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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/.gitignore2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile70
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/acrn.c81
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c1309
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/aperfmperf.c460
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c2827
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c1042
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c251
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c2463
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h90
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c140
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c467
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c212
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c394
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c109
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c1427
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c235
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c82
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c91
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/Makefile14
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c1378
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c216
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c2874
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c374
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c147
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c801
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c521
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h236
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/p5.c66
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c477
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/threshold.c31
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/winchip.c41
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/Makefile5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c972
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c810
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c941
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh74
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c502
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/amd.c125
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/centaur.c127
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cleanup.c987
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c284
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c924
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c425
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c887
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h80
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perfctr-watchdog.c162
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/powerflags.c24
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c177
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c49
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c950
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c587
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h542
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c822
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c1600
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock_event.h43
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c3480
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c73
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c180
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h29
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c1323
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h129
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h236
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c1263
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c963
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h107
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c435
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c168
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/transmeta.c111
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c257
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umc.c26
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c238
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c528
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vortex.c39
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c133
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpuid.c190
79 files changed, 40949 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/.gitignore b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0bca7ef74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+capflags.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f10a921ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Makefile for x86-compatible CPU details, features and quirks
+#
+
+# Don't trace early stages of a secondary CPU boot
+ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_common.o = -pg
+CFLAGS_REMOVE_perf_event.o = -pg
+endif
+
+# If these files are instrumented, boot hangs during the first second.
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_common.o := n
+KCOV_INSTRUMENT_perf_event.o := n
+KMSAN_SANITIZE_common.o := n
+
+# As above, instrumenting secondary CPU boot code causes boot hangs.
+KCSAN_SANITIZE_common.o := n
+
+# Make sure load_percpu_segment has no stackprotector
+CFLAGS_common.o := -fno-stack-protector
+
+obj-y := cacheinfo.o scattered.o topology.o
+obj-y += common.o
+obj-y += rdrand.o
+obj-y += match.o
+obj-y += bugs.o
+obj-y += aperfmperf.o
+obj-y += cpuid-deps.o
+obj-y += umwait.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_PROC_FS) += proc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES) += capflags.o powerflags.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IA32_FEAT_CTL) += feat_ctl.o
+ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+obj-y += intel.o intel_pconfig.o tsx.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_PM) += intel_epb.o
+endif
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD) += amd.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_HYGON) += hygon.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CYRIX_32) += cyrix.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR) += centaur.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_TRANSMETA_32) += transmeta.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_UMC_32) += umc.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_ZHAOXIN) += zhaoxin.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CPU_SUP_VORTEX_32) += vortex.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE) += mce/
+obj-$(CONFIG_MTRR) += mtrr/
+obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode/
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += resctrl/
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX) += sgx/
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) += perfctr-watchdog.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST) += vmware.o hypervisor.o mshyperv.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACRN_GUEST) += acrn.o
+
+ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
+quiet_cmd_mkcapflags = MKCAP $@
+ cmd_mkcapflags = $(CONFIG_SHELL) $(srctree)/$(src)/mkcapflags.sh $@ $^
+
+cpufeature = $(src)/../../include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+vmxfeature = $(src)/../../include/asm/vmxfeatures.h
+
+$(obj)/capflags.c: $(cpufeature) $(vmxfeature) $(src)/mkcapflags.sh FORCE
+ $(call if_changed,mkcapflags)
+endif
+targets += capflags.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/acrn.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/acrn.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..485441b7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/acrn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * ACRN detection support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Jason Chen CJ <jason.cj.chen@intel.com>
+ * Zhao Yakui <yakui.zhao@intel.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+
+#include <asm/acrn.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/idtentry.h>
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+
+static u32 __init acrn_detect(void)
+{
+ return acrn_cpuid_base();
+}
+
+static void __init acrn_init_platform(void)
+{
+ /* Setup the IDT for ACRN hypervisor callback */
+ alloc_intr_gate(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_acrn_hv_callback);
+
+ x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = acrn_get_tsc_khz;
+ x86_platform.calibrate_cpu = acrn_get_tsc_khz;
+}
+
+static bool acrn_x2apic_available(void)
+{
+ return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_X2APIC);
+}
+
+static void (*acrn_intr_handler)(void);
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_acrn_hv_callback)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
+
+ /*
+ * The hypervisor requires that the APIC EOI should be acked.
+ * If the APIC EOI is not acked, the APIC ISR bit for the
+ * HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR will not be cleared and then it
+ * will block the interrupt whose vector is lower than
+ * HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR.
+ */
+ ack_APIC_irq();
+ inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count);
+
+ if (acrn_intr_handler)
+ acrn_intr_handler();
+
+ set_irq_regs(old_regs);
+}
+
+void acrn_setup_intr_handler(void (*handler)(void))
+{
+ acrn_intr_handler = handler;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acrn_setup_intr_handler);
+
+void acrn_remove_intr_handler(void)
+{
+ acrn_intr_handler = NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(acrn_remove_intr_handler);
+
+const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_acrn = {
+ .name = "ACRN",
+ .detect = acrn_detect,
+ .type = X86_HYPER_ACRN,
+ .init.init_platform = acrn_init_platform,
+ .init.x2apic_available = acrn_x2apic_available,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c1d09c884
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1309 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/elf.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/topology.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
+#include <asm/delay.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+# include <asm/mmconfig.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+/*
+ * nodes_per_socket: Stores the number of nodes per socket.
+ * Refer to Fam15h Models 00-0fh BKDG - CPUID Fn8000_001E_ECX
+ * Node Identifiers[10:8]
+ */
+static u32 nodes_per_socket = 1;
+
+/*
+ * AMD errata checking
+ *
+ * Errata are defined as arrays of ints using the AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM() or
+ * AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM() macros. The latter is intended for newer errata that
+ * have an OSVW id assigned, which it takes as first argument. Both take a
+ * variable number of family-specific model-stepping ranges created by
+ * AMD_MODEL_RANGE().
+ *
+ * Example:
+ *
+ * const int amd_erratum_319[] =
+ * AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0x4, 0x2),
+ * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x8, 0x0, 0x8, 0x0),
+ * AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x9, 0x0, 0x9, 0x0));
+ */
+
+#define AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(...) { -1, __VA_ARGS__, 0 }
+#define AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(osvw_id, ...) { osvw_id, __VA_ARGS__, 0 }
+#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE(f, m_start, s_start, m_end, s_end) \
+ ((f << 24) | (m_start << 16) | (s_start << 12) | (m_end << 4) | (s_end))
+#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range) (((range) >> 24) & 0xff)
+#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range) (((range) >> 12) & 0xfff)
+#define AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range) ((range) & 0xfff)
+
+static const int amd_erratum_400[] =
+ AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(1, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0xf, 0x41, 0x2, 0xff, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0x2, 0x1, 0xff, 0xf));
+
+static const int amd_erratum_383[] =
+ AMD_OSVW_ERRATUM(3, AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x10, 0, 0, 0xff, 0xf));
+
+/* #1054: Instructions Retired Performance Counter May Be Inaccurate */
+static const int amd_erratum_1054[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0, 0, 0x2f, 0xf));
+
+static const int amd_zenbleed[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x30, 0x0, 0x4f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x90, 0x0, 0x91, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+
+static const int amd_div0[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf));
+
+static const int amd_erratum_1485[] =
+ AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x10, 0x0, 0x1f, 0xf),
+ AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x19, 0x60, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
+
+static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
+{
+ int osvw_id = *erratum++;
+ u32 range;
+ u32 ms;
+
+ if (osvw_id >= 0 && osvw_id < 65536 &&
+ cpu_has(cpu, X86_FEATURE_OSVW)) {
+ u64 osvw_len;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_ID_LENGTH, osvw_len);
+ if (osvw_id < osvw_len) {
+ u64 osvw_bits;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_OSVW_STATUS + (osvw_id >> 6),
+ osvw_bits);
+ return osvw_bits & (1ULL << (osvw_id & 0x3f));
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* OSVW unavailable or ID unknown, match family-model-stepping range */
+ ms = (cpu->x86_model << 4) | cpu->x86_stepping;
+ while ((range = *erratum++))
+ if ((cpu->x86 == AMD_MODEL_RANGE_FAMILY(range)) &&
+ (ms >= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_START(range)) &&
+ (ms <= AMD_MODEL_RANGE_END(range)))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline int rdmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long *p)
+{
+ u32 gprs[8] = { 0 };
+ int err;
+
+ WARN_ONCE((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf),
+ "%s should only be used on K8!\n", __func__);
+
+ gprs[1] = msr;
+ gprs[7] = 0x9c5a203a;
+
+ err = rdmsr_safe_regs(gprs);
+
+ *p = gprs[0] | ((u64)gprs[2] << 32);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static inline int wrmsrl_amd_safe(unsigned msr, unsigned long long val)
+{
+ u32 gprs[8] = { 0 };
+
+ WARN_ONCE((boot_cpu_data.x86 != 0xf),
+ "%s should only be used on K8!\n", __func__);
+
+ gprs[0] = (u32)val;
+ gprs[1] = msr;
+ gprs[2] = val >> 32;
+ gprs[7] = 0x9c5a203a;
+
+ return wrmsr_safe_regs(gprs);
+}
+
+/*
+ * B step AMD K6 before B 9730xxxx have hardware bugs that can cause
+ * misexecution of code under Linux. Owners of such processors should
+ * contact AMD for precise details and a CPU swap.
+ *
+ * See http://www.multimania.com/poulot/k6bug.html
+ * and section 2.6.2 of "AMD-K6 Processor Revision Guide - Model 6"
+ * (Publication # 21266 Issue Date: August 1998)
+ *
+ * The following test is erm.. interesting. AMD neglected to up
+ * the chip setting when fixing the bug but they also tweaked some
+ * performance at the same time..
+ */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+extern __visible void vide(void);
+__asm__(".text\n"
+ ".globl vide\n"
+ ".type vide, @function\n"
+ ".align 4\n"
+ "vide: ret\n");
+#endif
+
+static void init_amd_k5(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * General Systems BIOSen alias the cpu frequency registers
+ * of the Elan at 0x000df000. Unfortunately, one of the Linux
+ * drivers subsequently pokes it, and changes the CPU speed.
+ * Workaround : Remove the unneeded alias.
+ */
+#define CBAR (0xfffc) /* Configuration Base Address (32-bit) */
+#define CBAR_ENB (0x80000000)
+#define CBAR_KEY (0X000000CB)
+ if (c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 10) {
+ if (inl(CBAR) & CBAR_ENB)
+ outl(0 | CBAR_KEY, CBAR);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static void init_amd_k6(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ u32 l, h;
+ int mbytes = get_num_physpages() >> (20-PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ if (c->x86_model < 6) {
+ /* Based on AMD doc 20734R - June 2000 */
+ if (c->x86_model == 0) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_APIC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PGE);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86_model == 6 && c->x86_stepping == 1) {
+ const int K6_BUG_LOOP = 1000000;
+ int n;
+ void (*f_vide)(void);
+ u64 d, d2;
+
+ pr_info("AMD K6 stepping B detected - ");
+
+ /*
+ * It looks like AMD fixed the 2.6.2 bug and improved indirect
+ * calls at the same time.
+ */
+
+ n = K6_BUG_LOOP;
+ f_vide = vide;
+ OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(f_vide);
+ d = rdtsc();
+ while (n--)
+ f_vide();
+ d2 = rdtsc();
+ d = d2-d;
+
+ if (d > 20*K6_BUG_LOOP)
+ pr_cont("system stability may be impaired when more than 32 MB are used.\n");
+ else
+ pr_cont("probably OK (after B9730xxxx).\n");
+ }
+
+ /* K6 with old style WHCR */
+ if (c->x86_model < 8 ||
+ (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping < 8)) {
+ /* We can only write allocate on the low 508Mb */
+ if (mbytes > 508)
+ mbytes = 508;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_K6_WHCR, l, h);
+ if ((l&0x0000FFFF) == 0) {
+ unsigned long flags;
+ l = (1<<0)|((mbytes/4)<<1);
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ wbinvd();
+ wrmsr(MSR_K6_WHCR, l, h);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ pr_info("Enabling old style K6 write allocation for %d Mb\n",
+ mbytes);
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping > 7) ||
+ c->x86_model == 9 || c->x86_model == 13) {
+ /* The more serious chips .. */
+
+ if (mbytes > 4092)
+ mbytes = 4092;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_K6_WHCR, l, h);
+ if ((l&0xFFFF0000) == 0) {
+ unsigned long flags;
+ l = ((mbytes>>2)<<22)|(1<<16);
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ wbinvd();
+ wrmsr(MSR_K6_WHCR, l, h);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ pr_info("Enabling new style K6 write allocation for %d Mb\n",
+ mbytes);
+ }
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86_model == 10) {
+ /* AMD Geode LX is model 10 */
+ /* placeholder for any needed mods */
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static void init_amd_k7(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ u32 l, h;
+
+ /*
+ * Bit 15 of Athlon specific MSR 15, needs to be 0
+ * to enable SSE on Palomino/Morgan/Barton CPU's.
+ * If the BIOS didn't enable it already, enable it here.
+ */
+ if (c->x86_model >= 6 && c->x86_model <= 10) {
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM)) {
+ pr_info("Enabling disabled K7/SSE Support.\n");
+ msr_clear_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, 15);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It's been determined by AMD that Athlons since model 8 stepping 1
+ * are more robust with CLK_CTL set to 200xxxxx instead of 600xxxxx
+ * As per AMD technical note 27212 0.2
+ */
+ if ((c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 1) || (c->x86_model > 8)) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, l, h);
+ if ((l & 0xfff00000) != 0x20000000) {
+ pr_info("CPU: CLK_CTL MSR was %x. Reprogramming to %x\n",
+ l, ((l & 0x000fffff)|0x20000000));
+ wrmsr(MSR_K7_CLK_CTL, (l & 0x000fffff)|0x20000000, h);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
+ if (!c->cpu_index)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Certain Athlons might work (for various values of 'work') in SMP
+ * but they are not certified as MP capable.
+ */
+ /* Athlon 660/661 is valid. */
+ if ((c->x86_model == 6) && ((c->x86_stepping == 0) ||
+ (c->x86_stepping == 1)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Duron 670 is valid */
+ if ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping == 0))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Athlon 662, Duron 671, and Athlon >model 7 have capability
+ * bit. It's worth noting that the A5 stepping (662) of some
+ * Athlon XP's have the MP bit set.
+ * See http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/jow-18.10.01-000 for
+ * more.
+ */
+ if (((c->x86_model == 6) && (c->x86_stepping >= 2)) ||
+ ((c->x86_model == 7) && (c->x86_stepping >= 1)) ||
+ (c->x86_model > 7))
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MP))
+ return;
+
+ /* If we get here, not a certified SMP capable AMD system. */
+
+ /*
+ * Don't taint if we are running SMP kernel on a single non-MP
+ * approved Athlon
+ */
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
+ " processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+/*
+ * To workaround broken NUMA config. Read the comment in
+ * srat_detect_node().
+ */
+static int nearby_node(int apicid)
+{
+ int i, node;
+
+ for (i = apicid - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = __apicid_to_node[i];
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
+ return node;
+ }
+ for (i = apicid + 1; i < MAX_LOCAL_APIC; i++) {
+ node = __apicid_to_node[i];
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
+ return node;
+ }
+ return first_node(node_online_map); /* Shouldn't happen */
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Fix up cpu_core_id for pre-F17h systems to be in the
+ * [0 .. cores_per_node - 1] range. Not really needed but
+ * kept so as not to break existing setups.
+ */
+static void legacy_fixup_core_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 cus_per_node;
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x17)
+ return;
+
+ cus_per_node = c->x86_max_cores / nodes_per_socket;
+ c->cpu_core_id %= cus_per_node;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fixup core topology information for
+ * (1) AMD multi-node processors
+ * Assumption: Number of cores in each internal node is the same.
+ * (2) AMD processors supporting compute units
+ */
+static void amd_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* get information required for multi-node processors */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ int err;
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
+
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15)
+ c->cu_id = ebx & 0xff;
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x17) {
+ c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xff;
+
+ if (smp_num_siblings > 1)
+ c->x86_max_cores /= smp_num_siblings;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In case leaf B is available, use it to derive
+ * topology information.
+ */
+ err = detect_extended_topology(c);
+ if (!err)
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
+
+ cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
+
+ } else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
+ u64 value;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
+
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
+ } else
+ return;
+
+ if (nodes_per_socket > 1) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM);
+ legacy_fixup_core_id(c);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * On a AMD dual core setup the lower bits of the APIC id distinguish the cores.
+ * Assumes number of cores is a power of two.
+ */
+static void amd_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned bits;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ bits = c->x86_coreid_bits;
+ /* Low order bits define the core id (index of core in socket) */
+ c->cpu_core_id = c->initial_apicid & ((1 << bits)-1);
+ /* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
+ c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
+ /* use socket ID also for last level cache */
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
+}
+
+u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void)
+{
+ return nodes_per_socket;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_nodes_per_socket);
+
+static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ int node;
+ unsigned apicid = c->apicid;
+
+ node = numa_cpu_node(cpu);
+ if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ node = get_llc_id(cpu);
+
+ /*
+ * On multi-fabric platform (e.g. Numascale NumaChip) a
+ * platform-specific handler needs to be called to fixup some
+ * IDs of the CPU.
+ */
+ if (x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id)
+ x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id(c, node);
+
+ if (!node_online(node)) {
+ /*
+ * Two possibilities here:
+ *
+ * - The CPU is missing memory and no node was created. In
+ * that case try picking one from a nearby CPU.
+ *
+ * - The APIC IDs differ from the HyperTransport node IDs
+ * which the K8 northbridge parsing fills in. Assume
+ * they are all increased by a constant offset, but in
+ * the same order as the HT nodeids. If that doesn't
+ * result in a usable node fall back to the path for the
+ * previous case.
+ *
+ * This workaround operates directly on the mapping between
+ * APIC ID and NUMA node, assuming certain relationship
+ * between APIC ID, HT node ID and NUMA topology. As going
+ * through CPU mapping may alter the outcome, directly
+ * access __apicid_to_node[].
+ */
+ int ht_nodeid = c->initial_apicid;
+
+ if (__apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid] != NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ node = __apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid];
+ /* Pick a nearby node */
+ if (!node_online(node))
+ node = nearby_node(apicid);
+ }
+ numa_set_node(cpu, node);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void early_init_amd_mc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned bits, ecx;
+
+ /* Multi core CPU? */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008)
+ return;
+
+ ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x80000008);
+
+ c->x86_max_cores = (ecx & 0xff) + 1;
+
+ /* CPU telling us the core id bits shift? */
+ bits = (ecx >> 12) & 0xF;
+
+ /* Otherwise recompute */
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ while ((1 << bits) < c->x86_max_cores)
+ bits++;
+ }
+
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = bits;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void bsp_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+
+ if (c->x86 > 0x10 ||
+ (c->x86 == 0x10 && c->x86_model >= 0x2)) {
+ u64 val;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, val);
+ if (!(val & BIT(24)))
+ pr_warn(FW_BUG "TSC doesn't count with P0 frequency!\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15) {
+ unsigned long upperbit;
+ u32 cpuid, assoc;
+
+ cpuid = cpuid_edx(0x80000005);
+ assoc = cpuid >> 16 & 0xff;
+ upperbit = ((cpuid >> 24) << 10) / assoc;
+
+ va_align.mask = (upperbit - 1) & PAGE_MASK;
+ va_align.flags = ALIGN_VA_32 | ALIGN_VA_64;
+
+ /* A random value per boot for bit slice [12:upper_bit) */
+ va_align.bits = get_random_u32() & va_align.mask;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAITX))
+ use_mwaitx_delay();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ u32 ecx;
+
+ ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001e);
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
+ u64 value;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD) &&
+ c->x86 >= 0x15 && c->x86 <= 0x17) {
+ unsigned int bit;
+
+ switch (c->x86) {
+ case 0x15: bit = 54; break;
+ case 0x16: bit = 33; break;
+ case 0x17: bit = 10; break;
+ default: return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
+ * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
+ */
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << bit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
+}
+
+static void early_detect_mem_encrypt(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /*
+ * BIOS support is required for SME and SEV.
+ * For SME: If BIOS has enabled SME then adjust x86_phys_bits by
+ * the SME physical address space reduction value.
+ * If BIOS has not enabled SME then don't advertise the
+ * SME feature (set in scattered.c).
+ * If the kernel has not enabled SME via any means then
+ * don't advertise the SME feature.
+ * For SEV: If BIOS has not enabled SEV then don't advertise the
+ * SEV and SEV_ES feature (set in scattered.c).
+ *
+ * In all cases, since support for SME and SEV requires long mode,
+ * don't advertise the feature under CONFIG_X86_32.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SME) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SEV)) {
+ /* Check if memory encryption is enabled */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ goto clear_all;
+
+ /*
+ * Always adjust physical address bits. Even though this
+ * will be a value above 32-bits this is still done for
+ * CONFIG_X86_32 so that accurate values are reported.
+ */
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= (cpuid_ebx(0x8000001f) >> 6) & 0x3f;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ goto clear_all;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, msr);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K7_HWCR_SMMLOCK))
+ goto clear_sev;
+
+ return;
+
+clear_all:
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SME);
+clear_sev:
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+ }
+}
+
+static void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 value;
+ u32 dummy;
+
+ early_init_amd_mc(c);
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0xf)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
+
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy);
+
+ /*
+ * c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
+ * with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states
+ */
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
+ }
+
+ /* Bit 12 of 8000_0007 edx is accumulated power mechanism. */
+ if (c->x86_power & BIT(12))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER);
+
+ /* Bit 14 indicates the Runtime Average Power Limit interface. */
+ if (c->x86_power & BIT(14))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RAPL);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
+#else
+ /* Set MTRR capability flag if appropriate */
+ if (c->x86 == 5)
+ if (c->x86_model == 13 || c->x86_model == 9 ||
+ (c->x86_model == 8 && c->x86_stepping >= 8))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR);
+#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI)
+ /*
+ * ApicID can always be treated as an 8-bit value for AMD APIC versions
+ * >= 0x10, but even old K8s came out of reset with version 0x10. So, we
+ * can safely set X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID unconditionally for families
+ * after 16h.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC)) {
+ if (c->x86 > 0x16)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID);
+ else if (c->x86 >= 0xf) {
+ /* check CPU config space for extended APIC ID */
+ unsigned int val;
+
+ val = read_pci_config(0, 24, 0, 0x68);
+ if ((val >> 17 & 0x3) == 0x3)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This is only needed to tell the kernel whether to use VMCALL
+ * and VMMCALL. VMMCALL is never executed except under virt, so
+ * we can set it unconditionally.
+ */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL);
+
+ /* F16h erratum 793, CVE-2013-6885 */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x16 && c->x86_model <= 0xf)
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, 15);
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether the machine is affected by erratum 400. This is
+ * used to select the proper idle routine and to enable the check
+ * whether the machine is affected in arch_post_acpi_init(), which
+ * sets the X86_BUG_AMD_APIC_C1E bug depending on the MSR check.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_400))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_E400);
+
+ early_detect_mem_encrypt(c);
+
+ /* Re-enable TopologyExtensions if switched off by BIOS */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15 &&
+ (c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x6f) &&
+ !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+
+ if (msr_set_bit(0xc0011005, 54) > 0) {
+ rdmsrl(0xc0011005, value);
+ if (value & BIT_64(54)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT);
+ pr_info_once(FW_INFO "CPU: Re-enabling disabled Topology Extensions Support.\n");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
+ smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
+}
+
+static void init_amd_k8(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 level;
+ u64 value;
+
+ /* On C+ stepping K8 rep microcode works well for copy/memset */
+ level = cpuid_eax(1);
+ if ((level >= 0x0f48 && level < 0x0f50) || level >= 0x0f58)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+
+ /*
+ * Some BIOSes incorrectly force this feature, but only K8 revision D
+ * (model = 0x14) and later actually support it.
+ * (AMD Erratum #110, docId: 25759).
+ */
+ if (c->x86_model < 0x14 && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM)) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LAHF_LM);
+ if (!rdmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, &value)) {
+ value &= ~BIT_64(32);
+ wrmsrl_amd_safe(0xc001100d, value);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!c->x86_model_id[0])
+ strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "Hammer");
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ /*
+ * Disable TLB flush filter by setting HWCR.FFDIS on K8
+ * bit 6 of msr C001_0015
+ *
+ * Errata 63 for SH-B3 steppings
+ * Errata 122 for all steppings (F+ have it disabled by default)
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, 6);
+#endif
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SWAPGS_FENCE);
+}
+
+static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H
+ /* do this for boot cpu */
+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
+ check_enable_amd_mmconf_dmi();
+
+ fam10h_check_enable_mmcfg();
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Disable GART TLB Walk Errors on Fam10h. We do this here because this
+ * is always needed when GART is enabled, even in a kernel which has no
+ * MCE support built in. BIOS should disable GartTlbWlk Errors already.
+ * If it doesn't, we do it here as suggested by the BKDG.
+ *
+ * Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=33012
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_MCx_MASK(4), 10);
+
+ /*
+ * On family 10h BIOS may not have properly enabled WC+ support, causing
+ * it to be converted to CD memtype. This may result in performance
+ * degradation for certain nested-paging guests. Prevent this conversion
+ * by clearing bit 24 in MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2.
+ *
+ * NOTE: we want to use the _safe accessors so as not to #GP kvm
+ * guests on older kvm hosts.
+ */
+ msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_BU_CFG2, 24);
+
+ if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_383))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH);
+}
+
+static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Apply erratum 665 fix unconditionally so machines without a BIOS
+ * fix work.
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, 31);
+}
+
+static bool rdrand_force;
+
+static int __init rdrand_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+ rdrand_force = true;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("rdrand", rdrand_cmdline);
+
+static void clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Saving of the MSR used to hide the RDRAND support during
+ * suspend/resume is done by arch/x86/power/cpu.c, which is
+ * dependent on CONFIG_PM_SLEEP.
+ */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PM_SLEEP))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * The self-test can clear X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, so check for
+ * RDRAND support using the CPUID function directly.
+ */
+ if (!(cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) || rdrand_force)
+ return;
+
+ msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_CPUID_FN_1, 62);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the CPUID change has occurred in case the kernel is
+ * running virtualized and the hypervisor doesn't support the MSR.
+ */
+ if (cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(30)) {
+ pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, but hypervisor does not support hiding RDRAND via CPUID.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+ pr_info_once("BIOS may not properly restore RDRAND after suspend, hiding RDRAND via CPUID. Use rdrand=force to reenable.\n");
+}
+
+static void init_amd_jg(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support
+ * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND
+ * instruction support via CPUID.
+ */
+ clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
+}
+
+static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 value;
+
+ /*
+ * The way access filter has a performance penalty on some workloads.
+ * Disable it on the affected CPUs.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86_model >= 0x02) && (c->x86_model < 0x20)) {
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, &value) && !(value & 0x1E)) {
+ value |= 0x1E;
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_F15H_IC_CFG, value);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Some BIOS implementations do not restore proper RDRAND support
+ * across suspend and resume. Check on whether to hide the RDRAND
+ * instruction support via CPUID.
+ */
+ clear_rdrand_cpuid_bit(c);
+}
+
+void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+ u64 value;
+
+ /*
+ * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation.
+ *
+ * This suppresses speculation from the middle of a basic block, i.e. it
+ * suppresses non-branch predictions.
+ *
+ * We use STIBP as a heuristic to filter out Zen2 from the rest of F17H
+ */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, &value)) {
+ value |= MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN_BIT;
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ZEN2_SPECTRAL_CHICKEN, value);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Work around Erratum 1386. The XSAVES instruction malfunctions in
+ * certain circumstances on Zen1/2 uarch, and not all parts have had
+ * updated microcode at the time of writing (March 2023).
+ *
+ * Affected parts all have no supervisor XSAVE states, meaning that
+ * the XSAVEC instruction (which works fine) is equivalent.
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+}
+
+static void init_amd_zn(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ node_reclaim_distance = 32;
+#endif
+
+ /* Fix up CPUID bits, but only if not virtualised. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+
+ /* Erratum 1076: CPB feature bit not being set in CPUID. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+ /*
+ * Zen3 (Fam19 model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to
+ * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the
+ * BTC_NO bit.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x19 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode(void)
+{
+ u32 good_rev = 0;
+
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case 0x30 ... 0x3f: good_rev = 0x0830107a; break;
+ case 0x60 ... 0x67: good_rev = 0x0860010b; break;
+ case 0x68 ... 0x6f: good_rev = 0x08608105; break;
+ case 0x70 ... 0x7f: good_rev = 0x08701032; break;
+ case 0xa0 ... 0xaf: good_rev = 0x08a00008; break;
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.microcode < good_rev)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void zenbleed_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (!cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_zenbleed))
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+ return;
+
+ if (!cpu_has_zenbleed_microcode()) {
+ pr_notice_once("Zenbleed: please update your microcode for the most optimal fix\n");
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
+ } else {
+ msr_clear_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_ZEN2_FP_BACKUP_FIX_BIT);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ early_init_amd(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Bit 31 in normal CPUID used for nonstandard 3DNow ID;
+ * 3DNow is IDd by bit 31 in extended CPUID (1*32+31) anyway
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, 0*32+31);
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x10)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+
+ /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */
+ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* K6s reports MCEs but don't actually have all the MSRs */
+ if (c->x86 < 6)
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE);
+
+ switch (c->x86) {
+ case 4: init_amd_k5(c); break;
+ case 5: init_amd_k6(c); break;
+ case 6: init_amd_k7(c); break;
+ case 0xf: init_amd_k8(c); break;
+ case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break;
+ case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break;
+ case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break;
+ case 0x16: init_amd_jg(c); break;
+ case 0x17: init_spectral_chicken(c);
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0x19: init_amd_zn(c); break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Enable workaround for FXSAVE leak on CPUs
+ * without a XSaveErPtr feature
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 >= 6) && (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XSAVEERPTR)))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK);
+
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+
+ amd_detect_cmp(c);
+ amd_get_topology(c);
+ srat_detect_node(c);
+
+ init_amd_cacheinfo(c);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+ /*
+ * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which
+ * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
+ * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
+ * is not present.
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
+ MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
+ /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Family 0x12 and above processors have APIC timer
+ * running in deep C states.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 > 0x11)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
+
+ /* 3DNow or LM implies PREFETCHW */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH))
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_LM))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH);
+
+ /* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+
+ /*
+ * Turn on the Instructions Retired free counter on machines not
+ * susceptible to erratum #1054 "Instructions Retired Performance
+ * Counter May Be Inaccurate".
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IRPERF) &&
+ !cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1054))
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_K7_HWCR, MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
+
+ zenbleed_check(c);
+
+ if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_div0)) {
+ pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) &&
+ cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_erratum_1485))
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG, MSR_ZEN4_BP_CFG_SHARED_BTB_FIX_BIT);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static unsigned int amd_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
+{
+ /* AMD errata T13 (order #21922) */
+ if (c->x86 == 6) {
+ /* Duron Rev A0 */
+ if (c->x86_model == 3 && c->x86_stepping == 0)
+ size = 64;
+ /* Tbird rev A1/A2 */
+ if (c->x86_model == 4 &&
+ (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 1))
+ size = 256;
+ }
+ return size;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void cpu_detect_tlb_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 ebx, eax, ecx, edx;
+ u16 mask = 0xfff;
+
+ if (c->x86 < 0xf)
+ return;
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000006)
+ return;
+
+ cpuid(0x80000006, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = (ebx >> 16) & mask;
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = ebx & mask;
+
+ /*
+ * K8 doesn't have 2M/4M entries in the L2 TLB so read out the L1 TLB
+ * characteristics from the CPUID function 0x80000005 instead.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 0xf) {
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ mask = 0xff;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle DTLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
+ if (!((eax >> 16) & mask))
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = (cpuid_eax(0x80000005) >> 16) & 0xff;
+ else
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = (eax >> 16) & mask;
+
+ /* a 4M entry uses two 2M entries */
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] >> 1;
+
+ /* Handle ITLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
+ if (!(eax & mask)) {
+ /* Erratum 658 */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15 && c->x86_model <= 0x1f) {
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = 1024;
+ } else {
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = eax & 0xff;
+ }
+ } else
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = eax & mask;
+
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] >> 1;
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev amd_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "AMD",
+ .c_ident = { "AuthenticAMD" },
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ .legacy_models = {
+ { .family = 4, .model_names =
+ {
+ [3] = "486 DX/2",
+ [7] = "486 DX/2-WB",
+ [8] = "486 DX/4",
+ [9] = "486 DX/4-WB",
+ [14] = "Am5x86-WT",
+ [15] = "Am5x86-WB"
+ }
+ },
+ },
+ .legacy_cache_size = amd_size_cache,
+#endif
+ .c_early_init = early_init_amd,
+ .c_detect_tlb = cpu_detect_tlb_amd,
+ .c_bsp_init = bsp_init_amd,
+ .c_init = init_amd,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_AMD,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(amd_cpu_dev);
+
+void set_dr_addr_mask(unsigned long mask, int dr)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BPEXT))
+ return;
+
+ switch (dr) {
+ case 0:
+ wrmsr(MSR_F16H_DR0_ADDR_MASK, mask, 0);
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ case 2:
+ case 3:
+ wrmsr(MSR_F16H_DR1_ADDR_MASK - 1 + dr, mask, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ if (c->x86 == 0x17 && ((c->x86_model >= 0x30 && c->x86_model < 0x40) ||
+ (c->x86_model >= 0x70 && c->x86_model < 0x80)))
+ return 166;
+
+ if (c->x86 == 0x19 && ((c->x86_model >= 0x20 && c->x86_model < 0x30) ||
+ (c->x86_model >= 0x40 && c->x86_model < 0x70)))
+ return 166;
+
+ return 255;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_get_highest_perf);
+
+bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
+{
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
+ /* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
+ case 0x17:
+ return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+ case 0x19:
+ /* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
+ if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+static void zenbleed_check_cpu(void *unused)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(smp_processor_id());
+
+ zenbleed_check(c);
+}
+
+void amd_check_microcode(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return;
+
+ on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Issue a DIV 0/1 insn to clear any division data from previous DIV
+ * operations.
+ */
+void noinstr amd_clear_divider(void)
+{
+ asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "div %2\n\t", X86_BUG_DIV0)
+ :: "a" (0), "d" (0), "r" (1));
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(amd_clear_divider);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/aperfmperf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/aperfmperf.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fdbb5f074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/aperfmperf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * x86 APERF/MPERF KHz calculation for
+ * /sys/.../cpufreq/scaling_cur_freq
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Intel Corp.
+ * Author: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/ktime.h>
+#include <linux/math64.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/sched/isolation.h>
+#include <linux/sched/topology.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+struct aperfmperf {
+ seqcount_t seq;
+ unsigned long last_update;
+ u64 acnt;
+ u64 mcnt;
+ u64 aperf;
+ u64 mperf;
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct aperfmperf, cpu_samples) = {
+ .seq = SEQCNT_ZERO(cpu_samples.seq)
+};
+
+static void init_counter_refs(void)
+{
+ u64 aperf, mperf;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APERF, aperf);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MPERF, mperf);
+
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_samples.aperf, aperf);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_samples.mperf, mperf);
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
+/*
+ * APERF/MPERF frequency ratio computation.
+ *
+ * The scheduler wants to do frequency invariant accounting and needs a <1
+ * ratio to account for the 'current' frequency, corresponding to
+ * freq_curr / freq_max.
+ *
+ * Since the frequency freq_curr on x86 is controlled by micro-controller and
+ * our P-state setting is little more than a request/hint, we need to observe
+ * the effective frequency 'BusyMHz', i.e. the average frequency over a time
+ * interval after discarding idle time. This is given by:
+ *
+ * BusyMHz = delta_APERF / delta_MPERF * freq_base
+ *
+ * where freq_base is the max non-turbo P-state.
+ *
+ * The freq_max term has to be set to a somewhat arbitrary value, because we
+ * can't know which turbo states will be available at a given point in time:
+ * it all depends on the thermal headroom of the entire package. We set it to
+ * the turbo level with 4 cores active.
+ *
+ * Benchmarks show that's a good compromise between the 1C turbo ratio
+ * (freq_curr/freq_max would rarely reach 1) and something close to freq_base,
+ * which would ignore the entire turbo range (a conspicuous part, making
+ * freq_curr/freq_max always maxed out).
+ *
+ * An exception to the heuristic above is the Atom uarch, where we choose the
+ * highest turbo level for freq_max since Atom's are generally oriented towards
+ * power efficiency.
+ *
+ * Setting freq_max to anything less than the 1C turbo ratio makes the ratio
+ * freq_curr / freq_max to eventually grow >1, in which case we clip it to 1.
+ */
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(arch_scale_freq_key);
+
+static u64 arch_turbo_freq_ratio = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
+static u64 arch_max_freq_ratio = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
+
+void arch_set_max_freq_ratio(bool turbo_disabled)
+{
+ arch_max_freq_ratio = turbo_disabled ? SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE :
+ arch_turbo_freq_ratio;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_set_max_freq_ratio);
+
+static bool __init turbo_disabled(void)
+{
+ u64 misc_en;
+ int err;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, &misc_en);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ return (misc_en & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_TURBO_DISABLE);
+}
+
+static bool __init slv_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ATOM_CORE_RATIOS, base_freq);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ATOM_CORE_TURBO_RATIOS, turbo_freq);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ *base_freq = (*base_freq >> 16) & 0x3F; /* max P state */
+ *turbo_freq = *turbo_freq & 0x3F; /* 1C turbo */
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#define X86_MATCH(model) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
+ INTEL_FAM6_##model, X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, NULL)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id has_knl_turbo_ratio_limits[] __initconst = {
+ X86_MATCH(XEON_PHI_KNL),
+ X86_MATCH(XEON_PHI_KNM),
+ {}
+};
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id has_skx_turbo_ratio_limits[] __initconst = {
+ X86_MATCH(SKYLAKE_X),
+ {}
+};
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id has_glm_turbo_ratio_limits[] __initconst = {
+ X86_MATCH(ATOM_GOLDMONT),
+ X86_MATCH(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D),
+ X86_MATCH(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS),
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init knl_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq,
+ int num_delta_fratio)
+{
+ int fratio, delta_fratio, found;
+ int err, i;
+ u64 msr;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, base_freq);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ *base_freq = (*base_freq >> 8) & 0xFF; /* max P state */
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT, &msr);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ fratio = (msr >> 8) & 0xFF;
+ i = 16;
+ found = 0;
+ do {
+ if (found >= num_delta_fratio) {
+ *turbo_freq = fratio;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ delta_fratio = (msr >> (i + 5)) & 0x7;
+
+ if (delta_fratio) {
+ found += 1;
+ fratio -= delta_fratio;
+ }
+
+ i += 8;
+ } while (i < 64);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool __init skx_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq, int size)
+{
+ u64 ratios, counts;
+ u32 group_size;
+ int err, i;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, base_freq);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ *base_freq = (*base_freq >> 8) & 0xFF; /* max P state */
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT, &ratios);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT1, &counts);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 64; i += 8) {
+ group_size = (counts >> i) & 0xFF;
+ if (group_size >= size) {
+ *turbo_freq = (ratios >> i) & 0xFF;
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool __init core_set_max_freq_ratio(u64 *base_freq, u64 *turbo_freq)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+ int err;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, base_freq);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ err = rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT, &msr);
+ if (err)
+ return false;
+
+ *base_freq = (*base_freq >> 8) & 0xFF; /* max P state */
+ *turbo_freq = (msr >> 24) & 0xFF; /* 4C turbo */
+
+ /* The CPU may have less than 4 cores */
+ if (!*turbo_freq)
+ *turbo_freq = msr & 0xFF; /* 1C turbo */
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool __init intel_set_max_freq_ratio(void)
+{
+ u64 base_freq, turbo_freq;
+ u64 turbo_ratio;
+
+ if (slv_set_max_freq_ratio(&base_freq, &turbo_freq))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(has_glm_turbo_ratio_limits) &&
+ skx_set_max_freq_ratio(&base_freq, &turbo_freq, 1))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(has_knl_turbo_ratio_limits) &&
+ knl_set_max_freq_ratio(&base_freq, &turbo_freq, 1))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (x86_match_cpu(has_skx_turbo_ratio_limits) &&
+ skx_set_max_freq_ratio(&base_freq, &turbo_freq, 4))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (core_set_max_freq_ratio(&base_freq, &turbo_freq))
+ goto out;
+
+ return false;
+
+out:
+ /*
+ * Some hypervisors advertise X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF
+ * but then fill all MSR's with zeroes.
+ * Some CPUs have turbo boost but don't declare any turbo ratio
+ * in MSR_TURBO_RATIO_LIMIT.
+ */
+ if (!base_freq || !turbo_freq) {
+ pr_debug("Couldn't determine cpu base or turbo frequency, necessary for scale-invariant accounting.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ turbo_ratio = div_u64(turbo_freq * SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE, base_freq);
+ if (!turbo_ratio) {
+ pr_debug("Non-zero turbo and base frequencies led to a 0 ratio.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ arch_turbo_freq_ratio = turbo_ratio;
+ arch_set_max_freq_ratio(turbo_disabled());
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PM_SLEEP
+static struct syscore_ops freq_invariance_syscore_ops = {
+ .resume = init_counter_refs,
+};
+
+static void register_freq_invariance_syscore_ops(void)
+{
+ register_syscore_ops(&freq_invariance_syscore_ops);
+}
+#else
+static inline void register_freq_invariance_syscore_ops(void) {}
+#endif
+
+static void freq_invariance_enable(void)
+{
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&arch_scale_freq_key)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return;
+ }
+ static_branch_enable(&arch_scale_freq_key);
+ register_freq_invariance_syscore_ops();
+ pr_info("Estimated ratio of average max frequency by base frequency (times 1024): %llu\n", arch_max_freq_ratio);
+}
+
+void freq_invariance_set_perf_ratio(u64 ratio, bool turbo_disabled)
+{
+ arch_turbo_freq_ratio = ratio;
+ arch_set_max_freq_ratio(turbo_disabled);
+ freq_invariance_enable();
+}
+
+static void __init bp_init_freq_invariance(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ return;
+
+ if (intel_set_max_freq_ratio())
+ freq_invariance_enable();
+}
+
+static void disable_freq_invariance_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ static_branch_disable(&arch_scale_freq_key);
+
+ /*
+ * Set arch_freq_scale to a default value on all cpus
+ * This negates the effect of scaling
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ per_cpu(arch_freq_scale, cpu) = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(disable_freq_invariance_work,
+ disable_freq_invariance_workfn);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, arch_freq_scale) = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
+
+static void scale_freq_tick(u64 acnt, u64 mcnt)
+{
+ u64 freq_scale;
+
+ if (!arch_scale_freq_invariant())
+ return;
+
+ if (check_shl_overflow(acnt, 2*SCHED_CAPACITY_SHIFT, &acnt))
+ goto error;
+
+ if (check_mul_overflow(mcnt, arch_max_freq_ratio, &mcnt) || !mcnt)
+ goto error;
+
+ freq_scale = div64_u64(acnt, mcnt);
+ if (!freq_scale)
+ goto error;
+
+ if (freq_scale > SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE)
+ freq_scale = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
+
+ this_cpu_write(arch_freq_scale, freq_scale);
+ return;
+
+error:
+ pr_warn("Scheduler frequency invariance went wobbly, disabling!\n");
+ schedule_work(&disable_freq_invariance_work);
+}
+#else
+static inline void bp_init_freq_invariance(void) { }
+static inline void scale_freq_tick(u64 acnt, u64 mcnt) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 && CONFIG_SMP */
+
+void arch_scale_freq_tick(void)
+{
+ struct aperfmperf *s = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_samples);
+ u64 acnt, mcnt, aperf, mperf;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_APERF, aperf);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MPERF, mperf);
+ acnt = aperf - s->aperf;
+ mcnt = mperf - s->mperf;
+
+ s->aperf = aperf;
+ s->mperf = mperf;
+
+ raw_write_seqcount_begin(&s->seq);
+ s->last_update = jiffies;
+ s->acnt = acnt;
+ s->mcnt = mcnt;
+ raw_write_seqcount_end(&s->seq);
+
+ scale_freq_tick(acnt, mcnt);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Discard samples older than the define maximum sample age of 20ms. There
+ * is no point in sending IPIs in such a case. If the scheduler tick was
+ * not running then the CPU is either idle or isolated.
+ */
+#define MAX_SAMPLE_AGE ((unsigned long)HZ / 50)
+
+unsigned int arch_freq_get_on_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+ struct aperfmperf *s = per_cpu_ptr(&cpu_samples, cpu);
+ unsigned int seq, freq;
+ unsigned long last;
+ u64 acnt, mcnt;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF))
+ goto fallback;
+
+ do {
+ seq = raw_read_seqcount_begin(&s->seq);
+ last = s->last_update;
+ acnt = s->acnt;
+ mcnt = s->mcnt;
+ } while (read_seqcount_retry(&s->seq, seq));
+
+ /*
+ * Bail on invalid count and when the last update was too long ago,
+ * which covers idle and NOHZ full CPUs.
+ */
+ if (!mcnt || (jiffies - last) > MAX_SAMPLE_AGE)
+ goto fallback;
+
+ return div64_u64((cpu_khz * acnt), mcnt);
+
+fallback:
+ freq = cpufreq_quick_get(cpu);
+ return freq ? freq : cpu_khz;
+}
+
+static int __init bp_init_aperfmperf(void)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF))
+ return 0;
+
+ init_counter_refs();
+ bp_init_freq_invariance();
+ return 0;
+}
+early_initcall(bp_init_aperfmperf);
+
+void ap_init_aperfmperf(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF))
+ init_counter_refs();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..13dffc43d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2827 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 1994 Linus Torvalds
+ *
+ * Cyrix stuff, June 1998 by:
+ * - Rafael R. Reilova (moved everything from head.S),
+ * <rreilova@ececs.uc.edu>
+ * - Channing Corn (tests & fixes),
+ * - Andrew D. Balsa (code cleanup).
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/prctl.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+#include <asm/paravirt.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
+
+/* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
+u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+/* The current value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR with task-specific bits set */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+
+u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+void (*x86_return_thunk)(void) __ro_after_init = &__x86_return_thunk;
+
+/* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
+static void update_spec_ctrl(u64 val)
+{
+ this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Keep track of the SPEC_CTRL MSR value for the current task, which may differ
+ * from x86_spec_ctrl_base due to STIBP/SSB in __speculation_ctrl_update().
+ */
+void update_spec_ctrl_cond(u64 val)
+{
+ if (this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current) == val)
+ return;
+
+ this_cpu_write(x86_spec_ctrl_current, val);
+
+ /*
+ * When KERNEL_IBRS this MSR is written on return-to-user, unless
+ * forced the update can be delayed until that time.
+ */
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val);
+}
+
+u64 spec_ctrl_current(void)
+{
+ return this_cpu_read(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current);
+
+/*
+ * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control.
+ * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu().
+ */
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_base;
+u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+/* Control conditional STIBP in switch_to() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
+/* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
+/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
+
+/*
+ * Controls whether l1d flush based mitigations are enabled,
+ * based on hw features and admin setting via boot parameter
+ * defaults to false
+ */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
+
+/* Controls CPU Fill buffer clear before KVM guest MMIO accesses */
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Read the SPEC_CTRL MSR to account for reserved bits which may
+ * have unknown values. AMD64_LS_CFG MSR is cached in the early AMD
+ * init code as it is not enumerated and depends on the family.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+ /*
+ * Previously running kernel (kexec), may have some controls
+ * turned ON. Clear them and let the mitigations setup below
+ * rediscover them based on configuration.
+ */
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base &= ~SPEC_CTRL_MITIGATIONS_MASK;
+ }
+
+ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
+ spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
+ spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); specifically it wants to know about
+ * spectre_v2=ibrs.
