Adding upstream version 6.1.76.upstream/6.1.76upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 5105 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fbadc61fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5105 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ *  Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ *  This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ *  Authors:
+ *	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
+ *
+ *  Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ *                Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *  Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
+ *  Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/icmpv6.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/watch_queue.h>
+#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define TRANS_TRUE	"TRUE"
+#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE	4
+
+#define SMK_CONNECTING	0
+#define SMK_RECEIVING	1
+#define SMK_SENDING	2
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ipv6_lock);
+static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+#endif
+struct kmem_cache *smack_rule_cache;
+int smack_enabled __initdata;
+
+#define A(s) {"smack"#s, sizeof("smack"#s) - 1, Opt_##s}
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	int len;
+	int opt;
+} smk_mount_opts[] = {
+	{"smackfsdef", sizeof("smackfsdef") - 1, Opt_fsdefault},
+	A(fsdefault), A(fsfloor), A(fshat), A(fsroot), A(fstransmute)
+};
+#undef A
+
+static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smk_mount_opts); i++) {
+		size_t len = smk_mount_opts[i].len;
+		if (len > l || memcmp(s, smk_mount_opts[i].name, len))
+			continue;
+		if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
+			continue;
+		*arg = s + len + 1;
+		return smk_mount_opts[i].opt;
+	}
+	return Opt_error;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
+	"Bringup Error",	/* Unused */
+	"Bringup",		/* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
+	"Unconfined Subject",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
+	"Unconfined Object",	/* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
+};
+
+static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	if (mode & MAY_READ)
+		s[i++] = 'r';
+	if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
+		s[i++] = 'w';
+	if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
+		s[i++] = 'x';
+	if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
+		s[i++] = 'a';
+	if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+		s[i++] = 't';
+	if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
+		s[i++] = 'l';
+	if (i == 0)
+		s[i++] = '-';
+	s[i] = '\0';
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
+		       struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
+			  int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
+		acc, current->comm, note);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct_obj(otp);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+		current->comm, otp->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+	if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
+	    (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+				int mode, int rc)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+		pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+			inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+	if (rc <= 0)
+		return rc;
+	if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+		rc = 0;
+
+	smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+	pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+		sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+		inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+		current->comm);
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @name: type of the label (attribute)
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
+ * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
+					struct dentry *dp)
+{
+	int rc;
+	char *buffer;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+
+	if (!(ip->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+	buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (buffer == NULL)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, ip, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+	if (rc < 0)
+		skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+	else if (rc == 0)
+		skp = NULL;
+	else
+		skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
+
+	kfree(buffer);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * init_inode_smack - initialize an inode security blob
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void init_inode_smack(struct inode *inode, struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	isp->smk_flags = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * init_task_smack - initialize a task security blob
+ * @tsp: blob to initialize
+ * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
+ * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
+ *
+ */
+static void init_task_smack(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *task,
+					struct smack_known *forked)
+{
+	tsp->smk_task = task;
+	tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+	mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_rule *nrp;
+	struct smack_rule *orp;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+		nrp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_rule_cache, gfp);
+		if (nrp == NULL) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			break;
+		}
+		*nrp = *orp;
+		list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+				gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
+
+	list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
+		nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
+		if (nklep == NULL) {
+			smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
+		list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode: input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
+		return MAY_READWRITE;
+	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+		return MAY_READ;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
+				 struct smack_known *tracee_known,
+				 unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *tracer_known;
+	const struct cred *tracercred;
+
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+		saip = &ad;
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tracercred = __task_cred(tracer);
+	tsp = smack_cred(tracercred);
+	tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+	if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+	    (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+	     smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+		if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
+			rc = 0;
+		else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+			rc = -EACCES;
+		else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred))
+			rc = 0;
+		else
+			rc = -EACCES;
+
+		if (saip)
+			smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
+				  tracee_known->smk_known,
+				  0, rc, saip);
+
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return rc;
+	}
+
+	/* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(ctp);
+
+	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(current_cred()));
+
+	return smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @typefrom_file: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
+		rc = -EACCES;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sb);
+
+	sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
+	sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
+	/*
+	 * SMK_SB_INITIALIZED will be zero from kzalloc.
+	 */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct smack_mnt_opts {
+	const char *fsdefault, *fsfloor, *fshat, *fsroot, *fstransmute;
+};
+
+static void smack_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	kfree(opts->fsdefault);
+	kfree(opts->fsfloor);
+	kfree(opts->fshat);
+	kfree(opts->fsroot);
+	kfree(opts->fstransmute);
+	kfree(opts);
+}
+
+static int smack_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
+
+	if (!opts) {
+		opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!opts)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		*mnt_opts = opts;
+	}
+	if (!s)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	switch (token) {
+	case Opt_fsdefault:
+		if (opts->fsdefault)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsdefault = s;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fsfloor:
+		if (opts->fsfloor)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsfloor = s;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fshat:
+		if (opts->fshat)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fshat = s;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fsroot:
+		if (opts->fsroot)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fsroot = s;
+		break;
+	case Opt_fstransmute:
+		if (opts->fstransmute)
+			goto out_opt_err;
+		opts->fstransmute = s;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+out_opt_err:
+	pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_submount - Initialise security data for a filesystem context
+ * @fc: The filesystem context.
