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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000
commit2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch)
tree848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /kernel/seccomp.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlinux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz
linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c2464
1 files changed, 2464 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e9852d1b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2464 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/seccomp.c
+ *
+ * Copyright 2004-2005 Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Google, Inc.
+ * Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
+ *
+ * This defines a simple but solid secure-computing facility.
+ *
+ * Mode 1 uses a fixed list of allowed system calls.
+ * Mode 2 allows user-defined system call filters in the form
+ * of Berkeley Packet Filters/Linux Socket Filters.
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "seccomp: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/coredump.h>
+#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+
+/* Not exposed in headers: strictly internal use only. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD (SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER + 1)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#include <asm/syscall.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+
+/*
+ * When SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID was first introduced, it had the
+ * wrong direction flag in the ioctl number. This is the broken one,
+ * which the kernel needs to keep supporting until all userspaces stop
+ * using the wrong command number.
+ */
+#define SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID_WRONG_DIR SECCOMP_IOR(2, __u64)
+
+enum notify_state {
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT,
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT,
+ SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED,
+};
+
+struct seccomp_knotif {
+ /* The struct pid of the task whose filter triggered the notification */
+ struct task_struct *task;
+
+ /* The "cookie" for this request; this is unique for this filter. */
+ u64 id;
+
+ /*
+ * The seccomp data. This pointer is valid the entire time this
+ * notification is active, since it comes from __seccomp_filter which
+ * eclipses the entire lifecycle here.
+ */
+ const struct seccomp_data *data;
+
+ /*
+ * Notification states. When SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF is returned, a
+ * struct seccomp_knotif is created and starts out in INIT. Once the
+ * handler reads the notification off of an FD, it transitions to SENT.
+ * If a signal is received the state transitions back to INIT and
+ * another message is sent. When the userspace handler replies, state
+ * transitions to REPLIED.
+ */
+ enum notify_state state;
+
+ /* The return values, only valid when in SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED */
+ int error;
+ long val;
+ u32 flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Signals when this has changed states, such as the listener
+ * dying, a new seccomp addfd message, or changing to REPLIED
+ */
+ struct completion ready;
+
+ struct list_head list;
+
+ /* outstanding addfd requests */
+ struct list_head addfd;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_kaddfd - container for seccomp_addfd ioctl messages
+ *
+ * @file: A reference to the file to install in the other task
+ * @fd: The fd number to install it at. If the fd number is -1, it means the
+ * installing process should allocate the fd as normal.
+ * @flags: The flags for the new file descriptor. At the moment, only O_CLOEXEC
+ * is allowed.
+ * @ioctl_flags: The flags used for the seccomp_addfd ioctl.
+ * @ret: The return value of the installing process. It is set to the fd num
+ * upon success (>= 0).
+ * @completion: Indicates that the installing process has completed fd
+ * installation, or gone away (either due to successful
+ * reply, or signal)
+ *
+ */
+struct seccomp_kaddfd {
+ struct file *file;
+ int fd;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ __u32 ioctl_flags;
+
+ union {
+ bool setfd;
+ /* To only be set on reply */
+ int ret;
+ };
+ struct completion completion;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct notification - container for seccomp userspace notifications. Since
+ * most seccomp filters will not have notification listeners attached and this
+ * structure is fairly large, we store the notification-specific stuff in a
+ * separate structure.
+ *
+ * @request: A semaphore that users of this notification can wait on for
+ * changes. Actual reads and writes are still controlled with
+ * filter->notify_lock.
+ * @next_id: The id of the next request.
+ * @notifications: A list of struct seccomp_knotif elements.
+ */
+struct notification {
+ struct semaphore request;
+ u64 next_id;
+ struct list_head notifications;
+};
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
+/**
+ * struct action_cache - per-filter cache of seccomp actions per
+ * arch/syscall pair
+ *
+ * @allow_native: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
+ * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
+ * native architecture.
+ * @allow_compat: A bitmap where each bit represents whether the
+ * filter will always allow the syscall, for the
+ * compat architecture.
+ */
+struct action_cache {
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_native, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR);
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(allow_compat, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR);
+#endif
+};
+#else
+struct action_cache { };
+
+static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
+ const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter)
+{
+}
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
+
+/**
+ * struct seccomp_filter - container for seccomp BPF programs
+ *
+ * @refs: Reference count to manage the object lifetime.
+ * A filter's reference count is incremented for each directly
+ * attached task, once for the dependent filter, and if
+ * requested for the user notifier. When @refs reaches zero,
+ * the filter can be freed.
+ * @users: A filter's @users count is incremented for each directly
+ * attached task (filter installation, fork(), thread_sync),
+ * and once for the dependent filter (tracked in filter->prev).
+ * When it reaches zero it indicates that no direct or indirect
+ * users of that filter exist. No new tasks can get associated with
+ * this filter after reaching 0. The @users count is always smaller
+ * or equal to @refs. Hence, reaching 0 for @users does not mean
+ * the filter can be freed.
+ * @cache: cache of arch/syscall mappings to actions
+ * @log: true if all actions except for SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should be logged
+ * @wait_killable_recv: Put notifying process in killable state once the
+ * notification is received by the userspace listener.
+ * @prev: points to a previously installed, or inherited, filter
+ * @prog: the BPF program to evaluate
+ * @notif: the struct that holds all notification related information
+ * @notify_lock: A lock for all notification-related accesses.
+ * @wqh: A wait queue for poll if a notifier is in use.
+ *
+ * seccomp_filter objects are organized in a tree linked via the @prev
+ * pointer. For any task, it appears to be a singly-linked list starting
+ * with current->seccomp.filter, the most recently attached or inherited filter.
+ * However, multiple filters may share a @prev node, by way of fork(), which
+ * results in a unidirectional tree existing in memory. This is similar to
+ * how namespaces work.
+ *
+ * seccomp_filter objects should never be modified after being attached
+ * to a task_struct (other than @refs).
+ */
+struct seccomp_filter {
+ refcount_t refs;
+ refcount_t users;
+ bool log;
+ bool wait_killable_recv;
+ struct action_cache cache;
+ struct seccomp_filter *prev;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ struct notification *notif;
+ struct mutex notify_lock;
+ wait_queue_head_t wqh;
+};
+
+/* Limit any path through the tree to 256KB worth of instructions. */
+#define MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH ((1 << 18) / sizeof(struct sock_filter))
+
+/*
+ * Endianness is explicitly ignored and left for BPF program authors to manage
+ * as per the specific architecture.
