Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 5931 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..56c39a0c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5931 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Algorithm testing framework and tests.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Jean-Francois Dive <jef@linuxbe.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Nokia Siemens Networks
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Updated RFC4106 AES-GCM testing.
+ *    Authors: Aidan O'Mahony (aidan.o.mahony@intel.com)
+ *             Adrian Hoban <adrian.hoban@intel.com>
+ *             Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@intel.com>
+ *             Tadeusz Struk (tadeusz.struk@intel.com)
+ *    Copyright (c) 2010, Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/once.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/drbg.h>
+#include <crypto/akcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/kpp.h>
+#include <crypto/acompress.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/cipher.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+MODULE_IMPORT_NS(CRYPTO_INTERNAL);
+
+static bool notests;
+module_param(notests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(notests, "disable crypto self-tests");
+
+static bool panic_on_fail;
+module_param(panic_on_fail, bool, 0444);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+static bool noextratests;
+module_param(noextratests, bool, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(noextratests, "disable expensive crypto self-tests");
+
+static unsigned int fuzz_iterations = 100;
+module_param(fuzz_iterations, uint, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(fuzz_iterations, "number of fuzz test iterations");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS
+
+/* a perfect nop */
+int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "testmgr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Need slab memory for testing (size in number of pages).
+ */
+#define XBUFSIZE	8
+
+/*
+* Used by test_cipher()
+*/
+#define ENCRYPT 1
+#define DECRYPT 0
+
+struct aead_test_suite {
+	const struct aead_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set if trying to decrypt an inauthentic ciphertext with this
+	 * algorithm might result in EINVAL rather than EBADMSG, due to other
+	 * validation the algorithm does on the inputs such as length checks.
+	 */
+	unsigned int einval_allowed : 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set if this algorithm requires that the IV be located at the end of
+	 * the AAD buffer, in addition to being given in the normal way.  The
+	 * behavior when the two IV copies differ is implementation-defined.
+	 */
+	unsigned int aad_iv : 1;
+};
+
+struct cipher_test_suite {
+	const struct cipher_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct comp_test_suite {
+	struct {
+		const struct comp_testvec *vecs;
+		unsigned int count;
+	} comp, decomp;
+};
+
+struct hash_test_suite {
+	const struct hash_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct cprng_test_suite {
+	const struct cprng_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct drbg_test_suite {
+	const struct drbg_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct akcipher_test_suite {
+	const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct kpp_test_suite {
+	const struct kpp_testvec *vecs;
+	unsigned int count;
+};
+
+struct alg_test_desc {
+	const char *alg;
+	const char *generic_driver;
+	int (*test)(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+		    u32 type, u32 mask);
+	int fips_allowed;	/* set if alg is allowed in fips mode */
+
+	union {
+		struct aead_test_suite aead;
+		struct cipher_test_suite cipher;
+		struct comp_test_suite comp;
+		struct hash_test_suite hash;
+		struct cprng_test_suite cprng;
+		struct drbg_test_suite drbg;
+		struct akcipher_test_suite akcipher;
+		struct kpp_test_suite kpp;
+	} suite;
+};
+
+static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
+{
+	print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
+			16, 1,
+			buf, len, false);
+}
+
+static int __testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++) {
+		buf[i] = (char *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, order);
+		if (!buf[i])
+			goto err_free_buf;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+err_free_buf:
+	while (i-- > 0)
+		free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
+
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int testmgr_alloc_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+	return __testmgr_alloc_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+static void __testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE], int order)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < XBUFSIZE; i++)
+		free_pages((unsigned long)buf[i], order);
+}
+
+static void testmgr_free_buf(char *buf[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+	__testmgr_free_buf(buf, 0);
+}
+
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE	0xfe
+#define TESTMGR_POISON_LEN	16
+
+static inline void testmgr_poison(void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+	memset(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len);
+}
+
+/* Is the memory region still fully poisoned? */
+static inline bool testmgr_is_poison(const void *addr, size_t len)
+{
+	return memchr_inv(addr, TESTMGR_POISON_BYTE, len) == NULL;
+}
+
+/* flush type for hash algorithms */
+enum flush_type {
+	/* merge with update of previous buffer(s) */
+	FLUSH_TYPE_NONE = 0,
+
+	/* update with previous buffer(s) before doing this one */
+	FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+
+	/* likewise, but also export and re-import the intermediate state */
+	FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+};
+
+/* finalization function for hash algorithms */
+enum finalization_type {
+	FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,	/* use final() */
+	FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP,	/* use finup() */
+	FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,	/* use digest() */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Whether the crypto operation will occur in-place, and if so whether the
+ * source and destination scatterlist pointers will coincide (req->src ==
+ * req->dst), or whether they'll merely point to two separate scatterlists
+ * (req->src != req->dst) that reference the same underlying memory.
+ *
+ * This is only relevant for algorithm types that support in-place operation.
+ */
+enum inplace_mode {
+	OUT_OF_PLACE,
+	INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+	INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS,
+};
+
+#define TEST_SG_TOTAL	10000
+
+/**
+ * struct test_sg_division - description of a scatterlist entry
+ *
+ * This struct describes one entry of a scatterlist being constructed to check a
+ * crypto test vector.
+ *
+ * @proportion_of_total: length of this chunk relative to the total length,
+ *			 given as a proportion out of TEST_SG_TOTAL so that it
+ *			 scales to fit any test vector
+ * @offset: byte offset into a 2-page buffer at which this chunk will start
+ * @offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to the
+ *				  @offset
+ * @flush_type: for hashes, whether an update() should be done now vs.
+ *		continuing to accumulate data
+ * @nosimd: if doing the pending update(), do it with SIMD disabled?
+ */
+struct test_sg_division {
+	unsigned int proportion_of_total;
+	unsigned int offset;
+	bool offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+	enum flush_type flush_type;
+	bool nosimd;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct testvec_config - configuration for testing a crypto test vector
+ *
+ * This struct describes the data layout and other parameters with which each
+ * crypto test vector can be tested.
+ *
+ * @name: name of this config, logged for debugging purposes if a test fails
+ * @inplace_mode: whether and how to operate on the data in-place, if applicable
+ * @req_flags: extra request_flags, e.g. CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP
+ * @src_divs: description of how to arrange the source scatterlist
+ * @dst_divs: description of how to arrange the dst scatterlist, if applicable
+ *	      for the algorithm type.  Defaults to @src_divs if unset.
+ * @iv_offset: misalignment of the IV in the range [0..MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1],
+ *	       where 0 is aligned to a 2*(MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK+1) byte boundary
+ * @iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ *				     the @iv_offset
+ * @key_offset: misalignment of the key, where 0 is default alignment
+ * @key_offset_relative_to_alignmask: if true, add the algorithm's alignmask to
+ *				      the @key_offset
+ * @finalization_type: what finalization function to use for hashes
+ * @nosimd: execute with SIMD disabled?  Requires !CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP.
+ */
+struct testvec_config {
+	const char *name;
+	enum inplace_mode inplace_mode;
+	u32 req_flags;
+	struct test_sg_division src_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+	struct test_sg_division dst_divs[XBUFSIZE];
+	unsigned int iv_offset;
+	unsigned int key_offset;
+	bool iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+	bool key_offset_relative_to_alignmask;
+	enum finalization_type finalization_type;
+	bool nosimd;
+};
+
+#define TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN	192
+
+/*
+ * The following are the lists of testvec_configs to test for each algorithm
+ * type when the basic crypto self-tests are enabled, i.e. when
+ * CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS is unset.  They aim to provide good test
+ * coverage, while keeping the test time much shorter than the full fuzz tests
+ * so that the basic tests can be enabled in a wider range of circumstances.
+ */
+
+/* Configs for skciphers and aeads */
+static const struct testvec_config default_cipher_testvec_configs[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "in-place (one sglist)",
+		.inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+	}, {
+		.name = "in-place (two sglists)",
+		.inplace_mode = INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS,
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+	}, {
+		.name = "out-of-place",
+		.inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE,
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+	}, {
+		.name = "unaligned buffer, offset=1",
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+		.iv_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+	}, {
+		.name = "buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 10000,
+				.offset = 1,
+				.offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+			},
+		},
+		.iv_offset = 1,
+		.iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+	}, {
+		.name = "two even aligned splits",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+		},
+	}, {
+		.name = "uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+		.req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+		.src_divs = {
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7  },
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+		},
+		.iv_offset = 3,
+		.key_offset = 3,
+	}, {
+		.name = "misaligned splits crossing pages, inplace",
+		.inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST,
+		.src_divs = {
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 7500,
+				.offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32
+			}, {
+				.proportion_of_total = 2500,
+				.offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7
+			},
+		},
+	}
+};
+
+static const struct testvec_config default_hash_testvec_configs[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "init+update+final aligned buffer",
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+	}, {
+		.name = "init+finup aligned buffer",
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP,
+	}, {
+		.name = "digest aligned buffer",
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000 } },
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+	}, {
+		.name = "init+update+final misaligned buffer",
+		.src_divs = { { .proportion_of_total = 10000, .offset = 1 } },
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+	}, {
+		.name = "digest buffer aligned only to alignmask",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 10000,
+				.offset = 1,
+				.offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+			},
+		},
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+		.key_offset = 1,
+		.key_offset_relative_to_alignmask = true,
+	}, {
+		.name = "init+update+update+final two even splits",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 5000 },
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 5000,
+				.flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH,
+			},
+		},
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+	}, {
+		.name = "digest uneven misaligned splits, may sleep",
+		.req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+		.src_divs = {
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 1900, .offset = 33 },
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 3300, .offset = 7  },
+			{ .proportion_of_total = 4800, .offset = 18 },
+		},
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+	}, {
+		.name = "digest misaligned splits crossing pages",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 7500,
+				.offset = PAGE_SIZE - 32,
+			}, {
+				.proportion_of_total = 2500,
+				.offset = PAGE_SIZE - 7,
+			},
+		},
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST,
+	}, {
+		.name = "import/export",
+		.src_divs = {
+			{
+				.proportion_of_total = 6500,
+				.flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+			}, {
+				.proportion_of_total = 3500,
+				.flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT,
+			},
+		},
+		.finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL,
+	}
+};
+
+static unsigned int count_test_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs)
+{
+	unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+	unsigned int ndivs = 0;
+
+	do {
+		remaining -= divs[ndivs++].proportion_of_total;
+	} while (remaining);
+
+	return ndivs;
+}
+
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES	BIT(0)
+#define SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD	BIT(1)
+
+static bool valid_sg_divisions(const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+			       unsigned int count, int *flags_ret)
+{
+	unsigned int total = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count && total != TEST_SG_TOTAL; i++) {
+		if (divs[i].proportion_of_total <= 0 ||
+		    divs[i].proportion_of_total > TEST_SG_TOTAL - total)
+			return false;
+		total += divs[i].proportion_of_total;
+		if (divs[i].flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE)
+			*flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES;
+		if (divs[i].nosimd)
+			*flags_ret |= SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD;
+	}
+	return total == TEST_SG_TOTAL &&
+		memchr_inv(&divs[i], 0, (count - i) * sizeof(divs[0])) == NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the given testvec_config is valid.  This isn't strictly needed
+ * since every testvec_config should be valid, but check anyway so that people
+ * don't unknowingly add broken configs that don't do what they wanted.
+ */
+static bool valid_testvec_config(const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+	int flags = 0;
+
+	if (cfg->name == NULL)
+		return false;
+
+	if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->src_divs, ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs),
+				&flags))
+		return false;
+
+	if (cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total) {
+		if (!valid_sg_divisions(cfg->dst_divs,
+					ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs), &flags))
+			return false;
+	} else {
+		if (memchr_inv(cfg->dst_divs, 0, sizeof(cfg->dst_divs)))
+			return false;
+		/* defaults to dst_divs=src_divs */
+	}
+
+	if (cfg->iv_offset +
+	    (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK : 0) >
+	    MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)
+		return false;
+
+	if ((flags & (SGDIVS_HAVE_FLUSHES | SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+	    cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST)
+		return false;
+
+	if ((cfg->nosimd || (flags & SGDIVS_HAVE_NOSIMD)) &&
+	    (cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+struct test_sglist {
+	char *bufs[XBUFSIZE];
+	struct scatterlist sgl[XBUFSIZE];
+	struct scatterlist sgl_saved[XBUFSIZE];
+	struct scatterlist *sgl_ptr;
+	unsigned int nents;
+};
+
+static int init_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+	return __testmgr_alloc_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+static void destroy_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+	return __testmgr_free_buf(tsgl->bufs, 1 /* two pages per buffer */);
+}
+
+/**
+ * build_test_sglist() - build a scatterlist for a crypto test
+ *
+ * @tsgl: the scatterlist to build.  @tsgl->bufs[] contains an array of 2-page
+ *	  buffers which the scatterlist @tsgl->sgl[] will be made to point into.
+ * @divs: the layout specification on which the scatterlist will be based
+ * @alignmask: the algorithm's alignmask
+ * @total_len: the total length of the scatterlist to build in bytes
+ * @data: if non-NULL, the buffers will be filled with this data until it ends.
+ *	  Otherwise the buffers will be poisoned.  In both cases, some bytes
+ *	  past the end of each buffer will be poisoned to help detect overruns.