+ */
+ retbleed_select_mitigation();
+ /*
+ * spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
+ * forced for UNRET or IBPB.
+ */
+ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation();
+ ssb_select_mitigation();
+ l1tf_select_mitigation();
+ md_clear_select_mitigation();
+ srbds_select_mitigation();
+ l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * srso_select_mitigation() depends and must run after
+ * retbleed_select_mitigation().
+ */
+ srso_select_mitigation();
+ gds_select_mitigation();
+}
+
+/*
+ * NOTE: This function is *only* called for SVM, since Intel uses
+ * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL for SSBD.
+ */
+void
+x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest)
+{
+ u64 guestval, hostval;
+ struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info();
+
+ /*
+ * If SSBD is not handled in MSR_SPEC_CTRL on AMD, update
+ * MSR_AMD64_L2_CFG or MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL if supported.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If the host has SSBD mitigation enabled, force it in the host's
+ * virtual MSR value. If its not permanently enabled, evaluate
+ * current's TIF_SSBD thread flag.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE))
+ hostval = SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ else
+ hostval = ssbd_tif_to_spec_ctrl(ti->flags);
+
+ /* Sanitize the guest value */
+ guestval = guest_virt_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+
+ if (hostval != guestval) {
+ unsigned long tif;
+
+ tif = setguest ? ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(guestval) :
+ ssbd_spec_ctrl_to_tif(hostval);
+
+ speculation_ctrl_update(tif);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_virt_spec_ctrl);
+
+static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
+{
+ u64 msrval = x86_amd_ls_cfg_base | x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, msrval);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+ [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_FULL) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
+ (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mds", mds_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "TAA: " fmt
+
+enum taa_mitigations {
+ TAA_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_VERW,
+ TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
+
+static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+ [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+};
+
+static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* TSX previously disabled by tsx=off */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TAA mitigation via VERW is turned off if both
+ * tsx_async_abort=off and mds=off are specified.
+ */
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ /*
+ * VERW doesn't clear the CPU buffers when MD_CLEAR=1 and MDS_NO=1.
+ * A microcode update fixes this behavior to clear CPU buffers. It also
+ * adds support for MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL which is enumerated by the
+ * ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR bit.
+ *
+ * On MDS_NO=1 CPUs if ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR is not set, microcode
+ * update is required.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ( (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ /*
+ * TSX is enabled, select alternate mitigation for TAA which is
+ * the same as MDS. Enable MDS static branch to clear CPU buffers.
+ *
+ * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
+ * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
+ */
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+
+ if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("tsx_async_abort", tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MMIO Stale Data: " fmt
+
+enum mmio_mitigations {
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
+
+static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode",
+ [MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW] = "Mitigation: Clear CPU buffers",
+};
+
+static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ||
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN) ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable CPU buffer clear mitigation for host and VMM, if also affected
+ * by MDS or TAA. Otherwise, enable mitigation for VMM only.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+ else
+ static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * If Processor-MMIO-Stale-Data bug is present and Fill Buffer data can
+ * be propagated to uncore buffers, clearing the Fill buffers on idle
+ * is required irrespective of SMT state.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO))
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the system has the right microcode.
+ *
+ * CPU Fill buffer clear mitigation is enumerated by either an explicit
+ * FB_CLEAR or by the presence of both MD_CLEAR and L1D_FLUSH on MDS
+ * affected systems.
+ */
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR) ||
+ (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)))
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ else
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+
+ if (mmio_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+}
+
+static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "full,nosmt")) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_nosmt = true;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "" fmt
+
+static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation, if necessary.
+ */
+ if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
+ mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) {
+ taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ }
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+ mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+ }
+out:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
+ pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ pr_info("TAA: %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+}
+
+static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ mds_select_mitigation();
+ taa_select_mitigation();
+ mmio_select_mitigation();
+
+ /*
+ * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
+ * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
+ * mitigation selection is done.
+ */
+ md_clear_update_mitigation();
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "SRBDS: " fmt
+
+enum srbds_mitigations {
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF,
+ SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled",
+ [SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+static bool srbds_off;
+
+void update_srbds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ if (srbds_mitigation == SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * A MDS_NO CPU for which SRBDS mitigation is not needed due to TSX
+ * being disabled and it hasn't received the SRBDS MSR microcode.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ switch (srbds_mitigation) {
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF:
+ mcu_ctrl |= RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~RNGDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+}
+
+static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if this is one of the MDS_NO systems supporting TSX that
+ * are only exposed to SRBDS when TSX is enabled or when CPU is affected
+ * by Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerability.
+ */
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ if ((ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_TSX_OFF;
+ else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ else if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_off() || srbds_off)
+ srbds_mitigation = SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+ update_srbds_msr();
+ pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ srbds_off = !strcmp(str, "off");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("srbds", srbds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1D Flush : " fmt
+
+enum l1d_flush_mitigations {
+ L1D_FLUSH_OFF = 0,
+ L1D_FLUSH_ON,
+};
+
+static enum l1d_flush_mitigations l1d_flush_mitigation __initdata = L1D_FLUSH_OFF;
+
+static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!l1d_flush_mitigation || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D))
+ return;
+
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
+ pr_info("Conditional flush on switch_mm() enabled\n");
+}
+
+static int __init l1d_flush_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+ l1d_flush_mitigation = L1D_FLUSH_ON;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "GDS: " fmt
+
+enum gds_mitigations {
+ GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
+ GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#else
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+#endif
+
+static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED] = "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE] = "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL] = "Mitigation: Microcode",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED] = "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
+ [GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR] = "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
+{
+ return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
+ gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
+
+void update_gds_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ switch (gds_mitigation) {
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED:
+ /*
+ * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have
+ * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
+ break;
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+ return;
+ };
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+ /*
+ * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to
+ * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot
+ * processor was not.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after);
+}
+
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ /* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
+
+ /* No microcode */
+ if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
+ /*
+ * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
+ * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
+ pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n");
+ } else {
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+ if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
+ if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n");
+
+ /*
+ * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs
+ * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked
+ * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
+ * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
+ * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled.
+ */
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
+ }
+
+ update_gds_msr();
+out:
+ pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+ gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt
+
+enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+};
+
+static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+
+static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
+ [SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO] = "Mitigation: usercopy/swapgs barriers and __user pointer sanitization",
+};
+
+/*
+ * Does SMAP provide full mitigation against speculative kernel access to
+ * userspace?
+ */
+static bool smap_works_speculatively(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * On CPUs which are vulnerable to Meltdown, SMAP does not
+ * prevent speculative access to user data in the L1 cache.
+ * Consider SMAP to be non-functional as a mitigation on these
+ * CPUs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (spectre_v1_mitigation == SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
+ /*
+ * With Spectre v1, a user can speculatively control either
+ * path of a conditional swapgs with a user-controlled GS
+ * value. The mitigation is to add lfences to both code paths.
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
+ * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
+ *
+ * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
+ * address in GS. That makes an attack harder, but still
+ * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ||
+ !smap_works_speculatively()) {
+ /*
+ * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
+ * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
+ * is serializing.
+ *
+ * If neither is there, mitigate with an LFENCE to
+ * stop speculation through swapgs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_USER);
+
+ /*
+ * Enable lfences in the kernel entry (non-swapgs)
+ * paths, to prevent user entry from speculatively
+ * skipping swapgs.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ spectre_v1_mitigation = SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation {
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
+};
+
+enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
+ RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET,
+ RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB,
+};
+
+static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET] = "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
+ [RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+};
+
+static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
+ RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+
+static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
+
+static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ while (str) {
+ char *next = strchr(str, ',');
+ if (next) {
+ *next = 0;
+ next++;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "auto")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "unret")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb")) {
+ retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB;
+ } else if (!strcmp(str, "nosmt")) {
+ retbleed_nosmt = true;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("Ignoring unknown retbleed option (%s).", str);
+ }
+
+ str = next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
+
+static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ bool mitigate_smt = false;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return;
+
+ switch (retbleed_cmd) {
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
+ return;
+
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB:
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ goto do_cmd_auto;
+ }
+ break;
+
+do_cmd_auto:
+ case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
+ default:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The Intel mitigation (IBRS or eIBRS) was already selected in
+ * spectre_v2_select_mitigation(). 'retbleed_mitigation' will
+ * be set accordingly below.
+ */
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
+ case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETHUNK))
+ x86_return_thunk = retbleed_return_thunk;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG);
+
+ mitigate_smt = true;
+ break;
+
+ case RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ mitigate_smt = true;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (mitigate_smt && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) &&
+ (retbleed_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+
+ /*
+ * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+ * retbleed= cmdline option.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
+
+bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_NONE || has_retpoline)
+ return true;
+
+ pr_err("System may be vulnerable to spectre v2\n");
+ spectre_v2_bad_module = true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_bad_module ? " - vulnerable module loaded" : "";
+}
+#else
+static inline const char *spectre_v2_module_string(void) { return ""; }
+#endif
+
+#define SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG "WARNING: LFENCE mitigation is not recommended for this CPU, data leaks possible!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS on, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG "WARNING: Unprivileged eBPF is enabled with eIBRS+LFENCE mitigation and SMT, data leaks possible via Spectre v2 BHB attacks!\n"
+#define SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG "WARNING: IBRS mitigation selected on Enhanced IBRS CPU, this may cause unnecessary performance loss\n"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+void unpriv_ebpf_notify(int new_state)
+{
+ if (new_state)
+ return;
+
+ /* Unprivileged eBPF is enabled */
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+ int len = strlen(opt);
+
+ return len == arglen && !strncmp(arg, opt, len);
+}
+
+/* The kernel command line selection for spectre v2 */
+enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
+};
+
+enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP,
+ SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB,
+};
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_user_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE] = "User space: Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP always-on protection",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via prctl",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP] = "User space: Mitigation: STIBP via seccomp and prctl",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
+ bool secure;
+} v2_user_options[] __initconst = {
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "prctl", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL, false },
+ { "prctl,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB, false },
+ { "seccomp", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP, false },
+ { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+ pr_info("spectre_v2_user=%s forced on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
+
+static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
+spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
+{
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
+ if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
+ spec_v2_user_print_cond(v2_user_options[i].option,
+ v2_user_options[i].secure);
+ return v2_user_options[i].cmd;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+}
+
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+}
+
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+}
+
+static void __init
+spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
+ bool smt_possible = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP);
+ enum spectre_v2_user_cmd cmd;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP))
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED ||
+ cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+ smt_possible = false;
+
+ cmd = spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline();
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE:
+ goto set_mode;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+ else
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = mode;
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_FORCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL_IBPB:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB:
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT;
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("mitigation: Enabling %s Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n",
+ static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb) ?
+ "always-on" : "conditional");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP
+ * is not required.
+ *
+ * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target
+ * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which
+ * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS
+ * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return
+ * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection,
+ * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
+ !smt_possible ||
+ spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, an STIBP mode other than "off" has been set.
+ * If STIBP support is not being forced, check if STIBP always-on
+ * is preferred.
+ */
+ if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON))
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ||
+ retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
+ if (mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT &&
+ mode != SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ pr_info("Selecting STIBP always-on mode to complement retbleed mitigation\n");
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED;
+ }
+
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp = mode;
+
+set_mode:
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_user_strings[mode]);
+}
+
+static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
+ [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
+ [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+ bool secure;
+} mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
+ { "off", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE, false },
+ { "on", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE, true },
+ { "retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE, false },
+ { "retpoline,amd", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
+ { "retpoline,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE, false },
+ { "retpoline,generic", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+ { "eibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS, false },
+ { "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
+ { "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
+ { "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
+ { "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false },
+};
+
+static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure)
+ pr_info("%s selected on command line.\n", reason);
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off())
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+ cmd = mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+ cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
+ pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+ mitigation_options[i].option);
+ return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+
+ spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
+ mitigation_options[i].secure);
+ return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+ return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+ }
+
+ return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
+/* Disable in-kernel use of non-RSB RET predictors */
+static void __init spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RRSBA) {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_RRSBA_DIS_S;
+ update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+ /*
+ * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks
+ * after VM exit:
+ *
+ * 1) RSB underflow
+ *
+ * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+ *
+ * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing
+ * the RSB.
+ *
+ * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch
+ * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared
+ * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike
+ * user-space-poisoned RSB entries.
+ *
+ * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB
+ * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required,
+ * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed.
+ */
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n");
+ }
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit");
+ dump_stack();
+}
+
+static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
+ /*
+ * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
+ * then nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
+ (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
+ return;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
+ return;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE_MSG);
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
+ mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
+
+ if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+ update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+
+ switch (mode) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED))
+ pr_warn(SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_PERF_MSG);
+ break;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+ fallthrough;
+
+ case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Disable alternate RSB predictions in kernel when indirect CALLs and
+ * JMPs gets protection against BHI and Intramode-BTI, but RET
+ * prediction from a non-RSB predictor is still a risk.
+ */
+ if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+ mode == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE)
+ spec_ctrl_disable_kernel_rrsba();
+
+ spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
+ pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
+
+ /*
+ * If Spectre v2 protection has been enabled, fill the RSB during a
+ * context switch. In general there are two types of RSB attacks
+ * across context switches, for which the CALLs/RETs may be unbalanced.
+ *
+ * 1) RSB underflow
+ *
+ * Some Intel parts have "bottomless RSB". When the RSB is empty,
+ * speculated return targets may come from the branch predictor,
+ * which could have a user-poisoned BTB or BHB entry.
+ *
+ * AMD has it even worse: *all* returns are speculated from the BTB,
+ * regardless of the state of the RSB.
+ *
+ * When IBRS or eIBRS is enabled, the "user -> kernel" attack
+ * scenario is mitigated by the IBRS branch prediction isolation
+ * properties, so the RSB buffer filling wouldn't be necessary to
+ * protect against this type of attack.
+ *
+ * The "user -> user" attack scenario is mitigated by RSB filling.
+ *
+ * 2) Poisoned RSB entry
+ *
+ * If the 'next' in-kernel return stack is shorter than 'prev',
+ * 'next' could be tricked into speculating with a user-poisoned RSB
+ * entry.
+ *
+ * The "user -> kernel" attack scenario is mitigated by SMEP and
+ * eIBRS.
+ *
+ * The "user -> user" scenario, also known as SpectreBHB, requires
+ * RSB clearing.
+ *
+ * So to mitigate all cases, unconditionally fill RSB on context
+ * switches.
+ *
+ * FIXME: Is this pointless for retbleed-affected AMD?
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW);
+ pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
+
+ spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(mode);
+
+ /*
+ * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
+ * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
+ * firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
+ * enabled.
+ *
+ * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
+ * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
+ * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
+ * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)) {
+
+ if (retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_IBPB) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW);
+ pr_info("Enabling Speculation Barrier for firmware calls\n");
+ }
+
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
+ pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */
+ spectre_v2_cmd = cmd;
+}
+
+static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused)
+{
+ u64 val = spec_ctrl_current() | (x86_spec_ctrl_base & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP);
+ update_spec_ctrl(val);
+}
+
+/* Update x86_spec_ctrl_base in case SMT state changed. */
+static void update_stibp_strict(void)
+{
+ u64 mask = x86_spec_ctrl_base & ~SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP;
+
+ if (mask == x86_spec_ctrl_base)
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Update user space SMT mitigation: STIBP %s\n",
+ mask & SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ? "always-on" : "off");
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base = mask;
+ on_each_cpu(update_stibp_msr, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the evaluation of TIF_SPEC_IB */
+static void update_indir_branch_cond(void)
+{
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ static_branch_enable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+ else
+ static_branch_disable(&switch_to_cond_stibp);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+/* Update the static key controlling the MDS CPU buffer clear in idle */
+static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable the idle clearing if SMT is active on CPUs which are
+ * affected only by MSBDS and not any other MDS variant.
+ *
+ * The other variants cannot be mitigated when SMT is enabled, so
+ * clearing the buffers on idle just to prevent the Store Buffer
+ * repartitioning leak would be a window dressing exercise.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ return;
+
+ if (sched_smt_active()) {
+ static_branch_enable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ } else if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO)) {
+ static_branch_disable(&mds_idle_clear);
+ }
+}
+
+#define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
+#define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
+
+void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ pr_warn_once(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE_EBPF_SMT_MSG);
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ update_stibp_strict();
+ break;
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ update_indir_branch_cond();
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (mds_mitigation) {
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV:
+ if (sched_smt_active() && !boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY))
+ pr_warn_once(MDS_MSG_SMT);
+ update_mds_branch_idle();
+ break;
+ case MDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (taa_mitigation) {
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(TAA_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED:
+ case TAA_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+ if (sched_smt_active())
+ pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+ break;
+ case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Store Bypass: " fmt
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation ssb_mode __ro_after_init = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+
+/* The kernel command line selection */
+enum ssb_mitigation_cmd {
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL,
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP,
+};
+
+static const char * const ssb_strings[] = {
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl",
+ [SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP] = "Mitigation: Speculative Store Bypass disabled via prctl and seccomp",
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+} ssb_mitigation_options[] __initconst = {
+ { "auto", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO }, /* Platform decides */
+ { "on", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "off", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE }, /* Don't touch Speculative Store Bypass */
+ { "prctl", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl */
+ { "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */
+};
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ char arg[20];
+ int ret, i;
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
+ cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
+ } else {
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
+ if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
+ continue;
+
+ cmd = ssb_mitigation_options[i].cmd;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
+ return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return cmd;
+}
+
+static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ enum ssb_mitigation mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD))
+ return mode;
+
+ cmd = ssb_parse_cmdline();
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS) &&
+ (cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE ||
+ cmd == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO))
+ return mode;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP:
+ /*
+ * Choose prctl+seccomp as the default mode if seccomp is
+ * enabled.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECCOMP))
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP;
+ else
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_ON:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_PRCTL:
+ mode = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL;
+ break;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here:
+ * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible.
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass
+ * - X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE - engage the mitigation
+ */
+ if (mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE);
+ /*
+ * Intel uses the SPEC CTRL MSR Bit(2) for this, while AMD may
+ * use a completely different MSR and bit dependent on family.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) &&
+ !static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+ } else {
+ x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD;
+ update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return mode;
+}
+
+static void ssb_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ ssb_mode = __ssb_select_mitigation();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt
+
+static void task_update_spec_tif(struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ /* Force the update of the real TIF bits */
+ set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SPEC_FORCE_UPDATE);
+
+ /*
+ * Immediately update the speculation control MSRs for the current
+ * task, but for a non-current task delay setting the CPU
+ * mitigation until it is scheduled next.
+ *
+ * This can only happen for SECCOMP mitigation. For PRCTL it's
+ * always the current task.
+ */
+ if (tsk == current)
+ speculation_ctrl_update_current();
+}
+
+static int l1d_flush_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ set_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
+ return 0;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ clear_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH);
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ if (ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL &&
+ ssb_mode != SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ /* If speculation is force disabled, enable is not allowed */
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_set_spec_ssb_force_disable(task);
+ task_clear_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC:
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+ task_set_spec_ssb_disable(task);
+ task_set_spec_ssb_noexec(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_spec_ib_user_controlled(void)
+{
+ return spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP;
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (ctrl) {
+ case PR_SPEC_ENABLE:
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * With strict mode for both IBPB and STIBP, the instruction
+ * code paths avoid checking this task flag and instead,
+ * unconditionally run the instruction. However, STIBP and IBPB
+ * are independent and either can be set to conditionally
+ * enabled regardless of the mode of the other.
+ *
+ * If either is set to conditional, allow the task flag to be
+ * updated, unless it was force-disabled by a previous prctl
+ * call. Currently, this is possible on an AMD CPU which has the
+ * feature X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP_ALWAYS_ON. In this case, if the
+ * kernel is booted with 'spectre_v2_user=seccomp', then
+ * spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP and
+ * spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED.
+ */
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled() ||
+ task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ task_clear_spec_ib_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ break;
+ case PR_SPEC_DISABLE:
+ case PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE:
+ /*
+ * Indirect branch speculation is always allowed when
+ * mitigation is force disabled.
+ */
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!is_spec_ib_user_controlled())
+ return 0;
+
+ task_set_spec_ib_disable(task);
+ if (ctrl == PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE)
+ task_set_spec_ib_force_disable(task);
+ task_update_spec_tif(task);
+ if (task == current)
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -ERANGE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which,
+ unsigned long ctrl)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+ return ib_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ case PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH:
+ return l1d_flush_prctl_set(task, ctrl);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
+void arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP)
+ ssb_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP)
+ ib_prctl_set(task, PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int l1d_flush_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush))
+ return PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+
+ if (test_ti_thread_flag(&task->thread_info, TIF_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ else
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+}
+
+static int ssb_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ switch (ssb_mode) {
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE:
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP:
+ case SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL:
+ if (task_spec_ssb_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ssb_noexec(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC;
+ if (task_spec_ssb_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ default:
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS))
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+ }
+}
+
+static int ib_prctl_get(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+
+ if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE &&
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE)
+ return PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ else if (is_spec_ib_user_controlled()) {
+ if (task_spec_ib_force_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE;
+ if (task_spec_ib_disable(task))
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ return PR_SPEC_PRCTL | PR_SPEC_ENABLE;
+ } else if (spectre_v2_user_ibpb == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED)
+ return PR_SPEC_DISABLE;
+ else
+ return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED;
+}
+
+int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long which)
+{
+ switch (which) {
+ case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return ssb_prctl_get(task);
+ case PR_SPEC_INDIRECT_BRANCH:
+ return ib_prctl_get(task);
+ case PR_SPEC_L1D_FLUSH:
+ return l1d_flush_prctl_get(task);
+ default:
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+}
+
+void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL))
+ update_spec_ctrl(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+
+ if (ssb_mode == SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE)
+ x86_amd_ssb_disable();
+}
+
+bool itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
+
+/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
+#endif
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
+
+/*
+ * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the
+ * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits.
+ *
+ * The L1TF mitigation uses the top most address bit for the inversion of
+ * non present PTEs. When the installed memory reaches into the top most
+ * address bit due to memory holes, which has been observed on machines
+ * which report 36bits physical address bits and have 32G RAM installed,
+ * then the mitigation range check in l1tf_select_mitigation() triggers.
+ * This is a false positive because the mitigation is still possible due to
+ * the fact that the cache uses 44bit internally. Use the cache bits
+ * instead of the reported physical bits and adjust them on the affected
+ * machines to 44bit if the reported bits are less than 44.
+ */
+static void override_cache_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86 != 6)
+ return;
+
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE:
+ if (c->x86_cache_bits < 44)
+ c->x86_cache_bits = 44;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ u64 half_pa;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+ return;
+
+ if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+
+ override_cache_bits(&boot_cpu_data);
+
+ switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
+ break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
+ cpu_smt_disable(false);
+ break;
+ case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
+ cpu_smt_disable(true);
+ break;
+ }
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 2
+ pr_warn("Kernel not compiled for PAE. No mitigation for L1TF\n");
+ return;
+#endif
+
+ half_pa = (u64)l1tf_pfn_limit() << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (l1tf_mitigation != L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+ e820__mapped_any(half_pa, ULLONG_MAX - half_pa, E820_TYPE_RAM)) {
+ pr_warn("System has more than MAX_PA/2 memory. L1TF mitigation not effective.\n");
+ pr_info("You may make it effective by booting the kernel with mem=%llu parameter.\n",
+ half_pa);
+ pr_info("However, doing so will make a part of your RAM unusable.\n");
+ pr_info("Reading https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html might help you decide.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV);
+}
+
+static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nowarn"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "flush,nosmt"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "full,force"))
+ l1tf_mitigation = L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt
+
+enum srso_mitigation {
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
+ SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
+ SRSO_CMD_OFF,
+ SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
+ SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
+ SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
+ SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE] = "Mitigation: microcode",
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET] = "Mitigation: safe RET",
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB] = "Mitigation: IBPB",
+ [SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
+};
+
+static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+
+static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+ if (!str)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
+ srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+ else
+ pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html for mitigation options."
+
+static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+ bool has_microcode;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+ goto pred_cmd;
+
+ /*
+ * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
+ * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
+ */
+ has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
+ if (!has_microcode) {
+ pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
+ pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
+ * flags for guests.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
+
+ /*
+ * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
+ * IBPB microcode has been applied.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19 && !cpu_smt_possible()) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
+ pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n");
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ goto pred_cmd;
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (srso_cmd) {
+ case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
+ goto pred_cmd;
+
+ case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
+ if (has_microcode) {
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
+ pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+ /*
+ * Enable the return thunk for generated code
+ * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_UNRET);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_alias_return_thunk;
+ } else {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
+ x86_return_thunk = srso_return_thunk;
+ }
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+ goto pred_cmd;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (has_microcode) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ goto pred_cmd;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+ srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+ goto pred_cmd;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode"));
+
+pred_cmd:
+ if ((!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+ x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
+
+#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static const char * const l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = "auto",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = "vulnerable",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = "conditional cache flushes",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS] = "cache flushes",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = "EPT disabled",
+ [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = "flush not necessary"
+};
+
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+
+ if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+ (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+ sched_smt_active())) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+ l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL) ||
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: VMX unsupported\n");
+ else if (!(cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE))
+ return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: VMX disabled\n");
+ else if (itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation)
+ return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Mitigation: Split huge pages\n");
+ else
+ return sprintf(buf, "KVM: Vulnerable\n");
+}
+#else
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+}
+
+static ssize_t itlb_multihit_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "Processor vulnerable\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+static ssize_t mds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF ? "vulnerable" :
+ sched_smt_active() ? "mitigated" : "disabled"));
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if ((taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED) ||
+ (taa_mitigation == TAA_MITIGATION_OFF))
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ taa_strings[taa_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+
+ if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF)
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT Host state unknown\n",
+ mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
+ }
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation],
+ sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
+}
+
+static char *stibp_state(void)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
+ return "";
+
+ switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE:
+ return ", STIBP: disabled";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT:
+ return ", STIBP: forced";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED:
+ return ", STIBP: always-on";
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL:
+ case SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP:
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_to_cond_stibp))
+ return ", STIBP: conditional";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+static char *ibpb_state(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+ return ", IBPB: always-on";
+ if (static_key_enabled(&switch_mm_cond_ibpb))
+ return ", IBPB: conditional";
+ return ", IBPB: disabled";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+static char *pbrsb_eibrs_state(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT))
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: SW sequence";
+ else
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Vulnerable";
+ } else {
+ return ", PBRSB-eIBRS: Not affected";
+ }
+}
+
+static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: LFENCE\n");
+
+ if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS with unprivileged eBPF\n");
+
+ if (sched_smt_active() && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled() &&
+ spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: eIBRS+LFENCE with unprivileged eBPF and SMT\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+ spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled],
+ ibpb_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "",
+ stibp_state(),
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW) ? ", RSB filling" : "",
+ pbrsb_eibrs_state(),
+ spectre_v2_module_string());
+}
+
+static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET ||
+ retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable: untrained return thunk / IBPB on non-AMD based uarch\n");
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s; SMT %s\n",
+ retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation],
+ !sched_smt_active() ? "disabled" :
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT ||
+ spectre_v2_user_stibp == SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED ?
+ "enabled with STIBP protection" : "vulnerable");
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "Mitigation: SMT disabled\n");
+
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
+ srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) ? "" : ", no microcode");
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf, unsigned int bug)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(bug))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n");
+
+ switch (bug) {
+ case X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: PTI\n");
+
+ if (hypervisor_is_type(X86_HYPER_XEN_PV))
+ return sprintf(buf, "Unknown (XEN PV detected, hypervisor mitigation required)\n");
+
+ break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", spectre_v1_strings[spectre_v1_mitigation]);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2:
+ return spectre_v2_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS:
+ return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]);
+
+ case X86_BUG_L1TF:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
+ return l1tf_show_state(buf);
+ break;
+
+ case X86_BUG_MDS:
+ return mds_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_TAA:
+ return tsx_async_abort_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT:
+ return itlb_multihit_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SRBDS:
+ return srbds_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA:
+ case X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN:
+ return mmio_stale_data_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
+ return retbleed_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_GDS:
+ return gds_show_state(buf);
+
+ case X86_BUG_SRSO:
+ return srso_show_state(buf);
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n");
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_l1tf(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MDS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_tsx_async_abort(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_TAA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_srbds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_mmio_stale_data(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ else
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..66556833d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cacheinfo.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1042 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Routines to identify caches on Intel CPU.
+ *
+ * Changes:
+ * Venkatesh Pallipadi : Adding cache identification through cpuid(4)
+ * Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>: Work with CPU hotplug infrastructure.
+ * Andi Kleen / Andreas Herrmann : CPUID4 emulation on AMD.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <asm/amd_nb.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#define LVL_1_INST 1
+#define LVL_1_DATA 2
+#define LVL_2 3
+#define LVL_3 4
+#define LVL_TRACE 5
+
+/* Shared last level cache maps */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_llc_shared_map);
+
+/* Shared L2 cache maps */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(cpumask_var_t, cpu_l2c_shared_map);
+
+struct _cache_table {
+ unsigned char descriptor;
+ char cache_type;
+ short size;
+};
+
+#define MB(x) ((x) * 1024)
+
+/* All the cache descriptor types we care about (no TLB or
+ trace cache entries) */
+
+static const struct _cache_table cache_table[] =
+{
+ { 0x06, LVL_1_INST, 8 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x08, LVL_1_INST, 16 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x09, LVL_1_INST, 32 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x0a, LVL_1_DATA, 8 }, /* 2 way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x0c, LVL_1_DATA, 16 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x0d, LVL_1_DATA, 16 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x0e, LVL_1_DATA, 24 }, /* 6-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x21, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x22, LVL_3, 512 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x23, LVL_3, MB(1) }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x25, LVL_3, MB(2) }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x29, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x2c, LVL_1_DATA, 32 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x30, LVL_1_INST, 32 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x39, LVL_2, 128 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3a, LVL_2, 192 }, /* 6-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3b, LVL_2, 128 }, /* 2-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3c, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3d, LVL_2, 384 }, /* 6-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3e, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x3f, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 2-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x41, LVL_2, 128 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x42, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x43, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x44, LVL_2, MB(1) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x45, LVL_2, MB(2) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x46, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x47, LVL_3, MB(8) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x48, LVL_2, MB(3) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x49, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x4a, LVL_3, MB(6) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x4b, LVL_3, MB(8) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x4c, LVL_3, MB(12) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x4d, LVL_3, MB(16) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x4e, LVL_2, MB(6) }, /* 24-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x60, LVL_1_DATA, 16 }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x66, LVL_1_DATA, 8 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x67, LVL_1_DATA, 16 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x68, LVL_1_DATA, 32 }, /* 4-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x70, LVL_TRACE, 12 }, /* 8-way set assoc */
+ { 0x71, LVL_TRACE, 16 }, /* 8-way set assoc */
+ { 0x72, LVL_TRACE, 32 }, /* 8-way set assoc */
+ { 0x73, LVL_TRACE, 64 }, /* 8-way set assoc */
+ { 0x78, LVL_2, MB(1) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x79, LVL_2, 128 }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x7a, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x7b, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x7c, LVL_2, MB(1) }, /* 8-way set assoc, sectored cache, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x7d, LVL_2, MB(2) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x7f, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 2-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x80, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x82, LVL_2, 256 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x83, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 8-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x84, LVL_2, MB(1) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x85, LVL_2, MB(2) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 32 byte line size */
+ { 0x86, LVL_2, 512 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x87, LVL_2, MB(1) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd0, LVL_3, 512 }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd1, LVL_3, MB(1) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd2, LVL_3, MB(2) }, /* 4-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd6, LVL_3, MB(1) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd7, LVL_3, MB(2) }, /* 8-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xd8, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xdc, LVL_3, MB(2) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xdd, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xde, LVL_3, MB(8) }, /* 12-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xe2, LVL_3, MB(2) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xe3, LVL_3, MB(4) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xe4, LVL_3, MB(8) }, /* 16-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xea, LVL_3, MB(12) }, /* 24-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xeb, LVL_3, MB(18) }, /* 24-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0xec, LVL_3, MB(24) }, /* 24-way set assoc, 64 byte line size */
+ { 0x00, 0, 0}
+};
+
+
+enum _cache_type {
+ CTYPE_NULL = 0,
+ CTYPE_DATA = 1,
+ CTYPE_INST = 2,
+ CTYPE_UNIFIED = 3
+};
+
+union _cpuid4_leaf_eax {
+ struct {
+ enum _cache_type type:5;
+ unsigned int level:3;
+ unsigned int is_self_initializing:1;
+ unsigned int is_fully_associative:1;
+ unsigned int reserved:4;
+ unsigned int num_threads_sharing:12;
+ unsigned int num_cores_on_die:6;
+ } split;
+ u32 full;
+};
+
+union _cpuid4_leaf_ebx {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int coherency_line_size:12;
+ unsigned int physical_line_partition:10;
+ unsigned int ways_of_associativity:10;
+ } split;
+ u32 full;
+};
+
+union _cpuid4_leaf_ecx {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int number_of_sets:32;
+ } split;
+ u32 full;
+};
+
+struct _cpuid4_info_regs {
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_eax eax;
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ebx ebx;
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ecx ecx;
+ unsigned int id;
+ unsigned long size;
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb;
+};
+
+static unsigned short num_cache_leaves;
+
+/* AMD doesn't have CPUID4. Emulate it here to report the same
+ information to the user. This makes some assumptions about the machine:
+ L2 not shared, no SMT etc. that is currently true on AMD CPUs.
+
+ In theory the TLBs could be reported as fake type (they are in "dummy").
+ Maybe later */
+union l1_cache {
+ struct {
+ unsigned line_size:8;
+ unsigned lines_per_tag:8;
+ unsigned assoc:8;
+ unsigned size_in_kb:8;
+ };
+ unsigned val;
+};
+
+union l2_cache {
+ struct {
+ unsigned line_size:8;
+ unsigned lines_per_tag:4;
+ unsigned assoc:4;
+ unsigned size_in_kb:16;
+ };
+ unsigned val;
+};
+
+union l3_cache {
+ struct {
+ unsigned line_size:8;
+ unsigned lines_per_tag:4;
+ unsigned assoc:4;
+ unsigned res:2;
+ unsigned size_encoded:14;
+ };
+ unsigned val;
+};
+
+static const unsigned short assocs[] = {
+ [1] = 1,
+ [2] = 2,
+ [4] = 4,
+ [6] = 8,
+ [8] = 16,
+ [0xa] = 32,
+ [0xb] = 48,
+ [0xc] = 64,
+ [0xd] = 96,
+ [0xe] = 128,
+ [0xf] = 0xffff /* fully associative - no way to show this currently */
+};
+
+static const unsigned char levels[] = { 1, 1, 2, 3 };
+static const unsigned char types[] = { 1, 2, 3, 3 };
+
+static const enum cache_type cache_type_map[] = {
+ [CTYPE_NULL] = CACHE_TYPE_NOCACHE,
+ [CTYPE_DATA] = CACHE_TYPE_DATA,
+ [CTYPE_INST] = CACHE_TYPE_INST,
+ [CTYPE_UNIFIED] = CACHE_TYPE_UNIFIED,
+};
+
+static void
+amd_cpuid4(int leaf, union _cpuid4_leaf_eax *eax,
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ebx *ebx,
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ecx *ecx)
+{
+ unsigned dummy;
+ unsigned line_size, lines_per_tag, assoc, size_in_kb;
+ union l1_cache l1i, l1d;
+ union l2_cache l2;
+ union l3_cache l3;
+ union l1_cache *l1 = &l1d;
+
+ eax->full = 0;
+ ebx->full = 0;
+ ecx->full = 0;
+
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &dummy, &dummy, &l1d.val, &l1i.val);
+ cpuid(0x80000006, &dummy, &dummy, &l2.val, &l3.val);
+
+ switch (leaf) {
+ case 1:
+ l1 = &l1i;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 0:
+ if (!l1->val)
+ return;
+ assoc = assocs[l1->assoc];
+ line_size = l1->line_size;
+ lines_per_tag = l1->lines_per_tag;
+ size_in_kb = l1->size_in_kb;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ if (!l2.val)
+ return;
+ assoc = assocs[l2.assoc];
+ line_size = l2.line_size;
+ lines_per_tag = l2.lines_per_tag;
+ /* cpu_data has errata corrections for K7 applied */
+ size_in_kb = __this_cpu_read(cpu_info.x86_cache_size);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ if (!l3.val)
+ return;
+ assoc = assocs[l3.assoc];
+ line_size = l3.line_size;
+ lines_per_tag = l3.lines_per_tag;
+ size_in_kb = l3.size_encoded * 512;
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM)) {
+ size_in_kb = size_in_kb >> 1;
+ assoc = assoc >> 1;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ eax->split.is_self_initializing = 1;
+ eax->split.type = types[leaf];
+ eax->split.level = levels[leaf];
+ eax->split.num_threads_sharing = 0;
+ eax->split.num_cores_on_die = __this_cpu_read(cpu_info.x86_max_cores) - 1;
+
+
+ if (assoc == 0xffff)
+ eax->split.is_fully_associative = 1;
+ ebx->split.coherency_line_size = line_size - 1;
+ ebx->split.ways_of_associativity = assoc - 1;
+ ebx->split.physical_line_partition = lines_per_tag - 1;
+ ecx->split.number_of_sets = (size_in_kb * 1024) / line_size /
+ (ebx->split.ways_of_associativity + 1) - 1;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_AMD_NB) && defined(CONFIG_SYSFS)
+
+/*
+ * L3 cache descriptors
+ */
+static void amd_calc_l3_indices(struct amd_northbridge *nb)
+{
+ struct amd_l3_cache *l3 = &nb->l3_cache;
+ unsigned int sc0, sc1, sc2, sc3;
+ u32 val = 0;
+
+ pci_read_config_dword(nb->misc, 0x1C4, &val);
+
+ /* calculate subcache sizes */
+ l3->subcaches[0] = sc0 = !(val & BIT(0));
+ l3->subcaches[1] = sc1 = !(val & BIT(4));
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x15) {
+ l3->subcaches[0] = sc0 += !(val & BIT(1));
+ l3->subcaches[1] = sc1 += !(val & BIT(5));
+ }
+
+ l3->subcaches[2] = sc2 = !(val & BIT(8)) + !(val & BIT(9));
+ l3->subcaches[3] = sc3 = !(val & BIT(12)) + !(val & BIT(13));
+
+ l3->indices = (max(max3(sc0, sc1, sc2), sc3) << 10) - 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check whether a slot used for disabling an L3 index is occupied.
+ * @l3: L3 cache descriptor
+ * @slot: slot number (0..1)
+ *
+ * @returns: the disabled index if used or negative value if slot free.
+ */
+static int amd_get_l3_disable_slot(struct amd_northbridge *nb, unsigned slot)
+{
+ unsigned int reg = 0;
+
+ pci_read_config_dword(nb->misc, 0x1BC + slot * 4, &reg);
+
+ /* check whether this slot is activated already */
+ if (reg & (3UL << 30))
+ return reg & 0xfff;
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static ssize_t show_cache_disable(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf, char *buf,
+ unsigned int slot)
+{
+ int index;
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb = this_leaf->priv;
+
+ index = amd_get_l3_disable_slot(nb, slot);
+ if (index >= 0)
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", index);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "FREE\n");
+}
+
+#define SHOW_CACHE_DISABLE(slot) \
+static ssize_t \
+cache_disable_##slot##_show(struct device *dev, \
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf) \
+{ \
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = dev_get_drvdata(dev); \
+ return show_cache_disable(this_leaf, buf, slot); \
+}
+SHOW_CACHE_DISABLE(0)
+SHOW_CACHE_DISABLE(1)
+
+static void amd_l3_disable_index(struct amd_northbridge *nb, int cpu,
+ unsigned slot, unsigned long idx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ idx |= BIT(30);
+
+ /*
+ * disable index in all 4 subcaches
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+ u32 reg = idx | (i << 20);
+
+ if (!nb->l3_cache.subcaches[i])
+ continue;
+
+ pci_write_config_dword(nb->misc, 0x1BC + slot * 4, reg);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to WBINVD on a core on the node containing the L3
+ * cache which indices we disable therefore a simple wbinvd()
+ * is not sufficient.
+ */
+ wbinvd_on_cpu(cpu);
+
+ reg |= BIT(31);
+ pci_write_config_dword(nb->misc, 0x1BC + slot * 4, reg);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * disable a L3 cache index by using a disable-slot
+ *
+ * @l3: L3 cache descriptor
+ * @cpu: A CPU on the node containing the L3 cache
+ * @slot: slot number (0..1)
+ * @index: index to disable
+ *
+ * @return: 0 on success, error status on failure
+ */
+static int amd_set_l3_disable_slot(struct amd_northbridge *nb, int cpu,
+ unsigned slot, unsigned long index)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* check if @slot is already used or the index is already disabled */
+ ret = amd_get_l3_disable_slot(nb, slot);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ if (index > nb->l3_cache.indices)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* check whether the other slot has disabled the same index already */
+ if (index == amd_get_l3_disable_slot(nb, !slot))
+ return -EEXIST;
+
+ amd_l3_disable_index(nb, cpu, slot, index);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t store_cache_disable(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf,
+ const char *buf, size_t count,
+ unsigned int slot)
+{
+ unsigned long val = 0;
+ int cpu, err = 0;
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb = this_leaf->priv;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ cpu = cpumask_first(&this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 10, &val) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ err = amd_set_l3_disable_slot(nb, cpu, slot, val);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == -EEXIST)
+ pr_warn("L3 slot %d in use/index already disabled!\n",
+ slot);
+ return err;
+ }
+ return count;
+}
+
+#define STORE_CACHE_DISABLE(slot) \
+static ssize_t \
+cache_disable_##slot##_store(struct device *dev, \
+ struct device_attribute *attr, \
+ const char *buf, size_t count) \
+{ \
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = dev_get_drvdata(dev); \
+ return store_cache_disable(this_leaf, buf, count, slot); \
+}
+STORE_CACHE_DISABLE(0)
+STORE_CACHE_DISABLE(1)
+
+static ssize_t subcaches_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ int cpu = cpumask_first(&this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%x\n", amd_get_subcaches(cpu));
+}
+
+static ssize_t subcaches_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ int cpu = cpumask_first(&this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ unsigned long val;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 16, &val) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (amd_set_subcaches(cpu, val))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(cache_disable_0);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(cache_disable_1);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(subcaches);
+
+static umode_t
+cache_private_attrs_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct attribute *attr, int unused)
+{
+ struct device *dev = kobj_to_dev(kobj);
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ umode_t mode = attr->mode;
+
+ if (!this_leaf->priv)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((attr == &dev_attr_subcaches.attr) &&
+ amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING))
+ return mode;
+
+ if ((attr == &dev_attr_cache_disable_0.attr ||
+ attr == &dev_attr_cache_disable_1.attr) &&
+ amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE))
+ return mode;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct attribute_group cache_private_group = {
+ .is_visible = cache_private_attrs_is_visible,
+};
+
+static void init_amd_l3_attrs(void)
+{
+ int n = 1;
+ static struct attribute **amd_l3_attrs;
+
+ if (amd_l3_attrs) /* already initialized */
+ return;
+
+ if (amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE))
+ n += 2;
+ if (amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING))
+ n += 1;
+
+ amd_l3_attrs = kcalloc(n, sizeof(*amd_l3_attrs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!amd_l3_attrs)
+ return;
+
+ n = 0;
+ if (amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_INDEX_DISABLE)) {
+ amd_l3_attrs[n++] = &dev_attr_cache_disable_0.attr;
+ amd_l3_attrs[n++] = &dev_attr_cache_disable_1.attr;
+ }
+ if (amd_nb_has_feature(AMD_NB_L3_PARTITIONING))
+ amd_l3_attrs[n++] = &dev_attr_subcaches.attr;
+
+ cache_private_group.attrs = amd_l3_attrs;
+}
+
+const struct attribute_group *
+cache_get_priv_group(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf)
+{
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb = this_leaf->priv;
+
+ if (this_leaf->level < 3 || !nb)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (nb && nb->l3_cache.indices)
+ init_amd_l3_attrs();
+
+ return &cache_private_group;
+}
+
+static void amd_init_l3_cache(struct _cpuid4_info_regs *this_leaf, int index)
+{
+ int node;
+
+ /* only for L3, and not in virtualized environments */
+ if (index < 3)
+ return;
+
+ node = topology_die_id(smp_processor_id());
+ this_leaf->nb = node_to_amd_nb(node);
+ if (this_leaf->nb && !this_leaf->nb->l3_cache.indices)
+ amd_calc_l3_indices(this_leaf->nb);
+}
+#else
+#define amd_init_l3_cache(x, y)
+#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_NB && CONFIG_SYSFS */
+
+static int
+cpuid4_cache_lookup_regs(int index, struct _cpuid4_info_regs *this_leaf)
+{
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_eax eax;
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ebx ebx;
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_ecx ecx;
+ unsigned edx;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
+ cpuid_count(0x8000001d, index, &eax.full,
+ &ebx.full, &ecx.full, &edx);
+ else
+ amd_cpuid4(index, &eax, &ebx, &ecx);
+ amd_init_l3_cache(this_leaf, index);
+ } else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ cpuid_count(0x8000001d, index, &eax.full,
+ &ebx.full, &ecx.full, &edx);
+ amd_init_l3_cache(this_leaf, index);
+ } else {
+ cpuid_count(4, index, &eax.full, &ebx.full, &ecx.full, &edx);
+ }
+
+ if (eax.split.type == CTYPE_NULL)
+ return -EIO; /* better error ? */
+
+ this_leaf->eax = eax;
+ this_leaf->ebx = ebx;
+ this_leaf->ecx = ecx;
+ this_leaf->size = (ecx.split.number_of_sets + 1) *
+ (ebx.split.coherency_line_size + 1) *
+ (ebx.split.physical_line_partition + 1) *
+ (ebx.split.ways_of_associativity + 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int find_num_cache_leaves(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, op;
+ union _cpuid4_leaf_eax cache_eax;
+ int i = -1;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ op = 0x8000001d;
+ else
+ op = 4;
+
+ do {
+ ++i;
+ /* Do cpuid(op) loop to find out num_cache_leaves */
+ cpuid_count(op, i, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ cache_eax.full = eax;
+ } while (cache_eax.split.type != CTYPE_NULL);
+ return i;
+}
+
+void cacheinfo_amd_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
+ * have an L3 cache by looking at the L3 cache CPUID leaf.
+ */
+ if (!cpuid_edx(0x80000006))
+ return;
+
+ if (c->x86 < 0x17) {
+ /* LLC is at the node level. */
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
+ } else if (c->x86 == 0x17 && c->x86_model <= 0x1F) {
+ /*
+ * LLC is at the core complex level.
+ * Core complex ID is ApicId[3] for these processors.
+ */
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->apicid >> 3;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * LLC ID is calculated from the number of threads sharing the
+ * cache.
+ * */
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, num_sharing_cache = 0;
+ u32 llc_index = find_num_cache_leaves(c) - 1;
+
+ cpuid_count(0x8000001d, llc_index, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (eax)
+ num_sharing_cache = ((eax >> 14) & 0xfff) + 1;
+
+ if (num_sharing_cache) {
+ int bits = get_count_order(num_sharing_cache);
+
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->apicid >> bits;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, int cpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * We may have multiple LLCs if L3 caches exist, so check if we
+ * have an L3 cache by looking at the L3 cache CPUID leaf.
+ */
+ if (!cpuid_edx(0x80000006))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * LLC is at the core complex level.
+ * Core complex ID is ApicId[3] for these processors.
