Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 602 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0611fd838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,602 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * handle transition of Linux booting another kernel
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Eric Biederman  <ebiederm@xmission.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"kexec: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/numa.h>
+#include <linux/ftrace.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
+
+#include <asm/init.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/io_apic.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/kexec-bzimage64.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI
+/*
+ * Used while adding mapping for ACPI tables.
+ * Can be reused when other iomem regions need be mapped
+ */
+struct init_pgtable_data {
+	struct x86_mapping_info *info;
+	pgd_t *level4p;
+};
+
+static int mem_region_callback(struct resource *res, void *arg)
+{
+	struct init_pgtable_data *data = arg;
+	unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+	mstart = res->start;
+	mend = mstart + resource_size(res) - 1;
+
+	return kernel_ident_mapping_init(data->info, data->level4p, mstart, mend);
+}
+
+static int
+map_acpi_tables(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p)
+{
+	struct init_pgtable_data data;
+	unsigned long flags;
+	int ret;
+
+	data.info = info;
+	data.level4p = level4p;
+	flags = IORESOURCE_MEM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
+
+	ret = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_ACPI_TABLES, flags, 0, -1,
+				  &data, mem_region_callback);
+	if (ret && ret != -EINVAL)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* ACPI tables could be located in ACPI Non-volatile Storage region */
+	ret = walk_iomem_res_desc(IORES_DESC_ACPI_NV_STORAGE, flags, 0, -1,
+				  &data, mem_region_callback);
+	if (ret && ret != -EINVAL)
+		return ret;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+static int map_acpi_tables(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
+const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = {
+		&kexec_bzImage64_ops,
+		NULL
+};
+#endif
+
+static int
+map_efi_systab(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *level4p)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI
+	unsigned long mstart, mend;
+
+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+		return 0;
+
+	mstart = (boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab |
+			((u64)boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi<<32));
+
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_64BIT))
+		mend = mstart + sizeof(efi_system_table_64_t);
+	else
+		mend = mstart + sizeof(efi_system_table_32_t);
+
+	if (!mstart)
+		return 0;
+
+	return kernel_ident_mapping_init(info, level4p, mstart, mend);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void free_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.p4d);
+	image->arch.p4d = NULL;
+	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pud);
+	image->arch.pud = NULL;
+	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pmd);
+	image->arch.pmd = NULL;
+	free_page((unsigned long)image->arch.pte);
+	image->arch.pte = NULL;
+}
+
+static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
+{
+	pgprot_t prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC_NOENC;
+	unsigned long vaddr, paddr;
+	int result = -ENOMEM;
+	p4d_t *p4d;
+	pud_t *pud;
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+	pte_t *pte;
+
+	vaddr = (unsigned long)relocate_kernel;
+	paddr = __pa(page_address(image->control_code_page)+PAGE_SIZE);
+	pgd += pgd_index(vaddr);
+	if (!pgd_present(*pgd)) {
+		p4d = (p4d_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!p4d)
+			goto err;
+		image->arch.p4d = p4d;
+		set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, vaddr);
+	if (!p4d_present(*p4d)) {
+		pud = (pud_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!pud)
+			goto err;
+		image->arch.pud = pud;
+		set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pud = pud_offset(p4d, vaddr);
+	if (!pud_present(*pud)) {
+		pmd = (pmd_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!pmd)
+			goto err;
+		image->arch.pmd = pmd;
+		set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
+	if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) {
+		pte = (pte_t *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!pte)
+			goto err;
+		image->arch.pte = pte;
+		set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(__pa(pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+	}
+	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
+
+	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
+	return 0;
+err:
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void *alloc_pgt_page(void *data)
+{
+	struct kimage *image = (struct kimage *)data;
+	struct page *page;
+	void *p = NULL;
+
+	page = kimage_alloc_control_pages(image, 0);
+	if (page) {
+		p = page_address(page);
+		clear_page(p);
+	}
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
+{
+	struct x86_mapping_info info = {
+		.alloc_pgt_page	= alloc_pgt_page,
+		.context	= image,
+		.page_flag	= __PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC,
+		.kernpg_flag	= _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC,
+	};
+	unsigned long mstart, mend;
+	pgd_t *level4p;
+	int result;
+	int i;
+
+	level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
+	clear_page(level4p);
+
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+		info.page_flag   |= _PAGE_ENC;
+		info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
+	}
+
+	if (direct_gbpages)
+		info.direct_gbpages = true;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nr_pfn_mapped; i++) {
+		mstart = pfn_mapped[i].start << PAGE_SHIFT;
+		mend   = pfn_mapped[i].end << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+		result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
+						 level4p, mstart, mend);
+		if (result)
+			return result;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * segments's mem ranges could be outside 0 ~ max_pfn,
+	 * for example when jump back to original kernel from kexeced kernel.
