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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 15:26:00 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 15:26:00 +0000
commit830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a (patch)
treed6a0ece6feea91f3c656166dbaa884ef8a29740e /lib/dnssec/nsec.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadknot-resolver-830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a.tar.xz
knot-resolver-830407e88f9d40d954356c3754f2647f91d5c06a.zip
Adding upstream version 5.6.0.upstream/5.6.0upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--lib/dnssec/nsec.c315
1 files changed, 315 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/lib/dnssec/nsec.c b/lib/dnssec/nsec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b17247
--- /dev/null
+++ b/lib/dnssec/nsec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+/* Copyright (C) CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-resolver@labs.nic.cz>
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <libknot/descriptor.h>
+#include <libknot/dname.h>
+#include <libknot/packet/wire.h>
+#include <libknot/rrset.h>
+#include <libknot/rrtype/nsec.h>
+#include <libknot/rrtype/rrsig.h>
+#include <libdnssec/error.h>
+#include <libdnssec/nsec.h>
+
+#include "lib/defines.h"
+#include "lib/dnssec/nsec.h"
+#include "lib/utils.h"
+#include "resolve.h"
+
+int kr_nsec_children_in_zone_check(const uint8_t *bm, uint16_t bm_size)
+{
+ if (kr_fails_assert(bm))
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+ const bool parent_side =
+ dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_DNAME)
+ || (dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_NS)
+ && !dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA)
+ );
+ return parent_side ? abs(ENOENT) : kr_ok();
+ /* LATER: after refactoring, probably also check if signer name equals owner,
+ * but even without that it's not possible to attack *correctly* signed zones.
+ */
+}
+
+/* This block of functions implements a "safe" version of knot_dname_cmp(),
+ * until that one handles in-label zero bytes correctly. */
+static int lf_cmp(const uint8_t *lf1, const uint8_t *lf2)
+{
+ /* Compare common part. */
+ uint8_t common = lf1[0];
+ if (common > lf2[0]) {
+ common = lf2[0];
+ }
+ int ret = memcmp(lf1 + 1, lf2 + 1, common);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* If they match, compare lengths. */
+ if (lf1[0] < lf2[0]) {
+ return -1;
+ } else if (lf1[0] > lf2[0]) {
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+static void dname_reverse(const knot_dname_t *src, size_t src_len, knot_dname_t *dst)
+{
+ knot_dname_t *idx = dst + src_len - 1;
+ kr_require(src[src_len - 1] == '\0');
+ *idx = '\0';
+
+ while (*src) {
+ uint16_t len = *src + 1;
+ idx -= len;
+ memcpy(idx, src, len);
+ src += len;
+ }
+ kr_require(idx == dst);
+}
+static int dname_cmp(const knot_dname_t *d1, const knot_dname_t *d2)
+{
+ size_t d1_len = knot_dname_size(d1);
+ size_t d2_len = knot_dname_size(d2);
+
+ knot_dname_t d1_rev_arr[d1_len], d2_rev_arr[d2_len];
+ const knot_dname_t *d1_rev = d1_rev_arr, *d2_rev = d2_rev_arr;
+
+ dname_reverse(d1, d1_len, d1_rev_arr);
+ dname_reverse(d2, d2_len, d2_rev_arr);
+
+ int res = 0;
+ while (res == 0 && d1_rev != NULL) {
+ res = lf_cmp(d1_rev, d2_rev);
+ d1_rev = knot_wire_next_label(d1_rev, NULL);
+ d2_rev = knot_wire_next_label(d2_rev, NULL);
+ }
+
+ kr_require(res != 0 || d2_rev == NULL);
+ return res;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Check whether this nsec proves that there is no closer match for sname.
+ *
+ * @param nsec NSEC RRSet.
+ * @param sname Searched name.
+ * @return 0 if proves, >0 if not (abs(ENOENT) or abs(EEXIST)), or error code (<0).