+ * @reference: reference superblock
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
+				 struct super_block *reference)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *ctx;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+	ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	fc->security = ctx;
+
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(reference);
+	isp = smack_inode(reference->s_root->d_inode);
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_default) {
+		ctx->fsdefault = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_default->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fsdefault)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_floor) {
+		ctx->fsfloor = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_floor->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fsfloor)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_hat) {
+		ctx->fshat = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_hat->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!ctx->fshat)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+		if (sbsp->smk_root) {
+			ctx->fstransmute = kstrdup(sbsp->smk_root->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+			if (!ctx->fstransmute)
+				return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_dup - Duplicate the security data on fs_context duplication
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context.
+ * @src_fc: The source filesystem context being duplicated.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
+				struct fs_context *src_fc)
+{
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *dst, *src = src_fc->security;
+
+	if (!src)
+		return 0;
+
+	fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fc->security)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	dst = fc->security;
+
+	if (src->fsdefault) {
+		dst->fsdefault = kstrdup(src->fsdefault, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst->fsdefault)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (src->fsfloor) {
+		dst->fsfloor = kstrdup(src->fsfloor, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst->fsfloor)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (src->fshat) {
+		dst->fshat = kstrdup(src->fshat, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst->fshat)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (src->fsroot) {
+		dst->fsroot = kstrdup(src->fsroot, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst->fsroot)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	if (src->fstransmute) {
+		dst->fstransmute = kstrdup(src->fstransmute, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!dst->fstransmute)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec smack_fs_parameters[] = {
+	fsparam_string("smackfsdef",		Opt_fsdefault),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsdefault",	Opt_fsdefault),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsfloor",		Opt_fsfloor),
+	fsparam_string("smackfshat",		Opt_fshat),
+	fsparam_string("smackfsroot",		Opt_fsroot),
+	fsparam_string("smackfstransmute",	Opt_fstransmute),
+	{}
+};
+
+/**
+ * smack_fs_context_parse_param - Parse a single mount parameter
+ * @fc: The new filesystem context being constructed.
+ * @param: The parameter.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOPARAM to pass the parameter on or anything else on
+ * error.
+ */
+static int smack_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
+					struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+	struct fs_parse_result result;
+	int opt, rc;
+
+	opt = fs_parse(fc, smack_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+	if (opt < 0)
+		return opt;
+
+	rc = smack_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
+	if (!rc)
+		param->string = NULL;
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
+{
+	char *from = options, *to = options;
+	bool first = true;
+
+	while (1) {
+		char *next = strchr(from, ',');
+		int token, len, rc;
+		char *arg = NULL;
+
+		if (next)
+			len = next - from;
+		else
+			len = strlen(from);
+
+		token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
+		if (token != Opt_error) {
+			arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, from + len - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
+			rc = smack_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
+			if (unlikely(rc)) {
+				kfree(arg);
+				if (*mnt_opts)
+					smack_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
+				*mnt_opts = NULL;
+				return rc;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (!first) {	// copy with preceding comma
+				from--;
+				len++;
+			}
+			if (to != from)
+				memmove(to, from, len);
+			to += len;
+			first = false;
+		}
+		if (!from[len])
+			break;
+		from += len + 1;
+	}
+	*to = '\0';
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @mnt_opts: Smack mount options
+ * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
+ * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ *
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
+ * labels.
+ */
+static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+		void *mnt_opts,
+		unsigned long kern_flags,
+		unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+	struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+	struct superblock_smack *sp = smack_superblock(sb);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
+	bool transmute = false;
+
+	if (sp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_INITIALIZED)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
+		 */
+		if (opts)
+			return -EPERM;
+		/*
+		 * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
+		 */
+		skp = smk_of_current();
+		sp->smk_root = skp;
+		sp->smk_default = skp;
+		/*
+		 * For a handful of fs types with no user-controlled
+		 * backing store it's okay to trust security labels
+		 * in the filesystem. The rest are untrusted.
+		 */
+		if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
+		    sb->s_magic != SYSFS_MAGIC && sb->s_magic != TMPFS_MAGIC &&
+		    sb->s_magic != RAMFS_MAGIC) {
+			transmute = true;
+			sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sp->smk_flags |= SMK_SB_INITIALIZED;
+
+	if (opts) {
+		if (opts->fsdefault) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsdefault, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_default = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fsfloor) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsfloor, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_floor = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fshat) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fshat, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_hat = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fsroot) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fsroot, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+		}
+		if (opts->fstransmute) {
+			skp = smk_import_entry(opts->fstransmute, 0);
+			if (IS_ERR(skp))
+				return PTR_ERR(skp);
+			sp->smk_root = skp;
+			transmute = true;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the root inode.
+	 */
+	init_inode_smack(inode, sp->smk_root);
+
+	if (transmute) {
+		isp = smack_inode(inode);
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbp = smack_superblock(dentry->d_sb);
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BPRM hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_creds_for_exec - Update bprm->cred if needed for exec
+ * @bprm: the exec information
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+	struct task_smack *bsp = smack_cred(bprm->cred);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	int rc;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
+		return 0;
+
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	if ((sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) &&
+	    isp->smk_task != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
+		struct task_struct *tracer;
+		rc = 0;
+
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+		if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+			rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+						   isp->smk_task,
+						   PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+						   __func__);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (rc != 0)
+			return rc;
+	}
+	if (bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
+	bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+	/* Decide if this is a secure exec. */
+	if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
+		bprm->secureexec = 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	init_inode_smack(inode, skp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the newly created inode
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @qstr: unused
+ * @name: where to put the attribute name
+ * @value: where to put the attribute value
+ * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+				     const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
+				     void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct inode_smack *issp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(tsp);
+	struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+	int may;
+
+	if (name)
+		*name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
+
+	if (value && len) {
+		/*
+		 * If equal, transmuting already occurred in
+		 * smack_dentry_create_files_as(). No need to check again.