+ */
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->apicid >> 3;
+}
+
+void init_amd_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ num_cache_leaves = find_num_cache_leaves(c);
+ } else if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000006) {
+ if (cpuid_edx(0x80000006) & 0xf000)
+ num_cache_leaves = 4;
+ else
+ num_cache_leaves = 3;
+ }
+}
+
+void init_hygon_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ num_cache_leaves = find_num_cache_leaves(c);
+}
+
+void init_intel_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* Cache sizes */
+ unsigned int trace = 0, l1i = 0, l1d = 0, l2 = 0, l3 = 0;
+ unsigned int new_l1d = 0, new_l1i = 0; /* Cache sizes from cpuid(4) */
+ unsigned int new_l2 = 0, new_l3 = 0, i; /* Cache sizes from cpuid(4) */
+ unsigned int l2_id = 0, l3_id = 0, num_threads_sharing, index_msb;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned int cpu = c->cpu_index;
+#endif
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level > 3) {
+ static int is_initialized;
+
+ if (is_initialized == 0) {
+ /* Init num_cache_leaves from boot CPU */
+ num_cache_leaves = find_num_cache_leaves(c);
+ is_initialized++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Whenever possible use cpuid(4), deterministic cache
+ * parameters cpuid leaf to find the cache details
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_cache_leaves; i++) {
+ struct _cpuid4_info_regs this_leaf = {};
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = cpuid4_cache_lookup_regs(i, &this_leaf);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (this_leaf.eax.split.level) {
+ case 1:
+ if (this_leaf.eax.split.type == CTYPE_DATA)
+ new_l1d = this_leaf.size/1024;
+ else if (this_leaf.eax.split.type == CTYPE_INST)
+ new_l1i = this_leaf.size/1024;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ new_l2 = this_leaf.size/1024;
+ num_threads_sharing = 1 + this_leaf.eax.split.num_threads_sharing;
+ index_msb = get_count_order(num_threads_sharing);
+ l2_id = c->apicid & ~((1 << index_msb) - 1);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ new_l3 = this_leaf.size/1024;
+ num_threads_sharing = 1 + this_leaf.eax.split.num_threads_sharing;
+ index_msb = get_count_order(num_threads_sharing);
+ l3_id = c->apicid & ~((1 << index_msb) - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Don't use cpuid2 if cpuid4 is supported. For P4, we use cpuid2 for
+ * trace cache
+ */
+ if ((num_cache_leaves == 0 || c->x86 == 15) && c->cpuid_level > 1) {
+ /* supports eax=2 call */
+ int j, n;
+ unsigned int regs[4];
+ unsigned char *dp = (unsigned char *)regs;
+ int only_trace = 0;
+
+ if (num_cache_leaves != 0 && c->x86 == 15)
+ only_trace = 1;
+
+ /* Number of times to iterate */
+ n = cpuid_eax(2) & 0xFF;
+
+ for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
+ cpuid(2, &regs[0], &regs[1], &regs[2], &regs[3]);
+
+ /* If bit 31 is set, this is an unknown format */
+ for (j = 0 ; j < 3 ; j++)
+ if (regs[j] & (1 << 31))
+ regs[j] = 0;
+
+ /* Byte 0 is level count, not a descriptor */
+ for (j = 1 ; j < 16 ; j++) {
+ unsigned char des = dp[j];
+ unsigned char k = 0;
+
+ /* look up this descriptor in the table */
+ while (cache_table[k].descriptor != 0) {
+ if (cache_table[k].descriptor == des) {
+ if (only_trace && cache_table[k].cache_type != LVL_TRACE)
+ break;
+ switch (cache_table[k].cache_type) {
+ case LVL_1_INST:
+ l1i += cache_table[k].size;
+ break;
+ case LVL_1_DATA:
+ l1d += cache_table[k].size;
+ break;
+ case LVL_2:
+ l2 += cache_table[k].size;
+ break;
+ case LVL_3:
+ l3 += cache_table[k].size;
+ break;
+ case LVL_TRACE:
+ trace += cache_table[k].size;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (new_l1d)
+ l1d = new_l1d;
+
+ if (new_l1i)
+ l1i = new_l1i;
+
+ if (new_l2) {
+ l2 = new_l2;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = l2_id;
+ per_cpu(cpu_l2c_id, cpu) = l2_id;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (new_l3) {
+ l3 = new_l3;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = l3_id;
+#endif
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ /*
+ * If cpu_llc_id is not yet set, this means cpuid_level < 4 which in
+ * turns means that the only possibility is SMT (as indicated in
+ * cpuid1). Since cpuid2 doesn't specify shared caches, and we know
+ * that SMT shares all caches, we can unconditionally set cpu_llc_id to
+ * c->phys_proc_id.
+ */
+ if (per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) == BAD_APICID)
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->phys_proc_id;
+#endif
+
+ c->x86_cache_size = l3 ? l3 : (l2 ? l2 : (l1i+l1d));
+
+ if (!l2)
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+}
+
+static int __cache_amd_cpumap_setup(unsigned int cpu, int index,
+ struct _cpuid4_info_regs *base)
+{
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci;
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf;
+ int i, sibling;
+
+ /*
+ * For L3, always use the pre-calculated cpu_llc_shared_mask
+ * to derive shared_cpu_map.
+ */
+ if (index == 3) {
+ for_each_cpu(i, cpu_llc_shared_mask(cpu)) {
+ this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(i);
+ if (!this_cpu_ci->info_list)
+ continue;
+ this_leaf = this_cpu_ci->info_list + index;
+ for_each_cpu(sibling, cpu_llc_shared_mask(cpu)) {
+ if (!cpu_online(sibling))
+ continue;
+ cpumask_set_cpu(sibling,
+ &this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ unsigned int apicid, nshared, first, last;
+
+ nshared = base->eax.split.num_threads_sharing + 1;
+ apicid = cpu_data(cpu).apicid;
+ first = apicid - (apicid % nshared);
+ last = first + nshared - 1;
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i) {
+ this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(i);
+ if (!this_cpu_ci->info_list)
+ continue;
+
+ apicid = cpu_data(i).apicid;
+ if ((apicid < first) || (apicid > last))
+ continue;
+
+ this_leaf = this_cpu_ci->info_list + index;
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(sibling) {
+ apicid = cpu_data(sibling).apicid;
+ if ((apicid < first) || (apicid > last))
+ continue;
+ cpumask_set_cpu(sibling,
+ &this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ }
+ }
+ } else
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static void __cache_cpumap_setup(unsigned int cpu, int index,
+ struct _cpuid4_info_regs *base)
+{
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf, *sibling_leaf;
+ unsigned long num_threads_sharing;
+ int index_msb, i;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ if (__cache_amd_cpumap_setup(cpu, index, base))
+ return;
+ }
+
+ this_leaf = this_cpu_ci->info_list + index;
+ num_threads_sharing = 1 + base->eax.split.num_threads_sharing;
+
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ if (num_threads_sharing == 1)
+ return;
+
+ index_msb = get_count_order(num_threads_sharing);
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(i)
+ if (cpu_data(i).apicid >> index_msb == c->apicid >> index_msb) {
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *sib_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(i);
+
+ if (i == cpu || !sib_cpu_ci->info_list)
+ continue;/* skip if itself or no cacheinfo */
+ sibling_leaf = sib_cpu_ci->info_list + index;
+ cpumask_set_cpu(i, &this_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &sibling_leaf->shared_cpu_map);
+ }
+}
+
+static void ci_leaf_init(struct cacheinfo *this_leaf,
+ struct _cpuid4_info_regs *base)
+{
+ this_leaf->id = base->id;
+ this_leaf->attributes = CACHE_ID;
+ this_leaf->level = base->eax.split.level;
+ this_leaf->type = cache_type_map[base->eax.split.type];
+ this_leaf->coherency_line_size =
+ base->ebx.split.coherency_line_size + 1;
+ this_leaf->ways_of_associativity =
+ base->ebx.split.ways_of_associativity + 1;
+ this_leaf->size = base->size;
+ this_leaf->number_of_sets = base->ecx.split.number_of_sets + 1;
+ this_leaf->physical_line_partition =
+ base->ebx.split.physical_line_partition + 1;
+ this_leaf->priv = base->nb;
+}
+
+int init_cache_level(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
+
+ if (!num_cache_leaves)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ if (!this_cpu_ci)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ this_cpu_ci->num_levels = 3;
+ this_cpu_ci->num_leaves = num_cache_leaves;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The max shared threads number comes from CPUID.4:EAX[25-14] with input
+ * ECX as cache index. Then right shift apicid by the number's order to get
+ * cache id for this cache node.
+ */
+static void get_cache_id(int cpu, struct _cpuid4_info_regs *id4_regs)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ unsigned long num_threads_sharing;
+ int index_msb;
+
+ num_threads_sharing = 1 + id4_regs->eax.split.num_threads_sharing;
+ index_msb = get_count_order(num_threads_sharing);
+ id4_regs->id = c->apicid >> index_msb;
+}
+
+int populate_cache_leaves(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned int idx, ret;
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *this_cpu_ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpu);
+ struct cacheinfo *this_leaf = this_cpu_ci->info_list;
+ struct _cpuid4_info_regs id4_regs = {};
+
+ for (idx = 0; idx < this_cpu_ci->num_leaves; idx++) {
+ ret = cpuid4_cache_lookup_regs(idx, &id4_regs);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ get_cache_id(cpu, &id4_regs);
+ ci_leaf_init(this_leaf++, &id4_regs);
+ __cache_cpumap_setup(cpu, idx, &id4_regs);
+ }
+ this_cpu_ci->cpu_map_populated = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..345f7d905
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/centaur.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#define ACE_PRESENT (1 << 6)
+#define ACE_ENABLED (1 << 7)
+#define ACE_FCR (1 << 28) /* MSR_VIA_FCR */
+
+#define RNG_PRESENT (1 << 2)
+#define RNG_ENABLED (1 << 3)
+#define RNG_ENABLE (1 << 6) /* MSR_VIA_RNG */
+
+static void init_c3(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ /* Test for Centaur Extended Feature Flags presence */
+ if (cpuid_eax(0xC0000000) >= 0xC0000001) {
+ u32 tmp = cpuid_edx(0xC0000001);
+
+ /* enable ACE unit, if present and disabled */
+ if ((tmp & (ACE_PRESENT | ACE_ENABLED)) == ACE_PRESENT) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_VIA_FCR, lo, hi);
+ lo |= ACE_FCR; /* enable ACE unit */
+ wrmsr(MSR_VIA_FCR, lo, hi);
+ pr_info("CPU: Enabled ACE h/w crypto\n");
+ }
+
+ /* enable RNG unit, if present and disabled */
+ if ((tmp & (RNG_PRESENT | RNG_ENABLED)) == RNG_PRESENT) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_VIA_RNG, lo, hi);
+ lo |= RNG_ENABLE; /* enable RNG unit */
+ wrmsr(MSR_VIA_RNG, lo, hi);
+ pr_info("CPU: Enabled h/w RNG\n");
+ }
+
+ /* store Centaur Extended Feature Flags as
+ * word 5 of the CPU capability bit array
+ */
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_C000_0001_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0xC0000001);
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /* Cyrix III family needs CX8 & PGE explicitly enabled. */
+ if (c->x86_model >= 6 && c->x86_model <= 13) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_VIA_FCR, lo, hi);
+ lo |= (1<<1 | 1<<7);
+ wrmsr(MSR_VIA_FCR, lo, hi);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CX8);
+ }
+
+ /* Before Nehemiah, the C3's had 3dNOW! */
+ if (c->x86_model >= 6 && c->x86_model < 9)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW);
+#endif
+ if (c->x86 == 0x6 && c->x86_model >= 0xf) {
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size * 2;
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 7)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+}
+
+enum {
+ ECX8 = 1<<1,
+ EIERRINT = 1<<2,
+ DPM = 1<<3,
+ DMCE = 1<<4,
+ DSTPCLK = 1<<5,
+ ELINEAR = 1<<6,
+ DSMC = 1<<7,
+ DTLOCK = 1<<8,
+ EDCTLB = 1<<8,
+ EMMX = 1<<9,
+ DPDC = 1<<11,
+ EBRPRED = 1<<12,
+ DIC = 1<<13,
+ DDC = 1<<14,
+ DNA = 1<<15,
+ ERETSTK = 1<<16,
+ E2MMX = 1<<19,
+ EAMD3D = 1<<20,
+};
+
+static void early_init_centaur(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Centaur's MCR. */
+ if (c->x86 == 5)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR);
+#endif
+ if ((c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xf) ||
+ (c->x86 >= 7))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32);
+#endif
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_centaur(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ char *name;
+ u32 fcr_set = 0;
+ u32 fcr_clr = 0;
+ u32 lo, hi, newlo;
+ u32 aa, bb, cc, dd;
+
+ /*
+ * Bit 31 in normal CPUID used for nonstandard 3DNow ID;
+ * 3DNow is IDd by bit 31 in extended CPUID (1*32+31) anyway
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, 0*32+31);
+#endif
+ early_init_centaur(c);
+ init_intel_cacheinfo(c);
+ detect_num_cpu_cores(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ detect_ht(c);
+#endif
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level > 9) {
+ unsigned int eax = cpuid_eax(10);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for version and the number of counters
+ * Version(eax[7:0]) can't be 0;
+ * Counters(eax[15:8]) should be greater than 1;
+ */
+ if ((eax & 0xff) && (((eax >> 8) & 0xff) > 1))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ if (c->x86 == 5) {
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case 4:
+ name = "C6";
+ fcr_set = ECX8|DSMC|EDCTLB|EMMX|ERETSTK;
+ fcr_clr = DPDC;
+ pr_notice("Disabling bugged TSC.\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TSC);
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ switch (c->x86_stepping) {
+ default:
+ name = "2";
+ break;
+ case 7 ... 9:
+ name = "2A";
+ break;
+ case 10 ... 15:
+ name = "2B";
+ break;
+ }
+ fcr_set = ECX8|DSMC|DTLOCK|EMMX|EBRPRED|ERETSTK|
+ E2MMX|EAMD3D;
+ fcr_clr = DPDC;
+ break;
+ case 9:
+ name = "3";
+ fcr_set = ECX8|DSMC|DTLOCK|EMMX|EBRPRED|ERETSTK|
+ E2MMX|EAMD3D;
+ fcr_clr = DPDC;
+ break;
+ default:
+ name = "??";
+ }
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IDT_FCR1, lo, hi);
+ newlo = (lo|fcr_set) & (~fcr_clr);
+
+ if (newlo != lo) {
+ pr_info("Centaur FCR was 0x%X now 0x%X\n",
+ lo, newlo);
+ wrmsr(MSR_IDT_FCR1, newlo, hi);
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Centaur FCR is 0x%X\n", lo);
+ }
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Centaur's MCR. */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR);
+ /* Report CX8 */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CX8);
+ /* Set 3DNow! on Winchip 2 and above. */
+ if (c->x86_model >= 8)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_3DNOW);
+ /* See if we can find out some more. */
+ if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x80000005) {
+ /* Yes, we can. */
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &aa, &bb, &cc, &dd);
+ /* Add L1 data and code cache sizes. */
+ c->x86_cache_size = (cc>>24)+(dd>>24);
+ }
+ sprintf(c->x86_model_id, "WinChip %s", name);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (c->x86 == 6 || c->x86 >= 7)
+ init_c3(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+#endif
+
+ init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static unsigned int
+centaur_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
+{
+ /* VIA C3 CPUs (670-68F) need further shifting. */
+ if ((c->x86 == 6) && ((c->x86_model == 7) || (c->x86_model == 8)))
+ size >>= 8;
+
+ /*
+ * There's also an erratum in Nehemiah stepping 1, which
+ * returns '65KB' instead of '64KB'
+ * - Note, it seems this may only be in engineering samples.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 9) &&
+ (c->x86_stepping == 1) && (size == 65))
+ size -= 1;
+ return size;
+}
+#endif
+
+static const struct cpu_dev centaur_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Centaur",
+ .c_ident = { "CentaurHauls" },
+ .c_early_init = early_init_centaur,
+ .c_init = init_centaur,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ .legacy_cache_size = centaur_size_cache,
+#endif
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(centaur_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..454cdf341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2463 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* cpu_feature_enabled() cannot be used this early */
+#define USE_EARLY_PGTABLE_L5
+
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+#include <linux/kgdb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+#include <linux/utsname.h>
+
+#include <asm/alternative.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/stackprotector.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
+#include <asm/doublefault.h>
+#include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/debugreg.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/vsyscall.h>
+#include <linux/topology.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
+#include <asm/proto.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/fpu/api.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap2.h>
+#include <linux/numa.h>
+#include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
+#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/sev.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+u32 elf_hwcap2 __read_mostly;
+
+/* all of these masks are initialized in setup_cpu_local_masks() */
+cpumask_var_t cpu_initialized_mask;
+cpumask_var_t cpu_callout_mask;
+cpumask_var_t cpu_callin_mask;
+
+/* representing cpus for which sibling maps can be computed */
+cpumask_var_t cpu_sibling_setup_mask;
+
+/* Number of siblings per CPU package */
+int smp_num_siblings = 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(smp_num_siblings);
+
+/* Last level cache ID of each logical CPU */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_llc_id) = BAD_APICID;
+
+u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ return per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(get_llc_id);
+
+/* L2 cache ID of each logical CPU */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u16, cpu_l2c_id) = BAD_APICID;
+
+static struct ppin_info {
+ int feature;
+ int msr_ppin_ctl;
+ int msr_ppin;
+} ppin_info[] = {
+ [X86_VENDOR_INTEL] = {
+ .feature = X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN,
+ .msr_ppin_ctl = MSR_PPIN_CTL,
+ .msr_ppin = MSR_PPIN
+ },
+ [X86_VENDOR_AMD] = {
+ .feature = X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN,
+ .msr_ppin_ctl = MSR_AMD_PPIN_CTL,
+ .msr_ppin = MSR_AMD_PPIN
+ },
+};
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id ppin_cpuids[] = {
+ X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_AMD_PPIN, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_AMD]),
+ X86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+
+ /* Legacy models without CPUID enumeration */
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(IVYBRIDGE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(HASWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SKYLAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_D, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, &ppin_info[X86_VENDOR_INTEL]),
+
+ {}
+};
+
+static void ppin_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *id;
+ unsigned long long val;
+ struct ppin_info *info;
+
+ id = x86_match_cpu(ppin_cpuids);
+ if (!id)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Testing the presence of the MSR is not enough. Need to check
+ * that the PPIN_CTL allows reading of the PPIN.
+ */
+ info = (struct ppin_info *)id->driver_data;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val))
+ goto clear_ppin;
+
+ if ((val & 3UL) == 1UL) {
+ /* PPIN locked in disabled mode */
+ goto clear_ppin;
+ }
+
+ /* If PPIN is disabled, try to enable */
+ if (!(val & 2UL)) {
+ wrmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, val | 2UL);
+ rdmsrl_safe(info->msr_ppin_ctl, &val);
+ }
+
+ /* Is the enable bit set? */
+ if (val & 2UL) {
+ c->ppin = __rdmsr(info->msr_ppin);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, info->feature);
+ return;
+ }
+
+clear_ppin:
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, info->feature);
+}
+
+/* correctly size the local cpu masks */
+void __init setup_cpu_local_masks(void)
+{
+ alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_initialized_mask);
+ alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callin_mask);
+ alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_callout_mask);
+ alloc_bootmem_cpumask_var(&cpu_sibling_setup_mask);
+}
+
+static void default_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+#else
+ /* Not much we can do here... */
+ /* Check if at least it has cpuid */
+ if (c->cpuid_level == -1) {
+ /* No cpuid. It must be an ancient CPU */
+ if (c->x86 == 4)
+ strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "486");
+ else if (c->x86 == 3)
+ strcpy(c->x86_model_id, "386");
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev default_cpu = {
+ .c_init = default_init,
+ .c_vendor = "Unknown",
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN,
+};
+
+static const struct cpu_dev *this_cpu = &default_cpu;
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_PAGE_ALIGNED(struct gdt_page, gdt_page) = { .gdt = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /*
+ * We need valid kernel segments for data and code in long mode too
+ * IRET will check the segment types kkeil 2000/10/28
+ * Also sysret mandates a special GDT layout
+ *
+ * TLS descriptors are currently at a different place compared to i386.
+ * Hopefully nobody expects them at a fixed place (Wine?)
+ */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09b, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa09b, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc093, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER32_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fb, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f3, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xa0fb, 0, 0xfffff),
+#else
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc09a, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_KERNEL_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_CS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0fa, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_DEFAULT_USER_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc0f2, 0, 0xfffff),
+ /*
+ * Segments used for calling PnP BIOS have byte granularity.
+ * They code segments and data segments have fixed 64k limits,
+ * the transfer segment sizes are set at run time.
+ */
+ /* 32-bit code */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS32] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff),
+ /* 16-bit code */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_CS16] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff),
+ /* 16-bit data */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_DS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0xffff),
+ /* 16-bit data */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0),
+ /* 16-bit data */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PNPBIOS_TS2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x0092, 0, 0),
+ /*
+ * The APM segments have byte granularity and their bases
+ * are set at run time. All have 64k limits.
+ */
+ /* 32-bit code */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x409a, 0, 0xffff),
+ /* 16-bit code */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+1] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x009a, 0, 0xffff),
+ /* data */
+ [GDT_ENTRY_APMBIOS_BASE+2] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0x4092, 0, 0xffff),
+
+ [GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
+ [GDT_ENTRY_PERCPU] = GDT_ENTRY_INIT(0xc092, 0, 0xfffff),
+#endif
+} };
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(gdt_page);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static int __init x86_nopcid_setup(char *s)
+{
+ /* nopcid doesn't accept parameters */
+ if (s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ return 0;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+ pr_info("nopcid: PCID feature disabled\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nopcid", x86_nopcid_setup);
+#endif
+
+static int __init x86_noinvpcid_setup(char *s)
+{
+ /* noinvpcid doesn't accept parameters */
+ if (s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* do not emit a message if the feature is not present */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID))
+ return 0;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
+ pr_info("noinvpcid: INVPCID feature disabled\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("noinvpcid", x86_noinvpcid_setup);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static int cachesize_override = -1;
+static int disable_x86_serial_nr = 1;
+
+static int __init cachesize_setup(char *str)
+{
+ get_option(&str, &cachesize_override);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("cachesize=", cachesize_setup);
+
+/* Standard macro to see if a specific flag is changeable */
+static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag)
+{
+ u32 f1, f2;
+
+ /*
+ * Cyrix and IDT cpus allow disabling of CPUID
+ * so the code below may return different results
+ * when it is executed before and after enabling
+ * the CPUID. Add "volatile" to not allow gcc to
+ * optimize the subsequent calls to this function.
+ */
+ asm volatile ("pushfl \n\t"
+ "pushfl \n\t"
+ "popl %0 \n\t"
+ "movl %0, %1 \n\t"
+ "xorl %2, %0 \n\t"
+ "pushl %0 \n\t"
+ "popfl \n\t"
+ "pushfl \n\t"
+ "popl %0 \n\t"
+ "popfl \n\t"
+
+ : "=&r" (f1), "=&r" (f2)
+ : "ir" (flag));
+
+ return ((f1^f2) & flag) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Probe for the CPUID instruction */
+int have_cpuid_p(void)
+{
+ return flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_ID);
+}
+
+static void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned long lo, hi;
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PN) || !disable_x86_serial_nr)
+ return;
+
+ /* Disable processor serial number: */
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);
+ lo |= 0x200000;
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_BBL_CR_CTL, lo, hi);
+
+ pr_notice("CPU serial number disabled.\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PN);
+
+ /* Disabling the serial number may affect the cpuid level */
+ c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
+}
+
+static int __init x86_serial_nr_setup(char *s)
+{
+ disable_x86_serial_nr = 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("serialnumber", x86_serial_nr_setup);
+#else
+static inline int flag_is_changeable_p(u32 flag)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+static inline void squash_the_stupid_serial_number(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void setup_smep(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMEP))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMEP);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void setup_smap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned long eflags = native_save_fl();
+
+ /* This should have been cleared long ago */
+ BUG_ON(eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMAP))
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_SMAP);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* Check the boot processor, plus build option for UMIP. */
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the current processor's cpuid bits. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_UMIP))
+ goto out;
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
+
+ pr_info_once("x86/cpu: User Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) activated\n");
+
+ return;
+
+out:
+ /*
+ * Make sure UMIP is disabled in case it was enabled in a
+ * previous boot (e.g., via kexec).
+ */
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_UMIP);
+}
+
+/* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */
+static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask =
+ X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP |
+ X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET;
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
+static unsigned long cr4_pinned_bits __ro_after_init;
+
+void native_write_cr0(unsigned long val)
+{
+ unsigned long bits_missing = 0;
+
+set_register:
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr0": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
+
+ if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
+ if (unlikely((val & X86_CR0_WP) != X86_CR0_WP)) {
+ bits_missing = X86_CR0_WP;
+ val |= bits_missing;
+ goto set_register;
+ }
+ /* Warn after we've set the missing bits. */
+ WARN_ONCE(bits_missing, "CR0 WP bit went missing!?\n");
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(native_write_cr0);
+
+void __no_profile native_write_cr4(unsigned long val)
+{
+ unsigned long bits_changed = 0;
+
+set_register:
+ asm volatile("mov %0,%%cr4": "+r" (val) : : "memory");
+
+ if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning)) {
+ if (unlikely((val & cr4_pinned_mask) != cr4_pinned_bits)) {
+ bits_changed = (val & cr4_pinned_mask) ^ cr4_pinned_bits;
+ val = (val & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
+ goto set_register;
+ }
+ /* Warn after we've corrected the changed bits. */
+ WARN_ONCE(bits_changed, "pinned CR4 bits changed: 0x%lx!?\n",
+ bits_changed);
+ }
+}
+#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_LKDTM)
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(native_write_cr4);
+#endif
+
+void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)
+{
+ unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+
+ newval = (cr4 & ~clear) | set;
+ if (newval != cr4) {
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, newval);
+ __write_cr4(newval);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cr4_update_irqsoff);
+
+/* Read the CR4 shadow. */
+unsigned long cr4_read_shadow(void)
+{
+ return this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cr4_read_shadow);
+
+void cr4_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned long cr4 = __read_cr4();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID))
+ cr4 |= X86_CR4_PCIDE;
+ if (static_branch_likely(&cr_pinning))
+ cr4 = (cr4 & ~cr4_pinned_mask) | cr4_pinned_bits;
+
+ __write_cr4(cr4);
+
+ /* Initialize cr4 shadow for this CPU. */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.cr4, cr4);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Once CPU feature detection is finished (and boot params have been
+ * parsed), record any of the sensitive CR bits that are set, and
+ * enable CR pinning.
+ */
+static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
+{
+ cr4_pinned_bits = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4) & cr4_pinned_mask;
+ static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
+}
+
+static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
+{
+ /* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
+ if (strlen(arg))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+ return 1;
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+ pr_info("FSGSBASE disabled via kernel command line\n");
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);
+
+/*
+ * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
+ */
+static bool pku_disabled;
+
+static __always_inline void setup_pku(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data) {
+ if (pku_disabled || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_PKU))
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Setting CR4.PKE will cause the X86_FEATURE_OSPKE cpuid
+ * bit to be set. Enforce it.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE);
+
+ } else if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE)) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_PKE);
+ /* Load the default PKRU value */
+ pkru_write_default();
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+static __init int setup_disable_pku(char *arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * Do not clear the X86_FEATURE_PKU bit. All of the
+ * runtime checks are against OSPKE so clearing the
+ * bit does nothing.
+ *
+ * This way, we will see "pku" in cpuinfo, but not
+ * "ospke", which is exactly what we want. It shows
+ * that the CPU has PKU, but the OS has not enabled it.
+ * This happens to be exactly how a system would look
+ * if we disabled the config option.
+ */
+ pr_info("x86: 'nopku' specified, disabling Memory Protection Keys\n");
+ pku_disabled = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku);
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+
+__noendbr u64 ibt_save(void)
+{
+ u64 msr = 0;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr & ~CET_ENDBR_EN);
+ }
+
+ return msr;
+}
+
+__noendbr void ibt_restore(u64 save)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
+ msr &= ~CET_ENDBR_EN;
+ msr |= (save & CET_ENDBR_EN);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
+ }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 msr = CET_ENDBR_EN;
+
+ if (!HAS_KERNEL_IBT ||
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ return;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, msr);
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET);
+
+ if (!ibt_selftest()) {
+ pr_err("IBT selftest: Failed!\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+__noendbr void cet_disable(void)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always
+ * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization
+ * software. Add those features to this table to auto-disable them.
+ */
+struct cpuid_dependent_feature {
+ u32 feature;
+ u32 level;
+};
+
+static const struct cpuid_dependent_feature
+cpuid_dependent_features[] = {
+ { X86_FEATURE_MWAIT, 0x00000005 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_DCA, 0x00000009 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, 0x0000000d },
+ { 0, 0 }
+};
+
+static void filter_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, bool warn)
+{
+ const struct cpuid_dependent_feature *df;
+
+ for (df = cpuid_dependent_features; df->feature; df++) {
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, df->feature))
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Note: cpuid_level is set to -1 if unavailable, but
+ * extended_extended_level is set to 0 if unavailable
+ * and the legitimate extended levels are all negative
+ * when signed; hence the weird messing around with
+ * signs here...
+ */
+ if (!((s32)df->level < 0 ?
+ (u32)df->level > (u32)c->extended_cpuid_level :
+ (s32)df->level > (s32)c->cpuid_level))
+ continue;
+
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, df->feature);
+ if (!warn)
+ continue;
+
+ pr_warn("CPU: CPU feature " X86_CAP_FMT " disabled, no CPUID level 0x%x\n",
+ x86_cap_flag(df->feature), df->level);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Naming convention should be: <Name> [(<Codename>)]
+ * This table only is used unless init_<vendor>() below doesn't set it;
+ * in particular, if CPUID levels 0x80000002..4 are supported, this
+ * isn't used
+ */
+
+/* Look up CPU names by table lookup. */
+static const char *table_lookup_model(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ const struct legacy_cpu_model_info *info;
+
+ if (c->x86_model >= 16)
+ return NULL; /* Range check */
+
+ if (!this_cpu)
+ return NULL;
+
+ info = this_cpu->legacy_models;
+
+ while (info->family) {
+ if (info->family == c->x86)
+ return info->model_names[c->x86_model];
+ info++;
+ }
+#endif
+ return NULL; /* Not found */
+}
+
+/* Aligned to unsigned long to avoid split lock in atomic bitmap ops */
+__u32 cpu_caps_cleared[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
+__u32 cpu_caps_set[NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS] __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
+
+void load_percpu_segment(int cpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ loadsegment(fs, __KERNEL_PERCPU);
+#else
+ __loadsegment_simple(gs, 0);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu));
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/* The 32-bit entry code needs to find cpu_entry_area. */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct cpu_entry_area *, cpu_entry_area);
+#endif
+
+/* Load the original GDT from the per-cpu structure */
+void load_direct_gdt(int cpu)
+{
+ struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
+
+ gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
+ gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
+ load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_direct_gdt);
+
+/* Load a fixmap remapping of the per-cpu GDT */
+void load_fixmap_gdt(int cpu)
+{
+ struct desc_ptr gdt_descr;
+
+ gdt_descr.address = (long)get_cpu_gdt_ro(cpu);
+ gdt_descr.size = GDT_SIZE - 1;
+ load_gdt(&gdt_descr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(load_fixmap_gdt);
+
+/*
+ * Current gdt points %fs at the "master" per-cpu area: after this,
+ * it's on the real one.
+ */
+void switch_to_new_gdt(int cpu)
+{
+ /* Load the original GDT */
+ load_direct_gdt(cpu);
+ /* Reload the per-cpu base */
+ load_percpu_segment(cpu);
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev *cpu_devs[X86_VENDOR_NUM] = {};
+
+static void get_model_name(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int *v;
+ char *p, *q, *s;
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000004)
+ return;
+
+ v = (unsigned int *)c->x86_model_id;
+ cpuid(0x80000002, &v[0], &v[1], &v[2], &v[3]);
+ cpuid(0x80000003, &v[4], &v[5], &v[6], &v[7]);
+ cpuid(0x80000004, &v[8], &v[9], &v[10], &v[11]);
+ c->x86_model_id[48] = 0;
+
+ /* Trim whitespace */
+ p = q = s = &c->x86_model_id[0];
+
+ while (*p == ' ')
+ p++;
+
+ while (*p) {
+ /* Note the last non-whitespace index */
+ if (!isspace(*p))
+ s = q;
+
+ *q++ = *p++;
+ }
+
+ *(s + 1) = '\0';
+}
+
+void detect_num_cpu_cores(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ c->x86_max_cores = 1;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) || c->cpuid_level < 4)
+ return;
+
+ cpuid_count(4, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (eax & 0x1f)
+ c->x86_max_cores = (eax >> 26) + 1;
+}
+
+void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int n, dummy, ebx, ecx, edx, l2size;
+
+ n = c->extended_cpuid_level;
+
+ if (n >= 0x80000005) {
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ c->x86_cache_size = (ecx>>24) + (edx>>24);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ /* On K8 L1 TLB is inclusive, so don't count it */
+ c->x86_tlbsize = 0;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (n < 0x80000006) /* Some chips just has a large L1. */
+ return;
+
+ cpuid(0x80000006, &dummy, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ l2size = ecx >> 16;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ c->x86_tlbsize += ((ebx >> 16) & 0xfff) + (ebx & 0xfff);
+#else
+ /* do processor-specific cache resizing */
+ if (this_cpu->legacy_cache_size)
+ l2size = this_cpu->legacy_cache_size(c, l2size);
+
+ /* Allow user to override all this if necessary. */
+ if (cachesize_override != -1)
+ l2size = cachesize_override;
+
+ if (l2size == 0)
+ return; /* Again, no L2 cache is possible */
+#endif
+
+ c->x86_cache_size = l2size;
+}
+
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4k[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_2m[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lli_4m[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4k[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_2m[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_4m[NR_INFO];
+u16 __read_mostly tlb_lld_1g[NR_INFO];
+
+static void cpu_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (this_cpu->c_detect_tlb)
+ this_cpu->c_detect_tlb(c);
+
+ pr_info("Last level iTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d\n",
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES],
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES]);
+
+ pr_info("Last level dTLB entries: 4KB %d, 2MB %d, 4MB %d, 1GB %d\n",
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES],
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES], tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES]);
+}
+
+int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HT))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CMP_LEGACY))
+ return -1;
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY))
+ return -1;
+
+ cpuid(1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ smp_num_siblings = (ebx & 0xff0000) >> 16;
+ if (smp_num_siblings == 1)
+ pr_info_once("CPU0: Hyper-Threading is disabled\n");
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ int index_msb, core_bits;
+
+ if (detect_ht_early(c) < 0)
+ return;
+
+ index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings);
+ c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb);
+
+ smp_num_siblings = smp_num_siblings / c->x86_max_cores;
+
+ index_msb = get_count_order(smp_num_siblings);
+
+ core_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
+
+ c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, index_msb) &
+ ((1 << core_bits) - 1);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void get_cpu_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ char *v = c->x86_vendor_id;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++) {
+ if (!cpu_devs[i])
+ break;
+
+ if (!strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[0]) ||
+ (cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1] &&
+ !strcmp(v, cpu_devs[i]->c_ident[1]))) {
+
+ this_cpu = cpu_devs[i];
+ c->x86_vendor = this_cpu->c_x86_vendor;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_err_once("CPU: vendor_id '%s' unknown, using generic init.\n" \
+ "CPU: Your system may be unstable.\n", v);
+
+ c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
+ this_cpu = &default_cpu;
+}
+
+void cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* Get vendor name */
+ cpuid(0x00000000, (unsigned int *)&c->cpuid_level,
+ (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[0],
+ (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[8],
+ (unsigned int *)&c->x86_vendor_id[4]);
+
+ c->x86 = 4;
+ /* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
+ u32 junk, tfms, cap0, misc;
+
+ cpuid(0x00000001, &tfms, &misc, &junk, &cap0);
+ c->x86 = x86_family(tfms);
+ c->x86_model = x86_model(tfms);
+ c->x86_stepping = x86_stepping(tfms);
+
+ if (cap0 & (1<<19)) {
+ c->x86_clflush_size = ((misc >> 8) & 0xff) * 8;
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void apply_forced_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++) {
+ c->x86_capability[i] &= ~cpu_caps_cleared[i];
+ c->x86_capability[i] |= cpu_caps_set[i];
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_speculation_control(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * The Intel SPEC_CTRL CPUID bit implies IBRS and IBPB support,
+ * and they also have a different bit for STIBP support. Also,
+ * a hypervisor might have set the individual AMD bits even on
+ * Intel CPUs, for finer-grained selection of what's available.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBRS)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+ }
+}
+
+void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ /* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000001 */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
+ cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_ECX] = ecx;
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = edx;
+ }
+
+ /* Thermal and Power Management Leaf: level 0x00000006 (eax) */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000006)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_6_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x00000006);
+
+ /* Additional Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000007 */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000007) {
+ cpuid_count(0x00000007, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_0_EBX] = ebx;
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_ECX] = ecx;
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_EDX] = edx;
+
+ /* Check valid sub-leaf index before accessing it */
+ if (eax >= 1) {
+ cpuid_count(0x00000007, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_7_1_EAX] = eax;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Extended state features: level 0x0000000d */
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x0000000d) {
+ cpuid_count(0x0000000d, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_D_1_EAX] = eax;
+ }
+
+ /* AMD-defined flags: level 0x80000001 */
+ eax = cpuid_eax(0x80000000);
+ c->extended_cpuid_level = eax;
+
+ if ((eax & 0xffff0000) == 0x80000000) {
+ if (eax >= 0x80000001) {
+ cpuid(0x80000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_ECX] = ecx;
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0001_EDX] = edx;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007) {
+ cpuid(0x80000007, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = ebx;
+ c->x86_power = edx;
+ }
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
+ cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0008_EBX] = ebx;
+ }
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000000a)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_000A_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x8000000a);
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x8000001f);
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = cpuid_eax(0x80000021);
+
+ init_scattered_cpuid_features(c);
+ init_speculation_control(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe.
+ * This needs to happen each time we re-probe, which may happen
+ * several times during CPU initialization.
+ */
+ apply_forced_caps(c);
+}
+
+void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008) {
+ cpuid(0x80000008, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_virt_bits = (eax >> 8) & 0xff;
+ c->x86_phys_bits = eax & 0xff;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE36))
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
+#endif
+ c->x86_cache_bits = c->x86_phys_bits;
+}
+
+static void identify_cpu_without_cpuid(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * First of all, decide if this is a 486 or higher
+ * It's a 486 if we can modify the AC flag
+ */
+ if (flag_is_changeable_p(X86_EFLAGS_AC))
+ c->x86 = 4;
+ else
+ c->x86 = 3;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X86_VENDOR_NUM; i++)
+ if (cpu_devs[i] && cpu_devs[i]->c_identify) {
+ c->x86_vendor_id[0] = 0;
+ cpu_devs[i]->c_identify(c);
+ if (c->x86_vendor_id[0]) {
+ get_cpu_vendor(c);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+#define NO_SPECULATION BIT(0)
+#define NO_MELTDOWN BIT(1)
+#define NO_SSB BIT(2)
+#define NO_L1TF BIT(3)
+#define NO_MDS BIT(4)
+#define MSBDS_ONLY BIT(5)
+#define NO_SWAPGS BIT(6)
+#define NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT BIT(7)
+#define NO_SPECTRE_V2 BIT(8)
+#define NO_MMIO BIT(9)
+#define NO_EIBRS_PBRSB BIT(10)
+
+#define VULNWL(vendor, family, model, whitelist) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_INTEL(model, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_##model, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_AMD(family, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+#define VULNWL_HYGON(family, whitelist) \
+ VULNWL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, whitelist)
+
+static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
+ VULNWL(ANY, 4, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(INTEL, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(NSC, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(VORTEX, 5, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+ VULNWL(VORTEX, 6, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECULATION),
+
+ /* Intel Family 6 */
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(TIGERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE, NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ALDERLAKE_L, NO_MMIO),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SALTWELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_BONNELL_MID, NO_SPECULATION | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_D, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNL, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(XEON_PHI_KNM, NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(CORE_YONAH, NO_SSB),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_MID, NO_L1TF | MSBDS_ONLY | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_AIRMONT_NP, NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT),
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, NO_MDS | NO_L1TF | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+
+ /*
+ * Technically, swapgs isn't serializing on AMD (despite it previously
+ * being documented as such in the APM). But according to AMD, %gs is
+ * updated non-speculatively, and the issuing of %gs-relative memory
+ * operands will be blocked until the %gs update completes, which is
+ * good enough for our purposes.
+ */
+
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+ VULNWL_INTEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_EIBRS_PBRSB),
+
+ /* AMD Family 0xf - 0x12 */
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x0f, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x10, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x11, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_AMD(0x12, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_SSB | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+
+ /* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */
+ VULNWL_AMD(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL_HYGON(X86_FAMILY_ANY, NO_MELTDOWN | NO_L1TF | NO_MDS | NO_SWAPGS | NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT | NO_MMIO),
+
+ /* Zhaoxin Family 7 */
+ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
+ VULNWL(ZHAOXIN, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
+ {}
+};
+
+#define VULNBL(vendor, family, model, blacklist) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL(vendor, family, model, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(model, steppings, issues) \
+ X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_STEPPINGS_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, \
+ INTEL_FAM6_##model, steppings, \
+ X86_FEATURE_ANY, issues)
+
+#define VULNBL_AMD(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(AMD, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define VULNBL_HYGON(family, blacklist) \
+ VULNBL(HYGON, family, X86_MODEL_ANY, blacklist)
+
+#define SRBDS BIT(0)
+/* CPU is affected by X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO BIT(1)
+/* CPU is affected by Shared Buffers Data Sampling (SBDS), a variant of X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA */
+#define MMIO_SBDS BIT(2)
+/* CPU is affected by RETbleed, speculating where you would not expect it */
+#define RETBLEED BIT(3)
+/* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
+#define SMT_RSB BIT(4)
+/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
+#define SRSO BIT(5)
+/* CPU is affected by GDS */
+#define GDS BIT(6)
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(HASWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
+ VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
+ VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
+ {}
+};
+
+static bool __init cpu_matches(const struct x86_cpu_id *table, unsigned long which)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m = x86_match_cpu(table);
+
+ return m && !!(m->driver_data & which);
+}
+
+u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = 0;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES))
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, ia32_cap);
+
+ return ia32_cap;
+}
+
+static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+ return (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO &&
+ ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
+}
+
+static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+
+ /* Set ITLB_MULTIHIT bug if cpu is not in the whitelist and not mitigated */
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT);
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECULATION))
+ return;
+
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1);
+
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SPECTRE_V2))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2);
+
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO) &&
+ !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS);
+
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED);
+
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MDS) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MDS);
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, MSBDS_ONLY))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY);
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_SWAPGS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SWAPGS);
+
+ /*
+ * When the CPU is not mitigated for TAA (TAA_NO=0) set TAA bug when:
+ * - TSX is supported or
+ * - TSX_CTRL is present
+ *
+ * TSX_CTRL check is needed for cases when TSX could be disabled before
+ * the kernel boot e.g. kexec.
+ * TSX_CTRL check alone is not sufficient for cases when the microcode
+ * update is not present or running as guest that don't get TSX_CTRL.
+ */
+ if (!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO) &&
+ (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RTM) ||
+ (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR)))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TAA);
+
+ /*
+ * SRBDS affects CPUs which support RDRAND or RDSEED and are listed
+ * in the vulnerability blacklist.
+ *
+ * Some of the implications and mitigation of Shared Buffers Data
+ * Sampling (SBDS) are similar to SRBDS. Give SBDS same treatment as
+ * SRBDS.
+ */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED)) &&
+ cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRBDS | MMIO_SBDS))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRBDS);
+
+ /*
+ * Processor MMIO Stale Data bug enumeration
+ *
+ * Affected CPU list is generally enough to enumerate the vulnerability,
+ * but for virtualization case check for ARCH_CAP MSR bits also, VMM may
+ * not want the guest to enumerate the bug.
+ *
+ * Set X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN for CPUs that are neither in the blacklist,
+ * nor in the whitelist and also don't enumerate MSR ARCH_CAP MMIO bits.
+ */
+ if (!arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
+ else if (!cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MMIO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN);
+ }
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED) &&
+ !cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_EIBRS_PBRSB) &&
+ !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB);
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
+ * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
+ * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
+ * which means that AVX will be disabled.
+ */
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
+ return;
+
+ /* Rogue Data Cache Load? No! */
+ if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO)
+ return;
+
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_MELTDOWN);
+
+ if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_L1TF))
+ return;
+
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The NOPL instruction is supposed to exist on all CPUs of family >= 6;
+ * unfortunately, that's not true in practice because of early VIA
+ * chips and (more importantly) broken virtualizers that are not easy
+ * to detect. In the latter case it doesn't even *fail* reliably, so
+ * probing for it doesn't even work. Disable it completely on 32-bit
+ * unless we can find a reliable way to detect all the broken cases.
+ * Enable it explicitly on 64-bit for non-constant inputs of cpu_has().
+ */
+static void detect_nopl(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
+#else
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_NOPL);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * We parse cpu parameters early because fpu__init_system() is executed
+ * before parse_early_param().
+ */
+static void __init cpu_parse_early_param(void)
+{
+ char arg[128];
+ char *argptr = arg, *opt;
+ int arglen, taint = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "no387"))
+#ifdef CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FPU);
+#else
+ pr_err("Option 'no387' required CONFIG_MATH_EMULATION enabled.\n");
+#endif
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nofxsr"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FXSR);
+#endif
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsave"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE);
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaveopt"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT);
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "noxsaves"))
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
+
+ arglen = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "clearcpuid", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (arglen <= 0)
+ return;
+
+ pr_info("Clearing CPUID bits:");
+
+ while (argptr) {
+ bool found __maybe_unused = false;
+ unsigned int bit;
+
+ opt = strsep(&argptr, ",");
+
+ /*
+ * Handle naked numbers first for feature flags which don't
+ * have names.
+ */
+ if (!kstrtouint(opt, 10, &bit)) {
+ if (bit < NCAPINTS * 32) {
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
+ /* empty-string, i.e., ""-defined feature flags */
+ if (!x86_cap_flags[bit])
+ pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT_NUM, x86_cap_flag_num(bit));
+ else
+#endif
+ pr_cont(" " X86_CAP_FMT, x86_cap_flag(bit));
+
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
+ taint++;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The assumption is that there are no feature names with only
+ * numbers in the name thus go to the next argument.
+ */
+ continue;
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES
+ for (bit = 0; bit < 32 * NCAPINTS; bit++) {
+ if (!x86_cap_flag(bit))
+ continue;
+
+ if (strcmp(x86_cap_flag(bit), opt))
+ continue;
+
+ pr_cont(" %s", opt);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(bit);
+ taint++;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ pr_cont(" (unknown: %s)", opt);
+#endif
+ }
+ pr_cont("\n");
+
+ if (taint)
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do minimum CPU detection early.
+ * Fields really needed: vendor, cpuid_level, family, model, mask,
+ * cache alignment.
+ * The others are not touched to avoid unwanted side effects.
+ *
+ * WARNING: this function is only called on the boot CPU. Don't add code
+ * here that is supposed to run on all CPUs.