+ * @out_divs: if non-NULL, the test_sg_division to which each scatterlist entry
+ *	      corresponds will be returned here.  This will match @divs except
+ *	      that divisions resolving to a length of 0 are omitted as they are
+ *	      not included in the scatterlist.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 or a -errno value
+ */
+static int build_test_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+			     const struct test_sg_division *divs,
+			     const unsigned int alignmask,
+			     const unsigned int total_len,
+			     struct iov_iter *data,
+			     const struct test_sg_division *out_divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+	struct {
+		const struct test_sg_division *div;
+		size_t length;
+	} partitions[XBUFSIZE];
+	const unsigned int ndivs = count_test_sg_divisions(divs);
+	unsigned int len_remaining = total_len;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(partitions) != ARRAY_SIZE(tsgl->sgl));
+	if (WARN_ON(ndivs > ARRAY_SIZE(partitions)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Calculate the (div, length) pairs */
+	tsgl->nents = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < ndivs; i++) {
+		unsigned int len_this_sg =
+			min(len_remaining,
+			    (total_len * divs[i].proportion_of_total +
+			     TEST_SG_TOTAL / 2) / TEST_SG_TOTAL);
+
+		if (len_this_sg != 0) {
+			partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[i];
+			partitions[tsgl->nents].length = len_this_sg;
+			tsgl->nents++;
+			len_remaining -= len_this_sg;
+		}
+	}
+	if (tsgl->nents == 0) {
+		partitions[tsgl->nents].div = &divs[0];
+		partitions[tsgl->nents].length = 0;
+		tsgl->nents++;
+	}
+	partitions[tsgl->nents - 1].length += len_remaining;
+
+	/* Set up the sgl entries and fill the data or poison */
+	sg_init_table(tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents);
+	for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+		unsigned int offset = partitions[i].div->offset;
+		void *addr;
+
+		if (partitions[i].div->offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+			offset += alignmask;
+
+		while (offset + partitions[i].length + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN >
+		       2 * PAGE_SIZE) {
+			if (WARN_ON(offset <= 0))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			offset /= 2;
+		}
+
+		addr = &tsgl->bufs[i][offset];
+		sg_set_buf(&tsgl->sgl[i], addr, partitions[i].length);
+
+		if (out_divs)
+			out_divs[i] = partitions[i].div;
+
+		if (data) {
+			size_t copy_len, copied;
+
+			copy_len = min(partitions[i].length, data->count);
+			copied = copy_from_iter(addr, copy_len, data);
+			if (WARN_ON(copied != copy_len))
+				return -EINVAL;
+			testmgr_poison(addr + copy_len, partitions[i].length +
+				       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN - copy_len);
+		} else {
+			testmgr_poison(addr, partitions[i].length +
+				       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+		}
+	}
+
+	sg_mark_end(&tsgl->sgl[tsgl->nents - 1]);
+	tsgl->sgl_ptr = tsgl->sgl;
+	memcpy(tsgl->sgl_saved, tsgl->sgl, tsgl->nents * sizeof(tsgl->sgl[0]));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that a scatterlist crypto operation produced the correct output.
+ *
+ * @tsgl: scatterlist containing the actual output
+ * @expected_output: buffer containing the expected output
+ * @len_to_check: length of @expected_output in bytes
+ * @unchecked_prefix_len: number of ignored bytes in @tsgl prior to real result
+ * @check_poison: verify that the poison bytes after each chunk are intact?
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if correct, -EINVAL if incorrect, -EOVERFLOW if buffer overrun.
+ */
+static int verify_correct_output(const struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+				 const char *expected_output,
+				 unsigned int len_to_check,
+				 unsigned int unchecked_prefix_len,
+				 bool check_poison)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+		struct scatterlist *sg = &tsgl->sgl_ptr[i];
+		unsigned int len = sg->length;
+		unsigned int offset = sg->offset;
+		const char *actual_output;
+
+		if (unchecked_prefix_len) {
+			if (unchecked_prefix_len >= len) {
+				unchecked_prefix_len -= len;
+				continue;
+			}
+			offset += unchecked_prefix_len;
+			len -= unchecked_prefix_len;
+			unchecked_prefix_len = 0;
+		}
+		len = min(len, len_to_check);
+		actual_output = page_address(sg_page(sg)) + offset;
+		if (memcmp(expected_output, actual_output, len) != 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (check_poison &&
+		    !testmgr_is_poison(actual_output + len, TESTMGR_POISON_LEN))
+			return -EOVERFLOW;
+		len_to_check -= len;
+		expected_output += len;
+	}
+	if (WARN_ON(len_to_check != 0))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_test_sglist_corrupted(const struct test_sglist *tsgl)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+		if (tsgl->sgl[i].page_link != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].page_link)
+			return true;
+		if (tsgl->sgl[i].offset != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].offset)
+			return true;
+		if (tsgl->sgl[i].length != tsgl->sgl_saved[i].length)
+			return true;
+	}
+	return false;
+}
+
+struct cipher_test_sglists {
+	struct test_sglist src;
+	struct test_sglist dst;
+};
+
+static struct cipher_test_sglists *alloc_cipher_test_sglists(void)
+{
+	struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+
+	tsgls = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgls), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsgls)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->src) != 0)
+		goto fail_kfree;
+	if (init_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst) != 0)
+		goto fail_destroy_src;
+
+	return tsgls;
+
+fail_destroy_src:
+	destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+fail_kfree:
+	kfree(tsgls);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void free_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	if (tsgls) {
+		destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->src);
+		destroy_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst);
+		kfree(tsgls);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Build the src and dst scatterlists for an skcipher or AEAD test */
+static int build_cipher_test_sglists(struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls,
+				     const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+				     unsigned int alignmask,
+				     unsigned int src_total_len,
+				     unsigned int dst_total_len,
+				     const struct kvec *inputs,
+				     unsigned int nr_inputs)
+{
+	struct iov_iter input;
+	int err;
+
+	iov_iter_kvec(&input, ITER_SOURCE, inputs, nr_inputs, src_total_len);
+	err = build_test_sglist(&tsgls->src, cfg->src_divs, alignmask,
+				cfg->inplace_mode != OUT_OF_PLACE ?
+					max(dst_total_len, src_total_len) :
+					src_total_len,
+				&input, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	/*
+	 * In-place crypto operations can use the same scatterlist for both the
+	 * source and destination (req->src == req->dst), or can use separate
+	 * scatterlists (req->src != req->dst) which point to the same
+	 * underlying memory.  Make sure to test both cases.
+	 */
+	if (cfg->inplace_mode == INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST) {
+		tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->src.sgl;
+		tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (cfg->inplace_mode == INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS) {
+		/*
+		 * For now we keep it simple and only test the case where the
+		 * two scatterlists have identical entries, rather than
+		 * different entries that split up the same memory differently.
+		 */
+		memcpy(tsgls->dst.sgl, tsgls->src.sgl,
+		       tsgls->src.nents * sizeof(tsgls->src.sgl[0]));
+		memcpy(tsgls->dst.sgl_saved, tsgls->src.sgl,
+		       tsgls->src.nents * sizeof(tsgls->src.sgl[0]));
+		tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr = tsgls->dst.sgl;
+		tsgls->dst.nents = tsgls->src.nents;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Out of place */
+	return build_test_sglist(&tsgls->dst,
+				 cfg->dst_divs[0].proportion_of_total ?
+					cfg->dst_divs : cfg->src_divs,
+				 alignmask, dst_total_len, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Support for testing passing a misaligned key to setkey():
+ *
+ * If cfg->key_offset is set, copy the key into a new buffer at that offset,
+ * optionally adding alignmask.  Else, just use the key directly.
+ */
+static int prepare_keybuf(const u8 *key, unsigned int ksize,
+			  const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			  unsigned int alignmask,
+			  const u8 **keybuf_ret, const u8 **keyptr_ret)
+{
+	unsigned int key_offset = cfg->key_offset;
+	u8 *keybuf = NULL, *keyptr = (u8 *)key;
+
+	if (key_offset != 0) {
+		if (cfg->key_offset_relative_to_alignmask)
+			key_offset += alignmask;
+		keybuf = kmalloc(key_offset + ksize, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!keybuf)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		keyptr = keybuf + key_offset;
+		memcpy(keyptr, key, ksize);
+	}
+	*keybuf_ret = keybuf;
+	*keyptr_ret = keyptr;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Like setkey_f(tfm, key, ksize), but sometimes misalign the key */
+#define do_setkey(setkey_f, tfm, key, ksize, cfg, alignmask)		\
+({									\
+	const u8 *keybuf, *keyptr;					\
+	int err;							\
+									\
+	err = prepare_keybuf((key), (ksize), (cfg), (alignmask),	\
+			     &keybuf, &keyptr);				\
+	if (err == 0) {							\
+		err = setkey_f((tfm), keyptr, (ksize));			\
+		kfree(keybuf);						\
+	}								\
+	err;								\
+})
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+/*
+ * The fuzz tests use prandom instead of the normal Linux RNG since they don't
+ * need cryptographically secure random numbers.  This greatly improves the
+ * performance of these tests, especially if they are run before the Linux RNG
+ * has been initialized or if they are run on a lockdep-enabled kernel.
+ */
+
+static inline void init_rnd_state(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+	prandom_seed_state(rng, get_random_u64());
+}
+
+static inline u8 prandom_u8(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+	return prandom_u32_state(rng);
+}
+
+static inline u32 prandom_u32_below(struct rnd_state *rng, u32 ceil)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This is slightly biased for non-power-of-2 values of 'ceil', but this
+	 * isn't important here.
+	 */
+	return prandom_u32_state(rng) % ceil;
+}
+
+static inline bool prandom_bool(struct rnd_state *rng)
+{
+	return prandom_u32_below(rng, 2);
+}
+
+static inline u32 prandom_u32_inclusive(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					u32 floor, u32 ceil)
+{
+	return floor + prandom_u32_below(rng, ceil - floor + 1);
+}
+
+/* Generate a random length in range [0, max_len], but prefer smaller values */
+static unsigned int generate_random_length(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					   unsigned int max_len)
+{
+	unsigned int len = prandom_u32_below(rng, max_len + 1);
+
+	switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+	case 0:
+		return len % 64;
+	case 1:
+		return len % 256;
+	case 2:
+		return len % 1024;
+	default:
+		return len;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Flip a random bit in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_bit(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t bitpos;
+
+	bitpos = prandom_u32_below(rng, size * 8);
+	buf[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos % 8);
+}
+
+/* Flip a random byte in the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void flip_random_byte(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	buf[prandom_u32_below(rng, size)] ^= 0xff;
+}
+
+/* Sometimes make some random changes to the given nonempty data buffer */
+static void mutate_buffer(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t num_flips;
+	size_t i;
+
+	/* Sometimes flip some bits */
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) {
+		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8),
+				  size * 8);
+		for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+			flip_random_bit(rng, buf, size);
+	}
+
+	/* Sometimes flip some bytes */
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0) {
+		num_flips = min_t(size_t, 1 << prandom_u32_below(rng, 8), size);
+		for (i = 0; i < num_flips; i++)
+			flip_random_byte(rng, buf, size);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Randomly generate 'count' bytes, but sometimes make them "interesting" */
+static void generate_random_bytes(struct rnd_state *rng, u8 *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	u8 b;
+	u8 increment;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (count == 0)
+		return;
+
+	switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8)) { /* Choose a generation strategy */
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+		/* All the same byte, plus optional mutations */
+		switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+		case 0:
+			b = 0x00;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			b = 0xff;
+			break;
+		default:
+			b = prandom_u8(rng);
+			break;
+		}
+		memset(buf, b, count);
+		mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count);
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		/* Ascending or descending bytes, plus optional mutations */
+		increment = prandom_u8(rng);
+		b = prandom_u8(rng);
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++, b += increment)
+			buf[i] = b;
+		mutate_buffer(rng, buf, count);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Fully random bytes */
+		prandom_bytes_state(rng, buf, count);
+	}
+}
+
+static char *generate_random_sgl_divisions(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					   struct test_sg_division *divs,
+					   size_t max_divs, char *p, char *end,
+					   bool gen_flushes, u32 req_flags)
+{
+	struct test_sg_division *div = divs;
+	unsigned int remaining = TEST_SG_TOTAL;
+
+	do {
+		unsigned int this_len;
+		const char *flushtype_str;
+
+		if (div == &divs[max_divs - 1] || prandom_bool(rng))
+			this_len = remaining;
+		else
+			this_len = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, remaining);
+		div->proportion_of_total = this_len;
+
+		if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+			div->offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng,
+							    PAGE_SIZE - 128,
+							    PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+		else if (prandom_bool(rng))
+			div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, 32);
+		else
+			div->offset = prandom_u32_below(rng, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 8) == 0)
+			div->offset_relative_to_alignmask = true;
+
+		div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_NONE;
+		if (gen_flushes) {
+			switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+			case 0:
+				div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				div->flush_type = FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (div->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+		    !(req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) &&
+		    prandom_bool(rng))
+			div->nosimd = true;
+
+		switch (div->flush_type) {
+		case FLUSH_TYPE_FLUSH:
+			if (div->nosimd)
+				flushtype_str = "<flush,nosimd>";
+			else
+				flushtype_str = "<flush>";
+			break;
+		case FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT:
+			if (div->nosimd)
+				flushtype_str = "<reimport,nosimd>";
+			else
+				flushtype_str = "<reimport>";
+			break;
+		default:
+			flushtype_str = "";
+			break;
+		}
+
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(TEST_SG_TOTAL != 10000); /* for "%u.%u%%" */
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "%s%u.%u%%@%s+%u%s", flushtype_str,
+			       this_len / 100, this_len % 100,
+			       div->offset_relative_to_alignmask ?
