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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl | 335 |
1 files changed, 335 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl b/caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e0497db336 --- /dev/null +++ b/caps/nsIScriptSecurityManager.idl @@ -0,0 +1,335 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsISupports.idl" +#include "nsIPrincipal.idl" +interface nsIURI; +interface nsIChannel; +interface nsIClassInfo; +interface nsIDocShell; +interface nsIDomainPolicy; +interface nsILoadContext; + +%{ C++ +#include "jspubtd.h" + +namespace mozilla { +namespace dom { +class DomainPolicyClone; +} +} +%} + +[ptr] native JSContextPtr(JSContext); +[ptr] native JSObjectPtr(JSObject); +[ptr] native DomainPolicyClonePtr(mozilla::dom::DomainPolicyClone); + +[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(51daad87-3a0c-44cc-b620-7356801c9022)] +interface nsIScriptSecurityManager : nsISupports +{ + /** + * For each of these hooks returning NS_OK means 'let the action continue'. + * Returning an error code means 'veto the action'. XPConnect will return + * false to the js engine if the action is vetoed. The implementor of this + * interface is responsible for setting a JS exception into the JSContext + * if that is appropriate. + */ + [noscript] void canCreateWrapper(in JSContextPtr aJSContext, + in nsIIDRef aIID, + in nsISupports aObj, + in nsIClassInfo aClassInfo); + + [noscript] void canCreateInstance(in JSContextPtr aJSContext, + in nsCIDRef aCID); + + [noscript] void canGetService(in JSContextPtr aJSContext, + in nsCIDRef aCID); + + /** + * Check that the script currently running in context "cx" can load "uri". + * + * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request + * should be denied. + * + * @param cx the JSContext of the script causing the load + * @param uri the URI that is being loaded + */ + [noscript] void checkLoadURIFromScript(in JSContextPtr cx, in nsIURI uri); + + /** + * Default CheckLoadURI permissions + */ + // Default permissions + const unsigned long STANDARD = 0; + + // Indicate that the load is a load of a new document that is not + // user-triggered. Here "user-triggered" could be broadly interpreted -- + // for example, scripted sets of window.location.href might be treated as + // "user-triggered" in some circumstances. A typical example of a load + // that is not user-triggered is a <meta> refresh load. If this flag is + // set, the load will be denied if the originating principal's URI has the + // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT flag set. + const unsigned long LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 1 << 0; + + // Allow the loading of chrome URLs by non-chrome URLs. Use with great + // care! This will actually allow the loading of any URI which has the + // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE protocol handler flag set. Ths + // probably means at least chrome: and resource:. + const unsigned long ALLOW_CHROME = 1 << 1; + + // Don't allow URLs which would inherit the caller's principal (such as + // javascript: or data:) to load. See + // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT. + const unsigned long DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = 1 << 2; + + // Alias for DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL for backwards compat with + // JS-implemented extensions. + const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL; + + // Don't allow javascript: URLs to load + // WARNING: Support for this value was added in Mozilla 1.7.8 and + // Firefox 1.0.4. Use in prior versions WILL BE IGNORED. + // When using this, make sure that you actually want DISALLOW_SCRIPT, not + // DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL + const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT = 1 << 3; + + // Do not report errors if we just want to check if a principal can load + // a URI to not unnecessarily spam the error console. + const unsigned long DONT_REPORT_ERRORS = 1 << 4; + + /** + * Check that content with principal aPrincipal can load "uri". + * + * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request + * should be denied. + * + * @param aPrincipal the principal identifying the actor causing the load + * @param uri the URI that is being loaded + * @param flags the permission set, see above + * @param innerWindowID the window ID for error reporting. If this is 0 + * (which happens automatically if it's not passed from JS), errors + * will only appear in the browser console, not window-associated + * consoles like the web console. + */ + [binaryname(CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal)] + void checkLoadURIWithPrincipalXPCOM(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal, + in nsIURI uri, + in unsigned long flags, + [optional] in unsigned long long innerWindowID); + + /** + * Same as the above, but when called from JS, raises exceptions with more + * useful messages, including both the tested URI and the principal string. + */ + [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS)] + void checkLoadURIWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal, + in nsIURI uri, + [optional] in unsigned long flags, + [optional] in unsigned long long innerWindowID); + + /** + * Similar to checkLoadURIWithPrincipal but there are two differences: + * + * 1) The URI is a string, not a URI object. + * 2) This function assumes that the URI may still be subject to fixup (and + * hence will check whether fixed-up versions of the URI are allowed to + * load as well); if any of the versions of this URI is not allowed, this + * function will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI. + */ + [binaryname(CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal)] + void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipalXPCOM(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal, + in AUTF8String uri, + in unsigned long flags); + + /** + * Same as the above, but when called from JS, raises exceptions with more + * useful messages, including both the tested URI and the principal string. + */ + [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipalFromJS)] + void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal, + in AUTF8String uri, + [optional] in unsigned long flags); + + /** + * Returns true if the URI is from a domain that is allow-listed through + * prefs to be allowed to use file:// URIs. + * @param aUri the URI to be tested + */ + bool inFileURIAllowlist(in nsIURI aUri); + + ///////////////// Principals /////////////////////// + + /** + * Return the all-powerful system principal. + */ + nsIPrincipal getSystemPrincipal(); + + /** + * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the load context. + * @param loadContext to get the OriginAttributes from. + */ + nsIPrincipal getLoadContextContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri, + in nsILoadContext loadContext); + + /** + * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the docshell. + * @param docShell to get the OriginAttributes from. + */ + nsIPrincipal getDocShellContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri, + in nsIDocShell docShell); + + /** + * If this is a content principal, return a copy with different + * origin attributes. + */ + [implicit_jscontext] + nsIPrincipal principalWithOA(in nsIPrincipal principal, + in jsval originAttributes); + + /** + * Returns a principal whose origin is composed of |uri| and |originAttributes|. + * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and + * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults. + */ + [implicit_jscontext] + nsIPrincipal createContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri, in jsval originAttributes); + + /** + * Returns a principal whose origin is the one we pass in. + * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and + * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults. + */ + nsIPrincipal createContentPrincipalFromOrigin(in ACString origin); + + /** + * Takes a principal and returns a string representation of it or a nullptr if it can't be serialized. + * Example output: `{"1": {"0": "https://mozilla.com", "2": "^privateBrowsingId=1"}}` + */ + ACString principalToJSON(in nsIPrincipal principal); + + /** + * Takes a string of the following format: + * `{"1": {"0": "https://mozilla.com", "2": "^privateBrowsingId=1"}}` + * and turns it into a principal or a nullptr on error. + */ + nsIPrincipal JSONToPrincipal(in ACString json); + + /** + * Returns a unique nonce principal with |originAttributes|. + * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and + * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults. + */ + [implicit_jscontext] + nsIPrincipal createNullPrincipal(in jsval originAttributes); + + /** + * Returns OK if aSourceURI and target have the same "origin" + * (scheme, host, and port). + * ReportError flag suppresses error reports for functions that + * don't need reporting. + * FromPrivateWindow indicates whether the error occurs in a private + * window or not. + */ + void checkSameOriginURI(in nsIURI aSourceURI, + in nsIURI aTargetURI, + in boolean reportError, + in boolean fromPrivateWindow); + + /** + * Get the principal for the given channel. This will typically be the + * channel owner if there is one, and the content principal for the + * channel's URI otherwise. aChannel must not be null. + */ + nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel); + + /** + * Get the storage principal for the given channel. This is basically the + * same of getChannelResultPrincipal() execept for trackers, where we + * return a principal with a different OriginAttributes. + */ + nsIPrincipal getChannelResultStoragePrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel); + + /** + * This method returns 2 principals from a nsIChannel: + * - aPrincipal is the regular principal. + * - aPartitionedPrincipal is aPrincipal plus an isolation key in its + * originAttributes. + * See more in StoragePrincipalHelper.h + */ + void getChannelResultPrincipals(in nsIChannel aChannel, + out nsIPrincipal aPrincipal, + out nsIPrincipal aPartitionedPrincipal); + + /** + * Temporary API until bug 1220687 is fixed. + * + * Returns the same value as getChannelResultPrincipal, but ignoring + * sandboxing. Specifically, if sandboxing would have prevented the + * channel's triggering principal from being returned by + * getChannelResultPrincipal, the triggering principal will be returned + * by this method. + * + * Note that this method only ignores sandboxing of the channel in + * question, it does not ignore sandboxing of any channels further up a + * document chain. The triggering principal itself may still be the null + * principal due to sandboxing further up a document chain. In that regard + * the ignoring of sandboxing is limited. + */ + [noscript, nostdcall] + nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(in nsIChannel aChannel); + + /** + * Get the content principal for the channel's URI. + * aChannel must not be null. + */ + nsIPrincipal getChannelURIPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel); + + const unsigned long DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID = 0; + + const unsigned long DEFAULT_PRIVATE_BROWSING_ID = 0; + + /** + * Per-domain controls to enable and disable script. This system is designed + * to be used by at most one consumer, and enforces this with its semantics. + * + * Initially, domainPolicyActive is false. When activateDomainPolicy() is + * invoked, domainPolicyActive becomes true, and subsequent calls to + * activateDomainPolicy() will fail until deactivate() is invoked on the + * nsIDomainPolicy returned from activateDomainPolicy(). At this point, + * domainPolicyActive becomes false again, and a new consumer may acquire + * control of the system by invoking activateDomainPolicy(). + */ + nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicy(); + readonly attribute boolean domainPolicyActive; + + /** + * Only the parent process can directly access domain policies, child + * processes only have a read-only mirror to the one in the parent. + * For child processes the mirror is updated via messages + * and ContentChild will hold the DomainPolicy by calling + * ActivateDomainPolicyInternal directly. New consumer to this + * function should not be addded. + */ + [noscript] nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicyInternal(); + + /** + * This function is for internal use only. Every time a child process is spawned, we + * must clone any active domain policies in the parent to the new child. + */ + [noscript, notxpcom] void cloneDomainPolicy(in DomainPolicyClonePtr aClone); + + /** + * Query mechanism for the above policy. + * + * If domainPolicyEnabled is false, this simply returns the current value + * of javascript.enabled. Otherwise, it returns the same value, but taking + * the various blocklist/allowlist exceptions into account. + */ + bool policyAllowsScript(in nsIURI aDomain); +}; + +%{C++ +#define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1" +%} |