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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 09:22:09 +0000 |
commit | 43a97878ce14b72f0981164f87f2e35e14151312 (patch) | |
tree | 620249daf56c0258faa40cbdcf9cfba06de2a846 /toolkit/components/reputationservice/ApplicationReputation.cpp | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | firefox-43a97878ce14b72f0981164f87f2e35e14151312.tar.xz firefox-43a97878ce14b72f0981164f87f2e35e14151312.zip |
Adding upstream version 110.0.1.upstream/110.0.1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | toolkit/components/reputationservice/ApplicationReputation.cpp | 1980 |
1 files changed, 1980 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/toolkit/components/reputationservice/ApplicationReputation.cpp b/toolkit/components/reputationservice/ApplicationReputation.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a462a3a0ae --- /dev/null +++ b/toolkit/components/reputationservice/ApplicationReputation.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,1980 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* vim: set ts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ +// See +// https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Features/Application_Reputation_Design_Doc +// for a description of Chrome's implementation of this feature. +#include "ApplicationReputation.h" +#include "chrome/common/safe_browsing/csd.pb.h" + +#include "nsIArray.h" +#include "nsIApplicationReputation.h" +#include "nsIChannel.h" +#include "nsIHttpChannel.h" +#include "nsIIOService.h" +#include "nsIObserverService.h" +#include "nsISimpleEnumerator.h" +#include "nsIStreamListener.h" +#include "nsIStringStream.h" +#include "nsITimer.h" +#include "nsIUploadChannel2.h" +#include "nsIURI.h" +#include "nsIURL.h" +#include "nsIUrlClassifierDBService.h" +#include "nsIURLFormatter.h" +#include "nsIX509Cert.h" +#include "nsIX509CertDB.h" + +#include "mozilla/ArrayUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/BasePrincipal.h" +#include "mozilla/Components.h" +#include "mozilla/ErrorNames.h" +#include "mozilla/LoadContext.h" +#include "mozilla/Preferences.h" +#include "mozilla/ScopeExit.h" +#include "mozilla/Services.h" +#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h" +#include "mozilla/TimeStamp.h" +#include "mozilla/intl/LocaleService.h" + +#include "nsCOMPtr.h" +#include "nsDebug.h" +#include "nsDependentSubstring.h" +#include "nsError.h" +#include "nsLocalFileCommon.h" +#include "nsNetCID.h" +#include "nsReadableUtils.h" +#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" +#include "nsString.h" +#include "nsTArray.h" +#include "nsThreadUtils.h" + +#include "nsIContentPolicy.h" +#include "nsICryptoHash.h" +#include "nsILoadInfo.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" +#include "nsWeakReference.h" +#include "nsIRedirectHistoryEntry.h" + +#include "ApplicationReputationTelemetryUtils.h" + +using mozilla::ArrayLength; +using mozilla::BasePrincipal; +using mozilla::OriginAttributes; +using mozilla::Preferences; +using mozilla::TimeStamp; +using mozilla::intl::LocaleService; +using mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate; +using mozilla::Telemetry::AccumulateCategorical; +using safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest; +using safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain; +using safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest_Resource; +using safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest_SignatureInfo; + +// Preferences that we need to initialize the query. +#define PREF_SB_APP_REP_URL "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.url" +#define PREF_SB_MALWARE_ENABLED "browser.safebrowsing.malware.enabled" +#define PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_ENABLED "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.enabled" +#define PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_REMOTE_ENABLED \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.enabled" +#define PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_REMOTE_TIMEOUT \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.timeout_ms" +#define PREF_DOWNLOAD_BLOCK_TABLE "urlclassifier.downloadBlockTable" +#define PREF_DOWNLOAD_ALLOW_TABLE "urlclassifier.downloadAllowTable" + +// Preferences that are needed to action the verdict. +#define PREF_BLOCK_DANGEROUS \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_dangerous" +#define PREF_BLOCK_DANGEROUS_HOST \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_dangerous_host" +#define PREF_BLOCK_POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_potentially_unwanted" +#define PREF_BLOCK_UNCOMMON \ + "browser.safebrowsing.downloads.remote.block_uncommon" + +// MOZ_LOG=ApplicationReputation:5 +mozilla::LazyLogModule ApplicationReputationService::prlog( + "ApplicationReputation"); +#define LOG(args) \ + MOZ_LOG(ApplicationReputationService::prlog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args) +#define LOG_ENABLED() \ + MOZ_LOG_TEST(ApplicationReputationService::prlog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug) + +/** + * Our detection of executable/binary files uses 3 lists: + * - kNonBinaryExecutables (below) + * - kBinaryFileExtensions (below) + * - sExecutableExts (in nsLocalFileCommon) + * + * On Windows, the `sExecutableExts` list is used to determine whether files + * count as executable. For executable files, we will not offer an "open with" + * option when downloading, only "save as". + * + * On all platforms, the combination of these lists is used to determine + * whether files should be subject to application reputation checks. + * Specifically, all files with extensions that: + * - are in kBinaryFileExtensions, or + * - are in sExecutableExts **and not in kNonBinaryExecutables** + * + * will be subject to checks. + * + * There are tests that verify that these lists are sorted and that extensions + * never appear in both the sExecutableExts and kBinaryFileExtensions lists. + * + * When adding items to any lists: + * - please prefer adding to sExecutableExts unless it is imperative users can + * (potentially automatically!) open such files with a helper application + * without first saving them (and that outweighs any associated risk). + * - if adding executable items that shouldn't be submitted to apprep servers, + * add them to sExecutableExts and also to kNonBinaryExecutables. + * - always add an associated comment in the kBinaryFileExtensions list. Add + * a commented-out entry with an `exec` annotation if you add the actual + * entry in sExecutableExts. + * + * When removing items please consider whether items should still be in the + * sExecutableExts list even if removing them from the kBinaryFileExtensions + * list, and vice versa. + * + * Note that there is a GTest that does its best to check some of these + * invariants that you'll likely need to update if you're modifying these + * lists. + */ + +// Items that are in sExecutableExts but shouldn't be submitted for application +// reputation checks. +/* static */ +const char* const ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables[] = { + // clang-format off + ".ad", + ".afploc", + ".air", + ".atloc", + ".ftploc", + // clang-format on +}; + +// Items that should be submitted for application reputation checks that users +// are able to open immediately (without first saving and then finding the +// file). If users shouldn't be able to open them immediately, add to +// sExecutableExts instead (see also the docstring comment above!). +/* static */ +const char* const ApplicationReputationService::kBinaryFileExtensions[] = { + // Originally extracted from the "File Type Policies" Chrome extension + // Items listed with an `exec` comment are in the sExecutableExts list in + // nsLocalFileCommon.h . + //".001", + //".7z", + //".ace", + //".accda", exec // MS Access database + //".accdb", exec // MS Access database + //".accde", exec // MS Access database + //".accdr", exec // MS Access database + ".action", // Mac script + //".ad", exec // Windows + //".ade", exec // MS Access + //".adp", exec // MS Access + //".air", exec // Adobe AIR installer; excluded from apprep checks. + ".apk", // Android package + //".app", exec // Executable application + ".applescript", + //".application", exec // MS ClickOnce + ".appref-ms", // MS ClickOnce + //".arc", + //".arj", + ".as", // Mac archive + //".asp", exec // Windows Server script + ".asx", // Windows Media Player + //".b64", + //".balz", + //".bas", exec // Basic script + ".bash", // Linux shell + //".bat", exec // Windows shell + //".bhx", + ".bin", + ".btapp", // uTorrent and Transmission + ".btinstall", // uTorrent and Transmission + ".btkey", // uTorrent and