+					"alignmask" : "",
+			       div->offset, this_len == remaining ? "" : ", ");
+		remaining -= this_len;
+		div++;
+	} while (remaining);
+
+	return p;
+}
+
+/* Generate a random testvec_config for fuzz testing */
+static void generate_random_testvec_config(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					   struct testvec_config *cfg,
+					   char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+	char *p = name;
+	char * const end = name + max_namelen;
+
+	memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+	cfg->name = name;
+
+	p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "random:");
+
+	switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+	case 0:
+	case 1:
+		cfg->inplace_mode = OUT_OF_PLACE;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		cfg->inplace_mode = INPLACE_ONE_SGLIST;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace_one_sglist");
+		break;
+	default:
+		cfg->inplace_mode = INPLACE_TWO_SGLISTS;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " inplace_two_sglists");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		cfg->req_flags |= CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " may_sleep");
+	}
+
+	switch (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4)) {
+	case 0:
+		cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_final");
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_finup");
+		break;
+	default:
+		cfg->finalization_type = FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " use_digest");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (!(cfg->req_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP) && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		cfg->nosimd = true;
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " nosimd");
+	}
+
+	p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " src_divs=[");
+	p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->src_divs,
+					  ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->src_divs), p, end,
+					  (cfg->finalization_type !=
+					   FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST),
+					  cfg->req_flags);
+	p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+
+	if (cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " dst_divs=[");
+		p = generate_random_sgl_divisions(rng, cfg->dst_divs,
+						  ARRAY_SIZE(cfg->dst_divs),
+						  p, end, false,
+						  cfg->req_flags);
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, "]");
+	}
+
+	if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		cfg->iv_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1,
+						       MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " iv_offset=%u", cfg->iv_offset);
+	}
+
+	if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		cfg->key_offset = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1,
+							MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK);
+		p += scnprintf(p, end - p, " key_offset=%u", cfg->key_offset);
+	}
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(!valid_testvec_config(cfg));
+}
+
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+	migrate_disable();
+	__this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, true);
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+	__this_cpu_write(crypto_simd_disabled_for_test, false);
+	migrate_enable();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given an algorithm name, build the name of the generic implementation of that
+ * algorithm, assuming the usual naming convention.  Specifically, this appends
+ * "-generic" to every part of the name that is not a template name.  Examples:
+ *
+ *	aes => aes-generic
+ *	cbc(aes) => cbc(aes-generic)
+ *	cts(cbc(aes)) => cts(cbc(aes-generic))
+ *	rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305) => rfc7539(chacha20-generic,poly1305-generic)
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, or -ENAMETOOLONG if the generic name would be too long
+ */
+static int build_generic_driver_name(const char *algname,
+				     char driver_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME])
+{
+	const char *in = algname;
+	char *out = driver_name;
+	size_t len = strlen(algname);
+
+	if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+		goto too_long;
+	do {
+		const char *in_saved = in;
+
+		while (*in && *in != '(' && *in != ')' && *in != ',')
+			*out++ = *in++;
+		if (*in != '(' && in > in_saved) {
+			len += 8;
+			if (len >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+				goto too_long;
+			memcpy(out, "-generic", 8);
+			out += 8;
+		}
+	} while ((*out++ = *in++) != '\0');
+	return 0;
+
+too_long:
+	pr_err("alg: generic driver name for \"%s\" would be too long\n",
+	       algname);
+	return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static void crypto_disable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void crypto_reenable_simd_for_test(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int build_hash_sglist(struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+			     const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+			     const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			     unsigned int alignmask,
+			     const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE])
+{
+	struct kvec kv;
+	struct iov_iter input;
+
+	kv.iov_base = (void *)vec->plaintext;
+	kv.iov_len = vec->psize;
+	iov_iter_kvec(&input, ITER_SOURCE, &kv, 1, vec->psize);
+	return build_test_sglist(tsgl, cfg->src_divs, alignmask, vec->psize,
+				 &input, divs);
+}
+
+static int check_hash_result(const char *type,
+			     const u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+			     const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+			     const char *vec_name,
+			     const char *driver,
+			     const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+	if (memcmp(result, vec->digest, digestsize) != 0) {
+		pr_err("alg: %s: %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (!testmgr_is_poison(&result[digestsize], TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+		pr_err("alg: %s: %s overran result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       type, driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int check_shash_op(const char *op, int err,
+				 const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+				 const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+	if (err)
+		pr_err("alg: shash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the shash API */
+static int test_shash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+			      const char *vec_name,
+			      const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			      struct shash_desc *desc,
+			      struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+			      u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
+	const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
+	const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int statesize = crypto_shash_statesize(tfm);
+	const char *driver = crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm);
+	const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+	unsigned int i;
+	u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+	int err;
+
+	/* Set the key, if specified */
+	if (vec->ksize) {
+		err = do_setkey(crypto_shash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+				cfg, alignmask);
+		if (err) {
+			if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+				return 0;
+			pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+			       crypto_shash_get_flags(tfm));
+			return err;
+		}
+		if (vec->setkey_error) {
+			pr_err("alg: shash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+	err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: shash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Do the actual hashing */
+
+	testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+	testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+	if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+	    vec->digest_error) {
+		/* Just using digest() */
+		if (tsgl->nents != 1)
+			return 0;
+		if (cfg->nosimd)
+			crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+		err = crypto_shash_digest(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[0]),
+					  tsgl->sgl[0].length, result);
+		if (cfg->nosimd)
+			crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+		if (err) {
+			if (err == vec->digest_error)
+				return 0;
+			pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+			       cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+		if (vec->digest_error) {
+			pr_err("alg: shash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		goto result_ready;
+	}
+
+	/* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+	err = crypto_shash_init(desc);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+	err = check_shash_op("init", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+		if (i + 1 == tsgl->nents &&
+		    cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINUP) {
+			if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+				crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+			err = crypto_shash_finup(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+						 tsgl->sgl[i].length, result);
+			if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+				crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+			err = check_shash_op("finup", err, driver, vec_name,
+					     cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			goto result_ready;
+		}
+		if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+			crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+		err = crypto_shash_update(desc, sg_virt(&tsgl->sgl[i]),
+					  tsgl->sgl[i].length);
+		if (divs[i]->nosimd)
+			crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+		err = check_shash_op("update", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+			/* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+			testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+				       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+			err = crypto_shash_export(desc, hashstate);
+			err = check_shash_op("export", err, driver, vec_name,
+					     cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+					       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+				pr_err("alg: shash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+				       driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+				return -EOVERFLOW;
+			}
+			testmgr_poison(desc->__ctx, crypto_shash_descsize(tfm));
+			err = crypto_shash_import(desc, hashstate);
+			err = check_shash_op("import", err, driver, vec_name,
+					     cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+	err = crypto_shash_final(desc, result);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+	err = check_shash_op("final", err, driver, vec_name, cfg);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+result_ready:
+	return check_hash_result("shash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+				 driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int do_ahash_op(int (*op)(struct ahash_request *req),
+		       struct ahash_request *req,
+		       struct crypto_wait *wait, bool nosimd)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (nosimd)
+		crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+
+	err = op(req);
+
+	if (nosimd)
+		crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+
+	return crypto_wait_req(err, wait);
+}
+
+static int check_nonfinal_ahash_op(const char *op, int err,
+				   u8 *result, unsigned int digestsize,
+				   const char *driver, const char *vec_name,
+				   const struct testvec_config *cfg)
+{
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (!testmgr_is_poison(result, digestsize)) {
+		pr_err("alg: ahash: %s %s() used result buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Test one hash test vector in one configuration, using the ahash API */
+static int test_ahash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+			      const char *vec_name,
+			      const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			      struct ahash_request *req,
+			      struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+			      u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_ahash_alignmask(tfm);
+	const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(tfm);
+	const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm);
+	const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+	const struct test_sg_division *divs[XBUFSIZE];
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct scatterlist *pending_sgl;
+	unsigned int pending_len;
+	u8 result[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN];
+	int err;
+
+	/* Set the key, if specified */
+	if (vec->ksize) {
+		err = do_setkey(crypto_ahash_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->ksize,
+				cfg, alignmask);
+		if (err) {
+			if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+				return 0;
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+			       crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm));
+			return err;
+		}
+		if (vec->setkey_error) {
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Build the scatterlist for the source data */
+	err = build_hash_sglist(tsgl, vec, cfg, alignmask, divs);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: ahash: %s: error preparing scatterlist for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Do the actual hashing */
+
+	testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+	testmgr_poison(result, digestsize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+
+	if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_DIGEST ||
+	    vec->digest_error) {
+		/* Just using digest() */
+		ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done,
+					   &wait);
+		ahash_request_set_crypt(req, tsgl->sgl, result, vec->psize);
+		err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_digest, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+		if (err) {
+			if (err == vec->digest_error)
+				return 0;
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, err,
+			       cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+		if (vec->digest_error) {
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s digest() unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, vec_name, vec->digest_error, cfg->name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		goto result_ready;
+	}
+
+	/* Using init(), zero or more update(), then final() or finup() */
+
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, result, 0);
+	err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_init, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+	err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("init", err, result, digestsize,
+				      driver, vec_name, cfg);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	pending_sgl = NULL;
+	pending_len = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < tsgl->nents; i++) {
+		if (divs[i]->flush_type != FLUSH_TYPE_NONE &&
+		    pending_sgl != NULL) {
+			/* update() with the pending data */
+			ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags,
+						   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+			ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result,
+						pending_len);
+			err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait,
+					  divs[i]->nosimd);
+			err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err,
+						      result, digestsize,
+						      driver, vec_name, cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			pending_sgl = NULL;
+			pending_len = 0;
+		}
+		if (divs[i]->flush_type == FLUSH_TYPE_REIMPORT) {
+			/* Test ->export() and ->import() */
+			testmgr_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+				       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN);
+			err = crypto_ahash_export(req, hashstate);
+			err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("export", err,
+						      result, digestsize,
+						      driver, vec_name, cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			if (!testmgr_is_poison(hashstate + statesize,
+					       TESTMGR_POISON_LEN)) {
+				pr_err("alg: ahash: %s export() overran state buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+				       driver, vec_name, cfg->name);
+				return -EOVERFLOW;
+			}
+
+			testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_ahash_reqsize(tfm));
+			err = crypto_ahash_import(req, hashstate);
+			err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("import", err,
+						      result, digestsize,
+						      driver, vec_name, cfg);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+		if (pending_sgl == NULL)
+			pending_sgl = &tsgl->sgl[i];
+		pending_len += tsgl->sgl[i].length;
+	}
+
+	ahash_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(req, pending_sgl, result, pending_len);
+	if (cfg->finalization_type == FINALIZATION_TYPE_FINAL) {
+		/* finish with update() and final() */
+		err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_update, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+		err = check_nonfinal_ahash_op("update", err, result, digestsize,
+					      driver, vec_name, cfg);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_final, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s final() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* finish with finup() */
+		err = do_ahash_op(crypto_ahash_finup, req, &wait, cfg->nosimd);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_err("alg: ahash: %s finup() failed with err %d on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, err, vec_name, cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+	}
+
+result_ready:
+	return check_hash_result("ahash", result, digestsize, vec, vec_name,
+				 driver, cfg);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec_cfg(const struct hash_testvec *vec,
+			     const char *vec_name,
+			     const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			     struct ahash_request *req,
+			     struct shash_desc *desc,
+			     struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+			     u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * For algorithms implemented as "shash", most bugs will be detected by
+	 * both the shash and ahash tests.  Test the shash API first so that the
+	 * failures involve less indirection, so are easier to debug.
+	 */
+
+	if (desc) {
+		err = test_shash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, cfg, desc, tsgl,
+					 hashstate);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	return test_ahash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, cfg, req, tsgl, hashstate);
+}
+
+static int test_hash_vec(const struct hash_testvec *vec, unsigned int vec_num,
+			 struct ahash_request *req, struct shash_desc *desc,
+			 struct test_sglist *tsgl, u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	char vec_name[16];
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++) {
+		err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name,
+					&default_hash_testvec_configs[i],
+					req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+	if (!noextratests) {
+		struct rnd_state rng;
+		struct testvec_config cfg;
+		char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+		init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+			generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+						       sizeof(cfgname));
+			err = test_hash_vec_cfg(vec, vec_name, &cfg,
+						req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a hash test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_hash_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					 struct shash_desc *desc,
+					 struct hash_testvec *vec,
+					 unsigned int maxkeysize,
+					 unsigned int maxdatasize,
+					 char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+	/* Data */
+	vec->psize = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->plaintext, vec->psize);
+
+	/*
+	 * Key: length in range [1, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize.
+	 * If algorithm is unkeyed, then maxkeysize == 0 and set ksize = 0.