+		 */
+		if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted) {
+			rcu_read_lock();
+			may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+					       &skp->smk_rules);
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * In addition to having smk_task equal to smk_transmuted,
+		 * if the access rule allows transmutation and the directory
+		 * requests transmutation then by all means transmute.
+		 * Mark the inode as changed.
+		 */
+		if ((tsp->smk_task == tsp->smk_transmuted) ||
+		    (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+		     smk_inode_transmutable(dir))) {
+			/*
+			 * The caller of smack_dentry_create_files_as()
+			 * should have overridden the current cred, so the
+			 * inode label was already set correctly in
+			 * smack_inode_alloc_security().
+			 */
+			if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_transmuted)
+				isp = dsp;
+			issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
+		}
+
+		*value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
+		if (*value == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+
+		*len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: the existing object
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+			    struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	/*
+	 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+	 */
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * You also need write access to the containing directory
+		 */
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: unused
+ * @old_dentry: the old object
+ * @new_inode: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+			      struct dentry *old_dentry,
+			      struct inode *new_inode,
+			      struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+	isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+	rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+
+	if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+		rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ *
+ * This is the important Smack hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(inode->i_sb);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+	int rc;
+
+	mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+	/*
+	 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+	 */
+	if (mask == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED) {
+		if (smk_of_inode(inode) != sbsp->smk_root)
+			return -EACCES;
+	}
+
+	/* May be droppable after audit */
+	if (no_block)
+		return -ECHILD;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: for the force flag
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
+	 */
+	if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+		return 0;
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @path: path to extract the info from
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value of the attribute
+ * @size: size of the value
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int check_priv = 0;
+	int check_import = 0;
+	int check_star = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+		   strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		check_import = 1;
+		check_star = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		check_priv = 1;
+		if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+		    strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	} else
+		rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+	if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+		rc = -EPERM;
+
+	if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
+		skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
+		if (IS_ERR(skp))
+			rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+		else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+		    (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
+			rc = -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+				      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_task = skp;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+		if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+			isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+	}
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				   struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+		if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+			rc = -EPERM;
+	} else
+		rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
+
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry));
+	/*
+	 * Don't do anything special for these.
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+	 *	XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+		struct super_block *sbp = dentry->d_sb;
+		struct superblock_smack *sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
+
+		isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_default;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0)
+		isp->smk_task = NULL;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
+		isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+		isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @mnt_userns: active user namespace
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @alloc: duplicate memory
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+				   struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   void **buffer, bool alloc)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
+	struct smack_known *isp;
+	struct inode_smack *ispp;
+	size_t label_len;
+	char *label = NULL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+		ispp = smack_inode(inode);
+		if (ispp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE)
+			label = TRANS_TRUE;
+		else
+			label = "";
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+		 */
+		sbp = ip->i_sb;
+		if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+		if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+		if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+			isp = ssp->smk_in;
+		else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+			isp = ssp->smk_out;
+		else
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	if (!label)
+		label = isp->smk_known;
+
+	label_len = strlen(label);
+
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = kstrdup(label, GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (*buffer == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	return label_len;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+				    size_t buffer_size)
+{
+	int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+
+	if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
+		memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/*
+ * There is no smack_file_permission hook
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * f_security is the owner security information. It
+ * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	}
+
+	if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Generally these operations are harmless.
+ * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
+ * for passing information, so they require write access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+			    unsigned long arg)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case F_GETLK:
+		break;
+	case F_SETLK:
+	case F_SETLKW:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+		break;
+	case F_SETOWN:
+	case F_SETSIG:
+		smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+		rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_mmap_file - Check permissions for a mmap operation.
+ * @file: contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot: contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags: contains the operational flags.
+ *
+ * The @file may be NULL, e.g. if mapping anonymous memory.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *mkp;
+	struct smack_rule *srp;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	int may;
+	int mmay;
+	int tmay;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (file == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file))))
+		return 0;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(file_inode(file));
+	if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
+	if (sbsp->smk_flags & SMK_SB_UNTRUSTED &&
+	    isp->smk_mmap != sbsp->smk_root)
+		return -EACCES;
+	mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	skp = smk_of_current();
+	rc = 0;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+	 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+	 * to that rule's object label.
+	 */
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
+		okp = srp->smk_object;
+		/*
+		 * Matching labels always allows access.
+		 */
+		if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		 * If there is a matching local rule take
+		 * that into account as well.
+		 */
+		may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+				       okp->smk_known,
+				       &tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (may == -ENOENT)
+			may = srp->smk_access;
+		else
+			may &= srp->smk_access;
+		/*
+		 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+		 * possibly have less access.
+		 */
+		if (may == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Fetch the global list entry.
+		 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * can't have as much access as current.
+		 */
+		mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&mkp->smk_rules);
+		if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+		 * potential access, too.
+		 */
+		tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+					&tsp->smk_rules);
+		if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+			mmay &= tmay;
+
+		/*
+		 * If there is any access available to current that is
+		 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+		 * deny access.
+		 */
+		if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+			rc = -EACCES;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_file(file);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+				     struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(tsk->cred));
+	const struct cred *tcred;
+	struct file *file;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	/*
+	 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+	 */
+	file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+	/* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+	blob = smack_file(file);
+	skp = *blob;
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	tcred = __task_cred(tsk);
+	if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred))
+		rc = 0;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+	smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_DELIVER, rc, &ad);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+	int rc;
+	int may = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct socket *sock;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+		return 0;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
+		sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+		/*
+		 * If the receiving process can't write to the
+		 * passed socket or if the passed socket can't
+		 * write to the receiving process don't accept
+		 * the passed socket.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, ssp->smk_out, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		if (rc < 0)
+			return rc;
+		rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_in, tsp->smk_task, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * This code relies on bitmasks.
+	 */
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+		may = MAY_READ;
+	if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+	rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_open(struct file *file)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Task hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification.  This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	init_task_smack(smack_cred(cred), NULL, NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the credentials in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	struct smack_rule *rp;
+	struct list_head *l;
+	struct list_head *n;
+
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+	list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+		rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+		list_del(&rp->list);
+		kmem_cache_free(smack_rule_cache, rp);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+			      gfp_t gfp)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+	int rc;
+
+	init_task_smack(new_tsp, old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task);
+
+	rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
+				gfp);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+	struct task_smack *old_tsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+	mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+	/* cbs copy rule list */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_getsecid - get the secid corresponding to a creds structure
+ * @cred: the object creds
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *cred, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
+ *
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service.
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+	struct task_smack *new_tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	new_tsp->smk_task = smack_from_secid(secid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
+ *
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
+					struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access: the access requested
+ * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
+				const char *caller)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	int rc;
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
+ * @p: the task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+
+	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @cred: identifies the cred to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
+			   int sig, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!sig)
+		return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+	/*
+	 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+	 * can write the receiver.
+	 */
+	if (cred == NULL) {
+		rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+		return rc;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If the cred isn't NULL we're dealing with some USB IO
+	 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+	 * we can't take privilege into account.
+	 */
+	skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct inode_smack *isp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+
+	isp->smk_inode = skp;
+	isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
+	if (ssp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+	} else {
+		ssp->smk_in = skp;
+		ssp->smk_out = skp;
+	}
+	ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+
+	sk->sk_security = ssp;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+
+	if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+			if (spp->smk_sock != sk)
+				continue;
+			spp->smk_can_reuse = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+	}
+#endif
+	kfree(sk->sk_security);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_clone_security - Copy security context
+ * @sk: the old socket
+ * @newsk: the new socket
+ *
+ * Copy the security context of the old socket pointer to the cloned
+ */
+static void smack_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp_old = sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp_new = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	*ssp_new = *ssp_old;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_net4addr *snp;
+	struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+
+	if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
+		/*
+		 * we break after finding the first match because
+		 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		 * so we have found the most specific match
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
+		    (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
+			return snp->smk_label;
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
+ * @sip: the address
+ *
+ * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
+ */
+static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	__be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+	__be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+
+	if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
+	    ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
+		return true;
+	return false;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts.  The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+	struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
+	int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
+	 */
+	if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
+		return NULL;
+
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+		/*
+		 * If the label is NULL the entry has
+		 * been renounced. Ignore it.
+		 */
+		if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+			continue;
+		/*
+		* we break after finding the first match because
+		* the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+		* so we have found the most specific match
+		*/
+		for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+			if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
+			    snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+				found = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (found)
+			return snp->smk_label;
+	}
+
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbl_add - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Attach the outbound smack value (smk_out) to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlbl_add(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp = ssp->smk_out;
+	int rc;
+
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+	rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+	switch (rc) {
+	case 0:
+		ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_LABELED;
+		break;
+	case -EDESTADDRREQ:
+		ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_REQSKB;
+		rc = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbl_delete - Remove the secattr from a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Remove the outbound smack value from a socket
+ */
+static void smack_netlbl_delete(struct sock *sk)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+
+	/*
+	 * Take the label off the socket if one is set.
+	 */
+	if (ssp->smk_state != SMK_NETLBL_LABELED)
+		return;
+
+	local_bh_disable();
+	bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+	netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+	bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+	local_bh_enable();
+	ssp->smk_state = SMK_NETLBL_UNLABELED;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv4_check - Perform IPv4 host access checks
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sap: the destination address
+ *
+ * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
+ * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
+ *
+ */
+static int smk_ipv4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smack_known *hkp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
+	if (hkp != NULL) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
+		ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
+		ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		/*
+		 * Clear the socket netlabel if it's set.
+		 */
+		if (!rc)
+			smack_netlbl_delete(sk);
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
+ * @subject: subject Smack label
+ * @object: object Smack label
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Check an IPv6 access
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
+				struct smack_known *object,
+				struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
+	ad.a.u.net->dport = address->sin6_port;
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
+	else
+		ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
+{
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	unsigned short port = 0;
+
+	if (address == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * This operation is changing the Smack information
+		 * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
+		 * as well.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+			if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
+				continue;
+			spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+			spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
+		 * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+	port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+	/*
+	 * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
+	 */
+	if (port == 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Look for an existing port list entry.
+	 * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
+	 */
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sock->type)
+			continue;
+		if (spp->smk_can_reuse != 1) {
+			rcu_read_unlock();
+			return;
+		}
+		spp->smk_port = port;
+		spp->smk_sock = sk;
+		spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+		spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+		spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+		return;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+	/*
+	 * A new port entry is required.