Transmission + ".btsearch", // uTorrent and Transmission + ".btskin", // uTorrent and Transmission + ".bz", // Linux archive (bzip) + ".bz2", // Linux archive (bzip2) + ".bzip2", // Linux archive (bzip2) + ".cab", // Windows archive + ".caction", // Automator action + ".cdr", // Mac disk image + //".cer", exec // Signed certificate file + ".cfg", // Windows + ".chi", // Windows Help + //".chm", exec // Windows Help + ".class", // Java + //".cmd", exec // Windows executable + //".com", exec // Windows executable + ".command", // Mac script + ".configprofile", // Configuration file for Apple systems + ".cpgz", // Mac archive + ".cpi", // Control Panel Item. Executable used for adding icons + // to Control Panel + //".cpio", + //".cpl", exec // Windows executable + //".crt", exec // Windows signed certificate + ".crx", // Chrome extensions + ".csh", // Linux shell + //".csv", + ".dart", // Mac disk image + ".dc42", // Apple DiskCopy Image + ".deb", // Linux package + ".definition", // Automator action + ".desktop", // A shortcut that runs other files + //".der", exec // Signed certificate + ".dex", // Android + ".dht", // HTML + ".dhtm", // HTML + ".dhtml", // HTML + ".diskcopy42", // Apple DiskCopy Image + ".dll", // Windows executable + ".dmg", // Mac disk image + ".dmgpart", // Mac disk image + ".doc", // MS Office + ".docb", // MS Office + ".docm", // MS Word + ".docx", // MS Word + ".dot", // MS Word + ".dotm", // MS Word + ".dott", // MS Office + ".dotx", // MS Word + ".drv", // Windows driver + ".dvdr", // Mac Disk image + ".dylib", // Mach object dynamic library file + ".efi", // Firmware + ".eml", // MS Outlook + //".exe", exec // Windows executable + //".fat", + //".fileloc", exec // Apple finder internet location data file + ".fon", // Windows font + //".fxp", exec // MS FoxPro + ".gadget", // Windows + //".gif", + ".grp", // Windows + ".gz", // Linux archive (gzip) + ".gzip", // Linux archive (gzip) + ".hfs", // Mac disk image + //".hlp", exec // Windows Help + ".hqx", // Mac archive + //".hta", exec // HTML trusted application + ".htm", ".html", + ".htt", // MS HTML template + //".ica", + ".img", // Mac disk image + ".imgpart", // Mac disk image + //".inf", exec // Windows installer + //".inetloc", exec // Apple finder internet location data file + ".ini", // Generic config file + //".ins", exec // IIS config + ".internetconnect", // Configuration file for Apple system + //".inx", // InstallShield + ".iso", // CD image + //".isp", exec // IIS config + //".isu", // InstallShield + //".jar", exec // Java + //".jnlp", exec // Java + //".job", // Windows + //".jpg", + //".jpeg", + //".js", exec // JavaScript script + //".jse", exec // JScript + ".ksh", // Linux shell + //".lha", + //".lnk", exec // Windows + ".local", // Windows + //".lpaq1", + //".lpaq5", + //".lpaq8", + //".lzh", + //".lzma", + //".mad", exec // MS Access + //".maf", exec // MS Access + //".mag", exec // MS Access + //".mam", exec // MS Access + ".manifest", // Windows + //".maq", exec // MS Access + //".mar", exec // MS Access + //".mas", exec // MS Access + //".mat", exec // MS Access + //".mau", exec // Media attachment + //".mav", exec // MS Access + //".maw", exec // MS Access + //".mda", exec // MS Access + //".mdb", exec // MS Access + //".mde", exec // MS Access + //".mdt", exec // MS Access + //".mdw", exec // MS Access + //".mdz", exec // MS Access + ".mht", // MS HTML + ".mhtml", // MS HTML + ".mim", // MS Mail + //".mkv", + ".mmc", // MS Office + ".mobileconfig", // Configuration file for Apple systems + ".mof", // Windows + //".mov", + //".mp3", + //".mp4", + ".mpkg", // Mac installer + //".msc", exec // Windows executable + ".msg", // MS Outlook + //".msh", exec // Windows shell + //".msh1", exec // Windows shell + //".msh1xml", exec // Windows shell + //".msh2", exec // Windows shell + //".msh2xml", exec // Windows shell + //".mshxml", exec // Windows + //".msi", exec // Windows installer + //".msp", exec // Windows installer + //".mst", exec // Windows installer + ".ndif", // Mac disk image + ".networkconnect", // Configuration file for Apple systems + //".ntfs", // 7z + ".ocx", // ActiveX + //".ops", exec // MS Office + ".osas", // AppleScript + ".osax", // AppleScript + //".out", // Linux binary + ".oxt", // OpenOffice extension, can execute arbitrary code + //".package", + //".paf", // PortableApps package + //".paq8f", + //".paq8jd", + //".paq8l", + //".paq8o", + ".partial", // Downloads + ".pax", // Mac archive + //".pcd", exec // Microsoft Visual Test + ".pdf", // Adobe Acrobat + //".pea", + ".pet", // Linux package + //".pif", exec // Windows + ".pkg", // Mac installer + ".pl", // Perl script + //".plg", exec // MS Visual Studio + //".png", + ".pot", // MS PowerPoint + ".potm", // MS PowerPoint + ".potx", // MS PowerPoint + ".ppam", // MS PowerPoint + ".pps", // MS PowerPoint + ".ppsm", // MS PowerPoint + ".ppsx", // MS PowerPoint + ".ppt", // MS PowerPoint + ".pptm", // MS PowerPoint + ".pptx", // MS PowerPoint + //".prf", exec // MS Outlook + //".prg", exec // Windows + ".ps1", // Windows shell + ".ps1xml", // Windows shell + ".ps2", // Windows shell + ".ps2xml", // Windows shell + ".psc1", // Windows shell + ".psc2", // Windows shell + //".pst", exec // MS Outlook + ".pup", // Linux package + ".py", // Python script + ".pyc", // Python binary + ".pyd", // Equivalent of a DLL, for python libraries + ".pyo", // Compiled python code + ".pyw", // Python GUI + //".quad", + //".r00", + //".r01", + //".r02", + //".r03", + //".r04", + //".r05", + //".r06", + //".r07", + //".r08", + //".r09", + //".r10", + //".r11", + //".r12", + //".r13", + //".r14", + //".r15", + //".r16", + //".r17", + //".r18", + //".r19", + //".r20", + //".r21", + //".r22", + //".r23", + //".r24", + //".r25", + //".r26", + //".r27", + //".r28", + //".r29", + //".rar", + ".rb", // Ruby script + //".reg", exec // Windows Registry + ".rels", // MS Office + //".rgs", // Windows Registry + ".rpm", // Linux package + ".rtf", // MS Office + //".run", // Linux shell + //".scf", exec // Windows shell + ".scpt", // AppleScript + ".scptd", // AppleScript + //".scr", exec // Windows + //".sct", exec // Windows shell + ".search-ms", // Windows + ".seplugin", // AppleScript + ".service", // Systemd service unit file + //".settingcontent-ms", exec // Windows settings + ".sh", // Linux shell + ".shar", // Linux shell + //".shb", exec // Windows + //".shs", exec // Windows shell + ".sht", // HTML + ".shtm", // HTML + ".shtml", // HTML + ".sldm", // MS PowerPoint + ".sldx", // MS PowerPoint + ".slk", // MS Excel + ".slp", // Linux package + ".smi", // Mac disk image + ".sparsebundle", // Mac disk image + ".sparseimage", // Mac disk image + ".spl", // Adobe Flash + //".squashfs", + ".svg", + ".swf", // Adobe Flash + ".swm", // Windows Imaging + ".sys", // Windows + ".tar", // Linux archive + ".taz", // Linux archive (bzip2) + ".tbz", // Linux archive (bzip2) + ".tbz2", // Linux archive (bzip2) + ".tcsh", // Linux shell + //".tif", + ".tgz", // Linux archive (gzip) + //".toast", // Roxio disk image + ".torrent", // Bittorrent + ".tpz", // Linux archive (gzip) + //".txt", + ".txz", // Linux archive (xz) + ".tz", // Linux archive (gzip) + //".u3p", // U3 Smart Apps + ".udf", // MS Excel + ".udif", // Mac disk image + //".url", exec // Windows + //".uu", + //".uue", + //".vb", exec // Visual Basic script + //".vbe", exec // Visual Basic script + //".vbs", exec // Visual Basic script + //".vbscript", // Visual Basic script + //".vdx", exec // MS Visio + ".vhd", // Windows virtual hard drive + ".vhdx", // Windows virtual hard drive + ".vmdk", // VMware virtual disk + //".vsd", exec // MS Visio + //".vsdm", exec // MS Visio + //".vsdx", exec // MS Visio + //".vsmacros", exec // MS Visual Studio + //".vss", exec // MS Visio + //".vssm", exec // MS Visio + //".vssx", exec // MS Visio + //".vst", exec // MS Visio + //".vstm", exec // MS Visio + //".vstx", exec // MS Visio + //".vsw", exec // MS Visio + //".vsx", exec // MS Visio + //".vtx", exec // MS Visio + //".wav", + //".webloc", // MacOS website location file + //".webp", + ".website", // Windows + ".wflow", // Automator action + ".wim", // Windows Imaging + ".workflow", // Mac Automator + //".wrc", // FreeArc archive + //".ws", exec // Windows script + //".wsc", exec // Windows script + //".wsf", exec // Windows script + //".wsh", exec // Windows script + ".xar", // MS Excel + ".xbap", // XAML Browser Application + ".xht", ".xhtm", ".xhtml", + ".xip", // Mac archive + ".xla", // MS Excel + ".xlam", // MS Excel + ".xldm", // MS Excel + ".xll", // MS Excel + ".xlm", // MS Excel + ".xls", // MS Excel + ".xlsb", // MS Excel + ".xlsm", // MS Excel + ".xlsx", // MS Excel + ".xlt", // MS Excel + ".xltm", // MS Excel + ".xltx", // MS