+ */
+static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
+ c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
+#else
+ c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 32;
+ c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
+#endif
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
+
+ memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
+ c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;
+
+ if (!have_cpuid_p())
+ identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);
+
+ /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
+ if (have_cpuid_p()) {
+ cpu_detect(c);
+ get_cpu_vendor(c);
+ get_cpu_cap(c);
+ get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
+ cpu_parse_early_param();
+
+ if (this_cpu->c_early_init)
+ this_cpu->c_early_init(c);
+
+ c->cpu_index = 0;
+ filter_cpuid_features(c, false);
+
+ if (this_cpu->c_bsp_init)
+ this_cpu->c_bsp_init(c);
+ } else {
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CPUID);
+ }
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
+
+ cpu_set_bug_bits(c);
+
+ sld_setup(c);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /*
+ * Regardless of whether PCID is enumerated, the SDM says
+ * that it can't be enabled in 32-bit mode.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PCID);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Later in the boot process pgtable_l5_enabled() relies on
+ * cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LA57). If 5-level paging is not
+ * enabled by this point we need to clear the feature bit to avoid
+ * false-positives at the later stage.
+ *
+ * pgtable_l5_enabled() can be false here for several reasons:
+ * - 5-level paging is disabled compile-time;
+ * - it's 32-bit kernel;
+ * - machine doesn't support 5-level paging;
+ * - user specified 'no5lvl' in kernel command line.
+ */
+ if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LA57);
+
+ detect_nopl();
+}
+
+void __init early_cpu_init(void)
+{
+ const struct cpu_dev *const *cdev;
+ int count = 0;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
+ pr_info("KERNEL supported cpus:\n");
+#endif
+
+ for (cdev = __x86_cpu_dev_start; cdev < __x86_cpu_dev_end; cdev++) {
+ const struct cpu_dev *cpudev = *cdev;
+
+ if (count >= X86_VENDOR_NUM)
+ break;
+ cpu_devs[count] = cpudev;
+ count++;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT
+ {
+ unsigned int j;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < 2; j++) {
+ if (!cpudev->c_ident[j])
+ continue;
+ pr_info(" %s %s\n", cpudev->c_vendor,
+ cpudev->c_ident[j]);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ early_identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
+}
+
+static bool detect_null_seg_behavior(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Empirically, writing zero to a segment selector on AMD does
+ * not clear the base, whereas writing zero to a segment
+ * selector on Intel does clear the base. Intel's behavior
+ * allows slightly faster context switches in the common case
+ * where GS is unused by the prev and next threads.
+ *
+ * Since neither vendor documents this anywhere that I can see,
+ * detect it directly instead of hard-coding the choice by
+ * vendor.
+ *
+ * I've designated AMD's behavior as the "bug" because it's
+ * counterintuitive and less friendly.
+ */
+
+ unsigned long old_base, tmp;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 1);
+ loadsegment(fs, 0);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, tmp);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, old_base);
+ return tmp == 0;
+}
+
+void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* BUG_NULL_SEG is only relevant with 64bit userspace */
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return;
+
+ /* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000021 &&
+ cpuid_eax(0x80000021) & BIT(6))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * CPUID bit above wasn't set. If this kernel is still running
+ * as a HV guest, then the HV has decided not to advertize
+ * that CPUID bit for whatever reason. For example, one
+ * member of the migration pool might be vulnerable. Which
+ * means, the bug is present: set the BUG flag and return.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Zen2 CPUs also have this behaviour, but no CPUID bit.
+ * 0x18 is the respective family for Hygon.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 0x17 || c->x86 == 0x18) &&
+ detect_null_seg_behavior())
+ return;
+
+ /* All the remaining ones are affected */
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_NULL_SEG);
+}
+
+static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ c->extended_cpuid_level = 0;
+
+ if (!have_cpuid_p())
+ identify_cpu_without_cpuid(c);
+
+ /* cyrix could have cpuid enabled via c_identify()*/
+ if (!have_cpuid_p())
+ return;
+
+ cpu_detect(c);
+
+ get_cpu_vendor(c);
+
+ get_cpu_cap(c);
+
+ get_cpu_address_sizes(c);
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
+ c->initial_apicid = (cpuid_ebx(1) >> 24) & 0xFF;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
+# else
+ c->apicid = c->initial_apicid;
+# endif
+#endif
+ c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid;
+ }
+
+ get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
+
+ /*
+ * ESPFIX is a strange bug. All real CPUs have it. Paravirt
+ * systems that run Linux at CPL > 0 may or may not have the
+ * issue, but, even if they have the issue, there's absolutely
+ * nothing we can do about it because we can't use the real IRET
+ * instruction.
+ *
+ * NB: For the time being, only 32-bit kernels support
+ * X86_BUG_ESPFIX as such. 64-bit kernels directly choose
+ * whether to apply espfix using paravirt hooks. If any
+ * non-paravirt system ever shows up that does *not* have the
+ * ESPFIX issue, we can change this.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_ESPFIX);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate that ACPI/mptables have the same information about the
+ * effective APIC id and update the package map.
+ */
+static void validate_apic_and_package_id(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned int apicid, cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ apicid = apic->cpu_present_to_apicid(cpu);
+
+ if (apicid != c->apicid) {
+ pr_err(FW_BUG "CPU%u: APIC id mismatch. Firmware: %x APIC: %x\n",
+ cpu, apicid, c->initial_apicid);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(topology_update_package_map(c->phys_proc_id, cpu));
+ BUG_ON(topology_update_die_map(c->cpu_die_id, cpu));
+#else
+ c->logical_proc_id = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This does the hard work of actually picking apart the CPU stuff...
+ */
+static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
+ c->x86_cache_size = 0;
+ c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN;
+ c->x86_model = c->x86_stepping = 0; /* So far unknown... */
+ c->x86_vendor_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
+ c->x86_model_id[0] = '\0'; /* Unset */
+ c->x86_max_cores = 1;
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = 0;
+ c->cu_id = 0xff;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ c->x86_clflush_size = 64;
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
+ c->x86_virt_bits = 48;
+#else
+ c->cpuid_level = -1; /* CPUID not detected */
+ c->x86_clflush_size = 32;
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 32;
+ c->x86_virt_bits = 32;
+#endif
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size;
+ memset(&c->x86_capability, 0, sizeof(c->x86_capability));
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
+ memset(&c->vmx_capability, 0, sizeof(c->vmx_capability));
+#endif
+
+ generic_identify(c);
+
+ if (this_cpu->c_identify)
+ this_cpu->c_identify(c);
+
+ /* Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, after probe */
+ apply_forced_caps(c);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Vendor-specific initialization. In this section we
+ * canonicalize the feature flags, meaning if there are
+ * features a certain CPU supports which CPUID doesn't
+ * tell us, CPUID claiming incorrect flags, or other bugs,
+ * we handle them here.
+ *
+ * At the end of this section, c->x86_capability better
+ * indicate the features this CPU genuinely supports!
+ */
+ if (this_cpu->c_init)
+ this_cpu->c_init(c);
+
+ /* Disable the PN if appropriate */
+ squash_the_stupid_serial_number(c);
+
+ /* Set up SMEP/SMAP/UMIP */
+ setup_smep(c);
+ setup_smap(c);
+ setup_umip(c);
+
+ /* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+ elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
+ * Now we do "generic changes."
+ */
+
+ /* Filter out anything that depends on CPUID levels we don't have */
+ filter_cpuid_features(c, true);
+
+ /* If the model name is still unset, do table lookup. */
+ if (!c->x86_model_id[0]) {
+ const char *p;
+ p = table_lookup_model(c);
+ if (p)
+ strcpy(c->x86_model_id, p);
+ else
+ /* Last resort... */
+ sprintf(c->x86_model_id, "%02x/%02x",
+ c->x86, c->x86_model);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ detect_ht(c);
+#endif
+
+ x86_init_rdrand(c);
+ setup_pku(c);
+ setup_cet(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear/Set all flags overridden by options, need do it
+ * before following smp all cpus cap AND.
+ */
+ apply_forced_caps(c);
+
+ /*
+ * On SMP, boot_cpu_data holds the common feature set between
+ * all CPUs; so make sure that we indicate which features are
+ * common between the CPUs. The first time this routine gets
+ * executed, c == &boot_cpu_data.
+ */
+ if (c != &boot_cpu_data) {
+ /* AND the already accumulated flags with these */
+ for (i = 0; i < NCAPINTS; i++)
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i] &= c->x86_capability[i];
+
+ /* OR, i.e. replicate the bug flags */
+ for (i = NCAPINTS; i < NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS; i++)
+ c->x86_capability[i] |= boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[i];
+ }
+
+ ppin_init(c);
+
+ /* Init Machine Check Exception if available. */
+ mcheck_cpu_init(c);
+
+ select_idle_routine(c);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ numa_add_cpu(smp_processor_id());
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up the CPU state needed to execute SYSENTER/SYSEXIT instructions
+ * on 32-bit kernels:
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+void enable_sep_cpu(void)
+{
+ struct tss_struct *tss;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEP))
+ return;
+
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ tss = &per_cpu(cpu_tss_rw, cpu);
+
+ /*
+ * We cache MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS's value in the TSS's ss1 field --
+ * see the big comment in struct x86_hw_tss's definition.
+ */
+
+ tss->x86_tss.ss1 = __KERNEL_CS;
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, tss->x86_tss.ss1, 0);
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1), 0);
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (unsigned long)entry_SYSENTER_32, 0);
+
+ put_cpu();
+}
+#endif
+
+void __init identify_boot_cpu(void)
+{
+ identify_cpu(&boot_cpu_data);
+ if (HAS_KERNEL_IBT && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT))
+ pr_info("CET detected: Indirect Branch Tracking enabled\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ sysenter_setup();
+ enable_sep_cpu();
+#endif
+ cpu_detect_tlb(&boot_cpu_data);
+ setup_cr_pinning();
+
+ tsx_init();
+}
+
+void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ BUG_ON(c == &boot_cpu_data);
+ identify_cpu(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ enable_sep_cpu();
+#endif
+ mtrr_ap_init();
+ validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
+ x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
+ update_srbds_msr();
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+ update_gds_msr();
+
+ tsx_ap_init();
+}
+
+void print_cpu_info(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ const char *vendor = NULL;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor < X86_VENDOR_NUM) {
+ vendor = this_cpu->c_vendor;
+ } else {
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0)
+ vendor = c->x86_vendor_id;
+ }
+
+ if (vendor && !strstr(c->x86_model_id, vendor))
+ pr_cont("%s ", vendor);
+
+ if (c->x86_model_id[0])
+ pr_cont("%s", c->x86_model_id);
+ else
+ pr_cont("%d86", c->x86);
+
+ pr_cont(" (family: 0x%x, model: 0x%x", c->x86, c->x86_model);
+
+ if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
+ pr_cont(", stepping: 0x%x)\n", c->x86_stepping);
+ else
+ pr_cont(")\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * clearcpuid= was already parsed in cpu_parse_early_param(). This dummy
+ * function prevents it from becoming an environment variable for init.
+ */
+static __init int setup_clearcpuid(char *arg)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("clearcpuid=", setup_clearcpuid);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_FIRST(struct fixed_percpu_data,
+ fixed_percpu_data) __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) __visible;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(fixed_percpu_data);
+
+/*
+ * The following percpu variables are hot. Align current_task to
+ * cacheline size such that they fall in the same cacheline.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task) ____cacheline_aligned =
+ &init_task;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(void *, hardirq_stack_ptr);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, hardirq_stack_inuse);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) = TOP_OF_INIT_STACK;
+
+static void wrmsrl_cstar(unsigned long val)
+{
+ /*
+ * Intel CPUs do not support 32-bit SYSCALL. Writing to MSR_CSTAR
+ * is so far ignored by the CPU, but raises a #VE trap in a TDX
+ * guest. Avoid the pointless write on all Intel CPUs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_CSTAR, val);
+}
+
+/* May not be marked __init: used by software suspend */
+void syscall_init(void)
+{
+ wrmsr(MSR_STAR, 0, (__USER32_CS << 16) | __KERNEL_CS);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_LSTAR, (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
+ wrmsrl_cstar((unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_compat);
+ /*
+ * This only works on Intel CPUs.
+ * On AMD CPUs these MSRs are 32-bit, CPU truncates MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP.
+ * This does not cause SYSENTER to jump to the wrong location, because
+ * AMD doesn't allow SYSENTER in long mode (either 32- or 64-bit).
+ */
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)__KERNEL_CS);
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP,
+ (unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(smp_processor_id()) + 1));
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, (u64)entry_SYSENTER_compat);
+#else
+ wrmsrl_cstar((unsigned long)ignore_sysret);
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, (u64)GDT_ENTRY_INVALID_SEG);
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, 0ULL);
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, 0ULL);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Flags to clear on syscall; clear as much as possible
+ * to minimize user space-kernel interference.
+ */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,
+ X86_EFLAGS_CF|X86_EFLAGS_PF|X86_EFLAGS_AF|
+ X86_EFLAGS_ZF|X86_EFLAGS_SF|X86_EFLAGS_TF|
+ X86_EFLAGS_IF|X86_EFLAGS_DF|X86_EFLAGS_OF|
+ X86_EFLAGS_IOPL|X86_EFLAGS_NT|X86_EFLAGS_RF|
+ X86_EFLAGS_AC|X86_EFLAGS_ID);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, current_task) = &init_task;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(current_task);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, __preempt_count) = INIT_PREEMPT_COUNT;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__preempt_count);
+
+/*
+ * On x86_32, vm86 modifies tss.sp0, so sp0 isn't a reliable way to find
+ * the top of the kernel stack. Use an extra percpu variable to track the
+ * top of the kernel stack directly.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cpu_current_top_of_stack) =
+ (unsigned long)&init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE;
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(cpu_current_top_of_stack);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, __stack_chk_guard);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_guard);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+/*
+ * Clear all 6 debug registers:
+ */
+static void clear_all_debug_regs(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ /* Ignore db4, db5 */
+ if ((i == 4) || (i == 5))
+ continue;
+
+ set_debugreg(0, i);
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KGDB
+/*
+ * Restore debug regs if using kgdbwait and you have a kernel debugger
+ * connection established.
+ */
+static void dbg_restore_debug_regs(void)
+{
+ if (unlikely(kgdb_connected && arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break))
+ arch_kgdb_ops.correct_hw_break();
+}
+#else /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
+#define dbg_restore_debug_regs()
+#endif /* ! CONFIG_KGDB */
+
+static void wait_for_master_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ /*
+ * wait for ACK from master CPU before continuing
+ * with AP initialization
+ */
+ WARN_ON(cpumask_test_and_set_cpu(cpu, cpu_initialized_mask));
+ while (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_callout_mask))
+ cpu_relax();
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned long cpudata = vdso_encode_cpunode(cpu, early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
+ struct desc_struct d = { };
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDPID))
+ wrmsr(MSR_TSC_AUX, cpudata, 0);
+
+ /* Store CPU and node number in limit. */
+ d.limit0 = cpudata;
+ d.limit1 = cpudata >> 16;
+
+ d.type = 5; /* RO data, expand down, accessed */
+ d.dpl = 3; /* Visible to user code */
+ d.s = 1; /* Not a system segment */
+ d.p = 1; /* Present */
+ d.d = 1; /* 32-bit */
+
+ write_gdt_entry(get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu), GDT_ENTRY_CPUNODE, &d, DESCTYPE_S);
+}
+
+static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu)
+{
+ if (cpu)
+ load_ucode_ap();
+}
+
+static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss)
+{
+ /* Set up the per-CPU TSS IST stacks */
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DF] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DF);
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_NMI] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(NMI);
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_DB] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(DB);
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_MCE] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(MCE);
+ /* Only mapped when SEV-ES is active */
+ tss->x86_tss.ist[IST_INDEX_VC] = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC);
+}
+
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+static inline void setup_getcpu(int cpu) { }
+
+static inline void ucode_cpu_init(int cpu)
+{
+ show_ucode_info_early();
+}
+
+static inline void tss_setup_ist(struct tss_struct *tss) { }
+
+#endif /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
+
+static inline void tss_setup_io_bitmap(struct tss_struct *tss)
+{
+ tss->x86_tss.io_bitmap_base = IO_BITMAP_OFFSET_INVALID;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IOPL_IOPERM
+ tss->io_bitmap.prev_max = 0;
+ tss->io_bitmap.prev_sequence = 0;
+ memset(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap, 0xff, sizeof(tss->io_bitmap.bitmap));
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the extra array entry past the end of the all
+ * permission bitmap as required by the hardware.
+ */
+ tss->io_bitmap.mapall[IO_BITMAP_LONGS] = ~0UL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup everything needed to handle exceptions from the IDT, including the IST
+ * exceptions which use paranoid_entry().
+ */
+void cpu_init_exception_handling(void)
+{
+ struct tss_struct *tss = this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_tss_rw);
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* paranoid_entry() gets the CPU number from the GDT */
+ setup_getcpu(cpu);
+
+ /* IST vectors need TSS to be set up. */
+ tss_setup_ist(tss);
+ tss_setup_io_bitmap(tss);
+ set_tss_desc(cpu, &get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
+
+ load_TR_desc();
+
+ /* GHCB needs to be setup to handle #VC. */
+ setup_ghcb();
+
+ /* Finally load the IDT */
+ load_current_idt();
+}
+
+/*
+ * cpu_init() initializes state that is per-CPU. Some data is already
+ * initialized (naturally) in the bootstrap process, such as the GDT. We
+ * reload it nevertheless, this function acts as a 'CPU state barrier',
+ * nothing should get across.
+ */
+void cpu_init(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *cur = current;
+ int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
+
+ wait_for_master_cpu(cpu);
+
+ ucode_cpu_init(cpu);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ if (this_cpu_read(numa_node) == 0 &&
+ early_cpu_to_node(cpu) != NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ set_numa_node(early_cpu_to_node(cpu));
+#endif
+ pr_debug("Initializing CPU#%d\n", cpu);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) || cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_VME) ||
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DE))
+ cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VME|X86_CR4_PVI|X86_CR4_TSD|X86_CR4_DE);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the per-CPU GDT with the boot GDT,
+ * and set up the GDT descriptor:
+ */
+ switch_to_new_gdt(cpu);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+ loadsegment(fs, 0);
+ memset(cur->thread.tls_array, 0, GDT_ENTRY_TLS_ENTRIES * 8);
+ syscall_init();
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_FS_BASE, 0);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, 0);
+ barrier();
+
+ x2apic_setup();
+ }
+
+ mmgrab(&init_mm);
+ cur->active_mm = &init_mm;
+ BUG_ON(cur->mm);
+ initialize_tlbstate_and_flush();
+ enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, cur);
+
+ /*
+ * sp0 points to the entry trampoline stack regardless of what task
+ * is running.
+ */
+ load_sp0((unsigned long)(cpu_entry_stack(cpu) + 1));
+
+ load_mm_ldt(&init_mm);
+
+ clear_all_debug_regs();
+ dbg_restore_debug_regs();
+
+ doublefault_init_cpu_tss();
+
+ if (is_uv_system())
+ uv_cpu_init();
+
+ load_fixmap_gdt(cpu);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+void cpu_init_secondary(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Relies on the BP having set-up the IDT tables, which are loaded
+ * on this CPU in cpu_init_exception_handling().
+ */
+ cpu_init_exception_handling();
+ cpu_init();
+ fpu__init_cpu();
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
+/**
+ * store_cpu_caps() - Store a snapshot of CPU capabilities
+ * @curr_info: Pointer where to store it
+ *
+ * Returns: None
+ */
+void store_cpu_caps(struct cpuinfo_x86 *curr_info)
+{
+ /* Reload CPUID max function as it might've changed. */
+ curr_info->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
+
+ /* Copy all capability leafs and pick up the synthetic ones. */
+ memcpy(&curr_info->x86_capability, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
+ sizeof(curr_info->x86_capability));
+
+ /* Get the hardware CPUID leafs */
+ get_cpu_cap(curr_info);
+}
+
+/**
+ * microcode_check() - Check if any CPU capabilities changed after an update.
+ * @prev_info: CPU capabilities stored before an update.
+ *
+ * The microcode loader calls this upon late microcode load to recheck features,
+ * only when microcode has been updated. Caller holds microcode_mutex and CPU
+ * hotplug lock.
+ *
+ * Return: None
+ */
+void microcode_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *prev_info)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 curr_info;
+
+ perf_check_microcode();
+
+ amd_check_microcode();
+
+ store_cpu_caps(&curr_info);
+
+ if (!memcmp(&prev_info->x86_capability, &curr_info.x86_capability,
+ sizeof(prev_info->x86_capability)))
+ return;
+
+ pr_warn("x86/CPU: CPU features have changed after loading microcode, but might not take effect.\n");
+ pr_warn("x86/CPU: Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Invoked from core CPU hotplug code after hotplug operations
+ */
+void arch_smt_update(void)
+{
+ /* Handle the speculative execution misfeatures */
+ cpu_bugs_smt_update();
+ /* Check whether IPI broadcasting can be enabled */
+ apic_smt_update();
+}
+
+void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void)
+{
+ identify_boot_cpu();
+
+ /*
+ * identify_boot_cpu() initialized SMT support information, let the
+ * core code know.
+ */
+ cpu_smt_check_topology();
+
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP)) {
+ pr_info("CPU: ");
+ print_cpu_info(&boot_cpu_data);
+ }
+
+ cpu_select_mitigations();
+
+ arch_smt_update();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+ /*
+ * Check whether this is a real i386 which is not longer
+ * supported and fixup the utsname.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 4)
+ panic("Kernel requires i486+ for 'invlpg' and other features");
+
+ init_utsname()->machine[1] =
+ '0' + (boot_cpu_data.x86 > 6 ? 6 : boot_cpu_data.x86);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Must be before alternatives because it might set or clear
+ * feature bits.
+ */
+ fpu__init_system();
+ fpu__init_cpu();
+
+ alternative_instructions();
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages
+ * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping
+ * MTRRs into large pages causes slow downs.
+ *
+ * Right now we don't do that with gbpages because there seems
+ * very little benefit for that case.
+ */
+ if (!direct_gbpages)
+ set_memory_4k((unsigned long)__va(0), 1);
+ } else {
+ fpu__init_check_bugs();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA
+ * operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will
+ * mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will
+ * not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It
+ * must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64
+ * hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted.
+ */
+ mem_encrypt_init();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d9aeb3350
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef ARCH_X86_CPU_H
+#define ARCH_X86_CPU_H
+
+/* attempt to consolidate cpu attributes */
+struct cpu_dev {
+ const char *c_vendor;
+
+ /* some have two possibilities for cpuid string */
+ const char *c_ident[2];
+
+ void (*c_early_init)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
+ void (*c_bsp_init)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
+ void (*c_init)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
+ void (*c_identify)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
+ void (*c_detect_tlb)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *);
+ int c_x86_vendor;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ /* Optional vendor specific routine to obtain the cache size. */
+ unsigned int (*legacy_cache_size)(struct cpuinfo_x86 *,
+ unsigned int);
+
+ /* Family/stepping-based lookup table for model names. */
+ struct legacy_cpu_model_info {
+ int family;
+ const char *model_names[16];
+ } legacy_models[5];
+#endif
+};
+
+struct _tlb_table {
+ unsigned char descriptor;
+ char tlb_type;
+ unsigned int entries;
+ /* unsigned int ways; */
+ char info[128];
+};
+
+#define cpu_dev_register(cpu_devX) \
+ static const struct cpu_dev *const __cpu_dev_##cpu_devX __used \
+ __section(".x86_cpu_dev.init") = \
+ &cpu_devX;
+
+extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[],
+ *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[];
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL
+enum tsx_ctrl_states {
+ TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
+ TSX_CTRL_DISABLE,
+ TSX_CTRL_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT,
+ TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+extern __ro_after_init enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state;
+
+extern void __init tsx_init(void);
+void tsx_ap_init(void);
+#else
+static inline void tsx_init(void) { }
+static inline void tsx_ap_init(void) { }
+#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL */
+
+extern void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
+extern void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void get_cpu_address_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void cpu_detect_cache_sizes(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void init_intel_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void init_amd_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void init_hygon_cacheinfo(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
+extern void detect_num_cpu_cores(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern int detect_ht_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void detect_ht(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+extern void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+
+unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);
+void cpu_select_mitigations(void);
+
+extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
+extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
+extern void update_gds_msr(void);
+
+extern u64 x86_read_arch_cap_msr(void);
+
+#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c881bcafb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/* Declare dependencies between CPUIDs */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+struct cpuid_dep {
+ unsigned int feature;
+ unsigned int depends;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Table of CPUID features that depend on others.
+ *
+ * This only includes dependencies that can be usefully disabled, not
+ * features part of the base set (like FPU).
+ *
+ * Note this all is not __init / __initdata because it can be
+ * called from cpu hotplug. It shouldn't do anything in this case,
+ * but it's difficult to tell that to the init reference checker.
+ */
+static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
+ { X86_FEATURE_FXSR, X86_FEATURE_FPU },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XSAVEOPT, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XSAVEC, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XSAVES, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PKU, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_MPX, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CMOV, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
+ { X86_FEATURE_MMX, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
+ { X86_FEATURE_MMXEXT, X86_FEATURE_MMX },
+ { X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XSAVE, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM, X86_FEATURE_FXSR },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM2, X86_FEATURE_XMM },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM4_1, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM4_2, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XMM3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PCLMULQDQ, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SSSE3, X86_FEATURE_XMM2, },
+ { X86_FEATURE_F16C, X86_FEATURE_XMM2, },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AES, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SHA_NI, X86_FEATURE_XMM2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_FMA, X86_FEATURE_AVX },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX2, X86_FEATURE_AVX, },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512F, X86_FEATURE_AVX, },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512IFMA, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512PF, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512ER, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512CD, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512DQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512VBMI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VBMI2, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_GFNI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_VAES, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_VPCLMULQDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VNNI, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BITALG, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4VNNIW, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ, X86_FEATURE_AVX512F },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512VL },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16, X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW },
+ { X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, X86_FEATURE_MBA },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC, X86_FEATURE_SGX },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SGX1, X86_FEATURE_SGX },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SGX2, X86_FEATURE_SGX1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES },
+ { X86_FEATURE_XFD, X86_FEATURE_XGETBV1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AMX_TILE, X86_FEATURE_XFD },
+ {}
+};
+
+static inline void clear_feature(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: This could use the non atomic __*_bit() variants, but the
+ * rest of the cpufeature code uses atomics as well, so keep it for
+ * consistency. Cleanup all of it separately.
+ */
+ if (!c) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(&boot_cpu_data, feature);
+ set_bit(feature, (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared);
+ } else {
+ clear_bit(feature, (unsigned long *)c->x86_capability);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Take the capabilities and the BUG bits into account */
+#define MAX_FEATURE_BITS ((NCAPINTS + NBUGINTS) * sizeof(u32) * 8)
+
+static void do_clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
+{
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(disable, MAX_FEATURE_BITS);
+ const struct cpuid_dep *d;
+ bool changed;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(feature >= MAX_FEATURE_BITS))
+ return;
+
+ clear_feature(c, feature);
+
+ /* Collect all features to disable, handling dependencies */
+ memset(disable, 0, sizeof(disable));
+ __set_bit(feature, disable);
+
+ /* Loop until we get a stable state. */
+ do {
+ changed = false;
+ for (d = cpuid_deps; d->feature; d++) {
+ if (!test_bit(d->depends, disable))
+ continue;
+ if (__test_and_set_bit(d->feature, disable))
+ continue;
+
+ changed = true;
+ clear_feature(c, d->feature);
+ }
+ } while (changed);
+}
+
+void clear_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int feature)
+{
+ do_clear_cpu_cap(c, feature);
+}
+
+void setup_clear_cpu_cap(unsigned int feature)
+{
+ do_clear_cpu_cap(NULL, feature);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9651275ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cyrix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,467 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/isa-dma.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <asm/dma.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <asm/processor-cyrix.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <linux/timer.h>
+#include <asm/pci-direct.h>
+#include <asm/tsc.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+/*
+ * Read NSC/Cyrix DEVID registers (DIR) to get more detailed info. about the CPU
+ */
+static void __do_cyrix_devid(unsigned char *dir0, unsigned char *dir1)
+{
+ unsigned char ccr2, ccr3;
+
+ /* we test for DEVID by checking whether CCR3 is writable */
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3 ^ 0x80);
+ getCx86(0xc0); /* dummy to change bus */
+
+ if (getCx86(CX86_CCR3) == ccr3) { /* no DEVID regs. */
+ ccr2 = getCx86(CX86_CCR2);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR2, ccr2 ^ 0x04);
+ getCx86(0xc0); /* dummy */
+
+ if (getCx86(CX86_CCR2) == ccr2) /* old Cx486SLC/DLC */
+ *dir0 = 0xfd;
+ else { /* Cx486S A step */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR2, ccr2);
+ *dir0 = 0xfe;
+ }
+ } else {
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3); /* restore CCR3 */
+
+ /* read DIR0 and DIR1 CPU registers */
+ *dir0 = getCx86(CX86_DIR0);
+ *dir1 = getCx86(CX86_DIR1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void do_cyrix_devid(unsigned char *dir0, unsigned char *dir1)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ __do_cyrix_devid(dir0, dir1);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+/*
+ * Cx86_dir0_msb is a HACK needed by check_cx686_cpuid/slop in bugs.h in
+ * order to identify the Cyrix CPU model after we're out of setup.c
+ *
+ * Actually since bugs.h doesn't even reference this perhaps someone should
+ * fix the documentation ???
+ */
+static unsigned char Cx86_dir0_msb = 0;
+
+static const char Cx86_model[][9] = {
+ "Cx486", "Cx486", "5x86 ", "6x86", "MediaGX ", "6x86MX ",
+ "M II ", "Unknown"
+};
+static const char Cx486_name[][5] = {
+ "SLC", "DLC", "SLC2", "DLC2", "SRx", "DRx",
+ "SRx2", "DRx2"
+};
+static const char Cx486S_name[][4] = {
+ "S", "S2", "Se", "S2e"
+};
+static const char Cx486D_name[][4] = {
+ "DX", "DX2", "?", "?", "?", "DX4"
+};
+static char Cx86_cb[] = "?.5x Core/Bus Clock";
+static const char cyrix_model_mult1[] = "12??43";
+static const char cyrix_model_mult2[] = "12233445";
+
+/*
+ * Reset the slow-loop (SLOP) bit on the 686(L) which is set by some old
+ * BIOSes for compatibility with DOS games. This makes the udelay loop
+ * work correctly, and improves performance.
+ *
+ * FIXME: our newer udelay uses the tsc. We don't need to frob with SLOP
+ */
+
+static void check_cx686_slop(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (Cx86_dir0_msb == 3) {
+ unsigned char ccr3, ccr5;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10); /* enable MAPEN */
+ ccr5 = getCx86(CX86_CCR5);
+ if (ccr5 & 2)
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR5, ccr5 & 0xfd); /* reset SLOP */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3); /* disable MAPEN */
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ if (ccr5 & 2) { /* possible wrong calibration done */
+ pr_info("Recalibrating delay loop with SLOP bit reset\n");
+ calibrate_delay();
+ c->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+static void set_cx86_reorder(void)
+{
+ u8 ccr3;
+
+ pr_info("Enable Memory access reorder on Cyrix/NSC processor.\n");
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10); /* enable MAPEN */
+
+ /* Load/Store Serialize to mem access disable (=reorder it) */
+ setCx86(CX86_PCR0, getCx86(CX86_PCR0) & ~0x80);
+ /* set load/store serialize from 1GB to 4GB */
+ ccr3 |= 0xe0;
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3);
+}
+
+static void set_cx86_memwb(void)
+{
+ pr_info("Enable Memory-Write-back mode on Cyrix/NSC processor.\n");
+
+ /* CCR2 bit 2: unlock NW bit */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR2, getCx86(CX86_CCR2) & ~0x04);
+ /* set 'Not Write-through' */
+ write_cr0(read_cr0() | X86_CR0_NW);
+ /* CCR2 bit 2: lock NW bit and set WT1 */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR2, getCx86(CX86_CCR2) | 0x14);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Configure later MediaGX and/or Geode processor.
+ */
+
+static void geode_configure(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 ccr3;
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ /* Suspend on halt power saving and enable #SUSP pin */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR2, getCx86(CX86_CCR2) | 0x88);
+
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10); /* enable MAPEN */
+
+
+ /* FPU fast, DTE cache, Mem bypass */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR4, getCx86(CX86_CCR4) | 0x38);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3); /* disable MAPEN */
+
+ set_cx86_memwb();
+ set_cx86_reorder();
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static void early_init_cyrix(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned char dir0, dir0_msn, dir1 = 0;
+
+ __do_cyrix_devid(&dir0, &dir1);
+ dir0_msn = dir0 >> 4; /* identifies CPU "family" */
+
+ switch (dir0_msn) {
+ case 3: /* 6x86/6x86L */
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Cyrix's ARRs. */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR);
+ break;
+ case 5: /* 6x86MX/M II */
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Cyrix's ARRs. */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_cyrix(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned char dir0, dir0_msn, dir0_lsn, dir1 = 0;
+ char *buf = c->x86_model_id;
+ const char *p = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Bit 31 in normal CPUID used for nonstandard 3DNow ID;
+ * 3DNow is IDd by bit 31 in extended CPUID (1*32+31) anyway
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, 0*32+31);
+
+ /* Cyrix used bit 24 in extended (AMD) CPUID for Cyrix MMX extensions */
+ if (test_cpu_cap(c, 1*32+24)) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, 1*32+24);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CXMMX);
+ }
+
+ do_cyrix_devid(&dir0, &dir1);
+
+ check_cx686_slop(c);
+
+ Cx86_dir0_msb = dir0_msn = dir0 >> 4; /* identifies CPU "family" */
+ dir0_lsn = dir0 & 0xf; /* model or clock multiplier */
+
+ /* common case step number/rev -- exceptions handled below */
+ c->x86_model = (dir1 >> 4) + 1;
+ c->x86_stepping = dir1 & 0xf;
+
+ /* Now cook; the original recipe is by Channing Corn, from Cyrix.
+ * We do the same thing for each generation: we work out
+ * the model, multiplier and stepping. Black magic included,
+ * to make the silicon step/rev numbers match the printed ones.
+ */
+
+ switch (dir0_msn) {
+ unsigned char tmp;
+
+ case 0: /* Cx486SLC/DLC/SRx/DRx */
+ p = Cx486_name[dir0_lsn & 7];
+ break;
+
+ case 1: /* Cx486S/DX/DX2/DX4 */
+ p = (dir0_lsn & 8) ? Cx486D_name[dir0_lsn & 5]
+ : Cx486S_name[dir0_lsn & 3];
+ break;
+
+ case 2: /* 5x86 */
+ Cx86_cb[2] = cyrix_model_mult1[dir0_lsn & 5];
+ p = Cx86_cb+2;
+ break;
+
+ case 3: /* 6x86/6x86L */
+ Cx86_cb[1] = ' ';
+ Cx86_cb[2] = cyrix_model_mult1[dir0_lsn & 5];
+ if (dir1 > 0x21) { /* 686L */
+ Cx86_cb[0] = 'L';
+ p = Cx86_cb;
+ (c->x86_model)++;
+ } else /* 686 */
+ p = Cx86_cb+1;
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Cyrix's ARRs. */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR);
+ /* 6x86's contain this bug */
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_COMA);
+ break;
+
+ case 4: /* MediaGX/GXm or Geode GXM/GXLV/GX1 */
+ case 11: /* GX1 with inverted Device ID */
+#ifdef CONFIG_PCI
+ {
+ u32 vendor, device;
+ /*
+ * It isn't really a PCI quirk directly, but the cure is the
+ * same. The MediaGX has deep magic SMM stuff that handles the
+ * SB emulation. It throws away the fifo on disable_dma() which
+ * is wrong and ruins the audio.
+ *
+ * Bug2: VSA1 has a wrap bug so that using maximum sized DMA
+ * causes bad things. According to NatSemi VSA2 has another
+ * bug to do with 'hlt'. I've not seen any boards using VSA2
+ * and X doesn't seem to support it either so who cares 8).
+ * VSA1 we work around however.
+ */
+
+ pr_info("Working around Cyrix MediaGX virtual DMA bugs.\n");
+ isa_dma_bridge_buggy = 2;
+
+ /* We do this before the PCI layer is running. However we
+ are safe here as we know the bridge must be a Cyrix
+ companion and must be present */
+ vendor = read_pci_config_16(0, 0, 0x12, PCI_VENDOR_ID);
+ device = read_pci_config_16(0, 0, 0x12, PCI_DEVICE_ID);
+
+ /*
+ * The 5510/5520 companion chips have a funky PIT.
+ */
+ if (vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_CYRIX &&
+ (device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_CYRIX_5510 ||
+ device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_CYRIX_5520))
+ mark_tsc_unstable("cyrix 5510/5520 detected");
+ }
+#endif
+ c->x86_cache_size = 16; /* Yep 16K integrated cache that's it */
+
+ /* GXm supports extended cpuid levels 'ala' AMD */
+ if (c->cpuid_level == 2) {
+ /* Enable cxMMX extensions (GX1 Datasheet 54) */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR7, getCx86(CX86_CCR7) | 1);
+
+ /*
+ * GXm : 0x30 ... 0x5f GXm datasheet 51
+ * GXlv: 0x6x GXlv datasheet 54
+ * ? : 0x7x
+ * GX1 : 0x8x GX1 datasheet 56
+ */
+ if ((0x30 <= dir1 && dir1 <= 0x6f) ||
+ (0x80 <= dir1 && dir1 <= 0x8f))
+ geode_configure();
+ return;
+ } else { /* MediaGX */
+ Cx86_cb[2] = (dir0_lsn & 1) ? '3' : '4';
+ p = Cx86_cb+2;
+ c->x86_model = (dir1 & 0x20) ? 1 : 2;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case 5: /* 6x86MX/M II */
+ if (dir1 > 7) {
+ dir0_msn++; /* M II */
+ /* Enable MMX extensions (App note 108) */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR7, getCx86(CX86_CCR7)|1);
+ } else {
+ /* A 6x86MX - it has the bug. */
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_COMA);
+ }
+ tmp = (!(dir0_lsn & 7) || dir0_lsn & 1) ? 2 : 0;
+ Cx86_cb[tmp] = cyrix_model_mult2[dir0_lsn & 7];
+ p = Cx86_cb+tmp;
+ if (((dir1 & 0x0f) > 4) || ((dir1 & 0xf0) == 0x20))
+ (c->x86_model)++;
+ /* Emulate MTRRs using Cyrix's ARRs. */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR);
+ break;
+
+ case 0xf: /* Cyrix 486 without DEVID registers */
+ switch (dir0_lsn) {
+ case 0xd: /* either a 486SLC or DLC w/o DEVID */
+ dir0_msn = 0;
+ p = Cx486_name[!!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU)];
+ break;
+
+ case 0xe: /* a 486S A step */
+ dir0_msn = 0;
+ p = Cx486S_name[0];
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default: /* unknown (shouldn't happen, we know everyone ;-) */
+ dir0_msn = 7;
+ break;
+ }
+ strcpy(buf, Cx86_model[dir0_msn & 7]);
+ if (p)
+ strcat(buf, p);
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle National Semiconductor branded processors
+ */
+static void init_nsc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * There may be GX1 processors in the wild that are branded
+ * NSC and not Cyrix.
+ *
+ * This function only handles the GX processor, and kicks every
+ * thing else to the Cyrix init function above - that should
+ * cover any processors that might have been branded differently
+ * after NSC acquired Cyrix.
+ *
+ * If this breaks your GX1 horribly, please e-mail
+ * info-linux@ldcmail.amd.com to tell us.
+ */
+
+ /* Handle the GX (Formally known as the GX2) */
+
+ if (c->x86 == 5 && c->x86_model == 5)
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+ else
+ init_cyrix(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cyrix CPUs without cpuid or with cpuid not yet enabled can be detected
+ * by the fact that they preserve the flags across the division of 5/2.
+ * PII and PPro exhibit this behavior too, but they have cpuid available.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Perform the Cyrix 5/2 test. A Cyrix won't change
+ * the flags, while other 486 chips will.
+ */
+static inline int test_cyrix_52div(void)
+{
+ unsigned int test;
+
+ __asm__ __volatile__(
+ "sahf\n\t" /* clear flags (%eax = 0x0005) */
+ "div %b2\n\t" /* divide 5 by 2 */
+ "lahf" /* store flags into %ah */
+ : "=a" (test)
+ : "0" (5), "q" (2)
+ : "cc");
+
+ /* AH is 0x02 on Cyrix after the divide.. */
+ return (unsigned char) (test >> 8) == 0x02;
+}
+
+static void cyrix_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* Detect Cyrix with disabled CPUID */
+ if (c->x86 == 4 && test_cyrix_52div()) {
+ unsigned char dir0, dir1;
+
+ strcpy(c->x86_vendor_id, "CyrixInstead");
+ c->x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_CYRIX;
+
+ /* Actually enable cpuid on the older cyrix */
+
+ /* Retrieve CPU revisions */
+
+ do_cyrix_devid(&dir0, &dir1);
+
+ dir0 >>= 4;
+
+ /* Check it is an affected model */
+
+ if (dir0 == 5 || dir0 == 3) {
+ unsigned char ccr3;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ pr_info("Enabling CPUID on Cyrix processor.\n");
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ /* enable MAPEN */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10);
+ /* enable cpuid */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR4, getCx86(CX86_CCR4) | 0x80);
+ /* disable MAPEN */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev cyrix_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Cyrix",
+ .c_ident = { "CyrixInstead" },
+ .c_early_init = early_init_cyrix,
+ .c_init = init_cyrix,
+ .c_identify = cyrix_identify,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_CYRIX,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(cyrix_cpu_dev);
+
+static const struct cpu_dev nsc_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "NSC",
+ .c_ident = { "Geode by NSC" },
+ .c_init = init_nsc,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_NSC,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(nsc_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..03851240c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/tboot.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/cpu: " fmt
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
+enum vmx_feature_leafs {
+ MISC_FEATURES = 0,
+ PRIMARY_CTLS,
+ SECONDARY_CTLS,
+ TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW,
+ TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH,
+ NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS,
+};
+
+#define VMX_F(x) BIT(VMX_FEATURE_##x & 0x1f)
+
+static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 supported, funcs, ept, vpid, ign, low, high;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(NVMXINTS != NR_VMX_FEATURE_WORDS);
+
+ /*
+ * The high bits contain the allowed-1 settings, i.e. features that can
+ * be turned on. The low bits contain the allowed-0 settings, i.e.
+ * features that can be turned off. Ignore the allowed-0 settings,
+ * if a feature can be turned on then it's supported.
+ *
+ * Use raw rdmsr() for primary processor controls and pin controls MSRs
+ * as they exist on any CPU that supports VMX, i.e. we want the WARN if
+ * the RDMSR faults.
+ */
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS, ign, supported);
+ c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] = supported;
+
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, &ign, &supported);
+ c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] = supported;
+
+ /* All 64 bits of tertiary controls MSR are allowed-1 settings. */
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS3, &low, &high);
+ c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_LOW] = low;
+ c->vmx_capability[TERTIARY_CTLS_HIGH] = high;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS, ign, supported);
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC, &ign, &funcs);
+
+ /*
+ * Except for EPT+VPID, which enumerates support for both in a single
+ * MSR, low for EPT, high for VPID.
+ */
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP, &ept, &vpid);
+
+ /* Pin, EPT, VPID and VM-Func are merged into a single word. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(supported >> 16);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(funcs >> 4);
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] = (supported & 0xffff) |
+ ((vpid & 0x1) << 16) |
+ ((funcs & 0xf) << 28);
+
+ /* EPT bits are full on scattered and must be manually handled. */
+ if (ept & VMX_EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY_BIT)
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_EXECUTE_ONLY);
+ if (ept & VMX_EPT_AD_BIT)
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_AD);
+ if (ept & VMX_EPT_1GB_PAGE_BIT)
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(EPT_1GB);
+
+ /* Synthetic APIC features that are aggregates of multiple features. */
+ if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) &&
+ (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_APIC_ACCESSES)))
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY);
+
+ if ((c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR)) &&
+ (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)) &&
+ (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRT_INTR_DELIVERY)) &&
+ (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(POSTED_INTR)))
+ c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] |= VMX_F(APICV);
+
+ /* Set the synthetic cpufeatures to preserve /proc/cpuinfo's ABI. */
+ if (c->vmx_capability[PRIMARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_TPR))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW);
+ if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(FLEXPRIORITY))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FLEXPRIORITY);
+ if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VIRTUAL_NMIS))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VNMI);
+ if (c->vmx_capability[SECONDARY_CTLS] & VMX_F(EPT))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT);
+ if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(EPT_AD))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EPT_AD);
+ if (c->vmx_capability[MISC_FEATURES] & VMX_F(VPID))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VPID);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
+
+static int __init nosgx(char *str)
+{
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+early_param("nosgx", nosgx);
+
+void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ bool enable_sgx_kvm = false, enable_sgx_driver = false;
+ bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
+ bool enable_vmx;
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX)) {
+ /*
+ * Separate out SGX driver enabling from KVM. This allows KVM
+ * guests to use SGX even if the kernel SGX driver refuses to
+ * use it. This happens if flexible Launch Control is not
+ * available.
+ */
+ enable_sgx_driver = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+ enable_sgx_kvm = enable_vmx && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM);
+ }
+
+ if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
+ goto update_caps;
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore whatever value BIOS left in the MSR to avoid enabling random
+ * features or faulting on the WRMSR.
+ */
+ msr = FEAT_CTL_LOCKED;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable VMX if and only if the kernel may do VMXON at some point,
+ * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
+ * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
+ */
+ if (enable_vmx) {
+ msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
+
+ if (tboot)
+ msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
+ }
+
+ if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) {
+ msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+ if (enable_sgx_driver)
+ msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
+
+update_caps:
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL);
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ goto update_sgx;
+
+ if ( (tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)) ||
+ (!tboot && !(msr & FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX))) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL))
+ pr_err_once("VMX (%s TXT) disabled by BIOS\n",
+ tboot ? "inside" : "outside");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
+ } else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
+ init_vmx_capabilities(c);
+#endif
+ }
+
+update_sgx:
+ if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED)) {
+ if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver)
+ pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS.\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * VMX feature bit may be cleared due to being disabled in BIOS,
+ * in which case SGX virtualization cannot be supported either.
+ */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && enable_sgx_kvm) {
+ pr_err_once("SGX virtualization disabled due to lack of VMX.\n");
+ enable_sgx_kvm = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) && enable_sgx_driver) {
+ if (!enable_sgx_kvm) {
+ pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Disable SGX.\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+ } else {
+ pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Support SGX virtualization only.\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e8380bd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hygon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+
+/*
+ * Hygon Processor Support for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Chengdu Haiguang IC Design Co., Ltd.
+ *
+ * Author: Pu Wen <puwen@hygon.cn>
+ */
+#include <linux/io.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+#include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
+#include <asm/delay.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#define APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT 6
+
+/*
+ * nodes_per_socket: Stores the number of nodes per socket.
+ * Refer to CPUID Fn8000_001E_ECX Node Identifiers[10:8]
+ */
+static u32 nodes_per_socket = 1;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+/*
+ * To workaround broken NUMA config. Read the comment in
+ * srat_detect_node().
+ */
+static int nearby_node(int apicid)
+{
+ int i, node;
+
+ for (i = apicid - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ node = __apicid_to_node[i];
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
+ return node;
+ }
+ for (i = apicid + 1; i < MAX_LOCAL_APIC; i++) {
+ node = __apicid_to_node[i];
+ if (node != NUMA_NO_NODE && node_online(node))
+ return node;
+ }
+ return first_node(node_online_map); /* Shouldn't happen */
+}
+#endif
+
+static void hygon_get_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT))
+ smp_num_siblings = ((cpuid_ebx(0x8000001e) >> 8) & 0xff) + 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fixup core topology information for
+ * (1) Hygon multi-node processors
+ * Assumption: Number of cores in each internal node is the same.