+	 * or first kernel is booted with user mem map, and second kernel
+	 * could be loaded out of that range.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < image->nr_segments; i++) {
+		mstart = image->segment[i].mem;
+		mend   = mstart + image->segment[i].memsz;
+
+		result = kernel_ident_mapping_init(&info,
+						 level4p, mstart, mend);
+
+		if (result)
+			return result;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare EFI systab and ACPI tables for kexec kernel since they are
+	 * not covered by pfn_mapped.
+	 */
+	result = map_efi_systab(&info, level4p);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+
+	result = map_acpi_tables(&info, level4p);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+
+	return init_transition_pgtable(image, level4p);
+}
+
+static void load_segments(void)
+{
+	__asm__ __volatile__ (
+		"\tmovl %0,%%ds\n"
+		"\tmovl %0,%%es\n"
+		"\tmovl %0,%%ss\n"
+		"\tmovl %0,%%fs\n"
+		"\tmovl %0,%%gs\n"
+		: : "a" (__KERNEL_DS) : "memory"
+		);
+}
+
+int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	unsigned long start_pgtable;
+	int result;
+
+	/* Calculate the offsets */
+	start_pgtable = page_to_pfn(image->control_code_page) << PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+	/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */
+	result = init_pgtable(image, start_pgtable);
+	if (result)
+		return result;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void machine_kexec_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	free_transition_pgtable(image);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do not allocate memory (or fail in any way) in machine_kexec().
+ * We are past the point of no return, committed to rebooting now.
+ */
+void machine_kexec(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	unsigned long page_list[PAGES_NR];
+	void *control_page;
+	int save_ftrace_enabled;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
+	if (image->preserve_context)
+		save_processor_state();
+#endif
+
+	save_ftrace_enabled = __ftrace_enabled_save();
+
+	/* Interrupts aren't acceptable while we reboot */
+	local_irq_disable();
+	hw_breakpoint_disable();
+	cet_disable();
+
+	if (image->preserve_context) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
+		/*
+		 * We need to put APICs in legacy mode so that we can
+		 * get timer interrupts in second kernel. kexec/kdump
+		 * paths already have calls to restore_boot_irq_mode()
+		 * in one form or other. kexec jump path also need one.
+		 */
+		clear_IO_APIC();
+		restore_boot_irq_mode();
+#endif
+	}
+
+	control_page = page_address(image->control_code_page) + PAGE_SIZE;
+	__memcpy(control_page, relocate_kernel, KEXEC_CONTROL_CODE_MAX_SIZE);
+
+	page_list[PA_CONTROL_PAGE] = virt_to_phys(control_page);
+	page_list[VA_CONTROL_PAGE] = (unsigned long)control_page;
+	page_list[PA_TABLE_PAGE] =
+	  (unsigned long)__pa(page_address(image->control_code_page));
+
+	if (image->type == KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT)
+		page_list[PA_SWAP_PAGE] = (page_to_pfn(image->swap_page)
+						<< PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	/*
+	 * The segment registers are funny things, they have both a
+	 * visible and an invisible part.  Whenever the visible part is
+	 * set to a specific selector, the invisible part is loaded
+	 * with from a table in memory.  At no other time is the
+	 * descriptor table in memory accessed.