+ */
+static void populate_seccomp_data(struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ /*
+ * Instead of using current_pt_reg(), we're already doing the work
+ * to safely fetch "current", so just use "task" everywhere below.
+ */
+ struct task_struct *task = current;
+ struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(task);
+ unsigned long args[6];
+
+ sd->nr = syscall_get_nr(task, regs);
+ sd->arch = syscall_get_arch(task);
+ syscall_get_arguments(task, regs, args);
+ sd->args[0] = args[0];
+ sd->args[1] = args[1];
+ sd->args[2] = args[2];
+ sd->args[3] = args[3];
+ sd->args[4] = args[4];
+ sd->args[5] = args[5];
+ sd->instruction_pointer = KSTK_EIP(task);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_check_filter - verify seccomp filter code
+ * @filter: filter to verify
+ * @flen: length of filter
+ *
+ * Takes a previously checked filter (by bpf_check_classic) and
+ * redirects all filter code that loads struct sk_buff data
+ * and related data through seccomp_bpf_load. It also
+ * enforces length and alignment checking of those loads.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the rule set is legal or -EINVAL if not.
+ */
+static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
+{
+ int pc;
+ for (pc = 0; pc < flen; pc++) {
+ struct sock_filter *ftest = &filter[pc];
+ u16 code = ftest->code;
+ u32 k = ftest->k;
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS:
+ ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_ABS;
+ /* 32-bit aligned and not out of bounds. */
+ if (k >= sizeof(struct seccomp_data) || k & 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ continue;
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
+ ftest->code = BPF_LD | BPF_IMM;
+ ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
+ continue;
+ case BPF_LDX | BPF_W | BPF_LEN:
+ ftest->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM;
+ ftest->k = sizeof(struct seccomp_data);
+ continue;
+ /* Explicitly include allowed calls. */
+ case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_RET | BPF_A:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_ADD | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_SUB | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_MUL | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_DIV | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_OR | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_LSH | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_NEG:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_IMM:
+ case BPF_LDX | BPF_IMM:
+ case BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX:
+ case BPF_MISC | BPF_TXA:
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_MEM:
+ case BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM:
+ case BPF_ST:
+ case BPF_STX:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_X:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_X:
+ continue;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
+static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(const void *bitmap,
+ size_t bitmap_size,
+ int syscall_nr)
+{
+ if (unlikely(syscall_nr < 0 || syscall_nr >= bitmap_size))
+ return false;
+ syscall_nr = array_index_nospec(syscall_nr, bitmap_size);
+
+ return test_bit(syscall_nr, bitmap);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_cache_check_allow - lookup seccomp cache
+ * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
+ * @sd: The seccomp data to lookup the cache with
+ *
+ * Returns true if the seccomp_data is cached and allowed.
+ */
+static inline bool seccomp_cache_check_allow(const struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
+ const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ int syscall_nr = sd->nr;
+ const struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache;
+
+#ifndef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+ /* A native-only architecture doesn't need to check sd->arch. */
+ return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
+ syscall_nr);
+#else
+ if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE))
+ return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_native,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
+ syscall_nr);
+ if (likely(sd->arch == SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT))
+ return seccomp_cache_check_allow_bitmap(cache->allow_compat,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR,
+ syscall_nr);
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
+ return false;
+}
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_run_filters - evaluates all seccomp filters against @sd
+ * @sd: optional seccomp data to be passed to filters
+ * @match: stores struct seccomp_filter that resulted in the return value,
+ * unless filter returned SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, in which case it will
+ * be unchanged.
+ *
+ * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
+ */
+#define ACTION_ONLY(ret) ((s32)((ret) & (SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL)))
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ struct seccomp_filter **match)
+{
+ u32 ret = SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+ /* Make sure cross-thread synced filter points somewhere sane. */
+ struct seccomp_filter *f =
+ READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
+
+ /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */
+ if (WARN_ON(f == NULL))
+ return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS;
+
+ if (seccomp_cache_check_allow(f, sd))
+ return SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+
+ /*
+ * All filters in the list are evaluated and the lowest BPF return
+ * value always takes priority (ignoring the DATA).
+ */
+ for (; f; f = f->prev) {
+ u32 cur_ret = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(f->prog, sd);
+
+ if (ACTION_ONLY(cur_ret) < ACTION_ONLY(ret)) {
+ ret = cur_ret;
+ *match = f;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode)
+{
+ assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (current->seccomp.mode && current->seccomp.mode != seccomp_mode)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { }
+
+static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long seccomp_mode,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+ task->seccomp.mode = seccomp_mode;
+ /*
+ * Make sure SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP cannot be set before the mode (and
+ * filter) is set.
+ */
+ smp_mb__before_atomic();
+ /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */
+ if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0)
+ arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task);
+ set_task_syscall_work(task, SECCOMP);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+/* Returns 1 if the parent is an ancestor of the child. */
+static int is_ancestor(struct seccomp_filter *parent,
+ struct seccomp_filter *child)
+{
+ /* NULL is the root ancestor. */
+ if (parent == NULL)
+ return 1;
+ for (; child; child = child->prev)
+ if (child == parent)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_can_sync_threads: checks if all threads can be synchronized
+ *
+ * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or the pid of a thread which was
+ * either not in the correct seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral
+ * seccomp filter.
+ */
+static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
+
+ BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
+ assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ /* Validate all threads being eligible for synchronization. */
+ caller = current;
+ for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+ pid_t failed;
+
+ /* Skip current, since it is initiating the sync. */
+ if (thread == caller)
+ continue;
+
+ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED ||
+ (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER &&
+ is_ancestor(thread->seccomp.filter,
+ caller->seccomp.filter)))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */
+ failed = task_pid_vnr(thread);
+ /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */
+ if (WARN_ON(failed == 0))
+ failed = -ESRCH;
+ return failed;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void seccomp_filter_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ if (filter) {
+ bpf_prog_destroy(filter->prog);
+ kfree(filter);
+ }
+}
+
+static void __seccomp_filter_orphan(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
+{
+ while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->users)) {
+ if (waitqueue_active(&orig->wqh))
+ wake_up_poll(&orig->wqh, EPOLLHUP);
+ orig = orig->prev;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __put_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
+{
+ /* Clean up single-reference branches iteratively. */
+ while (orig && refcount_dec_and_test(&orig->refs)) {
+ struct seccomp_filter *freeme = orig;
+ orig = orig->prev;
+ seccomp_filter_free(freeme);
+ }
+}
+
+static void __seccomp_filter_release(struct seccomp_filter *orig)
+{
+ /* Notify about any unused filters in the task's former filter tree. */
+ __seccomp_filter_orphan(orig);
+ /* Finally drop all references to the task's former tree. */
+ __put_seccomp_filter(orig);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_filter_release - Detach the task from its filter tree,
+ * drop its reference count, and notify
+ * about unused filters
+ *
+ * This function should only be called when the task is exiting as
+ * it detaches it from its filter tree. As such, READ_ONCE() and
+ * barriers are not needed here, as would normally be needed.
