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diff --git a/Documentation/driver-api/vfio.rst b/Documentation/driver-api/vfio.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c663b6f97 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/driver-api/vfio.rst @@ -0,0 +1,528 @@ +================================== +VFIO - "Virtual Function I/O" [1]_ +================================== + +Many modern systems now provide DMA and interrupt remapping facilities +to help ensure I/O devices behave within the boundaries they've been +allotted. This includes x86 hardware with AMD-Vi and Intel VT-d, +POWER systems with Partitionable Endpoints (PEs) and embedded PowerPC +systems such as Freescale PAMU. The VFIO driver is an IOMMU/device +agnostic framework for exposing direct device access to userspace, in +a secure, IOMMU protected environment. In other words, this allows +safe [2]_, non-privileged, userspace drivers. + +Why do we want that? Virtual machines often make use of direct device +access ("device assignment") when configured for the highest possible +I/O performance. From a device and host perspective, this simply +turns the VM into a userspace driver, with the benefits of +significantly reduced latency, higher bandwidth, and direct use of +bare-metal device drivers [3]_. + +Some applications, particularly in the high performance computing +field, also benefit from low-overhead, direct device access from +userspace. Examples include network adapters (often non-TCP/IP based) +and compute accelerators. Prior to VFIO, these drivers had to either +go through the full development cycle to become proper upstream +driver, be maintained out of tree, or make use of the UIO framework, +which has no notion of IOMMU protection, limited interrupt support, +and requires root privileges to access things like PCI configuration +space. + +The VFIO driver framework intends to unify these, replacing both the +KVM PCI specific device assignment code as well as provide a more +secure, more featureful userspace driver environment than UIO. + +Groups, Devices, and IOMMUs +--------------------------- + +Devices are the main target of any I/O driver. Devices typically +create a programming interface made up of I/O access, interrupts, +and DMA. Without going into the details of each of these, DMA is +by far the most critical aspect for maintaining a secure environment +as allowing a device read-write access to system memory imposes the +greatest risk to the overall system integrity. + +To help mitigate this risk, many modern IOMMUs now incorporate +isolation properties into what was, in many cases, an interface only +meant for translation (ie. solving the addressing problems of devices +with limited address spaces). With this, devices can now be isolated +from each other and from arbitrary memory access, thus allowing +things like secure direct assignment of devices into virtual machines. + +This isolation is not always at the granularity of a single device +though. Even when an IOMMU is capable of this, properties of devices, +interconnects, and IOMMU topologies can each reduce this isolation. +For instance, an individual device may be part of a larger multi- +function enclosure. While the IOMMU may be able to distinguish +between devices within the enclosure, the enclosure may not require +transactions between devices to reach the IOMMU. Examples of this +could be anything from a multi-function PCI device with backdoors +between functions to a non-PCI-ACS (Access Control Services) capable +bridge allowing redirection without reaching the IOMMU. Topology +can also play a factor in terms of hiding devices. A PCIe-to-PCI +bridge masks the devices behind it, making transaction appear as if +from the bridge itself. Obviously IOMMU design plays a major factor +as well. + +Therefore, while for the most part an IOMMU may have device level +granularity, any system is susceptible to reduced granularity. The +IOMMU API therefore supports a notion of IOMMU groups. A group is +a set of devices which is isolatable from all other devices in the +system. Groups are therefore the unit of ownership used by VFIO. + +While the group is the minimum granularity that must be used to +ensure secure user access, it's not necessarily the preferred +granularity. In IOMMUs which make use of page tables, it may be +possible to share a set of page tables between different groups, +reducing the overhead both to the platform (reduced TLB thrashing, +reduced duplicate page tables), and to the user (programming only +a single set of translations). For this reason, VFIO makes use of +a container class, which may hold one or more groups. A container +is created by simply opening the /dev/vfio/vfio character device. + +On its own, the container provides little functionality, with all +but a couple version and extension query interfaces locked away. +The user needs to add a group into the container for the next level +of functionality. To do this, the user first needs to identify the +group associated with the desired device. This can be done using +the sysfs links described in the example below. By unbinding the +device from the host driver and binding it to a VFIO driver, a new +VFIO group will appear for the group as /dev/vfio/$GROUP, where +$GROUP is the IOMMU group number of which the device is a member. +If the IOMMU group contains multiple devices, each will need to +be bound to a VFIO driver before operations on the VFIO group +are allowed (it's also sufficient to only unbind the device from +host drivers if a VFIO driver is unavailable; this will make the +group available, but not that particular device). TBD - interface +for disabling driver probing/locking a device. + +Once the group is ready, it may be added to the container by opening +the VFIO group character device (/dev/vfio/$GROUP) and using the +VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER ioctl, passing the file descriptor of the +previously opened container file. If desired and if the IOMMU driver +supports sharing the IOMMU context between groups, multiple groups may +be set to the same container. If a group fails to set to a container +with existing groups, a new empty container will need to be used +instead. + +With a group (or groups) attached to a container, the remaining +ioctls become available, enabling access to the VFIO IOMMU interfaces. +Additionally, it now becomes possible to get file descriptors for each +device within a group using an ioctl on the VFIO group file descriptor. + +The VFIO device API includes ioctls for describing the device, the I/O +regions and their read/write/mmap offsets on the device descriptor, as +well as mechanisms for describing and registering interrupt +notifications. + +VFIO Usage Example +------------------ + +Assume user wants to access PCI device 0000:06:0d.0:: + + $ readlink /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group + ../../../../kernel/iommu_groups/26 + +This device is therefore in IOMMU group 26. This device is on the +pci bus, therefore the user will make use of vfio-pci to manage the +group:: + + # modprobe vfio-pci + +Binding this device to the vfio-pci driver creates the VFIO group +character devices for this group:: + + $ lspci -n -s 0000:06:0d.0 + 06:0d.0 0401: 1102:0002 (rev 08) + # echo 0000:06:0d.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/driver/unbind + # echo 1102 0002 > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/vfio-pci/new_id + +Now we need to look at what other devices are in the group to free +it for use by VFIO:: + + $ ls -l /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000:06:0d.0/iommu_group/devices + total 0 + lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:00:1e.0 -> + ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0 + lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.0 -> + ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.0 + lrwxrwxrwx. 1 root root 0 Apr 23 16:13 0000:06:0d.1 -> + ../../../../devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:1e.0/0000:06:0d.1 + +This device is behind a PCIe-to-PCI bridge [4]_, therefore we also +need to add device 0000:06:0d.1 to the group following the same +procedure as above. Device 0000:00:1e.0 is a bridge that does +not currently have a host driver, therefore it's not required to +bind this device to the vfio-pci driver (vfio-pci does not currently +support PCI bridges). + +The final step is to provide the user with access to the group if +unprivileged operation is desired (note that /dev/vfio/vfio provides +no capabilities on its own and is therefore expected to be set to +mode 0666 by the system):: + + # chown user:user /dev/vfio/26 + +The user now has full access to all the devices and the iommu for this +group and can access them as follows:: + + int container, group, device, i; + struct vfio_group_status group_status = + { .argsz = sizeof(group_status) }; + struct vfio_iommu_type1_info iommu_info = { .argsz = sizeof(iommu_info) }; + struct vfio_iommu_type1_dma_map dma_map = { .argsz = sizeof(dma_map) }; + struct vfio_device_info device_info = { .argsz = sizeof(device_info) }; + + /* Create a new container */ + container = open("/dev/vfio/vfio", O_RDWR); + + if (ioctl(container, VFIO_GET_API_VERSION) != VFIO_API_VERSION) + /* Unknown API version */ + + if (!ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU)) + /* Doesn't support the IOMMU driver we want. */ + + /* Open the group */ + group = open("/dev/vfio/26", O_RDWR); + + /* Test the group is viable and available */ + ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_STATUS, &group_status); + + if (!(group_status.flags & VFIO_GROUP_FLAGS_VIABLE)) + /* Group is not viable (ie, not all devices bound for vfio) */ + + /* Add the group to the container */ + ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container); + + /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_TYPE1_IOMMU); + + /* Get addition IOMMU info */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_GET_INFO, &iommu_info); + + /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */ + dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); + dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024; + dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */ + dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE; + + ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map); + + /* Get a file descriptor for the device */ + device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0"); + + /* Test and setup the device */ + ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_INFO, &device_info); + + for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_regions; i++) { + struct vfio_region_info reg = { .argsz = sizeof(reg) }; + + reg.index = i; + + ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO, ®); + + /* Setup mappings... read/write offsets, mmaps + * For PCI devices, config space is a region */ + } + + for (i = 0; i < device_info.num_irqs; i++) { + struct vfio_irq_info irq = { .argsz = sizeof(irq) }; + + irq.index = i; + + ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_GET_IRQ_INFO, &irq); + + /* Setup IRQs... eventfds, VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS */ + } + + /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */ + ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET); + +VFIO User API +------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Please see include/linux/vfio.h for complete API documentation. + +VFIO bus driver API +------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +VFIO bus drivers, such as vfio-pci make use of only a few interfaces +into VFIO core. When devices are bound and unbound to the driver, +the driver should call vfio_register_group_dev() and +vfio_unregister_group_dev() respectively:: + + void vfio_init_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device, + struct