+ */
+static int nsec_covers(const knot_rrset_t *nsec, const knot_dname_t *sname)
+{
+ if (kr_fails_assert(nsec && sname))
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+ const int cmp = dname_cmp(sname, nsec->owner);
+ if (cmp < 0) return abs(ENOENT); /* 'sname' before 'owner', so can't be covered */
+ if (cmp == 0) return abs(EEXIST); /* matched, not covered */
+
+ /* We have to lower-case 'next' with libknot >= 2.7; see also RFC 6840 5.1. */
+ knot_dname_t next[KNOT_DNAME_MAXLEN];
+ int ret = knot_dname_to_wire(next, knot_nsec_next(nsec->rrs.rdata), sizeof(next));
+ if (kr_fails_assert(ret >= 0))
+ return kr_error(ret);
+ knot_dname_to_lower(next);
+
+ /* If NSEC 'owner' >= 'next', it means that there is nothing after 'owner' */
+ const bool is_last_nsec = dname_cmp(nsec->owner, next) >= 0;
+ const bool in_range = is_last_nsec || dname_cmp(sname, next) < 0;
+ if (!in_range)
+ return abs(ENOENT);
+ /* Before returning kr_ok(), we have to check a special case:
+ * sname might be under delegation from owner and thus
+ * not in the zone of this NSEC at all.
+ */
+ if (knot_dname_in_bailiwick(sname, nsec->owner) <= 0)
+ return kr_ok();
+ const uint8_t *bm = knot_nsec_bitmap(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ uint16_t bm_size = knot_nsec_bitmap_len(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+
+ return kr_nsec_children_in_zone_check(bm, bm_size);
+}
+
+int kr_nsec_bitmap_nodata_check(const uint8_t *bm, uint16_t bm_size, uint16_t type, const knot_dname_t *owner)
+{
+ const int NO_PROOF = abs(ENOENT);
+ if (!bm || !owner)
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+ if (dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, type))
+ return NO_PROOF;
+
+ if (type != KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME
+ && dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME)) {
+ return NO_PROOF;
+ }
+ /* Special behavior around zone cuts. */
+ switch (type) {
+ case KNOT_RRTYPE_DS:
+ /* Security feature: in case of DS also check for SOA
+ * non-existence to be more certain that we don't hold
+ * a child-side NSEC by some mistake (e.g. when forwarding).
+ * See RFC4035 5.2, next-to-last paragraph.
+ * This doesn't apply for root DS as it doesn't exist in DNS hierarchy.
+ */
+ if (owner[0] != '\0' && dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA))
+ return NO_PROOF;
+ break;
+ case KNOT_RRTYPE_CNAME:
+ /* Exception from the `default` rule. It's perhaps disputable,
+ * but existence of CNAME at zone apex is not allowed, so we
+ * consider a parent-side record to be enough to prove non-existence. */
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Parent-side delegation record isn't authoritative for non-DS;
+ * see RFC6840 4.1. */
+ if (dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_NS)
+ && !dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA)) {
+ return NO_PROOF;
+ }
+ /* LATER(opt): perhaps short-circuit test if we repeat it here. */
+ }
+
+ return kr_ok();
+}
+
+/// Convenience wrapper for kr_nsec_bitmap_nodata_check()
+static int no_data_response_check_rrtype(const knot_rrset_t *nsec, uint16_t type)
+{
+ if (kr_fails_assert(nsec && nsec->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC))
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+ const uint8_t *bm = knot_nsec_bitmap(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ uint16_t bm_size = knot_nsec_bitmap_len(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ return kr_nsec_bitmap_nodata_check(bm, bm_size, type, nsec->owner);
+}
+
+int kr_nsec_wildcard_answer_response_check(const knot_pkt_t *pkt, knot_section_t section_id,
+ const knot_dname_t *sname)
+{
+ const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, section_id);
+ if (!sec || !sname)
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+
+ for (unsigned i = 0; i < sec->count; ++i) {
+ const knot_rrset_t *rrset = knot_pkt_rr(sec, i);
+ if (rrset->type != KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC)
+ continue;
+ if (nsec_covers(rrset, sname) == 0)
+ return kr_ok();
+ }
+
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+}
+
+int kr_nsec_negative(const ranked_rr_array_t *rrrs, uint32_t qry_uid,
+ const knot_dname_t *sname, uint16_t stype)
+{
+ // We really only consider the (canonically) first NSEC in each RRset.
+ // Using same owner with differing content probably isn't useful for NSECs anyway.
+ // Many other parts of code do the same, too.
+ if (kr_fails_assert(rrrs && sname))
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+
+ // Terminology: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4592#section-3.3.1
+ int clencl_labels = -1; // the label count of the closest encloser of sname
+ for (int i = rrrs->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) { // NSECs near the end typically
+ const knot_rrset_t *nsec = rrrs->at[i]->rr;
+ bool ok = rrrs->at[i]->qry_uid == qry_uid
+ && nsec->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC
+ && kr_rank_test(rrrs->at[i]->rank, KR_RANK_SECURE);
+ if (!ok) continue;
+ const int covers = nsec_covers(nsec, sname);
+ if (covers == abs(EEXIST)
+ && no_data_response_check_rrtype(nsec, stype) == 0) {
+ return PKT_NODATA; // proven NODATA by matching NSEC
+ }
+ if (covers != 0) continue;
+
+ // We have to lower-case 'next' with libknot >= 2.7; see also RFC 6840 5.1.
+ // LATER(optim.): it's duplicate work with the nsec_covers() call.
+ knot_dname_t next[KNOT_DNAME_MAXLEN];
+ int ret = knot_dname_to_wire(next, knot_nsec_next(nsec->rrs.rdata), sizeof(next));
+ if (kr_fails_assert(ret >= 0))
+ return kr_error(ret);
+ knot_dname_to_lower(next);
+
+ clencl_labels = MAX(knot_dname_matched_labels(nsec->owner, sname),
+ knot_dname_matched_labels(sname, next));
+ break; // reduce indentation again
+ }
+
+ if (clencl_labels < 0)
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+ const int sname_labels = knot_dname_labels(sname, NULL);
+ if (sname_labels == clencl_labels)
+ return PKT_NODATA; // proven NODATA; sname is an empty non-terminal
+
+ // Explicitly construct name for the corresponding source of synthesis.
+ knot_dname_t ssynth[KNOT_DNAME_MAXLEN + 2];
+ ssynth[0] = 1;
+ ssynth[1] = '*';
+ const knot_dname_t *clencl = sname;
+ for (int l = sname_labels; l > clencl_labels; --l)
+ clencl = knot_wire_next_label(clencl, NULL);
+ (void)!!knot_dname_store(&ssynth[2], clencl);
+
+ // Try to (dis)prove the source of synthesis by a covering or matching NSEC.
+ for (int i = rrrs->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) { // NSECs near the end typically
+ const knot_rrset_t *nsec = rrrs->at[i]->rr;
+ bool ok = rrrs->at[i]->qry_uid == qry_uid
+ && nsec->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC
+ && kr_rank_test(rrrs->at[i]->rank, KR_RANK_SECURE);
+ if (!ok) continue;
+ const int covers = nsec_covers(nsec, ssynth);
+ if (covers == abs(EEXIST)) {
+ int ret = no_data_response_check_rrtype(nsec, stype);
+ if (ret == 0) return PKT_NODATA; // proven NODATA by wildcard NSEC
+ // TODO: also try expansion? Or at least a different return code?
+ } else if (covers == 0) {
+ return PKT_NXDOMAIN | PKT_NODATA;
+ }
+ }
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+}
+
+int kr_nsec_ref_to_unsigned(const ranked_rr_array_t *rrrs, uint32_t qry_uid,
+ const knot_dname_t *sname)
+{
+ for (int i = rrrs->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) { // NSECs near the end typically
+ const knot_rrset_t *nsec = rrrs->at[i]->rr;
+ bool ok = rrrs->at[i]->qry_uid == qry_uid
+ && nsec->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NSEC
+ && kr_rank_test(rrrs->at[i]->rank, KR_RANK_SECURE)
+ // avoid any possibility of getting tricked in deeper zones
+ && knot_dname_in_bailiwick(sname, nsec->owner) >= 0;
+ if (!ok) continue;
+
+ kr_assert(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ const uint8_t *bm = knot_nsec_bitmap(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ uint16_t bm_size = knot_nsec_bitmap_len(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ ok = ok && dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_NS)
+ && !dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_DS)
+ && !dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA);
+ if (ok) return kr_ok();
+ }
+ return kr_error(DNSSEC_NOT_FOUND);
+}
+
+int kr_nsec_matches_name_and_type(const knot_rrset_t *nsec,
+ const knot_dname_t *name, uint16_t type)
+{
+ /* It's not secure enough to just check a single bit for (some) other types,
+ * but we (currently) only use this API for NS. See RFC 6840 sec. 4. */
+ if (kr_fails_assert(type == KNOT_RRTYPE_NS && nsec && nsec->rrs.rdata && name))
+ return kr_error(EINVAL);
+ if (!knot_dname_is_equal(nsec->owner, name))
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+ const uint8_t *bm = knot_nsec_bitmap(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ uint16_t bm_size = knot_nsec_bitmap_len(nsec->rrs.rdata);
+ if (dnssec_nsec_bitmap_contains(bm, bm_size, type)) {
+ return kr_ok();
+ } else {
+ return kr_error(ENOENT);
+ }
+}