+ * (2) Hygon processors supporting compute units
+ */
+static void hygon_get_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* get information required for multi-node processors */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ int err;
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid(0x8000001e, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->cpu_die_id = ecx & 0xff;
+
+ c->cpu_core_id = ebx & 0xff;
+
+ if (smp_num_siblings > 1)
+ c->x86_max_cores /= smp_num_siblings;
+
+ /*
+ * In case leaf B is available, use it to derive
+ * topology information.
+ */
+ err = detect_extended_topology(c);
+ if (!err)
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order(c->x86_max_cores);
+
+ /*
+ * Socket ID is ApicId[6] for the processors with model <= 0x3
+ * when running on host.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) && c->x86_model <= 0x3)
+ c->phys_proc_id = c->apicid >> APICID_SOCKET_ID_BIT;
+
+ cacheinfo_hygon_init_llc_id(c, cpu);
+ } else if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
+ u64 value;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
+ c->cpu_die_id = value & 7;
+
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id;
+ } else
+ return;
+
+ if (nodes_per_socket > 1)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM);
+}
+
+/*
+ * On Hygon setup the lower bits of the APIC id distinguish the cores.
+ * Assumes number of cores is a power of two.
+ */
+static void hygon_detect_cmp(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int bits;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ bits = c->x86_coreid_bits;
+ /* Low order bits define the core id (index of core in socket) */
+ c->cpu_core_id = c->initial_apicid & ((1 << bits)-1);
+ /* Convert the initial APIC ID into the socket ID */
+ c->phys_proc_id = c->initial_apicid >> bits;
+ /* use socket ID also for last level cache */
+ per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu) = c->cpu_die_id = c->phys_proc_id;
+}
+
+static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ int node;
+ unsigned int apicid = c->apicid;
+
+ node = numa_cpu_node(cpu);
+ if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ node = per_cpu(cpu_llc_id, cpu);
+
+ /*
+ * On multi-fabric platform (e.g. Numascale NumaChip) a
+ * platform-specific handler needs to be called to fixup some
+ * IDs of the CPU.
+ */
+ if (x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id)
+ x86_cpuinit.fixup_cpu_id(c, node);
+
+ if (!node_online(node)) {
+ /*
+ * Two possibilities here:
+ *
+ * - The CPU is missing memory and no node was created. In
+ * that case try picking one from a nearby CPU.
+ *
+ * - The APIC IDs differ from the HyperTransport node IDs.
+ * Assume they are all increased by a constant offset, but
+ * in the same order as the HT nodeids. If that doesn't
+ * result in a usable node fall back to the path for the
+ * previous case.
+ *
+ * This workaround operates directly on the mapping between
+ * APIC ID and NUMA node, assuming certain relationship
+ * between APIC ID, HT node ID and NUMA topology. As going
+ * through CPU mapping may alter the outcome, directly
+ * access __apicid_to_node[].
+ */
+ int ht_nodeid = c->initial_apicid;
+
+ if (__apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid] != NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ node = __apicid_to_node[ht_nodeid];
+ /* Pick a nearby node */
+ if (!node_online(node))
+ node = nearby_node(apicid);
+ }
+ numa_set_node(cpu, node);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void early_init_hygon_mc(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned int bits, ecx;
+
+ /* Multi core CPU? */
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000008)
+ return;
+
+ ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x80000008);
+
+ c->x86_max_cores = (ecx & 0xff) + 1;
+
+ /* CPU telling us the core id bits shift? */
+ bits = (ecx >> 12) & 0xF;
+
+ /* Otherwise recompute */
+ if (bits == 0) {
+ while ((1 << bits) < c->x86_max_cores)
+ bits++;
+ }
+
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = bits;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void bsp_init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC)) {
+ u64 val;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, val);
+ if (!(val & BIT(24)))
+ pr_warn(FW_BUG "TSC doesn't count with P0 frequency!\n");
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MWAITX))
+ use_mwaitx_delay();
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TOPOEXT)) {
+ u32 ecx;
+
+ ecx = cpuid_ecx(0x8000001e);
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((ecx >> 8) & 7) + 1;
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NODEID_MSR)) {
+ u64 value;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_FAM10H_NODE_ID, value);
+ __max_die_per_package = nodes_per_socket = ((value >> 3) & 7) + 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) {
+ /*
+ * Try to cache the base value so further operations can
+ * avoid RMW. If that faults, do not enable SSBD.
+ */
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, &x86_amd_ls_cfg_base)) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask = 1ULL << 10;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void early_init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 dummy;
+
+ early_init_hygon_mc(c);
+
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_K8);
+
+ rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, &c->microcode, &dummy);
+
+ /*
+ * c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
+ * with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states
+ */
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
+ }
+
+ /* Bit 12 of 8000_0007 edx is accumulated power mechanism. */
+ if (c->x86_power & BIT(12))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER);
+
+ /* Bit 14 indicates the Runtime Average Power Limit interface. */
+ if (c->x86_power & BIT(14))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RAPL);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSCALL32);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC) && defined(CONFIG_PCI)
+ /*
+ * ApicID can always be treated as an 8-bit value for Hygon APIC So, we
+ * can safely set X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID unconditionally.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_EXTD_APICID);
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * This is only needed to tell the kernel whether to use VMCALL
+ * and VMMCALL. VMMCALL is never executed except under virt, so
+ * we can set it unconditionally.
+ */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMMCALL);
+
+ hygon_get_topology_early(c);
+}
+
+static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ early_init_hygon(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Bit 31 in normal CPUID used for nonstandard 3DNow ID;
+ * 3DNow is IDd by bit 31 in extended CPUID (1*32+31) anyway
+ */
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, 0*32+31);
+
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+
+ /* get apicid instead of initial apic id from cpuid */
+ c->apicid = hard_smp_processor_id();
+
+ /*
+ * XXX someone from Hygon needs to confirm this DTRT
+ *
+ init_spectral_chicken(c);
+ */
+
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ZEN);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPB);
+
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+
+ hygon_detect_cmp(c);
+ hygon_get_topology(c);
+ srat_detect_node(c);
+
+ init_hygon_cacheinfo(c);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2)) {
+ /*
+ * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which
+ * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
+ * msr_set_bit() uses the safe accessors, too, even if the MSR
+ * is not present.
+ */
+ msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG,
+ MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT);
+
+ /* A serializing LFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Hygon processors have APIC timer running in deep C states.
+ */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARAT);
+
+ /* Hygon CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET, Xen does. */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
+
+ check_null_seg_clears_base(c);
+}
+
+static void cpu_detect_tlb_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 ebx, eax, ecx, edx;
+ u16 mask = 0xfff;
+
+ if (c->extended_cpuid_level < 0x80000006)
+ return;
+
+ cpuid(0x80000006, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = (ebx >> 16) & mask;
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = ebx & mask;
+
+ /* Handle DTLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
+ if (!((eax >> 16) & mask))
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = (cpuid_eax(0x80000005) >> 16) & 0xff;
+ else
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = (eax >> 16) & mask;
+
+ /* a 4M entry uses two 2M entries */
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] >> 1;
+
+ /* Handle ITLB 2M and 4M sizes, fall back to L1 if L2 is disabled */
+ if (!(eax & mask)) {
+ cpuid(0x80000005, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = eax & 0xff;
+ } else
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = eax & mask;
+
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] >> 1;
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev hygon_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Hygon",
+ .c_ident = { "HygonGenuine" },
+ .c_early_init = early_init_hygon,
+ .c_detect_tlb = cpu_detect_tlb_hygon,
+ .c_bsp_init = bsp_init_hygon,
+ .c_init = init_hygon,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_HYGON,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(hygon_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..553bfbfc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/hypervisor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Common hypervisor code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, VMware, Inc.
+ * Author : Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, GOOD TITLE or
+ * NON INFRINGEMENT. See the GNU General Public License for more
+ * details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+
+static const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 * const hypervisors[] =
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
+ &x86_hyper_xen_pv,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM
+ &x86_hyper_xen_hvm,
+#endif
+ &x86_hyper_vmware,
+ &x86_hyper_ms_hyperv,
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
+ &x86_hyper_kvm,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_JAILHOUSE_GUEST
+ &x86_hyper_jailhouse,
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACRN_GUEST
+ &x86_hyper_acrn,
+#endif
+};
+
+enum x86_hypervisor_type x86_hyper_type;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_hyper_type);
+
+bool __initdata nopv;
+static __init int parse_nopv(char *arg)
+{
+ nopv = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("nopv", parse_nopv);
+
+static inline const struct hypervisor_x86 * __init
+detect_hypervisor_vendor(void)
+{
+ const struct hypervisor_x86 *h = NULL, * const *p;
+ uint32_t pri, max_pri = 0;
+
+ for (p = hypervisors; p < hypervisors + ARRAY_SIZE(hypervisors); p++) {
+ if (unlikely(nopv) && !(*p)->ignore_nopv)
+ continue;
+
+ pri = (*p)->detect();
+ if (pri > max_pri) {
+ max_pri = pri;
+ h = *p;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (h)
+ pr_info("Hypervisor detected: %s\n", h->name);
+
+ return h;
+}
+
+static void __init copy_array(const void *src, void *target, unsigned int size)
+{
+ unsigned int i, n = size / sizeof(void *);
+ const void * const *from = (const void * const *)src;
+ const void **to = (const void **)target;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (from[i])
+ to[i] = from[i];
+}
+
+void __init init_hypervisor_platform(void)
+{
+ const struct hypervisor_x86 *h;
+
+ h = detect_hypervisor_vendor();
+
+ if (!h)
+ return;
+
+ copy_array(&h->init, &x86_init.hyper, sizeof(h->init));
+ copy_array(&h->runtime, &x86_platform.hyper, sizeof(h->runtime));
+
+ x86_hyper_type = h->type;
+ x86_init.hyper.init_platform();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..427899650
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1427 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pgtable.h>
+
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+#include <linux/semaphore.h>
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/bugs.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap2.h>
+#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/thermal.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+#include <linux/topology.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+#include <asm/mpspec.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#endif
+
+enum split_lock_detect_state {
+ sld_off = 0,
+ sld_warn,
+ sld_fatal,
+ sld_ratelimit,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Default to sld_off because most systems do not support split lock detection.
+ * sld_state_setup() will switch this to sld_warn on systems that support
+ * split lock/bus lock detect, unless there is a command line override.
+ */
+static enum split_lock_detect_state sld_state __ro_after_init = sld_off;
+static u64 msr_test_ctrl_cache __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * With a name like MSR_TEST_CTL it should go without saying, but don't touch
+ * MSR_TEST_CTL unless the CPU is one of the whitelisted models. Writing it
+ * on CPUs that do not support SLD can cause fireworks, even when writing '0'.
+ */
+static bool cpu_model_supports_sld __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Processors which have self-snooping capability can handle conflicting
+ * memory type across CPUs by snooping its own cache. However, there exists
+ * CPU models in which having conflicting memory types still leads to
+ * unpredictable behavior, machine check errors, or hangs. Clear this
+ * feature to prevent its use on machines with known erratas.
+ */
+static void check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE:
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool ring3mwait_disabled __read_mostly;
+
+static int __init ring3mwait_disable(char *__unused)
+{
+ ring3mwait_disabled = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ring3mwait=disable", ring3mwait_disable);
+
+static void probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ring 3 MONITOR/MWAIT feature cannot be detected without
+ * cpu model and family comparison.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 != 6)
+ return;
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (ring3mwait_disabled)
+ return;
+
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RING3MWAIT);
+ this_cpu_or(msr_misc_features_shadow,
+ 1UL << MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES_RING3MWAIT_BIT);
+
+ if (c == &boot_cpu_data)
+ ELF_HWCAP2 |= HWCAP2_RING3MWAIT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Early microcode releases for the Spectre v2 mitigation were broken.
+ * Information taken from;
+ * - https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/03/microcode-update-guidance.pdf
+ * - https://kb.vmware.com/s/article/52345
+ * - Microcode revisions observed in the wild
+ * - Release note from 20180108 microcode release
+ */
+struct sku_microcode {
+ u8 model;
+ u8 stepping;
+ u32 microcode;
+};
+static const struct sku_microcode spectre_bad_microcodes[] = {
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x0B, 0x80 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x0A, 0x80 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE, 0x09, 0x80 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L, 0x0A, 0x80 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_L, 0x09, 0x80 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x03, 0x0100013e },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 0x04, 0x0200003c },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL, 0x04, 0x28 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_G, 0x01, 0x1b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 0x02, 0x14 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_D, 0x03, 0x07000011 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X, 0x01, 0x0b000025 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L, 0x01, 0x21 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G, 0x01, 0x18 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL, 0x03, 0x23 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x02, 0x3b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X, 0x04, 0x10 },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X, 0x04, 0x42a },
+ /* Observed in the wild */
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x06, 0x61b },
+ { INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X, 0x07, 0x712 },
+};
+
+static bool bad_spectre_microcode(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * We know that the hypervisor lie to us on the microcode version so
+ * we may as well hope that it is running the correct version.
+ */
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return false;
+
+ if (c->x86 != 6)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spectre_bad_microcodes); i++) {
+ if (c->x86_model == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].model &&
+ c->x86_stepping == spectre_bad_microcodes[i].stepping)
+ return (c->microcode <= spectre_bad_microcodes[i].microcode);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+int intel_cpu_collect_info(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
+{
+ unsigned int val[2];
+ unsigned int family, model;
+ struct cpu_signature csig = { 0 };
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ memset(uci, 0, sizeof(*uci));
+
+ eax = 0x00000001;
+ ecx = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ csig.sig = eax;
+
+ family = x86_family(eax);
+ model = x86_model(eax);
+
+ if (model >= 5 || family > 6) {
+ /* get processor flags from MSR 0x17 */
+ native_rdmsr(MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID, val[0], val[1]);
+ csig.pf = 1 << ((val[1] >> 18) & 7);
+ }
+
+ csig.rev = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+
+ uci->cpu_sig = csig;
+ uci->valid = 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(intel_cpu_collect_info);
+
+static void early_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 misc_enable;
+
+ /* Unmask CPUID levels if masked: */
+ if (c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xd)) {
+ if (msr_clear_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
+ MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_LIMIT_CPUID_BIT) > 0) {
+ c->cpuid_level = cpuid_eax(0);
+ get_cpu_cap(c);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((c->x86 == 0xf && c->x86_model >= 0x03) ||
+ (c->x86 == 0x6 && c->x86_model >= 0x0e))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 6 && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64))
+ c->microcode = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+
+ /* Now if any of them are set, check the blacklist and clear the lot */
+ if ((cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBRS) || cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) && bad_spectre_microcode(c)) {
+ pr_warn("Intel Spectre v2 broken microcode detected; disabling Speculation Control\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_STIBP);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_STIBP);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SSBD);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Atom erratum AAE44/AAF40/AAG38/AAH41:
+ *
+ * A race condition between speculative fetches and invalidating
+ * a large page. This is worked around in microcode, but we
+ * need the microcode to have already been loaded... so if it is
+ * not, recommend a BIOS update and disable large pages.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0x1c && c->x86_stepping <= 2 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x20e) {
+ pr_warn("Atom PSE erratum detected, BIOS microcode update recommended\n");
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PSE);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32);
+#else
+ /* Netburst reports 64 bytes clflush size, but does IO in 128 bytes */
+ if (c->x86 == 15 && c->x86_cache_alignment == 64)
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = 128;
+#endif
+
+ /* CPUID workaround for 0F33/0F34 CPU */
+ if (c->x86 == 0xF && c->x86_model == 0x3
+ && (c->x86_stepping == 0x3 || c->x86_stepping == 0x4))
+ c->x86_phys_bits = 36;
+
+ /*
+ * c->x86_power is 8000_0007 edx. Bit 8 is TSC runs at constant rate
+ * with P/T states and does not stop in deep C-states.
+ *
+ * It is also reliable across cores and sockets. (but not across
+ * cabinets - we turn it off in that case explicitly.)
+ */
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
+ }
+
+ /* Penwell and Cloverview have the TSC which doesn't sleep on S3 */
+ if (c->x86 == 6) {
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_MID:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SALTWELL_TABLET:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT_MID:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT_NP:
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC_S3);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There is a known erratum on Pentium III and Core Solo
+ * and Core Duo CPUs.
+ * " Page with PAT set to WC while associated MTRR is UC
+ * may consolidate to UC "
+ * Because of this erratum, it is better to stick with
+ * setting WC in MTRR rather than using PAT on these CPUs.
+ *
+ * Enable PAT WC only on P4, Core 2 or later CPUs.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 15)
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PAT);
+
+ /*
+ * If fast string is not enabled in IA32_MISC_ENABLE for any reason,
+ * clear the fast string and enhanced fast string CPU capabilities.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xd)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable);
+ if (!(misc_enable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING)) {
+ pr_info("Disabled fast string operations\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ERMS);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Intel Quark Core DevMan_001.pdf section 6.4.11
+ * "The operating system also is required to invalidate (i.e., flush)
+ * the TLB when any changes are made to any of the page table entries.
+ * The operating system must reload CR3 to cause the TLB to be flushed"
+ *
+ * As a result, boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE) in arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+ * should be false so that __flush_tlb_all() causes CR3 instead of CR4.PGE
+ * to be modified.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 5 && c->x86_model == 9) {
+ pr_info("Disabling PGE capability bit\n");
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_PGE);
+ }
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ /*
+ * If HTT (EDX[28]) is set EBX[16:23] contain the number of
+ * apicids which are reserved per package. Store the resulting
+ * shift value for the package management code.
+ */
+ if (edx & (1U << 28))
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order((ebx >> 16) & 0xff);
+ }
+
+ check_memory_type_self_snoop_errata(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Get the number of SMT siblings early from the extended topology
+ * leaf, if available. Otherwise try the legacy SMT detection.
+ */
+ if (detect_extended_topology_early(c) < 0)
+ detect_ht_early(c);
+}
+
+static void bsp_init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ resctrl_cpu_detect(c);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+/*
+ * Early probe support logic for ppro memory erratum #50
+ *
+ * This is called before we do cpu ident work
+ */
+
+int ppro_with_ram_bug(void)
+{
+ /* Uses data from early_cpu_detect now */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < 8) {
+ pr_info("Pentium Pro with Errata#50 detected. Taking evasive action.\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void intel_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ /* calling is from identify_secondary_cpu() ? */
+ if (!c->cpu_index)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Mask B, Pentium, but not Pentium MMX
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 5 &&
+ c->x86_stepping >= 1 && c->x86_stepping <= 4 &&
+ c->x86_model <= 3) {
+ /*
+ * Remember we have B step Pentia with bugs
+ */
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: SMP operation may be unreliable"
+ "with B stepping processors.\n");
+ }
+}
+
+static int forcepae;
+static int __init forcepae_setup(char *__unused)
+{
+ forcepae = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("forcepae", forcepae_setup);
+
+static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_F00F_BUG
+ /*
+ * All models of Pentium and Pentium with MMX technology CPUs
+ * have the F0 0F bug, which lets nonprivileged users lock up the
+ * system. Announce that the fault handler will be checking for it.
+ * The Quark is also family 5, but does not have the same bug.
+ */
+ clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_F00F);
+ if (c->x86 == 5 && c->x86_model < 9) {
+ static int f00f_workaround_enabled;
+
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_F00F);
+ if (!f00f_workaround_enabled) {
+ pr_notice("Intel Pentium with F0 0F bug - workaround enabled.\n");
+ f00f_workaround_enabled = 1;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * SEP CPUID bug: Pentium Pro reports SEP but doesn't have it until
+ * model 3 mask 3
+ */
+ if ((c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4 | c->x86_stepping) < 0x633)
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SEP);
+
+ /*
+ * PAE CPUID issue: many Pentium M report no PAE but may have a
+ * functionally usable PAE implementation.
+ * Forcefully enable PAE if kernel parameter "forcepae" is present.
+ */
+ if (forcepae) {
+ pr_warn("PAE forced!\n");
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PAE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * P4 Xeon erratum 037 workaround.
+ * Hardware prefetcher may cause stale data to be loaded into the cache.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 15) && (c->x86_model == 1) && (c->x86_stepping == 1)) {
+ if (msr_set_bit(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE,
+ MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PREFETCH_DISABLE_BIT) > 0) {
+ pr_info("CPU: C0 stepping P4 Xeon detected.\n");
+ pr_info("CPU: Disabling hardware prefetching (Erratum 037)\n");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * See if we have a good local APIC by checking for buggy Pentia,
+ * i.e. all B steppings and the C2 stepping of P54C when using their
+ * integrated APIC (see 11AP erratum in "Pentium Processor
+ * Specification Update").
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC) && (c->x86<<8 | c->x86_model<<4) == 0x520 &&
+ (c->x86_stepping < 0x6 || c->x86_stepping == 0xb))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_11AP);
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_USERCOPY
+ /*
+ * Set up the preferred alignment for movsl bulk memory moves
+ */
+ switch (c->x86) {
+ case 4: /* 486: untested */
+ break;
+ case 5: /* Old Pentia: untested */
+ break;
+ case 6: /* PII/PIII only like movsl with 8-byte alignment */
+ movsl_mask.mask = 7;
+ break;
+ case 15: /* P4 is OK down to 8-byte alignment */
+ movsl_mask.mask = 7;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ intel_smp_check(c);
+}
+#else
+static void intel_workarounds(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static void srat_detect_node(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+ unsigned node;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ /* Don't do the funky fallback heuristics the AMD version employs
+ for now. */
+ node = numa_cpu_node(cpu);
+ if (node == NUMA_NO_NODE || !node_online(node)) {
+ /* reuse the value from init_cpu_to_node() */
+ node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
+ }
+ numa_set_node(cpu, node);
+#endif
+}
+
+#define MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE 0x982
+
+/* Helpers to access TME_ACTIVATE MSR */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(x) (x & 0x1)
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(x) (x & 0x2)
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(x) ((x >> 4) & 0xf) /* Bits 7:4 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128 0
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(x) ((x >> 32) & 0xf) /* Bits 35:32 */
+
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(x) ((x >> 48) & 0xffff) /* Bits 63:48 */
+#define TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128 1
+
+/* Values for mktme_status (SW only construct) */
+#define MKTME_ENABLED 0
+#define MKTME_DISABLED 1
+#define MKTME_UNINITIALIZED 2
+static int mktme_status = MKTME_UNINITIALIZED;
+
+static void detect_tme(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 tme_activate, tme_policy, tme_crypto_algs;
+ int keyid_bits = 0, nr_keyids = 0;
+ static u64 tme_activate_cpu0 = 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TME_ACTIVATE, tme_activate);
+
+ if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+ if (tme_activate != tme_activate_cpu0) {
+ /* Broken BIOS? */
+ pr_err_once("x86/tme: configuration is inconsistent between CPUs\n");
+ pr_err_once("x86/tme: MKTME is not usable\n");
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+
+ /* Proceed. We may need to exclude bits from x86_phys_bits. */
+ }
+ } else {
+ tme_activate_cpu0 = tme_activate;
+ }
+
+ if (!TME_ACTIVATE_LOCKED(tme_activate) || !TME_ACTIVATE_ENABLED(tme_activate)) {
+ pr_info_once("x86/tme: not enabled by BIOS\n");
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mktme_status != MKTME_UNINITIALIZED)
+ goto detect_keyid_bits;
+
+ pr_info("x86/tme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+
+ tme_policy = TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY(tme_activate);
+ if (tme_policy != TME_ACTIVATE_POLICY_AES_XTS_128)
+ pr_warn("x86/tme: Unknown policy is active: %#llx\n", tme_policy);
+
+ tme_crypto_algs = TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_ALGS(tme_activate);
+ if (!(tme_crypto_algs & TME_ACTIVATE_CRYPTO_AES_XTS_128)) {
+ pr_err("x86/mktme: No known encryption algorithm is supported: %#llx\n",
+ tme_crypto_algs);
+ mktme_status = MKTME_DISABLED;
+ }
+detect_keyid_bits:
+ keyid_bits = TME_ACTIVATE_KEYID_BITS(tme_activate);
+ nr_keyids = (1UL << keyid_bits) - 1;
+ if (nr_keyids) {
+ pr_info_once("x86/mktme: enabled by BIOS\n");
+ pr_info_once("x86/mktme: %d KeyIDs available\n", nr_keyids);
+ } else {
+ pr_info_once("x86/mktme: disabled by BIOS\n");
+ }
+
+ if (mktme_status == MKTME_UNINITIALIZED) {
+ /* MKTME is usable */
+ mktme_status = MKTME_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * KeyID bits effectively lower the number of physical address
+ * bits. Update cpuinfo_x86::x86_phys_bits accordingly.
+ */
+ c->x86_phys_bits -= keyid_bits;
+}
+
+static void init_cpuid_fault(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (!rdmsrl_safe(MSR_PLATFORM_INFO, &msr)) {
+ if (msr & MSR_PLATFORM_INFO_CPUID_FAULT)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CPUID_FAULT);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_intel_misc_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, &msr))
+ return;
+
+ /* Clear all MISC features */
+ this_cpu_write(msr_misc_features_shadow, 0);
+
+ /* Check features and update capabilities and shadow control bits */
+ init_cpuid_fault(c);
+ probe_xeon_phi_r3mwait(c);
+
+ msr = this_cpu_read(msr_misc_features_shadow);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLES, msr);
+}
+
+static void split_lock_init(void);
+static void bus_lock_init(void);
+
+static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ early_init_intel(c);
+
+ intel_workarounds(c);
+
+ /*
+ * Detect the extended topology information if available. This
+ * will reinitialise the initial_apicid which will be used
+ * in init_intel_cacheinfo()
+ */
+ detect_extended_topology(c);
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY)) {
+ /*
+ * let's use the legacy cpuid vector 0x1 and 0x4 for topology
+ * detection.
+ */
+ detect_num_cpu_cores(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ detect_ht(c);
+#endif
+ }
+
+ init_intel_cacheinfo(c);
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level > 9) {
+ unsigned eax = cpuid_eax(10);
+ /* Check for version and the number of counters */
+ if ((eax & 0xff) && (((eax>>8) & 0xff) > 1))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON);
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XMM2))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DS)) {
+ unsigned int l1, l2;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, l1, l2);
+ if (!(l1 & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_BTS_UNAVAIL))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_BTS);
+ if (!(l1 & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_PEBS_UNAVAIL))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PEBS);
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH) &&
+ (c->x86_model == 29 || c->x86_model == 46 || c->x86_model == 47))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MONITOR);
+
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MWAIT) &&
+ ((c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT)))
+ set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_MONITOR);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ if (c->x86 == 15)
+ c->x86_cache_alignment = c->x86_clflush_size * 2;
+ if (c->x86 == 6)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+#else
+ /*
+ * Names for the Pentium II/Celeron processors
+ * detectable only by also checking the cache size.
+ * Dixon is NOT a Celeron.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6) {
+ unsigned int l2 = c->x86_cache_size;
+ char *p = NULL;
+
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case 5:
+ if (l2 == 0)
+ p = "Celeron (Covington)";
+ else if (l2 == 256)
+ p = "Mobile Pentium II (Dixon)";
+ break;
+
+ case 6:
+ if (l2 == 128)
+ p = "Celeron (Mendocino)";
+ else if (c->x86_stepping == 0 || c->x86_stepping == 5)
+ p = "Celeron-A";
+ break;
+
+ case 8:
+ if (l2 == 128)
+ p = "Celeron (Coppermine)";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (p)
+ strcpy(c->x86_model_id, p);
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 == 15)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_P4);
+ if (c->x86 == 6)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_P3);
+#endif
+
+ /* Work around errata */
+ srat_detect_node(c);
+
+ init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TME))
+ detect_tme(c);
+
+ init_intel_misc_features(c);
+
+ split_lock_init();
+ bus_lock_init();
+
+ intel_init_thermal(c);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static unsigned int intel_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
+{
+ /*
+ * Intel PIII Tualatin. This comes in two flavours.
+ * One has 256kb of cache, the other 512. We have no way
+ * to determine which, so we use a boottime override
+ * for the 512kb model, and assume 256 otherwise.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 6) && (c->x86_model == 11) && (size == 0))
+ size = 256;
+
+ /*
+ * Intel Quark SoC X1000 contains a 4-way set associative
+ * 16K cache with a 16 byte cache line and 256 lines per tag
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 5) && (c->x86_model == 9))
+ size = 16;
+ return size;
+}
+#endif
+
+#define TLB_INST_4K 0x01
+#define TLB_INST_4M 0x02
+#define TLB_INST_2M_4M 0x03
+
+#define TLB_INST_ALL 0x05
+#define TLB_INST_1G 0x06
+
+#define TLB_DATA_4K 0x11
+#define TLB_DATA_4M 0x12
+#define TLB_DATA_2M_4M 0x13
+#define TLB_DATA_4K_4M 0x14
+
+#define TLB_DATA_1G 0x16
+
+#define TLB_DATA0_4K 0x21
+#define TLB_DATA0_4M 0x22
+#define TLB_DATA0_2M_4M 0x23
+
+#define STLB_4K 0x41
+#define STLB_4K_2M 0x42
+
+static const struct _tlb_table intel_tlb_table[] = {
+ { 0x01, TLB_INST_4K, 32, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x02, TLB_INST_4M, 2, " TLB_INST 4 MByte pages, full associative" },
+ { 0x03, TLB_DATA_4K, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x04, TLB_DATA_4M, 8, " TLB_DATA 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x05, TLB_DATA_4M, 32, " TLB_DATA 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x0b, TLB_INST_4M, 4, " TLB_INST 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x4f, TLB_INST_4K, 32, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages" },
+ { 0x50, TLB_INST_ALL, 64, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
+ { 0x51, TLB_INST_ALL, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
+ { 0x52, TLB_INST_ALL, 256, " TLB_INST 4 KByte and 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages" },
+ { 0x55, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 7, " TLB_INST 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages, fully associative" },
+ { 0x56, TLB_DATA0_4M, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x57, TLB_DATA0_4K, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0x59, TLB_DATA0_4K, 16, " TLB_DATA0 4 KByte pages, fully associative" },
+ { 0x5a, TLB_DATA0_2M_4M, 32, " TLB_DATA0 2-MByte or 4 MByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x5b, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
+ { 0x5c, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
+ { 0x5d, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages" },
+ { 0x61, TLB_INST_4K, 48, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, full associative" },
+ { 0x63, TLB_DATA_1G, 4, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0x6b, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 8-way associative" },
+ { 0x6c, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 128, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte or 4 MByte pages, 8-way associative" },
+ { 0x6d, TLB_DATA_1G, 16, " TLB_DATA 1 GByte pages, fully associative" },
+ { 0x76, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 8, " TLB_INST 2-MByte or 4-MByte pages, fully associative" },
+ { 0xb0, TLB_INST_4K, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0xb1, TLB_INST_2M_4M, 4, " TLB_INST 2M pages, 4-way, 8 entries or 4M pages, 4-way entries" },
+ { 0xb2, TLB_INST_4K, 64, " TLB_INST 4KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0xb3, TLB_DATA_4K, 128, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way set associative" },
+ { 0xb4, TLB_DATA_4K, 256, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0xb5, TLB_INST_4K, 64, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 8-way set associative" },
+ { 0xb6, TLB_INST_4K, 128, " TLB_INST 4 KByte pages, 8-way set associative" },
+ { 0xba, TLB_DATA_4K, 64, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0xc0, TLB_DATA_4K_4M, 8, " TLB_DATA 4 KByte and 4 MByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0xc1, STLB_4K_2M, 1024, " STLB 4 KByte and 2 MByte pages, 8-way associative" },
+ { 0xc2, TLB_DATA_2M_4M, 16, " TLB_DATA 2 MByte/4MByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0xca, STLB_4K, 512, " STLB 4 KByte pages, 4-way associative" },
+ { 0x00, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+static void intel_tlb_lookup(const unsigned char desc)
+{
+ unsigned char k;
+ if (desc == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* look up this descriptor in the table */
+ for (k = 0; intel_tlb_table[k].descriptor != desc &&
+ intel_tlb_table[k].descriptor != 0; k++)
+ ;
+
+ if (intel_tlb_table[k].tlb_type == 0)
+ return;
+
+ switch (intel_tlb_table[k].tlb_type) {
+ case STLB_4K:
+ if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case STLB_4K_2M:
+ if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_INST_ALL:
+ if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_INST_4K:
+ if (tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_INST_4M:
+ if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_INST_2M_4M:
+ if (tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lli_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_DATA_4K:
+ case TLB_DATA0_4K:
+ if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_DATA_4M:
+ case TLB_DATA0_4M:
+ if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_DATA_2M_4M:
+ case TLB_DATA0_2M_4M:
+ if (tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_2m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_DATA_4K_4M:
+ if (tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4k[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ if (tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_4m[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ case TLB_DATA_1G:
+ if (tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES] < intel_tlb_table[k].entries)
+ tlb_lld_1g[ENTRIES] = intel_tlb_table[k].entries;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void intel_detect_tlb(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ int i, j, n;
+ unsigned int regs[4];
+ unsigned char *desc = (unsigned char *)regs;
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level < 2)
+ return;
+
+ /* Number of times to iterate */
+ n = cpuid_eax(2) & 0xFF;
+
+ for (i = 0 ; i < n ; i++) {
+ cpuid(2, &regs[0], &regs[1], &regs[2], &regs[3]);
+
+ /* If bit 31 is set, this is an unknown format */
+ for (j = 0 ; j < 3 ; j++)
+ if (regs[j] & (1 << 31))
+ regs[j] = 0;
+
+ /* Byte 0 is level count, not a descriptor */
+ for (j = 1 ; j < 16 ; j++)
+ intel_tlb_lookup(desc[j]);
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev intel_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Intel",
+ .c_ident = { "GenuineIntel" },
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ .legacy_models = {
+ { .family = 4, .model_names =
+ {
+ [0] = "486 DX-25/33",
+ [1] = "486 DX-50",
+ [2] = "486 SX",
+ [3] = "486 DX/2",
+ [4] = "486 SL",
+ [5] = "486 SX/2",
+ [7] = "486 DX/2-WB",
+ [8] = "486 DX/4",
+ [9] = "486 DX/4-WB"
+ }
+ },
+ { .family = 5, .model_names =
+ {
+ [0] = "Pentium 60/66 A-step",
+ [1] = "Pentium 60/66",
+ [2] = "Pentium 75 - 200",
+ [3] = "OverDrive PODP5V83",
+ [4] = "Pentium MMX",
+ [7] = "Mobile Pentium 75 - 200",
+ [8] = "Mobile Pentium MMX",
+ [9] = "Quark SoC X1000",
+ }
+ },
+ { .family = 6, .model_names =
+ {
+ [0] = "Pentium Pro A-step",
+ [1] = "Pentium Pro",
+ [3] = "Pentium II (Klamath)",
+ [4] = "Pentium II (Deschutes)",
+ [5] = "Pentium II (Deschutes)",
+ [6] = "Mobile Pentium II",
+ [7] = "Pentium III (Katmai)",
+ [8] = "Pentium III (Coppermine)",
+ [10] = "Pentium III (Cascades)",
+ [11] = "Pentium III (Tualatin)",
+ }
+ },
+ { .family = 15, .model_names =
+ {
+ [0] = "Pentium 4 (Unknown)",
+ [1] = "Pentium 4 (Willamette)",
+ [2] = "Pentium 4 (Northwood)",
+ [4] = "Pentium 4 (Foster)",
+ [5] = "Pentium 4 (Foster)",
+ }
+ },
+ },
+ .legacy_cache_size = intel_size_cache,
+#endif
+ .c_detect_tlb = intel_detect_tlb,
+ .c_early_init = early_init_intel,
+ .c_bsp_init = bsp_init_intel,
+ .c_init = init_intel,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_INTEL,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(intel_cpu_dev);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "x86/split lock detection: " fmt
+
+static const struct {
+ const char *option;
+ enum split_lock_detect_state state;
+} sld_options[] __initconst = {
+ { "off", sld_off },
+ { "warn", sld_warn },
+ { "fatal", sld_fatal },
+ { "ratelimit:", sld_ratelimit },
+};
+
+static struct ratelimit_state bld_ratelimit;
+
+static unsigned int sysctl_sld_mitigate = 1;
+static DEFINE_SEMAPHORE(buslock_sem);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
+static struct ctl_table sld_sysctls[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "split_lock_mitigate",
+ .data = &sysctl_sld_mitigate,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_douintvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
+ .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
+ },
+ {}
+};
+
+static int __init sld_mitigate_sysctl_init(void)
+{
+ register_sysctl_init("kernel", sld_sysctls);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(sld_mitigate_sysctl_init);
+#endif
+
+static inline bool match_option(const char *arg, int arglen, const char *opt)
+{
+ int len = strlen(opt), ratelimit;
+
+ if (strncmp(arg, opt, len))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Min ratelimit is 1 bus lock/sec.
+ * Max ratelimit is 1000 bus locks/sec.
+ */
+ if (sscanf(arg, "ratelimit:%d", &ratelimit) == 1 &&
+ ratelimit > 0 && ratelimit <= 1000) {
+ ratelimit_state_init(&bld_ratelimit, HZ, ratelimit);
+ ratelimit_set_flags(&bld_ratelimit, RATELIMIT_MSG_ON_RELEASE);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return len == arglen;
+}
+
+static bool split_lock_verify_msr(bool on)
+{
+ u64 ctrl, tmp;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, &ctrl))
+ return false;
+ if (on)
+ ctrl |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+ else
+ ctrl &= ~MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+ if (wrmsrl_safe(MSR_TEST_CTRL, ctrl))
+ return false;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, tmp);
+ return ctrl == tmp;
+}
+
+static void __init sld_state_setup(void)
+{
+ enum split_lock_detect_state state = sld_warn;
+ char arg[20];
+ int i, ret;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+ return;
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "split_lock_detect",
+ arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sld_options); i++) {
+ if (match_option(arg, ret, sld_options[i].option)) {
+ state = sld_options[i].state;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ sld_state = state;
+}
+
+static void __init __split_lock_setup(void)
+{
+ if (!split_lock_verify_msr(false)) {
+ pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, msr_test_ctrl_cache);
+
+ if (!split_lock_verify_msr(true)) {
+ pr_info("MSR access failed: Disabled\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Restore the MSR to its cached value. */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, msr_test_ctrl_cache);
+
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * MSR_TEST_CTRL is per core, but we treat it like a per CPU MSR. Locking
+ * is not implemented as one thread could undo the setting of the other
+ * thread immediately after dropping the lock anyway.
+ */
+static void sld_update_msr(bool on)
+{
+ u64 test_ctrl_val = msr_test_ctrl_cache;
+
+ if (on)
+ test_ctrl_val |= MSR_TEST_CTRL_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_TEST_CTRL, test_ctrl_val);
+}
+
+static void split_lock_init(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * #DB for bus lock handles ratelimit and #AC for split lock is
+ * disabled.
+ */
+ if (sld_state == sld_ratelimit) {
+ split_lock_verify_msr(false);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (cpu_model_supports_sld)
+ split_lock_verify_msr(sld_state != sld_off);
+}
+
+static void __split_lock_reenable_unlock(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ sld_update_msr(true);
+ up(&buslock_sem);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(sl_reenable_unlock, __split_lock_reenable_unlock);
+
+static void __split_lock_reenable(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ sld_update_msr(true);
+}
+static DECLARE_DELAYED_WORK(sl_reenable, __split_lock_reenable);
+
+/*
+ * If a CPU goes offline with pending delayed work to re-enable split lock
+ * detection then the delayed work will be executed on some other CPU. That
+ * handles releasing the buslock_sem, but because it executes on a
+ * different CPU probably won't re-enable split lock detection. This is a
+ * problem on HT systems since the sibling CPU on the same core may then be
+ * left running with split lock detection disabled.
+ *
+ * Unconditionally re-enable detection here.
+ */
+static int splitlock_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ sld_update_msr(true);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void split_lock_warn(unsigned long ip)
+{
+ struct delayed_work *work;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!current->reported_split_lock)
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("#AC: %s/%d took a split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
+ current->comm, current->pid, ip);
+ current->reported_split_lock = 1;
+
+ if (sysctl_sld_mitigate) {
+ /*
+ * misery factor #1:
+ * sleep 10ms before trying to execute split lock.
+ */
+ if (msleep_interruptible(10) > 0)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Misery factor #2:
+ * only allow one buslocked disabled core at a time.
+ */
+ if (down_interruptible(&buslock_sem) == -EINTR)
+ return;
+ work = &sl_reenable_unlock;
+ } else {
+ work = &sl_reenable;
+ }
+
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(cpu, work, 2);
+
+ /* Disable split lock detection on this CPU to make progress */
+ sld_update_msr(false);
+ put_cpu();
+}
+
+bool handle_guest_split_lock(unsigned long ip)
+{
+ if (sld_state == sld_warn) {
+ split_lock_warn(ip);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ pr_warn_once("#AC: %s/%d %s split_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
+ current->comm, current->pid,
+ sld_state == sld_fatal ? "fatal" : "bogus", ip);
+
+ current->thread.error_code = 0;
+ current->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_AC;
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, NULL);
+ return false;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(handle_guest_split_lock);
+
+static void bus_lock_init(void)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, val);
+
+ if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+ (sld_state == sld_warn || sld_state == sld_fatal)) ||
+ sld_state == sld_off) {
+ /*
+ * Warn and fatal are handled by #AC for split lock if #AC for
+ * split lock is supported.
+ */
+ val &= ~DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+ } else {
+ val |= DEBUGCTLMSR_BUS_LOCK_DETECT;
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR, val);
+}
+
+bool handle_user_split_lock(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
+{
+ if ((regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_AC) || sld_state == sld_fatal)
+ return false;
+ split_lock_warn(regs->ip);
+ return true;
+}
+
+void handle_bus_lock(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ switch (sld_state) {
+ case sld_off:
+ break;
+ case sld_ratelimit:
+ /* Enforce no more than bld_ratelimit bus locks/sec. */
+ while (!__ratelimit(&bld_ratelimit))
+ msleep(20);
+ /* Warn on the bus lock. */
+ fallthrough;
+ case sld_warn:
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("#DB: %s/%d took a bus_lock trap at address: 0x%lx\n",
+ current->comm, current->pid, regs->ip);
+ break;
+ case sld_fatal:
+ force_sig_fault(SIGBUS, BUS_ADRALN, NULL);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Bits in the IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES are not architectural, so they should
+ * only be trusted if it is confirmed that a CPU model implements a
+ * specific feature at a particular bit position.
+ *
+ * The possible driver data field values:
+ *
+ * - 0: CPU models that are known to have the per-core split-lock detection
+ * feature even though they do not enumerate IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES.
+ *
+ * - 1: CPU models which may enumerate IA32_CORE_CAPABILITIES and if so use
+ * bit 5 to enumerate the per-core split-lock detection feature.
+ */
+static const struct x86_cpu_id split_lock_cpu_ids[] __initconst = {
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_X, 0),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_L, 0),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ICELAKE_D, 0),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT_D, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ATOM_TREMONT_L, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE_L, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(TIGERLAKE, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE_L, 1),
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(RAPTORLAKE, 1),
+ {}
+};
+
+static void __init split_lock_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
+ u64 ia32_core_caps;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return;
+
+ m = x86_match_cpu(split_lock_cpu_ids);
+ if (!m)
+ return;
+
+ switch (m->driver_data) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CORE_CAPABILITIES))
+ return;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS, ia32_core_caps);
+ if (!(ia32_core_caps & MSR_IA32_CORE_CAPS_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+ return;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cpu_model_supports_sld = true;
+ __split_lock_setup();
+}
+
+static void sld_state_show(void)
+{
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT) &&
+ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT))
+ return;
+
+ switch (sld_state) {
+ case sld_off:
+ pr_info("disabled\n");
+ break;
+ case sld_warn:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+ pr_info("#AC: crashing the kernel on kernel split_locks and warning on user-space split_locks\n");
+ if (cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+ "x86/splitlock", NULL, splitlock_cpu_offline) < 0)
+ pr_warn("No splitlock CPU offline handler\n");
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+ pr_info("#DB: warning on user-space bus_locks\n");
+ }
+ break;
+ case sld_fatal:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+ pr_info("#AC: crashing the kernel on kernel split_locks and sending SIGBUS on user-space split_locks\n");
+ } else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT)) {
+ pr_info("#DB: sending SIGBUS on user-space bus_locks%s\n",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT) ?
+ " from non-WB" : "");
+ }
+ break;
+ case sld_ratelimit:
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BUS_LOCK_DETECT))
+ pr_info("#DB: setting system wide bus lock rate limit to %u/sec\n", bld_ratelimit.burst);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void __init sld_setup(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ split_lock_setup(c);
+ sld_state_setup();
+ sld_state_show();
+}
+
+#define X86_HYBRID_CPU_TYPE_ID_SHIFT 24
+
+/**
+ * get_this_hybrid_cpu_type() - Get the type of this hybrid CPU
+ *
+ * Returns the CPU type [31:24] (i.e., Atom or Core) of a CPU in
+ * a hybrid processor. If the processor is not hybrid, returns 0.
+ */
+u8 get_this_hybrid_cpu_type(void)
+{
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYBRID_CPU))
+ return 0;
+
+ return cpuid_eax(0x0000001a) >> X86_HYBRID_CPU_TYPE_ID_SHIFT;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fbaf12e43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_epb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Performance and Energy Bias Hint support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/pm.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+/**
+ * DOC: overview
+ *
+ * The Performance and Energy Bias Hint (EPB) allows software to specify its
+ * preference with respect to the power-performance tradeoffs present in the
+ * processor. Generally, the EPB is expected to be set by user space (directly
+ * via sysfs or with the help of the x86_energy_perf_policy tool), but there are
+ * two reasons for the kernel to update it.
+ *
+ * First, there are systems where the platform firmware resets the EPB during
+ * system-wide transitions from sleep states back into the working state
+ * effectively causing the previous EPB updates by user space to be lost.
+ * Thus the kernel needs to save the current EPB values for all CPUs during
+ * system-wide transitions to sleep states and restore them on the way back to
+ * the working state. That can be achieved by saving EPB for secondary CPUs
+ * when they are taken offline during transitions into system sleep states and
+ * for the boot CPU in a syscore suspend operation, so that it can be restored
+ * for the boot CPU in a syscore resume operation and for the other CPUs when
+ * they are brought back online. However, CPUs that are already offline when
+ * a system-wide PM transition is started are not taken offline again, but their
+ * EPB values may still be reset by the platform firmware during the transition,
+ * so in fact it is necessary to save the EPB of any CPU taken offline and to
+ * restore it when the given CPU goes back online at all times.
+ *
+ * Second, on many systems the initial EPB value coming from the platform
+ * firmware is 0 ('performance') and at least on some of them that is because
+ * the platform firmware does not initialize EPB at all with the assumption that
+ * the OS will do that anyway. That sometimes is problematic, as it may cause
+ * the system battery to drain too fast, for example, so it is better to adjust
+ * it on CPU bring-up and if the initial EPB value for a given CPU is 0, the
+ * kernel changes it to 6 ('normal').
+ */
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u8, saved_epb);
+
+#define EPB_MASK 0x0fULL
+#define EPB_SAVED 0x10ULL
+#define MAX_EPB EPB_MASK
+
+enum energy_perf_value_index {
+ EPB_INDEX_PERFORMANCE,
+ EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE,
+ EPB_INDEX_NORMAL,
+ EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_POWERSAVE,
+ EPB_INDEX_POWERSAVE,
+};
+
+static u8 energ_perf_values[] = {
+ [EPB_INDEX_PERFORMANCE] = ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_PERFORMANCE,
+ [EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE] = ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE,
+ [EPB_INDEX_NORMAL] = ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_NORMAL,
+ [EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_POWERSAVE] = ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_BALANCE_POWERSAVE,
+ [EPB_INDEX_POWERSAVE] = ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_POWERSAVE,
+};
+
+static int intel_epb_save(void)
+{
+ u64 epb;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS, epb);
+ /*
+ * Ensure that saved_epb will always be nonzero after this write even if
+ * the EPB value read from the MSR is 0.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(saved_epb, (epb & EPB_MASK) | EPB_SAVED);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void intel_epb_restore(void)
+{
+ u64 val = this_cpu_read(saved_epb);
+ u64 epb;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS, epb);
+ if (val) {
+ val &= EPB_MASK;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Because intel_epb_save() has not run for the current CPU yet,
+ * it is going online for the first time, so if its EPB value is
+ * 0 ('performance') at this point, assume that it has not been
+ * initialized by the platform firmware and set it to 6
+ * ('normal').
