From afd7a175b53248d68095cecf5616705d093ffbc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 18:14:08 +0200 Subject: Adding debian version 2.2.40-1.1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- ...keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch | 71 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+) create mode 100644 debian/patches/Use-hkps-keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch (limited to 'debian/patches/Use-hkps-keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch') diff --git a/debian/patches/Use-hkps-keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch b/debian/patches/Use-hkps-keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc9ee90 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/Use-hkps-keys.openpgp.org-as-the-default-keyserver.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor +Date: Thu, 11 Jul 2019 21:52:11 -0400 +Subject: Use hkps://keys.openpgp.org as the default keyserver + +As of 2.2.17, GnuPG will refuse to accept any third-party +certifications from OpenPGP certificates pulled from the keyserver +network. + +The SKS keyserver network currently has at least a dozen popular +certificates which are flooded with enough unusable third-party +certifications that they cannot be retrieved in any reasonable amount +of time. + +The hkps://keys.openpgp.org keyserver installation offers HKPS, +performs cryptographic validation, and by policy does not distribute +third-party certifications anyway. + +It is not distributed or federated yet, unfortunately, but it is +functional, which is more than can be said for the dying SKS pool. +And given that GnuPG is going to reject all the third-party +certifications anyway, there is no clear "web of trust" rationale for +relying on the SKS pool. + +One sticking point is that keys.openpgp.org does not distribute user +IDs unless the user has proven control of the associated e-mail +address. This means that on standard upstream GnuPG, retrieving +revocations or subkey updates of those certificates will fail, because +upstream GnuPG ignores any incoming certificate without a user ID, +even if it knows a user ID in the local copy of the certificate (see +https://dev.gnupg.org/T4393). + +However, we have three patches in +debian/patches/import-merge-without-userid/ that together fix that +bug. + +Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor +--- + configure.ac | 2 +- + doc/dirmngr.texi | 6 +++++- + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index 0a4ae1e..c48cb8c 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -1837,7 +1837,7 @@ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SCDAEMON_SOCK_NAME, "S.scdaemon", + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_SOCK_NAME, "S.dirmngr", + [The name of the dirmngr socket]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(DIRMNGR_DEFAULT_KEYSERVER, +- "hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com", ++ "hkps://keys.openpgp.org", + [The default keyserver for dirmngr to use, if none is explicitly given]) + + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(GPGEXT_GPG, "gpg", [The standard binary file suffix]) +diff --git a/doc/dirmngr.texi b/doc/dirmngr.texi +index ab831de..f7c7672 100644 +--- a/doc/dirmngr.texi ++++ b/doc/dirmngr.texi +@@ -331,7 +331,11 @@ whether Tor is locally running or not. The check for a running Tor is + done for each new connection. + + If no keyserver is explicitly configured, dirmngr will use the +-built-in default of @code{https://keyserver.ubuntu.com}. ++built-in default of @code{https://keys.openpgp.org}. ++ ++Note that the above default is a Debian-specific choice. Upstream ++GnuPG prefers @code{hkps://keyserver.ubuntu.com}. See ++/usr/share/doc/gpgconf/NEWS.Debian.gz for more details. + + Windows users with a keyserver running on their Active Directory + may use the short form @code{ldap:///} for @var{name} to access this directory. -- cgit v1.2.3