/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 8; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* vim: set ts=8 sts=2 et sw=2 tw=80: */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include #include #include "nsCOMPtr.h" #include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" #include "nsContentUtils.h" #include "nsCSPContext.h" #include "nsCSPParser.h" #include "nsCSPService.h" #include "nsGlobalWindowOuter.h" #include "nsError.h" #include "nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback.h" #include "nsIClassInfoImpl.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Document.h" #include "nsIHttpChannel.h" #include "nsIInterfaceRequestor.h" #include "nsIInterfaceRequestorUtils.h" #include "nsIObjectInputStream.h" #include "nsIObjectOutputStream.h" #include "nsIObserver.h" #include "nsIObserverService.h" #include "nsIStringStream.h" #include "nsISupportsPrimitives.h" #include "nsIUploadChannel.h" #include "nsIURIMutator.h" #include "nsIScriptError.h" #include "nsMimeTypes.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsIContentPolicy.h" #include "nsSupportsPrimitives.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "nsScriptSecurityManager.h" #include "nsStringStream.h" #include "mozilla/Logging.h" #include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_security.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CSPReportBinding.h" #include "mozilla/dom/CSPDictionariesBinding.h" #include "mozilla/ipc/PBackgroundSharedTypes.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h" #include "nsINetworkInterceptController.h" #include "nsSandboxFlags.h" #include "nsIScriptElement.h" #include "nsIEventTarget.h" #include "mozilla/dom/DocGroup.h" #include "mozilla/dom/Element.h" #include "nsXULAppAPI.h" #include "nsJSUtils.h" using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::dom; using namespace mozilla::ipc; static LogModule* GetCspContextLog() { static LazyLogModule gCspContextPRLog("CSPContext"); return gCspContextPRLog; } #define CSPCONTEXTLOG(args) \ MOZ_LOG(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args) #define CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED() \ MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspContextLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug) static LogModule* GetCspOriginLogLog() { static LazyLogModule gCspOriginPRLog("CSPOrigin"); return gCspOriginPRLog; } #define CSPORIGINLOG(args) \ MOZ_LOG(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, args) #define CSPORIGINLOGENABLED() \ MOZ_LOG_TEST(GetCspOriginLogLog(), mozilla::LogLevel::Debug) #ifdef DEBUG /** * This function is only used for verification purposes within * GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData. */ static bool ValidateDirectiveName(const nsAString& aDirective) { static const auto directives = []() { std::unordered_set directives; constexpr size_t dirLen = sizeof(CSPStrDirectives) / sizeof(CSPStrDirectives[0]); for (size_t i = 0; i < dirLen; ++i) { directives.insert(CSPStrDirectives[i]); } return directives; }(); nsAutoString directive(aDirective); auto itr = directives.find(NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(directive).get()); return itr != directives.end(); } #endif // DEBUG static void BlockedContentSourceToString( nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aSource, nsACString& aString) { switch (aSource) { case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eUnknown: aString.Truncate(); break; case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eInline: aString.AssignLiteral("inline"); break; case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eEval: aString.AssignLiteral("eval"); break; case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf: aString.AssignLiteral("self"); break; case nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eWasmEval: aString.AssignLiteral("wasm-eval"); break; } } /* ===== nsIContentSecurityPolicy impl ====== */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad(nsContentPolicyType aContentType, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, bool aSendViolationReports, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aParserCreated, int16_t* outDecision) { if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, aContentLocation: %s", aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); CSPCONTEXTLOG((">>>> aContentType: %d", aContentType)); } // This ShouldLoad function is called from nsCSPService::ShouldLoad, // which already checked a number of things, including: // * aContentLocation is not null; we can consume this without further checks // * scheme is not a allowlisted scheme (about: chrome:, etc). // * CSP is enabled // * Content Type is not allowlisted (CSP Reports, TYPE_DOCUMENT, etc). // * Fast Path for Apps // Default decision, CSP can revise it if there's a policy to enforce *outDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // If the content type doesn't map to a CSP directive, there's nothing for // CSP to do. CSPDirective dir = CSP_ContentTypeToDirective(aContentType); if (dir == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::NO_DIRECTIVE) { return NS_OK; } bool permitted = permitsInternal( dir, nullptr, // aTriggeringElement aCSPEventListener, aContentLocation, aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aNonce, false, // allow fallback to default-src aSendViolationReports, true, // send blocked URI in violation reports aParserCreated); *outDecision = permitted ? nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT : nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_SERVER; if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG( ("nsCSPContext::ShouldLoad, decision: %s, " "aContentLocation: %s", *outDecision > 0 ? "load" : "deny", aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); } return NS_OK; } bool nsCSPContext::permitsInternal( CSPDirective aDir, Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsIURI* aOriginalURIIfRedirect, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aSpecific, bool aSendViolationReports, bool aSendContentLocationInViolationReports, bool aParserCreated) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); bool permits = true; nsAutoString violatedDirective; for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { if (!mPolicies[p]->permits(aDir, aContentLocation, aNonce, !!aOriginalURIIfRedirect, aSpecific, aParserCreated, violatedDirective)) { // If the policy is violated and not report-only, reject the load and // report to the console if (!mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::permitsInternal, false")); permits = false; } // In CSP 3.0 the effective directive doesn't become the actually used // directive in case of a fallback from e.g. script-src-elem to // script-src or default-src. nsAutoString effectiveDirective; effectiveDirective.AssignASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir)); // Callers should set |aSendViolationReports| to false if this is a // preload - the decision may be wrong due to the inability to get the // nonce, and will incorrectly fail the unit tests. if (aSendViolationReports) { uint32_t lineNumber = 0; uint32_t columnNumber = 0; nsAutoString spec; JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext(); if (cx) { nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber); // If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0 // anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case. } AsyncReportViolation( aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, (aSendContentLocationInViolationReports ? aContentLocation : nullptr), BlockedContentSource::eUnknown, /* a BlockedContentSource */ aOriginalURIIfRedirect, /* in case of redirect originalURI is not null */ violatedDirective, effectiveDirective, p, /* policy index */ u""_ns, /* no observer subject */ spec, /* source file */ false, // aReportSample (no sample) u""_ns, /* no script sample */ lineNumber, /* line number */ columnNumber); /* column number */ } } } return permits; } /* ===== nsISupports implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_CLASSINFO(nsCSPContext, nullptr, nsIClassInfo::MAIN_THREAD_ONLY, NS_CSPCONTEXT_CID) NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS_CI(nsCSPContext, nsIContentSecurityPolicy, nsISerializable) nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext() : mInnerWindowID(0), mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck(false), mLoadingContext(nullptr), mLoadingPrincipal(nullptr), mQueueUpMessages(true) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::nsCSPContext")); } nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext() { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::~nsCSPContext")); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { delete mPolicies[i]; } } /* static */ bool nsCSPContext::Equals(nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aCSP, nsIContentSecurityPolicy* aOtherCSP) { if (aCSP == aOtherCSP) { // fast path for pointer equality return true; } uint32_t policyCount = 0; if (aCSP) { aCSP->GetPolicyCount(&policyCount); } uint32_t otherPolicyCount = 0; if (aOtherCSP) { aOtherCSP->GetPolicyCount(&otherPolicyCount); } if (policyCount != otherPolicyCount) { return false; } nsAutoString policyStr, otherPolicyStr; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < policyCount; ++i) { aCSP->GetPolicyString(i, policyStr); aOtherCSP->GetPolicyString(i, otherPolicyStr); if (!policyStr.Equals(otherPolicyStr)) { return false; } } return true; } nsresult nsCSPContext::InitFromOther(nsCSPContext* aOtherContext) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(aOtherContext); nsresult rv = NS_OK; nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(aOtherContext->mLoadingContext); if (doc) { rv = SetRequestContextWithDocument(doc); } else { rv = SetRequestContextWithPrincipal( aOtherContext->mLoadingPrincipal, aOtherContext->mSelfURI, aOtherContext->mReferrer, aOtherContext->mInnerWindowID); } NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aOtherContext->mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck; // This policy was already parsed somewhere else, don't emit parsing errors. mSuppressParserLogMessages = true; for (auto policy : aOtherContext->mPolicies) { nsAutoString policyStr; policy->toString(policyStr); AppendPolicy(policyStr, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(), policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag()); } mSuppressParserLogMessages = aOtherContext->mSuppressParserLogMessages; mIPCPolicies = aOtherContext->mIPCPolicies.Clone(); return NS_OK; } void nsCSPContext::EnsureIPCPoliciesRead() { // Most likely the parser errors already happened before serializing // the policy for IPC. bool previous = mSuppressParserLogMessages; mSuppressParserLogMessages = true; if (mIPCPolicies.Length() > 0) { nsresult rv; for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) { rv = AppendPolicy(policy.policy(), policy.reportOnlyFlag(), policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag()); Unused << NS_WARN_IF(NS_FAILED(rv)); } mIPCPolicies.Clear(); } mSuppressParserLogMessages = previous; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetPolicyString(uint32_t aIndex, nsAString& outStr) { outStr.Truncate(); EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) { return NS_ERROR_ILLEGAL_VALUE; } mPolicies[aIndex]->toString(outStr); return NS_OK; } const nsCSPPolicy* nsCSPContext::GetPolicy(uint32_t aIndex) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); if (aIndex >= mPolicies.Length()) { return nullptr; } return mPolicies[aIndex]; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetPolicyCount(uint32_t* outPolicyCount) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outPolicyCount = mPolicies.Length(); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetUpgradeInsecureRequests(bool* outUpgradeRequest) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outUpgradeRequest = false; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective( nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) { *outUpgradeRequest = true; return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetBlockAllMixedContent(bool* outBlockAllMixedContent) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outBlockAllMixedContent = false; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() && mPolicies[i]->hasDirective( nsIContentSecurityPolicy::BLOCK_ALL_MIXED_CONTENT)) { *outBlockAllMixedContent = true; return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetEnforcesFrameAncestors(bool* outEnforcesFrameAncestors) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outEnforcesFrameAncestors = false; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag() && mPolicies[i]->hasDirective( nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE)) { *outEnforcesFrameAncestors = true; return NS_OK; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy(const nsAString& aPolicyString, bool aReportOnly, bool aDeliveredViaMetaTag) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy: %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get())); // Use mSelfURI from setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} (bug 991474) MOZ_ASSERT( mLoadingPrincipal, "did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?"); MOZ_ASSERT( mSelfURI, "did you forget to call setRequestContextWith{Document,Principal}?"); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mLoadingPrincipal, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(mSelfURI, NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED); if (CSPORIGINLOGENABLED()) { nsAutoCString selfURISpec; mSelfURI->GetSpec(selfURISpec); CSPORIGINLOG(("CSP - AppendPolicy")); CSPORIGINLOG((" * selfURI: %s", selfURISpec.get())); CSPORIGINLOG((" * reportOnly: %s", aReportOnly ? "yes" : "no")); CSPORIGINLOG( (" * deliveredViaMetaTag: %s", aDeliveredViaMetaTag ? "yes" : "no")); CSPORIGINLOG( (" * policy: %s\n", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(aPolicyString).get())); } nsCSPPolicy* policy = nsCSPParser::parseContentSecurityPolicy( aPolicyString, mSelfURI, aReportOnly, this, aDeliveredViaMetaTag, mSuppressParserLogMessages); if (policy) { if (policy->hasDirective( nsIContentSecurityPolicy::UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE)) { nsAutoCString selfURIspec, referrer; if (mSelfURI) { mSelfURI->GetAsciiSpec(selfURIspec); } CopyUTF16toUTF8(mReferrer, referrer); CSPCONTEXTLOG( ("nsCSPContext::AppendPolicy added UPGRADE_IF_INSECURE_DIRECTIVE " "self-uri=%s referrer=%s", selfURIspec.get(), referrer.get())); } mPolicies.AppendElement(policy); // set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); if (doc) { doc->SetHasCSP(true); } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsEval) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outShouldReportViolation = false; *outAllowsEval = true; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns, false)) { // policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline // script if the policy is report-only. *outShouldReportViolation = true; if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { *outAllowsEval = false; } } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsWasmEval(bool* outShouldReportViolation, bool* outAllowsWasmEval) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); *outShouldReportViolation = false; *outAllowsWasmEval = true; if (!StaticPrefs::security_csp_wasm_unsafe_eval_enabled()) { // Allow and don't report when wasm-unsafe-eval isn't supported. return NS_OK; } for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { // Either 'unsafe-eval' or 'wasm-unsafe-eval' can allow this if (!mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns, false) && !mPolicies[i]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL, u""_ns, false)) { // policy is violated: must report the violation and allow the inline // script if the policy is report-only. *outShouldReportViolation = true; if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { *outAllowsWasmEval = false; } } } return NS_OK; } // Helper function to report inline violations void nsCSPContext::reportInlineViolation( CSPDirective aDirective, Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aSample, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, // TODO, use report only flag for that uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber) { nsString observerSubject; // if the nonce is non empty, then we report the nonce error, otherwise // let's report the hash error; no need to report the unsafe-inline error // anymore. if (!aNonce.IsEmpty()) { observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE || aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) ? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING( SCRIPT_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC) : NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING( STYLE_NONCE_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); } else { observerSubject = (aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE || aDirective == SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) ? NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING( SCRIPT_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC) : NS_LITERAL_STRING_FROM_CSTRING( STYLE_HASH_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); } nsAutoString sourceFile; uint32_t lineNumber; uint32_t columnNumber; JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext(); if (!cx || !nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, sourceFile, &lineNumber, &columnNumber)) { // use selfURI as the sourceFile if (mSelfURI) { nsAutoCString cSourceFile; mSelfURI->GetSpec(cSourceFile); sourceFile.Assign(NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(cSourceFile)); } lineNumber = aLineNumber; columnNumber = aColumnNumber; } AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr, // aBlockedURI BlockedContentSource::eInline, // aBlockedSource mSelfURI, // aOriginalURI aViolatedDirective, // aViolatedDirective aEffectiveDirective, // aEffectiveDirective aViolatedPolicyIndex, // aViolatedPolicyIndex observerSubject, // aObserverSubject sourceFile, // aSourceFile aReportSample, // aReportSample aSample, // aScriptSample lineNumber, // aLineNum columnNumber); // aColumnNum } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsInline(CSPDirective aDirective, bool aHasUnsafeHash, const nsAString& aNonce, bool aParserCreated, Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aContentOfPseudoScript, uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber, bool* outAllowsInline) { *outAllowsInline = true; if (aDirective != SCRIPT_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE && aDirective != SCRIPT_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE && aDirective != STYLE_SRC_ELEM_DIRECTIVE && aDirective != STYLE_SRC_ATTR_DIRECTIVE) { MOZ_ASSERT(false, "can only allow inline for (script/style)-src-(attr/elem)"); return NS_OK; } EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); nsAutoString content(u""_ns); // always iterate all policies, otherwise we might not send out all reports for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { bool allowed = mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_UNSAFE_INLINE, u""_ns, aParserCreated) || mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_NONCE, aNonce, aParserCreated); // If the inlined script or style is allowed by either unsafe-inline or the // nonce, go ahead and shortcut this loop so we can avoid allocating // unecessary strings if (allowed) { continue; } // Check the content length to ensure the content is not allocated more than // once. Even though we are in a for loop, it is probable that there is only // one policy, so this check may be unnecessary. if (content.IsEmpty() && aTriggeringElement) { nsCOMPtr element = do_QueryInterface(aTriggeringElement); if (element) { element->GetScriptText(content); } } if (content.IsEmpty()) { content = aContentOfPseudoScript; } // Per https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#match-element-to-source-list // Step 5. If type is "script" or "style", or unsafe-hashes flag is true: // // aHasUnsafeHash is true for event handlers (type "script attribute"), // style= attributes (type "style attribute") and the javascript: protocol. if (!aHasUnsafeHash || mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_UNSAFE_HASHES, u""_ns, aParserCreated)) { allowed = mPolicies[i]->allows(aDirective, CSP_HASH, content, aParserCreated); } if (!allowed) { // policy is violoated: deny the load unless policy is report only and // report the violation. if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { *outAllowsInline = false; } nsAutoString violatedDirective; bool reportSample = false; mPolicies[i]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType( aDirective, violatedDirective, &reportSample); // In CSP 3.0 the effective directive doesn't become the actually used // directive in case of a fallback from e.g. script-src-elem to // script-src or default-src. nsAutoString effectiveDirective; effectiveDirective.AssignASCII(CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDirective)); reportInlineViolation(aDirective, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aNonce, reportSample, content, violatedDirective, effectiveDirective, i, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber); } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetAllowsNavigateTo(nsIURI* aURI, bool aIsFormSubmission, bool aWasRedirected, bool aEnforceAllowlist, bool* outAllowsNavigateTo) { /* * The matrix below shows the different values of (aWasRedirect, * aEnforceAllowlist) for the three different checks we do. * * Navigation | Start Loading | Initiate Redirect | Document * | (nsDocShell) | (nsCSPService) | * ----------------------------------------------------------------- * A -> B (false,false) - (false,true) * A -> ... -> B (false,false) (true,false) (true,true) */ *outAllowsNavigateTo = false; EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); // The 'form-action' directive overrules 'navigate-to' for form submissions. // So in case this is a form submission and the directive 'form-action' is // present then there is nothing for us to do here, see: 6.3.3.1.2 // https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#navigate-to-pre-navigate if (aIsFormSubmission) { for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (mPolicies[i]->hasDirective( nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FORM_ACTION_DIRECTIVE)) { *outAllowsNavigateTo = true; return NS_OK; } } } bool atLeastOneBlock = false; for (unsigned long i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { if (!mPolicies[i]->allowsNavigateTo(aURI, aWasRedirected, aEnforceAllowlist)) { if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { atLeastOneBlock = true; } // If the load encountered a server side redirect, the spec suggests to // remove the path component from the URI, see: // https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP3/#source-list-paths-and-redirects nsCOMPtr blockedURIForReporting = aURI; if (aWasRedirected) { nsAutoCString prePathStr; nsCOMPtr prePathURI; nsresult rv = aURI->GetPrePath(prePathStr); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(blockedURIForReporting), prePathStr); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } // Lines numbers and source file for the violation report uint32_t lineNumber = 0; uint32_t columnNumber = 0; nsAutoCString spec; JSContext* cx = nsContentUtils::GetCurrentJSContext(); if (cx) { nsJSUtils::GetCallingLocation(cx, spec, &lineNumber, &columnNumber); // If GetCallingLocation fails linenumber & columnNumber are set to 0 // anyway so we can skip checking if that is the case. } // Report the violation nsresult rv = AsyncReportViolation( nullptr, // aTriggeringElement nullptr, // aCSPEventListener blockedURIForReporting, // aBlockedURI nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource::eSelf, // aBlockedSource nullptr, // aOriginalURI u"navigate-to"_ns, // aViolatedDirective u"navigate-to"_ns, // aEffectiveDirective i, // aViolatedPolicyIndex u""_ns, // aObserverSubject NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(spec), // aSourceFile