+	 */
+	spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (spp == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	spp->smk_port = port;
+	spp->smk_sock = sk;
+	spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+	spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+	spp->smk_sock_type = sock->type;
+	spp->smk_can_reuse = 0;
+
+	mutex_lock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
+	list_add_rcu(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
+	mutex_unlock(&smack_ipv6_lock);
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
+				int act)
+{
+	struct smk_port_label *spp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	unsigned short port;
+	struct smack_known *object;
+
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+		skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+		object = ssp->smk_in;
+	} else {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The other end is a single label host.
+	 */
+	if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+	if (skp == NULL)
+		skp = smack_net_ambient;
+	if (object == NULL)
+		object = smack_net_ambient;
+
+	/*
+	 * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
+	 */
+	if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
+		return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+
+	/*
+	 * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
+	 */
+	if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+		return 0;
+
+	port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	list_for_each_entry_rcu(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+		if (spp->smk_port != port || spp->smk_sock_type != sk->sk_type)
+			continue;
+		object = spp->smk_in;
+		if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
+			ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
+		break;
+	}
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *nsp = smack_inode(inode);
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct socket *sock;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_inode = skp;
+		nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+	 */
+	if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+	if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+		ssp->smk_in = skp;
+	else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
+		ssp->smk_out = skp;
+		if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+			rc = smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
+			if (rc != 0)
+				printk(KERN_WARNING
+					"Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
+					__func__, -rc);
+		}
+	} else
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+				    int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+	 */
+	if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+		ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+	}
+
+	if (family != PF_INET)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Set the outbound netlbl.
+	 */
+	return smack_netlbl_add(sock->sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_socketpair - create socket pair
+ * @socka: one socket
+ * @sockb: another socket
+ *
+ * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
+		                   struct socket *sockb)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *asp = socka->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *bsp = sockb->sk->sk_security;
+
+	asp->smk_packet = bsp->smk_out;
+	bsp->smk_packet = asp->smk_out;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @address: the port address
+ * @addrlen: size of the address
+ *
+ * Records the label bound to a port.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
+		    address->sa_family != AF_INET6)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+				int addrlen)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (sock->sk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+	    (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
+		return 0;
+	if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+		return 0;
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && sap->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+		struct smack_known *rsp = NULL;
+
+		if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+			return 0;
+		if (__is_defined(SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING))
+			rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
+		if (rsp != NULL) {
+			struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
+					    SMK_CONNECTING);
+		}
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+
+		return rc;
+	}
+	if (sap->sa_family != AF_INET || addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+		return 0;
+	rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+	int may = 0;
+
+	if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+		may |= MAY_READ;
+	if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+		may |= MAY_WRITE;
+	if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+		may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+	return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_msg_msg(msg);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_ipc - the smack pointer for the ipc
+ * @isp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_ipc(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+	return *blob;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_alloc_security - Set the security blob for ipc
+ * @isp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(isp);
+
+	*blob = smk_of_current();
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @isp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT:
+	case SHM_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case SHM_LOCK:
+	case SHM_UNLOCK:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SHM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information.
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, char __user *shmaddr,
+			   int shmflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+	return smk_curacc_shm(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @isp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int semflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case GETPID:
+	case GETNCNT:
+	case GETZCNT:
+	case GETVAL:
+	case GETALL:
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT:
+	case SEM_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case SETVAL:
+	case SETALL:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+	case IPC_SET:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case SEM_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct sembuf *sops,
+			   unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_sem(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @isp : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int access)
+{
+	struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_ipc(isp);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = isp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, int cmd)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	switch (cmd) {
+	case IPC_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT:
+	case MSG_STAT_ANY:
+		may = MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case IPC_SET:
+	case IPC_RMID:
+		may = MAY_READWRITE;
+		break;
+	case IPC_INFO:
+	case MSG_INFO:
+		/*
+		 * System level information
+		 */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp, struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  int msqflg)
+{
+	int may;
+
+	may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgrcv - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @isp: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *isp,
+				  struct msg_msg *msg,
+				  struct task_struct *target, long type,
+				  int mode)
+{
+	return smk_curacc_msq(isp, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+	struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
+	int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+	ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known **blob = smack_ipc(ipp);
+	struct smack_known *iskp = *blob;
+
+	*secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	struct super_block *sbp;
+	struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
+	struct smack_known *final;
+	char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
+	int transflag = 0;
+	int rc;
+	struct dentry *dp;
+
+	if (inode == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	isp = smack_inode(inode);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the inode is already instantiated
+	 * take the quick way out
+	 */
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+		return;
+
+	sbp = inode->i_sb;
+	sbsp = smack_superblock(sbp);
+	/*
+	 * We're going to use the superblock default label
+	 * if there's no label on the file.
+	 */
+	final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is the root inode the superblock
+	 * may be in the process of initialization.
+	 * If that is the case use the root value out
+	 * of the superblock.
+	 */
+	if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+		switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+		case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+			 * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+			 * options.
+			 */
+			sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
+			sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
+			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+			break;
+		case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
+			 * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
+			 */
+			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+			break;
+		case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+			isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+			break;
+		case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+			/*
+			 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+			 * structures associated with the task involved.
+			 */
+			isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_star;
+			break;
+		default:
+			isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+			break;
+		}
+		isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * This is pretty hackish.
+	 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+	 * file system specific code, but it does help
+	 * with keeping it simple.
+	 */
+	switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+	case SMACK_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+	case CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
+		 * that the smack file system doesn't do
+		 * extended attributes.