Excel + ".xlw", // MS Excel + ".xml", // MS Excel + ".xnk", // MS Exchange + ".xrm-ms", // Windows + ".xsd", // XML schema definition + ".xsl", // XML Stylesheet + //".xxe", + ".xz", // Linux archive (xz) + ".z", // InstallShield +#ifdef XP_WIN // disable on Mac/Linux, see 1167493 + ".zip", // Generic archive +#endif + ".zipx", // WinZip + //".zpaq", +}; + +static const char* const kMozNonBinaryExecutables[] = { + ".001", ".7z", ".ace", ".arc", ".arj", ".b64", ".balz", + ".bhx", ".cpio", ".fat", ".lha", ".lpaq1", ".lpaq5", ".lpaq8", + ".lzh", ".lzma", ".ntfs", ".paq8f", ".paq8jd", ".paq8l", ".paq8o", + ".pea", ".quad", ".r00", ".r01", ".r02", ".r03", ".r04", + ".r05", ".r06", ".r07", ".r08", ".r09", ".r10", ".r11", + ".r12", ".r13", ".r14", ".r15", ".r16", ".r17", ".r18", + ".r19", ".r20", ".r21", ".r22", ".r23", ".r24", ".r25", + ".r26", ".r27", ".r28", ".r29", ".rar", ".squashfs", ".uu", + ".uue", ".wrc", ".xxe", ".zpaq", ".toast", +}; + +static const char* const kSafeFileExtensions[] = { + ".jpg", ".jpeg", ".mp3", ".mp4", ".png", ".csv", ".ica", + ".gif", ".txt", ".package", ".tif", ".webp", ".mkv", ".wav", + ".mov", ".paf", ".vbscript", ".ad", ".inx", ".isu", ".job", + ".rgs", ".u3p", ".out", ".run", ".bmp", ".css", ".ehtml", + ".flac", ".ico", ".jfif", ".m4a", ".m4v", ".mpeg", ".mpg", + ".oga", ".ogg", ".ogm", ".ogv", ".opus", ".pjp", ".pjpeg", + ".svgz", ".text", ".tiff", ".weba", ".webm", ".xbm", +}; + +enum class LookupType { AllowlistOnly, BlocklistOnly, BothLists }; + +// Define the reasons that download protection service accepts or blocks this +// download. This is now used for telemetry purposes and xpcshell test. Please +// also update the xpcshell-test if a reason is added. +// +// LocalWhitelist : URL is found in the local whitelist +// LocalBlocklist : URL is found in the local blocklist +// NonBinary : The downloaded non-binary file is not found in the +// local blocklist VerdictSafe : Remote lookup reports the download is +// safe VerdictUnknown : Remote lookup reports unknown, we treat this as a +// safe download VerdictDangerous : Remote lookup reports the download is +// dangerous VerdictDangerousHost : Remote lookup reports the download is from a +// dangerous host VerdictUnwanted : Remote lookup reports the download is +// potentially unwatned VerdictUncommon : Remote lookup reports the +// download is uncommon VerdictUnrecognized : The verdict type from remote +// lookup is not defined in the csd.proto DangerousPrefOff : The download is +// dangerous, but the corresponding preference is off DangerousHostPrefOff : The +// download is from a dangerous host, but the corresponding preference is off +// UnwantedPrefOff : The download is potentially unwanted, but the +// corresponding preference is off UncommonPrefOff : The download us +// uncommon, but the coressponding preference is off NetworkError : +// There is an error while requesting remote lookup RemoteLookupDisabled : +// Remote lookup is disabled or the remote lookup URL is empty InternalError : +// An unexpected internal error DPDisabled : Download protection is +// disabled +using Reason = mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_REASON; + +class PendingDBLookup; + +// A single use class private to ApplicationReputationService encapsulating an +// nsIApplicationReputationQuery and an nsIApplicationReputationCallback. Once +// created by ApplicationReputationService, it is guaranteed to call mCallback. +// This class is private to ApplicationReputationService. +class PendingLookup final : public nsIStreamListener, + public nsITimerCallback, + public nsINamed, + public nsIObserver, + public nsSupportsWeakReference { + public: + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS + NS_DECL_NSIREQUESTOBSERVER + NS_DECL_NSISTREAMLISTENER + NS_DECL_NSITIMERCALLBACK + NS_DECL_NSINAMED + NS_DECL_NSIOBSERVER + + // Constructor and destructor. + PendingLookup(nsIApplicationReputationQuery* aQuery, + nsIApplicationReputationCallback* aCallback); + + // Start the lookup. The lookup may have 2 parts: local and remote. In the + // local lookup, PendingDBLookups are created to query the local allow and + // blocklists for various URIs associated with this downloaded file. In the + // event that no results are found, a remote lookup is sent to the Application + // Reputation server. + nsresult StartLookup(); + + private: + ~PendingLookup(); + + friend class PendingDBLookup; + + // Telemetry states. + // Status of the remote response (valid or not). + enum SERVER_RESPONSE_TYPES { + SERVER_RESPONSE_VALID = 0, + SERVER_RESPONSE_FAILED = 1, + SERVER_RESPONSE_INVALID = 2, + }; + + // The target filename for the downloaded file. + nsCString mFileName; + + // True if extension of this file matches any extension in the + // kBinaryFileExtensions or sExecutableExts list. + bool mIsBinaryFile; + + // Number of blocklist and allowlist hits we have seen. + uint32_t mBlocklistCount; + uint32_t mAllowlistCount; + + // The query containing metadata about the downloaded file. + nsCOMPtr<nsIApplicationReputationQuery> mQuery; + + // The callback with which to report the verdict. + nsCOMPtr<nsIApplicationReputationCallback> mCallback; + + // An array of strings created from certificate information used to whitelist + // the downloaded file. + nsTArray<nsCString> mAllowlistSpecs; + // The source URI of the download (i.e. final URI after any redirects). + nsTArray<nsCString> mAnylistSpecs; + // The referrer and possibly any redirects. + nsTArray<nsCString> mBlocklistSpecs; + + // When we started this query + TimeStamp mStartTime; + + // The channel used to talk to the remote lookup server + nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> mChannel; + + // Timer to abort this lookup if it takes too long + nsCOMPtr<nsITimer> mTimeoutTimer; + + // A protocol buffer for storing things we need in the remote request. We + // store the resource chain (redirect information) as well as signature + // information extracted using the Windows Authenticode API, if the binary is + // signed. + ClientDownloadRequest mRequest; + + // The response from the application reputation query. This is read in chunks + // as part of our nsIStreamListener implementation and may contain embedded + // NULLs. + nsCString mResponse; + + // The clock records the start time of a remote lookup request, used by + // telemetry. + PRIntervalTime mTelemetryRemoteRequestStartMs; + + // Returns the type of download binary for the file. + ClientDownloadRequest::DownloadType GetDownloadType( + const nsACString& aFilename); + + // Clean up and call the callback. PendingLookup must not be used after this + // function is called. + nsresult OnComplete(uint32_t aVerdict, Reason aReason, nsresult aRv); + + // Wrapper function for nsIStreamListener.onStopRequest to make it easy to + // guarantee calling the callback + nsresult OnStopRequestInternal(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsresult aResult, + uint32_t& aVerdict, Reason& aReason); + + // Return the hex-encoded hash of the whole URI. + nsresult GetSpecHash(nsACString& aSpec, nsACString& hexEncodedHash); + + // Strip url parameters, fragments, and user@pass fields from the URI spec + // using nsIURL. Hash data URIs and return blob URIs unfiltered. + nsresult GetStrippedSpec(nsIURI* aUri, nsACString& spec); + + // Escape '/' and '%' in certificate attribute values. + nsCString EscapeCertificateAttribute(const nsACString& aAttribute); + + // Escape ':' in fingerprint values. + nsCString EscapeFingerprint(const nsACString& aAttribute); + + // Generate whitelist strings for the given certificate pair from the same + // certificate chain. + nsresult GenerateWhitelistStringsForPair(nsIX509Cert* certificate, + nsIX509Cert* issuer); + + // Generate whitelist strings for the given certificate chain, which starts + // with the signer and may go all the way to the root cert. + nsresult GenerateWhitelistStringsForChain( + const ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain& aChain); + + // For signed binaries, generate strings of the form: + // http://sb-ssl.google.com/safebrowsing/csd/certificate/ + // <issuer_cert_sha1_fingerprint>[/CN=<cn>][/O=<org>][/OU=<unit>] + // for each (cert, issuer) pair in each chain of certificates that is + // associated with the binary. + nsresult GenerateWhitelistStrings(); + + // Parse the XPCOM certificate lists and stick them into the protocol buffer + // version. + nsresult ParseCertificates( + const nsTArray<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>>& aSigArray); + + // Adds the redirects to mBlocklistSpecs to be looked up. + nsresult AddRedirects(nsIArray* aRedirects); + + // Helper function to ensure that we call PendingLookup::LookupNext or + // PendingLookup::OnComplete. + nsresult DoLookupInternal(); + + // Looks up all the URIs that may be responsible for allowlisting or + // blocklisting the downloaded file. These URIs may include whitelist strings + // generated by certificates verifying the binary as well as the target URI + // from which the file was downloaded. + nsresult LookupNext(); + + // Sends a query to the remote application reputation service. Returns NS_OK + // on success. + nsresult SendRemoteQuery(); + + // Helper function to ensure that we always call the callback. + nsresult SendRemoteQueryInternal(Reason& aReason); +}; + +// A single-use class for looking up a single URI in the safebrowsing DB. This +// class is private to PendingLookup. +class PendingDBLookup final : public nsIUrlClassifierCallback { + public: + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS + NS_DECL_NSIURLCLASSIFIERCALLBACK + + // Constructor and destructor + explicit PendingDBLookup(PendingLookup* aPendingLookup); + + // Look up the given URI in the safebrowsing DBs, optionally on both the allow + // list and the blocklist. If there is a match, call + // PendingLookup::OnComplete. Otherwise, call PendingLookup::LookupNext. + nsresult LookupSpec(const nsACString& aSpec, const LookupType& aLookupType); + + private: + ~PendingDBLookup(); + + // The download appeared on the allowlist, blocklist, or no list (and thus + // could trigger a remote query. + enum LIST_TYPES { + ALLOW_LIST = 0, + BLOCK_LIST = 1, + NO_LIST = 2, + }; + + nsCString mSpec; + LookupType mLookupType; + RefPtr<PendingLookup> mPendingLookup; + nsresult LookupSpecInternal(const nsACString& aSpec); +}; + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(PendingDBLookup, nsIUrlClassifierCallback) + +PendingDBLookup::PendingDBLookup(PendingLookup* aPendingLookup) + : mLookupType(LookupType::BothLists), mPendingLookup(aPendingLookup) { + LOG(("Created pending DB lookup [this = %p]", this)); +} + +PendingDBLookup::~PendingDBLookup() { + LOG(("Destroying pending DB lookup [this = %p]", this)); + mPendingLookup = nullptr; +} + +nsresult PendingDBLookup::LookupSpec(const nsACString& aSpec, + const LookupType& aLookupType) { + LOG(("Checking principal %s [this=%p]", aSpec.Data(), this)); + mSpec = aSpec; + mLookupType = aLookupType; + nsresult rv = LookupSpecInternal(aSpec); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + nsAutoCString errorName; + mozilla::GetErrorName(rv, errorName); + LOG(("Error in LookupSpecInternal() [rv = %s, this = %p]", errorName.get(), + this)); + return mPendingLookup->LookupNext(); // ignore this lookup and move to next + } + // LookupSpecInternal has called nsIUrlClassifierCallback.lookup, which is + // guaranteed to call HandleEvent. + return rv; +} + +nsresult PendingDBLookup::LookupSpecInternal(const nsACString& aSpec) { + nsresult rv; + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + rv = ios->NewURI(aSpec, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + OriginAttributes attrs; + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal = + BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(uri, attrs); + if (!principal) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + // Check local lists to see if the URI has already been whitelisted or + // blacklisted. + LOG(("Checking DB service for principal %s [this = %p]", mSpec.get(), this)); + nsCOMPtr<nsIUrlClassifierDBService> dbService = + mozilla::components::UrlClassifierDB::Service(&rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsAutoCString tables; + nsAutoCString allowlist; + Preferences::GetCString(PREF_DOWNLOAD_ALLOW_TABLE, allowlist); + if ((mLookupType != LookupType::BlocklistOnly) && !allowlist.IsEmpty()) { + tables.Append(allowlist); + } + nsAutoCString blocklist; + Preferences::GetCString(PREF_DOWNLOAD_BLOCK_TABLE, blocklist); + if ((mLookupType != LookupType::AllowlistOnly) && !blocklist.IsEmpty()) { + if (!tables.IsEmpty()) { + tables.Append(','); + } + tables.Append(blocklist); + } + return dbService->Lookup(principal, tables, this); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingDBLookup::HandleEvent(const nsACString& tables) { + // HandleEvent is guaranteed to call either: + // 1) PendingLookup::OnComplete if the URL matches the blocklist, or + // 2) PendingLookup::LookupNext if the URL does not match the blocklist. + // Blocklisting trumps allowlisting. + nsAutoCString blockList; + Preferences::GetCString(PREF_DOWNLOAD_BLOCK_TABLE, blockList); + if ((mLookupType != LookupType::AllowlistOnly) && + FindInReadable(blockList, tables)) { + mPendingLookup->mBlocklistCount++; + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_LOCAL, BLOCK_LIST); + LOG(("Found principal %s on blocklist [this = %p]", mSpec.get(), this)); + return mPendingLookup->OnComplete( + nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_DANGEROUS, + Reason::LocalBlocklist, NS_OK); + } + + nsAutoCString allowList; + Preferences::GetCString(PREF_DOWNLOAD_ALLOW_TABLE, allowList); + if ((mLookupType != LookupType::BlocklistOnly) && + FindInReadable(allowList, tables)) { + mPendingLookup->mAllowlistCount++; + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_LOCAL, ALLOW_LIST); + LOG(("Found principal %s on allowlist [this = %p]", mSpec.get(), this)); + // Don't call onComplete, since blocklisting trumps allowlisting + return mPendingLookup->LookupNext(); + } + + LOG(("Didn't find principal %s on any list [this = %p]", mSpec.get(), this)); + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_LOCAL, NO_LIST); + return mPendingLookup->LookupNext(); +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(PendingLookup, nsIStreamListener, nsIRequestObserver, + nsIObserver, nsISupportsWeakReference, nsITimerCallback, + nsINamed) + +PendingLookup::PendingLookup(nsIApplicationReputationQuery* aQuery, + nsIApplicationReputationCallback* aCallback) + : mIsBinaryFile(false), + mBlocklistCount(0), + mAllowlistCount(0), + mQuery(aQuery), + mCallback(aCallback) { + LOG(("Created pending lookup [this = %p]", this)); +} + +PendingLookup::~PendingLookup() { + LOG(("Destroying pending lookup [this = %p]", this)); +} + +static const char* const kDmgFileExtensions[] = { + ".cdr", ".dart", ".dc42", ".diskcopy42", + ".dmg", ".dmgpart", ".dvdr", ".img", + ".imgpart", ".iso", ".ndif", ".smi", + ".sparsebundle", ".sparseimage", ".toast", ".udif", +}; + +static const char* const kRarFileExtensions[] = { + ".r00", ".r01", ".r02", ".r03", ".r04", ".r05", ".r06", ".r07", + ".r08", ".r09", ".r10", ".r11", ".r12", ".r13", ".r14", ".r15", + ".r16", ".r17", ".r18", ".r19", ".r20", ".r21", ".r22", ".r23", + ".r24", ".r25", ".r26", ".r27", ".r28", ".r29", ".rar", +}; + +static const char* const kZipFileExtensions[] = { + ".zip", // Generic archive + ".zipx", // WinZip +}; + +static const char* GetFileExt(const nsACString& aFilename, + const char* const aFileExtensions[], + const size_t aLength) { + for (size_t i = 0; i < aLength; ++i) { + if (StringEndsWith(aFilename, nsDependentCString(aFileExtensions[i]))) { + return aFileExtensions[i]; + } + } + return nullptr; +} + +static const char* GetFileExt(const nsACString& aFilename) { +#define _GetFileExt(_f, _l) GetFileExt(_f, _l, ArrayLength(_l)) + const char* ext = _GetFileExt( + aFilename, ApplicationReputationService::kBinaryFileExtensions); + if (ext == nullptr && + !_GetFileExt(aFilename, + ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables)) { + ext = _GetFileExt(aFilename, sExecutableExts); + } + return ext; +} + +// Returns true if the file extension matches one in the given array. +static bool IsFileType(const nsACString& aFilename, + const char* const aFileExtensions[], + const size_t aLength) { + return GetFileExt(aFilename, aFileExtensions, aLength) != nullptr; +} + +static bool IsBinary(const nsACString& aFilename) { + return IsFileType(aFilename, + ApplicationReputationService::kBinaryFileExtensions, + ArrayLength( + ApplicationReputationService::kBinaryFileExtensions)) || + (!IsFileType( + aFilename, ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables, + ArrayLength( + ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables)) && + IsFileType(aFilename, sExecutableExts, ArrayLength(sExecutableExts))); +} + +ClientDownloadRequest::DownloadType PendingLookup::GetDownloadType( + const nsACString& aFilename) { + MOZ_ASSERT(IsBinary(aFilename)); + + // From + // https://cs.chromium.org/chromium/src/chrome/common/safe_browsing/download_protection_util.cc?l=17 + if (StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".zip"_ns)) { + return ClientDownloadRequest::ZIPPED_EXECUTABLE; + } else if (StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".apk"_ns)) { + return ClientDownloadRequest::ANDROID_APK; + } else if (StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".app"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".applescript"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".cdr"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".dart"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".dc42"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".diskcopy42"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".dmg"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".dmgpart"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".dvdr"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".img"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".imgpart"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".iso"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".mpkg"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".ndif"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".osas"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".osax"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".pkg"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".scpt"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".scptd"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".seplugin"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".smi"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".sparsebundle"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".sparseimage"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".toast"_ns) || + StringEndsWith(aFilename, ".udif"_ns)) { + return ClientDownloadRequest::MAC_EXECUTABLE; + } + + return ClientDownloadRequest::WIN_EXECUTABLE; // default to Windows binaries +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::LookupNext() { + // We must call LookupNext or SendRemoteQuery upon return. + // Look up all of the URLs that could allow or block this download. + // Blocklist first. + + // If a url is in blocklist we should call PendingLookup::OnComplete directly. + MOZ_ASSERT(mBlocklistCount == 0); + + nsCString spec; + if (!mAnylistSpecs.IsEmpty()) { + // Check the source URI only. + spec = mAnylistSpecs.PopLastElement(); + RefPtr<PendingDBLookup> lookup(new PendingDBLookup(this)); + + // We don't need to check whitelist if the file is not a binary file. + auto type = + mIsBinaryFile ? LookupType::BothLists : LookupType::BlocklistOnly; + return lookup->LookupSpec(spec, type); + } + + if (!mBlocklistSpecs.IsEmpty()) { + // Check the referrer and redirect chain. + spec = mBlocklistSpecs.PopLastElement(); + RefPtr<PendingDBLookup> lookup(new PendingDBLookup(this)); + return lookup->LookupSpec(spec, LookupType::BlocklistOnly); + } + + // Now that we've looked up all of the URIs against the blocklist, + // if any of mAnylistSpecs or mAllowlistSpecs matched the allowlist, + // go ahead and pass. + if (mAllowlistCount > 0) { + return OnComplete(nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE, + Reason::LocalWhitelist, NS_OK); + } + + MOZ_ASSERT_IF(!mIsBinaryFile, mAllowlistSpecs.Length() == 0); + + // Only binary signatures remain. + if (!mAllowlistSpecs.IsEmpty()) { + spec = mAllowlistSpecs.PopLastElement(); + LOG(("PendingLookup::LookupNext: checking %s on allowlist", spec.get())); + RefPtr<PendingDBLookup> lookup(new PendingDBLookup(this)); + return lookup->LookupSpec(spec, LookupType::AllowlistOnly); + } + + if (!mFileName.IsEmpty()) { + if (IsBinary(mFileName)) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_TYPE:: + BinaryFile); + } else if (IsFileType(mFileName, kSafeFileExtensions, + ArrayLength(kSafeFileExtensions))) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_TYPE:: + NonBinaryFile); + } else if (IsFileType(mFileName, kMozNonBinaryExecutables, + ArrayLength(kMozNonBinaryExecutables))) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_TYPE:: + MozNonBinaryFile); + } else { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_TYPE:: + UnknownFile); + } + } else { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_TYPE:: + MissingFilename); + } + + if (IsFileType(mFileName, kDmgFileExtensions, + ArrayLength(kDmgFileExtensions))) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_ARCHIVE:: + DmgFile); + } else if (IsFileType(mFileName, kRarFileExtensions, + ArrayLength(kRarFileExtensions))) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_ARCHIVE:: + RarFile); + } else if (IsFileType(mFileName, kZipFileExtensions, + ArrayLength(kZipFileExtensions))) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_ARCHIVE:: + ZipFile); + } else if (mIsBinaryFile) { + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_BINARY_ARCHIVE:: + OtherBinaryFile); + } + + // There are no more URIs to check against local list. If the file is + // not eligible for remote lookup, bail. + if (!mIsBinaryFile) { + LOG(("Not eligible for remote lookups [this=%p]", this)); + return OnComplete(nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE, + Reason::NonBinaryFile, NS_OK); + } + + nsresult rv = SendRemoteQuery(); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return OnComplete(nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE, + Reason::InternalError, rv); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsCString PendingLookup::EscapeCertificateAttribute( + const nsACString& aAttribute) { + // Escape '/' because it's a field separator, and '%' because Chrome does + nsCString escaped; + escaped.SetCapacity(aAttribute.Length()); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < aAttribute.Length(); ++i) { + if (aAttribute.Data()[i] == '%') { + escaped.AppendLiteral("%25"); + } else if (aAttribute.Data()[i] == '/') { + escaped.AppendLiteral("%2F"); + } else if (aAttribute.Data()[i] == ' ') { + escaped.AppendLiteral("%20"); + } else { + escaped.Append(aAttribute.Data()[i]); + } + } + return escaped; +} + +nsCString PendingLookup::EscapeFingerprint(const nsACString& aFingerprint) { + // Google's fingerprint doesn't have colons + nsCString escaped; + escaped.SetCapacity(aFingerprint.Length()); + for (unsigned int i = 0; i < aFingerprint.Length(); ++i) { + if (aFingerprint.Data()[i] != ':') { + escaped.Append(aFingerprint.Data()[i]); + } + } + return escaped; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::GenerateWhitelistStringsForPair( + nsIX509Cert* certificate, nsIX509Cert* issuer) { + // The whitelist paths have format: + // http://sb-ssl.google.com/safebrowsing/csd/certificate/<issuer_cert_fingerprint>[/CN=<cn>][/O=<org>][/OU=<unit>] + // Any of CN, O, or OU may be omitted from the whitelist entry. Unfortunately + // this is not publicly documented, but the Chrome implementation can be found + // here: + // https://code.google.com/p/chromium/codesearch#search/&q=GetCertificateWhitelistStrings + nsCString whitelistString( + "http://sb-ssl.google.com/safebrowsing/csd/certificate/"); + + nsString fingerprint; + nsresult rv = issuer->GetSha1Fingerprint(fingerprint); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + whitelistString.Append(EscapeFingerprint(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(fingerprint))); + + nsString commonName; + rv = certificate->GetCommonName(commonName); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + if (!commonName.IsEmpty()) { + whitelistString.AppendLiteral("/CN="); + whitelistString.Append( + EscapeCertificateAttribute(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(commonName))); + } + + nsString organization; + rv = certificate->GetOrganization(organization); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + if (!organization.IsEmpty()) { + whitelistString.AppendLiteral("/O="); + whitelistString.Append( + EscapeCertificateAttribute(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(organization))); + } + + nsString organizationalUnit; + rv = certificate->GetOrganizationalUnit(organizationalUnit); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + if (!organizationalUnit.IsEmpty()) { + whitelistString.AppendLiteral("/OU="); + whitelistString.Append( + EscapeCertificateAttribute(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(organizationalUnit))); + } + LOG(("Whitelisting %s", whitelistString.get())); + + mAllowlistSpecs.AppendElement(whitelistString); + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::GenerateWhitelistStringsForChain( + const safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain& aChain) { + // We need a signing certificate and an issuer to construct a whitelist + // entry. + if (aChain.element_size() < 2) { + return NS_OK; + } + + // Get the signer. + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509CertDB> certDB = do_GetService(NS_X509CERTDB_CONTRACTID, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> signer; + nsTArray<uint8_t> signerBytes; + signerBytes.AppendElements(aChain.element(0).certificate().data(), + aChain.element(0).certificate().size()); + rv = certDB->ConstructX509(signerBytes, getter_AddRefs(signer)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + for (int i = 1; i < aChain.element_size(); ++i) { + // Get the issuer. + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> issuer; + nsTArray<uint8_t> issuerBytes; + issuerBytes.AppendElements(aChain.element(i).certificate().data(), + aChain.element(i).certificate().size()); + rv = certDB->ConstructX509(issuerBytes, getter_AddRefs(issuer)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + rv = GenerateWhitelistStringsForPair(signer, issuer); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::GenerateWhitelistStrings() { + for (int i = 0; i < mRequest.signature().certificate_chain_size(); ++i) { + nsresult rv = GenerateWhitelistStringsForChain( + mRequest.signature().certificate_chain(i)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::AddRedirects(nsIArray* aRedirects) { + uint32_t length = 0; + aRedirects->GetLength(&length); + LOG(("ApplicationReputation: Got %u redirects", length)); + nsCOMPtr<nsISimpleEnumerator> iter; + nsresult rv = aRedirects->Enumerate(getter_AddRefs(iter)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + bool hasMoreRedirects = false; + rv = iter->HasMoreElements(&hasMoreRedirects); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + while (hasMoreRedirects) { + nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> supports; + rv = iter->GetNext(getter_AddRefs(supports)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIRedirectHistoryEntry> redirectEntry = + do_QueryInterface(supports, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> principal; + rv = redirectEntry->GetPrincipal(getter_AddRefs(principal)); + auto* basePrin = BasePrincipal::Cast(principal); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + rv = basePrin->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // Add the spec to our list of local lookups. The most recent redirect is + // the last element. + nsCString spec; + rv = GetStrippedSpec(uri, spec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mBlocklistSpecs.AppendElement(spec); + LOG(("ApplicationReputation: Appending redirect %s\n", spec.get())); + + // Store the redirect information in the remote request. + ClientDownloadRequest_Resource* resource = mRequest.add_resources(); + resource->set_url(spec.get()); + resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_REDIRECT); + + rv = iter->HasMoreElements(&hasMoreRedirects); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::StartLookup() { + mStartTime = TimeStamp::Now(); + nsresult rv = DoLookupInternal(); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return OnComplete(nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE, + Reason::InternalError, NS_OK); + } + return rv; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::GetSpecHash(nsACString& aSpec, + nsACString& hexEncodedHash) { + nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> cryptoHash; + nsresult rv = + NS_NewCryptoHash(nsICryptoHash::SHA256, getter_AddRefs(cryptoHash)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + rv = cryptoHash->Update( + reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(aSpec.BeginReading()), aSpec.Length()); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsAutoCString binaryHash; + rv = cryptoHash->Finish(false, binaryHash); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // This needs to match HexEncode() in Chrome's + // src/base/strings/string_number_conversions.cc + static const char* const hex = "0123456789ABCDEF"; + hexEncodedHash.SetCapacity(2 * binaryHash.Length()); + for (size_t i = 0; i < binaryHash.Length(); ++i) { + auto c = static_cast<unsigned char>(binaryHash[i]); + hexEncodedHash.Append(hex[(c >> 4) & 0x0F]); + hexEncodedHash.Append(hex[c & 0x0F]); + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::GetStrippedSpec(nsIURI* aUri, nsACString& escaped) { + if (NS_WARN_IF(!aUri)) { + return NS_ERROR_INVALID_ARG; + } + + nsresult rv; + rv = aUri->GetScheme(escaped); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + if (escaped.EqualsLiteral("blob")) { + aUri->GetSpec(escaped); + LOG( + ("PendingLookup::GetStrippedSpec(): blob URL left unstripped as '%s' " + "[this = %p]", + PromiseFlatCString(escaped).get(), this)); + return NS_OK; + } + + if (escaped.EqualsLiteral("data")) { + // Replace URI with "data:<everything before comma>,SHA256(<whole URI>)" + aUri->GetSpec(escaped); + int32_t comma = escaped.FindChar(','); + if (comma > -1 && + static_cast<nsCString::size_type>(comma) < escaped.Length() - 1) { + MOZ_ASSERT(comma > 4, "Data URIs start with 'data:'"); + nsAutoCString hexEncodedHash; + rv = GetSpecHash(escaped, hexEncodedHash); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { + escaped.Truncate(comma + 1); + escaped.Append(hexEncodedHash); + } + } + + LOG( + ("PendingLookup::GetStrippedSpec(): data URL stripped to '%s' [this = " + "%p]", + PromiseFlatCString(escaped).get(), this)); + return NS_OK; + } + + // If aURI is not an nsIURL, we do not want to check the lists or send a + // remote query. + nsCOMPtr<nsIURL> url = do_QueryInterface(aUri, &rv); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + LOG( + ("PendingLookup::GetStrippedSpec(): scheme '%s' is not supported [this " + "= %p]", + PromiseFlatCString(escaped).get(), this)); + return rv; + } + + nsCString temp; + rv = url->GetHostPort(temp); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + escaped.AppendLiteral("://"); + escaped.Append(temp); + + rv = url->GetFilePath(temp); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // nsIUrl.filePath starts with '/' + escaped.Append(temp); + + LOG(("PendingLookup::GetStrippedSpec(): URL stripped to '%s' [this = %p]", + PromiseFlatCString(escaped).get(), this)); + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::DoLookupInternal() { + // We want to check the target URI, its referrer, and associated redirects + // against the local lists. + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = mQuery->GetSourceURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCString sourceSpec; + rv = GetStrippedSpec(uri, sourceSpec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + mAnylistSpecs.AppendElement(sourceSpec); + + ClientDownloadRequest_Resource* resource = mRequest.add_resources(); + resource->set_url(sourceSpec.get()); + resource->set_type(ClientDownloadRequest::DOWNLOAD_URL); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIReferrerInfo> referrerInfo; + mozilla::Unused << mQuery->GetReferrerInfo(getter_AddRefs(referrerInfo)); + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> referrer; + // It is quite possible that referrer header is omitted due to security reason + // (for example navigation from https-> http). Hence we should use the + // original referrer which has not applied referrer policy yet, to make sure + // we don't mistakenly allow unsafe download. + if (referrerInfo) { + referrer = referrerInfo->GetOriginalReferrer(); + } + + if (referrer) { + nsCString referrerSpec; + rv = GetStrippedSpec(referrer, referrerSpec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mBlocklistSpecs.AppendElement(referrerSpec); + resource->set_referrer(referrerSpec.get()); + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIArray> redirects; + rv = mQuery->GetRedirects(getter_AddRefs(redirects)); + if (redirects) { + AddRedirects(redirects); + } else { + LOG(("ApplicationReputation: Got no redirects [this=%p]", this)); + } + + rv = mQuery->GetSuggestedFileName(mFileName); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !mFileName.IsEmpty()) { + mIsBinaryFile = IsBinary(mFileName); + LOG(("Suggested filename: %s [binary = %d, this = %p]", mFileName.get(), + mIsBinaryFile, this)); + } else { + nsAutoCString errorName; + mozilla::GetErrorName(rv, errorName); + LOG(("No suggested filename [rv = %s, this = %p]", errorName.get(), this)); + mFileName.Truncate(); + } + + // We can skip parsing certificate for non-binary files because we only + // check local block list for them. + if (mIsBinaryFile) { + nsTArray<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>> sigArray; + rv = mQuery->GetSignatureInfo(sigArray); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + if (!sigArray.IsEmpty()) { + rv = ParseCertificates(sigArray); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + + rv = GenerateWhitelistStrings(); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + + // Start the call chain. + return LookupNext(); +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::OnComplete(uint32_t aVerdict, Reason aReason, + nsresult aRv) { + if (NS_FAILED(aRv)) { + nsAutoCString errorName; + mozilla::GetErrorName(aRv, errorName); + LOG( + ("Failed sending remote