+ */
+void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
+
+ /* We are effectively holding the siglock by not having any sighand. */
+ WARN_ON(tsk->sighand != NULL);
+
+ /* Detach task from its filter tree. */
+ tsk->seccomp.filter = NULL;
+ __seccomp_filter_release(orig);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_sync_threads: sets all threads to use current's filter
+ *
+ * Expects sighand and cred_guard_mutex locks to be held, and for
+ * seccomp_can_sync_threads() to have returned success already
+ * without dropping the locks.
+ *
+ */
+static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct task_struct *thread, *caller;
+
+ BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex));
+ assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ /* Synchronize all threads. */
+ caller = current;
+ for_each_thread(caller, thread) {
+ /* Skip current, since it needs no changes. */
+ if (thread == caller)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Get a task reference for the new leaf node. */
+ get_seccomp_filter(caller);
+
+ /*
+ * Drop the task reference to the shared ancestor since
+ * current's path will hold a reference. (This also
+ * allows a put before the assignment.)
+ */
+ __seccomp_filter_release(thread->seccomp.filter);
+
+ /* Make our new filter tree visible. */
+ smp_store_release(&thread->seccomp.filter,
+ caller->seccomp.filter);
+ atomic_set(&thread->seccomp.filter_count,
+ atomic_read(&caller->seccomp.filter_count));
+
+ /*
+ * Don't let an unprivileged task work around
+ * the no_new_privs restriction by creating
+ * a thread that sets it up, enters seccomp,
+ * then dies.
+ */
+ if (task_no_new_privs(caller))
+ task_set_no_new_privs(thread);
+
+ /*
+ * Opt the other thread into seccomp if needed.
+ * As threads are considered to be trust-realm
+ * equivalent (see ptrace_may_access), it is safe to
+ * allow one thread to transition the other.
+ */
+ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
+ seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+ flags);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_prepare_filter: Prepares a seccomp filter for use.
+ * @fprog: BPF program to install
+ *
+ * Returns filter on success or an ERR_PTR on failure.
+ */
+static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *sfilter;
+ int ret;
+ const bool save_orig =
+#if defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) || defined(SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE)
+ true;
+#else
+ false;
+#endif
+
+ if (fprog->len == 0 || fprog->len > BPF_MAXINSNS)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ BUG_ON(INT_MAX / fprog->len < sizeof(struct sock_filter));
+
+ /*
+ * Installing a seccomp filter requires that the task has
+ * CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its namespace or be running with no_new_privs.
+ * This avoids scenarios where unprivileged tasks can affect the
+ * behavior of privileged children.
+ */
+ if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
+ !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
+
+ /* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
+ sfilter = kzalloc(sizeof(*sfilter), GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!sfilter)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ mutex_init(&sfilter->notify_lock);
+ ret = bpf_prog_create_from_user(&sfilter->prog, fprog,
+ seccomp_check_filter, save_orig);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ kfree(sfilter);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ refcount_set(&sfilter->refs, 1);
+ refcount_set(&sfilter->users, 1);
+ init_waitqueue_head(&sfilter->wqh);
+
+ return sfilter;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_prepare_user_filter - prepares a user-supplied sock_fprog
+ * @user_filter: pointer to the user data containing a sock_fprog.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and non-zero otherwise.
+ */
+static struct seccomp_filter *
+seccomp_prepare_user_filter(const char __user *user_filter)
+{
+ struct sock_fprog fprog;
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ if (in_compat_syscall()) {
+ struct compat_sock_fprog fprog32;
+ if (copy_from_user(&fprog32, user_filter, sizeof(fprog32)))
+ goto out;
+ fprog.len = fprog32.len;
+ fprog.filter = compat_ptr(fprog32.filter);
+ } else /* falls through to the if below. */
+#endif
+ if (copy_from_user(&fprog, user_filter, sizeof(fprog)))
+ goto out;
+ filter = seccomp_prepare_filter(&fprog);
+out:
+ return filter;
+}
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
+/**
+ * seccomp_is_const_allow - check if filter is constant allow with given data
+ * @fprog: The BPF programs
+ * @sd: The seccomp data to check against, only syscall number and arch
+ * number are considered constant.
+ */
+static bool seccomp_is_const_allow(struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog,
+ struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ unsigned int reg_value = 0;
+ unsigned int pc;
+ bool op_res;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fprog))
+ return false;
+
+ for (pc = 0; pc < fprog->len; pc++) {
+ struct sock_filter *insn = &fprog->filter[pc];
+ u16 code = insn->code;
+ u32 k = insn->k;
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS:
+ switch (k) {
+ case offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr):
+ reg_value = sd->nr;
+ break;
+ case offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch):
+ reg_value = sd->arch;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* can't optimize (non-constant value load) */
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case BPF_RET | BPF_K:
+ /* reached return with constant values only, check allow */
+ return k == SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW;
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JA:
+ pc += insn->k;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGE | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K:
+ case BPF_JMP | BPF_JSET | BPF_K:
+ switch (BPF_OP(code)) {
+ case BPF_JEQ:
+ op_res = reg_value == k;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGE:
+ op_res = reg_value >= k;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JGT:
+ op_res = reg_value > k;
+ break;
+ case BPF_JSET:
+ op_res = !!(reg_value & k);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* can't optimize (unknown jump) */
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ pc += op_res ? insn->jt : insn->jf;
+ break;
+ case BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K:
+ reg_value &= k;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* can't optimize (unknown insn) */
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* ran off the end of the filter?! */
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter,
+ void *bitmap, const void *bitmap_prev,
+ size_t bitmap_size, int arch)
+{
+ struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog = sfilter->prog->orig_prog;
+ struct seccomp_data sd;
+ int nr;
+
+ if (bitmap_prev) {
+ /* The new filter must be as restrictive as the last. */
+ bitmap_copy(bitmap, bitmap_prev, bitmap_size);
+ } else {
+ /* Before any filters, all syscalls are always allowed. */
+ bitmap_fill(bitmap, bitmap_size);
+ }
+
+ for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) {
+ /* No bitmap change: not a cacheable action. */
+ if (!test_bit(nr, bitmap))
+ continue;
+
+ sd.nr = nr;
+ sd.arch = arch;
+
+ /* No bitmap change: continue to always allow. */
+ if (seccomp_is_const_allow(fprog, &sd))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Not a cacheable action: always run filters.