+ */
+ val = epb & EPB_MASK;
+ if (val == ENERGY_PERF_BIAS_PERFORMANCE) {
+ val = energ_perf_values[EPB_INDEX_NORMAL];
+ pr_warn_once("ENERGY_PERF_BIAS: Set to 'normal', was 'performance'\n");
+ }
+ }
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS, (epb & ~EPB_MASK) | val);
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops intel_epb_syscore_ops = {
+ .suspend = intel_epb_save,
+ .resume = intel_epb_restore,
+};
+
+static const char * const energy_perf_strings[] = {
+ [EPB_INDEX_PERFORMANCE] = "performance",
+ [EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_PERFORMANCE] = "balance-performance",
+ [EPB_INDEX_NORMAL] = "normal",
+ [EPB_INDEX_BALANCE_POWERSAVE] = "balance-power",
+ [EPB_INDEX_POWERSAVE] = "power",
+};
+
+static ssize_t energy_perf_bias_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu = dev->id;
+ u64 epb;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = rdmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS, &epb);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%llu\n", epb);
+}
+
+static ssize_t energy_perf_bias_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu = dev->id;
+ u64 epb, val;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __sysfs_match_string(energy_perf_strings,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(energy_perf_strings), buf);
+ if (ret >= 0)
+ val = energ_perf_values[ret];
+ else if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &val) || val > MAX_EPB)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = rdmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS, &epb);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = wrmsrl_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_IA32_ENERGY_PERF_BIAS,
+ (epb & ~EPB_MASK) | val);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(energy_perf_bias);
+
+static struct attribute *intel_epb_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_energy_perf_bias.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group intel_epb_attr_group = {
+ .name = power_group_name,
+ .attrs = intel_epb_attrs
+};
+
+static int intel_epb_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *cpu_dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+ intel_epb_restore();
+ if (!cpuhp_tasks_frozen)
+ sysfs_merge_group(&cpu_dev->kobj, &intel_epb_attr_group);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int intel_epb_offline(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *cpu_dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+ if (!cpuhp_tasks_frozen)
+ sysfs_unmerge_group(&cpu_dev->kobj, &intel_epb_attr_group);
+
+ intel_epb_save();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_id intel_epb_normal[] = {
+ X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(ALDERLAKE_L, 7),
+ {}
+};
+
+static __init int intel_epb_init(void)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *id = x86_match_cpu(intel_epb_normal);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_EPB))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (id)
+ energ_perf_values[EPB_INDEX_NORMAL] = id->driver_data;
+
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_X86_INTEL_EPB_ONLINE,
+ "x86/intel/epb:online", intel_epb_online,
+ intel_epb_offline);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto err_out_online;
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&intel_epb_syscore_ops);
+ return 0;
+
+err_out_online:
+ cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_AP_X86_INTEL_EPB_ONLINE);
+ return ret;
+}
+subsys_initcall(intel_epb_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0771a905b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel_pconfig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel PCONFIG instruction support.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/intel_pconfig.h>
+
+#define PCONFIG_CPUID 0x1b
+
+#define PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_MASK ((1 << 12) - 1)
+
+/* Subleaf type (EAX) for PCONFIG CPUID leaf (0x1B) */
+enum {
+ PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_INVALID = 0,
+ PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_TARGETID = 1,
+};
+
+/* Bitmask of supported targets */
+static u64 targets_supported __read_mostly;
+
+int pconfig_target_supported(enum pconfig_target target)
+{
+ /*
+ * We would need to re-think the implementation once we get > 64
+ * PCONFIG targets. Spec allows up to 2^32 targets.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PCONFIG_TARGET_NR >= 64);
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(target >= 64))
+ return 0;
+ return targets_supported & (1ULL << target);
+}
+
+static int __init intel_pconfig_init(void)
+{
+ int subleaf;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Scan subleafs of PCONFIG CPUID leaf.
+ *
+ * Subleafs of the same type need not to be consecutive.
+ *
+ * Stop on the first invalid subleaf type. All subleafs after the first
+ * invalid are invalid too.
+ */
+ for (subleaf = 0; subleaf < INT_MAX; subleaf++) {
+ struct cpuid_regs regs;
+
+ cpuid_count(PCONFIG_CPUID, subleaf,
+ &regs.eax, &regs.ebx, &regs.ecx, &regs.edx);
+
+ switch (regs.eax & PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_MASK) {
+ case PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_INVALID:
+ /* Stop on the first invalid subleaf */
+ goto out;
+ case PCONFIG_CPUID_SUBLEAF_TARGETID:
+ /* Mark supported PCONFIG targets */
+ if (regs.ebx < 64)
+ targets_supported |= (1ULL << regs.ebx);
+ if (regs.ecx < 64)
+ targets_supported |= (1ULL << regs.ecx);
+ if (regs.edx < 64)
+ targets_supported |= (1ULL << regs.edx);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Unknown CPUID.PCONFIG subleaf: ignore */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(intel_pconfig_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ad6776081
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/match.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+/**
+ * x86_match_cpu - match current CPU again an array of x86_cpu_ids
+ * @match: Pointer to array of x86_cpu_ids. Last entry terminated with
+ * {}.
+ *
+ * Return the entry if the current CPU matches the entries in the
+ * passed x86_cpu_id match table. Otherwise NULL. The match table
+ * contains vendor (X86_VENDOR_*), family, model and feature bits or
+ * respective wildcard entries.
+ *
+ * A typical table entry would be to match a specific CPU
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAM_MODEL_FEATURE(INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL,
+ * X86_FEATURE_ANY, NULL);
+ *
+ * Fields can be wildcarded with %X86_VENDOR_ANY, %X86_FAMILY_ANY,
+ * %X86_MODEL_ANY, %X86_FEATURE_ANY (except for vendor)
+ *
+ * asm/cpu_device_id.h contains a set of useful macros which are shortcuts
+ * for various common selections. The above can be shortened to:
+ *
+ * X86_MATCH_INTEL_FAM6_MODEL(BROADWELL, NULL);
+ *
+ * Arrays used to match for this should also be declared using
+ * MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, ...)
+ *
+ * This always matches against the boot cpu, assuming models and features are
+ * consistent over all CPUs.
+ */
+const struct x86_cpu_id *x86_match_cpu(const struct x86_cpu_id *match)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_id *m;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ for (m = match;
+ m->vendor | m->family | m->model | m->steppings | m->feature;
+ m++) {
+ if (m->vendor != X86_VENDOR_ANY && c->x86_vendor != m->vendor)
+ continue;
+ if (m->family != X86_FAMILY_ANY && c->x86 != m->family)
+ continue;
+ if (m->model != X86_MODEL_ANY && c->x86_model != m->model)
+ continue;
+ if (m->steppings != X86_STEPPING_ANY &&
+ !(BIT(c->x86_stepping) & m->steppings))
+ continue;
+ if (m->feature != X86_FEATURE_ANY && !cpu_has(c, m->feature))
+ continue;
+ return m;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(x86_match_cpu);
+
+static const struct x86_cpu_desc *
+x86_match_cpu_with_stepping(const struct x86_cpu_desc *match)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ const struct x86_cpu_desc *m;
+
+ for (m = match; m->x86_family | m->x86_model; m++) {
+ if (c->x86_vendor != m->x86_vendor)
+ continue;
+ if (c->x86 != m->x86_family)
+ continue;
+ if (c->x86_model != m->x86_model)
+ continue;
+ if (c->x86_stepping != m->x86_stepping)
+ continue;
+ return m;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+bool x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev(const struct x86_cpu_desc *table)
+{
+ const struct x86_cpu_desc *res = x86_match_cpu_with_stepping(table);
+
+ if (!res || res->x86_microcode_rev > boot_cpu_data.microcode)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_cpu_has_min_microcode_rev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..015856abd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-y = core.o severity.o genpool.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ANCIENT_MCE) += winchip.o p5.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE_INTEL) += intel.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD) += amd.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE_THRESHOLD) += threshold.o
+
+mce-inject-y := inject.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCE_INJECT) += mce-inject.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI) += apei.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MCELOG_LEGACY) += dev-mcelog.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..991f38f57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/amd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1378 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * (c) 2005-2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Written by Jacob Shin - AMD, Inc.
+ * Maintained by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+ *
+ * All MC4_MISCi registers are shared between cores on a node.
+ */
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include <asm/amd_nb.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/trace/irq_vectors.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define NR_BLOCKS 5
+#define THRESHOLD_MAX 0xFFF
+#define INT_TYPE_APIC 0x00020000
+#define MASK_VALID_HI 0x80000000
+#define MASK_CNTP_HI 0x40000000
+#define MASK_LOCKED_HI 0x20000000
+#define MASK_LVTOFF_HI 0x00F00000
+#define MASK_COUNT_EN_HI 0x00080000
+#define MASK_INT_TYPE_HI 0x00060000
+#define MASK_OVERFLOW_HI 0x00010000
+#define MASK_ERR_COUNT_HI 0x00000FFF
+#define MASK_BLKPTR_LO 0xFF000000
+#define MCG_XBLK_ADDR 0xC0000400
+
+/* Deferred error settings */
+#define MSR_CU_DEF_ERR 0xC0000410
+#define MASK_DEF_LVTOFF 0x000000F0
+#define MASK_DEF_INT_TYPE 0x00000006
+#define DEF_LVT_OFF 0x2
+#define DEF_INT_TYPE_APIC 0x2
+
+/* Scalable MCA: */
+
+/* Threshold LVT offset is at MSR0xC0000410[15:12] */
+#define SMCA_THR_LVT_OFF 0xF000
+
+static bool thresholding_irq_en;
+
+static const char * const th_names[] = {
+ "load_store",
+ "insn_fetch",
+ "combined_unit",
+ "decode_unit",
+ "northbridge",
+ "execution_unit",
+};
+
+static const char * const smca_umc_block_names[] = {
+ "dram_ecc",
+ "misc_umc"
+};
+
+#define HWID_MCATYPE(hwid, mcatype) (((hwid) << 16) | (mcatype))
+
+struct smca_hwid {
+ unsigned int bank_type; /* Use with smca_bank_types for easy indexing. */
+ u32 hwid_mcatype; /* (hwid,mcatype) tuple */
+};
+
+struct smca_bank {
+ const struct smca_hwid *hwid;
+ u32 id; /* Value of MCA_IPID[InstanceId]. */
+ u8 sysfs_id; /* Value used for sysfs name. */
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct smca_bank[MAX_NR_BANKS], smca_banks);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(u8[N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES], smca_bank_counts);
+
+struct smca_bank_name {
+ const char *name; /* Short name for sysfs */
+ const char *long_name; /* Long name for pretty-printing */
+};
+
+static struct smca_bank_name smca_names[] = {
+ [SMCA_LS ... SMCA_LS_V2] = { "load_store", "Load Store Unit" },
+ [SMCA_IF] = { "insn_fetch", "Instruction Fetch Unit" },
+ [SMCA_L2_CACHE] = { "l2_cache", "L2 Cache" },
+ [SMCA_DE] = { "decode_unit", "Decode Unit" },
+ [SMCA_RESERVED] = { "reserved", "Reserved" },
+ [SMCA_EX] = { "execution_unit", "Execution Unit" },
+ [SMCA_FP] = { "floating_point", "Floating Point Unit" },
+ [SMCA_L3_CACHE] = { "l3_cache", "L3 Cache" },
+ [SMCA_CS ... SMCA_CS_V2] = { "coherent_slave", "Coherent Slave" },
+ [SMCA_PIE] = { "pie", "Power, Interrupts, etc." },
+
+ /* UMC v2 is separate because both of them can exist in a single system. */
+ [SMCA_UMC] = { "umc", "Unified Memory Controller" },
+ [SMCA_UMC_V2] = { "umc_v2", "Unified Memory Controller v2" },
+ [SMCA_PB] = { "param_block", "Parameter Block" },
+ [SMCA_PSP ... SMCA_PSP_V2] = { "psp", "Platform Security Processor" },
+ [SMCA_SMU ... SMCA_SMU_V2] = { "smu", "System Management Unit" },
+ [SMCA_MP5] = { "mp5", "Microprocessor 5 Unit" },
+ [SMCA_MPDMA] = { "mpdma", "MPDMA Unit" },
+ [SMCA_NBIO] = { "nbio", "Northbridge IO Unit" },
+ [SMCA_PCIE ... SMCA_PCIE_V2] = { "pcie", "PCI Express Unit" },
+ [SMCA_XGMI_PCS] = { "xgmi_pcs", "Ext Global Memory Interconnect PCS Unit" },
+ [SMCA_NBIF] = { "nbif", "NBIF Unit" },
+ [SMCA_SHUB] = { "shub", "System Hub Unit" },
+ [SMCA_SATA] = { "sata", "SATA Unit" },
+ [SMCA_USB] = { "usb", "USB Unit" },
+ [SMCA_GMI_PCS] = { "gmi_pcs", "Global Memory Interconnect PCS Unit" },
+ [SMCA_XGMI_PHY] = { "xgmi_phy", "Ext Global Memory Interconnect PHY Unit" },
+ [SMCA_WAFL_PHY] = { "wafl_phy", "WAFL PHY Unit" },
+ [SMCA_GMI_PHY] = { "gmi_phy", "Global Memory Interconnect PHY Unit" },
+};
+
+static const char *smca_get_name(enum smca_bank_types t)
+{
+ if (t >= N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return smca_names[t].name;
+}
+
+const char *smca_get_long_name(enum smca_bank_types t)
+{
+ if (t >= N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return smca_names[t].long_name;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(smca_get_long_name);
+
+enum smca_bank_types smca_get_bank_type(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank)
+{
+ struct smca_bank *b;
+
+ if (bank >= MAX_NR_BANKS)
+ return N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES;
+
+ b = &per_cpu(smca_banks, cpu)[bank];
+ if (!b->hwid)
+ return N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES;
+
+ return b->hwid->bank_type;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(smca_get_bank_type);
+
+static const struct smca_hwid smca_hwid_mcatypes[] = {
+ /* { bank_type, hwid_mcatype } */
+
+ /* Reserved type */
+ { SMCA_RESERVED, HWID_MCATYPE(0x00, 0x0) },
+
+ /* ZN Core (HWID=0xB0) MCA types */
+ { SMCA_LS, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_LS_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x10) },
+ { SMCA_IF, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x1) },
+ { SMCA_L2_CACHE, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x2) },
+ { SMCA_DE, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x3) },
+ /* HWID 0xB0 MCATYPE 0x4 is Reserved */
+ { SMCA_EX, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x5) },
+ { SMCA_FP, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x6) },
+ { SMCA_L3_CACHE, HWID_MCATYPE(0xB0, 0x7) },
+
+ /* Data Fabric MCA types */
+ { SMCA_CS, HWID_MCATYPE(0x2E, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_PIE, HWID_MCATYPE(0x2E, 0x1) },
+ { SMCA_CS_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0x2E, 0x2) },
+
+ /* Unified Memory Controller MCA type */
+ { SMCA_UMC, HWID_MCATYPE(0x96, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_UMC_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0x96, 0x1) },
+
+ /* Parameter Block MCA type */
+ { SMCA_PB, HWID_MCATYPE(0x05, 0x0) },
+
+ /* Platform Security Processor MCA type */
+ { SMCA_PSP, HWID_MCATYPE(0xFF, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_PSP_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0xFF, 0x1) },
+
+ /* System Management Unit MCA type */
+ { SMCA_SMU, HWID_MCATYPE(0x01, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_SMU_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0x01, 0x1) },
+
+ /* Microprocessor 5 Unit MCA type */
+ { SMCA_MP5, HWID_MCATYPE(0x01, 0x2) },
+
+ /* MPDMA MCA type */
+ { SMCA_MPDMA, HWID_MCATYPE(0x01, 0x3) },
+
+ /* Northbridge IO Unit MCA type */
+ { SMCA_NBIO, HWID_MCATYPE(0x18, 0x0) },
+
+ /* PCI Express Unit MCA type */
+ { SMCA_PCIE, HWID_MCATYPE(0x46, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_PCIE_V2, HWID_MCATYPE(0x46, 0x1) },
+
+ { SMCA_XGMI_PCS, HWID_MCATYPE(0x50, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_NBIF, HWID_MCATYPE(0x6C, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_SHUB, HWID_MCATYPE(0x80, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_SATA, HWID_MCATYPE(0xA8, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_USB, HWID_MCATYPE(0xAA, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_GMI_PCS, HWID_MCATYPE(0x241, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_XGMI_PHY, HWID_MCATYPE(0x259, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_WAFL_PHY, HWID_MCATYPE(0x267, 0x0) },
+ { SMCA_GMI_PHY, HWID_MCATYPE(0x269, 0x0) },
+};
+
+/*
+ * In SMCA enabled processors, we can have multiple banks for a given IP type.
+ * So to define a unique name for each bank, we use a temp c-string to append
+ * the MCA_IPID[InstanceId] to type's name in get_name().
+ *
+ * InstanceId is 32 bits which is 8 characters. Make sure MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN
+ * is greater than 8 plus 1 (for underscore) plus length of longest type name.
+ */
+#define MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN 30
+static char buf_mcatype[MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN];
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct threshold_bank **, threshold_banks);
+
+/*
+ * A list of the banks enabled on each logical CPU. Controls which respective
+ * descriptors to initialize later in mce_threshold_create_device().
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, bank_map);
+
+/* Map of banks that have more than MCA_MISC0 available. */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, smca_misc_banks_map);
+
+static void amd_threshold_interrupt(void);
+static void amd_deferred_error_interrupt(void);
+
+static void default_deferred_error_interrupt(void)
+{
+ pr_err("Unexpected deferred interrupt at vector %x\n", DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR);
+}
+void (*deferred_error_int_vector)(void) = default_deferred_error_interrupt;
+
+static void smca_set_misc_banks_map(unsigned int bank, unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u32 low, high;
+
+ /*
+ * For SMCA enabled processors, BLKPTR field of the first MISC register
+ * (MCx_MISC0) indicates presence of additional MISC regs set (MISC1-4).
+ */
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(bank), &low, &high))
+ return;
+
+ if (!(low & MCI_CONFIG_MCAX))
+ return;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank), &low, &high))
+ return;
+
+ if (low & MASK_BLKPTR_LO)
+ per_cpu(smca_misc_banks_map, cpu) |= BIT_ULL(bank);
+
+}
+
+static void smca_configure(unsigned int bank, unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u8 *bank_counts = this_cpu_ptr(smca_bank_counts);
+ const struct smca_hwid *s_hwid;
+ unsigned int i, hwid_mcatype;
+ u32 high, low;
+ u32 smca_config = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CONFIG(bank);
+
+ /* Set appropriate bits in MCA_CONFIG */
+ if (!rdmsr_safe(smca_config, &low, &high)) {
+ /*
+ * OS is required to set the MCAX bit to acknowledge that it is
+ * now using the new MSR ranges and new registers under each
+ * bank. It also means that the OS will configure deferred
+ * errors in the new MCx_CONFIG register. If the bit is not set,
+ * uncorrectable errors will cause a system panic.
+ *
+ * MCA_CONFIG[MCAX] is bit 32 (0 in the high portion of the MSR.)
+ */
+ high |= BIT(0);
+
+ /*
+ * SMCA sets the Deferred Error Interrupt type per bank.
+ *
+ * MCA_CONFIG[DeferredIntTypeSupported] is bit 5, and tells us
+ * if the DeferredIntType bit field is available.
+ *
+ * MCA_CONFIG[DeferredIntType] is bits [38:37] ([6:5] in the
+ * high portion of the MSR). OS should set this to 0x1 to enable
+ * APIC based interrupt. First, check that no interrupt has been
+ * set.
+ */
+ if ((low & BIT(5)) && !((high >> 5) & 0x3))
+ high |= BIT(5);
+
+ wrmsr(smca_config, low, high);
+ }
+
+ smca_set_misc_banks_map(bank, cpu);
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(bank), &low, &high)) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to read MCA_IPID for bank %d\n", bank);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hwid_mcatype = HWID_MCATYPE(high & MCI_IPID_HWID,
+ (high & MCI_IPID_MCATYPE) >> 16);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(smca_hwid_mcatypes); i++) {
+ s_hwid = &smca_hwid_mcatypes[i];
+
+ if (hwid_mcatype == s_hwid->hwid_mcatype) {
+ this_cpu_ptr(smca_banks)[bank].hwid = s_hwid;
+ this_cpu_ptr(smca_banks)[bank].id = low;
+ this_cpu_ptr(smca_banks)[bank].sysfs_id = bank_counts[s_hwid->bank_type]++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+struct thresh_restart {
+ struct threshold_block *b;
+ int reset;
+ int set_lvt_off;
+ int lvt_off;
+ u16 old_limit;
+};
+
+static inline bool is_shared_bank(int bank)
+{
+ /*
+ * Scalable MCA provides for only one core to have access to the MSRs of
+ * a shared bank.
+ */
+ if (mce_flags.smca)
+ return false;
+
+ /* Bank 4 is for northbridge reporting and is thus shared */
+ return (bank == 4);
+}
+
+static const char *bank4_names(const struct threshold_block *b)
+{
+ switch (b->address) {
+ /* MSR4_MISC0 */
+ case 0x00000413:
+ return "dram";
+
+ case 0xc0000408:
+ return "ht_links";
+
+ case 0xc0000409:
+ return "l3_cache";
+
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "Funny MSR: 0x%08x\n", b->address);
+ return "";
+ }
+};
+
+
+static bool lvt_interrupt_supported(unsigned int bank, u32 msr_high_bits)
+{
+ /*
+ * bank 4 supports APIC LVT interrupts implicitly since forever.
+ */
+ if (bank == 4)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * IntP: interrupt present; if this bit is set, the thresholding
+ * bank can generate APIC LVT interrupts
+ */
+ return msr_high_bits & BIT(28);
+}
+
+static int lvt_off_valid(struct threshold_block *b, int apic, u32 lo, u32 hi)
+{
+ int msr = (hi & MASK_LVTOFF_HI) >> 20;
+
+ if (apic < 0) {
+ pr_err(FW_BUG "cpu %d, failed to setup threshold interrupt "
+ "for bank %d, block %d (MSR%08X=0x%x%08x)\n", b->cpu,
+ b->bank, b->block, b->address, hi, lo);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (apic != msr) {
+ /*
+ * On SMCA CPUs, LVT offset is programmed at a different MSR, and
+ * the BIOS provides the value. The original field where LVT offset
+ * was set is reserved. Return early here:
+ */
+ if (mce_flags.smca)
+ return 0;
+
+ pr_err(FW_BUG "cpu %d, invalid threshold interrupt offset %d "
+ "for bank %d, block %d (MSR%08X=0x%x%08x)\n",
+ b->cpu, apic, b->bank, b->block, b->address, hi, lo);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+};
+
+/* Reprogram MCx_MISC MSR behind this threshold bank. */
+static void threshold_restart_bank(void *_tr)
+{
+ struct thresh_restart *tr = _tr;
+ u32 hi, lo;
+
+ /* sysfs write might race against an offline operation */
+ if (!this_cpu_read(threshold_banks) && !tr->set_lvt_off)
+ return;
+
+ rdmsr(tr->b->address, lo, hi);
+
+ if (tr->b->threshold_limit < (hi & THRESHOLD_MAX))
+ tr->reset = 1; /* limit cannot be lower than err count */
+
+ if (tr->reset) { /* reset err count and overflow bit */
+ hi =
+ (hi & ~(MASK_ERR_COUNT_HI | MASK_OVERFLOW_HI)) |
+ (THRESHOLD_MAX - tr->b->threshold_limit);
+ } else if (tr->old_limit) { /* change limit w/o reset */
+ int new_count = (hi & THRESHOLD_MAX) +
+ (tr->old_limit - tr->b->threshold_limit);
+
+ hi = (hi & ~MASK_ERR_COUNT_HI) |
+ (new_count & THRESHOLD_MAX);
+ }
+
+ /* clear IntType */
+ hi &= ~MASK_INT_TYPE_HI;
+
+ if (!tr->b->interrupt_capable)
+ goto done;
+
+ if (tr->set_lvt_off) {
+ if (lvt_off_valid(tr->b, tr->lvt_off, lo, hi)) {
+ /* set new lvt offset */
+ hi &= ~MASK_LVTOFF_HI;
+ hi |= tr->lvt_off << 20;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (tr->b->interrupt_enable)
+ hi |= INT_TYPE_APIC;
+
+ done:
+
+ hi |= MASK_COUNT_EN_HI;
+ wrmsr(tr->b->address, lo, hi);
+}
+
+static void mce_threshold_block_init(struct threshold_block *b, int offset)
+{
+ struct thresh_restart tr = {
+ .b = b,
+ .set_lvt_off = 1,
+ .lvt_off = offset,
+ };
+
+ b->threshold_limit = THRESHOLD_MAX;
+ threshold_restart_bank(&tr);
+};
+
+static int setup_APIC_mce_threshold(int reserved, int new)
+{
+ if (reserved < 0 && !setup_APIC_eilvt(new, THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR,
+ APIC_EILVT_MSG_FIX, 0))
+ return new;
+
+ return reserved;
+}
+
+static int setup_APIC_deferred_error(int reserved, int new)
+{
+ if (reserved < 0 && !setup_APIC_eilvt(new, DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR,
+ APIC_EILVT_MSG_FIX, 0))
+ return new;
+
+ return reserved;
+}
+
+static void deferred_error_interrupt_enable(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 low = 0, high = 0;
+ int def_offset = -1, def_new;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_CU_DEF_ERR, &low, &high))
+ return;
+
+ def_new = (low & MASK_DEF_LVTOFF) >> 4;
+ if (!(low & MASK_DEF_LVTOFF)) {
+ pr_err(FW_BUG "Your BIOS is not setting up LVT offset 0x2 for deferred error IRQs correctly.\n");
+ def_new = DEF_LVT_OFF;
+ low = (low & ~MASK_DEF_LVTOFF) | (DEF_LVT_OFF << 4);
+ }
+
+ def_offset = setup_APIC_deferred_error(def_offset, def_new);
+ if ((def_offset == def_new) &&
+ (deferred_error_int_vector != amd_deferred_error_interrupt))
+ deferred_error_int_vector = amd_deferred_error_interrupt;
+
+ if (!mce_flags.smca)
+ low = (low & ~MASK_DEF_INT_TYPE) | DEF_INT_TYPE_APIC;
+
+ wrmsr(MSR_CU_DEF_ERR, low, high);
+}
+
+static u32 smca_get_block_address(unsigned int bank, unsigned int block,
+ unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ if (!block)
+ return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank);
+
+ if (!(per_cpu(smca_misc_banks_map, cpu) & BIT_ULL(bank)))
+ return 0;
+
+ return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISCy(bank, block - 1);
+}
+
+static u32 get_block_address(u32 current_addr, u32 low, u32 high,
+ unsigned int bank, unsigned int block,
+ unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u32 addr = 0, offset = 0;
+
+ if ((bank >= per_cpu(mce_num_banks, cpu)) || (block >= NR_BLOCKS))
+ return addr;
+
+ if (mce_flags.smca)
+ return smca_get_block_address(bank, block, cpu);
+
+ /* Fall back to method we used for older processors: */
+ switch (block) {
+ case 0:
+ addr = mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_MISC);
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ offset = ((low & MASK_BLKPTR_LO) >> 21);
+ if (offset)
+ addr = MCG_XBLK_ADDR + offset;
+ break;
+ default:
+ addr = ++current_addr;
+ }
+ return addr;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_threshold_block(unsigned int bank, unsigned int block, u32 addr,
+ int offset, u32 misc_high)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ u32 smca_low, smca_high;
+ struct threshold_block b;
+ int new;
+
+ if (!block)
+ per_cpu(bank_map, cpu) |= BIT_ULL(bank);
+
+ memset(&b, 0, sizeof(b));
+ b.cpu = cpu;
+ b.bank = bank;
+ b.block = block;
+ b.address = addr;
+ b.interrupt_capable = lvt_interrupt_supported(bank, misc_high);
+
+ if (!b.interrupt_capable)
+ goto done;
+
+ b.interrupt_enable = 1;
+
+ if (!mce_flags.smca) {
+ new = (misc_high & MASK_LVTOFF_HI) >> 20;
+ goto set_offset;
+ }
+
+ /* Gather LVT offset for thresholding: */
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_CU_DEF_ERR, &smca_low, &smca_high))
+ goto out;
+
+ new = (smca_low & SMCA_THR_LVT_OFF) >> 12;
+
+set_offset:
+ offset = setup_APIC_mce_threshold(offset, new);
+ if (offset == new)
+ thresholding_irq_en = true;
+
+done:
+ mce_threshold_block_init(&b, offset);
+
+out:
+ return offset;
+}
+
+bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ enum smca_bank_types bank_type = smca_get_bank_type(m->extcpu, m->bank);
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ /* See Family 17h Models 10h-2Fh Erratum #1114. */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x17 &&
+ c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x2F &&
+ bank_type == SMCA_IF && XEC(m->status, 0x3f) == 10)
+ return true;
+
+ /* NB GART TLB error reporting is disabled by default. */
+ if (c->x86 < 0x17) {
+ if (m->bank == 4 && XEC(m->status, 0x1f) == 0x5)
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Turn off thresholding banks for the following conditions:
+ * - MC4_MISC thresholding is not supported on Family 0x15.
+ * - Prevent possible spurious interrupts from the IF bank on Family 0x17
+ * Models 0x10-0x2F due to Erratum #1114.
+ */
+static void disable_err_thresholding(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int bank)
+{
+ int i, num_msrs;
+ u64 hwcr;
+ bool need_toggle;
+ u32 msrs[NR_BLOCKS];
+
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15 && bank == 4) {
+ msrs[0] = 0x00000413; /* MC4_MISC0 */
+ msrs[1] = 0xc0000408; /* MC4_MISC1 */
+ num_msrs = 2;
+ } else if (c->x86 == 0x17 &&
+ (c->x86_model >= 0x10 && c->x86_model <= 0x2F)) {
+
+ if (smca_get_bank_type(smp_processor_id(), bank) != SMCA_IF)
+ return;
+
+ msrs[0] = MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank);
+ num_msrs = 1;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
+
+ /* McStatusWrEn has to be set */
+ need_toggle = !(hwcr & BIT(18));
+ if (need_toggle)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr | BIT(18));
+
+ /* Clear CntP bit safely */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_msrs; i++)
+ msr_clear_bit(msrs[i], 62);
+
+ /* restore old settings */
+ if (need_toggle)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_K7_HWCR, hwcr);
+}
+
+/* cpu init entry point, called from mce.c with preempt off */
+void mce_amd_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int bank, block, cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ u32 low = 0, high = 0, address = 0;
+ int offset = -1;
+
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); ++bank) {
+ if (mce_flags.smca)
+ smca_configure(bank, cpu);
+
+ disable_err_thresholding(c, bank);
+
+ for (block = 0; block < NR_BLOCKS; ++block) {
+ address = get_block_address(address, low, high, bank, block, cpu);
+ if (!address)
+ break;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(address, &low, &high))
+ break;
+
+ if (!(high & MASK_VALID_HI))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!(high & MASK_CNTP_HI) ||
+ (high & MASK_LOCKED_HI))
+ continue;
+
+ offset = prepare_threshold_block(bank, block, address, offset, high);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mce_flags.succor)
+ deferred_error_interrupt_enable(c);
+}
+
+bool amd_mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m)
+{
+ /* ErrCodeExt[20:16] */
+ u8 xec = (m->status >> 16) & 0x1f;
+
+ if (mce_flags.smca)
+ return smca_get_bank_type(m->extcpu, m->bank) == SMCA_UMC && xec == 0x0;
+
+ return m->bank == 4 && xec == 0x8;
+}
+
+static void __log_error(unsigned int bank, u64 status, u64 addr, u64 misc)
+{
+ struct mce m;
+
+ mce_setup(&m);
+
+ m.status = status;
+ m.misc = misc;
+ m.bank = bank;
+ m.tsc = rdtsc();
+
+ if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV) {
+ m.addr = addr;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract [55:<lsb>] where lsb is the least significant
+ * *valid* bit of the address bits.
+ */
+ if (mce_flags.smca) {
+ u8 lsb = (m.addr >> 56) & 0x3f;
+
+ m.addr &= GENMASK_ULL(55, lsb);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mce_flags.smca) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(bank), m.ipid);
+
+ if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_SYNDV)
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_SYND(bank), m.synd);
+ }
+
+ mce_log(&m);
+}
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_deferred_error)
+{
+ trace_deferred_error_apic_entry(DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR);
+ inc_irq_stat(irq_deferred_error_count);
+ deferred_error_int_vector();
+ trace_deferred_error_apic_exit(DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR);
+ ack_APIC_irq();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the logged error is deferred. False, otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool
+_log_error_bank(unsigned int bank, u32 msr_stat, u32 msr_addr, u64 misc)
+{
+ u64 status, addr = 0;
+
+ rdmsrl(msr_stat, status);
+ if (!(status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
+ return false;
+
+ if (status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV)
+ rdmsrl(msr_addr, addr);
+
+ __log_error(bank, status, addr, misc);
+
+ wrmsrl(msr_stat, 0);
+
+ return status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED;
+}
+
+static bool _log_error_deferred(unsigned int bank, u32 misc)
+{
+ if (!_log_error_bank(bank, mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS),
+ mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_ADDR), misc))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Non-SMCA systems don't have MCA_DESTAT/MCA_DEADDR registers.
+ * Return true here to avoid accessing these registers.
+ */
+ if (!mce_flags.smca)
+ return true;
+
+ /* Clear MCA_DESTAT if the deferred error was logged from MCA_STATUS. */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_DESTAT(bank), 0);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We have three scenarios for checking for Deferred errors:
+ *
+ * 1) Non-SMCA systems check MCA_STATUS and log error if found.
+ * 2) SMCA systems check MCA_STATUS. If error is found then log it and also
+ * clear MCA_DESTAT.
+ * 3) SMCA systems check MCA_DESTAT, if error was not found in MCA_STATUS, and
+ * log it.
+ */
+static void log_error_deferred(unsigned int bank)
+{
+ if (_log_error_deferred(bank, 0))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Only deferred errors are logged in MCA_DE{STAT,ADDR} so just check
+ * for a valid error.
+ */
+ _log_error_bank(bank, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_DESTAT(bank),
+ MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_DEADDR(bank), 0);
+}
+
+/* APIC interrupt handler for deferred errors */
+static void amd_deferred_error_interrupt(void)
+{
+ unsigned int bank;
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); ++bank)
+ log_error_deferred(bank);
+}
+
+static void log_error_thresholding(unsigned int bank, u64 misc)
+{
+ _log_error_deferred(bank, misc);
+}
+
+static void log_and_reset_block(struct threshold_block *block)
+{
+ struct thresh_restart tr;
+ u32 low = 0, high = 0;
+
+ if (!block)
+ return;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(block->address, &low, &high))
+ return;
+
+ if (!(high & MASK_OVERFLOW_HI))
+ return;
+
+ /* Log the MCE which caused the threshold event. */
+ log_error_thresholding(block->bank, ((u64)high << 32) | low);
+
+ /* Reset threshold block after logging error. */
+ memset(&tr, 0, sizeof(tr));
+ tr.b = block;
+ threshold_restart_bank(&tr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Threshold interrupt handler will service THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR. The interrupt
+ * goes off when error_count reaches threshold_limit.
+ */
+static void amd_threshold_interrupt(void)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *first_block = NULL, *block = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ struct threshold_bank **bp = this_cpu_read(threshold_banks);
+ unsigned int bank, cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ /*
+ * Validate that the threshold bank has been initialized already. The
+ * handler is installed at boot time, but on a hotplug event the
+ * interrupt might fire before the data has been initialized.
+ */
+ if (!bp)
+ return;
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); ++bank) {
+ if (!(per_cpu(bank_map, cpu) & BIT_ULL(bank)))
+ continue;
+
+ first_block = bp[bank]->blocks;
+ if (!first_block)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * The first block is also the head of the list. Check it first
+ * before iterating over the rest.
+ */
+ log_and_reset_block(first_block);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(block, tmp, &first_block->miscj, miscj)
+ log_and_reset_block(block);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sysfs Interface
+ */
+
+struct threshold_attr {
+ struct attribute attr;
+ ssize_t (*show) (struct threshold_block *, char *);
+ ssize_t (*store) (struct threshold_block *, const char *, size_t count);
+};
+
+#define SHOW_FIELDS(name) \
+static ssize_t show_ ## name(struct threshold_block *b, char *buf) \
+{ \
+ return sprintf(buf, "%lu\n", (unsigned long) b->name); \
+}
+SHOW_FIELDS(interrupt_enable)
+SHOW_FIELDS(threshold_limit)
+
+static ssize_t
+store_interrupt_enable(struct threshold_block *b, const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ struct thresh_restart tr;
+ unsigned long new;
+
+ if (!b->interrupt_capable)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ b->interrupt_enable = !!new;
+
+ memset(&tr, 0, sizeof(tr));
+ tr.b = b;
+
+ if (smp_call_function_single(b->cpu, threshold_restart_bank, &tr, 1))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+store_threshold_limit(struct threshold_block *b, const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ struct thresh_restart tr;
+ unsigned long new;
+
+ if (kstrtoul(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (new > THRESHOLD_MAX)
+ new = THRESHOLD_MAX;
+ if (new < 1)
+ new = 1;
+
+ memset(&tr, 0, sizeof(tr));
+ tr.old_limit = b->threshold_limit;
+ b->threshold_limit = new;
+ tr.b = b;
+
+ if (smp_call_function_single(b->cpu, threshold_restart_bank, &tr, 1))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static ssize_t show_error_count(struct threshold_block *b, char *buf)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ /* CPU might be offline by now */
+ if (rdmsr_on_cpu(b->cpu, b->address, &lo, &hi))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", ((hi & THRESHOLD_MAX) -
+ (THRESHOLD_MAX - b->threshold_limit)));
+}
+
+static struct threshold_attr error_count = {
+ .attr = {.name = __stringify(error_count), .mode = 0444 },
+ .show = show_error_count,
+};
+
+#define RW_ATTR(val) \
+static struct threshold_attr val = { \
+ .attr = {.name = __stringify(val), .mode = 0644 }, \
+ .show = show_## val, \
+ .store = store_## val, \
+};
+
+RW_ATTR(interrupt_enable);
+RW_ATTR(threshold_limit);
+
+static struct attribute *default_attrs[] = {
+ &threshold_limit.attr,
+ &error_count.attr,
+ NULL, /* possibly interrupt_enable if supported, see below */
+ NULL,
+};
+ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(default);
+
+#define to_block(k) container_of(k, struct threshold_block, kobj)
+#define to_attr(a) container_of(a, struct threshold_attr, attr)
+
+static ssize_t show(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *b = to_block(kobj);
+ struct threshold_attr *a = to_attr(attr);
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = a->show ? a->show(b, buf) : -EIO;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t store(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *b = to_block(kobj);
+ struct threshold_attr *a = to_attr(attr);
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ ret = a->store ? a->store(b, buf, count) : -EIO;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct sysfs_ops threshold_ops = {
+ .show = show,
+ .store = store,
+};
+
+static void threshold_block_release(struct kobject *kobj);
+
+static struct kobj_type threshold_ktype = {
+ .sysfs_ops = &threshold_ops,
+ .default_groups = default_groups,
+ .release = threshold_block_release,
+};
+
+static const char *get_name(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank, struct threshold_block *b)
+{
+ enum smca_bank_types bank_type;
+
+ if (!mce_flags.smca) {
+ if (b && bank == 4)
+ return bank4_names(b);
+
+ return th_names[bank];
+ }
+
+ bank_type = smca_get_bank_type(cpu, bank);
+ if (bank_type >= N_SMCA_BANK_TYPES)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (b && bank_type == SMCA_UMC) {
+ if (b->block < ARRAY_SIZE(smca_umc_block_names))
+ return smca_umc_block_names[b->block];
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (per_cpu(smca_bank_counts, cpu)[bank_type] == 1)
+ return smca_get_name(bank_type);
+
+ snprintf(buf_mcatype, MAX_MCATYPE_NAME_LEN,
+ "%s_%u", smca_get_name(bank_type),
+ per_cpu(smca_banks, cpu)[bank].sysfs_id);
+ return buf_mcatype;
+}
+
+static int allocate_threshold_blocks(unsigned int cpu, struct threshold_bank *tb,
+ unsigned int bank, unsigned int block,
+ u32 address)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *b = NULL;
+ u32 low, high;
+ int err;
+
+ if ((bank >= this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks)) || (block >= NR_BLOCKS))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (rdmsr_safe(address, &low, &high))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!(high & MASK_VALID_HI)) {
+ if (block)
+ goto recurse;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!(high & MASK_CNTP_HI) ||
+ (high & MASK_LOCKED_HI))
+ goto recurse;
+
+ b = kzalloc(sizeof(struct threshold_block), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!b)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ b->block = block;
+ b->bank = bank;
+ b->cpu = cpu;
+ b->address = address;
+ b->interrupt_enable = 0;
+ b->interrupt_capable = lvt_interrupt_supported(bank, high);
+ b->threshold_limit = THRESHOLD_MAX;
+
+ if (b->interrupt_capable) {
+ default_attrs[2] = &interrupt_enable.attr;
+ b->interrupt_enable = 1;
+ } else {
+ default_attrs[2] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&b->miscj);
+
+ /* This is safe as @tb is not visible yet */
+ if (tb->blocks)
+ list_add(&b->miscj, &tb->blocks->miscj);
+ else
+ tb->blocks = b;
+
+ err = kobject_init_and_add(&b->kobj, &threshold_ktype, tb->kobj, get_name(cpu, bank, b));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+recurse:
+ address = get_block_address(address, low, high, bank, ++block, cpu);
+ if (!address)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = allocate_threshold_blocks(cpu, tb, bank, block, address);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ if (b)
+ kobject_uevent(&b->kobj, KOBJ_ADD);
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_free:
+ if (b) {
+ list_del(&b->miscj);
+ kobject_put(&b->kobj);
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int __threshold_add_blocks(struct threshold_bank *b)
+{
+ struct list_head *head = &b->blocks->miscj;
+ struct threshold_block *pos = NULL;
+ struct threshold_block *tmp = NULL;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ err = kobject_add(&b->blocks->kobj, b->kobj, b->blocks->kobj.name);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, head, miscj) {
+
+ err = kobject_add(&pos->kobj, b->kobj, pos->kobj.name);
+ if (err) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse(pos, tmp, head, miscj)
+ kobject_del(&pos->kobj);
+
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int threshold_create_bank(struct threshold_bank **bp, unsigned int cpu,
+ unsigned int bank)
+{
+ struct device *dev = this_cpu_read(mce_device);
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb = NULL;
+ struct threshold_bank *b = NULL;
+ const char *name = get_name(cpu, bank, NULL);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!dev)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (is_shared_bank(bank)) {
+ nb = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(cpu));
+
+ /* threshold descriptor already initialized on this node? */
+ if (nb && nb->bank4) {
+ /* yes, use it */
+ b = nb->bank4;
+ err = kobject_add(b->kobj, &dev->kobj, name);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ bp[bank] = b;
+ refcount_inc(&b->cpus);
+
+ err = __threshold_add_blocks(b);
+
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ b = kzalloc(sizeof(struct threshold_bank), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!b) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Associate the bank with the per-CPU MCE device */
+ b->kobj = kobject_create_and_add(name, &dev->kobj);
+ if (!b->kobj) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ if (is_shared_bank(bank)) {
+ b->shared = 1;
+ refcount_set(&b->cpus, 1);
+
+ /* nb is already initialized, see above */
+ if (nb) {
+ WARN_ON(nb->bank4);
+ nb->bank4 = b;
+ }
+ }
+
+ err = allocate_threshold_blocks(cpu, b, bank, 0, mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_MISC));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_kobj;
+
+ bp[bank] = b;
+ return 0;
+
+out_kobj:
+ kobject_put(b->kobj);
+out_free:
+ kfree(b);
+out:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void threshold_block_release(struct kobject *kobj)
+{
+ kfree(to_block(kobj));
+}
+
+static void deallocate_threshold_blocks(struct threshold_bank *bank)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *pos, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &bank->blocks->miscj, miscj) {
+ list_del(&pos->miscj);
+ kobject_put(&pos->kobj);
+ }
+
+ kobject_put(&bank->blocks->kobj);
+}
+
+static void __threshold_remove_blocks(struct threshold_bank *b)
+{
+ struct threshold_block *pos = NULL;
+ struct threshold_block *tmp = NULL;
+
+ kobject_put(b->kobj);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &b->blocks->miscj, miscj)
+ kobject_put(b->kobj);
+}
+
+static void threshold_remove_bank(struct threshold_bank *bank)
+{
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb;
+
+ if (!bank->blocks)
+ goto out_free;
+
+ if (!bank->shared)
+ goto out_dealloc;
+
+ if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&bank->cpus)) {
+ __threshold_remove_blocks(bank);
+ return;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The last CPU on this node using the shared bank is going
+ * away, remove that bank now.
+ */
+ nb = node_to_amd_nb(topology_die_id(smp_processor_id()));
+ nb->bank4 = NULL;
+ }
+
+out_dealloc:
+ deallocate_threshold_blocks(bank);
+
+out_free:
+ kobject_put(bank->kobj);
+ kfree(bank);
+}
+
+static void __threshold_remove_device(struct threshold_bank **bp)
+{
+ unsigned int bank, numbanks = this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks);
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < numbanks; bank++) {
+ if (!bp[bank])
+ continue;
+
+ threshold_remove_bank(bp[bank]);
+ bp[bank] = NULL;
+ }
+ kfree(bp);
+}
+
+int mce_threshold_remove_device(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct threshold_bank **bp = this_cpu_read(threshold_banks);
+
+ if (!bp)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the pointer before cleaning up, so that the interrupt won't
+ * touch anything of this.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(threshold_banks, NULL);
+
+ __threshold_remove_device(bp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mce_threshold_create_device - Create the per-CPU MCE threshold device
+ * @cpu: The plugged in CPU
+ *
+ * Create directories and files for all valid threshold banks.
+ *
+ * This is invoked from the CPU hotplug callback which was installed in
+ * mcheck_init_device(). The invocation happens in context of the hotplug
+ * thread running on @cpu. The callback is invoked on all CPUs which are
+ * online when the callback is installed or during a real hotplug event.
+ */
+int mce_threshold_create_device(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ unsigned int numbanks, bank;
+ struct threshold_bank **bp;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!mce_flags.amd_threshold)
+ return 0;
+
+ bp = this_cpu_read(threshold_banks);
+ if (bp)
+ return 0;
+
+ numbanks = this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks);
+ bp = kcalloc(numbanks, sizeof(*bp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!bp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < numbanks; ++bank) {
+ if (!(this_cpu_read(bank_map) & BIT_ULL(bank)))
+ continue;
+ err = threshold_create_bank(bp, cpu, bank);
+ if (err) {
+ __threshold_remove_device(bp);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+ this_cpu_write(threshold_banks, bp);
+
+ if (thresholding_irq_en)
+ mce_threshold_vector = amd_threshold_interrupt;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ed341714
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Bridge between MCE and APEI
+ *
+ * On some machine, corrected memory errors are reported via APEI
+ * generic hardware error source (GHES) instead of corrected Machine
+ * Check. These corrected memory errors can be reported to user space
+ * through /dev/mcelog via faking a corrected Machine Check, so that
+ * the error memory page can be offlined by /sbin/mcelog if the error
+ * count for one page is beyond the threshold.
