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|
/* vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et cindent: */
/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
* License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
* file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
#include "nsNTLMAuthModule.h"
#include <time.h>
#include "ScopedNSSTypes.h"
#include "md4.h"
#include "mozilla/Assertions.h"
#include "mozilla/Base64.h"
#include "mozilla/Casting.h"
#include "mozilla/CheckedInt.h"
#include "mozilla/EndianUtils.h"
#include "mozilla/Likely.h"
#include "mozilla/Logging.h"
#include "mozilla/Preferences.h"
#include "mozilla/Sprintf.h"
#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_network.h"
#include "mozilla/Telemetry.h"
#include "nsCOMPtr.h"
#include "nsComponentManagerUtils.h"
#include "nsICryptoHash.h"
#include "nsNativeCharsetUtils.h"
#include "nsNetCID.h"
#include "nsUnicharUtils.h"
#include "pk11pub.h"
#include "prsystem.h"
static mozilla::LazyLogModule sNTLMLog("NTLM");
#define LOG(x) MOZ_LOG(sNTLMLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug, x)
#define LOG_ENABLED() MOZ_LOG_TEST(sNTLMLog, mozilla::LogLevel::Debug)
static void des_makekey(const uint8_t* raw, uint8_t* key);
static void des_encrypt(const uint8_t* key, const uint8_t* src, uint8_t* hash);
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// this file contains a cross-platform NTLM authentication implementation. it
// is based on documentation from: http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
#define NTLM_NegotiateUnicode 0x00000001
#define NTLM_NegotiateOEM 0x00000002
#define NTLM_RequestTarget 0x00000004
#define NTLM_Unknown1 0x00000008
#define NTLM_NegotiateSign 0x00000010
#define NTLM_NegotiateSeal 0x00000020
#define NTLM_NegotiateDatagramStyle 0x00000040
#define NTLM_NegotiateLanManagerKey 0x00000080
#define NTLM_NegotiateNetware 0x00000100
#define NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey 0x00000200
#define NTLM_Unknown2 0x00000400
#define NTLM_Unknown3 0x00000800
#define NTLM_NegotiateDomainSupplied 0x00001000
#define NTLM_NegotiateWorkstationSupplied 0x00002000
#define NTLM_NegotiateLocalCall 0x00004000
#define NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign 0x00008000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeDomain 0x00010000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeServer 0x00020000
#define NTLM_TargetTypeShare 0x00040000
#define NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key 0x00080000
#define NTLM_RequestInitResponse 0x00100000
#define NTLM_RequestAcceptResponse 0x00200000
#define NTLM_RequestNonNTSessionKey 0x00400000
#define NTLM_NegotiateTargetInfo 0x00800000
#define NTLM_Unknown4 0x01000000
#define NTLM_Unknown5 0x02000000
#define NTLM_Unknown6 0x04000000
#define NTLM_Unknown7 0x08000000
#define NTLM_Unknown8 0x10000000
#define NTLM_Negotiate128 0x20000000
#define NTLM_NegotiateKeyExchange 0x40000000
#define NTLM_Negotiate56 0x80000000
// we send these flags with our type 1 message
#define NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS \
(NTLM_NegotiateUnicode | NTLM_NegotiateOEM | NTLM_RequestTarget | \
NTLM_NegotiateNTLMKey | NTLM_NegotiateAlwaysSign | NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key)
static const char NTLM_SIGNATURE[] = "NTLMSSP";
static const char NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER[] = {0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
static const char NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER[] = {0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
static const char NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER[] = {0x03, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};
#define NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN 32
#define NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN 48
#define NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN 64
/**
* We don't actually send a LM response, but we still have to send something in
* this spot
*/
#define LM_RESP_LEN 24
#define NTLM_CHAL_LEN 8
#define NTLM_HASH_LEN 16
#define NTLMv2_HASH_LEN 16
#define NTLM_RESP_LEN 24
#define NTLMv2_RESP_LEN 16
#define NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN 28
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Prints a description of flags to the NSPR Log, if enabled.
*/
static void LogFlags(uint32_t flags) {
if (!LOG_ENABLED()) return;
#define TEST(_flag) \
if (flags & NTLM_##_flag) \
PR_LogPrint(" 0x%08x (" #_flag ")\n", NTLM_##_flag)
TEST(NegotiateUnicode);
TEST(NegotiateOEM);
TEST(RequestTarget);
TEST(Unknown1);
TEST(NegotiateSign);
TEST(NegotiateSeal);
TEST(NegotiateDatagramStyle);
TEST(NegotiateLanManagerKey);
TEST(NegotiateNetware);
TEST(NegotiateNTLMKey);
TEST(Unknown2);
TEST(Unknown3);
TEST(NegotiateDomainSupplied);
TEST(NegotiateWorkstationSupplied);
TEST(NegotiateLocalCall);
TEST(NegotiateAlwaysSign);
TEST(TargetTypeDomain);
TEST(TargetTypeServer);
TEST(TargetTypeShare);
TEST(NegotiateNTLM2Key);
TEST(RequestInitResponse);
TEST(RequestAcceptResponse);
TEST(RequestNonNTSessionKey);
TEST(NegotiateTargetInfo);
TEST(Unknown4);
TEST(Unknown5);
TEST(Unknown6);
TEST(Unknown7);
TEST(Unknown8);
TEST(Negotiate128);
TEST(NegotiateKeyExchange);
TEST(Negotiate56);
#undef TEST
}
/**
* Prints a hexdump of buf to the NSPR Log, if enabled.
* @param tag Description of the data, will be printed in front of the data
* @param buf the data to print
* @param bufLen length of the data
*/
static void LogBuf(const char* tag, const uint8_t* buf, uint32_t bufLen) {
int i;
if (!LOG_ENABLED()) return;
PR_LogPrint("%s =\n", tag);
char line[80];
while (bufLen > 0) {
int count = bufLen;
if (count > 8) count = 8;
strcpy(line, " ");
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
int len = strlen(line);
snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, "0x%02x ", int(buf[i]));
}
for (; i < 8; ++i) {
int len = strlen(line);
snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, " ");
}
int len = strlen(line);
snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, " ");
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) {
len = strlen(line);
if (isprint(buf[i])) {
snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, "%c", buf[i]);
} else {
snprintf(line + len, sizeof(line) - len, ".");
}
}
PR_LogPrint("%s\n", line);
bufLen -= count;
buf += count;
}
}
/**
* Print base64-encoded token to the NSPR Log.
* @param name Description of the token, will be printed in front
* @param token The token to print
* @param tokenLen length of the data in token
*/
static void LogToken(const char* name, const void* token, uint32_t tokenLen) {
if (!LOG_ENABLED()) {
return;
}
nsDependentCSubstring tokenString(static_cast<const char*>(token), tokenLen);
nsAutoCString base64Token;
nsresult rv = mozilla::Base64Encode(tokenString, base64Token);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return;
}
PR_LogPrint("%s: %s\n", name, base64Token.get());
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// byte order swapping
#define SWAP16(x) ((((x)&0xff) << 8) | (((x) >> 8) & 0xff))
#define SWAP32(x) ((SWAP16((x)&0xffff) << 16) | (SWAP16((x) >> 16)))
static void* WriteBytes(void* buf, const void* data, uint32_t dataLen) {
memcpy(buf, data, dataLen);
return (uint8_t*)buf + dataLen;
}
static void* WriteDWORD(void* buf, uint32_t dword) {
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
// NTLM uses little endian on the wire
dword = SWAP32(dword);
#endif
return WriteBytes(buf, &dword, sizeof(dword));
}
static void* WriteSecBuf(void* buf, uint16_t length, uint32_t offset) {
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
length = SWAP16(length);
offset = SWAP32(offset);
#endif
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length));
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &length, sizeof(length));
buf = WriteBytes(buf, &offset, sizeof(offset));
return buf;
}
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
/**
* WriteUnicodeLE copies a unicode string from one buffer to another. The
* resulting unicode string is in little-endian format. The input string is
* assumed to be in the native endianness of the local machine. It is safe
* to pass the same buffer as both input and output, which is a handy way to
* convert the unicode buffer to little-endian on big-endian platforms.
*/
static void* WriteUnicodeLE(void* buf, const char16_t* str, uint32_t strLen) {
// convert input string from BE to LE
uint8_t *cursor = (uint8_t*)buf, *input = (uint8_t*)str;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < strLen; ++i, input += 2, cursor += 2) {
// allow for the case where |buf == str|
uint8_t temp = input[0];
cursor[0] = input[1];
cursor[1] = temp;
}
return buf;
}
#endif
static uint16_t ReadUint16(const uint8_t*& buf) {
uint16_t x = ((uint16_t)buf[0]) | ((uint16_t)buf[1] << 8);
buf += sizeof(x);
return x;
}
static uint32_t ReadUint32(const uint8_t*& buf) {
uint32_t x = ((uint32_t)buf[0]) | (((uint32_t)buf[1]) << 8) |
(((uint32_t)buf[2]) << 16) | (((uint32_t)buf[3]) << 24);
buf += sizeof(x);
return x;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
static void ZapBuf(void* buf, size_t bufLen) { memset(buf, 0, bufLen); }
static void ZapString(nsString& s) { ZapBuf(s.BeginWriting(), s.Length() * 2); }
/**
* NTLM_Hash computes the NTLM hash of the given password.
*
* @param password
* null-terminated unicode password.
* @param hash
* 16-byte result buffer
*/
static void NTLM_Hash(const nsString& password, unsigned char* hash) {
uint32_t len = password.Length();
uint8_t* passbuf;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
passbuf = (uint8_t*)malloc(len * 2);
WriteUnicodeLE(passbuf, password.get(), len);
#else
passbuf = (uint8_t*)password.get();
#endif
md4sum(passbuf, len * 2, hash);
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ZapBuf(passbuf, len * 2);
free(passbuf);
#endif
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* LM_Response generates the LM response given a 16-byte password hash and the
* challenge from the Type-2 message.
*
* @param hash
* 16-byte password hash
* @param challenge
* 8-byte challenge from Type-2 message
* @param response
* 24-byte buffer to contain the LM response upon return
*/
static void LM_Response(const uint8_t* hash, const uint8_t* challenge,
uint8_t* response) {
uint8_t keybytes[21], k1[8], k2[8], k3[8];
memcpy(keybytes, hash, 16);
ZapBuf(keybytes + 16, 5);
des_makekey(keybytes, k1);
des_makekey(keybytes + 7, k2);
des_makekey(keybytes + 14, k3);
des_encrypt(k1, challenge, response);
des_encrypt(k2, challenge, response + 8);
des_encrypt(k3, challenge, response + 16);
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
static nsresult GenerateType1Msg(void** outBuf, uint32_t* outLen) {
//
// verify that bufLen is sufficient
//
*outLen = NTLM_TYPE1_HEADER_LEN;
*outBuf = moz_xmalloc(*outLen);
//
// write out type 1 msg
//
void* cursor = *outBuf;
// 0 : signature
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
// 8 : marker
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE1_MARKER));
// 12 : flags
cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS);
//
// NOTE: it is common for the domain and workstation fields to be empty.
// this is true of Win2k clients, and my guess is that there is
// little utility to sending these strings before the charset has
// been negotiated. we follow suite -- anyways, it doesn't hurt
// to save some bytes on the wire ;-)
//
// 16 : supplied domain security buffer (empty)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
// 24 : supplied workstation security buffer (empty)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
return NS_OK;
}
struct Type2Msg {
uint32_t flags; // NTLM_Xxx bitwise combination
uint8_t challenge[NTLM_CHAL_LEN]; // 8 byte challenge
const uint8_t* target; // target string (type depends on flags)
uint32_t targetLen; // target length in bytes
const uint8_t*
targetInfo; // target Attribute-Value pairs (DNS domain, et al)
uint32_t targetInfoLen; // target AV pairs length in bytes
};
static nsresult ParseType2Msg(const void* inBuf, uint32_t inLen,
Type2Msg* msg) {
// make sure inBuf is long enough to contain a meaningful type2 msg.
//
// 0 NTLMSSP Signature
// 8 NTLM Message Type
// 12 Target Name
// 20 Flags
// 24 Challenge
// 32 targetInfo
// 48 start of optional data blocks
//
if (inLen < NTLM_TYPE2_HEADER_LEN) return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
const auto* cursor = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf);
// verify NTLMSSP signature
if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE)) != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor += sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE);
// verify Type-2 marker
if (memcmp(cursor, NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER)) != 0) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor += sizeof(NTLM_TYPE2_MARKER);
// Read target name security buffer: ...
// ... read target length.
uint32_t targetLen = ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... skip next 16-bit "allocated space" value.
ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... read offset from inBuf.
uint32_t offset = ReadUint32(cursor);
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> targetEnd = offset;
targetEnd += targetLen;
// Check the offset / length combo is in range of the input buffer, including
// integer overflow checking.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(targetEnd.isValid() && targetEnd.value() <= inLen)) {
msg->targetLen = targetLen;
msg->target = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf) + offset;
} else {
// Do not error out, for (conservative) backward compatibility.
msg->targetLen = 0;
msg->target = nullptr;
}
// read flags
msg->flags = ReadUint32(cursor);
// read challenge
memcpy(msg->challenge, cursor, sizeof(msg->challenge));
cursor += sizeof(msg->challenge);
LOG(("NTLM type 2 message:\n"));
LogBuf("target", msg->target, msg->targetLen);
LogBuf("flags",
mozilla::BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const uint32_t*>(&msg->flags), 4);
LogFlags(msg->flags);
LogBuf("challenge", msg->challenge, sizeof(msg->challenge));
// Read (and skip) the reserved field
ReadUint32(cursor);
ReadUint32(cursor);
// Read target name security buffer: ...
// ... read target length.
uint32_t targetInfoLen = ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... skip next 16-bit "allocated space" value.
ReadUint16(cursor);
// ... read offset from inBuf.
offset = ReadUint32(cursor);
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> targetInfoEnd = offset;
targetInfoEnd += targetInfoLen;
// Check the offset / length combo is in range of the input buffer, including
// integer overflow checking.
if (MOZ_LIKELY(targetInfoEnd.isValid() && targetInfoEnd.value() <= inLen)) {
msg->targetInfoLen = targetInfoLen;
msg->targetInfo = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inBuf) + offset;
} else {
NS_ERROR("failed to get NTLMv2 target info");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
return NS_OK;
}
static nsresult GenerateType3Msg(const nsString& domain,
const nsString& username,
const nsString& password, const void* inBuf,
uint32_t inLen, void** outBuf,
uint32_t* outLen) {
// inBuf contains Type-2 msg (the challenge) from server
MOZ_ASSERT(NS_IsMainThread());
nsresult rv;
Type2Msg msg{};
rv = ParseType2Msg(inBuf, inLen, &msg);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv;
bool unicode = (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateUnicode);
// There is no negotiation for NTLMv2, so we just do it unless we are forced
// by explict user configuration to use the older DES-based cryptography.
bool ntlmv2 = !mozilla::StaticPrefs::network_auth_force_generic_ntlm_v1();
// temporary buffers for unicode strings
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
nsAutoString ucsDomainBuf, ucsUserBuf;
#endif
nsAutoCString hostBuf;
nsAutoString ucsHostBuf;
// temporary buffers for oem strings
nsAutoCString oemDomainBuf, oemUserBuf, oemHostBuf;
// pointers and lengths for the string buffers; encoding is unicode if
// the "negotiate unicode" flag was set in the Type-2 message.
const void *domainPtr, *userPtr, *hostPtr;
uint32_t domainLen, userLen, hostLen;
// This is for NTLM, for NTLMv2 we set the new full length once we know it
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint16_t> ntlmRespLen = NTLM_RESP_LEN;
//
// get domain name
//
if (unicode) {
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ucsDomainBuf = domain;
domainPtr = ucsDomainBuf.get();
domainLen = ucsDomainBuf.Length() * 2;
WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(domainPtr),
static_cast<const char16_t*>(domainPtr),
ucsDomainBuf.Length());
#else
domainPtr = domain.get();
domainLen = domain.Length() * 2;
#endif
} else {
NS_CopyUnicodeToNative(domain, oemDomainBuf);
domainPtr = oemDomainBuf.get();
domainLen = oemDomainBuf.Length();
}
//
// get user name
//
if (unicode) {
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
ucsUserBuf = username;
userPtr = ucsUserBuf.get();
userLen = ucsUserBuf.Length() * 2;
WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(userPtr),
static_cast<const char16_t*>(userPtr), ucsUserBuf.Length());
#else
userPtr = username.get();
userLen = username.Length() * 2;
#endif
} else {
NS_CopyUnicodeToNative(username, oemUserBuf);
userPtr = oemUserBuf.get();
userLen = oemUserBuf.Length();
}
//
// get workstation name
// (do not use local machine's hostname after bug 1046421)
//
rv = mozilla::Preferences::GetCString("network.generic-ntlm-auth.workstation",
hostBuf);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (unicode) {
CopyUTF8toUTF16(hostBuf, ucsHostBuf);
hostPtr = ucsHostBuf.get();
hostLen = ucsHostBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(hostPtr),
static_cast<const char16_t*>(hostPtr), ucsHostBuf.Length());
#endif
} else {
hostPtr = hostBuf.get();
hostLen = hostBuf.Length();
}
//
// now that we have generated all of the strings, we can allocate outBuf.