+ * atomic clear_bit() not needed, filter not visible yet.
+ */
+ __clear_bit(nr, bitmap);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_cache_prepare - emulate the filter to find cacheable syscalls
+ * @sfilter: The seccomp filter
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful or -errno if error occurred.
+ */
+static void seccomp_cache_prepare(struct seccomp_filter *sfilter)
+{
+ struct action_cache *cache = &sfilter->cache;
+ const struct action_cache *cache_prev =
+ sfilter->prev ? &sfilter->prev->cache : NULL;
+
+ seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter, cache->allow_native,
+ cache_prev ? cache_prev->allow_native : NULL,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE);
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+ seccomp_cache_prepare_bitmap(sfilter, cache->allow_compat,
+ cache_prev ? cache_prev->allow_compat : NULL,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT);
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
+}
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_attach_filter: validate and attach filter
+ * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
+ * @filter: seccomp filter to add to the current process
+ *
+ * Caller must be holding current->sighand->siglock lock.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ve on error, or
+ * - in TSYNC mode: the pid of a thread which was either not in the correct
+ * seccomp mode or did not have an ancestral seccomp filter
+ * - in NEW_LISTENER mode: the fd of the new listener
+ */
+static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ unsigned long total_insns;
+ struct seccomp_filter *walker;
+
+ assert_spin_locked(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ /* Validate resulting filter length. */
+ total_insns = filter->prog->len;
+ for (walker = current->seccomp.filter; walker; walker = walker->prev)
+ total_insns += walker->prog->len + 4; /* 4 instr penalty */
+ if (total_insns > MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* If thread sync has been requested, check that it is possible. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) {
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = seccomp_can_sync_threads();
+ if (ret) {
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ else
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Set log flag, if present. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG)
+ filter->log = true;
+
+ /* Set wait killable flag, if present. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV)
+ filter->wait_killable_recv = true;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is an existing filter, make it the prev and don't drop its
+ * task reference.
+ */
+ filter->prev = current->seccomp.filter;
+ seccomp_cache_prepare(filter);
+ current->seccomp.filter = filter;
+ atomic_inc(&current->seccomp.filter_count);
+
+ /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+ seccomp_sync_threads(flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __get_seccomp_filter(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ refcount_inc(&filter->refs);
+}
+
+/* get_seccomp_filter - increments the reference count of the filter on @tsk */
+void get_seccomp_filter(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *orig = tsk->seccomp.filter;
+ if (!orig)
+ return;
+ __get_seccomp_filter(orig);
+ refcount_inc(&orig->users);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+/* For use with seccomp_actions_logged */
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS (1 << 0)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD (1 << 1)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP (1 << 2)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO (1 << 3)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE (1 << 4)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_LOG (1 << 5)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW (1 << 6)
+#define SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF (1 << 7)
+
+static u32 seccomp_actions_logged = SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE |
+ SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
+
+static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action,
+ bool requested)
+{
+ bool log = false;
+
+ switch (action) {
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
+ log = requested && seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
+ log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_LOG;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
+ log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
+ default:
+ log = seccomp_actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the
+ * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence
+ * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the
+ * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl.
+ */
+ if (!log)
+ return;
+
+ audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Secure computing mode 1 allows only read/write/exit/sigreturn.
+ * To be fully secure this must be combined with rlimit
+ * to limit the stack allocations too.
+ */
+static const int mode1_syscalls[] = {
+ __NR_seccomp_read, __NR_seccomp_write, __NR_seccomp_exit, __NR_seccomp_sigreturn,
+ -1, /* negative terminated */
+};
+
+static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+ const int *allowed_syscalls = mode1_syscalls;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ if (in_compat_syscall())
+ allowed_syscalls = get_compat_mode1_syscalls();
+#endif
+ do {
+ if (*allowed_syscalls == this_syscall)
+ return;
+ } while (*++allowed_syscalls != -1);
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
+ dump_stack();
+#endif
+ current->seccomp.mode = SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD;
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, true);
+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+ int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return;
+
+ if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED)
+ return;
+ else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
+ __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+ else
+ BUG();
+}
+#else
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static u64 seccomp_next_notify_id(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: overflow is ok here, the id just needs to be unique per
+ * filter.
+ */
+ lockdep_assert_held(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return filter->notif->next_id++;
+}
+
+static void seccomp_handle_addfd(struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, struct seccomp_knotif *n)
+{
+ int fd;
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the notification, and reset the list pointers, indicating
+ * that it has been handled.
+ */
+ list_del_init(&addfd->list);
+ if (!addfd->setfd)
+ fd = receive_fd(addfd->file, addfd->flags);
+ else
+ fd = receive_fd_replace(addfd->fd, addfd->file, addfd->flags);
+ addfd->ret = fd;
+
+ if (addfd->ioctl_flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND) {
+ /* If we fail reset and return an error to the notifier */
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ n->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT;
+ } else {
+ /* Return the FD we just added */
+ n->flags = 0;
+ n->error = 0;
+ n->val = fd;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Mark the notification as completed. From this point, addfd mem
+ * might be invalidated and we can't safely read it anymore.
+ */
+ complete(&addfd->completion);
+}
+
+static bool should_sleep_killable(struct seccomp_filter *match,
+ struct seccomp_knotif *n)
+{
+ return match->wait_killable_recv && n->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT;
+}
+
+static int seccomp_do_user_notification(int this_syscall,
+ struct seccomp_filter *match,
+ const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ int err;
+ u32 flags = 0;
+ long ret = 0;
+ struct seccomp_knotif n = {};
+ struct seccomp_kaddfd *addfd, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
+ err = -ENOSYS;
+ if (!match->notif)
+ goto out;
+
+ n.task = current;
+ n.state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
+ n.data = sd;
+ n.id = seccomp_next_notify_id(match);
+ init_completion(&n.ready);
+ list_add_tail(&n.list, &match->notif->notifications);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&n.addfd);
+
+ up(&match->notif->request);
+ wake_up_poll(&match->wqh, EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
+
+ /*
+ * This is where we wait for a reply from userspace.