false, // aReportSample u""_ns, // aScriptSample lineNumber, // aLineNum columnNumber); // aColumnNum NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } } *outAllowsNavigateTo = !atLeastOneBlock; return NS_OK; } /** * For each policy, log any violation on the Error Console and send a report * if a report-uri is present in the policy * * @param aViolationType * one of the VIOLATION_TYPE_* constants, e.g. inline-script or eval * @param aSourceFile * name of the source file containing the violation (if available) * @param aContentSample * sample of the violating content (to aid debugging) * @param aLineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) * @param aColumnNum * source column number of the violation (if available) * @param aNonce * (optional) If this is a nonce violation, include the nonce so we can * recheck to determine which policies were violated and send the * appropriate reports. * @param aContent * (optional) If this is a hash violation, include contents of the inline * resource in the question so we can recheck the hash in order to * determine which policies were violated and send the appropriate * reports. */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::LogViolationDetails( uint16_t aViolationType, Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample, int32_t aLineNum, int32_t aColumnNum, const nsAString& aNonce, const nsAString& aContent) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); BlockedContentSource blockedContentSource; enum CSPKeyword keyword; nsAutoString observerSubject; if (aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_EVAL) { blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eEval; keyword = CSP_UNSAFE_EVAL; observerSubject.AssignLiteral(EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); } else { NS_ASSERTION( aViolationType == nsIContentSecurityPolicy::VIOLATION_TYPE_WASM_EVAL, "unexpected aViolationType"); blockedContentSource = BlockedContentSource::eWasmEval; keyword = CSP_WASM_UNSAFE_EVAL; observerSubject.AssignLiteral(WASM_EVAL_VIOLATION_OBSERVER_TOPIC); } for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { NS_ASSERTION(mPolicies[p], "null pointer in nsTArray"); if (mPolicies[p]->allows(SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, keyword, u""_ns, false)) { continue; } nsAutoString violatedDirective; bool reportSample = false; mPolicies[p]->getDirectiveStringAndReportSampleForContentType( SCRIPT_SRC_DIRECTIVE, violatedDirective, &reportSample); AsyncReportViolation(aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, nullptr, blockedContentSource, nullptr, violatedDirective, u"script-src"_ns /* aEffectiveDirective */, p, observerSubject, aSourceFile, reportSample, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum); } return NS_OK; } #undef CASE_CHECK_AND_REPORT NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithDocument(Document* aDocument) { MOZ_ASSERT(aDocument, "Can't set context without doc"); NS_ENSURE_ARG(aDocument); mLoadingContext = do_GetWeakReference(aDocument); mSelfURI = aDocument->GetDocumentURI(); mLoadingPrincipal = aDocument->NodePrincipal(); aDocument->GetReferrer(mReferrer); mInnerWindowID = aDocument->InnerWindowID(); // the innerWindowID is not available for CSPs delivered through the // header at the time setReqeustContext is called - let's queue up // console messages until it becomes available, see flushConsoleMessages mQueueUpMessages = !mInnerWindowID; mCallingChannelLoadGroup = aDocument->GetDocumentLoadGroup(); // set the flag on the document for CSP telemetry mEventTarget = aDocument->EventTargetFor(TaskCategory::Other); MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal"); MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI"); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::SetRequestContextWithPrincipal(nsIPrincipal* aRequestPrincipal, nsIURI* aSelfURI, const nsAString& aReferrer, uint64_t aInnerWindowId) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(aRequestPrincipal); mLoadingPrincipal = aRequestPrincipal; mSelfURI = aSelfURI; mReferrer = aReferrer; mInnerWindowID = aInnerWindowId; // if no document is available, then it also does not make sense to queue // console messages sending messages to the browser console instead of the web // console in that case. mQueueUpMessages = false; mCallingChannelLoadGroup = nullptr; mEventTarget = nullptr; MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a valid requestPrincipal"); MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need mSelfURI to translate 'self' into actual URI"); return NS_OK; } nsIPrincipal* nsCSPContext::GetRequestPrincipal() { return mLoadingPrincipal; } nsIURI* nsCSPContext::GetSelfURI() { return mSelfURI; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetReferrer(nsAString& outReferrer) { outReferrer.Truncate(); outReferrer.Append(mReferrer); return NS_OK; } uint64_t nsCSPContext::GetInnerWindowID() { return mInnerWindowID; } bool nsCSPContext::GetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck() { return mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck; } void nsCSPContext::SetSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck( bool aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck) { mSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck = aSkipAllowInlineStyleCheck; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::EnsureEventTarget(nsIEventTarget* aEventTarget) { NS_ENSURE_ARG(aEventTarget); // Don't bother if we did have a valid event target (if the csp object is // tied to a document in SetRequestContextWithDocument) if (mEventTarget) { return NS_OK; } mEventTarget = aEventTarget; return NS_OK; } struct ConsoleMsgQueueElem { nsString mMsg; nsString mSourceName; nsString mSourceLine; uint32_t mLineNumber; uint32_t mColumnNumber; uint32_t mSeverityFlag; nsCString mCategory; }; void nsCSPContext::flushConsoleMessages() { bool privateWindow = false; // should flush messages even if doc is not available nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); if (doc) { mInnerWindowID = doc->InnerWindowID(); privateWindow = !!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId; } mQueueUpMessages = false; for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mConsoleMsgQueue.Length(); i++) { ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = mConsoleMsgQueue[i]; CSP_LogMessage(elem.mMsg, elem.mSourceName, elem.mSourceLine, elem.mLineNumber, elem.mColumnNumber, elem.mSeverityFlag, elem.mCategory, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow); } mConsoleMsgQueue.Clear(); } void nsCSPContext::logToConsole(const char* aName, const nsTArray& aParams, const nsAString& aSourceName, const nsAString& aSourceLine, uint32_t aLineNumber, uint32_t aColumnNumber, uint32_t aSeverityFlag) { // we are passing aName as the category so we can link to the // appropriate MDN docs depending on the specific error. nsDependentCString category(aName); // Fallback nsAutoString sourceName(aSourceName); if (sourceName.IsEmpty() && mSelfURI) { nsAutoCString spec; mSelfURI->GetSpec(spec); CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, sourceName); } // let's check if we have to queue up console messages if (mQueueUpMessages) { nsAutoString msg; CSP_GetLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, msg); ConsoleMsgQueueElem& elem = *mConsoleMsgQueue.AppendElement(); elem.mMsg = msg; elem.mSourceName = PromiseFlatString(sourceName); elem.mSourceLine = PromiseFlatString(aSourceLine); elem.mLineNumber = aLineNumber; elem.mColumnNumber = aColumnNumber; elem.mSeverityFlag = aSeverityFlag; elem.mCategory = category; return; } bool privateWindow = false; nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); if (doc) { privateWindow = !!doc->NodePrincipal()->OriginAttributesRef().mPrivateBrowsingId; } CSP_LogLocalizedStr(aName, aParams, sourceName, aSourceLine, aLineNumber, aColumnNumber, aSeverityFlag, category, mInnerWindowID, privateWindow); } /** * Strip URI for reporting according to: * https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/#security-violation-reports * * @param aSelfURI * The URI of the CSP policy. Used for cross-origin checks. * @param aURI * The URI of the blocked resource. In case of a redirect, this it the * initial URI the request started out with, not the redirected URI. * @param aEffectiveDirective * The effective directive that triggered this report * @return The ASCII serialization of the uri to be reported ignoring * the ref part of the URI. */ void StripURIForReporting(nsIURI* aSelfURI, nsIURI* aURI, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, nsACString& outStrippedURI) { // If the origin of aURI is a globally unique identifier (for example, // aURI has a scheme of data, blob, or filesystem), then // return the ASCII serialization of uri’s scheme. bool isHttpFtpOrWs = (aURI->SchemeIs("http") || aURI->SchemeIs("https") || aURI->SchemeIs("ftp") || aURI->SchemeIs("ws") || aURI->SchemeIs("wss")); if (!isHttpFtpOrWs) { // not strictly spec compliant, but what we really care about is // http/https and also ftp. If it's not http/https or ftp, then treat aURI // as if it's a globally unique identifier and just return the scheme. aURI->GetScheme(outStrippedURI); return; } // For cross-origin URIs in frame-src also strip the path. // This prevents detailed tracking of pages loaded into an iframe // by the embedding page using a report-only policy. if (aEffectiveDirective.EqualsLiteral("frame-src") || aEffectiveDirective.EqualsLiteral("object-src")) { nsIScriptSecurityManager* ssm = nsContentUtils::GetSecurityManager(); if (NS_FAILED(ssm->CheckSameOriginURI(aSelfURI, aURI, false, false))) { aURI->GetPrePath(outStrippedURI); return; } } // Return aURI, with any fragment component removed. aURI->GetSpecIgnoringRef(outStrippedURI); } nsresult nsCSPContext::GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData( nsIURI* aBlockedURI, const nsACString& aBlockedString, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aSourceFile, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum, mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1); MOZ_ASSERT(ValidateDirectiveName(aEffectiveDirective), "Invalid directive name"); nsresult rv; // document-uri nsAutoCString reportDocumentURI; StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, mSelfURI, aEffectiveDirective, reportDocumentURI); CopyUTF8toUTF16(reportDocumentURI, aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI); // referrer aViolationEventInit.mReferrer = mReferrer; // blocked-uri if (aBlockedURI) { nsAutoCString reportBlockedURI; StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, aOriginalURI ? aOriginalURI : aBlockedURI, aEffectiveDirective, reportBlockedURI); CopyUTF8toUTF16(reportBlockedURI, aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI); } else { CopyUTF8toUTF16(aBlockedString, aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI); } // effective-directive // The name of the policy directive that was violated. aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective = aEffectiveDirective; // violated-directive // In CSP2, the policy directive that was violated, as it appears in the // policy. In CSP3, the same as effective-directive. aViolationEventInit.mViolatedDirective = aEffectiveDirective; // original-policy nsAutoString originalPolicy; rv = this->GetPolicyString(aViolatedPolicyIndex, originalPolicy); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy = originalPolicy; // source-file if (!aSourceFile.IsEmpty()) { // if aSourceFile is a URI, we have to make sure to strip fragments nsCOMPtr sourceURI; NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(sourceURI), aSourceFile); if (sourceURI) { nsAutoCString spec; StripURIForReporting(mSelfURI, sourceURI, aEffectiveDirective, spec); CopyUTF8toUTF16(spec, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile); } else { aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile = aSourceFile; } } // sample (already truncated) aViolationEventInit.mSample = aScriptSample; // disposition aViolationEventInit.mDisposition = mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag() ? mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Report : mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventDisposition::Enforce; // status-code uint16_t statusCode = 0; { nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); if (doc) { nsCOMPtr channel = do_QueryInterface(doc->GetChannel()); if (channel) { uint32_t responseStatus = 0; nsresult rv = channel->GetResponseStatus(&responseStatus); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && (responseStatus <= UINT16_MAX)) { statusCode = static_cast(responseStatus); } } } } aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode = statusCode; // line-number aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber = aLineNum; // column-number aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber = aColumnNum; aViolationEventInit.mBubbles = true; aViolationEventInit.mComposed = true; return NS_OK; } nsresult nsCSPContext::SendReports( const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1); dom::CSPReport report; // blocked-uri report.mCsp_report.mBlocked_uri = aViolationEventInit.mBlockedURI; // document-uri report.mCsp_report.mDocument_uri = aViolationEventInit.mDocumentURI; // original-policy report.mCsp_report.mOriginal_policy = aViolationEventInit.mOriginalPolicy; // referrer report.mCsp_report.mReferrer = aViolationEventInit.mReferrer; // effective-directive report.mCsp_report.mEffective_directive = aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective; // violated-directive report.mCsp_report.mViolated_directive = aViolationEventInit.mEffectiveDirective; // disposition report.mCsp_report.mDisposition = aViolationEventInit.mDisposition; // status-code report.mCsp_report.mStatus_code = aViolationEventInit.mStatusCode; // source-file if (!aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile.IsEmpty()) { report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mSource_file.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile; } // script-sample if (!aViolationEventInit.mSample.IsEmpty()) { report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mScript_sample.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mSample; } // line-number if (aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber != 0) { report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mLine_number.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber; } if (aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber != 0) { report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Construct(); report.mCsp_report.mColumn_number.Value() = aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber; } nsString csp_report; if (!report.ToJSON(csp_report)) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } // ---------- Assembled, now send it to all the report URIs ----------- // nsTArray reportURIs; mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportURIs(reportURIs); nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); nsCOMPtr reportURI; nsCOMPtr reportChannel; nsresult rv; for (uint32_t r = 0; r < reportURIs.Length(); r++) { nsAutoCString reportURICstring = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(reportURIs[r]); // try to create a new uri from every report-uri string rv = NS_NewURI(getter_AddRefs(reportURI), reportURIs[r]); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { AutoTArray params = {reportURIs[r]}; CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create nsIURI for report URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber, aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag); continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs } // try to create a new channel for every report-uri if (doc) { rv = NS_NewChannel(getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, doc, nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL, nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT); } else { rv = NS_NewChannel( getter_AddRefs(reportChannel), reportURI, mLoadingPrincipal, nsILoadInfo::SEC_ALLOW_CROSS_ORIGIN_SEC_CONTEXT_IS_NULL, nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT); } if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("Could