query for application reputation " + "[rv = %s, this = %p]", + errorName.get(), this)); + } + + if (mTimeoutTimer) { + mTimeoutTimer->Cancel(); + mTimeoutTimer = nullptr; + } + + bool shouldBlock = true; + switch (aVerdict) { + case nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_DANGEROUS: + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_BLOCK_DANGEROUS, true)) { + shouldBlock = false; + aReason = Reason::DangerousPrefOff; + } + break; + case nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_UNCOMMON: + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_BLOCK_UNCOMMON, true)) { + shouldBlock = false; + aReason = Reason::UncommonPrefOff; + } + break; + case nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED: + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_BLOCK_POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED, true)) { + shouldBlock = false; + aReason = Reason::UnwantedPrefOff; + } + break; + case nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_DANGEROUS_HOST: + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_BLOCK_DANGEROUS_HOST, true)) { + shouldBlock = false; + aReason = Reason::DangerousHostPrefOff; + } + break; + default: + shouldBlock = false; + break; + } + + AccumulateCategorical(aReason); + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SHOULD_BLOCK, + shouldBlock); + + double t = (TimeStamp::Now() - mStartTime).ToMilliseconds(); + LOG(("Application Reputation verdict is %u, obtained in %f ms [this = %p]", + aVerdict, t, this)); + if (shouldBlock) { + LOG(("Application Reputation check failed, blocking bad binary [this = %p]", + this)); + } else { + LOG(("Application Reputation check passed [this = %p]", this)); + } + + nsresult res = mCallback->OnComplete(shouldBlock, aRv, aVerdict); + return res; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::ParseCertificates( + const nsTArray<nsTArray<nsTArray<uint8_t>>>& aSigArray) { + // Binaries may be signed by multiple chains of certificates. If there are no + // chains, the binary is unsigned (or we were unable to extract signature + // information on a non-Windows platform) + + // Each chain may have multiple certificates. + for (const auto& certList : aSigArray) { + safe_browsing::ClientDownloadRequest_CertificateChain* certChain = + mRequest.mutable_signature()->add_certificate_chain(); + for (const auto& cert : certList) { + // Add this certificate to the protobuf to send remotely. + certChain->add_element()->set_certificate(cert.Elements(), cert.Length()); + } + } + if (mRequest.signature().certificate_chain_size() > 0) { + mRequest.mutable_signature()->set_trusted(true); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::SendRemoteQuery() { + MOZ_ASSERT(!IsFileType( + mFileName, ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables, + ArrayLength(ApplicationReputationService::kNonBinaryExecutables))); + Reason reason = Reason::NotSet; + nsresult rv = SendRemoteQueryInternal(reason); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return OnComplete(nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE, reason, + rv); + } + // SendRemoteQueryInternal has fired off the query and we call OnComplete in + // the nsIStreamListener.onStopRequest. + return rv; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::SendRemoteQueryInternal(Reason& aReason) { + auto scopeExit = mozilla::MakeScopeExit([&aReason]() { + if (aReason == Reason::NotSet) { + aReason = Reason::InternalError; + } + }); + + // If we aren't supposed to do remote lookups, bail. + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_REMOTE_ENABLED, false)) { + LOG(("Remote lookups are disabled [this = %p]", this)); + aReason = Reason::RemoteLookupDisabled; + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + // If the remote lookup URL is empty or absent, bail. + nsString serviceUrl; + nsCOMPtr<nsIURLFormatter> formatter( + do_GetService("@mozilla.org/toolkit/URLFormatterService;1")); + if (!formatter || + NS_FAILED(formatter->FormatURLPref( + NS_ConvertASCIItoUTF16(PREF_SB_APP_REP_URL), serviceUrl)) || + serviceUrl.IsEmpty() || u"about:blank"_ns.Equals(serviceUrl)) { + LOG(("Remote lookup URL is empty or absent [this = %p]", this)); + aReason = Reason::RemoteLookupDisabled; + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + LOG(("Sending remote query for application reputation [this = %p]", this)); + // We did not find a local result, so fire off the query to the + // application reputation service. + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv; + rv = mQuery->GetSourceURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + nsCString spec; + rv = GetStrippedSpec(uri, spec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mRequest.set_url(spec.get()); + + uint32_t fileSize; + rv = mQuery->GetFileSize(&fileSize); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mRequest.set_length(fileSize); + // We have no way of knowing whether or not a user initiated the + // download. Set it to true to lessen the chance of false positives. + mRequest.set_user_initiated(true); + + nsCString locale; + rv = LocaleService::GetInstance()->GetAppLocaleAsBCP47(locale); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mRequest.set_locale(locale.get()); + nsCString sha256Hash; + rv = mQuery->GetSha256Hash(sha256Hash); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mRequest.mutable_digests()->set_sha256( + std::string(sha256Hash.Data(), sha256Hash.Length())); + mRequest.set_file_basename(mFileName.get()); + mRequest.set_download_type(GetDownloadType(mFileName)); + + if (mRequest.signature().trusted()) { + LOG( + ("Got signed binary for remote application reputation check " + "[this = %p]", + this)); + } else { + LOG( + ("Got unsigned binary for remote application reputation check " + "[this = %p]", + this)); + } + + // Serialize the protocol buffer to a string. This can only fail if we are + // out of memory, or if the protocol buffer req is missing required fields + // (only the URL for now). + std::string serialized; + if (!mRequest.SerializeToString(&serialized)) { + return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; + } + + if (LOG_ENABLED()) { + nsAutoCString serializedStr(serialized.c_str(), serialized.length()); + serializedStr.ReplaceSubstring("\0"_ns, "\\0"_ns); + + LOG(("Serialized protocol buffer [this = %p]: (length=%zd) %s", this, + serializedStr.Length(), serializedStr.get())); + } + + // Set the input stream to the serialized protocol buffer + nsCOMPtr<nsIStringInputStream> sstream = + do_CreateInstance("@mozilla.org/io/string-input-stream;1", &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + rv = sstream->SetData(serialized.c_str(), serialized.length()); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // Set up the channel to transmit the request to the service. + nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetService(NS_IOSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + rv = ios->NewChannel(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(serviceUrl), nullptr, nullptr, + nullptr, // aLoadingNode + nsContentUtils::GetSystemPrincipal(), + nullptr, // aTriggeringPrincipal + nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL, + nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OTHER, getter_AddRefs(mChannel)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + mChannel->SetLoadFlags(nsIChannel::LOAD_BYPASS_URL_CLASSIFIER); + + nsCOMPtr<nsILoadInfo> loadInfo = mChannel->LoadInfo(); + mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs; + attrs.mFirstPartyDomain.AssignLiteral(NECKO_SAFEBROWSING_FIRST_PARTY_DOMAIN); + loadInfo->SetOriginAttributes(attrs); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(mChannel, &rv)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + mozilla::Unused << httpChannel; + + // Upload the protobuf to the application reputation service. + nsCOMPtr<nsIUploadChannel2> uploadChannel = do_QueryInterface(mChannel, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + rv = uploadChannel->ExplicitSetUploadStream( + sstream, "application/octet-stream"_ns, serialized.size(), "POST"_ns, + false); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + uint32_t timeoutMs = + Preferences::GetUint(PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_REMOTE_TIMEOUT, 10000); + NS_NewTimerWithCallback(getter_AddRefs(mTimeoutTimer), this, timeoutMs, + nsITimer::TYPE_ONE_SHOT); + + mTelemetryRemoteRequestStartMs = PR_IntervalNow(); + + rv = mChannel->AsyncOpen(this); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::Notify(nsITimer* aTimer) { + LOG(("Remote lookup timed out [this = %p]", this)); + MOZ_ASSERT(aTimer == mTimeoutTimer); + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_REMOTE_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT, + true); + mChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT_EXTERNAL); + mTimeoutTimer->Cancel(); + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::GetName(nsACString& aName) { + aName.AssignLiteral("PendingLookup"); + return NS_OK; +} + +/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +// nsIObserver implementation +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic, + const char16_t* aData) { + if (!strcmp(aTopic, "quit-application")) { + if (mTimeoutTimer) { + mTimeoutTimer->Cancel(); + mTimeoutTimer = nullptr; + } + if (mChannel) { + mChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT); + } + } + return NS_OK; +} + +//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// +//// nsIStreamListener +static nsresult AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* inputStream, + void* closure, const char* rawSegment, + uint32_t toOffset, uint32_t count, + uint32_t* writeCount) { + nsAutoCString* decodedData = static_cast<nsAutoCString*>(closure); + decodedData->Append(rawSegment, count); + *writeCount = count; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsIInputStream* aStream, + uint64_t offset, uint32_t count) { + uint32_t read; + return aStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &mResponse, count, &read); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) { return NS_OK; } + +NS_IMETHODIMP +PendingLookup::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsresult aResult) { + NS_ENSURE_STATE(mCallback); + + if (aResult != NS_ERROR_NET_TIMEOUT_EXTERNAL) { + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_REMOTE_LOOKUP_TIMEOUT, + false); + + MOZ_ASSERT(mTelemetryRemoteRequestStartMs > 0); + int32_t msecs = PR_IntervalToMilliseconds(PR_IntervalNow() - + mTelemetryRemoteRequestStartMs); + + MOZ_ASSERT(msecs >= 0); + mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate( + mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_REMOTE_LOOKUP_RESPONSE_TIME, + msecs); + } + + uint32_t verdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE; + Reason reason = Reason::NotSet; + nsresult rv = OnStopRequestInternal(aRequest, aResult, verdict, reason); + OnComplete(verdict, reason, rv); + return rv; +} + +nsresult PendingLookup::OnStopRequestInternal(nsIRequest* aRequest, + nsresult aResult, + uint32_t& aVerdict, + Reason& aReason) { + auto scopeExit = mozilla::MakeScopeExit([&aReason]() { + // If |aReason| is not set while exiting, there must be an error. + if (aReason == Reason::NotSet) { + aReason = Reason::NetworkError; + } + }); + + if (NS_FAILED(aResult)) { + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_FAILED); + AccumulateCategorical(NSErrorToLabel(aResult)); + return aResult; + } + + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(aRequest, &rv); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_FAILED); + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER_2:: + FailGetChannel); + return rv; + } + + uint32_t status = 0; + rv = channel->GetResponseStatus(&status); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_FAILED); + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER_2:: + FailGetResponse); + return rv; + } + + if (status != 200) { + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_FAILED); + AccumulateCategorical(HTTPStatusToLabel(status)); + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + std::string buf(mResponse.Data(), mResponse.Length()); + safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse response; + if (!response.ParseFromString(buf)) { + LOG(("Invalid protocol buffer response [this = %p]: %s", this, + buf.c_str())); + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_INVALID); + return NS_ERROR_CANNOT_CONVERT_DATA; + } + + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER, + SERVER_RESPONSE_VALID); + AccumulateCategorical( + mozilla::Telemetry::LABELS_APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER_2:: + ResponseValid); + + // Clamp responses 0-7, we only know about 0-4 for now. + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SERVER_VERDICT, + std::min<uint32_t>(response.verdict(), 7)); + const char* ext = GetFileExt(mFileName); + AccumulateCategoricalKeyed(nsCString(ext), VerdictToLabel(std::min<uint32_t>( + response.verdict(), 7))); + switch (response.verdict()) { + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::DANGEROUS: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_DANGEROUS; + aReason = Reason::VerdictDangerous; + break; + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::DANGEROUS_HOST: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_DANGEROUS_HOST; + aReason = Reason::VerdictDangerousHost; + break; + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_POTENTIALLY_UNWANTED; + aReason = Reason::VerdictUnwanted; + break; + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::UNCOMMON: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_UNCOMMON; + aReason = Reason::VerdictUncommon; + break; + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::UNKNOWN: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE; + aReason = Reason::VerdictUnknown; + break; + case safe_browsing::ClientDownloadResponse::SAFE: + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE; + aReason = Reason::VerdictSafe; + break; + default: + // Treat everything else as safe + aVerdict = nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE; + aReason = Reason::VerdictUnrecognized; + break; + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(ApplicationReputationService, nsIApplicationReputationService) + +ApplicationReputationService* + ApplicationReputationService::gApplicationReputationService = nullptr; + +already_AddRefed<ApplicationReputationService> +ApplicationReputationService::GetSingleton() { + if (!gApplicationReputationService) { + // Note: This is cleared in the new ApplicationReputationService destructor. + gApplicationReputationService = new ApplicationReputationService(); + } + return do_AddRef(gApplicationReputationService); +} + +ApplicationReputationService::ApplicationReputationService() { + LOG(("Application reputation service started up")); +} + +ApplicationReputationService::~ApplicationReputationService() { + LOG(("Application reputation service shutting down")); + MOZ_ASSERT(gApplicationReputationService == this); + gApplicationReputationService = nullptr; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +ApplicationReputationService::QueryReputation( + nsIApplicationReputationQuery* aQuery, + nsIApplicationReputationCallback* aCallback) { + LOG(("Starting application reputation check [query=%p]", aQuery)); + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aQuery); + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aCallback); + + nsresult rv = QueryReputationInternal(aQuery, aCallback); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + Reason reason = rv == NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE ? Reason::DPDisabled + : Reason::InternalError; + + AccumulateCategorical(reason); + Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::APPLICATION_REPUTATION_SHOULD_BLOCK, false); + + aCallback->OnComplete(false, rv, + nsIApplicationReputationService::VERDICT_SAFE); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult ApplicationReputationService::QueryReputationInternal( + nsIApplicationReputationQuery* aQuery, + nsIApplicationReputationCallback* aCallback) { + // If malware checks aren't enabled, don't query application reputation. + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_SB_MALWARE_ENABLED, false)) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + if (!Preferences::GetBool(PREF_SB_DOWNLOADS_ENABLED, false)) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + nsresult rv = aQuery->GetSourceURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + // Bail if the URI hasn't been set. + NS_ENSURE_STATE(uri); + + // Create a new pending lookup and start the call chain. + RefPtr<PendingLookup> lookup(new PendingLookup(aQuery, aCallback)); + + // Add an observer for shutdown + nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService = + mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); + if (!observerService) { + return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } + + observerService->AddObserver(lookup, "quit-application", true); + return lookup->StartLookup(); +} + +nsresult ApplicationReputationService::IsBinary(const nsACString& aFileName, + bool* aBinary) { + *aBinary = ::IsBinary(aFileName); + return NS_OK; +} + +nsresult ApplicationReputationService::IsExecutable(const nsACString& aFileName, + bool* aExecutable) { + *aExecutable = + ::IsFileType(aFileName, sExecutableExts, ArrayLength(sExecutableExts)); + return NS_OK; +} |