Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 375 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e762a4b8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/core/scm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,375 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* scm.c - Socket level control messages processing.
+ *
+ * Author:	Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
+ *              Alignment and value checking mods by Craig Metz
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/user.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errqueue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/compat.h>
+#include <net/scm.h>
+#include <net/cls_cgroup.h>
+
+
+/*
+ *	Only allow a user to send credentials, that they could set with
+ *	setu(g)id.
+ */
+
+static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+{
+	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+	kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
+	kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
+
+	if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
+	     ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+	    ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)   || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
+	      uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) &&
+	    ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid)   || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
+	      gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) {
+	       return 0;
+	}
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
+{
+	int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+	struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp;
+	struct file **fpp;
+	int i, num;
+
+	num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - sizeof(struct cmsghdr))/sizeof(int);
+
+	if (num <= 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (num > SCM_MAX_FD)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!fpl)
+	{
+		fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scm_fp_list), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+		if (!fpl)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*fplp = fpl;
+		fpl->count = 0;
+		fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+		fpl->user = NULL;
+	}
+	fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
+
+	if (fpl->count + num > fpl->max)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count.
+	 */
+
+	for (i=0; i< num; i++)
+	{
+		int fd = fdp[i];
+		struct file *file;
+
+		if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget_raw(fd)))
+			return -EBADF;
+		/* don't allow io_uring files */
+		if (io_uring_get_socket(file)) {
+			fput(file);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		*fpp++ = file;
+		fpl->count++;
+	}
+
+	if (!fpl->user)
+		fpl->user = get_uid(current_user());
+
+	return num;
+}
+
+void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct scm_fp_list *fpl = scm->fp;
+	int i;
+
+	if (fpl) {
+		scm->fp = NULL;
+		for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+			fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+		free_uid(fpl->user);
+		kfree(fpl);
+	}
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_destroy);
+
+int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
+{
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+	int err;
+
+	for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
+		err = -EINVAL;
+
+		/* Verify that cmsg_len is at least sizeof(struct cmsghdr) */
+		/* The first check was omitted in <= 2.2.5. The reasoning was
+		   that parser checks cmsg_len in any case, so that
+		   additional check would be work duplication.
+		   But if cmsg_level is not SOL_SOCKET, we do not check
+		   for too short ancillary data object at all! Oops.
+		   OK, let's add it...
+		 */
+		if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+			goto error;
+
+		if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET)
+			continue;
+
+		switch (cmsg->cmsg_type)
+		{
+		case SCM_RIGHTS:
+			if (!sock->ops || sock->ops->family != PF_UNIX)
+				goto error;
+			err=scm_fp_copy(cmsg, &p->fp);
+			if (err<0)
+				goto error;
+			break;
+		case SCM_CREDENTIALS:
+		{
+			struct ucred creds;
+			kuid_t uid;
+			kgid_t gid;
+			if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
+				goto error;
+			memcpy(&creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
+			err = scm_check_creds(&creds);
+			if (err)
+				goto error;
+
+			p->creds.pid = creds.pid;
+			if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != creds.pid) {
+				struct pid *pid;
+				err = -ESRCH;
+				pid = find_get_pid(creds.pid);
+				if (!pid)
+					goto error;
+				put_pid(p->pid);
+				p->pid = pid;
+			}
+
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid);
+			gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid);
+			if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
+				goto error;
+
+			p->creds.uid = uid;
+			p->creds.gid = gid;
+			break;
+		}
+		default:
+			goto error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (p->fp && !p->fp->count)
+	{
+		kfree(p->fp);
+		p->fp = NULL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+error:
+	scm_destroy(p);
+	return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_send);
+
+int put_cmsg(struct msghdr * msg, int level, int type, int len, void *data)
+{
+	int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(len);
+
+	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
+		return put_cmsg_compat(msg, level, type, len, data);
+
+	if (!msg->msg_control || msg->msg_controllen < sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		return 0; /* XXX: return error? check spec. */
+	}
+	if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) {
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+		cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
+	}
+
+	if (msg->msg_control_is_user) {
+		struct cmsghdr __user *cm = msg->msg_control_user;
+
+		check_object_size(data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm), true);
+
+		if (!user_write_access_begin(cm, cmlen))
+			goto efault;
+
+		unsafe_put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len, efault_end);
+		unsafe_put_user(level, &cm->cmsg_level, efault_end);
+		unsafe_put_user(type, &cm->cmsg_type, efault_end);
+		unsafe_copy_to_user(CMSG_USER_DATA(cm), data,
+				    cmlen - sizeof(*cm), efault_end);
+		user_write_access_end();
+	} else {
+		struct cmsghdr *cm = msg->msg_control;
+
+		cm->cmsg_level = level;
+		cm->cmsg_type = type;
+		cm->cmsg_len = cmlen;
+		memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm));
+	}
+
+	cmlen = min(CMSG_SPACE(len), msg->msg_controllen);
+	msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+	msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+	return 0;
+
+efault_end:
+	user_write_access_end();
+efault:
+	return -EFAULT;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg);
+
+void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal)
+{
+	struct scm_timestamping64 tss;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) {
+		tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_sec;
+		tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_nsec;
+	}
+
+	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW, sizeof(tss), &tss);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64);
+
+void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal)
+{
+	struct scm_timestamping tss;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) {
+		tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_sec;
+		tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_nsec;
+	}
+
+	put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_OLD, sizeof(tss), &tss);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping);
+
+static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
+{
+	if (msg->msg_controllen <= sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
+		return 0;
+	return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
+}
+
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+	struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
+		(__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control;
+	unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0;
+	int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds(msg), scm->fp->count);
+	int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_USER_DATA(cm);
+	int err = 0, i;
+
+	/* no use for FD passing from kernel space callers */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!msg->msg_control_is_user))
+		return;
+
+	if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
+		scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
+		err = receive_fd_user(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
+		if (err < 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (i > 0) {
+		int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int));
+
+		err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
+		if (!err)
+			err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
+		if (!err)
+			err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
+		if (!err) {
+			cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int));
+			if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+				cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
+			msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+			msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (i < scm->fp->count || (scm->fp->count && fdmax <= 0))
+		msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+
+	/*
+	 * All of the files that fit in the message have had their usage counts
+	 * incremented, so we just free the list.
+	 */
+	__scm_destroy(scm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_detach_fds);
+
+struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
+{
+	struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!fpl)
+		return NULL;
+
+	new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]),
+			  GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (new_fpl) {
+		for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
+			get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
+		new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+		new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user);
+	}
+	return new_fpl;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup);