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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:47:53 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:47:53 +0000
commitc8bae7493d2f2910b57f13ded012e86bdcfb0532 (patch)
tree24e09d9f84dec336720cf393e156089ca2835791 /Documentation/RelNotes/2.30.6.txt
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadgit-c8bae7493d2f2910b57f13ded012e86bdcfb0532.tar.xz
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Adding upstream version 1:2.39.2.upstream/1%2.39.2upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
+=========================
+
+This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
+CVE-2022-39260.
+
+Fixes since v2.30.5
+-------------------
+
+ * CVE-2022-39253:
+ When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
+ symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
+ (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
+ This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
+ present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
+ repository.
+
+ Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
+ clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
+ have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
+
+ Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
+ "user" by default.
+
+ * CVE-2022-39260:
+ An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
+ overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
+ remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
+ `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
+
+ `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
+ longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
+ inputs larger than 2GiB.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
+fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
+
+Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
+The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
+
+
+Jeff King (2):
+ shell: add basic tests
+ shell: limit size of interactive commands
+
+Kevin Backhouse (1):
+ alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
+
+Taylor Blau (11):
+ builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
+ t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
+ t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
+ t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
+ transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default