+	 */
+	vec->setkey_error = 0;
+	vec->ksize = 0;
+	if (maxkeysize) {
+		vec->ksize = maxkeysize;
+		if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+			vec->ksize = prandom_u32_inclusive(rng, 1, maxkeysize);
+		generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->ksize);
+
+		vec->setkey_error = crypto_shash_setkey(desc->tfm, vec->key,
+							vec->ksize);
+		/* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to digest. */
+		if (vec->setkey_error)
+			goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Digest */
+	vec->digest_error = crypto_shash_digest(desc, vec->plaintext,
+						vec->psize, (u8 *)vec->digest);
+done:
+	snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: psize=%u ksize=%u\"",
+		 vec->psize, vec->ksize);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the hash algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding generic
+ * implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+				     unsigned int maxkeysize,
+				     struct ahash_request *req,
+				     struct shash_desc *desc,
+				     struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+				     u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int digestsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_ahash_blocksize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+	const char *algname = crypto_hash_alg_common(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+	const char *driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(tfm);
+	struct rnd_state rng;
+	char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_shash *generic_tfm = NULL;
+	struct shash_desc *generic_desc = NULL;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct hash_testvec vec = { 0 };
+	char vec_name[64];
+	struct testvec_config *cfg;
+	char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+	int err;
+
+	if (noextratests)
+		return 0;
+
+	init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+	if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+		err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+		return 0;
+
+	generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+		if (err == -ENOENT) {
+			pr_warn("alg: hash: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+				driver, generic_driver);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: hash: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+		       generic_driver, algname, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cfg) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	generic_desc = kzalloc(sizeof(*desc) +
+			       crypto_shash_descsize(generic_tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!generic_desc) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	generic_desc->tfm = generic_tfm;
+
+	/* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+	if (digestsize != crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: digestsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, digestsize,
+		       crypto_shash_digestsize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (blocksize != crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, blocksize, crypto_shash_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+	 * the other implementation against them.
+	 */
+
+	vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.plaintext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!vec.key || !vec.plaintext || !vec.digest) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		generate_random_hash_testvec(&rng, generic_desc, &vec,
+					     maxkeysize, maxdatasize,
+					     vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+		generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname,
+					       sizeof(cfgname));
+
+		err = test_hash_vec_cfg(&vec, vec_name, cfg,
+					req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	kfree(cfg);
+	kfree(vec.key);
+	kfree(vec.plaintext);
+	kfree(vec.digest);
+	crypto_free_shash(generic_tfm);
+	kfree_sensitive(generic_desc);
+	return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_hash_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+				     unsigned int maxkeysize,
+				     struct ahash_request *req,
+				     struct shash_desc *desc,
+				     struct test_sglist *tsgl,
+				     u8 *hashstate)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int alloc_shash(const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask,
+		       struct crypto_shash **tfm_ret,
+		       struct shash_desc **desc_ret)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	struct shash_desc *desc;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+			/*
+			 * This algorithm is only available through the ahash
+			 * API, not the shash API, so skip the shash tests.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate shash transform for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!desc) {
+		crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	desc->tfm = tfm;
+
+	*tfm_ret = tfm;
+	*desc_ret = desc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int __alg_test_hash(const struct hash_testvec *vecs,
+			   unsigned int num_vecs, const char *driver,
+			   u32 type, u32 mask,
+			   const char *generic_driver, unsigned int maxkeysize)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *atfm = NULL;
+	struct ahash_request *req = NULL;
+	struct crypto_shash *stfm = NULL;
+	struct shash_desc *desc = NULL;
+	struct test_sglist *tsgl = NULL;
+	u8 *hashstate = NULL;
+	unsigned int statesize;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * Always test the ahash API.  This works regardless of whether the
+	 * algorithm is implemented as ahash or shash.
+	 */
+
+	atfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(atfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(atfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(atfm);
+	}
+	driver = crypto_ahash_driver_name(atfm);
+
+	req = ahash_request_alloc(atfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If available also test the shash API, to cover corner cases that may
+	 * be missed by testing the ahash API only.
+	 */
+	err = alloc_shash(driver, type, mask, &stfm, &desc);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	tsgl = kmalloc(sizeof(*tsgl), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!tsgl || init_test_sglist(tsgl) != 0) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		kfree(tsgl);
+		tsgl = NULL;
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	statesize = crypto_ahash_statesize(atfm);
+	if (stfm)
+		statesize = max(statesize, crypto_shash_statesize(stfm));
+	hashstate = kmalloc(statesize + TESTMGR_POISON_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!hashstate) {
+		pr_err("alg: hash: failed to allocate hash state buffer for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_vecs; i++) {
+		if (fips_enabled && vecs[i].fips_skip)
+			continue;
+
+		err = test_hash_vec(&vecs[i], i, req, desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	err = test_hash_vs_generic_impl(generic_driver, maxkeysize, req,
+					desc, tsgl, hashstate);
+out:
+	kfree(hashstate);
+	if (tsgl) {
+		destroy_test_sglist(tsgl);
+		kfree(tsgl);
+	}
+	kfree(desc);
+	crypto_free_shash(stfm);
+	ahash_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_ahash(atfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_hash(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			 u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	const struct hash_testvec *template = desc->suite.hash.vecs;
+	unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.hash.count;
+	unsigned int nr_unkeyed, nr_keyed;
+	unsigned int maxkeysize = 0;
+	int err;
+
+	/*
+	 * For OPTIONAL_KEY algorithms, we have to do all the unkeyed tests
+	 * first, before setting a key on the tfm.  To make this easier, we
+	 * require that the unkeyed test vectors (if any) are listed first.
+	 */
+
+	for (nr_unkeyed = 0; nr_unkeyed < tcount; nr_unkeyed++) {
+		if (template[nr_unkeyed].ksize)
+			break;
+	}
+	for (nr_keyed = 0; nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed < tcount; nr_keyed++) {
+		if (!template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize) {
+			pr_err("alg: hash: test vectors for %s out of order, "
+			       "unkeyed ones must come first\n", desc->alg);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, maxkeysize,
+				   template[nr_unkeyed + nr_keyed].ksize);
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+	if (nr_unkeyed) {
+		err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_unkeyed, driver, type, mask,
+				      desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+		template += nr_unkeyed;
+	}
+
+	if (!err && nr_keyed)
+		err = __alg_test_hash(template, nr_keyed, driver, type, mask,
+				      desc->generic_driver, maxkeysize);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec_cfg(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec,
+			     const char *vec_name,
+			     const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+			     struct aead_request *req,
+			     struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+	const char *driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+	const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+	const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+		 cfg->iv_offset +
+		 (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+	struct kvec input[2];
+	int err;
+
+	/* Set the key */
+	if (vec->wk)
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+	else
+		crypto_aead_clear_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+
+	err = do_setkey(crypto_aead_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+			cfg, alignmask);
+	if (err && err != vec->setkey_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+		       crypto_aead_get_flags(tfm));
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (!err && vec->setkey_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Set the authentication tag size */
+	err = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+	if (err && err != vec->setauthsize_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (!err && vec->setauthsize_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s setauthsize unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setauthsize_error);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	if (vec->setkey_error || vec->setauthsize_error)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+	if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (vec->iv)
+		memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+	else
+		memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+
+	/* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+	input[0].iov_base = (void *)vec->assoc;
+	input[0].iov_len = vec->alen;
+	input[1].iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+	input[1].iov_len = enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen;
+	err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+					vec->alen + (enc ? vec->plen :
+						     vec->clen),
+					vec->alen + (enc ? vec->clen :
+						     vec->plen),
+					input, 2);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+	testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_aead_reqsize(tfm));
+	aead_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	aead_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+			       enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen, iv);
+	aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+	err = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(req) : crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+	err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+
+	/* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+	if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen) ||
+	    req->assoclen != vec->alen ||
+	    req->iv != iv ||
+	    req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+	    req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+	    crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+	    req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+	    req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+	    req->base.data != &wait) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		if (req->cryptlen != (enc ? vec->plen : vec->clen))
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+		if (req->assoclen != vec->alen)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->assoclen'\n");
+		if (req->iv != iv)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+		if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->src'\n");
+		if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+		if (crypto_aead_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+		if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+		if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+		if (req->base.data != &wait)
+			pr_err("alg: aead: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+	    is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for unexpected success or failure, or wrong error code */
+	if ((err == 0 && vec->novrfy) ||
+	    (err != vec->crypt_error && !(err == -EBADMSG && vec->novrfy))) {
+		char expected_error[32];
+
+		if (vec->novrfy &&
+		    vec->crypt_error != 0 && vec->crypt_error != -EBADMSG)
+			sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG or %d",
+				vec->crypt_error);
+		else if (vec->novrfy)
+			sprintf(expected_error, "-EBADMSG");
+		else
+			sprintf(expected_error, "%d", vec->crypt_error);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+			       driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, err,
+			       cfg->name);
+			return err;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, expected_error, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (err) /* Expectedly failed. */
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+	err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+				    enc ? vec->clen : vec->plen,
+				    vec->alen,
+				    enc || cfg->inplace_mode == OUT_OF_PLACE);
+	if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_vec(int enc, const struct aead_testvec *vec,
+			 unsigned int vec_num, struct aead_request *req,
+			 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	char vec_name[16];
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	if (enc && vec->novrfy)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+		err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+					&default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+					req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+	if (!noextratests) {
+		struct rnd_state rng;
+		struct testvec_config cfg;
+		char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+		init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+			generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+						       sizeof(cfgname));
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+						&cfg, req, tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+
+struct aead_extra_tests_ctx {
+	struct rnd_state rng;
+	struct aead_request *req;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+	const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc;
+	struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls;
+	unsigned int maxdatasize;
+	unsigned int maxkeysize;
+
+	struct aead_testvec vec;
+	char vec_name[64];
+	char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+	struct testvec_config cfg;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Make at least one random change to a (ciphertext, AAD) pair.  "Ciphertext"
+ * here means the full ciphertext including the authentication tag.  The
+ * authentication tag (and hence also the ciphertext) is assumed to be nonempty.
+ */
+static void mutate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng,
+				struct aead_testvec *vec, bool aad_iv,
+				unsigned int ivsize)
+{
+	const unsigned int aad_tail_size = aad_iv ? ivsize : 0;
+	const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+
+	if (prandom_bool(rng) && vec->alen > aad_tail_size) {
+		 /* Mutate the AAD */
+		flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc,
+				vec->alen - aad_tail_size);
+		if (prandom_bool(rng))
+			return;
+	}
+	if (prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		/* Mutate auth tag (assuming it's at the end of ciphertext) */
+		flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext + vec->plen, authsize);
+	} else {
+		/* Mutate any part of the ciphertext */
+		flip_random_bit(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Minimum authentication tag size in bytes at which we assume that we can
+ * reliably generate inauthentic messages, i.e. not generate an authentic
+ * message by chance.
+ */
+#define MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE 8
+
+static void generate_aead_message(struct rnd_state *rng,
+				  struct aead_request *req,
+				  const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+				  struct aead_testvec *vec,
+				  bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int authsize = vec->clen - vec->plen;
+	const bool inauthentic = (authsize >= MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE) &&
+				 (prefer_inauthentic ||
+				  prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0);
+
+	/* Generate the AAD. */
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+	if (suite->aad_iv && vec->alen >= ivsize)
+		/* Avoid implementation-defined behavior. */
+		memcpy((u8 *)vec->assoc + vec->alen - ivsize, vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+	if (inauthentic && prandom_bool(rng)) {
+		/* Generate a random ciphertext. */
+		generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->clen);
+	} else {
+		int i = 0;
+		struct scatterlist src[2], dst;
+		u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+		DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+		/* Generate a random plaintext and encrypt it. */
+		sg_init_table(src, 2);
+		if (vec->alen)
+			sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->assoc, vec->alen);
+		if (vec->plen) {
+			generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+			sg_set_buf(&src[i++], vec->ptext, vec->plen);
+		}
+		sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->alen + vec->clen);
+		memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+		aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+		aead_request_set_crypt(req, src, &dst, vec->plen, iv);
+		aead_request_set_ad(req, vec->alen);
+		vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_aead_encrypt(req),
+						   &wait);
+		/* If encryption failed, we're done. */
+		if (vec->crypt_error != 0)
+			return;
+		memmove((u8 *)vec->ctext, vec->ctext + vec->alen, vec->clen);
+		if (!inauthentic)
+			return;
+		/*
+		 * Mutate the authentic (ciphertext, AAD) pair to get an
+		 * inauthentic one.
+		 */
+		mutate_aead_message(rng, vec, suite->aad_iv, ivsize);
+	}
+	vec->novrfy = 1;
+	if (suite->einval_allowed)
+		vec->crypt_error = -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate an AEAD test vector 'vec' using the implementation specified by
+ * 'req'.  The buffers in 'vec' must already be allocated.
+ *
+ * If 'prefer_inauthentic' is true, then this function will generate inauthentic
+ * test vectors (i.e. vectors with 'vec->novrfy=1') more often.
+ */
+static void generate_random_aead_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					 struct aead_request *req,
+					 struct aead_testvec *vec,
+					 const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+					 unsigned int maxkeysize,
+					 unsigned int maxdatasize,
+					 char *name, size_t max_namelen,
+					 bool prefer_inauthentic)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int maxauthsize = crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm);
+	unsigned int authsize;
+	unsigned int total_len;
+
+	/* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+	vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+		vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1);
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+	vec->setkey_error = crypto_aead_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+	/* IV */
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+	/* Tag length: in [0, maxauthsize], but usually choose maxauthsize */
+	authsize = maxauthsize;
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+		authsize = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxauthsize + 1);
+	if (prefer_inauthentic && authsize < MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE)
+		authsize = MIN_COLLISION_FREE_AUTHSIZE;
+	if (WARN_ON(authsize > maxdatasize))
+		authsize = maxdatasize;
+	maxdatasize -= authsize;
+	vec->setauthsize_error = crypto_aead_setauthsize(tfm, authsize);
+
+	/* AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext lengths */
+	total_len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+		vec->alen = 0;
+	else
+		vec->alen = generate_random_length(rng, total_len);
+	vec->plen = total_len - vec->alen;
+	vec->clen = vec->plen + authsize;
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate the AAD, plaintext, and ciphertext.  Not applicable if the
+	 * key or the authentication tag size couldn't be set.