+ */
+ do {
+ bool wait_killable = should_sleep_killable(match, &n);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
+ if (wait_killable)
+ err = wait_for_completion_killable(&n.ready);
+ else
+ err = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&n.ready);
+ mutex_lock(&match->notify_lock);
+
+ if (err != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Check to see if the notifcation got picked up and
+ * whether we should switch to wait killable.
+ */
+ if (!wait_killable && should_sleep_killable(match, &n))
+ continue;
+
+ goto interrupted;
+ }
+
+ addfd = list_first_entry_or_null(&n.addfd,
+ struct seccomp_kaddfd, list);
+ /* Check if we were woken up by a addfd message */
+ if (addfd)
+ seccomp_handle_addfd(addfd, &n);
+
+ } while (n.state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED);
+
+ ret = n.val;
+ err = n.error;
+ flags = n.flags;
+
+interrupted:
+ /* If there were any pending addfd calls, clear them out */
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(addfd, tmp, &n.addfd, list) {
+ /* The process went away before we got a chance to handle it */
+ addfd->ret = -ESRCH;
+ list_del_init(&addfd->list);
+ complete(&addfd->completion);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Note that it's possible the listener died in between the time when
+ * we were notified of a response (or a signal) and when we were able to
+ * re-acquire the lock, so only delete from the list if the
+ * notification actually exists.
+ *
+ * Also note that this test is only valid because there's no way to
+ * *reattach* to a notifier right now. If one is added, we'll need to
+ * keep track of the notif itself and make sure they match here.
+ */
+ if (match->notif)
+ list_del(&n.list);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&match->notify_lock);
+
+ /* Userspace requests to continue the syscall. */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE)
+ return 0;
+
+ syscall_set_return_value(current, current_pt_regs(),
+ err, ret);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ const bool recheck_after_trace)
+{
+ u32 filter_ret, action;
+ struct seccomp_filter *match = NULL;
+ int data;
+ struct seccomp_data sd_local;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure that any changes to mode from another thread have
+ * been seen after SYSCALL_WORK_SECCOMP was seen.
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ if (!sd) {
+ populate_seccomp_data(&sd_local);
+ sd = &sd_local;
+ }
+
+ filter_ret = seccomp_run_filters(sd, &match);
+ data = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
+ action = filter_ret & SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL;
+
+ switch (action) {
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ /* Set low-order bits as an errno, capped at MAX_ERRNO. */
+ if (data > MAX_ERRNO)
+ data = MAX_ERRNO;
+ syscall_set_return_value(current, current_pt_regs(),
+ -data, 0);
+ goto skip;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ /* Show the handler the original registers. */
+ syscall_rollback(current, current_pt_regs());
+ /* Let the filter pass back 16 bits of data. */
+ force_sig_seccomp(this_syscall, data, false);
+ goto skip;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ /* We've been put in this state by the ptracer already. */
+ if (recheck_after_trace)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* ENOSYS these calls if there is no tracer attached. */
+ if (!ptrace_event_enabled(current, PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP)) {
+ syscall_set_return_value(current,
+ current_pt_regs(),
+ -ENOSYS, 0);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow the BPF to provide the event message */
+ ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
+ /*
+ * The delivery of a fatal signal during event
+ * notification may silently skip tracer notification,
+ * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified
+ * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have
+ * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just
+ * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal
+ * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit
+ * notifications.
+ */
+ if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
+ goto skip;
+ /* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
+ this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+ if (this_syscall < 0)
+ goto skip;
+
+ /*
+ * Recheck the syscall, since it may have changed. This
+ * intentionally uses a NULL struct seccomp_data to force
+ * a reload of all registers. This does not goto skip since
+ * a skip would have already been reported.
+ */
+ if (__seccomp_filter(this_syscall, NULL, true))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
+ if (seccomp_do_user_notification(this_syscall, match, sd))
+ goto skip;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, true);
+ return 0;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ /*
+ * Note that the "match" filter will always be NULL for
+ * this action since SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW is the starting
+ * state in seccomp_run_filters().
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
+ default:
+ current->seccomp.mode = SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD;
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, action, true);
+ /* Dump core only if this is the last remaining thread. */
+ if (action != SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD ||
+ (atomic_read(&current->signal->live) == 1)) {
+ /* Show the original registers in the dump. */
+ syscall_rollback(current, current_pt_regs());
+ /* Trigger a coredump with SIGSYS */
+ force_sig_seccomp(this_syscall, data, true);
+ } else {
+ do_exit(SIGSYS);
+ }
+ return -1; /* skip the syscall go directly to signal handling */
+ }
+
+ unreachable();
+
+skip:
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, 0, action, match ? match->log : false);
+ return -1;
+}
+#else
+static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
+ const bool recheck_after_trace)
+{
+ BUG();
+
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+ int this_syscall;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE) &&
+ unlikely(current->ptrace & PT_SUSPEND_SECCOMP))
+ return 0;
+
+ this_syscall = sd ? sd->nr :
+ syscall_get_nr(current, current_pt_regs());
+
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+ __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall); /* may call do_exit */
+ return 0;
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+ return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
+ /* Surviving SECCOMP_RET_KILL_* must be proactively impossible. */
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_DEAD:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ do_exit(SIGKILL);
+ return -1;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+
+long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
+{
+ return current->seccomp.mode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_strict: internal function for setting strict seccomp
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+#ifdef TIF_NOTSC
+ disable_TSC();
+#endif
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0);
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static void seccomp_notify_free(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ kfree(filter->notif);
+ filter->notif = NULL;
+}
+
+static void seccomp_notify_detach(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
+
+ if (!filter)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * If this file is being closed because e.g. the task who owned it
+ * died, let's wake everyone up who was waiting on us.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(knotif, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED)
+ continue;
+
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
+ knotif->error = -ENOSYS;
+ knotif->val = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We do not need to wake up any pending addfd messages, as
+ * the notifier will do that for us, as this just looks
+ * like a standard reply.
