Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 102 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa3d3607d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/spectre.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Interface for managing mitigations for Spectre vulnerabilities.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Google LLC
+ * Author: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
+ */
+
+#ifndef __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+#define __ASM_SPECTRE_H
+
+#define BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS 4
+#define __BP_HARDEN_HYP_VECS_SZ	((BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS - 1) * SZ_2K)
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/virt.h>
+
+/* Watch out, ordering is important here. */
+enum mitigation_state {
+	SPECTRE_UNAFFECTED,
+	SPECTRE_MITIGATED,
+	SPECTRE_VULNERABLE,
+};
+
+struct task_struct;
+
+/*
+ * Note: the order of this enum corresponds to __bp_harden_hyp_vecs and
+ * we rely on having the direct vectors first.
+ */
+enum arm64_hyp_spectre_vector {
+	/*
+	 * Take exceptions directly to __kvm_hyp_vector. This must be
+	 * 0 so that it used by default when mitigations are not needed.
+	 */
+	HYP_VECTOR_DIRECT,
+
+	/*
+	 * Bounce via a slot in the hypervisor text mapping of
+	 * __bp_harden_hyp_vecs, which contains an SMC call.
+	 */
+	HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_DIRECT,
+
+	/*
+	 * Bounce via a slot in a special mapping of __bp_harden_hyp_vecs
+	 * next to the idmap page.
+	 */
+	HYP_VECTOR_INDIRECT,
+
+	/*
+	 * Bounce via a slot in a special mapping of __bp_harden_hyp_vecs
+	 * next to the idmap page, which contains an SMC call.
+	 */
+	HYP_VECTOR_SPECTRE_INDIRECT,
+};
+
+typedef void (*bp_hardening_cb_t)(void);
+
+struct bp_hardening_data {
+	enum arm64_hyp_spectre_vector	slot;
+	bp_hardening_cb_t		fn;
+};
+
+DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct bp_hardening_data, bp_hardening_data);
+
+/* Called during entry so must be __always_inline */
+static __always_inline void arm64_apply_bp_hardening(void)
+{
+	struct bp_hardening_data *d;
+
+	if (!cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_SPECTRE_V2))
+		return;
+
+	d = this_cpu_ptr(&bp_hardening_data);
+	if (d->fn)
+		d->fn();
+}
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v2_state(void);
+bool has_spectre_v2(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope);
+void spectre_v2_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+
+bool has_spectre_v3a(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope);
+void spectre_v3a_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_v4_state(void);
+bool has_spectre_v4(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *cap, int scope);
+void spectre_v4_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+void spectre_v4_enable_task_mitigation(struct task_struct *tsk);
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_meltdown_state(void);
+
+enum mitigation_state arm64_get_spectre_bhb_state(void);
+bool is_spectre_bhb_affected(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope);
+u8 spectre_bhb_loop_affected(int scope);
+void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused);
+#endif	/* __ASSEMBLY__ */
+#endif	/* __ASM_SPECTRE_H */