+	 */
+	vec->novrfy = 0;
+	vec->crypt_error = 0;
+	if (vec->setkey_error == 0 && vec->setauthsize_error == 0)
+		generate_aead_message(rng, req, suite, vec, prefer_inauthentic);
+	snprintf(name, max_namelen,
+		 "\"random: alen=%u plen=%u authsize=%u klen=%u novrfy=%d\"",
+		 vec->alen, vec->plen, authsize, vec->klen, vec->novrfy);
+}
+
+static void try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(
+					struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+		generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, ctx->req, &ctx->vec,
+					     &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+					     ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+					     ctx->vec_name,
+					     sizeof(ctx->vec_name), true);
+		if (ctx->vec.novrfy)
+			return;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate inauthentic test vectors (i.e. ciphertext, AAD pairs that aren't the
+ * result of an encryption with the key) and verify that decryption fails.
+ */
+static int test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * Since this part of the tests isn't comparing the
+		 * implementation to another, there's no point in testing any
+		 * test vectors other than inauthentic ones (vec.novrfy=1) here.
+		 *
+		 * If we're having trouble generating such a test vector, e.g.
+		 * if the algorithm keeps rejecting the generated keys, don't
+		 * retry forever; just continue on.
+		 */
+		try_to_generate_inauthentic_testvec(ctx);
+		if (ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg,
+						       ctx->cfgname,
+						       sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+		}
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the AEAD algorithm against the corresponding generic implementation, if
+ * one is available.
+ */
+static int test_aead_vs_generic_impl(struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = ctx->tfm;
+	const char *algname = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+	const char *driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+	const char *generic_driver = ctx->test_desc->generic_driver;
+	char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_aead *generic_tfm = NULL;
+	struct aead_request *generic_req = NULL;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+		err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+		return 0;
+
+	generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+		if (err == -ENOENT) {
+			pr_warn("alg: aead: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+				driver, generic_driver);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: aead: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+		       generic_driver, algname, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	generic_req = aead_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!generic_req) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+	if (crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm) !=
+	    crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: maxauthsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_maxauthsize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm) != crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm) != crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm),
+		       crypto_aead_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+	 * the other implementation against them.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		generate_random_aead_testvec(&ctx->rng, generic_req, &ctx->vec,
+					     &ctx->test_desc->suite.aead,
+					     ctx->maxkeysize, ctx->maxdatasize,
+					     ctx->vec_name,
+					     sizeof(ctx->vec_name), false);
+		generate_random_testvec_config(&ctx->rng, &ctx->cfg,
+					       ctx->cfgname,
+					       sizeof(ctx->cfgname));
+		if (!ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if (ctx->vec.crypt_error == 0 || ctx->vec.novrfy) {
+			err = test_aead_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &ctx->vec,
+						ctx->vec_name, &ctx->cfg,
+						ctx->req, ctx->tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	crypto_free_aead(generic_tfm);
+	aead_request_free(generic_req);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+			   struct aead_request *req,
+			   struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	struct aead_extra_tests_ctx *ctx;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	if (noextratests)
+		return 0;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	init_rnd_state(&ctx->rng);
+	ctx->req = req;
+	ctx->tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	ctx->test_desc = test_desc;
+	ctx->tsgls = tsgls;
+	ctx->maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+	ctx->maxkeysize = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < test_desc->suite.aead.count; i++)
+		ctx->maxkeysize = max_t(unsigned int, ctx->maxkeysize,
+					test_desc->suite.aead.vecs[i].klen);
+
+	ctx->vec.key = kmalloc(ctx->maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.iv = kmalloc(crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.assoc = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.ptext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	ctx->vec.ctext = kmalloc(ctx->maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->vec.key || !ctx->vec.iv || !ctx->vec.assoc ||
+	    !ctx->vec.ptext || !ctx->vec.ctext) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = test_aead_vs_generic_impl(ctx);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = test_aead_inauthentic_inputs(ctx);
+out:
+	kfree(ctx->vec.key);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.iv);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.assoc);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.ptext);
+	kfree(ctx->vec.ctext);
+	kfree(ctx);
+	return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_aead_extra(const struct alg_test_desc *test_desc,
+			   struct aead_request *req,
+			   struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int test_aead(int enc, const struct aead_test_suite *suite,
+		     struct aead_request *req,
+		     struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+		err = test_aead_vec(enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_aead(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			 u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	const struct aead_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.aead;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm;
+	struct aead_request *req = NULL;
+	struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+	int err;
+
+	if (suite->count <= 0) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_aead(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	driver = crypto_aead_driver_name(tfm);
+
+	req = aead_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+	if (!tsgls) {
+		pr_err("alg: aead: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = test_aead(ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = test_aead(DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = test_aead_extra(desc, req, tsgls);
+out:
+	free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
+	aead_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_aead(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_cipher(struct crypto_cipher *tfm, int enc,
+		       const struct cipher_testvec *template,
+		       unsigned int tcount)
+{
+	const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_cipher_tfm(tfm));
+	unsigned int i, j, k;
+	char *q;
+	const char *e;
+	const char *input, *result;
+	void *data;
+	char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+	int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+	if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
+		goto out_nobuf;
+
+	if (enc == ENCRYPT)
+	        e = "encryption";
+	else
+		e = "decryption";
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+
+		if (fips_enabled && template[i].fips_skip)
+			continue;
+
+		input  = enc ? template[i].ptext : template[i].ctext;
+		result = enc ? template[i].ctext : template[i].ptext;
+		j++;
+
+		ret = -EINVAL;
+		if (WARN_ON(template[i].len > PAGE_SIZE))
+			goto out;
+
+		data = xbuf[0];
+		memcpy(data, input, template[i].len);
+
+		crypto_cipher_clear_flags(tfm, ~0);
+		if (template[i].wk)
+			crypto_cipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+
+		ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(tfm, template[i].key,
+					   template[i].klen);
+		if (ret) {
+			if (ret == template[i].setkey_error)
+				continue;
+			pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %u; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+			       algo, j, template[i].setkey_error, ret,
+			       crypto_cipher_get_flags(tfm));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (template[i].setkey_error) {
+			pr_err("alg: cipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %u; expected_error=%d\n",
+			       algo, j, template[i].setkey_error);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		for (k = 0; k < template[i].len;
+		     k += crypto_cipher_blocksize(tfm)) {
+			if (enc)
+				crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(tfm, data + k,
+							  data + k);
+			else
+				crypto_cipher_decrypt_one(tfm, data + k,
+							  data + k);
+		}
+
+		q = data;
+		if (memcmp(q, result, template[i].len)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Test %d failed "
+			       "on %s for %s\n", j, e, algo);
+			hexdump(q, template[i].len);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
+out_nobuf:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_skcipher_vec_cfg(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+				 const char *vec_name,
+				 const struct testvec_config *cfg,
+				 struct skcipher_request *req,
+				 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int alignmask = crypto_skcipher_alignmask(tfm);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+	const u32 req_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | cfg->req_flags;
+	const char *op = enc ? "encryption" : "decryption";
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+	u8 _iv[3 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1) + MAX_IVLEN];
+	u8 *iv = PTR_ALIGN(&_iv[0], 2 * (MAX_ALGAPI_ALIGNMASK + 1)) +
+		 cfg->iv_offset +
+		 (cfg->iv_offset_relative_to_alignmask ? alignmask : 0);
+	struct kvec input;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Set the key */
+	if (vec->wk)
+		crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+	else
+		crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(tfm,
+					    CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
+	err = do_setkey(crypto_skcipher_setkey, tfm, vec->key, vec->klen,
+			cfg, alignmask);
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == vec->setkey_error)
+			return 0;
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, flags=%#x\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error, err,
+		       crypto_skcipher_get_flags(tfm));
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (vec->setkey_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s setkey unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d\n",
+		       driver, vec_name, vec->setkey_error);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* The IV must be copied to a buffer, as the algorithm may modify it */
+	if (ivsize) {
+		if (WARN_ON(ivsize > MAX_IVLEN))
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (vec->generates_iv && !enc)
+			memcpy(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize);
+		else if (vec->iv)
+			memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+		else
+			memset(iv, 0, ivsize);
+	} else {
+		if (vec->generates_iv) {
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s has ivsize=0 but test vector %s generates IV!\n",
+			       driver, vec_name);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		iv = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Build the src/dst scatterlists */
+	input.iov_base = enc ? (void *)vec->ptext : (void *)vec->ctext;
+	input.iov_len = vec->len;
+	err = build_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls, cfg, alignmask,
+					vec->len, vec->len, &input, 1);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s: error preparing scatterlists for test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Do the actual encryption or decryption */
+	testmgr_poison(req->__ctx, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(tfm));
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, req_flags, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, tsgls->src.sgl_ptr, tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr,
+				   vec->len, iv);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_disable_simd_for_test();
+	err = enc ? crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req) : crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+	if (cfg->nosimd)
+		crypto_reenable_simd_for_test();
+	err = crypto_wait_req(err, &wait);
+
+	/* Check that the algorithm didn't overwrite things it shouldn't have */
+	if (req->cryptlen != vec->len ||
+	    req->iv != iv ||
+	    req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr ||
+	    req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr ||
+	    crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm ||
+	    req->base.complete != crypto_req_done ||
+	    req->base.flags != req_flags ||
+	    req->base.data != &wait) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted request struct on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		if (req->cryptlen != vec->len)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->cryptlen'\n");
+		if (req->iv != iv)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->iv'\n");
+		if (req->src != tsgls->src.sgl_ptr)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->src'\n");
+		if (req->dst != tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->dst'\n");
+		if (crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req) != tfm)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.tfm'\n");
+		if (req->base.complete != crypto_req_done)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.complete'\n");
+		if (req->base.flags != req_flags)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.flags'\n");
+		if (req->base.data != &wait)
+			pr_err("alg: skcipher: changed 'req->base.data'\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->src)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted src sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	if (tsgls->dst.sgl_ptr != tsgls->src.sgl &&
+	    is_test_sglist_corrupted(&tsgls->dst)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s corrupted dst sgl on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for success or failure */
+	if (err) {
+		if (err == vec->crypt_error)
+			return 0;
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s failed on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, actual_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, err, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (vec->crypt_error) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s unexpectedly succeeded on test vector %s; expected_error=%d, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, vec->crypt_error, cfg->name);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for the correct output (ciphertext or plaintext) */
+	err = verify_correct_output(&tsgls->dst, enc ? vec->ctext : vec->ptext,
+				    vec->len, 0, true);
+	if (err == -EOVERFLOW) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s overran dst buffer on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong result) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	/* If applicable, check that the algorithm generated the correct IV */
+	if (vec->iv_out && memcmp(iv, vec->iv_out, ivsize) != 0) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: %s %s test failed (wrong output IV) on test vector %s, cfg=\"%s\"\n",
+		       driver, op, vec_name, cfg->name);
+		hexdump(iv, ivsize);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int test_skcipher_vec(int enc, const struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+			     unsigned int vec_num,
+			     struct skcipher_request *req,
+			     struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	char vec_name[16];
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	if (fips_enabled && vec->fips_skip)
+		return 0;
+
+	sprintf(vec_name, "%u", vec_num);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++) {
+		err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+					    &default_cipher_testvec_configs[i],
+					    req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+	if (!noextratests) {
+		struct rnd_state rng;
+		struct testvec_config cfg;
+		char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+
+		init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+		for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations; i++) {
+			generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, &cfg, cfgname,
+						       sizeof(cfgname));
+			err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(enc, vec, vec_name,
+						    &cfg, req, tsgls);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+			cond_resched();
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+/*
+ * Generate a symmetric cipher test vector from the given implementation.
+ * Assumes the buffers in 'vec' were already allocated.
+ */
+static void generate_random_cipher_testvec(struct rnd_state *rng,
+					   struct skcipher_request *req,
+					   struct cipher_testvec *vec,
+					   unsigned int maxdatasize,
+					   char *name, size_t max_namelen)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	struct scatterlist src, dst;
+	u8 iv[MAX_IVLEN];
+	DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
+
+	/* Key: length in [0, maxkeysize], but usually choose maxkeysize */
+	vec->klen = maxkeysize;
+	if (prandom_u32_below(rng, 4) == 0)
+		vec->klen = prandom_u32_below(rng, maxkeysize + 1);
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->key, vec->klen);
+	vec->setkey_error = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, vec->key, vec->klen);
+
+	/* IV */
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->iv, ivsize);
+
+	/* Plaintext */
+	vec->len = generate_random_length(rng, maxdatasize);
+	generate_random_bytes(rng, (u8 *)vec->ptext, vec->len);
+
+	/* If the key couldn't be set, no need to continue to encrypt. */
+	if (vec->setkey_error)
+		goto done;
+
+	/* Ciphertext */
+	sg_init_one(&src, vec->ptext, vec->len);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, vec->ctext, vec->len);
+	memcpy(iv, vec->iv, ivsize);
+	skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, vec->len, iv);
+	vec->crypt_error = crypto_wait_req(crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+	if (vec->crypt_error != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * The only acceptable error here is for an invalid length, so
+		 * skcipher decryption should fail with the same error too.