device *dev, + const struct vfio_device_ops *ops); + void vfio_uninit_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device); + int vfio_register_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device); + void vfio_unregister_group_dev(struct vfio_device *device); + +The driver should embed the vfio_device in its own structure and call +vfio_init_group_dev() to pre-configure it before going to registration +and call vfio_uninit_group_dev() after completing the un-registration. +vfio_register_group_dev() indicates to the core to begin tracking the +iommu_group of the specified dev and register the dev as owned by a VFIO bus +driver. Once vfio_register_group_dev() returns it is possible for userspace to +start accessing the driver, thus the driver should ensure it is completely +ready before calling it. The driver provides an ops structure for callbacks +similar to a file operations structure:: + + struct vfio_device_ops { + int (*open)(struct vfio_device *vdev); + void (*release)(struct vfio_device *vdev); + ssize_t (*read)(struct vfio_device *vdev, char __user *buf, + size_t count, loff_t *ppos); + ssize_t (*write)(struct vfio_device *vdev, + const char __user *buf, + size_t size, loff_t *ppos); + long (*ioctl)(struct vfio_device *vdev, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg); + int (*mmap)(struct vfio_device *vdev, + struct vm_area_struct *vma); + }; + +Each function is passed the vdev that was originally registered +in the vfio_register_group_dev() call above. This allows the bus driver +to obtain its private data using container_of(). The open/release +callbacks are issued when a new file descriptor is created for a +device (via VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD). The ioctl interface provides +a direct pass through for VFIO_DEVICE_* ioctls. The read/write/mmap +interfaces implement the device region access defined by the device's +own VFIO_DEVICE_GET_REGION_INFO ioctl. + + +PPC64 sPAPR implementation note +------------------------------- + +This implementation has some specifics: + +1) On older systems (POWER7 with P5IOC2/IODA1) only one IOMMU group per + container is supported as an IOMMU table is allocated at the boot time, + one table per a IOMMU group which is a Partitionable Endpoint (PE) + (PE is often a PCI domain but not always). + + Newer systems (POWER8 with IODA2) have improved hardware design which allows + to remove this limitation and have multiple IOMMU groups per a VFIO + container. + +2) The hardware supports so called DMA windows - the PCI address range + within which DMA transfer is allowed, any attempt to access address space + out of the window leads to the whole PE isolation. + +3) PPC64 guests are paravirtualized but not fully emulated. There is an API + to map/unmap pages for DMA, and it normally maps 1..32 pages per call and + currently there is no way to reduce the number of calls. In order to make + things faster, the map/unmap handling has been implemented in real mode + which provides an excellent performance which has limitations such as + inability to do locked pages accounting in real time. + +4) According to sPAPR specification, A Partitionable Endpoint (PE) is an I/O + subtree that can be treated as a unit for the purposes of partitioning and + error recovery. A PE may be a single or multi-function IOA (IO Adapter), a + function of a multi-function IOA, or multiple IOAs (possibly including + switch and bridge structures above the multiple IOAs). PPC64 guests detect + PCI errors and recover from them via EEH RTAS services, which works on the + basis of additional ioctl commands. + + So 4 additional ioctls have been added: + + VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO + returns the size and the start of the DMA window on the PCI bus. + + VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE + enables the container. The locked pages accounting + is done at this point. This lets user first to know what + the DMA window is and adjust rlimit before doing any real job. + + VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE + disables the container. + + VFIO_EEH_PE_OP + provides an API for EEH setup, error detection and recovery. + + The code flow from the example above should be slightly changed:: + + struct vfio_eeh_pe_op pe_op = { .argsz = sizeof(pe_op), .flags = 0 }; + + ..... + /* Add the group to the container */ + ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_SET_CONTAINER, &container); + + /* Enable the IOMMU model we want */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_SET_IOMMU, VFIO_SPAPR_TCE_IOMMU) + + /* Get addition sPAPR IOMMU info */ + vfio_iommu_spapr_tce_info spapr_iommu_info; + ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_GET_INFO, &spapr_iommu_info); + + if (ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE)) + /* Cannot enable container, may be low rlimit */ + + /* Allocate some space and setup a DMA mapping */ + dma_map.vaddr = mmap(0, 1024 * 1024, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, 0, 0); + + dma_map.size = 1024 * 1024; + dma_map.iova = 0; /* 1MB starting at 0x0 from device view */ + dma_map.flags = VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_READ | VFIO_DMA_MAP_FLAG_WRITE; + + /* Check here is .iova/.size are within DMA window from spapr_iommu_info */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA, &dma_map); + + /* Get a file descriptor for the device */ + device = ioctl(group, VFIO_GROUP_GET_DEVICE_FD, "0000:06:0d.0"); + + .... + + /* Gratuitous device reset and go... */ + ioctl(device, VFIO_DEVICE_RESET); + + /* Make sure EEH is supported */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_CHECK_EXTENSION, VFIO_EEH); + + /* Enable the EEH functionality on the device */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_ENABLE; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* You're suggested to create additional data struct to represent + * PE, and put child