+ *
+ * For fatal MCE, save MCE record into persistent storage via ERST, so
+ * that the MCE record can be logged after reboot via ERST.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2010 Intel Corp.
+ * Author: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/cper.h>
+#include <acpi/apei.h>
+#include <acpi/ghes.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+void apei_mce_report_mem_error(int severity, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err)
+{
+ struct mce m;
+ int lsb;
+
+ if (!(mem_err->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Even if the ->validation_bits are set for address mask,
+ * to be extra safe, check and reject an error radius '0',
+ * and fall back to the default page size.
+ */
+ if (mem_err->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
+ lsb = find_first_bit((void *)&mem_err->physical_addr_mask, PAGE_SHIFT);
+ else
+ lsb = PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ mce_setup(&m);
+ m.bank = -1;
+ /* Fake a memory read error with unknown channel */
+ m.status = MCI_STATUS_VAL | MCI_STATUS_EN | MCI_STATUS_ADDRV | MCI_STATUS_MISCV | 0x9f;
+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | lsb;
+
+ if (severity >= GHES_SEV_RECOVERABLE)
+ m.status |= MCI_STATUS_UC;
+
+ if (severity >= GHES_SEV_PANIC) {
+ m.status |= MCI_STATUS_PCC;
+ m.tsc = rdtsc();
+ }
+
+ m.addr = mem_err->physical_addr;
+ mce_log(&m);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(apei_mce_report_mem_error);
+
+int apei_smca_report_x86_error(struct cper_ia_proc_ctx *ctx_info, u64 lapic_id)
+{
+ const u64 *i_mce = ((const u64 *) (ctx_info + 1));
+ unsigned int cpu;
+ struct mce m;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMCA))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The starting address of the register array extracted from BERT must
+ * match with the first expected register in the register layout of
+ * SMCA address space. This address corresponds to banks's MCA_STATUS
+ * register.
+ *
+ * Match any MCi_STATUS register by turning off bank numbers.
+ */
+ if ((ctx_info->msr_addr & MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MC0_STATUS) !=
+ MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MC0_STATUS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * The register array size must be large enough to include all the
+ * SMCA registers which need to be extracted.
+ *
+ * The number of registers in the register array is determined by
+ * Register Array Size/8 as defined in UEFI spec v2.8, sec N.2.4.2.2.
+ * The register layout is fixed and currently the raw data in the
+ * register array includes 6 SMCA registers which the kernel can
+ * extract.
+ */
+ if (ctx_info->reg_arr_size < 48)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mce_setup(&m);
+
+ m.extcpu = -1;
+ m.socketid = -1;
+
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ if (cpu_data(cpu).initial_apicid == lapic_id) {
+ m.extcpu = cpu;
+ m.socketid = cpu_data(m.extcpu).phys_proc_id;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ m.apicid = lapic_id;
+ m.bank = (ctx_info->msr_addr >> 4) & 0xFF;
+ m.status = *i_mce;
+ m.addr = *(i_mce + 1);
+ m.misc = *(i_mce + 2);
+ /* Skipping MCA_CONFIG */
+ m.ipid = *(i_mce + 4);
+ m.synd = *(i_mce + 5);
+
+ mce_log(&m);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define CPER_CREATOR_MCE \
+ GUID_INIT(0x75a574e3, 0x5052, 0x4b29, 0x8a, 0x8e, 0xbe, 0x2c, \
+ 0x64, 0x90, 0xb8, 0x9d)
+#define CPER_SECTION_TYPE_MCE \
+ GUID_INIT(0xfe08ffbe, 0x95e4, 0x4be7, 0xbc, 0x73, 0x40, 0x96, \
+ 0x04, 0x4a, 0x38, 0xfc)
+
+/*
+ * CPER specification (in UEFI specification 2.3 appendix N) requires
+ * byte-packed.
+ */
+struct cper_mce_record {
+ struct cper_record_header hdr;
+ struct cper_section_descriptor sec_hdr;
+ struct mce mce;
+} __packed;
+
+int apei_write_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ struct cper_mce_record rcd;
+
+ memset(&rcd, 0, sizeof(rcd));
+ memcpy(rcd.hdr.signature, CPER_SIG_RECORD, CPER_SIG_SIZE);
+ rcd.hdr.revision = CPER_RECORD_REV;
+ rcd.hdr.signature_end = CPER_SIG_END;
+ rcd.hdr.section_count = 1;
+ rcd.hdr.error_severity = CPER_SEV_FATAL;
+ /* timestamp, platform_id, partition_id are all invalid */
+ rcd.hdr.validation_bits = 0;
+ rcd.hdr.record_length = sizeof(rcd);
+ rcd.hdr.creator_id = CPER_CREATOR_MCE;
+ rcd.hdr.notification_type = CPER_NOTIFY_MCE;
+ rcd.hdr.record_id = cper_next_record_id();
+ rcd.hdr.flags = CPER_HW_ERROR_FLAGS_PREVERR;
+
+ rcd.sec_hdr.section_offset = (void *)&rcd.mce - (void *)&rcd;
+ rcd.sec_hdr.section_length = sizeof(rcd.mce);
+ rcd.sec_hdr.revision = CPER_SEC_REV;
+ /* fru_id and fru_text is invalid */
+ rcd.sec_hdr.validation_bits = 0;
+ rcd.sec_hdr.flags = CPER_SEC_PRIMARY;
+ rcd.sec_hdr.section_type = CPER_SECTION_TYPE_MCE;
+ rcd.sec_hdr.section_severity = CPER_SEV_FATAL;
+
+ memcpy(&rcd.mce, m, sizeof(*m));
+
+ return erst_write(&rcd.hdr);
+}
+
+ssize_t apei_read_mce(struct mce *m, u64 *record_id)
+{
+ struct cper_mce_record rcd;
+ int rc, pos;
+
+ rc = erst_get_record_id_begin(&pos);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+retry:
+ rc = erst_get_record_id_next(&pos, record_id);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ /* no more record */
+ if (*record_id == APEI_ERST_INVALID_RECORD_ID)
+ goto out;
+ rc = erst_read_record(*record_id, &rcd.hdr, sizeof(rcd), sizeof(rcd),
+ &CPER_CREATOR_MCE);
+ /* someone else has cleared the record, try next one */
+ if (rc == -ENOENT)
+ goto retry;
+ else if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ memcpy(m, &rcd.mce, sizeof(*m));
+ rc = sizeof(*m);
+out:
+ erst_get_record_id_end();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check whether there is record in ERST */
+int apei_check_mce(void)
+{
+ return erst_get_record_count();
+}
+
+int apei_clear_mce(u64 record_id)
+{
+ return erst_clear(record_id);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1a748da5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2874 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Machine check handler.
+ *
+ * K8 parts Copyright 2002,2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
+ * Rest from unknown author(s).
+ * 2004 Andi Kleen. Rewrote most of it.
+ * Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation
+ * Author: Andi Kleen
+ */
+
+#include <linux/thread_info.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/kobject.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kdebug.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/ras.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/irq_work.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/set_memory.h>
+#include <linux/sync_core.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* sysfs synchronization */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mce_sysfs_mutex);
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/mce.h>
+
+#define SPINUNIT 100 /* 100ns */
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_exception_count);
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned int, mce_num_banks);
+
+struct mce_bank {
+ u64 ctl; /* subevents to enable */
+
+ __u64 init : 1, /* initialise bank? */
+ __reserved_1 : 63;
+};
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(struct mce_bank[MAX_NR_BANKS], mce_banks_array);
+
+#define ATTR_LEN 16
+/* One object for each MCE bank, shared by all CPUs */
+struct mce_bank_dev {
+ struct device_attribute attr; /* device attribute */
+ char attrname[ATTR_LEN]; /* attribute name */
+ u8 bank; /* bank number */
+};
+static struct mce_bank_dev mce_bank_devs[MAX_NR_BANKS];
+
+struct mce_vendor_flags mce_flags __read_mostly;
+
+struct mca_config mca_cfg __read_mostly = {
+ .bootlog = -1,
+ .monarch_timeout = -1
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce, mces_seen);
+static unsigned long mce_need_notify;
+
+/*
+ * MCA banks polled by the period polling timer for corrected events.
+ * With Intel CMCI, this only has MCA banks which do not support CMCI (if any).
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(mce_banks_t, mce_poll_banks) = {
+ [0 ... BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_NR_BANKS)-1] = ~0UL
+};
+
+/*
+ * MCA banks controlled through firmware first for corrected errors.
+ * This is a global list of banks for which we won't enable CMCI and we
+ * won't poll. Firmware controls these banks and is responsible for
+ * reporting corrected errors through GHES. Uncorrected/recoverable
+ * errors are still notified through a machine check.
+ */
+mce_banks_t mce_banks_ce_disabled;
+
+static struct work_struct mce_work;
+static struct irq_work mce_irq_work;
+
+/*
+ * CPU/chipset specific EDAC code can register a notifier call here to print
+ * MCE errors in a human-readable form.
+ */
+BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(x86_mce_decoder_chain);
+
+/* Do initial initialization of a struct mce */
+void mce_setup(struct mce *m)
+{
+ memset(m, 0, sizeof(struct mce));
+ m->cpu = m->extcpu = smp_processor_id();
+ /* need the internal __ version to avoid deadlocks */
+ m->time = __ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ m->cpuvendor = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor;
+ m->cpuid = cpuid_eax(1);
+ m->socketid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).phys_proc_id;
+ m->apicid = cpu_data(m->extcpu).initial_apicid;
+ m->mcgcap = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP);
+ m->ppin = cpu_data(m->extcpu).ppin;
+ m->microcode = boot_cpu_data.microcode;
+}
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct mce, injectm);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(injectm);
+
+void mce_log(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (!mce_gen_pool_add(m))
+ irq_work_queue(&mce_irq_work);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_log);
+
+void mce_register_decode_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON(nb->priority < MCE_PRIO_LOWEST ||
+ nb->priority > MCE_PRIO_HIGHEST))
+ return;
+
+ blocking_notifier_chain_register(&x86_mce_decoder_chain, nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_register_decode_chain);
+
+void mce_unregister_decode_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&x86_mce_decoder_chain, nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_unregister_decode_chain);
+
+static void __print_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "CPU %d: Machine Check%s: %Lx Bank %d: %016Lx\n",
+ m->extcpu,
+ (m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_MCIP ? " Exception" : ""),
+ m->mcgstatus, m->bank, m->status);
+
+ if (m->ip) {
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "RIP%s %02x:<%016Lx> ",
+ !(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_EIPV) ? " !INEXACT!" : "",
+ m->cs, m->ip);
+
+ if (m->cs == __KERNEL_CS)
+ pr_cont("{%pS}", (void *)(unsigned long)m->ip);
+ pr_cont("\n");
+ }
+
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "TSC %llx ", m->tsc);
+ if (m->addr)
+ pr_cont("ADDR %llx ", m->addr);
+ if (m->misc)
+ pr_cont("MISC %llx ", m->misc);
+ if (m->ppin)
+ pr_cont("PPIN %llx ", m->ppin);
+
+ if (mce_flags.smca) {
+ if (m->synd)
+ pr_cont("SYND %llx ", m->synd);
+ if (m->ipid)
+ pr_cont("IPID %llx ", m->ipid);
+ }
+
+ pr_cont("\n");
+
+ /*
+ * Note this output is parsed by external tools and old fields
+ * should not be changed.
+ */
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "PROCESSOR %u:%x TIME %llu SOCKET %u APIC %x microcode %x\n",
+ m->cpuvendor, m->cpuid, m->time, m->socketid, m->apicid,
+ m->microcode);
+}
+
+static void print_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ __print_mce(m);
+
+ if (m->cpuvendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD && m->cpuvendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ pr_emerg_ratelimited(HW_ERR "Run the above through 'mcelog --ascii'\n");
+}
+
+#define PANIC_TIMEOUT 5 /* 5 seconds */
+
+static atomic_t mce_panicked;
+
+static int fake_panic;
+static atomic_t mce_fake_panicked;
+
+/* Panic in progress. Enable interrupts and wait for final IPI */
+static void wait_for_panic(void)
+{
+ long timeout = PANIC_TIMEOUT*USEC_PER_SEC;
+
+ preempt_disable();
+ local_irq_enable();
+ while (timeout-- > 0)
+ udelay(1);
+ if (panic_timeout == 0)
+ panic_timeout = mca_cfg.panic_timeout;
+ panic("Panicing machine check CPU died");
+}
+
+static noinstr void mce_panic(const char *msg, struct mce *final, char *exp)
+{
+ struct llist_node *pending;
+ struct mce_evt_llist *l;
+ int apei_err = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. Not that it
+ * matters a whole lot since the machine is going to panic anyway.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ if (!fake_panic) {
+ /*
+ * Make sure only one CPU runs in machine check panic
+ */
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_panicked) > 1)
+ wait_for_panic();
+ barrier();
+
+ bust_spinlocks(1);
+ console_verbose();
+ } else {
+ /* Don't log too much for fake panic */
+ if (atomic_inc_return(&mce_fake_panicked) > 1)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ pending = mce_gen_pool_prepare_records();
+ /* First print corrected ones that are still unlogged */
+ llist_for_each_entry(l, pending, llnode) {
+ struct mce *m = &l->mce;
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC)) {
+ print_mce(m);
+ if (!apei_err)
+ apei_err = apei_write_mce(m);
+ }
+ }
+ /* Now print uncorrected but with the final one last */
+ llist_for_each_entry(l, pending, llnode) {
+ struct mce *m = &l->mce;
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC))
+ continue;
+ if (!final || mce_cmp(m, final)) {
+ print_mce(m);
+ if (!apei_err)
+ apei_err = apei_write_mce(m);
+ }
+ }
+ if (final) {
+ print_mce(final);
+ if (!apei_err)
+ apei_err = apei_write_mce(final);
+ }
+ if (exp)
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Machine check: %s\n", exp);
+ if (!fake_panic) {
+ if (panic_timeout == 0)
+ panic_timeout = mca_cfg.panic_timeout;
+ panic(msg);
+ } else
+ pr_emerg(HW_ERR "Fake kernel panic: %s\n", msg);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+/* Support code for software error injection */
+
+static int msr_to_offset(u32 msr)
+{
+ unsigned bank = __this_cpu_read(injectm.bank);
+
+ if (msr == mca_cfg.rip_msr)
+ return offsetof(struct mce, ip);
+ if (msr == mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS))
+ return offsetof(struct mce, status);
+ if (msr == mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_ADDR))
+ return offsetof(struct mce, addr);
+ if (msr == mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_MISC))
+ return offsetof(struct mce, misc);
+ if (msr == MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS)
+ return offsetof(struct mce, mcgstatus);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void ex_handler_msr_mce(struct pt_regs *regs, bool wrmsr)
+{
+ if (wrmsr) {
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx, (unsigned int)regs->ax,
+ regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+ } else {
+ pr_emerg("MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pS)\n",
+ (unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip);
+ }
+
+ show_stack_regs(regs);
+
+ panic("MCA architectural violation!\n");
+
+ while (true)
+ cpu_relax();
+}
+
+/* MSR access wrappers used for error injection */
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr)
+{
+ DECLARE_ARGS(val, low, high);
+
+ if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
+ int offset;
+ u64 ret;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ else
+ ret = *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset);
+
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RDMSR on MCA MSRs should not fault. If they do, this is very much an
+ * architectural violation and needs to be reported to hw vendor. Panic
+ * the box to not allow any further progress.
+ */
+ asm volatile("1: rdmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_RDMSR_IN_MCE)
+ : EAX_EDX_RET(val, low, high) : "c" (msr));
+
+
+ return EAX_EDX_VAL(val, low, high);
+}
+
+static noinstr void mce_wrmsrl(u32 msr, u64 v)
+{
+ u32 low, high;
+
+ if (__this_cpu_read(injectm.finished)) {
+ int offset;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ offset = msr_to_offset(msr);
+ if (offset >= 0)
+ *(u64 *)((char *)this_cpu_ptr(&injectm) + offset) = v;
+
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ low = (u32)v;
+ high = (u32)(v >> 32);
+
+ /* See comment in mce_rdmsrl() */
+ asm volatile("1: wrmsr\n"
+ "2:\n"
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_WRMSR_IN_MCE)
+ : : "c" (msr), "a"(low), "d" (high) : "memory");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Collect all global (w.r.t. this processor) status about this machine
+ * check into our "mce" struct so that we can use it later to assess
+ * the severity of the problem as we read per-bank specific details.
+ */
+static noinstr void mce_gather_info(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /*
+ * Enable instrumentation around mce_setup() which calls external
+ * facilities.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ mce_setup(m);
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ m->mcgstatus = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS);
+ if (regs) {
+ /*
+ * Get the address of the instruction at the time of
+ * the machine check error.
+ */
+ if (m->mcgstatus & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV)) {
+ m->ip = regs->ip;
+ m->cs = regs->cs;
+
+ /*
+ * When in VM86 mode make the cs look like ring 3
+ * always. This is a lie, but it's better than passing
+ * the additional vm86 bit around everywhere.
+ */
+ if (v8086_mode(regs))
+ m->cs |= 3;
+ }
+ /* Use accurate RIP reporting if available. */
+ if (mca_cfg.rip_msr)
+ m->ip = mce_rdmsrl(mca_cfg.rip_msr);
+ }
+}
+
+int mce_available(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (mca_cfg.disabled)
+ return 0;
+ return cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MCA);
+}
+
+static void mce_schedule_work(void)
+{
+ if (!mce_gen_pool_empty())
+ schedule_work(&mce_work);
+}
+
+static void mce_irq_work_cb(struct irq_work *entry)
+{
+ mce_schedule_work();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the address reported by the CPU is in a format we can parse.
+ * It would be possible to add code for most other cases, but all would
+ * be somewhat complicated (e.g. segment offset would require an instruction
+ * parser). So only support physical addresses up to page granularity for now.
+ */
+int mce_usable_address(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Checks after this one are Intel/Zhaoxin-specific: */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m->misc) > PAGE_SHIFT)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (MCI_MISC_ADDR_MODE(m->misc) != MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_usable_address);
+
+bool mce_is_memory_error(struct mce *m)
+{
+ switch (m->cpuvendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
+ return amd_mce_is_memory_error(m);
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ case X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN:
+ /*
+ * Intel SDM Volume 3B - 15.9.2 Compound Error Codes
+ *
+ * Bit 7 of the MCACOD field of IA32_MCi_STATUS is used for
+ * indicating a memory error. Bit 8 is used for indicating a
+ * cache hierarchy error. The combination of bit 2 and bit 3
+ * is used for indicating a `generic' cache hierarchy error
+ * But we can't just blindly check the above bits, because if
+ * bit 11 is set, then it is a bus/interconnect error - and
+ * either way the above bits just gives more detail on what
+ * bus/interconnect error happened. Note that bit 12 can be
+ * ignored, as it's the "filter" bit.
+ */
+ return (m->status & 0xef80) == BIT(7) ||
+ (m->status & 0xef00) == BIT(8) ||
+ (m->status & 0xeffc) == 0xc;
+
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_is_memory_error);
+
+static bool whole_page(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (!mca_cfg.ser || !(m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV))
+ return true;
+
+ return MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m->misc) >= PAGE_SHIFT;
+}
+
+bool mce_is_correctable(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (m->cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
+ return false;
+
+ if (m->cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON && m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED)
+ return false;
+
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_is_correctable);
+
+static int mce_early_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+
+ if (!m)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ /* Emit the trace record: */
+ trace_mce_record(m);
+
+ set_bit(0, &mce_need_notify);
+
+ mce_notify_irq();
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block early_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = mce_early_notifier,
+ .priority = MCE_PRIO_EARLY,
+};
+
+static int uc_decode_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct mce *mce = (struct mce *)data;
+ unsigned long pfn;
+
+ if (!mce || !mce_usable_address(mce))
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ if (mce->severity != MCE_AO_SEVERITY &&
+ mce->severity != MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ pfn = mce->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (!memory_failure(pfn, 0)) {
+ set_mce_nospec(pfn);
+ mce->kflags |= MCE_HANDLED_UC;
+ }
+
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block mce_uc_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = uc_decode_notifier,
+ .priority = MCE_PRIO_UC,
+};
+
+static int mce_default_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+
+ if (!m)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ if (mca_cfg.print_all || !m->kflags)
+ __print_mce(m);
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block mce_default_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = mce_default_notifier,
+ /* lowest prio, we want it to run last. */
+ .priority = MCE_PRIO_LOWEST,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Read ADDR and MISC registers.
+ */
+static noinstr void mce_read_aux(struct mce *m, int i)
+{
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
+ m->misc = mce_rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_MISC));
+
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_ADDRV) {
+ m->addr = mce_rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_ADDR));
+
+ /*
+ * Mask the reported address by the reported granularity.
+ */
+ if (mca_cfg.ser && (m->status & MCI_STATUS_MISCV)) {
+ u8 shift = MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(m->misc);
+ m->addr >>= shift;
+ m->addr <<= shift;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extract [55:<lsb>] where lsb is the least significant
+ * *valid* bit of the address bits.
+ */
+ if (mce_flags.smca) {
+ u8 lsb = (m->addr >> 56) & 0x3f;
+
+ m->addr &= GENMASK_ULL(55, lsb);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mce_flags.smca) {
+ m->ipid = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(i));
+
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_SYNDV)
+ m->synd = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_SYND(i));
+ }
+}
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned, mce_poll_count);
+
+/*
+ * Poll for corrected events or events that happened before reset.
+ * Those are just logged through /dev/mcelog.
+ *
+ * This is executed in standard interrupt context.
+ *
+ * Note: spec recommends to panic for fatal unsignalled
+ * errors here. However this would be quite problematic --
+ * we would need to reimplement the Monarch handling and
+ * it would mess up the exclusion between exception handler
+ * and poll handler -- * so we skip this for now.
+ * These cases should not happen anyways, or only when the CPU
+ * is already totally * confused. In this case it's likely it will
+ * not fully execute the machine check handler either.
+ */
+bool machine_check_poll(enum mcp_flags flags, mce_banks_t *b)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ bool error_seen = false;
+ struct mce m;
+ int i;
+
+ this_cpu_inc(mce_poll_count);
+
+ mce_gather_info(&m, NULL);
+
+ if (flags & MCP_TIMESTAMP)
+ m.tsc = rdtsc();
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ if (!mce_banks[i].ctl || !test_bit(i, *b))
+ continue;
+
+ m.misc = 0;
+ m.addr = 0;
+ m.bank = i;
+
+ barrier();
+ m.status = mce_rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS));
+
+ /* If this entry is not valid, ignore it */
+ if (!(m.status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * If we are logging everything (at CPU online) or this
+ * is a corrected error, then we must log it.
+ */
+ if ((flags & MCP_UC) || !(m.status & MCI_STATUS_UC))
+ goto log_it;
+
+ /*
+ * Newer Intel systems that support software error
+ * recovery need to make additional checks. Other
+ * CPUs should skip over uncorrected errors, but log
+ * everything else.
+ */
+ if (!mca_cfg.ser) {
+ if (m.status & MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ continue;
+ goto log_it;
+ }
+
+ /* Log "not enabled" (speculative) errors */
+ if (!(m.status & MCI_STATUS_EN))
+ goto log_it;
+
+ /*
+ * Log UCNA (SDM: 15.6.3 "UCR Error Classification")
+ * UC == 1 && PCC == 0 && S == 0
+ */
+ if (!(m.status & MCI_STATUS_PCC) && !(m.status & MCI_STATUS_S))
+ goto log_it;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip anything else. Presumption is that our read of this
+ * bank is racing with a machine check. Leave the log alone
+ * for do_machine_check() to deal with it.
+ */
+ continue;
+
+log_it:
+ error_seen = true;
+
+ if (flags & MCP_DONTLOG)
+ goto clear_it;
+
+ mce_read_aux(&m, i);
+ m.severity = mce_severity(&m, NULL, NULL, false);
+ /*
+ * Don't get the IP here because it's unlikely to
+ * have anything to do with the actual error location.
+ */
+
+ if (mca_cfg.dont_log_ce && !mce_usable_address(&m))
+ goto clear_it;
+
+ if (flags & MCP_QUEUE_LOG)
+ mce_gen_pool_add(&m);
+ else
+ mce_log(&m);
+
+clear_it:
+ /*
+ * Clear state for this bank.
+ */
+ mce_wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS), 0);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't clear MCG_STATUS here because it's only defined for
+ * exceptions.
+ */
+
+ sync_core();
+
+ return error_seen;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(machine_check_poll);
+
+/*
+ * During IFU recovery Sandy Bridge -EP4S processors set the RIPV and
+ * EIPV bits in MCG_STATUS to zero on the affected logical processor (SDM
+ * Vol 3B Table 15-20). But this confuses both the code that determines
+ * whether the machine check occurred in kernel or user mode, and also
+ * the severity assessment code. Pretend that EIPV was set, and take the
+ * ip/cs values from the pt_regs that mce_gather_info() ignored earlier.
+ */
+static __always_inline void
+quirk_sandybridge_ifu(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (bank != 0)
+ return;
+ if ((m->mcgstatus & (MCG_STATUS_EIPV|MCG_STATUS_RIPV)) != 0)
+ return;
+ if ((m->status & (MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_STATUS_UC|
+ MCI_STATUS_EN|MCI_STATUS_MISCV|MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|
+ MCI_STATUS_PCC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR|
+ MCACOD)) !=
+ (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_EN|
+ MCI_STATUS_MISCV|MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_S|
+ MCI_STATUS_AR|MCACOD_INSTR))
+ return;
+
+ m->mcgstatus |= MCG_STATUS_EIPV;
+ m->ip = regs->ip;
+ m->cs = regs->cs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disable fast string copy and return from the MCE handler upon the first SRAR
+ * MCE on bank 1 due to a CPU erratum on Intel Skylake/Cascade Lake/Cooper Lake
+ * CPUs.
+ * The fast string copy instructions ("REP; MOVS*") could consume an
+ * uncorrectable memory error in the cache line _right after_ the desired region
+ * to copy and raise an MCE with RIP pointing to the instruction _after_ the
+ * "REP; MOVS*".
+ * This mitigation addresses the issue completely with the caveat of performance
+ * degradation on the CPU affected. This is still better than the OS crashing on
+ * MCEs raised on an irrelevant process due to "REP; MOVS*" accesses from a
+ * kernel context (e.g., copy_page).
+ *
+ * Returns true when fast string copy on CPU has been disabled.
+ */
+static noinstr bool quirk_skylake_repmov(void)
+{
+ u64 mcgstatus = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS);
+ u64 misc_enable = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE);
+ u64 mc1_status;
+
+ /*
+ * Apply the quirk only to local machine checks, i.e., no broadcast
+ * sync is needed.
+ */
+ if (!(mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_LMCES) ||
+ !(misc_enable & MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING))
+ return false;
+
+ mc1_status = mce_rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(1));
+
+ /* Check for a software-recoverable data fetch error. */
+ if ((mc1_status &
+ (MCI_STATUS_VAL | MCI_STATUS_OVER | MCI_STATUS_UC | MCI_STATUS_EN |
+ MCI_STATUS_ADDRV | MCI_STATUS_MISCV | MCI_STATUS_PCC |
+ MCI_STATUS_AR | MCI_STATUS_S)) ==
+ (MCI_STATUS_VAL | MCI_STATUS_UC | MCI_STATUS_EN |
+ MCI_STATUS_ADDRV | MCI_STATUS_MISCV |
+ MCI_STATUS_AR | MCI_STATUS_S)) {
+ misc_enable &= ~MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE_FAST_STRING;
+ mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MISC_ENABLE, misc_enable);
+ mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(1), 0);
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ pr_err_once("Erratum detected, disable fast string copy instructions.\n");
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some Zen-based Instruction Fetch Units set EIPV=RIPV=0 on poison consumption
+ * errors. This means mce_gather_info() will not save the "ip" and "cs" registers.
+ *
+ * However, the context is still valid, so save the "cs" register for later use.
+ *
+ * The "ip" register is truly unknown, so don't save it or fixup EIPV/RIPV.
+ *
+ * The Instruction Fetch Unit is at MCA bank 1 for all affected systems.
+ */
+static __always_inline void quirk_zen_ifu(int bank, struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (bank != 1)
+ return;
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_POISON))
+ return;
+
+ m->cs = regs->cs;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do a quick check if any of the events requires a panic.
+ * This decides if we keep the events around or clear them.
+ */
+static __always_inline int mce_no_way_out(struct mce *m, char **msg, unsigned long *validp,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ char *tmp = *msg;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ m->status = mce_rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS));
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
+ continue;
+
+ arch___set_bit(i, validp);
+ if (mce_flags.snb_ifu_quirk)
+ quirk_sandybridge_ifu(i, m, regs);
+
+ if (mce_flags.zen_ifu_quirk)
+ quirk_zen_ifu(i, m, regs);
+
+ m->bank = i;
+ if (mce_severity(m, regs, &tmp, true) >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY) {
+ mce_read_aux(m, i);
+ *msg = tmp;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Variable to establish order between CPUs while scanning.
+ * Each CPU spins initially until executing is equal its number.
+ */
+static atomic_t mce_executing;
+
+/*
+ * Defines order of CPUs on entry. First CPU becomes Monarch.
+ */
+static atomic_t mce_callin;
+
+/*
+ * Track which CPUs entered the MCA broadcast synchronization and which not in
+ * order to print holdouts.
+ */
+static cpumask_t mce_missing_cpus = CPU_MASK_ALL;
+
+/*
+ * Check if a timeout waiting for other CPUs happened.
+ */
+static noinstr int mce_timed_out(u64 *t, const char *msg)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Enable instrumentation around calls to external facilities */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ /*
+ * The others already did panic for some reason.
+ * Bail out like in a timeout.
+ * rmb() to tell the compiler that system_state
+ * might have been modified by someone else.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ if (atomic_read(&mce_panicked))
+ wait_for_panic();
+ if (!mca_cfg.monarch_timeout)
+ goto out;
+ if ((s64)*t < SPINUNIT) {
+ if (cpumask_and(&mce_missing_cpus, cpu_online_mask, &mce_missing_cpus))
+ pr_emerg("CPUs not responding to MCE broadcast (may include false positives): %*pbl\n",
+ cpumask_pr_args(&mce_missing_cpus));
+ mce_panic(msg, NULL, NULL);
+
+ ret = 1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *t -= SPINUNIT;
+
+out:
+ touch_nmi_watchdog();
+
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The Monarch's reign. The Monarch is the CPU who entered
+ * the machine check handler first. It waits for the others to
+ * raise the exception too and then grades them. When any
+ * error is fatal panic. Only then let the others continue.
+ *
+ * The other CPUs entering the MCE handler will be controlled by the
+ * Monarch. They are called Subjects.
+ *
+ * This way we prevent any potential data corruption in a unrecoverable case
+ * and also makes sure always all CPU's errors are examined.
+ *
+ * Also this detects the case of a machine check event coming from outer
+ * space (not detected by any CPUs) In this case some external agent wants
+ * us to shut down, so panic too.
+ *
+ * The other CPUs might still decide to panic if the handler happens
+ * in a unrecoverable place, but in this case the system is in a semi-stable
+ * state and won't corrupt anything by itself. It's ok to let the others
+ * continue for a bit first.
+ *
+ * All the spin loops have timeouts; when a timeout happens a CPU
+ * typically elects itself to be Monarch.
+ */
+static void mce_reign(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+ struct mce *m = NULL;
+ int global_worst = 0;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * This CPU is the Monarch and the other CPUs have run
+ * through their handlers.
+ * Grade the severity of the errors of all the CPUs.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
+ struct mce *mtmp = &per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu);
+
+ if (mtmp->severity > global_worst) {
+ global_worst = mtmp->severity;
+ m = &per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cannot recover? Panic here then.
+ * This dumps all the mces in the log buffer and stops the
+ * other CPUs.
+ */
+ if (m && global_worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY) {
+ /* call mce_severity() to get "msg" for panic */
+ mce_severity(m, NULL, &msg, true);
+ mce_panic("Fatal machine check", m, msg);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For UC somewhere we let the CPU who detects it handle it.
+ * Also must let continue the others, otherwise the handling
+ * CPU could deadlock on a lock.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * No machine check event found. Must be some external
+ * source or one CPU is hung. Panic.
+ */
+ if (global_worst <= MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY)
+ mce_panic("Fatal machine check from unknown source", NULL, NULL);
+
+ /*
+ * Now clear all the mces_seen so that they don't reappear on
+ * the next mce.
+ */
+ for_each_possible_cpu(cpu)
+ memset(&per_cpu(mces_seen, cpu), 0, sizeof(struct mce));
+}
+
+static atomic_t global_nwo;
+
+/*
+ * Start of Monarch synchronization. This waits until all CPUs have
+ * entered the exception handler and then determines if any of them
+ * saw a fatal event that requires panic. Then it executes them
+ * in the entry order.
+ * TBD double check parallel CPU hotunplug
+ */
+static noinstr int mce_start(int *no_way_out)
+{
+ u64 timeout = (u64)mca_cfg.monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
+ int order, ret = -1;
+
+ if (!timeout)
+ return ret;
+
+ arch_atomic_add(*no_way_out, &global_nwo);
+ /*
+ * Rely on the implied barrier below, such that global_nwo
+ * is updated before mce_callin.
+ */
+ order = arch_atomic_inc_return(&mce_callin);
+ arch_cpumask_clear_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &mce_missing_cpus);
+
+ /* Enable instrumentation around calls to external facilities */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for everyone.
+ */
+ while (arch_atomic_read(&mce_callin) != num_online_cpus()) {
+ if (mce_timed_out(&timeout,
+ "Timeout: Not all CPUs entered broadcast exception handler")) {
+ arch_atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ndelay(SPINUNIT);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * mce_callin should be read before global_nwo
+ */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ if (order == 1) {
+ /*
+ * Monarch: Starts executing now, the others wait.
+ */
+ arch_atomic_set(&mce_executing, 1);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Subject: Now start the scanning loop one by one in
+ * the original callin order.
+ * This way when there are any shared banks it will be
+ * only seen by one CPU before cleared, avoiding duplicates.
+ */
+ while (arch_atomic_read(&mce_executing) < order) {
+ if (mce_timed_out(&timeout,
+ "Timeout: Subject CPUs unable to finish machine check processing")) {
+ arch_atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ndelay(SPINUNIT);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the global no_way_out state.
+ */
+ *no_way_out = arch_atomic_read(&global_nwo);
+
+ ret = order;
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Synchronize between CPUs after main scanning loop.
+ * This invokes the bulk of the Monarch processing.
+ */
+static noinstr int mce_end(int order)
+{
+ u64 timeout = (u64)mca_cfg.monarch_timeout * NSEC_PER_USEC;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ /* Allow instrumentation around external facilities. */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ if (!timeout)
+ goto reset;
+ if (order < 0)
+ goto reset;
+
+ /*
+ * Allow others to run.
+ */
+ atomic_inc(&mce_executing);
+
+ if (order == 1) {
+ /*
+ * Monarch: Wait for everyone to go through their scanning
+ * loops.
+ */
+ while (atomic_read(&mce_executing) <= num_online_cpus()) {
+ if (mce_timed_out(&timeout,
+ "Timeout: Monarch CPU unable to finish machine check processing"))
+ goto reset;
+ ndelay(SPINUNIT);
+ }
+
+ mce_reign();
+ barrier();
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Subject: Wait for Monarch to finish.
+ */
+ while (atomic_read(&mce_executing) != 0) {
+ if (mce_timed_out(&timeout,
+ "Timeout: Monarch CPU did not finish machine check processing"))
+ goto reset;
+ ndelay(SPINUNIT);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't reset anything. That's done by the Monarch.
+ */
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Reset all global state.
+ */
+reset:
+ atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
+ atomic_set(&mce_callin, 0);
+ cpumask_setall(&mce_missing_cpus);
+ barrier();
+
+ /*
+ * Let others run again.
+ */
+ atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void mce_clear_state(unsigned long *toclear)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ if (arch_test_bit(i, toclear))
+ mce_wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS), 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cases where we avoid rendezvous handler timeout:
+ * 1) If this CPU is offline.
+ *
+ * 2) If crashing_cpu was set, e.g. we're entering kdump and we need to
+ * skip those CPUs which remain looping in the 1st kernel - see
+ * crash_nmi_callback().
+ *
+ * Note: there still is a small window between kexec-ing and the new,
+ * kdump kernel establishing a new #MC handler where a broadcasted MCE
+ * might not get handled properly.
+ */
+static noinstr bool mce_check_crashing_cpu(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+
+ if (arch_cpu_is_offline(cpu) ||
+ (crashing_cpu != -1 && crashing_cpu != cpu)) {
+ u64 mcgstatus;
+
+ mcgstatus = __rdmsr(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN) {
+ if (mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_LMCES)
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV) {
+ __wrmsr(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, 0, 0);
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __always_inline int
+__mc_scan_banks(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, struct mce *final,
+ unsigned long *toclear, unsigned long *valid_banks, int no_way_out,
+ int *worst)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ struct mca_config *cfg = &mca_cfg;
+ int severity, i, taint = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ arch___clear_bit(i, toclear);
+ if (!arch_test_bit(i, valid_banks))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!mce_banks[i].ctl)
+ continue;
+
+ m->misc = 0;
+ m->addr = 0;
+ m->bank = i;
+
+ m->status = mce_rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS));
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_VAL))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Corrected or non-signaled errors are handled by
+ * machine_check_poll(). Leave them alone, unless this panics.
+ */
+ if (!(m->status & (cfg->ser ? MCI_STATUS_S : MCI_STATUS_UC)) &&
+ !no_way_out)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Set taint even when machine check was not enabled. */
+ taint++;
+
+ severity = mce_severity(m, regs, NULL, true);
+
+ /*
+ * When machine check was for corrected/deferred handler don't
+ * touch, unless we're panicking.
+ */
+ if ((severity == MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY ||
+ severity == MCE_UCNA_SEVERITY) && !no_way_out)
+ continue;
+
+ arch___set_bit(i, toclear);
+
+ /* Machine check event was not enabled. Clear, but ignore. */
+ if (severity == MCE_NO_SEVERITY)
+ continue;
+
+ mce_read_aux(m, i);
+
+ /* assuming valid severity level != 0 */
+ m->severity = severity;
+
+ /*
+ * Enable instrumentation around the mce_log() call which is
+ * done in #MC context, where instrumentation is disabled.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ mce_log(m);
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ if (severity > *worst) {
+ *final = *m;
+ *worst = severity;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* mce_clear_state will clear *final, save locally for use later */
+ *m = *final;
+
+ return taint;
+}
+
+static void kill_me_now(struct callback_head *ch)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p = container_of(ch, struct task_struct, mce_kill_me);
+
+ p->mce_count = 0;
+ force_sig(SIGBUS);
+}
+
+static void kill_me_maybe(struct callback_head *cb)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p = container_of(cb, struct task_struct, mce_kill_me);
+ int flags = MF_ACTION_REQUIRED;
+ int ret;
+
+ p->mce_count = 0;
+ pr_err("Uncorrected hardware memory error in user-access at %llx", p->mce_addr);
+
+ if (!p->mce_ripv)
+ flags |= MF_MUST_KILL;
+
+ ret = memory_failure(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, flags);
+ if (!ret) {
+ set_mce_nospec(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+ sync_core();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * -EHWPOISON from memory_failure() means that it already sent SIGBUS
+ * to the current process with the proper error info,
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP means hwpoison_filter() filtered the error event,
+ *
+ * In both cases, no further processing is required.
+ */
+ if (ret == -EHWPOISON || ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return;
+
+ pr_err("Memory error not recovered");
+ kill_me_now(cb);
+}
+
+static void kill_me_never(struct callback_head *cb)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p = container_of(cb, struct task_struct, mce_kill_me);
+
+ p->mce_count = 0;
+ pr_err("Kernel accessed poison in user space at %llx\n", p->mce_addr);
+ if (!memory_failure(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT, 0))
+ set_mce_nospec(p->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static void queue_task_work(struct mce *m, char *msg, void (*func)(struct callback_head *))
+{
+ int count = ++current->mce_count;
+
+ /* First call, save all the details */
+ if (count == 1) {
+ current->mce_addr = m->addr;
+ current->mce_kflags = m->kflags;
+ current->mce_ripv = !!(m->mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV);
+ current->mce_whole_page = whole_page(m);
+ current->mce_kill_me.func = func;
+ }
+
+ /* Ten is likely overkill. Don't expect more than two faults before task_work() */
+ if (count > 10)
+ mce_panic("Too many consecutive machine checks while accessing user data", m, msg);
+
+ /* Second or later call, make sure page address matches the one from first call */
+ if (count > 1 && (current->mce_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT) != (m->addr >> PAGE_SHIFT))
+ mce_panic("Consecutive machine checks to different user pages", m, msg);
+
+ /* Do not call task_work_add() more than once */
+ if (count > 1)
+ return;
+
+ task_work_add(current, &current->mce_kill_me, TWA_RESUME);
+}
+
+/* Handle unconfigured int18 (should never happen) */
+static noinstr void unexpected_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ pr_err("CPU#%d: Unexpected int18 (Machine Check)\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+/*
+ * The actual machine check handler. This only handles real exceptions when
+ * something got corrupted coming in through int 18.
+ *
+ * This is executed in #MC context not subject to normal locking rules.
+ * This implies that most kernel services cannot be safely used. Don't even
+ * think about putting a printk in there!
+ *
+ * On Intel systems this is entered on all CPUs in parallel through
+ * MCE broadcast. However some CPUs might be broken beyond repair,
+ * so be always careful when synchronizing with others.
+ *
+ * Tracing and kprobes are disabled: if we interrupted a kernel context
+ * with IF=1, we need to minimize stack usage. There are also recursion
+ * issues: if the machine check was due to a failure of the memory
+ * backing the user stack, tracing that reads the user stack will cause
+ * potentially infinite recursion.
+ *
+ * Currently, the #MC handler calls out to a number of external facilities
+ * and, therefore, allows instrumentation around them. The optimal thing to
+ * have would be to do the absolutely minimal work required in #MC context
+ * and have instrumentation disabled only around that. Further processing can
+ * then happen in process context where instrumentation is allowed. Achieving
+ * that requires careful auditing and modifications. Until then, the code
+ * allows instrumentation temporarily, where required. *
+ */
+noinstr void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int worst = 0, order, no_way_out, kill_current_task, lmce, taint = 0;
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(valid_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS) = { 0 };
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(toclear, MAX_NR_BANKS) = { 0 };
+ struct mce m, *final;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+
+ if (unlikely(mce_flags.p5))
+ return pentium_machine_check(regs);
+ else if (unlikely(mce_flags.winchip))
+ return winchip_machine_check(regs);
+ else if (unlikely(!mca_cfg.initialized))
+ return unexpected_machine_check(regs);
+
+ if (mce_flags.skx_repmov_quirk && quirk_skylake_repmov())
+ goto clear;
+
+ /*
+ * Establish sequential order between the CPUs entering the machine
+ * check handler.
+ */
+ order = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * If no_way_out gets set, there is no safe way to recover from this
+ * MCE.
+ */
+ no_way_out = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If kill_current_task is not set, there might be a way to recover from this
+ * error.
+ */
+ kill_current_task = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * MCEs are always local on AMD. Same is determined by MCG_STATUS_LMCES
+ * on Intel.
+ */
+ lmce = 1;
+
+ this_cpu_inc(mce_exception_count);
+
+ mce_gather_info(&m, regs);
+ m.tsc = rdtsc();
+
+ final = this_cpu_ptr(&mces_seen);
+ *final = m;
+
+ no_way_out = mce_no_way_out(&m, &msg, valid_banks, regs);
+
+ barrier();
+
+ /*
+ * When no restart IP might need to kill or panic.
+ * Assume the worst for now, but if we find the
+ * severity is MCE_AR_SEVERITY we have other options.
+ */
+ if (!(m.mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_RIPV))
+ kill_current_task = 1;
+ /*
+ * Check if this MCE is signaled to only this logical processor,
+ * on Intel, Zhaoxin only.
+ */
+ if (m.cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ m.cpuvendor == X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN)
+ lmce = m.mcgstatus & MCG_STATUS_LMCES;
+
+ /*
+ * Local machine check may already know that we have to panic.
+ * Broadcast machine check begins rendezvous in mce_start()
+ * Go through all banks in exclusion of the other CPUs. This way we
+ * don't report duplicated events on shared banks because the first one
+ * to see it will clear it.
+ */
+ if (lmce) {
+ if (no_way_out)
+ mce_panic("Fatal local machine check", &m, msg);
+ } else {
+ order = mce_start(&no_way_out);
+ }
+
+ taint = __mc_scan_banks(&m, regs, final, toclear, valid_banks, no_way_out, &worst);
+
+ if (!no_way_out)
+ mce_clear_state(toclear);
+
+ /*
+ * Do most of the synchronization with other CPUs.
+ * When there's any problem use only local no_way_out state.
+ */
+ if (!lmce) {
+ if (mce_end(order) < 0) {
+ if (!no_way_out)
+ no_way_out = worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+
+ if (no_way_out)
+ mce_panic("Fatal machine check on current CPU", &m, msg);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If there was a fatal machine check we should have
+ * already called mce_panic earlier in this function.
+ * Since we re-read the banks, we might have found
+ * something new. Check again to see if we found a
+ * fatal error. We call "mce_severity()" again to
+ * make sure we have the right "msg".
+ */
+ if (worst >= MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY) {
+ mce_severity(&m, regs, &msg, true);
+ mce_panic("Local fatal machine check!", &m, msg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Enable instrumentation around the external facilities like task_work_add()
+ * (via queue_task_work()), fixup_exception() etc. For now, that is. Fixing this
+ * properly would need a lot more involved reorganization.
+ */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
+ if (taint)
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+
+ if (worst != MCE_AR_SEVERITY && !kill_current_task)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Fault was in user mode and we need to take some action */
+ if ((m.cs & 3) == 3) {
+ /* If this triggers there is no way to recover. Die hard. */
+ BUG_ON(!on_thread_stack() || !user_mode(regs));
+
+ if (kill_current_task)
+ queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_now);
+ else
+ queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_maybe);
+
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Handle an MCE which has happened in kernel space but from
+ * which the kernel can recover: ex_has_fault_handler() has
+ * already verified that the rIP at which the error happened is
+ * a rIP from which the kernel can recover (by jumping to
+ * recovery code specified in _ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT()) and the
+ * corresponding exception handler which would do that is the
+ * proper one.
+ */
+ if (m.kflags & MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV) {
+ if (!fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_MC, 0, 0))
+ mce_panic("Failed kernel mode recovery", &m, msg);
+ }
+
+ if (m.kflags & MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN)
+ queue_task_work(&m, msg, kill_me_never);
+ }
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+clear:
+ mce_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(do_machine_check);
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
+int memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
+{
+ /* mce_severity() should not hand us an ACTION_REQUIRED error */
+ BUG_ON(flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED);
+ pr_err("Uncorrected memory error in page 0x%lx ignored\n"
+ "Rebuild kernel with CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE=y for smarter handling\n",
+ pfn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Periodic polling timer for "silent" machine check errors. If the
+ * poller finds an MCE, poll 2x faster. When the poller finds no more
+ * errors, poll 2x slower (up to check_interval seconds).