+		 *
+		 * Cgroupfs is special
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star;
+		break;
+	case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+		 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+		 * pty with respect.
+		 */
+		final = ckp;
+		break;
+	case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+		 * The superblock default suffices.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+		/*
+		 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+		 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+		 * getting recreated on every reboot.
+		 */
+		final = &smack_known_star;
+		/*
+		 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+		 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+		 * to set mount options simulate setting the
+		 * superblock default.
+		 */
+		fallthrough;
+	default:
+		/*
+		 * This isn't an understood special case.
+		 * Get the value from the xattr.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
+		 */
+		if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+			final = &smack_known_star;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+		 * Use the aforeapplied default.
+		 * It would be curious if the label of the task
+		 * does not match that assigned.
+		 */
+		if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR))
+		        break;
+		/*
+		 * Get the dentry for xattr.
+		 */
+		dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+		if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
+			final = skp;
+
+		/*
+		 * Transmuting directory
+		 */
+		if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+			/*
+			 * If this is a new directory and the label was
+			 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
+			 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
+			 * and mark the inode.
+			 *
+			 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
+			 * directory mark the inode.
+			 */
+			if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
+				isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
+				rc = __vfs_setxattr(&init_user_ns, dp, inode,
+					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+					TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
+					0);
+			} else {
+				rc = __vfs_getxattr(dp, inode,
+					XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
+					TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
+				if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
+						       TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+					rc = -EINVAL;
+			}
+			if (rc >= 0)
+				transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+		 */
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_task = skp;
+
+		skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+		if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+		    skp == &smack_known_web)
+			skp = NULL;
+		isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+
+		dput(dp);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (final == NULL)
+		isp->smk_inode = ckp;
+	else
+		isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+	isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *name, char **value)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
+	char *cp;
+	int slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	slen = strlen(cp);
+	*value = cp;
+	return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct cred *new;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	/*
+	 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label
+	 * and the star ("*") label.
+	 */
+	if (skp == &smack_known_web || skp == &smack_known_star)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+		rc = -EPERM;
+		list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
+			if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
+				rc = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		if (rc)
+			return rc;
+	}
+
+	new = prepare_creds();
+	if (new == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(new);
+	tsp->smk_task = skp;
+	/*
+	 * process can change its label only once
+	 */
+	smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+	commit_creds(new);
+	return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one sock
+ * @other: the other sock
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+				     struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct smack_known *okp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+	if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+		skp = ssp->smk_out;
+		okp = osp->smk_in;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+		rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		if (rc == 0) {
+			okp = osp->smk_out;
+			skp = ssp->smk_in;
+			rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+			rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
+						MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
+	 */
+	if (rc == 0) {
+		nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+		ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+#endif
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+	rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msg: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
+ * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
+ * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+				int size)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *rsp;
+#endif
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+	 */
+	if (sip == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) ||
+		    sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		rc = smk_ipv4_check(sock->sk, sip);
+		break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (msg->msg_namelen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 ||
+		    sap->sin6_family != AF_INET6)
+			return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
+		if (rsp != NULL)
+			rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
+						SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+#endif
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) */
+		break;
+	}
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @ssp: socket security information
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+						struct socket_smack *ssp)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	int found = 0;
+	int acat;
+	int kcat;
+
+	/*
+	 * Netlabel found it in the cache.
+	 */
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE) != 0)
+		return (struct smack_known *)sap->cache->data;
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0)
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+		 */
+		return smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+
+	if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
+		 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+		 * behaving the way we expect it to.
+		 *
+		 * Look it up in the label table
+		 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+		 * for the packet fall back on the network
+		 * ambient value.
+		 */
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+			if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
+				continue;
+			/*
+			 * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
+			 */
+			if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
+				if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
+				     NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
+					found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+			for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
+				acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+							  acat + 1);
+				kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
+					skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
+					kcat + 1);
+				if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
+					break;
+			}
+			if (acat == kcat) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		if (found)
+			return skp;
+
+		if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
+			return &smack_known_web;
+		return &smack_known_star;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+	 * for the packet fall back on the network
+	 * ambient value.
+	 */
+	return smack_net_ambient;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+	u8 nexthdr;
+	int offset;
+	int proto = -EINVAL;
+	struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
+	struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+	__be16 frag_off;
+	struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+	struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+	struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+	sip->sin6_port = 0;
+
+	offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+	ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+	if (ip6 == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
+
+	nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+	offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+	offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+	if (offset < 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	proto = nexthdr;
+	switch (proto) {
+	case IPPROTO_TCP:
+		th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+		if (th != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = th->source;
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_UDP:
+	case IPPROTO_UDPLITE:
+		uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+		if (uh != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
+		break;
+	case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+		dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+		if (dh != NULL)
+			sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
+		break;
+	}
+	return proto;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_skb - Smack data from the secmark in an skb
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns smack_known of the secmark or NULL if that won't work.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	if (skb == NULL || skb->secmark == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+}
+#else
+static inline struct smack_known *smack_from_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_netlbl - Smack data from the IP options in an skb
+ * @sk: socket data came in on
+ * @family: address family
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Find the Smack label in the IP options. If it hasn't been
+ * added to the netlabel cache, add it here.