not create new channel for report URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); continue; // don't return yet, there may be more URIs } // log a warning to console if scheme is not http or https bool isHttpScheme = reportURI->SchemeIs("http") || reportURI->SchemeIs("https"); if (!isHttpScheme) { AutoTArray params = {reportURIs[r]}; logToConsole( "reportURInotHttpsOrHttp2", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber, aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag); continue; } // make sure this is an anonymous request (no cookies) so in case the // policy URI is injected, it can't be abused for CSRF. nsLoadFlags flags; rv = reportChannel->GetLoadFlags(&flags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); flags |= nsIRequest::LOAD_ANONYMOUS; rv = reportChannel->SetLoadFlags(flags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // we need to set an nsIChannelEventSink on the channel object // so we can tell it to not follow redirects when posting the reports RefPtr reportSink = new CSPReportRedirectSink(); if (doc && doc->GetDocShell()) { nsCOMPtr interceptController = do_QueryInterface(doc->GetDocShell()); reportSink->SetInterceptController(interceptController); } reportChannel->SetNotificationCallbacks(reportSink); // apply the loadgroup taken by setRequestContextWithDocument. If there's // no loadgroup, AsyncOpen will fail on process-split necko (since the // channel cannot query the iBrowserChild). rv = reportChannel->SetLoadGroup(mCallingChannelLoadGroup); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // wire in the string input stream to send the report nsCOMPtr sis( do_CreateInstance(NS_STRINGINPUTSTREAM_CONTRACTID)); NS_ASSERTION(sis, "nsIStringInputStream is needed but not available to send CSP " "violation reports"); nsAutoCString utf8CSPReport = NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(csp_report); rv = sis->SetData(utf8CSPReport.get(), utf8CSPReport.Length()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr uploadChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel)); if (!uploadChannel) { // It's possible the URI provided can't be uploaded to, in which case // we skip this one. We'll already have warned about a non-HTTP URI // earlier. continue; } rv = uploadChannel->SetUploadStream(sis, "application/csp-report"_ns, -1); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // if this is an HTTP channel, set the request method to post nsCOMPtr httpChannel(do_QueryInterface(reportChannel)); if (httpChannel) { rv = httpChannel->SetRequestMethod("POST"_ns); MOZ_ASSERT(NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)); } RefPtr listener = new CSPViolationReportListener(); rv = reportChannel->AsyncOpen(listener); // AsyncOpen should not fail, but could if there's no load group (like if // SetRequestContextWith{Document,Principal} is not given a channel). This // should fail quietly and not return an error since it's really ok if // reports don't go out, but it's good to log the error locally. if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { AutoTArray params = {reportURIs[r]}; CSPCONTEXTLOG(("AsyncOpen failed for report URI %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(params[0]).get())); logToConsole("triedToSendReport", params, aViolationEventInit.mSourceFile, aViolationEventInit.mSample, aViolationEventInit.mLineNumber, aViolationEventInit.mColumnNumber, nsIScriptError::errorFlag); } else { CSPCONTEXTLOG( ("Sent violation report to URI %s", reportURICstring.get())); } } return NS_OK; } nsresult nsCSPContext::FireViolationEvent( Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, const mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit& aViolationEventInit) { if (aCSPEventListener) { nsAutoString json; if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) { aCSPEventListener->OnCSPViolationEvent(json); } } // 1. If target is not null, and global is a Window, and target’s // shadow-including root is not global’s associated Document, set target to // null. RefPtr eventTarget = aTriggeringElement; nsCOMPtr doc = do_QueryReferent(mLoadingContext); if (doc && aTriggeringElement && aTriggeringElement->GetComposedDoc() != doc) { eventTarget = nullptr; } if (!eventTarget) { // If target is a Window, set target to target’s associated Document. eventTarget = doc; } if (!eventTarget && mInnerWindowID && XRE_IsParentProcess()) { if (RefPtr parent = WindowGlobalParent::GetByInnerWindowId(mInnerWindowID)) { nsAutoString json; if (aViolationEventInit.ToJSON(json)) { Unused << parent->SendDispatchSecurityPolicyViolation(json); } } return NS_OK; } if (!eventTarget) { // If we are here, we are probably dealing with workers. Those are handled // via nsICSPEventListener. Nothing to do here. return NS_OK; } RefPtr event = mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEvent::Constructor( eventTarget, u"securitypolicyviolation"_ns, aViolationEventInit); event->SetTrusted(true); ErrorResult rv; eventTarget->DispatchEvent(*event, rv); return rv.StealNSResult(); } /** * Dispatched from the main thread to send reports for one CSP violation. */ class CSPReportSenderRunnable final : public Runnable { public: CSPReportSenderRunnable( Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aBlockedURI, nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, bool aReportOnlyFlag, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile, bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum, nsCSPContext* aCSPContext) : mozilla::Runnable("CSPReportSenderRunnable"), mTriggeringElement(aTriggeringElement), mCSPEventListener(aCSPEventListener), mBlockedURI(aBlockedURI), mBlockedContentSource(aBlockedContentSource), mOriginalURI(aOriginalURI), mViolatedPolicyIndex(aViolatedPolicyIndex), mReportOnlyFlag(aReportOnlyFlag), mReportSample(aReportSample), mViolatedDirective(aViolatedDirective), mEffectiveDirective(aEffectiveDirective), mSourceFile(aSourceFile), mScriptSample(aScriptSample), mLineNum(aLineNum), mColumnNum(aColumnNum), mCSPContext(aCSPContext) { NS_ASSERTION(!aViolatedDirective.IsEmpty(), "Can not send reports without a violated directive"); // the observer subject is an nsISupports: either an nsISupportsCString // from the arg passed in directly, or if that's empty, it's the blocked // source. if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty() && mBlockedURI) { mObserverSubject = aBlockedURI; return; } nsAutoCString subject; if (aObserverSubject.IsEmpty()) { BlockedContentSourceToString(aBlockedContentSource, subject); } else { CopyUTF16toUTF8(aObserverSubject, subject); } nsCOMPtr supportscstr = do_CreateInstance(NS_SUPPORTS_CSTRING_CONTRACTID); if (supportscstr) { supportscstr->SetData(subject); mObserverSubject = do_QueryInterface(supportscstr); } // Truncate sample string. uint32_t length = mScriptSample.Length(); if (length > nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) { uint32_t desiredLength = nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength(); // Don't cut off right before a low surrogate. Just include it. if (NS_IS_LOW_SURROGATE(mScriptSample[desiredLength])) { desiredLength++; } mScriptSample.Replace(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength(), length - desiredLength, nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis()); } } NS_IMETHOD Run() override { MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread()); nsresult rv; // 0) prepare violation data mozilla::dom::SecurityPolicyViolationEventInit init; nsAutoCString blockedContentSource; BlockedContentSourceToString(mBlockedContentSource, blockedContentSource); rv = mCSPContext->GatherSecurityPolicyViolationEventData( mBlockedURI, blockedContentSource, mOriginalURI, mEffectiveDirective, mViolatedPolicyIndex, mSourceFile, mReportSample ? mScriptSample : EmptyString(), mLineNum, mColumnNum, init); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // 1) notify observers nsCOMPtr observerService = mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); if (mObserverSubject && observerService) { rv = observerService->NotifyObservers( mObserverSubject, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, mViolatedDirective.get()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } // 2) send reports for the policy that was violated mCSPContext->SendReports(init, mViolatedPolicyIndex); // 3) log to console (one per policy violation) if (mBlockedURI) { mBlockedURI->GetSpec(blockedContentSource); if (blockedContentSource.Length() > nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) { bool isData = mBlockedURI->SchemeIs("data"); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && isData && blockedContentSource.Length() > nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()) { blockedContentSource.Truncate(nsCSPContext::ScriptSampleMaxLength()); blockedContentSource.Append( NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(nsContentUtils::GetLocalizedEllipsis())); } } } if (blockedContentSource.Length() > 0) { nsString blockedContentSource16 = NS_ConvertUTF8toUTF16(blockedContentSource); AutoTArray params = {mViolatedDirective, blockedContentSource16}; mCSPContext->logToConsole( mReportOnlyFlag ? "CSPROViolationWithURI" : "CSPViolationWithURI", params, mSourceFile, mScriptSample, mLineNum, mColumnNum, nsIScriptError::errorFlag); } // 4) fire violation event // A frame-ancestors violation has occurred, but we should not dispatch // the violation event to a potentially cross-origin ancestor. if (!mViolatedDirective.EqualsLiteral("frame-ancestors")) { mCSPContext->FireViolationEvent(mTriggeringElement, mCSPEventListener, init); } return NS_OK; } private: RefPtr mTriggeringElement; nsCOMPtr mCSPEventListener; nsCOMPtr mBlockedURI; nsCSPContext::BlockedContentSource mBlockedContentSource; nsCOMPtr mOriginalURI; uint32_t mViolatedPolicyIndex; bool mReportOnlyFlag; bool mReportSample; nsString mViolatedDirective; nsString mEffectiveDirective; nsCOMPtr mObserverSubject; nsString mSourceFile; nsString mScriptSample; uint32_t mLineNum; uint32_t mColumnNum; RefPtr mCSPContext; }; /** * Asynchronously notifies any nsIObservers listening to the CSP violation * topic that a violation occurred. Also triggers report sending and console * logging. All asynchronous on the main thread. * * @param aTriggeringElement * The element that triggered this report violation. It can be null. * @param aBlockedContentSource * Either a CSP Source (like 'self', as string) or nsIURI: the source * of the violation. * @param aOriginalUri * The original URI if the blocked content is a redirect, else null * @param aViolatedDirective * the directive that was violated (string). * @param aViolatedPolicyIndex * the index of the policy that was violated (so we know where to send * the reports). * @param aObserverSubject * optional, subject sent to the nsIObservers listening to the CSP * violation topic. * @param aSourceFile * name of the file containing the inline script violation * @param aScriptSample * a sample of the violating inline script * @param aLineNum * source line number of the violation (if available) * @param aColumnNum * source column number of the violation (if available) */ nsresult nsCSPContext::AsyncReportViolation( Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aBlockedURI, BlockedContentSource aBlockedContentSource, nsIURI* aOriginalURI, const nsAString& aViolatedDirective, const nsAString& aEffectiveDirective, uint32_t aViolatedPolicyIndex, const nsAString& aObserverSubject, const nsAString& aSourceFile, bool aReportSample, const nsAString& aScriptSample, uint32_t aLineNum, uint32_t aColumnNum) { EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); NS_ENSURE_ARG_MAX(aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies.Length() - 1); nsCOMPtr task = new CSPReportSenderRunnable( aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aBlockedURI, aBlockedContentSource, aOriginalURI, aViolatedPolicyIndex, mPolicies[aViolatedPolicyIndex]->getReportOnlyFlag(), aViolatedDirective, aEffectiveDirective, aObserverSubject, aSourceFile, aReportSample, aScriptSample, aLineNum, aColumnNum, this); if (XRE_IsContentProcess()) { if (mEventTarget) { mEventTarget->Dispatch(task.forget(), NS_DISPATCH_NORMAL); return NS_OK; } } NS_DispatchToMainThread(task.forget()); return NS_OK; } /** * Based on the given loadinfo, determines if this CSP context allows the * ancestry. * * In order to determine the URI of the parent document (one causing the load * of this protected document), this function traverses all Browsing Contexts * until it reaches the top level browsing context. */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry(nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, bool* outPermitsAncestry) { nsresult rv; *outPermitsAncestry = true; RefPtr ctx; aLoadInfo->GetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(ctx)); // extract the ancestry as an array nsCOMArray ancestorsArray; nsCOMPtr uriClone; while (ctx) { nsCOMPtr currentPrincipal; // Generally permitsAncestry is consulted from within the // DocumentLoadListener in the parent process. For loads of type object // and embed it's called from the Document in the content process. // After Bug 1646899 we should be able to remove that branching code for // querying the currentURI. if (XRE_IsParentProcess()) { WindowGlobalParent* window = ctx->Canonical()->GetCurrentWindowGlobal(); if (window) { // Using the URI of the Principal and not the document because e.g. // about:blank inherits the principal and hence the URI of the // document does not reflect the security context of the document. currentPrincipal = window->DocumentPrincipal(); } } else if (nsPIDOMWindowOuter* windowOuter = ctx->GetDOMWindow()) { currentPrincipal = nsGlobalWindowOuter::Cast(windowOuter)->GetPrincipal(); } if (currentPrincipal) { nsCOMPtr currentURI; auto* currentBasePrincipal = BasePrincipal::Cast(currentPrincipal); currentBasePrincipal->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(currentURI)); if (currentURI) { nsAutoCString spec; currentURI->GetSpec(spec); // delete the userpass from the URI. rv = NS_MutateURI(currentURI) .SetRef(""_ns) .SetUserPass(""_ns) .Finalize(uriClone); // If setUserPass fails for some reason, just return a clone of the // current URI if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { rv = NS_GetURIWithoutRef(currentURI, getter_AddRefs(uriClone)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } ancestorsArray.AppendElement(uriClone); } } ctx = ctx->GetParent(); } nsAutoString violatedDirective; // Now that we've got the ancestry chain in ancestorsArray, time to check // them against any CSP. // NOTE: the ancestors are not allowed to be sent cross origin; this is a // restriction not placed on subresource loads. for (uint32_t a = 0; a < ancestorsArray.Length(); a++) { if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::PermitsAncestry, checking ancestor: %s", ancestorsArray[a]->GetSpecOrDefault().get())); } // omit the ancestor URI in violation reports if cross-origin as per spec // (it is a violation of the same-origin policy). bool okToSendAncestor = NS_SecurityCompareURIs(ancestorsArray[a], mSelfURI, true); bool permits = permitsInternal(nsIContentSecurityPolicy::FRAME_ANCESTORS_DIRECTIVE, nullptr, // triggering element nullptr, // nsICSPEventListener ancestorsArray[a], nullptr, // no redirect here. u""_ns, // no nonce true, // specific, do not use default-src true, // send violation reports okToSendAncestor, false); // not parser created if (!permits) { *outPermitsAncestry = false; } } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Permits(Element* aTriggeringElement, nsICSPEventListener* aCSPEventListener, nsIURI* aURI, CSPDirective aDir, bool aSpecific, bool aSendViolationReports, bool* outPermits) { // Can't perform check without aURI if (aURI == nullptr) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } if (aURI->SchemeIs("resource")) { // XXX Ideally we would call SubjectToCSP() here but that would also // allowlist e.g. javascript: URIs which should not be allowlisted here. // As a hotfix we just allowlist pdf.js internals