+ */
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+ }
+
+ seccomp_notify_free(filter);
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+}
+
+static int seccomp_notify_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+
+ seccomp_notify_detach(filter);
+ __put_seccomp_filter(filter);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* must be called with notif_lock held */
+static inline struct seccomp_knotif *
+find_notification(struct seccomp_filter *filter, u64 id)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *cur;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->id == id)
+ return cur;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+
+static long seccomp_notify_recv(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif = NULL, *cur;
+ struct seccomp_notif unotif;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /* Verify that we're not given garbage to keep struct extensible. */
+ ret = check_zeroed_user(buf, sizeof(unotif));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ if (!ret)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&unotif, 0, sizeof(unotif));
+
+ ret = down_interruptible(&filter->notif->request);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT) {
+ knotif = cur;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't find a notification, it could be that the task was
+ * interrupted by a fatal signal between the time we were woken and
+ * when we were able to acquire the rw lock.
+ */
+ if (!knotif) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ unotif.id = knotif->id;
+ unotif.pid = task_pid_vnr(knotif->task);
+ unotif.data = *(knotif->data);
+
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT;
+ wake_up_poll(&filter->wqh, EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM);
+ ret = 0;
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ if (ret == 0 && copy_to_user(buf, &unotif, sizeof(unotif))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Userspace screwed up. To make sure that we keep this
+ * notification alive, let's reset it back to INIT. It
+ * may have died when we released the lock, so we need to make
+ * sure it's still around.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ knotif = find_notification(filter, unotif.id);
+ if (knotif) {
+ /* Reset the process to make sure it's not stuck */
+ if (should_sleep_killable(filter, knotif))
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT;
+ up(&filter->notif->request);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_send(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_notif_resp resp = {};
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&resp, buf, sizeof(resp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (resp.flags & ~SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((resp.flags & SECCOMP_USER_NOTIF_FLAG_CONTINUE) &&
+ (resp.error || resp.val))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ knotif = find_notification(filter, resp.id);
+ if (!knotif) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow exactly one reply. */
+ if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
+ ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
+ knotif->error = resp.error;
+ knotif->val = resp.val;
+ knotif->flags = resp.flags;
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_id_valid(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ void __user *buf)
+{
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
+ u64 id;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&id, buf, sizeof(id)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ knotif = find_notification(filter, id);
+ if (knotif && knotif->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_addfd(struct seccomp_filter *filter,
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd __user *uaddfd,
+ unsigned int size)
+{
+ struct seccomp_notif_addfd addfd;
+ struct seccomp_knotif *knotif;
+ struct seccomp_kaddfd kaddfd;
+ int ret;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(addfd) < SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_VER0);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(addfd) != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_LATEST);
+
+ if (size < SECCOMP_NOTIFY_ADDFD_SIZE_VER0 || size >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = copy_struct_from_user(&addfd, sizeof(addfd), uaddfd, size);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (addfd.newfd_flags & ~O_CLOEXEC)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (addfd.flags & ~(SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD | SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (addfd.newfd && !(addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ kaddfd.file = fget(addfd.srcfd);
+ if (!kaddfd.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+
+ kaddfd.ioctl_flags = addfd.flags;
+ kaddfd.flags = addfd.newfd_flags;
+ kaddfd.setfd = addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SETFD;
+ kaddfd.fd = addfd.newfd;
+ init_completion(&kaddfd.completion);
+
+ ret = mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ knotif = find_notification(filter, addfd.id);
+ if (!knotif) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We do not want to allow for FD injection to occur before the
+ * notification has been picked up by a userspace handler, or after
+ * the notification has been replied to.
+ */
+ if (knotif->state != SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT) {
+ ret = -EINPROGRESS;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (addfd.flags & SECCOMP_ADDFD_FLAG_SEND) {
+ /*
+ * Disallow queuing an atomic addfd + send reply while there are
+ * some addfd requests still to process.
+ *
+ * There is no clear reason to support it and allows us to keep
+ * the loop on the other side straight-forward.
+ */
+ if (!list_empty(&knotif->addfd)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* Allow exactly only one reply */
+ knotif->state = SECCOMP_NOTIFY_REPLIED;
+ }
+
+ list_add(&kaddfd.list, &knotif->addfd);
+ complete(&knotif->ready);
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ /* Now we wait for it to be processed or be interrupted */
+ ret = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&kaddfd.completion);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We had a successful completion. The other side has already
+ * removed us from the addfd queue, and
+ * wait_for_completion_interruptible has a memory barrier upon
+ * success that lets us read this value directly without
+ * locking.
+ */
+ ret = kaddfd.ret;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&filter->notify_lock);
+ /*
+ * Even though we were woken up by a signal and not a successful
+ * completion, a completion may have happened in the mean time.
+ *
+ * We need to check again if the addfd request has been handled,
+ * and if not, we will remove it from the queue.
+ */
+ if (list_empty(&kaddfd.list))
+ ret = kaddfd.ret;
+ else
+ list_del(&kaddfd.list);
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+out:
+ fput(kaddfd.file);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_notify_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+ void __user *buf = (void __user *)arg;
+
+ /* Fixed-size ioctls */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_RECV:
+ return seccomp_notify_recv(filter, buf);
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_SEND:
+ return seccomp_notify_send(filter, buf);
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID_WRONG_DIR:
+ case SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ID_VALID:
+ return seccomp_notify_id_valid(filter, buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Extensible Argument ioctls */
+#define EA_IOCTL(cmd) ((cmd) & ~(IOC_INOUT | IOCSIZE_MASK))
+ switch (EA_IOCTL(cmd)) {
+ case EA_IOCTL(SECCOMP_IOCTL_NOTIF_ADDFD):
+ return seccomp_notify_addfd(filter, buf, _IOC_SIZE(cmd));
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static __poll_t seccomp_notify_poll(struct file *file,
+ struct poll_table_struct *poll_tab)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter = file->private_data;
+ __poll_t ret = 0;
+ struct seccomp_knotif *cur;
+
+ poll_wait(file, &filter->wqh, poll_tab);
+
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&filter->notify_lock) < 0)
+ return EPOLLERR;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(cur, &filter->notif->notifications, list) {
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_INIT)
+ ret |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+ if (cur->state == SECCOMP_NOTIFY_SENT)
+ ret |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ if ((ret & EPOLLIN) && (ret & EPOLLOUT))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&filter->notify_lock);
+
+ if (refcount_read(&filter->users) == 0)
+ ret |= EPOLLHUP;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations seccomp_notify_ops = {
+ .poll = seccomp_notify_poll,
+ .release = seccomp_notify_release,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = seccomp_notify_ioctl,
+ .compat_ioctl = seccomp_notify_ioctl,
+};
+
+static struct file *init_listener(struct seccomp_filter *filter)
+{
+ struct file *ret;
+
+ ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ filter->notif = kzalloc(sizeof(*(filter->notif)), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!filter->notif)
+ goto out;
+
+ sema_init(&filter->notif->request, 0);
+ filter->notif->next_id = get_random_u64();
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&filter->notif->notifications);
+
+ ret = anon_inode_getfile("seccomp notify", &seccomp_notify_ops,
+ filter, O_RDWR);
+ if (IS_ERR(ret))
+ goto out_notif;
+
+ /* The file has a reference to it now */
+ __get_seccomp_filter(filter);
+
+out_notif:
+ if (IS_ERR(ret))
+ seccomp_notify_free(filter);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Does @new_child have a listener while an ancestor also has a listener?