+ *
+ * Returns smack_known of the IP options or NULL if that won't work.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_netlbl(const struct sock *sk, u16 family,
+					     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
+	if (sk)
+		ssp = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr) == 0) {
+		skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+		if (secattr.flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE)
+			netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+	}
+
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+	return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
+	int proto;
+
+	if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+		family = PF_INET;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_INET:
+		/*
+		 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+		 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+		 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+		 */
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
+			skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+			if (skp == NULL)
+				skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+		ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+		 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+		 * This is the simplist possible security model
+		 * for networking.
+		 */
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+					MAY_WRITE, rc);
+		if (rc != 0)
+			netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
+		break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	case PF_INET6:
+		proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+		if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_UDPLITE &&
+		    proto != IPPROTO_TCP && proto != IPPROTO_DCCP)
+			break;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp == NULL) {
+			if (smk_ipv6_localhost(&sadd))
+				break;
+			skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
+			if (skp == NULL)
+				skp = smack_net_ambient;
+		}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+		smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+		ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+		ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+		ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+		rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+		rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+					MAY_WRITE, rc);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+		rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+		if (rc != 0)
+			icmpv6_send(skb, ICMPV6_DEST_UNREACH,
+					ICMPV6_ADM_PROHIBITED, 0);
+		break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+	}
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @optval: user's destination
+ * @optlen: size thereof
+ * @len: max thereof
+ *
+ * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+					  char __user *optval,
+					  int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	char *rcp = "";
+	int slen = 1;
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+	if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
+		rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
+		slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
+	}
+
+	if (slen > len)
+		rc = -ERANGE;
+	else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
+		rc = -EFAULT;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct sock *sk = NULL;
+	int family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	u32 s = 0;	/* 0 is the invalid secid */
+
+	if (skb != NULL) {
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+		else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+			family = PF_INET6;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+	}
+	if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
+		family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+
+	switch (family) {
+	case PF_UNIX:
+		ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+		s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET:
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp) {
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+		 */
+		if (sock != NULL)
+			sk = sock->sk;
+		skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+		if (skp != NULL)
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+		break;
+	case PF_INET6:
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+		skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+		if (skp)
+			s = skp->smk_secid;
+#endif
+		break;
+	}
+	*secid = s;
+	if (s == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
+ * is creating the new socket.
+ */
+static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp;
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+	if (sk == NULL ||
+	    (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
+		return;
+
+	ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	ssp->smk_in = skp;
+	ssp->smk_out = skp;
+	/* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+				   struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr;
+	struct iphdr *hdr;
+	struct smack_known *hskp;
+	int rc;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	if (family == PF_INET6) {
+		/*
+		 * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
+		 * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
+		 * processing on IPv6.
+		 */
+		if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+			family = PF_INET;
+		else
+			return 0;
+	}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+	 * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+	 * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+	 */
+	skp = smack_from_skb(skb);
+	if (skp == NULL) {
+		skp = smack_from_netlbl(sk, family, skb);
+		if (skp == NULL)
+			skp = &smack_known_huh;
+	}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+	ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+	ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+	ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
+	 * here. Read access is not required.
+	 */
+	rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
+	 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+	 */
+	req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
+	 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
+	 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+	 */
+	hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+	addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
+	rcu_read_lock();
+	hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
+	rcu_read_unlock();
+
+	if (hskp == NULL)
+		rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+	else
+		netlbl_req_delattr(req);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
+ * @sk: the new socket
+ * @req: the connection's request_sock
+ *
+ * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
+ */
+static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+				 const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+	struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+
+	if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+		skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+		ssp->smk_packet = skp;
+	} else
+		ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+			   unsigned long flags)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+
+	key->security = skp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
+ * @key: the object
+ *
+ * Clear the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+	key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @need_perm: requested key permission
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+				const struct cred *cred,
+				enum key_need_perm need_perm)
+{
+	struct key *keyp;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	int request = 0;
+	int rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate requested permissions
+	 */
+	switch (need_perm) {
+	case KEY_NEED_READ:
+	case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
+	case KEY_NEED_VIEW:
+		request |= MAY_READ;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
+	case KEY_NEED_LINK:
+	case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
+		request |= MAY_WRITE;
+		break;
+	case KEY_NEED_UNSPECIFIED:
+	case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
+	case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
+	case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+	if (keyp == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	if (keyp->security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (tkp == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
+ * @key points to the key to be queried
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ */
+static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+	size_t length;
+	char *copy;
+
+	if (key->security == NULL) {
+		*_buffer = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (copy == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	length = strlen(copy) + 1;
+
+	*_buffer = copy;
+	return length;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+/**
+ * smack_watch_key - Smack access to watch a key for notifications.
+ * @key: The key to be watched
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the @watch->cred has permission to read from the key object and
+ * an error otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_watch_key(struct key *key)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_current();
+	int rc;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	/*
+	 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+	 * it may do so.
+	 */
+	if (key->security == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * This should not occur
+	 */
+	if (tkp == NULL)
+		return -EACCES;
+
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key = key->serial;
+	ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = key->description;
+#endif
+	rc = smk_access(tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("key watch", tkp, key->security, MAY_READ, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+/**
+ * smack_post_notification - Smack access to post a notification to a queue
+ * @w_cred: The credentials of the watcher.
+ * @cred: The credentials of the event source (may be NULL).
+ * @n: The notification message to be posted.