here explicitly. nsAutoCString uriSpec; aURI->GetSpec(uriSpec); if (StringBeginsWith(uriSpec, "resource://pdf.js/"_ns)) { *outPermits = true; return NS_OK; } } *outPermits = permitsInternal(aDir, aTriggeringElement, aCSPEventListener, aURI, nullptr, // no original (pre-redirect) URI u""_ns, // no nonce aSpecific, aSendViolationReports, true, // send blocked URI in violation reports false); // not parser created if (CSPCONTEXTLOGENABLED()) { CSPCONTEXTLOG(("nsCSPContext::Permits, aUri: %s, aDir: %s, isAllowed: %s", aURI->GetSpecOrDefault().get(), CSP_CSPDirectiveToString(aDir), *outPermits ? "allow" : "deny")); } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::ToJSON(nsAString& outCSPinJSON) { outCSPinJSON.Truncate(); dom::CSPPolicies jsonPolicies; jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Construct(); EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { dom::CSP jsonCSP; mPolicies[p]->toDomCSPStruct(jsonCSP); if (!jsonPolicies.mCsp_policies.Value().AppendElement(jsonCSP, fallible)) { return NS_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY; } } // convert the gathered information to JSON if (!jsonPolicies.ToJSON(outCSPinJSON)) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags(uint32_t* aOutSandboxFlags) { if (!aOutSandboxFlags) { return NS_ERROR_FAILURE; } *aOutSandboxFlags = SANDBOXED_NONE; EnsureIPCPoliciesRead(); for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mPolicies.Length(); i++) { uint32_t flags = mPolicies[i]->getSandboxFlags(); // current policy doesn't have sandbox flag, check next policy if (!flags) { continue; } // current policy has sandbox flags, if the policy is in enforcement-mode // (i.e. not report-only) set these flags and check for policies with more // restrictions if (!mPolicies[i]->getReportOnlyFlag()) { *aOutSandboxFlags |= flags; } else { // sandbox directive is ignored in report-only mode, warn about it and // continue the loop checking for an enforcement policy. nsAutoString policy; mPolicies[i]->toString(policy); CSPCONTEXTLOG( ("nsCSPContext::GetCSPSandboxFlags, report only policy, ignoring " "sandbox in: %s", NS_ConvertUTF16toUTF8(policy).get())); AutoTArray params = {policy}; logToConsole("ignoringReportOnlyDirective", params, u""_ns, u""_ns, 0, 0, nsIScriptError::warningFlag); } } return NS_OK; } /* ========== CSPViolationReportListener implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPViolationReportListener, nsIStreamListener, nsIRequestObserver, nsISupports); CSPViolationReportListener::CSPViolationReportListener() = default; CSPViolationReportListener::~CSPViolationReportListener() = default; nsresult AppendSegmentToString(nsIInputStream* aInputStream, void* aClosure, const char* aRawSegment, uint32_t aToOffset, uint32_t aCount, uint32_t* outWrittenCount) { nsCString* decodedData = static_cast(aClosure); decodedData->Append(aRawSegment, aCount); *outWrittenCount = aCount; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnDataAvailable(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsIInputStream* aInputStream, uint64_t aOffset, uint32_t aCount) { uint32_t read; nsCString decodedData; return aInputStream->ReadSegments(AppendSegmentToString, &decodedData, aCount, &read); } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnStopRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest, nsresult aStatus) { return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPViolationReportListener::OnStartRequest(nsIRequest* aRequest) { return NS_OK; } /* ========== CSPReportRedirectSink implementation ========== */ NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(CSPReportRedirectSink, nsIChannelEventSink, nsIInterfaceRequestor); CSPReportRedirectSink::CSPReportRedirectSink() = default; CSPReportRedirectSink::~CSPReportRedirectSink() = default; NS_IMETHODIMP CSPReportRedirectSink::AsyncOnChannelRedirect( nsIChannel* aOldChannel, nsIChannel* aNewChannel, uint32_t aRedirFlags, nsIAsyncVerifyRedirectCallback* aCallback) { if (aRedirFlags & nsIChannelEventSink::REDIRECT_INTERNAL) { aCallback->OnRedirectVerifyCallback(NS_OK); return NS_OK; } // cancel the old channel so XHR failure callback happens nsresult rv = aOldChannel->Cancel(NS_ERROR_ABORT); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // notify an observer that we have blocked the report POST due to a // redirect, used in testing, do this async since we're in an async call now // to begin with nsCOMPtr uri; rv = aOldChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr observerService = mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); NS_ASSERTION(observerService, "Observer service required to log CSP violations"); observerService->NotifyObservers( uri, CSP_VIOLATION_TOPIC, u"denied redirect while sending violation report"); return NS_BINDING_REDIRECTED; } NS_IMETHODIMP CSPReportRedirectSink::GetInterface(const nsIID& aIID, void** aResult) { if (aIID.Equals(NS_GET_IID(nsINetworkInterceptController)) && mInterceptController) { nsCOMPtr copy(mInterceptController); *aResult = copy.forget().take(); return NS_OK; } return QueryInterface(aIID, aResult); } void CSPReportRedirectSink::SetInterceptController( nsINetworkInterceptController* aInterceptController) { mInterceptController = aInterceptController; } /* ===== nsISerializable implementation ====== */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Read(nsIObjectInputStream* aStream) { nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr supports; rv = NS_ReadOptionalObject(aStream, true, getter_AddRefs(supports)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); mSelfURI = do_QueryInterface(supports); MOZ_ASSERT(mSelfURI, "need a self URI to de-serialize"); nsAutoCString JSON; rv = aStream->ReadCString(JSON); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr principal = BasePrincipal::FromJSON(JSON); mLoadingPrincipal = principal; MOZ_ASSERT(mLoadingPrincipal, "need a loadingPrincipal to de-serialize"); uint32_t numPolicies; rv = aStream->Read32(&numPolicies); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsAutoString policyString; while (numPolicies > 0) { numPolicies--; rv = aStream->ReadString(policyString); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool reportOnly = false; rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&reportOnly); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool deliveredViaMetaTag = false; rv = aStream->ReadBoolean(&deliveredViaMetaTag); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); AddIPCPolicy(mozilla::ipc::ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, reportOnly, deliveredViaMetaTag)); } return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsCSPContext::Write(nsIObjectOutputStream* aStream) { nsresult rv = NS_WriteOptionalCompoundObject(aStream, mSelfURI, NS_GET_IID(nsIURI), true); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsAutoCString JSON; BasePrincipal::Cast(mLoadingPrincipal)->ToJSON(JSON); rv = aStream->WriteStringZ(JSON.get()); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // Serialize all the policies. aStream->Write32(mPolicies.Length() + mIPCPolicies.Length()); nsAutoString polStr; for (uint32_t p = 0; p < mPolicies.Length(); p++) { polStr.Truncate(); mPolicies[p]->toString(polStr); aStream->WriteWStringZ(polStr.get()); aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getReportOnlyFlag()); aStream->WriteBoolean(mPolicies[p]->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag()); } for (auto& policy : mIPCPolicies) { aStream->WriteWStringZ(policy.policy().get()); aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.reportOnlyFlag()); aStream->WriteBoolean(policy.deliveredViaMetaTagFlag()); } return NS_OK; } void nsCSPContext::AddIPCPolicy(const ContentSecurityPolicy& aPolicy) { mIPCPolicies.AppendElement(aPolicy); } void nsCSPContext::SerializePolicies( nsTArray& aPolicies) { for (auto* policy : mPolicies) { nsAutoString policyString; policy->toString(policyString); aPolicies.AppendElement( ContentSecurityPolicy(policyString, policy->getReportOnlyFlag(), policy->getDeliveredViaMetaTagFlag())); } aPolicies.AppendElements(mIPCPolicies); }