+ * If so, we'll want to reject this filter.
+ * This only has to be tested for the current process, even in the TSYNC case,
+ * because TSYNC installs @child with the same parent on all threads.
+ * Note that @new_child is not hooked up to its parent at this point yet, so
+ * we use current->seccomp.filter.
+ */
+static bool has_duplicate_listener(struct seccomp_filter *new_child)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *cur;
+
+ /* must be protected against concurrent TSYNC */
+ lockdep_assert_held(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!new_child->notif)
+ return false;
+ for (cur = current->seccomp.filter; cur; cur = cur->prev) {
+ if (cur->notif)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * seccomp_set_mode_filter: internal function for setting seccomp filter
+ * @flags: flags to change filter behavior
+ * @filter: struct sock_fprog containing filter
+ *
+ * This function may be called repeatedly to install additional filters.
+ * Every filter successfully installed will be evaluated (in reverse order)
+ * for each system call the task makes.
+ *
+ * Once current->seccomp.mode is non-zero, it may not be changed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *filter)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER;
+ struct seccomp_filter *prepared = NULL;
+ long ret = -EINVAL;
+ int listener = -1;
+ struct file *listener_f = NULL;
+
+ /* Validate flags. */
+ if (flags & ~SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * In the successful case, NEW_LISTENER returns the new listener fd.
+ * But in the failure case, TSYNC returns the thread that died. If you
+ * combine these two flags, there's no way to tell whether something
+ * succeeded or failed. So, let's disallow this combination if the user
+ * has not explicitly requested no errors from TSYNC.
+ */
+ if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) &&
+ (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) &&
+ ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC_ESRCH) == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_SENT flag doesn't make sense
+ * without the SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag.
+ */
+ if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_WAIT_KILLABLE_RECV) &&
+ ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Prepare the new filter before holding any locks. */
+ prepared = seccomp_prepare_user_filter(filter);
+ if (IS_ERR(prepared))
+ return PTR_ERR(prepared);
+
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
+ listener = get_unused_fd_flags(O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (listener < 0) {
+ ret = listener;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ listener_f = init_listener(prepared);
+ if (IS_ERR(listener_f)) {
+ put_unused_fd(listener);
+ ret = PTR_ERR(listener_f);
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure we cannot change seccomp or nnp state via TSYNC
+ * while another thread is in the middle of calling exec.
+ */
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC &&
+ mutex_lock_killable(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex))
+ goto out_put_fd;
+
+ spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (has_duplicate_listener(prepared)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = seccomp_attach_filter(flags, prepared);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */
+ prepared = NULL;
+
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags);
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+ mutex_unlock(&current->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
+out_put_fd:
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER) {
+ if (ret) {
+ listener_f->private_data = NULL;
+ fput(listener_f);
+ put_unused_fd(listener);
+ seccomp_notify_detach(prepared);
+ } else {
+ fd_install(listener, listener_f);
+ ret = listener;
+ }
+ }
+out_free:
+ seccomp_filter_free(prepared);
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static inline long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags,
+ const char __user *filter)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static long seccomp_get_action_avail(const char __user *uaction)
+{
+ u32 action;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&action, uaction, sizeof(action)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ switch (action) {
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRAP:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_TRACE:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_LOG:
+ case SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long seccomp_get_notif_sizes(void __user *usizes)
+{
+ struct seccomp_notif_sizes sizes = {
+ .seccomp_notif = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif),
+ .seccomp_notif_resp = sizeof(struct seccomp_notif_resp),
+ .seccomp_data = sizeof(struct seccomp_data),
+ };
+
+ if (copy_to_user(usizes, &sizes, sizeof(sizes)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Common entry point for both prctl and syscall. */
+static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
+ void __user *uargs)
+{
+ switch (op) {
+ case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT:
+ if (flags != 0 || uargs != NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return seccomp_set_mode_strict();
+ case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER:
+ return seccomp_set_mode_filter(flags, uargs);
+ case SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL:
+ if (flags != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return seccomp_get_action_avail(uargs);
+ case SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES:
+ if (flags != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs);
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(seccomp, unsigned int, op, unsigned int, flags,
+ void __user *, uargs)
+{
+ return do_seccomp(op, flags, uargs);
+}
+
+/**
+ * prctl_set_seccomp: configures current->seccomp.mode
+ * @seccomp_mode: requested mode to use
+ * @filter: optional struct sock_fprog for use with SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on failure.
+ */
+long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, void __user *filter)
+{
+ unsigned int op;
+ void __user *uargs;
+
+ switch (seccomp_mode) {
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
+ op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT;
+ /*
+ * Setting strict mode through prctl always ignored filter,
+ * so make sure it is always NULL here to pass the internal
+ * check in do_seccomp().
+ */
+ uargs = NULL;
+ break;
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
+ op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
+ uargs = filter;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* prctl interface doesn't have flags, so they are always zero. */
+ return do_seccomp(op, 0, uargs);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER) && defined(CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE)
+static struct seccomp_filter *get_nth_filter(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long filter_off)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *orig, *filter;
+ unsigned long count;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: this is only correct because the caller should be the (ptrace)
+ * tracer of the task, otherwise lock_task_sighand is needed.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (task->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER) {
+ spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ }
+
+ orig = task->seccomp.filter;
+ __get_seccomp_filter(orig);
+ spin_unlock_irq(&task->sighand->siglock);
+
+ count = 0;
+ for (filter = orig; filter; filter = filter->prev)
+ count++;
+
+ if (filter_off >= count) {
+ filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ count -= filter_off;
+ for (filter = orig; filter && count > 1; filter = filter->prev)
+ count--;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(count != 1 || !filter)) {
+ filter = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ __get_seccomp_filter(filter);
+
+out:
+ __put_seccomp_filter(orig);
+ return filter;
+}
+
+long seccomp_get_filter(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long filter_off,
+ void __user *data)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+ struct sock_fprog_kern *fprog;
+ long ret;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ filter = get_nth_filter(task, filter_off);
+ if (IS_ERR(filter))
+ return PTR_ERR(filter);
+
+ fprog = filter->prog->orig_prog;
+ if (!fprog) {
+ /* This must be a new non-cBPF filter, since we save
+ * every cBPF filter's orig_prog above when
+ * CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE is enabled.
