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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-upstream.tar.xz linux-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c | 217 |
1 files changed, 217 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..015927665 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/fortify.c @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (c) 2020 Francis Laniel <laniel_francis@privacyrequired.com> + * + * Add tests related to fortified functions in this file. + */ +#include "lkdtm.h" +#include <linux/string.h> +#include <linux/slab.h> + +static volatile int fortify_scratch_space; + +static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT(void) +{ + struct target { + char a[10]; + int foo; + } target[3] = {}; + /* + * Using volatile prevents the compiler from determining the value of + * 'size' at compile time. Without that, we would get a compile error + * rather than a runtime error. + */ + volatile int size = 20; + + pr_info("trying to strcmp() past the end of a struct\n"); + + strncpy(target[0].a, target[1].a, size); + + /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ + fortify_scratch_space = target[0].a[3]; + + pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a strncpy() object write overflow!\n"); + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); +} + +static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STR_MEMBER(void) +{ + struct target { + char a[10]; + char b[10]; + } target; + volatile int size = 20; + char *src; + + src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + strscpy(src, "over ten bytes", size); + size = strlen(src) + 1; + + pr_info("trying to strncpy() past the end of a struct member...\n"); + + /* + * strncpy(target.a, src, 20); will hit a compile error because the + * compiler knows at build time that target.a < 20 bytes. Use a + * volatile to force a runtime error. + */ + strncpy(target.a, src, size); + + /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ + fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3]; + + pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a strncpy() struct member write overflow!\n"); + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); + + kfree(src); +} + +static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_MEM_OBJECT(void) +{ + int before[10]; + struct target { + char a[10]; + int foo; + } target = {}; + int after[10]; + /* + * Using volatile prevents the compiler from determining the value of + * 'size' at compile time. Without that, we would get a compile error + * rather than a runtime error. + */ + volatile int size = 20; + + memset(before, 0, sizeof(before)); + memset(after, 0, sizeof(after)); + fortify_scratch_space = before[5]; + fortify_scratch_space = after[5]; + + pr_info("trying to memcpy() past the end of a struct\n"); + + pr_info("0: %zu\n", __builtin_object_size(&target, 0)); + pr_info("1: %zu\n", __builtin_object_size(&target, 1)); + pr_info("s: %d\n", size); + memcpy(&target, &before, size); + + /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ + fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3]; + + pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a memcpy() object write overflow!\n"); + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); +} + +static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_MEM_MEMBER(void) +{ + struct target { + char a[10]; + char b[10]; + } target; + volatile int size = 20; + char *src; + + src = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); + strscpy(src, "over ten bytes", size); + size = strlen(src) + 1; + + pr_info("trying to memcpy() past the end of a struct member...\n"); + + /* + * strncpy(target.a, src, 20); will hit a compile error because the + * compiler knows at build time that target.a < 20 bytes. Use a + * volatile to force a runtime error. + */ + memcpy(target.a, src, size); + + /* Store result to global to prevent the code from being eliminated */ + fortify_scratch_space = target.a[3]; + + pr_err("FAIL: fortify did not block a memcpy() struct member write overflow!\n"); + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); + + kfree(src); +} + +/* + * Calls fortified strscpy to test that it returns the same result as vanilla + * strscpy and generate a panic because there is a write overflow (i.e. src + * length is greater than dst length). + */ +static void lkdtm_FORTIFY_STRSCPY(void) +{ + char *src; + char dst[5]; + + struct { + union { + char big[10]; + char src[5]; + }; + } weird = { .big = "hello!" }; + char weird_dst[sizeof(weird.src) + 1]; + + src = kstrdup("foobar", GFP_KERNEL); + + if (src == NULL) + return; + + /* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if size is 0. */ + if (strscpy(dst, src, 0) != -E2BIG) + pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() of 0 length did not return -E2BIG\n"); + + /* Vanilla strscpy returns -E2BIG if src is truncated. */ + if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != -E2BIG) + pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return -E2BIG while src is truncated\n"); + + /* After above call, dst must contain "foob" because src was truncated. */ + if (strncmp(dst, "foob", sizeof(dst)) != 0) + pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foob\" but \"%s\"\n", + dst); + + /* Shrink src so the strscpy() below succeeds. */ + src[3] = '\0'; + + /* + * Vanilla strscpy returns number of character copied if everything goes + * well. + */ + if (strscpy(dst, src, sizeof(dst)) != 3) + pr_warn("FAIL: strscpy() did not return 3 while src was copied entirely truncated\n"); + + /* After above call, dst must contain "foo" because src was copied. */ + if (strncmp(dst, "foo", sizeof(dst)) != 0) + pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() dst does not contain \"foo\" but \"%s\"\n", + dst); + + /* Test when src is embedded inside a union. */ + strscpy(weird_dst, weird.src, sizeof(weird_dst)); + + if (strcmp(weird_dst, "hello") != 0) + pr_warn("FAIL: after strscpy() weird_dst does not contain \"hello\" but \"%s\"\n", + weird_dst); + + /* Restore src to its initial value. */ + src[3] = 'b'; + + /* + * Use strlen here so size cannot be known at compile time and there is + * a runtime write overflow. + */ + strscpy(dst, src, strlen(src)); + + pr_err("FAIL: strscpy() overflow not detected!\n"); + pr_expected_config(CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE); + + kfree(src); +} + +static struct crashtype crashtypes[] = { + CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STR_OBJECT), + CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STR_MEMBER), + CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_MEM_OBJECT), + CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_MEM_MEMBER), + CRASHTYPE(FORTIFY_STRSCPY), +}; + +struct crashtype_category fortify_crashtypes = { + .crashtypes = crashtypes, + .len = ARRAY_SIZE(crashtypes), +}; |