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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 18:49:45 +0000 |
commit | 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 (patch) | |
tree | 848558de17fb3008cdf4d861b01ac7781903ce39 /security/apparmor/task.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.tar.xz linux-2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4.zip |
Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/task.c | 293 |
1 files changed, 293 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..503dc0877 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/task.c @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor task related definitions and mediation + * + * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * TODO + * If a task uses change_hat it currently does not return to the old + * cred or task context but instead creates a new one. Ideally the task + * should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified. + */ + +#include <linux/gfp.h> +#include <linux/ptrace.h> + +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/cred.h" +#include "include/policy.h" +#include "include/task.h" + +/** + * aa_get_task_label - Get another task's label + * @task: task to query (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: counted reference to @task's label + */ +struct aa_label *aa_get_task_label(struct task_struct *task) +{ + struct aa_label *p; + + rcu_read_lock(); + p = aa_get_newest_label(__aa_task_raw_label(task)); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + return p; +} + +/** + * aa_replace_current_label - replace the current tasks label + * @label: new label (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_replace_current_label(struct aa_label *label) +{ + struct aa_label *old = aa_current_raw_label(); + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + struct cred *new; + + AA_BUG(!label); + + if (old == label) + return 0; + + if (current_cred() != current_real_cred()) + return -EBUSY; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (ctx->nnp && label_is_stale(ctx->nnp)) { + struct aa_label *tmp = ctx->nnp; + + ctx->nnp = aa_get_newest_label(tmp); + aa_put_label(tmp); + } + if (unconfined(label) || (labels_ns(old) != labels_ns(label))) + /* + * if switching to unconfined or a different label namespace + * clear out context state + */ + aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(task_ctx(current)); + + /* + * be careful switching cred label, when racing replacement it + * is possible that the cred labels's->proxy->label is the reference + * keeping @label valid, so make sure to get its reference before + * dropping the reference on the cred's label + */ + aa_get_label(label); + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); + set_cred_label(new, label); + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} + + +/** + * aa_set_current_onexec - set the tasks change_profile to happen onexec + * @label: system label to set at exec (MAYBE NULL to clear value) + * @stack: whether stacking should be done + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_set_current_onexec(struct aa_label *label, bool stack) +{ + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + + aa_get_label(label); + aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); + ctx->onexec = label; + ctx->token = stack; + + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_set_current_hat - set the current tasks hat + * @label: label to set as the current hat (NOT NULL) + * @token: token value that must be specified to change from the hat + * + * Do switch of tasks hat. If the task is currently in a hat + * validate the token to match. + * + * Returns: 0 or error on failure + */ +int aa_set_current_hat(struct aa_label *label, u64 token) +{ + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + struct cred *new; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + AA_BUG(!label); + + if (!ctx->previous) { + /* transfer refcount */ + ctx->previous = cred_label(new); + ctx->token = token; + } else if (ctx->token == token) { + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); + } else { + /* previous_profile && ctx->token != token */ + abort_creds(new); + return -EACCES; + } + + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(label)); + /* clear exec on switching context */ + aa_put_label(ctx->onexec); + ctx->onexec = NULL; + + commit_creds(new); + return 0; +} + +/** + * aa_restore_previous_label - exit from hat context restoring previous label + * @token: the token that must be matched to exit hat context + * + * Attempt to return out of a hat to the previous label. The token + * must match the stored token value. + * + * Returns: 0 or error of failure + */ +int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token) +{ + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = task_ctx(current); + struct cred *new; + + if (ctx->token != token) + return -EACCES; + /* ignore restores when there is no saved label */ + if (!ctx->previous) + return 0; + + new = prepare_creds(); + if (!new) + return -ENOMEM; + + aa_put_label(cred_label(new)); + set_cred_label(new, aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous)); + AA_BUG(!cred_label(new)); + /* clear exec && prev information when restoring to previous context */ + aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); + + commit_creds(new); + + return 0; +} + +/** + * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @mask: permission mask to convert + * + * Returns: pointer to static string + */ +static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask) +{ + switch (mask) { + case MAY_READ: + return "read"; + case MAY_WRITE: + return "trace"; + case AA_MAY_BE_READ: + return "readby"; + case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED: + return "tracedby"; + } + return ""; +} + +/* call back to audit ptrace fields */ +static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request)); + + if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"", + audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied)); + } + } + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); +} + +/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */ +/* TODO: conditionals */ +static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + + aad(sa)->peer = peer; + aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, + &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); +} + +static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, + struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + return 0; + + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); +} + +static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, + struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) + return 0; + + if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); + + /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ + if (&tracer->label == tracee) + return 0; + + aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; + aad(sa)->peer = tracee; + aad(sa)->request = 0; + aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, + CAP_OPT_NONE); + + return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); +} + +/** + * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee + * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL) + * @tracee: task label to be traced + * @request: permission request + * + * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error + */ +int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, + u32 request) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); + + return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, + profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), + profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); +} |