+		 * We'll test for this.  But to keep the API usage well-defined,
+		 * explicitly initialize the ciphertext buffer too.
+		 */
+		memset((u8 *)vec->ctext, 0, vec->len);
+	}
+done:
+	snprintf(name, max_namelen, "\"random: len=%u klen=%u\"",
+		 vec->len, vec->klen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test the skcipher algorithm represented by @req against the corresponding
+ * generic implementation, if one is available.
+ */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+					 struct skcipher_request *req,
+					 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
+	const unsigned int maxkeysize = crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int ivsize = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int blocksize = crypto_skcipher_blocksize(tfm);
+	const unsigned int maxdatasize = (2 * PAGE_SIZE) - TESTMGR_POISON_LEN;
+	const char *algname = crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_name;
+	const char *driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+	struct rnd_state rng;
+	char _generic_driver[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+	struct crypto_skcipher *generic_tfm = NULL;
+	struct skcipher_request *generic_req = NULL;
+	unsigned int i;
+	struct cipher_testvec vec = { 0 };
+	char vec_name[64];
+	struct testvec_config *cfg;
+	char cfgname[TESTVEC_CONFIG_NAMELEN];
+	int err;
+
+	if (noextratests)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Keywrap isn't supported here yet as it handles its IV differently. */
+	if (strncmp(algname, "kw(", 3) == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	init_rnd_state(&rng);
+
+	if (!generic_driver) { /* Use default naming convention? */
+		err = build_generic_driver_name(algname, _generic_driver);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		generic_driver = _generic_driver;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(generic_driver, driver) == 0) /* Already the generic impl? */
+		return 0;
+
+	generic_tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(generic_driver, 0, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(generic_tfm)) {
+		err = PTR_ERR(generic_tfm);
+		if (err == -ENOENT) {
+			pr_warn("alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for %s because %s is unavailable\n",
+				driver, generic_driver);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: error allocating %s (generic impl of %s): %d\n",
+		       generic_driver, algname, err);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	cfg = kzalloc(sizeof(*cfg), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!cfg) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	generic_req = skcipher_request_alloc(generic_tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!generic_req) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Check the algorithm properties for consistency. */
+
+	if (crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm) !=
+	    crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: min keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(tfm),
+		       crypto_skcipher_min_keysize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (maxkeysize != crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: max keysize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, maxkeysize,
+		       crypto_skcipher_max_keysize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (ivsize != crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: ivsize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, ivsize, crypto_skcipher_ivsize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (blocksize != crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: blocksize for %s (%u) doesn't match generic impl (%u)\n",
+		       driver, blocksize,
+		       crypto_skcipher_blocksize(generic_tfm));
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Now generate test vectors using the generic implementation, and test
+	 * the other implementation against them.
+	 */
+
+	vec.key = kmalloc(maxkeysize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.iv = kmalloc(ivsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.ptext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	vec.ctext = kmalloc(maxdatasize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!vec.key || !vec.iv || !vec.ptext || !vec.ctext) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < fuzz_iterations * 8; i++) {
+		generate_random_cipher_testvec(&rng, generic_req, &vec,
+					       maxdatasize,
+					       vec_name, sizeof(vec_name));
+		generate_random_testvec_config(&rng, cfg, cfgname,
+					       sizeof(cfgname));
+
+		err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(ENCRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+					    cfg, req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		err = test_skcipher_vec_cfg(DECRYPT, &vec, vec_name,
+					    cfg, req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	err = 0;
+out:
+	kfree(cfg);
+	kfree(vec.key);
+	kfree(vec.iv);
+	kfree(vec.ptext);
+	kfree(vec.ctext);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(generic_tfm);
+	skcipher_request_free(generic_req);
+	return err;
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+static int test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(const char *generic_driver,
+					 struct skcipher_request *req,
+					 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS */
+
+static int test_skcipher(int enc, const struct cipher_test_suite *suite,
+			 struct skcipher_request *req,
+			 struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int err;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < suite->count; i++) {
+		err = test_skcipher_vec(enc, &suite->vecs[i], i, req, tsgls);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+		cond_resched();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_skcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+			     const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
+	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
+	struct skcipher_request *req = NULL;
+	struct cipher_test_sglists *tsgls = NULL;
+	int err;
+
+	if (suite->count <= 0) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: empty test suite for %s\n", driver);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_skcipher(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate transform for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	driver = crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm);
+
+	req = skcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate request for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	tsgls = alloc_cipher_test_sglists();
+	if (!tsgls) {
+		pr_err("alg: skcipher: failed to allocate test buffers for %s\n",
+		       driver);
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	err = test_skcipher(ENCRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = test_skcipher(DECRYPT, suite, req, tsgls);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	err = test_skcipher_vs_generic_impl(desc->generic_driver, req, tsgls);
+out:
+	free_cipher_test_sglists(tsgls);
+	skcipher_request_free(req);
+	crypto_free_skcipher(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_comp(struct crypto_comp *tfm,
+		     const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
+		     const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate,
+		     int ctcount, int dtcount)
+{
+	const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_comp_tfm(tfm));
+	char *output, *decomp_output;
+	unsigned int i;
+	int ret;
+
+	output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!output)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	decomp_output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!decomp_output) {
+		kfree(output);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) {
+		int ilen;
+		unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+
+		memset(output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+		memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+
+		ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen;
+		ret = crypto_comp_compress(tfm, ctemplate[i].input,
+					   ilen, output, &dlen);
+		if (ret) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: compression failed "
+			       "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo,
+			       -ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ilen = dlen;
+		dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+		ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, output,
+					     ilen, decomp_output, &dlen);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: decompress: on test %d for %s failed: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Compression test %d "
+			       "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo,
+			       dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(decomp_output, ctemplate[i].input,
+			   ctemplate[i].inlen)) {
+			pr_err("alg: comp: compression failed: output differs: on test %d for %s\n",
+			       i + 1, algo);
+			hexdump(decomp_output, dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) {
+		int ilen;
+		unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+
+		memset(decomp_output, 0, COMP_BUF_SIZE);
+
+		ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen;
+		ret = crypto_comp_decompress(tfm, dtemplate[i].input,
+					     ilen, decomp_output, &dlen);
+		if (ret) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: decompression failed "
+			       "on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n", i + 1, algo,
+			       -ret);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d "
+			       "failed for %s: output len = %d\n", i + 1, algo,
+			       dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(decomp_output, dtemplate[i].output, dlen)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: comp: Decompression test %d "
+			       "failed for %s\n", i + 1, algo);
+			hexdump(decomp_output, dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(decomp_output);
+	kfree(output);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_acomp(struct crypto_acomp *tfm,
+		      const struct comp_testvec *ctemplate,
+		      const struct comp_testvec *dtemplate,
+		      int ctcount, int dtcount)
+{
+	const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_acomp_tfm(tfm));
+	unsigned int i;
+	char *output, *decomp_out;
+	int ret;
+	struct scatterlist src, dst;
+	struct acomp_req *req;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+
+	output = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!output)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	decomp_out = kmalloc(COMP_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!decomp_out) {
+		kfree(output);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ctcount; i++) {
+		unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+		int ilen = ctemplate[i].inlen;
+		void *input_vec;
+
+		input_vec = kmemdup(ctemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!input_vec) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		memset(output, 0, dlen);
+		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+		sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+		sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
+
+		req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
+		if (!req) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n",
+			       algo);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+		acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+					   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_compress(req), &wait);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		ilen = req->dlen;
+		dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+		sg_init_one(&src, output, ilen);
+		sg_init_one(&dst, decomp_out, dlen);
+		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+		acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (req->dlen != ctemplate[i].inlen) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, req->dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(input_vec, decomp_out, req->dlen)) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: Compression test %d failed for %s\n",
+			       i + 1, algo);
+			hexdump(output, req->dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+		sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+		acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, NULL, ilen, 0);
+
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_compress(req), &wait);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: compression failed on NULL dst buffer test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		kfree(input_vec);
+		acomp_request_free(req);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < dtcount; i++) {
+		unsigned int dlen = COMP_BUF_SIZE;
+		int ilen = dtemplate[i].inlen;
+		void *input_vec;
+
+		input_vec = kmemdup(dtemplate[i].input, ilen, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!input_vec) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		memset(output, 0, dlen);
+		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+		sg_init_one(&src, input_vec, ilen);
+		sg_init_one(&dst, output, dlen);
+
+		req = acomp_request_alloc(tfm);
+		if (!req) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: request alloc failed for %s\n",
+			       algo);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, &dst, ilen, dlen);
+		acomp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+					   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: decompression failed on test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (req->dlen != dtemplate[i].outlen) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s: output len = %d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, req->dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (memcmp(output, dtemplate[i].output, req->dlen)) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: Decompression test %d failed for %s\n",
+			       i + 1, algo);
+			hexdump(output, req->dlen);
+			ret = -EINVAL;
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+		crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+		acomp_request_set_params(req, &src, NULL, ilen, 0);
+
+		ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_acomp_decompress(req), &wait);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: decompression failed on NULL dst buffer test %d for %s: ret=%d\n",
+			       i + 1, algo, -ret);
+			kfree(input_vec);
+			acomp_request_free(req);
+			goto out;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		kfree(input_vec);
+		acomp_request_free(req);
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+
+out:
+	kfree(decomp_out);
+	kfree(output);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_cprng(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+		      const struct cprng_testvec *template,
+		      unsigned int tcount)
+{
+	const char *algo = crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_rng_tfm(tfm));
+	int err = 0, i, j, seedsize;
+	u8 *seed;
+	char result[32];
+
+	seedsize = crypto_rng_seedsize(tfm);
+
+	seed = kmalloc(seedsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!seed) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to allocate seed space "
+		       "for %s\n", algo);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+		memset(result, 0, 32);
+
+		memcpy(seed, template[i].v, template[i].vlen);
+		memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen, template[i].key,
+		       template[i].klen);
+		memcpy(seed + template[i].vlen + template[i].klen,
+		       template[i].dt, template[i].dtlen);
+
+		err = crypto_rng_reset(tfm, seed, seedsize);
+		if (err) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to reset rng "
+			       "for %s\n", algo);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		for (j = 0; j < template[i].loops; j++) {
+			err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(tfm, result,
+						   template[i].rlen);
+			if (err < 0) {
+				printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to obtain "
+				       "the correct amount of random data for "
+				       "%s (requested %d)\n", algo,
+				       template[i].rlen);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+
+		err = memcmp(result, template[i].result,
+			     template[i].rlen);
+		if (err) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Test %d failed for %s\n",
+			       i, algo);
+			hexdump(result, template[i].rlen);
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	kfree(seed);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_cipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+			   const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	const struct cipher_test_suite *suite = &desc->suite.cipher;
+	struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
+	int err;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cipher: Failed to load transform for "
+		       "%s: %ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+
+	err = test_cipher(tfm, ENCRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
+	if (!err)
+		err = test_cipher(tfm, DECRYPT, suite->vecs, suite->count);
+
+	crypto_free_cipher(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_comp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			 u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_comp *comp;
+	struct crypto_acomp *acomp;
+	int err;
+	u32 algo_type = type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS_MASK;
+
+	if (algo_type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_ACOMPRESS) {
+		acomp = crypto_alloc_acomp(driver, type, mask);
+		if (IS_ERR(acomp)) {
+			pr_err("alg: acomp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
+			       driver, PTR_ERR(acomp));
+			return PTR_ERR(acomp);
+		}
+		err = test_acomp(acomp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs,
+				 desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs,
+				 desc->suite.comp.comp.count,
+				 desc->suite.comp.decomp.count);
+		crypto_free_acomp(acomp);
+	} else {
+		comp = crypto_alloc_comp(driver, type, mask);
+		if (IS_ERR(comp)) {
+			pr_err("alg: comp: Failed to load transform for %s: %ld\n",
+			       driver, PTR_ERR(comp));
+			return PTR_ERR(comp);
+		}
+
+		err = test_comp(comp, desc->suite.comp.comp.vecs,
+				desc->suite.comp.decomp.vecs,
+				desc->suite.comp.comp.count,
+				desc->suite.comp.decomp.count);
+
+		crypto_free_comp(comp);
+	}
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_crc32c(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+			   const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+	__le32 val;
+	int err;
+
+	err = alg_test_hash(desc, driver, type, mask);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		if (PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT) {
+			/*
+			 * This crc32c implementation is only available through
+			 * ahash API, not the shash API, so the remaining part
+			 * of the test is not applicable to it.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Failed to load transform for %s: "
+		       "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	driver = crypto_shash_driver_name(tfm);
+
+	do {
+		SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+		u32 *ctx = (u32 *)shash_desc_ctx(shash);
+
+		shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+		*ctx = 420553207;
+		err = crypto_shash_final(shash, (u8 *)&val);
+		if (err) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: crc32c: Operation failed for "
+			       "%s: %d\n", driver, err);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (val != cpu_to_le32(~420553207)) {
+			pr_err("alg: crc32c: Test failed for %s: %u\n",
+			       driver, le32_to_cpu(val));
+			err = -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} while (0);
+
+	crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_cprng(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			  u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_rng *rng;
+	int err;
+
+	rng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(rng)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: cprng: Failed to load transform for %s: "
+		       "%ld\n", driver, PTR_ERR(rng));
+		return PTR_ERR(rng);
+	}
+
+	err = test_cprng(rng, desc->suite.cprng.vecs, desc->suite.cprng.count);
+
+	crypto_free_rng(rng);
+
+	return err;
+}
+
+
+static int drbg_cavs_test(const struct drbg_testvec *test, int pr,
+			  const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	int ret = -EAGAIN;
+	struct crypto_rng *drng;
+	struct drbg_test_data test_data;
+	struct drbg_string addtl, pers, testentropy;
+	unsigned char *buf = kzalloc(test->expectedlen, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+	if (!buf)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	drng = crypto_alloc_rng(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(drng)) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not allocate DRNG handle for "
+		       "%s\n", driver);
+		kfree_sensitive(buf);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	test_data.testentropy = &testentropy;
+	drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entropy, test->entropylen);
+	drbg_string_fill(&pers, test->pers, test->perslen);
+	ret = crypto_drbg_reset_test(drng, &pers, &test_data);
+	if (ret) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Failed to reset rng\n");
+		goto outbuf;
+	}
+
+	drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtla, test->addtllen);
+	if (pr) {
+		drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entpra, test->entprlen);
+		ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng,
+			buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl,	&test_data);
+	} else {
+		ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng,
+			buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for "
+		       "driver %s\n", driver);
+		goto outbuf;
+	}
+
+	drbg_string_fill(&addtl, test->addtlb, test->addtllen);
+	if (pr) {
+		drbg_string_fill(&testentropy, test->entprb, test->entprlen);
+		ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl_test(drng,
+			buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl, &test_data);
+	} else {
+		ret = crypto_drbg_get_bytes_addtl(drng,
+			buf, test->expectedlen, &addtl);
+	}
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: could not obtain random data for "
+		       "driver %s\n", driver);
+		goto outbuf;
+	}
+
+	ret = memcmp(test->expected, buf, test->expectedlen);
+
+outbuf:
+	crypto_free_rng(drng);
+	kfree_sensitive(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int alg_test_drbg(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			 u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	int err = 0;
+	int pr = 0;
+	int i = 0;
+	const struct drbg_testvec *template = desc->suite.drbg.vecs;
+	unsigned int tcount = desc->suite.drbg.count;
+
+	if (0 == memcmp(driver, "drbg_pr_", 8))
+		pr = 1;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+		err = drbg_cavs_test(&template[i], pr, driver, type, mask);
+		if (err) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "alg: drbg: Test %d failed for %s\n",
+			       i, driver);
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return err;
+
+}
+
+static int do_test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const struct kpp_testvec *vec,
+		       const char *alg)
+{
+	struct kpp_request *req;
+	void *input_buf = NULL;
+	void *output_buf = NULL;
+	void *a_public = NULL;
+	void *a_ss = NULL;
+	void *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	unsigned int out_len_max;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	struct scatterlist src, dst;
+
+	req = kpp_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		return err;
+
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+
+	err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->secret, vec->secret_size);
+	if (err < 0)
+		goto free_req;
+
+	out_len_max = crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm);
+	output_buf = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!output_buf) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_req;
+	}
+
+	/* Use appropriate parameter as base */
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, NULL, 0);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+	kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				 crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	/* Compute party A's public key */
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(req), &wait);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. err %d\n",
+		       alg, err);
+		goto free_output;
+	}
+
+	if (vec->genkey) {
+		/* Save party A's public key */
+		a_public = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!a_public) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto free_output;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Verify calculated public key */
+		if (memcmp(vec->expected_a_public, sg_virt(req->dst),
+			   vec->expected_a_public_size)) {
+			pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: generate public key test failed. Invalid output\n",
+			       alg);
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_output;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate shared secret key by using counter part (b) public key. */
+	input_buf = kmemdup(vec->b_public, vec->b_public_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!input_buf) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_output;
+	}
+
+	sg_init_one(&src, input_buf, vec->b_public_size);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+	kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->b_public_size);
+	kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+	kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				 crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req), &wait);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: %s: Party A: compute shared secret test failed. err %d\n",
+		       alg, err);
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+
+	if (vec->genkey) {
+		/* Save the shared secret obtained by party A */
+		a_ss = kmemdup(sg_virt(req->dst), vec->expected_ss_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!a_ss) {
+			err = -ENOMEM;
+			goto free_all;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Calculate party B's shared secret by using party A's
+		 * public key.
+		 */
+		err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm, vec->b_secret,
+					    vec->b_secret_size);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto free_all;
+
+		sg_init_one(&src, a_public, vec->expected_a_public_size);
+		sg_init_one(&dst, output_buf, out_len_max);
+		kpp_request_set_input(req, &src, vec->expected_a_public_size);
+		kpp_request_set_output(req, &dst, out_len_max);
+		kpp_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+					 crypto_req_done, &wait);
+		err = crypto_wait_req(crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(req),
+				      &wait);
+		if (err) {
+			pr_err("alg: %s: Party B: compute shared secret failed. err %d\n",
+			       alg, err);
+			goto free_all;
+		}
+
+		shared_secret = a_ss;
+	} else {
+		shared_secret = (void *)vec->expected_ss;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * verify shared secret from which the user will derive
+	 * secret key by executing whatever hash it has chosen
+	 */
+	if (memcmp(shared_secret, sg_virt(req->dst),
+		   vec->expected_ss_size)) {
+		pr_err("alg: %s: compute shared secret test failed. Invalid output\n",
+		       alg);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+free_all:
+	kfree(a_ss);
+	kfree(input_buf);
+free_output:
+	kfree(a_public);
+	kfree(output_buf);
+free_req:
+	kpp_request_free(req);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_kpp(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const char *alg,
+		    const struct kpp_testvec *vecs, unsigned int tcount)
+{
+	int ret, i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+		ret = do_test_kpp(tfm, vecs++, alg);
+		if (ret) {
+			pr_err("alg: %s: test failed on vector %d, err=%d\n",
+			       alg, i + 1, ret);
+			return ret;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_kpp(const struct alg_test_desc *desc, const char *driver,
+			u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_kpp *tfm;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_kpp(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: kpp: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	if (desc->suite.kpp.vecs)
+		err = test_kpp(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.kpp.vecs,
+			       desc->suite.kpp.count);
+
+	crypto_free_kpp(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static u8 *test_pack_u32(u8 *dst, u32 val)
+{
+	memcpy(dst, &val, sizeof(val));
+	return dst + sizeof(val);
+}
+
+static int test_akcipher_one(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm,
+			     const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs)
+{
+	char *xbuf[XBUFSIZE];
+	struct akcipher_request *req;
+	void *outbuf_enc = NULL;
+	void *outbuf_dec = NULL;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	unsigned int out_len_max, out_len = 0;
+	int err = -ENOMEM;
+	struct scatterlist src, dst, src_tab[3];
+	const char *m, *c;
+	unsigned int m_size, c_size;
+	const char *op;
+	u8 *key, *ptr;
+
+	if (testmgr_alloc_buf(xbuf))
+		return err;
+
+	req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!req)
+		goto free_xbuf;
+
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+
+	key = kmalloc(vecs->key_len + sizeof(u32) * 2 + vecs->param_len,
+		      GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!key)
+		goto free_req;
+	memcpy(key, vecs->key, vecs->key_len);
+	ptr = key + vecs->key_len;
+	ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->algo);
+	ptr = test_pack_u32(ptr, vecs->param_len);
+	memcpy(ptr, vecs->params, vecs->param_len);
+
+	if (vecs->public_key_vec)
+		err = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+	else
+		err = crypto_akcipher_set_priv_key(tfm, key, vecs->key_len);
+	if (err)
+		goto free_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * First run test which do not require a private key, such as
+	 * encrypt or verify.
+	 */
+	err = -ENOMEM;
+	out_len_max = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm);
+	outbuf_enc = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!outbuf_enc)
+		goto free_key;
+
+	if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+		m = vecs->m;
+		m_size = vecs->m_size;
+		c = vecs->c;
+		c_size = vecs->c_size;
+		op = "encrypt";
+	} else {
+		/* Swap args so we could keep plaintext (digest)
+		 * in vecs->m, and cooked signature in vecs->c.
+		 */
+		m = vecs->c; /* signature */
+		m_size = vecs->c_size;
+		c = vecs->m; /* digest */
+		c_size = vecs->m_size;
+		op = "verify";
+	}
+
+	err = -E2BIG;
+	if (WARN_ON(m_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+		goto free_all;
+	memcpy(xbuf[0], m, m_size);
+
+	sg_init_table(src_tab, 3);
+	sg_set_buf(&src_tab[0], xbuf[0], 8);
+	sg_set_buf(&src_tab[1], xbuf[0] + 8, m_size - 8);
+	if (vecs->siggen_sigver_test) {
+		if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+			goto free_all;
+		memcpy(xbuf[1], c, c_size);
+		sg_set_buf(&src_tab[2], xbuf[1], c_size);
+		akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, NULL, m_size, c_size);
+	} else {
+		sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_enc, out_len_max);
+		akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, src_tab, &dst, m_size,
+					   out_len_max);
+	}
+	akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				      crypto_req_done, &wait);
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
+			      /* Run asymmetric signature verification */
+			      crypto_akcipher_verify(req) :
+			      /* Run asymmetric encrypt */
+			      crypto_akcipher_encrypt(req), &wait);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+	if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && c) {
+		if (req->dst_len != c_size) {
+			pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len\n",
+			       op);
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_all;
+		}
+		/* verify that encrypted message is equal to expected */
+		if (memcmp(c, outbuf_enc, c_size) != 0) {
+			pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n",
+			       op);
+			hexdump(outbuf_enc, c_size);
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto free_all;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't invoke (decrypt or sign) test which require a private key
+	 * for vectors with only a public key.
+	 */
+	if (vecs->public_key_vec) {
+		err = 0;
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+	outbuf_dec = kzalloc(out_len_max, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!outbuf_dec) {
+		err = -ENOMEM;
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+
+	if (!vecs->siggen_sigver_test && !c) {
+		c = outbuf_enc;
+		c_size = req->dst_len;
+	}
+
+	err = -E2BIG;
+	op = vecs->siggen_sigver_test ? "sign" : "decrypt";
+	if (WARN_ON(c_size > PAGE_SIZE))
+		goto free_all;
+	memcpy(xbuf[0], c, c_size);
+
+	sg_init_one(&src, xbuf[0], c_size);
+	sg_init_one(&dst, outbuf_dec, out_len_max);
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+	akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &src, &dst, c_size, out_len_max);
+
+	err = crypto_wait_req(vecs->siggen_sigver_test ?