+	 *
+	 * I take advantage of this here by force loading the
+	 * segments, before I zap the gdt with an invalid value.
+	 */
+	load_segments();
+	/*
+	 * The gdt & idt are now invalid.
+	 * If you want to load them you must set up your own idt & gdt.
+	 */
+	native_idt_invalidate();
+	native_gdt_invalidate();
+
+	/* now call it */
+	image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head,
+				       (unsigned long)page_list,
+				       image->start,
+				       image->preserve_context,
+				       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP
+	if (image->preserve_context)
+		restore_processor_state();
+#endif
+
+	__ftrace_enabled_restore(save_ftrace_enabled);
+}
+
+/* arch-dependent functionality related to kexec file-based syscall */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE
+void *arch_kexec_kernel_image_load(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	if (!image->fops || !image->fops->load)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOEXEC);
+
+	return image->fops->load(image, image->kernel_buf,
+				 image->kernel_buf_len, image->initrd_buf,
+				 image->initrd_buf_len, image->cmdline_buf,
+				 image->cmdline_buf_len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply purgatory relocations.
+ *
+ * @pi:		Purgatory to be relocated.
+ * @section:	Section relocations applying to.
+ * @relsec:	Section containing RELAs.
+ * @symtabsec:	Corresponding symtab.
+ *
+ * TODO: Some of the code belongs to generic code. Move that in kexec.c.
+ */
+int arch_kexec_apply_relocations_add(struct purgatory_info *pi,
+				     Elf_Shdr *section, const Elf_Shdr *relsec,
+				     const Elf_Shdr *symtabsec)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	Elf64_Rela *rel;
+	Elf64_Sym *sym;
+	void *location;
+	unsigned long address, sec_base, value;
+	const char *strtab, *name, *shstrtab;
+	const Elf_Shdr *sechdrs;
+
+	/* String & section header string table */
+	sechdrs = (void *)pi->ehdr + pi->ehdr->e_shoff;
+	strtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[symtabsec->sh_link].sh_offset;
+	shstrtab = (char *)pi->ehdr + sechdrs[pi->ehdr->e_shstrndx].sh_offset;
+
+	rel = (void *)pi->ehdr + relsec->sh_offset;
+
+	pr_debug("Applying relocate section %s to %u\n",
+		 shstrtab + relsec->sh_name, relsec->sh_info);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < relsec->sh_size / sizeof(*rel); i++) {
+
+		/*
+		 * rel[i].r_offset contains byte offset from beginning
+		 * of section to the storage unit affected.
+		 *
+		 * This is location to update. This is temporary buffer
+		 * where section is currently loaded. This will finally be
+		 * loaded to a different address later, pointed to by
+		 * ->sh_addr. kexec takes care of moving it
+		 *  (kexec_load_segment()).
+		 */
+		location = pi->purgatory_buf;
+		location += section->sh_offset;
+		location += rel[i].r_offset;
+
+		/* Final address of the location */
+		address = section->sh_addr + rel[i].r_offset;
+
+		/*
+		 * rel[i].r_info contains information about symbol table index
+		 * w.r.t which relocation must be made and type of relocation
+		 * to apply. ELF64_R_SYM() and ELF64_R_TYPE() macros get
+		 * these respectively.