devices belonging to same IOMMU group to the + * PE instance for later reference. + */ + + /* Check the PE's state and make sure it's in functional state */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_GET_STATE; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* Save device state using pci_save_state(). + * EEH should be enabled on the specified device. + */ + + .... + + /* Inject EEH error, which is expected to be caused by 32-bits + * config load. + */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_INJECT_ERR; + pe_op.err.type = EEH_ERR_TYPE_32; + pe_op.err.func = EEH_ERR_FUNC_LD_CFG_ADDR; + pe_op.err.addr = 0ul; + pe_op.err.mask = 0ul; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + .... + + /* When 0xFF's returned from reading PCI config space or IO BARs + * of the PCI device. Check the PE's state to see if that has been + * frozen. + */ + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* Waiting for pending PCI transactions to be completed and don't + * produce any more PCI traffic from/to the affected PE until + * recovery is finished. + */ + + /* Enable IO for the affected PE and collect logs. Usually, the + * standard part of PCI config space, AER registers are dumped + * as logs for further analysis. + */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_UNFREEZE_IO; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* + * Issue PE reset: hot or fundamental reset. Usually, hot reset + * is enough. However, the firmware of some PCI adapters would + * require fundamental reset. + */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_HOT; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_RESET_DEACTIVATE; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* Configure the PCI bridges for the affected PE */ + pe_op.op = VFIO_EEH_PE_CONFIGURE; + ioctl(container, VFIO_EEH_PE_OP, &pe_op); + + /* Restored state we saved at initialization time. pci_restore_state() + * is good enough as an example. + */ + + /* Hopefully, error is recovered successfully. Now, you can resume to + * start PCI traffic to/from the affected PE. + */ + + .... + +5) There is v2 of SPAPR TCE IOMMU. It deprecates VFIO_IOMMU_ENABLE/ + VFIO_IOMMU_DISABLE and implements 2 new ioctls: + VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY + (which are unsupported in v1 IOMMU). + + PPC64 paravirtualized guests generate a lot of map/unmap requests, + and the handling of those includes pinning/unpinning pages and updating + mm::locked_vm counter to make sure we do not exceed the rlimit. + The v2 IOMMU splits accounting and pinning into separate operations: + + - VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_REGISTER_MEMORY/VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_UNREGISTER_MEMORY ioctls + receive a user space address and size of the block to be pinned. + Bisecting is not supported and VFIO_IOMMU_UNREGISTER_MEMORY is expected to + be called with the exact address and size used for registering + the memory block. The userspace is not expected to call these often. + The ranges are stored in a linked list in a VFIO container. + + - VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA/VFIO_IOMMU_UNMAP_DMA ioctls only update the actual + IOMMU table and do not do pinning; instead these check that the userspace + address is from pre-registered range. + + This separation helps in optimizing DMA for guests. + +6) sPAPR specification allows guests to have an additional DMA window(s) on + a PCI bus with a variable page size. Two ioctls have been added to support + this: VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE and VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE. + The platform has to support the functionality or error will be returned to + the userspace. The existing hardware supports up to 2 DMA windows, one is + 2GB long, uses 4K pages and called "default 32bit window"; the other can + be as big as entire RAM, use different page size, it is optional - guests + create those in run-time if the guest driver supports 64bit DMA. + + VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_CREATE receives a page shift, a DMA window size and + a number of TCE table levels (if a TCE table is going to be big enough and + the kernel may not be able to allocate enough of physically contiguous + memory). It creates a new window in the available slot and returns the bus + address where the new window starts. Due to hardware limitation, the user + space cannot choose the location of DMA windows. + + VFIO_IOMMU_SPAPR_TCE_REMOVE receives the bus start address of the window + and removes it. + +------------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +.. [1] VFIO was originally an acronym for "Virtual Function I/O" in its + initial implementation by Tom Lyon while as Cisco. We've since + outgrown the acronym, but it's catchy. + +.. [2] "safe" also depends upon a device being "well behaved". It's + possible for multi-function devices to have backdoors between + functions and even for single function devices to have alternative + access to things like PCI config space through MMIO registers. To + guard against the former we can include additional precautions in the + IOMMU driver to group multi-function PCI devices together + (iommu=group_mf). The latter we can't prevent, but the IOMMU should + still provide isolation. For PCI, SR-IOV Virtual Functions are the + best indicator of "well behaved", as these are designed for + virtualization usage models. + +.. [3] As always there are trade-offs to virtual machine device + assignment that are beyond the scope of VFIO. It's expected that + future IOMMU technologies will reduce some, but maybe not all, of + these trade-offs. + +.. [4] In this case the device is below a PCI bridge, so transactions + from either function of the device are indistinguishable to the iommu:: + + -[0000:00]-+-1e.0-[06]--+-0d.0 + \-0d.1 + + 00:1e.0 PCI bridge: Intel Corporation 82801 PCI Bridge (rev 90) |