+			      /* Run asymmetric signature generation */
+			      crypto_akcipher_sign(req) :
+			      /* Run asymmetric decrypt */
+			      crypto_akcipher_decrypt(req), &wait);
+	if (err) {
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. err %d\n", op, err);
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+	out_len = req->dst_len;
+	if (out_len < m_size) {
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output len %u\n",
+		       op, out_len);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		goto free_all;
+	}
+	/* verify that decrypted message is equal to the original msg */
+	if (memchr_inv(outbuf_dec, 0, out_len - m_size) ||
+	    memcmp(m, outbuf_dec + out_len - m_size, m_size)) {
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: %s test failed. Invalid output\n", op);
+		hexdump(outbuf_dec, out_len);
+		err = -EINVAL;
+	}
+free_all:
+	kfree(outbuf_dec);
+	kfree(outbuf_enc);
+free_key:
+	kfree(key);
+free_req:
+	akcipher_request_free(req);
+free_xbuf:
+	testmgr_free_buf(xbuf);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int test_akcipher(struct crypto_akcipher *tfm, const char *alg,
+			 const struct akcipher_testvec *vecs,
+			 unsigned int tcount)
+{
+	const char *algo =
+		crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(crypto_akcipher_tfm(tfm));
+	int ret, i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tcount; i++) {
+		ret = test_akcipher_one(tfm, vecs++);
+		if (!ret)
+			continue;
+
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: test %d failed for %s, err=%d\n",
+		       i + 1, algo, ret);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_akcipher(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+			     const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	struct crypto_akcipher *tfm;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(driver, type, mask);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+		pr_err("alg: akcipher: Failed to load tfm for %s: %ld\n",
+		       driver, PTR_ERR(tfm));
+		return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+	}
+	if (desc->suite.akcipher.vecs)
+		err = test_akcipher(tfm, desc->alg, desc->suite.akcipher.vecs,
+				    desc->suite.akcipher.count);
+
+	crypto_free_akcipher(tfm);
+	return err;
+}
+
+static int alg_test_null(const struct alg_test_desc *desc,
+			     const char *driver, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define ____VECS(tv)	.vecs = tv, .count = ARRAY_SIZE(tv)
+#define __VECS(tv)	{ ____VECS(tv) }
+
+/* Please keep this list sorted by algorithm name. */
+static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
+	{
+		.alg = "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha12-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha12_aes_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "adiantum(xchacha20,aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "adiantum(xchacha20-generic,aes-generic,nhpoly1305-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(adiantum_xchacha20_aes_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "aegis128",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(aegis128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ansi_cprng",
+		.test = alg_test_cprng,
+		.suite = {
+			.cprng = __VECS(ansi_cprng_aes_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(md5),ecb(cipher_null))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_md5_ecb_cipher_null_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ctr(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),ecb(cipher_null))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha1_ecb_cipher_null_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha224),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha224_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha256_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),ctr(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha384_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),ctr(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha384),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(aes))",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(hmac_sha512_des3_ede_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),ctr(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "authenc(hmac(sha512),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "blake2b-160",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 0,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(blake2b_160_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "blake2b-256",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 0,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(blake2b_256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "blake2b-384",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 0,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(blake2b_384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "blake2b-512",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 0,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(blake2b_512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(anubis)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(anubis_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(aria)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aria_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(blowfish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(bf_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(camellia)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(camellia_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(cast5)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast5_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(cast6)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast6_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(des)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(des3_ede)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		/* Same as cbc(aes) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "cbc(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		/* Same as cbc(sm4) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "cbc(psm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(serpent)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(serpent_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbc(twofish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tf_cbc_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+		.alg = "cbc-paes-s390",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#endif
+		.alg = "cbcmac(aes)",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(aes_cbcmac_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cbcmac(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sm4_cbcmac_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ccm(aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_ccm_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ccm(sm4)",
+		.generic_driver = "ccm_base(ctr(sm4-generic),cbcmac(sm4-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(sm4_ccm_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cfb(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_cfb_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cfb(aria)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aria_cfb_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cfb(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_cfb_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "chacha20",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(chacha20_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cmac(aes)",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(aes_cmac128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cmac(des3_ede)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(des3_ede_cmac64_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "cmac(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sm4_cmac128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "compress_null",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "crc32",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(crc32_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "crc32c",
+		.test = alg_test_crc32c,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(crc32c_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "crc64-rocksoft",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(crc64_rocksoft_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "crct10dif",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(crct10dif_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(aria)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aria_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(blowfish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(bf_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(camellia)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(camellia_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(cast5)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast5_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(cast6)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast6_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(des)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(des3_ede)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* Same as ctr(aes) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "ctr(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+
+		/* Same as ctr(sm4) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "ctr(psm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(serpent)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(serpent_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ctr(twofish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tf_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+		.alg = "ctr-paes-s390",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#endif
+		.alg = "cts(cbc(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cts_mode_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* Same as cts(cbc((aes)) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "cts(cbc(paes))",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "curve25519",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(curve25519_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "deflate",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(deflate_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(deflate_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "dh",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "digest_null",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes192_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_ctr_aes256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/*
+		 * There is no need to specifically test the DRBG with every
+		 * backend cipher -- covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test
+		 */
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha1",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* covered by drbg_nopr_hmac_sha256 test */
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha384",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_hmac_sha512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha1",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha256",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_nopr_sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* covered by drbg_nopr_sha256 test */
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha384",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_nopr_sha512",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes128",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_ctr_aes128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* covered by drbg_pr_ctr_aes128 test */
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes192",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_ctr_aes256",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha1",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha256",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* covered by drbg_pr_hmac_sha256 test */
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha384",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_hmac_sha512",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_sha1",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_sha256",
+		.test = alg_test_drbg,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.drbg = __VECS(drbg_pr_sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* covered by drbg_pr_sha256 test */
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_sha384",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "drbg_pr_sha512",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(anubis)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(anubis_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(arc4)",
+		.generic_driver = "ecb(arc4)-generic",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(arc4_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(aria)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aria_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(blowfish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(bf_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(camellia)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(camellia_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(cast5)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast5_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(cast6)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast6_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(cipher_null)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(des)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(des3_ede)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(des3_ede_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(fcrypt)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = {
+				.vecs = fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template,
+				.count = 1
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(khazad)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(khazad_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* Same as ecb(aes) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "ecb(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(seed)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(seed_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(serpent)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(serpent_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(tea)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tea_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(twofish)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tf_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(xeta)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(xeta_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecb(xtea)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(xtea_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+		.alg = "ecb-paes-s390",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#endif
+		.alg = "ecdh-nist-p192",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p192_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecdh-nist-p256",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecdh-nist-p384",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ecdh_p384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecdsa-nist-p192",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p192_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecdsa-nist-p256",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecdsa-nist-p384",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(ecdsa_nist_p384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ecrdsa",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(ecrdsa_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes)),sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(essiv_hmac_sha256_aes_cbc_tv_temp)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "essiv(cbc(aes),sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(essiv_aes_cbc_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS)
+		.alg = "ffdhe2048(dh)",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ffdhe2048_dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ffdhe3072(dh)",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ffdhe3072_dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ffdhe4096(dh)",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ffdhe4096_dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ffdhe6144(dh)",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ffdhe6144_dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ffdhe8192(dh)",
+		.test = alg_test_kpp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.kpp = __VECS(ffdhe8192_dh_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */
+		.alg = "gcm(aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(aes_gcm_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "gcm(aria)",
+		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(aria-generic),ghash-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(aria_gcm_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "gcm(sm4)",
+		.generic_driver = "gcm_base(ctr(sm4-generic),ghash-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(sm4_gcm_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ghash",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(ghash_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hctr2(aes)",
+		.generic_driver =
+		    "hctr2_base(xctr(aes-generic),polyval-generic)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_hctr2_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(md5)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_md5_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(rmd160)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_rmd160_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha1)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha1_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha224)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha224_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha3-224)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_224_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha3-256)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha3-384)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha3-512)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha3_512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha384)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sha512)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sha512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(sm3)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_sm3_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(streebog256)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "hmac(streebog512)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(hmac_streebog512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "jitterentropy_rng",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "kw(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_kw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lrw(aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(aes-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_lrw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lrw(camellia)",
+		.generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(camellia-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(camellia_lrw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lrw(cast6)",
+		.generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(cast6-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast6_lrw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lrw(serpent)",
+		.generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(serpent-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(serpent_lrw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lrw(twofish)",
+		.generic_driver = "lrw(ecb(twofish-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tf_lrw_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lz4",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(lz4_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(lz4_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lz4hc",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(lz4hc_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(lz4hc_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lzo",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(lzo_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(lzo_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "lzo-rle",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(lzorle_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(lzorle_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "md4",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(md4_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "md5",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(md5_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "michael_mic",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(michael_mic_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "nhpoly1305",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(nhpoly1305_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ofb(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_ofb_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* Same as ofb(aes) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "ofb(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "ofb(sm4)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_ofb_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "pcbc(fcrypt)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(fcrypt_pcbc_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha224)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha256)",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(pkcs1pad_rsa_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha384)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "poly1305",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(poly1305_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "polyval",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(polyval_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc3686(ctr(aes))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc3686(ctr(sm4))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(sm4_ctr_rfc3686_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+		.generic_driver = "rfc4106(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4106_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.aad_iv = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
+		.generic_driver = "rfc4309(ccm_base(ctr(aes-generic),cbcmac(aes-generic)))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_ccm_rfc4309_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.aad_iv = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
+		.generic_driver = "rfc4543(gcm_base(ctr(aes-generic),ghash-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(aes_gcm_rfc4543_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.aad_iv = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = __VECS(rfc7539_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rfc7539esp(chacha20,poly1305)",
+		.test = alg_test_aead,
+		.suite = {
+			.aead = {
+				____VECS(rfc7539esp_tv_template),
+				.einval_allowed = 1,
+				.aad_iv = 1,
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rmd160",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(rmd160_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "rsa",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(rsa_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha1",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha1_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha224",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha224_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha256",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha3-224",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha3_224_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha3-256",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha3_256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha3-384",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha3_384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha3-512",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha3_512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha384",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sha512",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sha512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sm2",
+		.test = alg_test_akcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.akcipher = __VECS(sm2_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "sm3",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(sm3_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "streebog256",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(streebog256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "streebog512",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(streebog512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "vmac64(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(vmac64_aes_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "wp256",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(wp256_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "wp384",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(wp384_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "wp512",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(wp512_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xcbc(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(aes_xcbc128_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xchacha12",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(xchacha12_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xchacha20",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(xchacha20_tv_template)
+		},
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xctr(aes)",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_xctr_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts(aes)",
+		.generic_driver = "xts(ecb(aes-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts(camellia)",
+		.generic_driver = "xts(ecb(camellia-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(camellia_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts(cast6)",
+		.generic_driver = "xts(ecb(cast6-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(cast6_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		/* Same as xts(aes) except the key is stored in
+		 * hardware secure memory which we reference by index
+		 */
+		.alg = "xts(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts(serpent)",
+		.generic_driver = "xts(ecb(serpent-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(serpent_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts(twofish)",
+		.generic_driver = "xts(ecb(twofish-generic))",
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(tf_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_PAES_S390)
+		.alg = "xts-paes-s390",
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.test = alg_test_skcipher,
+		.suite = {
+			.cipher = __VECS(aes_xts_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+#endif
+		.alg = "xts4096(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xts512(paes)",
+		.test = alg_test_null,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+	}, {
+		.alg = "xxhash64",
+		.test = alg_test_hash,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.hash = __VECS(xxhash64_tv_template)
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "zlib-deflate",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(zlib_deflate_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}, {
+		.alg = "zstd",
+		.test = alg_test_comp,
+		.fips_allowed = 1,
+		.suite = {
+			.comp = {
+				.comp = __VECS(zstd_comp_tv_template),
+				.decomp = __VECS(zstd_decomp_tv_template)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+};
+
+static void alg_check_test_descs_order(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 1; i < ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs); i++) {
+		int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg,
+				  alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+
+		if (WARN_ON(diff > 0)) {
+			pr_warn("testmgr: alg_test_descs entries in wrong order: '%s' before '%s'\n",
+				alg_test_descs[i - 1].alg,
+				alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+		}
+
+		if (WARN_ON(diff == 0)) {
+			pr_warn("testmgr: duplicate alg_test_descs entry: '%s'\n",
+				alg_test_descs[i].alg);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void alg_check_testvec_configs(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_cipher_testvec_configs); i++)
+		WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+				&default_cipher_testvec_configs[i]));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_hash_testvec_configs); i++)
+		WARN_ON(!valid_testvec_config(
+				&default_hash_testvec_configs[i]));
+}
+
+static void testmgr_onetime_init(void)
+{
+	alg_check_test_descs_order();
+	alg_check_testvec_configs();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS
+	pr_warn("alg: extra crypto tests enabled.  This is intended for developer use only.\n");
+#endif
+}
+
+static int alg_find_test(const char *alg)
+{
+	int start = 0;
+	int end = ARRAY_SIZE(alg_test_descs);
+
+	while (start < end) {
+		int i = (start + end) / 2;
+		int diff = strcmp(alg_test_descs[i].alg, alg);
+
+		if (diff > 0) {
+			end = i;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (diff < 0) {
+			start = i + 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		return i;
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int alg_fips_disabled(const char *driver, const char *alg)
+{
+	pr_info("alg: %s (%s) is disabled due to FIPS\n", alg, driver);
+
+	return -ECANCELED;
+}
+
+int alg_test(const char *driver, const char *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+	int i;
+	int j;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!fips_enabled && notests) {
+		printk_once(KERN_INFO "alg: self-tests disabled\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	DO_ONCE(testmgr_onetime_init);
+
+	if ((type & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER) {
+		char nalg[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME];
+
+		if (snprintf(nalg, sizeof(nalg), "ecb(%s)", alg) >=
+		    sizeof(nalg))
+			return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+		i = alg_find_test(nalg);
+		if (i < 0)
+			goto notest;
+
+		if (fips_enabled && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed)
+			goto non_fips_alg;
+
+		rc = alg_test_cipher(alg_test_descs + i, driver, type, mask);
+		goto test_done;
+	}
+
+	i = alg_find_test(alg);
+	j = alg_find_test(driver);
+	if (i < 0 && j < 0)
+		goto notest;
+
+	if (fips_enabled) {
+		if (j >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[j].fips_allowed)
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		if (i >= 0 && !alg_test_descs[i].fips_allowed)
+			goto non_fips_alg;
+	}
+
+	rc = 0;
+	if (i >= 0)
+		rc |= alg_test_descs[i].test(alg_test_descs + i, driver,
+					     type, mask);
+	if (j >= 0 && j != i)
+		rc |= alg_test_descs[j].test(alg_test_descs + j, driver,
+					     type, mask);
+
+test_done:
+	if (rc) {
+		if (fips_enabled || panic_on_fail) {
+			fips_fail_notify();
+			panic("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) failed in %s mode!\n",
+			      driver, alg,
+			      fips_enabled ? "fips" : "panic_on_fail");
+		}
+		pr_warn("alg: self-tests for %s using %s failed (rc=%d)",
+			alg, driver, rc);
+		WARN(rc != -ENOENT,
+		     "alg: self-tests for %s using %s failed (rc=%d)",
+		     alg, driver, rc);
+	} else {
+		if (fips_enabled)
+			pr_info("alg: self-tests for %s (%s) passed\n",
+				driver, alg);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+
+notest:
+	printk(KERN_INFO "alg: No test for %s (%s)\n", alg, driver);
+
+	if (type & CRYPTO_ALG_FIPS_INTERNAL)
+		return alg_fips_disabled(driver, alg);
+
+	return 0;
+non_fips_alg:
+	return alg_fips_disabled(driver, alg);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS */
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(alg_test);