//
//
// next, we compute the NTLM or NTLM2 responses.
//
uint8_t lmResp[LM_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmResp[NTLM_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmv2Resp[NTLMv2_RESP_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmHash[NTLM_HASH_LEN];
uint8_t ntlmv2_blob1[NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN];
if (ntlmv2) {
// NTLMv2 mode, the default
nsString userUpper, domainUpper;
// temporary buffers for unicode strings
nsAutoString ucsDomainUpperBuf;
nsAutoString ucsUserUpperBuf;
const void* domainUpperPtr;
const void* userUpperPtr;
uint32_t domainUpperLen;
uint32_t userUpperLen;
if (msg.targetInfoLen == 0) {
NS_ERROR("failed to get NTLMv2 target info, can not do NTLMv2");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
ToUpperCase(username, ucsUserUpperBuf);
userUpperPtr = ucsUserUpperBuf.get();
userUpperLen = ucsUserUpperBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(userUpperPtr),
static_cast<const char16_t*>(userUpperPtr),
ucsUserUpperBuf.Length());
#endif
ToUpperCase(domain, ucsDomainUpperBuf);
domainUpperPtr = ucsDomainUpperBuf.get();
domainUpperLen = ucsDomainUpperBuf.Length() * 2;
#ifdef IS_BIG_ENDIAN
WriteUnicodeLE(const_cast<void*>(domainUpperPtr),
static_cast<const char16_t*>(domainUpperPtr),
ucsDomainUpperBuf.Length());
#endif
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
HMAC ntlmv2HashHmac;
rv = ntlmv2HashHmac.Begin(SEC_OID_MD5, Span(ntlmHash, NTLM_HASH_LEN));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = ntlmv2HashHmac.Update(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(userUpperPtr),
userUpperLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = ntlmv2HashHmac.Update(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(domainUpperPtr),
domainUpperLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsTArray<uint8_t> ntlmv2Hash;
rv = ntlmv2HashHmac.End(ntlmv2Hash);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
uint8_t client_random[NTLM_CHAL_LEN];
PK11_GenerateRandom(client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
HMAC lmv2ResponseHmac;
rv = lmv2ResponseHmac.Begin(SEC_OID_MD5, Span(ntlmv2Hash));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = lmv2ResponseHmac.Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = lmv2ResponseHmac.Update(client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsTArray<uint8_t> lmv2Response;
rv = lmv2ResponseHmac.End(lmv2Response);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (lmv2Response.Length() != NTLMv2_HASH_LEN) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(lmResp, lmv2Response.Elements(), NTLMv2_HASH_LEN);
memcpy(lmResp + NTLMv2_HASH_LEN, client_random, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
memset(ntlmv2_blob1, 0, NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
time_t unix_time;
uint64_t nt_time = time(&unix_time);
nt_time += 11644473600LL; // Number of seconds betwen 1601 and 1970
nt_time *= 1000 * 1000 * 10; // Convert seconds to 100 ns units
ntlmv2_blob1[0] = 1;
ntlmv2_blob1[1] = 1;
mozilla::LittleEndian::writeUint64(&ntlmv2_blob1[8], nt_time);
PK11_GenerateRandom(&ntlmv2_blob1[16], NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
HMAC ntlmv2ResponseHmac;
rv = ntlmv2ResponseHmac.Begin(SEC_OID_MD5, Span(ntlmv2Hash));
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = ntlmv2ResponseHmac.Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = ntlmv2ResponseHmac.Update(ntlmv2_blob1, NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = ntlmv2ResponseHmac.Update(msg.targetInfo, msg.targetInfoLen);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
nsTArray<uint8_t> ntlmv2Response;
rv = ntlmv2ResponseHmac.End(ntlmv2Response);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
if (ntlmv2Response.Length() != NTLMv2_RESP_LEN) {
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(ntlmv2Resp, ntlmv2Response.Elements(), NTLMv2_RESP_LEN);
ntlmRespLen = NTLMv2_RESP_LEN + NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN;
ntlmRespLen += msg.targetInfoLen;
if (!ntlmRespLen.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed to do NTLMv2: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
} else if (msg.flags & NTLM_NegotiateNTLM2Key) {
// compute NTLM2 session response
nsCString sessionHashString;
PK11_GenerateRandom(lmResp, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
memset(lmResp + NTLM_CHAL_LEN, 0, LM_RESP_LEN - NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
nsCOMPtr<nsICryptoHash> hasher =
do_CreateInstance(NS_CRYPTO_HASH_CONTRACTID, &rv);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Init(nsICryptoHash::MD5);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(msg.challenge, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Update(lmResp, NTLM_CHAL_LEN);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
rv = hasher->Finish(false, sessionHashString);
if (NS_FAILED(rv)) {
return rv;
}
const auto* sessionHash = mozilla::BitwiseCast<const uint8_t*, const char*>(
sessionHashString.get());
LogBuf("NTLM2 effective key: ", sessionHash, 8);
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
LM_Response(ntlmHash, sessionHash, ntlmResp);
} else {
NTLM_Hash(password, ntlmHash);
LM_Response(ntlmHash, msg.challenge, ntlmResp);
// According to http://davenport.sourceforge.net/ntlm.html#ntlmVersion2,
// the correct way to not send the LM hash is to send the NTLM hash twice
// in both the LM and NTLM response fields.
LM_Response(ntlmHash, msg.challenge, lmResp);
}
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> totalLen = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN + LM_RESP_LEN;
totalLen += hostLen;
totalLen += domainLen;
totalLen += userLen;
totalLen += ntlmRespLen.value();
if (!totalLen.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to allocate NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_FAILURE;
}
*outBuf = moz_xmalloc(totalLen.value());
*outLen = totalLen.value();
//
// finally, we assemble the Type-3 msg :-)
//
void* cursor = *outBuf;
mozilla::CheckedInt<uint32_t> offset;
// 0 : signature
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
// 8 : marker
cursor = WriteBytes(cursor, NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER, sizeof(NTLM_TYPE3_MARKER));
// 12 : LM response sec buf
offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN;
offset += domainLen;
offset += userLen;
offset += hostLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, LM_RESP_LEN, offset.value());
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), lmResp, LM_RESP_LEN);
// 20 : NTLM or NTLMv2 response sec buf
offset += LM_RESP_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, ntlmRespLen.value(), offset.value());
if (ntlmv2) {
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmv2Resp,
NTLMv2_RESP_LEN);
offset += NTLMv2_RESP_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmv2_blob1,
NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN);
offset += NTLMv2_BLOB1_LEN;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), msg.targetInfo,
msg.targetInfoLen);
} else {
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), ntlmResp,
NTLM_RESP_LEN);
}
// 28 : domain name sec buf
offset = NTLM_TYPE3_HEADER_LEN;
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, domainLen, offset.value());
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), domainPtr, domainLen);
// 36 : user name sec buf
offset += domainLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, userLen, offset.value());
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), userPtr, userLen);
// 44 : workstation (host) name sec buf
offset += userLen;
if (!offset.isValid()) {
NS_ERROR("failed preparing to write NTLM response: integer overflow?!?");
return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, hostLen, offset.value());
memcpy(static_cast<uint8_t*>(*outBuf) + offset.value(), hostPtr, hostLen);
// 52 : session key sec buf (not used)
cursor = WriteSecBuf(cursor, 0, 0);
// 60 : negotiated flags
cursor = WriteDWORD(cursor, msg.flags & NTLM_TYPE1_FLAGS);
return NS_OK;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsNTLMAuthModule, nsIAuthModule)
nsNTLMAuthModule::~nsNTLMAuthModule() { ZapString(mPassword); }
nsresult nsNTLMAuthModule::InitTest() {
// disable NTLM authentication when FIPS mode is enabled.
return PK11_IsFIPS() ? NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE : NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Init(const nsACString& serviceName, uint32_t serviceFlags,
const nsAString& domain, const nsAString& username,
const nsAString& password) {
MOZ_ASSERT((serviceFlags & ~nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH) ==
nsIAuthModule::REQ_DEFAULT,
"Unexpected service flags");
mDomain = domain;
mUsername = username;
mPassword = password;
mNTLMNegotiateSent = false;
static bool sTelemetrySent = false;
if (!sTelemetrySent) {
mozilla::Telemetry::Accumulate(mozilla::Telemetry::NTLM_MODULE_USED_2,
serviceFlags & nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH
? NTLM_MODULE_GENERIC_PROXY
: NTLM_MODULE_GENERIC_DIRECT);
sTelemetrySent = true;
}
return NS_OK;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::GetNextToken(const void* inToken, uint32_t inTokenLen,
void** outToken, uint32_t* outTokenLen) {
nsresult rv;
// disable NTLM authentication when FIPS mode is enabled.