+ */
+static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
+				   const struct cred *cred,
+				   struct watch_notification *n)
+{
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct smack_known *subj, *obj;
+	int rc;
+
+	/* Always let maintenance notifications through. */
+	if (n->type == WATCH_TYPE_META)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!cred)
+		return 0;
+	subj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(cred));
+	obj = smk_of_task(smack_cred(w_cred));
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NOTIFICATION);
+	rc = smk_access(subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_note("notification", subj, obj, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */
+
+/*
+ * Smack Audit hooks
+ *
+ * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
+ * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
+ * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
+ * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
+ *
+ * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
+ * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
+ * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
+ * model where nearly everything is a label.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
+ * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
+ * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
+ * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
+ * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ *
+ * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char **rule = (char **)vrule;
+	*rule = NULL;
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
+	if (IS_ERR(skp))
+		return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+	*rule = skp->smk_known;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
+ * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
+ *
+ * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
+ * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
+ * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+	struct audit_field *f;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
+		f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+		if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
+ * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
+ * @op: required testing operator
+ * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
+ *
+ * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
+ * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	char *rule = vrule;
+
+	if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
+		return -ENOENT;
+	}
+
+	if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+		return 0;
+
+	skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
+	 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
+	 * label.
+	 */
+	if (op == Audit_equal)
+		return (rule == skp->smk_known);
+	if (op == Audit_not_equal)
+		return (rule != skp->smk_known);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There is no need for a smack_audit_rule_free hook.
+ * No memory was allocated.
+ */
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
+ * @name: Full xattr name to check.
+ */
+static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
+ * @secid: incoming integer
+ * @secdata: destination
+ * @seclen: how long it is
+ *
+ * Exists for networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+	if (secdata)
+		*secdata = skp->smk_known;
+	*seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
+ * @secdata: smack label
+ * @seclen: how long result is
+ * @secid: outgoing integer
+ *
+ * Exists for audit and networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+
+	if (skp)
+		*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	else
+		*secid = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * There used to be a smack_release_secctx hook
+ * that did nothing back when hooks were in a vector.
+ * Now that there's a list such a hook adds cost.
+ */
+
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx,
+				       ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+	return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK,
+				     ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+
+	*ctx = skp->smk_known;
+	*ctxlen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new)
+{
+
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct smack_known *skp;
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	struct cred *new_creds = *new;
+
+	if (new_creds == NULL) {
+		new_creds = prepare_creds();
+		if (new_creds == NULL)
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(new_creds);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid
+	 */
+	isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry));
+	skp = isp->smk_inode;
+	tsp->smk_task = skp;
+	*new = new_creds;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute.
+	 */
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+					struct qstr *name,
+					const struct cred *old,
+					struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct task_smack *otsp = smack_cred(old);
+	struct task_smack *ntsp = smack_cred(new);
+	struct inode_smack *isp;
+	int may;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use the process credential unless all of
+	 * the transmuting criteria are met
+	 */
+	ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task;
+
+	/*
+	 * the attribute of the containing directory
+	 */
+	isp = smack_inode(d_inode(dentry->d_parent));
+
+	if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) {
+		rcu_read_lock();
+		may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known,
+				       isp->smk_inode->smk_known,
+				       &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules);
+		rcu_read_unlock();
+
+		/*
+		 * If the directory is transmuting and the rule
+		 * providing access is transmuting use the containing
+		 * directory label instead of the process label.
+		 */
+		if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) {
+			ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
+			ntsp->smk_transmuted = ntsp->smk_task;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+	struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+	struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
+	 * the same as the current Smack value.
+	 */
+	if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+	if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
+		return 0;
+
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_cmd - check on file operations for io_uring
+ * @ioucmd: the command in question
+ *
+ * Make a best guess about whether a io_uring "command" should
+ * be allowed. Use the same logic used for determining if the
+ * file could be opened for read in the absence of better criteria.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
+{
+	struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
+	struct smk_audit_info ad;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+	struct inode *inode;
+	int rc;
+
+	if (!file)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	tsp = smack_cred(file->f_cred);
+	inode = file_inode(file);
+
+	smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+	smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+	rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+	rc = smk_bu_credfile(file->f_cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
+struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
+	.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_smack),
+	.lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
+	.lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_smack),
+};
+
+static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, smack_fs_context_submount),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, smack_fs_context_dup),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, smack_fs_context_parse_param),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, smack_free_mnt_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, smack_bprm_creds_for_exec),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, smack_file_ioctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, smack_cred_getsecid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_ipc_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, smack_socket_socketpair),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
+#endif
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, smack_sk_clone_security),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, smack_watch_key),
+#endif
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(post_notification, smack_post_notification),
+#endif
+
+ /* Audit hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, smack_uring_cmd),
+#endif
+};
+
+
+static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule list locks
+	 */
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
+	mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
+	/*
+	 * Initialize rule lists
+	 */
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
+	/*
+	 * Create the known labels list
+	 */
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
+	smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+	struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+	struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+	smack_rule_cache = KMEM_CACHE(smack_rule, 0);
+	if (!smack_rule_cache)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/*
+	 * Set the security state for the initial task.
+	 */
+	tsp = smack_cred(cred);
+	init_task_smack(tsp, &smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Register with LSM
+	 */
+	security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks), "smack");
+	smack_enabled = 1;
+
+	pr_info("Smack:  Initializing.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+	pr_info("Smack:  Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+	pr_info("Smack:  IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+
+	/* initialize the smack_known_list */
+	init_smack_known_list();
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+DEFINE_LSM(smack) = {
+	.name = "smack",
+	.flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
+	.blobs = &smack_blob_sizes,
+	.init = smack_init,
+};