+ */
+ ret = -EMEDIUMTYPE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = fprog->len;
+ if (!data)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(data, fprog->filter, bpf_classic_proglen(fprog)))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ __put_seccomp_filter(filter);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long seccomp_get_metadata(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long size, void __user *data)
+{
+ long ret;
+ struct seccomp_filter *filter;
+ struct seccomp_metadata kmd = {};
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) ||
+ current->seccomp.mode != SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) {
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ size = min_t(unsigned long, size, sizeof(kmd));
+
+ if (size < sizeof(kmd.filter_off))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&kmd.filter_off, data, sizeof(kmd.filter_off)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ filter = get_nth_filter(task, kmd.filter_off);
+ if (IS_ERR(filter))
+ return PTR_ERR(filter);
+
+ if (filter->log)
+ kmd.flags |= SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG;
+
+ ret = size;
+ if (copy_to_user(data, &kmd, size))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+
+ __put_seccomp_filter(filter);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+/* Human readable action names for friendly sysctl interaction */
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME "kill_process"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME "kill_thread"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME "trap"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME "errno"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME "user_notif"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME "trace"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME "log"
+#define SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME "allow"
+
+static const char seccomp_actions_avail[] =
+ SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME " "
+ SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME;
+
+struct seccomp_log_name {
+ u32 log;
+ const char *name;
+};
+
+static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = {
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_PROCESS, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_KILL_THREAD, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_TRAP, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_ERRNO, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_USER_NOTIF, SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_TRACE, SECCOMP_RET_TRACE_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_LOG, SECCOMP_RET_LOG_NAME },
+ { SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW_NAME },
+ { }
+};
+
+static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size,
+ u32 actions_logged,
+ const char *sep)
+{
+ const struct seccomp_log_name *cur;
+ bool append_sep = false;
+
+ for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) {
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ if (!(actions_logged & cur->log))
+ continue;
+
+ if (append_sep) {
+ ret = strscpy(names, sep, size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ names += ret;
+ size -= ret;
+ } else
+ append_sep = true;
+
+ ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ names += ret;
+ size -= ret;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool seccomp_action_logged_from_name(u32 *action_logged,
+ const char *name)
+{
+ const struct seccomp_log_name *cur;
+
+ for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name; cur++) {
+ if (!strcmp(cur->name, name)) {
+ *action_logged = cur->log;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names)
+{
+ char *name;
+
+ *actions_logged = 0;
+ while ((name = strsep(&names, " ")) && *name) {
+ u32 action_logged = 0;
+
+ if (!seccomp_action_logged_from_name(&action_logged, name))
+ return false;
+
+ *actions_logged |= action_logged;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void *buffer,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
+ struct ctl_table table;
+
+ memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
+
+ if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names),
+ seccomp_actions_logged, " "))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ table = *ro_table;
+ table.data = names;
+ table.maxlen = sizeof(names);
+ return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void *buffer,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged)
+{
+ char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
+ struct ctl_table table;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
+
+ table = *ro_table;
+ table.data = names;
+ table.maxlen = sizeof(names);
+ ret = proc_dostring(&table, 1, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 old_actions_logged,
+ int ret)
+{
+ char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
+ char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)];
+ const char *new = names;
+ const char *old = old_names;
+
+ if (!audit_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ memset(names, 0, sizeof(names));
+ memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names));
+
+ if (ret)
+ new = "?";
+ else if (!actions_logged)
+ new = "(none)";
+ else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names),
+ actions_logged, ","))
+ new = "?";
+
+ if (!old_actions_logged)
+ old = "(none)";
+ else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names,
+ sizeof(old_names),
+ old_actions_logged, ","))
+ old = "?";
+
+ return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret);
+}
+
+static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (write) {
+ u32 actions_logged = 0;
+ u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged;
+
+ ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos,
+ &actions_logged);
+ audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret);
+ } else
+ ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = {
+ { .procname = "kernel", },
+ { .procname = "seccomp", },
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table seccomp_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "actions_avail",
+ .data = (void *) &seccomp_actions_avail,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dostring,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "actions_logged",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = seccomp_actions_logged_handler,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+static int __init seccomp_sysctl_init(void)
+{
+ struct ctl_table_header *hdr;
+
+ hdr = register_sysctl_paths(seccomp_sysctl_path, seccomp_sysctl_table);
+ if (!hdr)
+ pr_warn("sysctl registration failed\n");
+ else
+ kmemleak_not_leak(hdr);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+device_initcall(seccomp_sysctl_init)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG
+/* Currently CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG implies SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE */
+static void proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(struct seq_file *m, const char *name,
+ const void *bitmap, size_t bitmap_size)
+{
+ int nr;
+
+ for (nr = 0; nr < bitmap_size; nr++) {
+ bool cached = test_bit(nr, bitmap);
+ char *status = cached ? "ALLOW" : "FILTER";
+
+ seq_printf(m, "%s %d %s\n", name, nr, status);
+ }
+}
+
+int proc_pid_seccomp_cache(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ struct seccomp_filter *f;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't want some sandboxed process to know what their seccomp
+ * filters consist of.
+ */
+ if (!file_ns_capable(m->file, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags))
+ return -ESRCH;
+
+ f = READ_ONCE(task->seccomp.filter);
+ if (!f) {
+ unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* prevent filter from being freed while we are printing it */
+ __get_seccomp_filter(f);
+ unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+
+ proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NAME,
+ f->cache.allow_native,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR);
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+ proc_pid_seccomp_cache_arch(m, SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NAME,
+ f->cache.allow_compat,
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR);
+#endif /* SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT */
+
+ __put_seccomp_filter(f);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_CACHE_DEBUG */