if (PK11_IsFIPS()) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_AVAILABLE;
}
if (mNTLMNegotiateSent) {
// if inToken is non-null, and we have sent the NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE (type 1),
// then the NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE (type 2) is expected
if (inToken) {
LogToken("in-token", inToken, inTokenLen);
// Now generate the NTLMSSP_AUTH (type 3)
rv = GenerateType3Msg(mDomain, mUsername, mPassword, inToken, inTokenLen,
outToken, outTokenLen);
} else {
LOG(
("NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE already sent and presumably "
"rejected by the server, refusing to send another"));
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
}
} else {
if (inToken) {
LOG(("NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE not sent but NTLM reply already received?!?"));
rv = NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
} else {
rv = GenerateType1Msg(outToken, outTokenLen);
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) {
mNTLMNegotiateSent = true;
}
}
}
if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) LogToken("out-token", *outToken, *outTokenLen);
return rv;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Unwrap(const void* inToken, uint32_t inTokenLen,
void** outToken, uint32_t* outTokenLen) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
NS_IMETHODIMP
nsNTLMAuthModule::Wrap(const void* inToken, uint32_t inTokenLen,
bool confidential, void** outToken,
uint32_t* outTokenLen) {
return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED;
}
//-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// DES support code
// set odd parity bit (in least significant bit position)
static uint8_t des_setkeyparity(uint8_t x) {
if ((((x >> 7) ^ (x >> 6) ^ (x >> 5) ^ (x >> 4) ^ (x >> 3) ^ (x >> 2) ^
(x >> 1)) &
0x01) == 0) {
x |= 0x01;
} else {
x &= 0xfe;
}
return x;
}
// build 64-bit des key from 56-bit raw key
static void des_makekey(const uint8_t* raw, uint8_t* key) {
key[0] = des_setkeyparity(raw[0]);
key[1] = des_setkeyparity((raw[0] << 7) | (raw[1] >> 1));
key[2] = des_setkeyparity((raw[1] << 6) | (raw[2] >> 2));
key[3] = des_setkeyparity((raw[2] << 5) | (raw[3] >> 3));
key[4] = des_setkeyparity((raw[3] << 4) | (raw[4] >> 4));
key[5] = des_setkeyparity((raw[4] << 3) | (raw[5] >> 5));
key[6] = des_setkeyparity((raw[5] << 2) | (raw[6] >> 6));
key[7] = des_setkeyparity((raw[6] << 1));
}
// run des encryption algorithm (using NSS)
static void des_encrypt(const uint8_t* key, const uint8_t* src, uint8_t* hash) {
CK_MECHANISM_TYPE cipherMech = CKM_DES_ECB;
PK11SymKey* symkey = nullptr;
PK11Context* ctxt = nullptr;
SECItem keyItem;
mozilla::UniqueSECItem param;
SECStatus rv;
unsigned int n;
mozilla::UniquePK11SlotInfo slot(PK11_GetBestSlot(cipherMech, nullptr));
if (!slot) {
NS_ERROR("no slot");
goto done;
}
keyItem.data = const_cast<uint8_t*>(key);
keyItem.len = 8;
symkey = PK11_ImportSymKey(slot.get(), cipherMech, PK11_OriginUnwrap,
CKA_ENCRYPT, &keyItem, nullptr);
if (!symkey) {
NS_ERROR("no symkey");
goto done;
}
// no initialization vector required
param = mozilla::UniqueSECItem(PK11_ParamFromIV(cipherMech, nullptr));
if (!param) {
NS_ERROR("no param");
goto done;
}
ctxt =
PK11_CreateContextBySymKey(cipherMech, CKA_ENCRYPT, symkey, param.get());
if (!ctxt) {
NS_ERROR("no context");
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_CipherOp(ctxt, hash, (int*)&n, 8, (uint8_t*)src, 8);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
NS_ERROR("des failure");
goto done;
}
rv = PK11_DigestFinal(ctxt, hash + 8, &n, 0);
if (rv != SECSuccess) {
NS_ERROR("des failure");
goto done;
}
done:
if (ctxt) PK11_DestroyContext(ctxt, true);
if (symkey) PK11_FreeSymKey(symkey);
}
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