
+      break;
+    case TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 46;
+      break;
+    // RSA key exchange
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 61;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 62;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 63;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 64;
+      break;
+    case SSL_RSA_FIPS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 65;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 66;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA:
+      value = 67;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+      value = 68;
+      break;
+    case TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+      value = 69;
+      break;
+    // TLS 1.3 PSK resumption
+    case TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:
+      value = 70;
+      break;
+    case TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:
+      value = 71;
+      break;
+    case TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:
+      value = 72;
+      break;
+    // unknown
+    default:
+      value = 0;
+      break;
+  }
+  MOZ_ASSERT(value != 0);
+  Telemetry::Accumulate(probe, value);
+}
+
+void HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc* fd, void* client_data) {
+  SECStatus rv;
+
+  NSSSocketControl* infoObject = (NSSSocketControl*)fd->higher->secret;
+
+  // Do the bookkeeping that needs to be done after the
+  // server's ServerHello...ServerHelloDone have been processed, but that
+  // doesn't need the handshake to be completed.
+  PreliminaryHandshakeDone(fd);
+
+  nsSSLIOLayerHelpers& ioLayerHelpers =
+      infoObject->SharedState().IOLayerHelpers();
+
+  SSLVersionRange versions(infoObject->GetTLSVersionRange());
+
+  MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+          ("[%p] HandshakeCallback: succeeded using TLS version range "
+           "(0x%04x,0x%04x)\n",
+           fd, static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.min),
+           static_cast<unsigned int>(versions.max)));
+
+  // If the handshake completed, then we know the site is TLS tolerant
+  ioLayerHelpers.rememberTolerantAtVersion(infoObject->GetHostName(),
+                                           infoObject->GetPort(), versions.max);
+
+  SSLChannelInfo channelInfo;
+  rv = SSL_GetChannelInfo(fd, &channelInfo, sizeof(channelInfo));
+  MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
+  if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+    // Get the protocol version for telemetry
+    // 1=tls1, 2=tls1.1, 3=tls1.2
+    unsigned int versionEnum = channelInfo.protocolVersion & 0xFF;
+    MOZ_ASSERT(versionEnum > 0);
+    Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_HANDSHAKE_VERSION, versionEnum);
+    AccumulateCipherSuite(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
+                              ? Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_FULL
+                              : Telemetry::SSL_CIPHER_SUITE_RESUMED,
+                          channelInfo);
+
+    SSLCipherSuiteInfo cipherInfo;
+    rv = SSL_GetCipherSuiteInfo(channelInfo.cipherSuite, &cipherInfo,
+                                sizeof cipherInfo);
+    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+      // keyExchange null=0, rsa=1, dh=2, fortezza=3, ecdh=4
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
+                                ? Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_FULL
+                                : Telemetry::SSL_KEY_EXCHANGE_ALGORITHM_RESUMED,
+                            channelInfo.keaType);
+
+      if (infoObject->IsFullHandshake()) {
+        switch (channelInfo.keaType) {
+          case ssl_kea_rsa:
+            AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
+                                    channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
+            break;
+          case ssl_kea_dh:
+            AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_DHE_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
+                                    channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
+            break;
+          case ssl_kea_ecdh:
+            AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_KEA_ECDHE_CURVE_FULL,
+                               channelInfo.keaKeyBits);
+            break;
+          default:
+            MOZ_CRASH("impossible KEA");
+            break;
+        }
+
+        Telemetry::Accumulate(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ALGORITHM_FULL,
+                              channelInfo.authType);
+
+        // RSA key exchange doesn't use a signature for auth.
+        if (channelInfo.keaType != ssl_kea_rsa) {
+          switch (channelInfo.authType) {
+            case ssl_auth_rsa:
+            case ssl_auth_rsa_sign:
+              AccumulateNonECCKeySize(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_RSA_KEY_SIZE_FULL,
+                                      channelInfo.authKeyBits);
+              break;
+            case ssl_auth_ecdsa:
+              AccumulateECCCurve(Telemetry::SSL_AUTH_ECDSA_CURVE_FULL,
+                                 channelInfo.authKeyBits);
+              break;
+            default:
+              MOZ_CRASH("impossible auth algorithm");
+              break;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+
+      Telemetry::Accumulate(infoObject->IsFullHandshake()
+                                ? Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_FULL
+                                : Telemetry::SSL_SYMMETRIC_CIPHER_RESUMED,
+                            cipherInfo.symCipher);
+    }
+  }
+
+  PRBool siteSupportsSafeRenego;
+  if (channelInfo.protocolVersion != SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_3) {
+    rv = SSL_HandshakeNegotiatedExtension(fd, ssl_renegotiation_info_xtn,
+                                          &siteSupportsSafeRenego);
+    MOZ_ASSERT(rv == SECSuccess);
+    if (rv != SECSuccess) {
+      siteSupportsSafeRenego = false;
+    }
+  } else {
+    // TLS 1.3 dropped support for renegotiation.
+    siteSupportsSafeRenego = true;
+  }
+  bool renegotiationUnsafe = !siteSupportsSafeRenego &&
+                             ioLayerHelpers.treatUnsafeNegotiationAsBroken();
+
+  bool deprecatedTlsVer =
+      (channelInfo.protocolVersion < SSL_LIBRARY_VERSION_TLS_1_2);
+
+  uint32_t state;
+  if (renegotiationUnsafe || deprecatedTlsVer) {
+    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_BROKEN;
+  } else {
+    state = nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_IS_SECURE;
+    SSLVersionRange defVersion;
+    rv = SSL_VersionRangeGetDefault(ssl_variant_stream, &defVersion);
+    if (rv == SECSuccess && versions.max >= defVersion.max) {
+      // we know this site no longer requires a version fallback
+      ioLayerHelpers.removeInsecureFallbackSite(infoObject->GetHostName(),
+                                                infoObject->GetPort());
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (infoObject->HasServerCert()) {
+    MOZ_LOG(gPIPNSSLog, LogLevel::Debug,
+            ("HandshakeCallback KEEPING existing cert\n"));
+  } else {
+    infoObject->RebuildCertificateInfoFromSSLTokenCache();
+  }
+
+  // Check if the user has added an override for a certificate error.
+  if (infoObject->HasUserOverriddenCertificateError()) {
+    state |= nsIWebProgressListener::STATE_CERT_USER_OVERRIDDEN;
+  }
+
+  infoObject->SetSecurityState(state);
+
+  // XXX Bug 883674: We shouldn't be formatting messages here in PSM; instead,
+  // we should set a flag on the channel that higher (UI) level code can check
+  // to log the warning. In particular, these warnings should go to the web
+  // console instead of to the error console. Also, the warning is not
+  // localized.
+  if (!siteSupportsSafeRenego) {
+    NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16 msg(infoObject->GetHostName());
+    msg.AppendLiteral(" : server does not support RFC 5746, see CVE-2009-3555");
+
+    nsContentUtils::LogSimpleConsoleError(
+        msg, "SSL"_ns, !!infoObject->GetOriginAttributes().mPrivateBrowsingId,
+        true /* from chrome context */);
+  }
+
+  infoObject->NoteTimeUntilReady();
+  infoObject->SetHandshakeCompleted();
+}