+		 */
+		sym = (void *)pi->ehdr + symtabsec->sh_offset;
+		sym += ELF64_R_SYM(rel[i].r_info);
+
+		if (sym->st_name)
+			name = strtab + sym->st_name;
+		else
+			name = shstrtab + sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_name;
+
+		pr_debug("Symbol: %s info: %02x shndx: %02x value=%llx size: %llx\n",
+			 name, sym->st_info, sym->st_shndx, sym->st_value,
+			 sym->st_size);
+
+		if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_UNDEF) {
+			pr_err("Undefined symbol: %s\n", name);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+
+		if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_COMMON) {
+			pr_err("symbol '%s' in common section\n", name);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+
+		if (sym->st_shndx == SHN_ABS)
+			sec_base = 0;
+		else if (sym->st_shndx >= pi->ehdr->e_shnum) {
+			pr_err("Invalid section %d for symbol %s\n",
+			       sym->st_shndx, name);
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		} else
+			sec_base = pi->sechdrs[sym->st_shndx].sh_addr;
+
+		value = sym->st_value;
+		value += sec_base;
+		value += rel[i].r_addend;
+
+		switch (ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info)) {
+		case R_X86_64_NONE:
+			break;
+		case R_X86_64_64:
+			*(u64 *)location = value;
+			break;
+		case R_X86_64_32:
+			*(u32 *)location = value;
+			if (value != *(u32 *)location)
+				goto overflow;
+			break;
+		case R_X86_64_32S:
+			*(s32 *)location = value;
+			if ((s64)value != *(s32 *)location)
+				goto overflow;
+			break;
+		case R_X86_64_PC32:
+		case R_X86_64_PLT32:
+			value -= (u64)address;
+			*(u32 *)location = value;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err("Unknown rela relocation: %llu\n",
+			       ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info));
+			return -ENOEXEC;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+overflow:
+	pr_err("Overflow in relocation type %d value 0x%lx\n",
+	       (int)ELF64_R_TYPE(rel[i].r_info), value);
+	return -ENOEXEC;
+}
+
+int arch_kimage_file_post_load_cleanup(struct kimage *image)
+{
+	vfree(image->elf_headers);
+	image->elf_headers = NULL;
+	image->elf_headers_sz = 0;
+
+	return kexec_image_post_load_cleanup_default(image);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE */
+
+static int
+kexec_mark_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, bool protect)
+{
+	struct page *page;
+	unsigned int nr_pages;
+
+	/*
+	 * For physical range: [start, end]. We must skip the unassigned
+	 * crashk resource with zero-valued "end" member.
+	 */
+	if (!end || start > end)
+		return 0;
+
+	page = pfn_to_page(start >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+	nr_pages = (end >> PAGE_SHIFT) - (start >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1;
+	if (protect)
+		return set_pages_ro(page, nr_pages);
+	else
+		return set_pages_rw(page, nr_pages);
+}
+
+static void kexec_mark_crashkres(bool protect)
+{
+	unsigned long control;
+
+	kexec_mark_range(crashk_low_res.start, crashk_low_res.end, protect);
+
+	/* Don't touch the control code page used in crash_kexec().*/
+	control = PFN_PHYS(page_to_pfn(kexec_crash_image->control_code_page));
+	/* Control code page is located in the 2nd page. */
+	kexec_mark_range(crashk_res.start, control + PAGE_SIZE - 1, protect);
+	control += KEXEC_CONTROL_PAGE_SIZE;
+	kexec_mark_range(control, crashk_res.end, protect);
+}
+
+void arch_kexec_protect_crashkres(void)
+{
+	kexec_mark_crashkres(true);
+}
+
+void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
+{
+	kexec_mark_crashkres(false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * During a traditional boot under SME, SME will encrypt the kernel,
+ * so the SME kexec kernel also needs to be un-encrypted in order to
+ * replicate a normal SME boot.
+ *
+ * During a traditional boot under SEV, the kernel has already been
+ * loaded encrypted, so the SEV kexec kernel needs to be encrypted in
+ * order to replicate a normal SEV boot.
+ */
+int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec
+	 * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
+	 * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
+	 */
+	return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
+}
+
+void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
+{
+	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back
+	 * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
+	 */
+	set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
+}