From ca67b09c015d4af3ae3cce12aa72e60941dbb8b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 18:29:52 +0200 Subject: Adding debian version 2.06-13+deb12u1. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- ...OB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+) create mode 100644 debian/patches/ntfs-cve-fixes/fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch (limited to 'debian/patches/ntfs-cve-fixes/fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch') diff --git a/debian/patches/ntfs-cve-fixes/fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch b/debian/patches/ntfs-cve-fixes/fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d762c06 --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/ntfs-cve-fixes/fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-reside.patch @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +From: Maxim Suhanov +Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300 +Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident $DATA + attribute + +When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in +the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters, +there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding +file record segment. + +When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will +read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of +arbitrary, attacker-chosen length. + +This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could +contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text, +obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables. + +This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the +corresponding file record segment only. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-4693 + +Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov +Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index c3c4db1..a68e173 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest, + { + if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range"); +- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len); ++ ++ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large"); ++ ++ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range"); ++ ++ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) > ++ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range"); ++ ++ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len); + return 0; + } + -- cgit v1.2.3