+ */
+static unsigned long check_interval = INITIAL_CHECK_INTERVAL;
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, mce_next_interval); /* in jiffies */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct timer_list, mce_timer);
+
+static unsigned long mce_adjust_timer_default(unsigned long interval)
+{
+ return interval;
+}
+
+static unsigned long (*mce_adjust_timer)(unsigned long interval) = mce_adjust_timer_default;
+
+static void __start_timer(struct timer_list *t, unsigned long interval)
+{
+ unsigned long when = jiffies + interval;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ if (!timer_pending(t) || time_before(when, t->expires))
+ mod_timer(t, round_jiffies(when));
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+static void mce_timer_fn(struct timer_list *t)
+{
+ struct timer_list *cpu_t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+ unsigned long iv;
+
+ WARN_ON(cpu_t != t);
+
+ iv = __this_cpu_read(mce_next_interval);
+
+ if (mce_available(this_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info))) {
+ machine_check_poll(0, this_cpu_ptr(&mce_poll_banks));
+
+ if (mce_intel_cmci_poll()) {
+ iv = mce_adjust_timer(iv);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Alert userspace if needed. If we logged an MCE, reduce the polling
+ * interval, otherwise increase the polling interval.
+ */
+ if (mce_notify_irq())
+ iv = max(iv / 2, (unsigned long) HZ/100);
+ else
+ iv = min(iv * 2, round_jiffies_relative(check_interval * HZ));
+
+done:
+ __this_cpu_write(mce_next_interval, iv);
+ __start_timer(t, iv);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure that the timer is firing in @interval from now.
+ */
+void mce_timer_kick(unsigned long interval)
+{
+ struct timer_list *t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+ unsigned long iv = __this_cpu_read(mce_next_interval);
+
+ __start_timer(t, interval);
+
+ if (interval < iv)
+ __this_cpu_write(mce_next_interval, interval);
+}
+
+/* Must not be called in IRQ context where del_timer_sync() can deadlock */
+static void mce_timer_delete_all(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu)
+ del_timer_sync(&per_cpu(mce_timer, cpu));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Notify the user(s) about new machine check events.
+ * Can be called from interrupt context, but not from machine check/NMI
+ * context.
+ */
+int mce_notify_irq(void)
+{
+ /* Not more than two messages every minute */
+ static DEFINE_RATELIMIT_STATE(ratelimit, 60*HZ, 2);
+
+ if (test_and_clear_bit(0, &mce_need_notify)) {
+ mce_work_trigger();
+
+ if (__ratelimit(&ratelimit))
+ pr_info(HW_ERR "Machine check events logged\n");
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_notify_irq);
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_mce_banks_init(void)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ u8 n_banks = this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < n_banks; i++) {
+ struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
+
+ /*
+ * Init them all, __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks() is going to apply
+ * the required vendor quirks before
+ * __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks() does the final bank setup.
+ */
+ b->ctl = -1ULL;
+ b->init = true;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize Machine Checks for a CPU.
+ */
+static void __mcheck_cpu_cap_init(void)
+{
+ u64 cap;
+ u8 b;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, cap);
+
+ b = cap & MCG_BANKCNT_MASK;
+
+ if (b > MAX_NR_BANKS) {
+ pr_warn("CPU%d: Using only %u machine check banks out of %u\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), MAX_NR_BANKS, b);
+ b = MAX_NR_BANKS;
+ }
+
+ this_cpu_write(mce_num_banks, b);
+
+ __mcheck_cpu_mce_banks_init();
+
+ /* Use accurate RIP reporting if available. */
+ if ((cap & MCG_EXT_P) && MCG_EXT_CNT(cap) >= 9)
+ mca_cfg.rip_msr = MSR_IA32_MCG_EIP;
+
+ if (cap & MCG_SER_P)
+ mca_cfg.ser = 1;
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_init_generic(void)
+{
+ enum mcp_flags m_fl = 0;
+ mce_banks_t all_banks;
+ u64 cap;
+
+ if (!mca_cfg.bootlog)
+ m_fl = MCP_DONTLOG;
+
+ /*
+ * Log the machine checks left over from the previous reset. Log them
+ * only, do not start processing them. That will happen in mcheck_late_init()
+ * when all consumers have been registered on the notifier chain.
+ */
+ bitmap_fill(all_banks, MAX_NR_BANKS);
+ machine_check_poll(MCP_UC | MCP_QUEUE_LOG | m_fl, &all_banks);
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_MCE);
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, cap);
+ if (cap & MCG_CTL_P)
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_MCG_CTL, 0xffffffff, 0xffffffff);
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks(void)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
+
+ if (!b->init)
+ continue;
+ wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_CTL), b->ctl);
+ wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_STATUS), 0);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do a final check to see if there are any unused/RAZ banks.
+ *
+ * This must be done after the banks have been initialized and any quirks have
+ * been applied.
+ *
+ * Do not call this from any user-initiated flows, e.g. CPU hotplug or sysfs.
+ * Otherwise, a user who disables a bank will not be able to re-enable it
+ * without a system reboot.
+ */
+static void __mcheck_cpu_check_banks(void)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ u64 msrval;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
+
+ if (!b->init)
+ continue;
+
+ rdmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_CTL), msrval);
+ b->init = !!msrval;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Add per CPU specific workarounds here */
+static int __mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ struct mca_config *cfg = &mca_cfg;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_UNKNOWN) {
+ pr_info("unknown CPU type - not enabling MCE support\n");
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* This should be disabled by the BIOS, but isn't always */
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ if (c->x86 == 15 && this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks) > 4) {
+ /*
+ * disable GART TBL walk error reporting, which
+ * trips off incorrectly with the IOMMU & 3ware
+ * & Cerberus:
+ */
+ clear_bit(10, (unsigned long *)&mce_banks[4].ctl);
+ }
+ if (c->x86 < 0x11 && cfg->bootlog < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Lots of broken BIOS around that don't clear them
+ * by default and leave crap in there. Don't log:
+ */
+ cfg->bootlog = 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Various K7s with broken bank 0 around. Always disable
+ * by default.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks) > 0)
+ mce_banks[0].ctl = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * overflow_recov is supported for F15h Models 00h-0fh
+ * even though we don't have a CPUID bit for it.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 0x15 && c->x86_model <= 0xf)
+ mce_flags.overflow_recov = 1;
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x17 && c->x86 <= 0x1A)
+ mce_flags.zen_ifu_quirk = 1;
+
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+ /*
+ * SDM documents that on family 6 bank 0 should not be written
+ * because it aliases to another special BIOS controlled
+ * register.
+ * But it's not aliased anymore on model 0x1a+
+ * Don't ignore bank 0 completely because there could be a
+ * valid event later, merely don't write CTL0.
+ */
+
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model < 0x1A && this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks) > 0)
+ mce_banks[0].init = false;
+
+ /*
+ * All newer Intel systems support MCE broadcasting. Enable
+ * synchronization with a one second timeout.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model >= 0xe)) &&
+ cfg->monarch_timeout < 0)
+ cfg->monarch_timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
+
+ /*
+ * There are also broken BIOSes on some Pentium M and
+ * earlier systems:
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model <= 13 && cfg->bootlog < 0)
+ cfg->bootlog = 0;
+
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 45)
+ mce_flags.snb_ifu_quirk = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Skylake, Cascacde Lake and Cooper Lake require a quirk on
+ * rep movs.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X)
+ mce_flags.skx_repmov_quirk = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN) {
+ /*
+ * All newer Zhaoxin CPUs support MCE broadcasting. Enable
+ * synchronization with a one second timeout.
+ */
+ if (c->x86 > 6 || (c->x86_model == 0x19 || c->x86_model == 0x1f)) {
+ if (cfg->monarch_timeout < 0)
+ cfg->monarch_timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->monarch_timeout < 0)
+ cfg->monarch_timeout = 0;
+ if (cfg->bootlog != 0)
+ cfg->panic_timeout = 30;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __mcheck_cpu_ancient_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86 != 5)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (c->x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ intel_p5_mcheck_init(c);
+ mce_flags.p5 = 1;
+ return 1;
+ case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
+ winchip_mcheck_init(c);
+ mce_flags.winchip = 1;
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Init basic CPU features needed for early decoding of MCEs.
+ */
+static void __mcheck_cpu_init_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD || c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+ mce_flags.overflow_recov = !!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV);
+ mce_flags.succor = !!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SUCCOR);
+ mce_flags.smca = !!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SMCA);
+ mce_flags.amd_threshold = 1;
+ }
+}
+
+static void mce_centaur_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ struct mca_config *cfg = &mca_cfg;
+
+ /*
+ * All newer Centaur CPUs support MCE broadcasting. Enable
+ * synchronization with a one second timeout.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 6 && c->x86_model == 0xf && c->x86_stepping >= 0xe) ||
+ c->x86 > 6) {
+ if (cfg->monarch_timeout < 0)
+ cfg->monarch_timeout = USEC_PER_SEC;
+ }
+}
+
+static void mce_zhaoxin_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+
+ /*
+ * These CPUs have MCA bank 8 which reports only one error type called
+ * SVAD (System View Address Decoder). The reporting of that error is
+ * controlled by IA32_MC8.CTL.0.
+ *
+ * If enabled, prefetching on these CPUs will cause SVAD MCE when
+ * virtual machines start and result in a system panic. Always disable
+ * bank 8 SVAD error by default.
+ */
+ if ((c->x86 == 7 && c->x86_model == 0x1b) ||
+ (c->x86_model == 0x19 || c->x86_model == 0x1f)) {
+ if (this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks) > 8)
+ mce_banks[8].ctl = 0;
+ }
+
+ intel_init_cmci();
+ intel_init_lmce();
+ mce_adjust_timer = cmci_intel_adjust_timer;
+}
+
+static void mce_zhaoxin_feature_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ intel_clear_lmce();
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_init_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ switch (c->x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ mce_intel_feature_init(c);
+ mce_adjust_timer = cmci_intel_adjust_timer;
+ break;
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD: {
+ mce_amd_feature_init(c);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
+ mce_hygon_feature_init(c);
+ break;
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
+ mce_centaur_feature_init(c);
+ break;
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN:
+ mce_zhaoxin_feature_init(c);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_clear_vendor(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ switch (c->x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ mce_intel_feature_clear(c);
+ break;
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN:
+ mce_zhaoxin_feature_clear(c);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void mce_start_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+{
+ unsigned long iv = check_interval * HZ;
+
+ if (mca_cfg.ignore_ce || !iv)
+ return;
+
+ this_cpu_write(mce_next_interval, iv);
+ __start_timer(t, iv);
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_setup_timer(void)
+{
+ struct timer_list *t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+
+ timer_setup(t, mce_timer_fn, TIMER_PINNED);
+}
+
+static void __mcheck_cpu_init_timer(void)
+{
+ struct timer_list *t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+
+ timer_setup(t, mce_timer_fn, TIMER_PINNED);
+ mce_start_timer(t);
+}
+
+bool filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return amd_filter_mce(m);
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ return intel_filter_mce(m);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void exc_machine_check_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ irqentry_state_t irq_state;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs));
+
+ /*
+ * Only required when from kernel mode. See
+ * mce_check_crashing_cpu() for details.
+ */
+ if (mca_cfg.initialized && mce_check_crashing_cpu())
+ return;
+
+ irq_state = irqentry_nmi_enter(regs);
+
+ do_machine_check(regs);
+
+ irqentry_nmi_exit(regs, irq_state);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void exc_machine_check_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs);
+
+ do_machine_check(regs);
+
+ irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+/* MCE hit kernel mode */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_MCE(exc_machine_check)
+{
+ unsigned long dr7;
+
+ dr7 = local_db_save();
+ exc_machine_check_kernel(regs);
+ local_db_restore(dr7);
+}
+
+/* The user mode variant. */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_MCE_USER(exc_machine_check)
+{
+ unsigned long dr7;
+
+ dr7 = local_db_save();
+ exc_machine_check_user(regs);
+ local_db_restore(dr7);
+}
+#else
+/* 32bit unified entry point */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_machine_check)
+{
+ unsigned long dr7;
+
+ dr7 = local_db_save();
+ if (user_mode(regs))
+ exc_machine_check_user(regs);
+ else
+ exc_machine_check_kernel(regs);
+ local_db_restore(dr7);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Called for each booted CPU to set up machine checks.
+ * Must be called with preempt off:
+ */
+void mcheck_cpu_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (mca_cfg.disabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (__mcheck_cpu_ancient_init(c))
+ return;
+
+ if (!mce_available(c))
+ return;
+
+ __mcheck_cpu_cap_init();
+
+ if (__mcheck_cpu_apply_quirks(c) < 0) {
+ mca_cfg.disabled = 1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (mce_gen_pool_init()) {
+ mca_cfg.disabled = 1;
+ pr_emerg("Couldn't allocate MCE records pool!\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mca_cfg.initialized = 1;
+
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_early(c);
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_generic();
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_vendor(c);
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks();
+ __mcheck_cpu_check_banks();
+ __mcheck_cpu_setup_timer();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called for each booted CPU to clear some machine checks opt-ins
+ */
+void mcheck_cpu_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (mca_cfg.disabled)
+ return;
+
+ if (!mce_available(c))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Possibly to clear general settings generic to x86
+ * __mcheck_cpu_clear_generic(c);
+ */
+ __mcheck_cpu_clear_vendor(c);
+
+}
+
+static void __mce_disable_bank(void *arg)
+{
+ int bank = *((int *)arg);
+ __clear_bit(bank, this_cpu_ptr(mce_poll_banks));
+ cmci_disable_bank(bank);
+}
+
+void mce_disable_bank(int bank)
+{
+ if (bank >= this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks)) {
+ pr_warn(FW_BUG
+ "Ignoring request to disable invalid MCA bank %d.\n",
+ bank);
+ return;
+ }
+ set_bit(bank, mce_banks_ce_disabled);
+ on_each_cpu(__mce_disable_bank, &bank, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * mce=off Disables machine check
+ * mce=no_cmci Disables CMCI
+ * mce=no_lmce Disables LMCE
+ * mce=dont_log_ce Clears corrected events silently, no log created for CEs.
+ * mce=print_all Print all machine check logs to console
+ * mce=ignore_ce Disables polling and CMCI, corrected events are not cleared.
+ * mce=TOLERANCELEVEL[,monarchtimeout] (number, see above)
+ * monarchtimeout is how long to wait for other CPUs on machine
+ * check, or 0 to not wait
+ * mce=bootlog Log MCEs from before booting. Disabled by default on AMD Fam10h
+ and older.
+ * mce=nobootlog Don't log MCEs from before booting.
+ * mce=bios_cmci_threshold Don't program the CMCI threshold
+ * mce=recovery force enable copy_mc_fragile()
+ */
+static int __init mcheck_enable(char *str)
+{
+ struct mca_config *cfg = &mca_cfg;
+
+ if (*str == 0) {
+ enable_p5_mce();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (*str == '=')
+ str++;
+ if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+ cfg->disabled = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "no_cmci"))
+ cfg->cmci_disabled = true;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "no_lmce"))
+ cfg->lmce_disabled = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "dont_log_ce"))
+ cfg->dont_log_ce = true;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "print_all"))
+ cfg->print_all = true;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "ignore_ce"))
+ cfg->ignore_ce = true;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "bootlog") || !strcmp(str, "nobootlog"))
+ cfg->bootlog = (str[0] == 'b');
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "bios_cmci_threshold"))
+ cfg->bios_cmci_threshold = 1;
+ else if (!strcmp(str, "recovery"))
+ cfg->recovery = 1;
+ else if (isdigit(str[0]))
+ get_option(&str, &(cfg->monarch_timeout));
+ else {
+ pr_info("mce argument %s ignored. Please use /sys\n", str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("mce", mcheck_enable);
+
+int __init mcheck_init(void)
+{
+ mce_register_decode_chain(&early_nb);
+ mce_register_decode_chain(&mce_uc_nb);
+ mce_register_decode_chain(&mce_default_nb);
+
+ INIT_WORK(&mce_work, mce_gen_pool_process);
+ init_irq_work(&mce_irq_work, mce_irq_work_cb);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mce_syscore: PM support
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Disable machine checks on suspend and shutdown. We can't really handle
+ * them later.
+ */
+static void mce_disable_error_reporting(void)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
+
+ if (b->init)
+ wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_CTL), 0);
+ }
+ return;
+}
+
+static void vendor_disable_error_reporting(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Don't clear on Intel or AMD or Hygon or Zhaoxin CPUs. Some of these
+ * MSRs are socket-wide. Disabling them for just a single offlined CPU
+ * is bad, since it will inhibit reporting for all shared resources on
+ * the socket like the last level cache (LLC), the integrated memory
+ * controller (iMC), etc.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN)
+ return;
+
+ mce_disable_error_reporting();
+}
+
+static int mce_syscore_suspend(void)
+{
+ vendor_disable_error_reporting();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void mce_syscore_shutdown(void)
+{
+ vendor_disable_error_reporting();
+}
+
+/*
+ * On resume clear all MCE state. Don't want to see leftovers from the BIOS.
+ * Only one CPU is active at this time, the others get re-added later using
+ * CPU hotplug:
+ */
+static void mce_syscore_resume(void)
+{
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_generic();
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_vendor(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info));
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks();
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops mce_syscore_ops = {
+ .suspend = mce_syscore_suspend,
+ .shutdown = mce_syscore_shutdown,
+ .resume = mce_syscore_resume,
+};
+
+/*
+ * mce_device: Sysfs support
+ */
+
+static void mce_cpu_restart(void *data)
+{
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
+ return;
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_generic();
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_clear_banks();
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_timer();
+}
+
+/* Reinit MCEs after user configuration changes */
+static void mce_restart(void)
+{
+ mce_timer_delete_all();
+ on_each_cpu(mce_cpu_restart, NULL, 1);
+ mce_schedule_work();
+}
+
+/* Toggle features for corrected errors */
+static void mce_disable_cmci(void *data)
+{
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
+ return;
+ cmci_clear();
+}
+
+static void mce_enable_ce(void *all)
+{
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
+ return;
+ cmci_reenable();
+ cmci_recheck();
+ if (all)
+ __mcheck_cpu_init_timer();
+}
+
+static struct bus_type mce_subsys = {
+ .name = "machinecheck",
+ .dev_name = "machinecheck",
+};
+
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct device *, mce_device);
+
+static inline struct mce_bank_dev *attr_to_bank(struct device_attribute *attr)
+{
+ return container_of(attr, struct mce_bank_dev, attr);
+}
+
+static ssize_t show_bank(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ u8 bank = attr_to_bank(attr)->bank;
+ struct mce_bank *b;
+
+ if (bank >= per_cpu(mce_num_banks, s->id))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ b = &per_cpu(mce_banks_array, s->id)[bank];
+
+ if (!b->init)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%llx\n", b->ctl);
+}
+
+static ssize_t set_bank(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ u8 bank = attr_to_bank(attr)->bank;
+ struct mce_bank *b;
+ u64 new;
+
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (bank >= per_cpu(mce_num_banks, s->id))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ b = &per_cpu(mce_banks_array, s->id)[bank];
+
+ if (!b->init)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ b->ctl = new;
+ mce_restart();
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static ssize_t set_ignore_ce(struct device *s,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ u64 new;
+
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+ if (mca_cfg.ignore_ce ^ !!new) {
+ if (new) {
+ /* disable ce features */
+ mce_timer_delete_all();
+ on_each_cpu(mce_disable_cmci, NULL, 1);
+ mca_cfg.ignore_ce = true;
+ } else {
+ /* enable ce features */
+ mca_cfg.ignore_ce = false;
+ on_each_cpu(mce_enable_ce, (void *)1, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static ssize_t set_cmci_disabled(struct device *s,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ u64 new;
+
+ if (kstrtou64(buf, 0, &new) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+ if (mca_cfg.cmci_disabled ^ !!new) {
+ if (new) {
+ /* disable cmci */
+ on_each_cpu(mce_disable_cmci, NULL, 1);
+ mca_cfg.cmci_disabled = true;
+ } else {
+ /* enable cmci */
+ mca_cfg.cmci_disabled = false;
+ on_each_cpu(mce_enable_ce, NULL, 1);
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+static ssize_t store_int_with_restart(struct device *s,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ unsigned long old_check_interval = check_interval;
+ ssize_t ret = device_store_ulong(s, attr, buf, size);
+
+ if (check_interval == old_check_interval)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+ mce_restart();
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_sysfs_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_INT_ATTR(monarch_timeout, 0644, mca_cfg.monarch_timeout);
+static DEVICE_BOOL_ATTR(dont_log_ce, 0644, mca_cfg.dont_log_ce);
+static DEVICE_BOOL_ATTR(print_all, 0644, mca_cfg.print_all);
+
+static struct dev_ext_attribute dev_attr_check_interval = {
+ __ATTR(check_interval, 0644, device_show_int, store_int_with_restart),
+ &check_interval
+};
+
+static struct dev_ext_attribute dev_attr_ignore_ce = {
+ __ATTR(ignore_ce, 0644, device_show_bool, set_ignore_ce),
+ &mca_cfg.ignore_ce
+};
+
+static struct dev_ext_attribute dev_attr_cmci_disabled = {
+ __ATTR(cmci_disabled, 0644, device_show_bool, set_cmci_disabled),
+ &mca_cfg.cmci_disabled
+};
+
+static struct device_attribute *mce_device_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_check_interval.attr,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCELOG_LEGACY
+ &dev_attr_trigger,
+#endif
+ &dev_attr_monarch_timeout.attr,
+ &dev_attr_dont_log_ce.attr,
+ &dev_attr_print_all.attr,
+ &dev_attr_ignore_ce.attr,
+ &dev_attr_cmci_disabled.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static cpumask_var_t mce_device_initialized;
+
+static void mce_device_release(struct device *dev)
+{
+ kfree(dev);
+}
+
+/* Per CPU device init. All of the CPUs still share the same bank device: */
+static int mce_device_create(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *dev;
+ int err;
+ int i, j;
+
+ if (!mce_available(&boot_cpu_data))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ dev = per_cpu(mce_device, cpu);
+ if (dev)
+ return 0;
+
+ dev = kzalloc(sizeof(*dev), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dev)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dev->id = cpu;
+ dev->bus = &mce_subsys;
+ dev->release = &mce_device_release;
+
+ err = device_register(dev);
+ if (err) {
+ put_device(dev);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; mce_device_attrs[i]; i++) {
+ err = device_create_file(dev, mce_device_attrs[i]);
+ if (err)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < per_cpu(mce_num_banks, cpu); j++) {
+ err = device_create_file(dev, &mce_bank_devs[j].attr);
+ if (err)
+ goto error2;
+ }
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mce_device_initialized);
+ per_cpu(mce_device, cpu) = dev;
+
+ return 0;
+error2:
+ while (--j >= 0)
+ device_remove_file(dev, &mce_bank_devs[j].attr);
+error:
+ while (--i >= 0)
+ device_remove_file(dev, mce_device_attrs[i]);
+
+ device_unregister(dev);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void mce_device_remove(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *dev = per_cpu(mce_device, cpu);
+ int i;
+
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mce_device_initialized))
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; mce_device_attrs[i]; i++)
+ device_remove_file(dev, mce_device_attrs[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < per_cpu(mce_num_banks, cpu); i++)
+ device_remove_file(dev, &mce_bank_devs[i].attr);
+
+ device_unregister(dev);
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mce_device_initialized);
+ per_cpu(mce_device, cpu) = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Make sure there are no machine checks on offlined CPUs. */
+static void mce_disable_cpu(void)
+{
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
+ return;
+
+ if (!cpuhp_tasks_frozen)
+ cmci_clear();
+
+ vendor_disable_error_reporting();
+}
+
+static void mce_reenable_cpu(void)
+{
+ struct mce_bank *mce_banks = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_array);
+ int i;
+
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)))
+ return;
+
+ if (!cpuhp_tasks_frozen)
+ cmci_reenable();
+ for (i = 0; i < this_cpu_read(mce_num_banks); i++) {
+ struct mce_bank *b = &mce_banks[i];
+
+ if (b->init)
+ wrmsrl(mca_msr_reg(i, MCA_CTL), b->ctl);
+ }
+}
+
+static int mce_cpu_dead(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ mce_intel_hcpu_update(cpu);
+
+ /* intentionally ignoring frozen here */
+ if (!cpuhp_tasks_frozen)
+ cmci_rediscover();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mce_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct timer_list *t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+ int ret;
+
+ mce_device_create(cpu);
+
+ ret = mce_threshold_create_device(cpu);
+ if (ret) {
+ mce_device_remove(cpu);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ mce_reenable_cpu();
+ mce_start_timer(t);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mce_cpu_pre_down(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct timer_list *t = this_cpu_ptr(&mce_timer);
+
+ mce_disable_cpu();
+ del_timer_sync(t);
+ mce_threshold_remove_device(cpu);
+ mce_device_remove(cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __init void mce_init_banks(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_NR_BANKS; i++) {
+ struct mce_bank_dev *b = &mce_bank_devs[i];
+ struct device_attribute *a = &b->attr;
+
+ b->bank = i;
+
+ sysfs_attr_init(&a->attr);
+ a->attr.name = b->attrname;
+ snprintf(b->attrname, ATTR_LEN, "bank%d", i);
+
+ a->attr.mode = 0644;
+ a->show = show_bank;
+ a->store = set_bank;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * When running on XEN, this initcall is ordered against the XEN mcelog
+ * initcall:
+ *
+ * device_initcall(xen_late_init_mcelog);
+ * device_initcall_sync(mcheck_init_device);
+ */
+static __init int mcheck_init_device(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if we have a spare virtual bit. This will only become
+ * a problem if/when we move beyond 5-level page tables.
+ */
+ MAYBE_BUILD_BUG_ON(__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT >= 63);
+
+ if (!mce_available(&boot_cpu_data)) {
+ err = -EIO;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&mce_device_initialized, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ mce_init_banks();
+
+ err = subsys_system_register(&mce_subsys, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_out_mem;
+
+ err = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_X86_MCE_DEAD, "x86/mce:dead", NULL,
+ mce_cpu_dead);
+ if (err)
+ goto err_out_mem;
+
+ /*
+ * Invokes mce_cpu_online() on all CPUs which are online when
+ * the state is installed.
+ */
+ err = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/mce:online",
+ mce_cpu_online, mce_cpu_pre_down);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto err_out_online;
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&mce_syscore_ops);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_out_online:
+ cpuhp_remove_state(CPUHP_X86_MCE_DEAD);
+
+err_out_mem:
+ free_cpumask_var(mce_device_initialized);
+
+err_out:
+ pr_err("Unable to init MCE device (rc: %d)\n", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+device_initcall_sync(mcheck_init_device);
+
+/*
+ * Old style boot options parsing. Only for compatibility.
+ */
+static int __init mcheck_disable(char *str)
+{
+ mca_cfg.disabled = 1;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("nomce", mcheck_disable);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+struct dentry *mce_get_debugfs_dir(void)
+{
+ static struct dentry *dmce;
+
+ if (!dmce)
+ dmce = debugfs_create_dir("mce", NULL);
+
+ return dmce;
+}
+
+static void mce_reset(void)
+{
+ atomic_set(&mce_fake_panicked, 0);
+ atomic_set(&mce_executing, 0);
+ atomic_set(&mce_callin, 0);
+ atomic_set(&global_nwo, 0);
+ cpumask_setall(&mce_missing_cpus);
+}
+
+static int fake_panic_get(void *data, u64 *val)
+{
+ *val = fake_panic;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fake_panic_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ mce_reset();
+ fake_panic = val;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(fake_panic_fops, fake_panic_get, fake_panic_set,
+ "%llu\n");
+
+static void __init mcheck_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *dmce;
+
+ dmce = mce_get_debugfs_dir();
+ debugfs_create_file_unsafe("fake_panic", 0444, dmce, NULL,
+ &fake_panic_fops);
+}
+#else
+static void __init mcheck_debugfs_init(void) { }
+#endif
+
+static int __init mcheck_late_init(void)
+{
+ if (mca_cfg.recovery)
+ enable_copy_mc_fragile();
+
+ mcheck_debugfs_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Flush out everything that has been logged during early boot, now that
+ * everything has been initialized (workqueues, decoders, ...).
+ */
+ mce_schedule_work();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(mcheck_late_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..100fbeebd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/dev-mcelog.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * /dev/mcelog driver
+ *
+ * K8 parts Copyright 2002,2003 Andi Kleen, SuSE Labs.
+ * Rest from unknown author(s).
+ * 2004 Andi Kleen. Rewrote most of it.
+ * Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation
+ * Author: Andi Kleen
+ */
+
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(mce_injector_chain);
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mce_chrdev_read_mutex);
+
+static char mce_helper[128];
+static char *mce_helper_argv[2] = { mce_helper, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Lockless MCE logging infrastructure.
+ * This avoids deadlocks on printk locks without having to break locks. Also
+ * separate MCEs from kernel messages to avoid bogus bug reports.
+ */
+
+static struct mce_log_buffer *mcelog;
+
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(mce_chrdev_wait);
+
+static int dev_mce_log(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct mce *mce = (struct mce *)data;
+ unsigned int entry;
+
+ if (mce->kflags & MCE_HANDLED_CEC)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_chrdev_read_mutex);
+
+ entry = mcelog->next;
+
+ /*
+ * When the buffer fills up discard new entries. Assume that the
+ * earlier errors are the more interesting ones:
+ */
+ if (entry >= mcelog->len) {
+ set_bit(MCE_OVERFLOW, (unsigned long *)&mcelog->flags);
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ mcelog->next = entry + 1;
+
+ memcpy(mcelog->entry + entry, mce, sizeof(struct mce));
+ mcelog->entry[entry].finished = 1;
+ mcelog->entry[entry].kflags = 0;
+
+ /* wake processes polling /dev/mcelog */
+ wake_up_interruptible(&mce_chrdev_wait);
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_chrdev_read_mutex);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ mce->kflags |= MCE_HANDLED_MCELOG;
+
+ return NOTIFY_OK;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block dev_mcelog_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = dev_mce_log,
+ .priority = MCE_PRIO_MCELOG,
+};
+
+static void mce_do_trigger(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ call_usermodehelper(mce_helper, mce_helper_argv, NULL, UMH_NO_WAIT);
+}
+
+static DECLARE_WORK(mce_trigger_work, mce_do_trigger);
+
+
+void mce_work_trigger(void)
+{
+ if (mce_helper[0])
+ schedule_work(&mce_trigger_work);
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+show_trigger(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ strcpy(buf, mce_helper);
+ strcat(buf, "\n");
+ return strlen(mce_helper) + 1;
+}
+
+static ssize_t set_trigger(struct device *s, struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t siz)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ strncpy(mce_helper, buf, sizeof(mce_helper));
+ mce_helper[sizeof(mce_helper)-1] = 0;
+ p = strchr(mce_helper, '\n');
+
+ if (p)
+ *p = 0;
+
+ return strlen(mce_helper) + !!p;
+}
+
+DEVICE_ATTR(trigger, 0644, show_trigger, set_trigger);
+
+/*
+ * mce_chrdev: Character device /dev/mcelog to read and clear the MCE log.
+ */
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+static int mce_chrdev_open_count; /* #times opened */
+static int mce_chrdev_open_exclu; /* already open exclusive? */
+
+static int mce_chrdev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ spin_lock(&mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+
+ if (mce_chrdev_open_exclu ||
+ (mce_chrdev_open_count && (file->f_flags & O_EXCL))) {
+ spin_unlock(&mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ if (file->f_flags & O_EXCL)
+ mce_chrdev_open_exclu = 1;
+ mce_chrdev_open_count++;
+
+ spin_unlock(&mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+
+ return nonseekable_open(inode, file);
+}
+
+static int mce_chrdev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ spin_lock(&mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+
+ mce_chrdev_open_count--;
+ mce_chrdev_open_exclu = 0;
+
+ spin_unlock(&mce_chrdev_state_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mce_apei_read_done;
+
+/* Collect MCE record of previous boot in persistent storage via APEI ERST. */
+static int __mce_read_apei(char __user **ubuf, size_t usize)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u64 record_id;
+ struct mce m;
+
+ if (usize < sizeof(struct mce))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = apei_read_mce(&m, &record_id);
+ /* Error or no more MCE record */
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ mce_apei_read_done = 1;
+ /*
+ * When ERST is disabled, mce_chrdev_read() should return
+ * "no record" instead of "no device."
+ */
+ if (rc == -ENODEV)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(*ubuf, &m, sizeof(struct mce)))
+ return rc;
+ /*
+ * In fact, we should have cleared the record after that has
+ * been flushed to the disk or sent to network in
+ * /sbin/mcelog, but we have no interface to support that now,
+ * so just clear it to avoid duplication.
+ */
+ rc = apei_clear_mce(record_id);
+ if (rc) {
+ mce_apei_read_done = 1;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ *ubuf += sizeof(struct mce);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t mce_chrdev_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t usize, loff_t *off)
+{
+ char __user *buf = ubuf;
+ unsigned next;
+ int i, err;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_chrdev_read_mutex);
+
+ if (!mce_apei_read_done) {
+ err = __mce_read_apei(&buf, usize);
+ if (err || buf != ubuf)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Only supports full reads right now */
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (*off != 0 || usize < mcelog->len * sizeof(struct mce))
+ goto out;
+
+ next = mcelog->next;
+ err = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < next; i++) {
+ struct mce *m = &mcelog->entry[i];
+
+ err |= copy_to_user(buf, m, sizeof(*m));
+ buf += sizeof(*m);
+ }
+
+ memset(mcelog->entry, 0, next * sizeof(struct mce));
+ mcelog->next = 0;
+
+ if (err)
+ err = -EFAULT;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_chrdev_read_mutex);
+
+ return err ? err : buf - ubuf;
+}
+
+static __poll_t mce_chrdev_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+{
+ poll_wait(file, &mce_chrdev_wait, wait);
+ if (READ_ONCE(mcelog->next))
+ return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+ if (!mce_apei_read_done && apei_check_mce())
+ return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long mce_chrdev_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case MCE_GET_RECORD_LEN:
+ return put_user(sizeof(struct mce), p);
+ case MCE_GET_LOG_LEN:
+ return put_user(mcelog->len, p);
+ case MCE_GETCLEAR_FLAGS: {
+ unsigned flags;
+
+ do {
+ flags = mcelog->flags;
+ } while (cmpxchg(&mcelog->flags, flags, 0) != flags);
+
+ return put_user(flags, p);
+ }
+ default:
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ }
+}
+
+void mce_register_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ blocking_notifier_chain_register(&mce_injector_chain, nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_register_injector_chain);
+
+void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&mce_injector_chain, nb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mce_unregister_injector_chain);
+
+static ssize_t mce_chrdev_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t usize, loff_t *off)
+{
+ struct mce m;
+
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * There are some cases where real MSR reads could slip
+ * through.
+ */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MCE) || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MCA))
+ return -EIO;
+
+ if ((unsigned long)usize > sizeof(struct mce))
+ usize = sizeof(struct mce);
+ if (copy_from_user(&m, ubuf, usize))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (m.extcpu >= num_possible_cpus() || !cpu_online(m.extcpu))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Need to give user space some time to set everything up,
+ * so do it a jiffie or two later everywhere.
+ */
+ schedule_timeout(2);
+
+ blocking_notifier_call_chain(&mce_injector_chain, 0, &m);
+
+ return usize;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations mce_chrdev_ops = {
+ .open = mce_chrdev_open,
+ .release = mce_chrdev_release,
+ .read = mce_chrdev_read,
+ .write = mce_chrdev_write,
+ .poll = mce_chrdev_poll,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = mce_chrdev_ioctl,
+ .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice mce_chrdev_device = {
+ MISC_MCELOG_MINOR,
+ "mcelog",
+ &mce_chrdev_ops,
+};
+
+static __init int dev_mcelog_init_device(void)
+{
+ int mce_log_len;
+ int err;
+
+ mce_log_len = max(MCE_LOG_MIN_LEN, num_online_cpus());
+ mcelog = kzalloc(struct_size(mcelog, entry, mce_log_len), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mcelog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(mcelog->signature, MCE_LOG_SIGNATURE, sizeof(mcelog->signature));
+ mcelog->len = mce_log_len;
+ mcelog->recordlen = sizeof(struct mce);
+
+ /* register character device /dev/mcelog */
+ err = misc_register(&mce_chrdev_device);
+ if (err) {
+ if (err == -EBUSY)
+ /* Xen dom0 might have registered the device already. */
+ pr_info("Unable to init device /dev/mcelog, already registered");
+ else
+ pr_err("Unable to init device /dev/mcelog (rc: %d)\n", err);
+
+ kfree(mcelog);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ mce_register_decode_chain(&dev_mcelog_nb);
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall_sync(dev_mcelog_init_device);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fbe8b61c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/genpool.c
@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * MCE event pool management in MCE context
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corp.
+ * Author: Chen, Gong <gong.chen@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/genalloc.h>
+#include <linux/llist.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * printk() is not safe in MCE context. This is a lock-less memory allocator
+ * used to save error information organized in a lock-less list.
+ *
+ * This memory pool is only to be used to save MCE records in MCE context.
+ * MCE events are rare, so a fixed size memory pool should be enough. Use
+ * 2 pages to save MCE events for now (~80 MCE records at most).
+ */
+#define MCE_POOLSZ (2 * PAGE_SIZE)
+
+static struct gen_pool *mce_evt_pool;
+static LLIST_HEAD(mce_event_llist);
+static char gen_pool_buf[MCE_POOLSZ];
+
+/*
+ * Compare the record "t" with each of the records on list "l" to see if
+ * an equivalent one is present in the list.
+ */
+static bool is_duplicate_mce_record(struct mce_evt_llist *t, struct mce_evt_llist *l)
+{
+ struct mce_evt_llist *node;
+ struct mce *m1, *m2;
+
+ m1 = &t->mce;
+
+ llist_for_each_entry(node, &l->llnode, llnode) {
+ m2 = &node->mce;
+
+ if (!mce_cmp(m1, m2))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The system has panicked - we'd like to peruse the list of MCE records
+ * that have been queued, but not seen by anyone yet. The list is in
+ * reverse time order, so we need to reverse it. While doing that we can
+ * also drop duplicate records (these were logged because some banks are
+ * shared between cores or by all threads on a socket).
+ */
+struct llist_node *mce_gen_pool_prepare_records(void)
+{
+ struct llist_node *head;
+ LLIST_HEAD(new_head);
+ struct mce_evt_llist *node, *t;
+
+ head = llist_del_all(&mce_event_llist);
+ if (!head)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* squeeze out duplicates while reversing order */
+ llist_for_each_entry_safe(node, t, head, llnode) {
+ if (!is_duplicate_mce_record(node, t))
+ llist_add(&node->llnode, &new_head);
+ }
+
+ return new_head.first;
+}
+
+void mce_gen_pool_process(struct work_struct *__unused)
+{
+ struct llist_node *head;
+ struct mce_evt_llist *node, *tmp;
+ struct mce *mce;
+
+ head = llist_del_all(&mce_event_llist);
+ if (!head)
+ return;
+
+ head = llist_reverse_order(head);
+ llist_for_each_entry_safe(node, tmp, head, llnode) {
+ mce = &node->mce;
+ blocking_notifier_call_chain(&x86_mce_decoder_chain, 0, mce);
+ gen_pool_free(mce_evt_pool, (unsigned long)node, sizeof(*node));
+ }
+}
+
+bool mce_gen_pool_empty(void)
+{
+ return llist_empty(&mce_event_llist);
+}
+
+int mce_gen_pool_add(struct mce *mce)
+{
+ struct mce_evt_llist *node;
+
+ if (filter_mce(mce))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!mce_evt_pool)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ node = (void *)gen_pool_alloc(mce_evt_pool, sizeof(*node));
+ if (!node) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("MCE records pool full!\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&node->mce, mce, sizeof(*mce));
+ llist_add(&node->llnode, &mce_event_llist);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mce_gen_pool_create(void)
+{
+ struct gen_pool *tmpp;
+ int ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ tmpp = gen_pool_create(ilog2(sizeof(struct mce_evt_llist)), -1);
+ if (!tmpp)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = gen_pool_add(tmpp, (unsigned long)gen_pool_buf, MCE_POOLSZ, -1);
+ if (ret) {
+ gen_pool_destroy(tmpp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mce_evt_pool = tmpp;
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int mce_gen_pool_init(void)
+{
+ /* Just init mce_gen_pool once. */
+ if (mce_evt_pool)
+ return 0;
+
+ return mce_gen_pool_create();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..87c15ab89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/inject.c
@@ -0,0 +1,801 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Machine check injection support.
+ * Copyright 2008 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Andi Kleen
+ * Ying Huang
+ *
+ * The AMD part (from mce_amd_inj.c): a simple MCE injection facility
+ * for testing different aspects of the RAS code. This driver should be
+ * built as module so that it can be loaded on production kernels for
+ * testing purposes.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2010-17: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+ * Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <asm/amd_nb.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
+#include <asm/smp.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static bool hw_injection_possible = true;
+
+/*
+ * Collect all the MCi_XXX settings
+ */
+static struct mce i_mce;
+static struct dentry *dfs_inj;
+
+#define MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE 4
+#define NBCFG 0x44
+
+enum injection_type {
+ SW_INJ = 0, /* SW injection, simply decode the error */
+ HW_INJ, /* Trigger a #MC */
+ DFR_INT_INJ, /* Trigger Deferred error interrupt */
+ THR_INT_INJ, /* Trigger threshold interrupt */
+ N_INJ_TYPES,
+};
+
+static const char * const flags_options[] = {
+ [SW_INJ] = "sw",
+ [HW_INJ] = "hw",
+ [DFR_INT_INJ] = "df",
+ [THR_INT_INJ] = "th",
+ NULL
+};
+
+/* Set default injection to SW_INJ */
+static enum injection_type inj_type = SW_INJ;
+
+#define MCE_INJECT_SET(reg) \
+static int inj_##reg##_set(void *data, u64 val) \
+{ \
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data; \
+ \
+ m->reg = val; \
+ return 0; \
+}
+
+MCE_INJECT_SET(status);
+MCE_INJECT_SET(misc);
+MCE_INJECT_SET(addr);
+MCE_INJECT_SET(synd);
+
+#define MCE_INJECT_GET(reg) \
+static int inj_##reg##_get(void *data, u64 *val) \
+{ \
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data; \
+ \
+ *val = m->reg; \
+ return 0; \
+}
+
+MCE_INJECT_GET(status);
+MCE_INJECT_GET(misc);
+MCE_INJECT_GET(addr);
+MCE_INJECT_GET(synd);
+MCE_INJECT_GET(ipid);
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(status_fops, inj_status_get, inj_status_set, "%llx\n");
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(misc_fops, inj_misc_get, inj_misc_set, "%llx\n");
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(addr_fops, inj_addr_get, inj_addr_set, "%llx\n");
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(synd_fops, inj_synd_get, inj_synd_set, "%llx\n");
+
+/* Use the user provided IPID value on a sw injection. */
+static int inj_ipid_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) {
+ if (inj_type == SW_INJ)
+ m->ipid = val;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(ipid_fops, inj_ipid_get, inj_ipid_set, "%llx\n");
+
+static void setup_inj_struct(struct mce *m)
+{
+ memset(m, 0, sizeof(struct mce));
+
+ m->cpuvendor = boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor;
+ m->time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+ m->cpuid = cpuid_eax(1);
+ m->microcode = boot_cpu_data.microcode;
+}
+
+/* Update fake mce registers on current CPU. */
+static void inject_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ struct mce *i = &per_cpu(injectm, m->extcpu);
+
+ /* Make sure no one reads partially written injectm */
+ i->finished = 0;
+ mb();
+ m->finished = 0;
+ /* First set the fields after finished */
+ i->extcpu = m->extcpu;
+ mb();
+ /* Now write record in order, finished last (except above) */
+ memcpy(i, m, sizeof(struct mce));
+ /* Finally activate it */
+ mb();
+ i->finished = 1;
+}
+
+static void raise_poll(struct mce *m)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ mce_banks_t b;
+
+ memset(&b, 0xff, sizeof(mce_banks_t));
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ machine_check_poll(0, &b);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ m->finished = 0;
+}
+
+static void raise_exception(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *pregs)
+{
+ struct pt_regs regs;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!pregs) {
+ memset(&regs, 0, sizeof(struct pt_regs));
+ regs.ip = m->ip;
+ regs.cs = m->cs;
+ pregs = &regs;
+ }
+ /* do_machine_check() expects interrupts disabled -- at least */
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ do_machine_check(pregs);
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+ m->finished = 0;
+}
+
+static cpumask_var_t mce_inject_cpumask;
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mce_inject_mutex);
+
+static int mce_raise_notify(unsigned int cmd, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct mce *m = this_cpu_ptr(&injectm);
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mce_inject_cpumask))
+ return NMI_DONE;
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mce_inject_cpumask);
+ if (m->inject_flags & MCJ_EXCEPTION)
+ raise_exception(m, regs);
+ else if (m->status)
+ raise_poll(m);
+ return NMI_HANDLED;
+}
+
+static void mce_irq_ipi(void *info)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct mce *m = this_cpu_ptr(&injectm);
+
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mce_inject_cpumask) &&
+ m->inject_flags & MCJ_EXCEPTION) {
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mce_inject_cpumask);
+ raise_exception(m, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Inject mce on current CPU */
+static int raise_local(void)
+{
+ struct mce *m = this_cpu_ptr(&injectm);
+ int context = MCJ_CTX(m->inject_flags);
+ int ret = 0;
+ int cpu = m->extcpu;
+
+ if (m->inject_flags & MCJ_EXCEPTION) {
+ pr_info("Triggering MCE exception on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ switch (context) {
+ case MCJ_CTX_IRQ:
+ /*
+ * Could do more to fake interrupts like
+ * calling irq_enter, but the necessary
+ * machinery isn't exported currently.
+ */
+ fallthrough;
+ case MCJ_CTX_PROCESS:
+ raise_exception(m, NULL);
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_info("Invalid MCE context\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pr_info("MCE exception done on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ } else if (m->status) {
+ pr_info("Starting machine check poll CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ raise_poll(m);
+ mce_notify_irq();
+ pr_info("Machine check poll done on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ } else
+ m->finished = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void __maybe_unused raise_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ int context = MCJ_CTX(m->inject_flags);
+
+ inject_mce(m);
+
+ if (context == MCJ_CTX_RANDOM)
+ return;
+
+ if (m->inject_flags & (MCJ_IRQ_BROADCAST | MCJ_NMI_BROADCAST)) {
+ unsigned long start;
+ int cpu;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ cpumask_copy(mce_inject_cpumask, cpu_online_mask);
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(get_cpu(), mce_inject_cpumask);
+ for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+ struct mce *mcpu = &per_cpu(injectm, cpu);
+ if (!mcpu->finished ||
+ MCJ_CTX(mcpu->inject_flags) != MCJ_CTX_RANDOM)
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mce_inject_cpumask);
+ }
+ if (!cpumask_empty(mce_inject_cpumask)) {
+ if (m->inject_flags & MCJ_IRQ_BROADCAST) {
+ /*
+ * don't wait because mce_irq_ipi is necessary
+ * to be sync with following raise_local
+ */
+ preempt_disable();
+ smp_call_function_many(mce_inject_cpumask,
+ mce_irq_ipi, NULL, 0);
+ preempt_enable();
+ } else if (m->inject_flags & MCJ_NMI_BROADCAST)
+ apic->send_IPI_mask(mce_inject_cpumask,
+ NMI_VECTOR);
+ }
+ start = jiffies;
+ while (!cpumask_empty(mce_inject_cpumask)) {
+ if (!time_before(jiffies, start + 2*HZ)) {
+ pr_err("Timeout waiting for mce inject %lx\n",
+ *cpumask_bits(mce_inject_cpumask));
+ break;
+ }
+ cpu_relax();
+ }
+ raise_local();
+ put_cpu();
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ } else {
+ preempt_disable();
+ raise_local();
+ preempt_enable();
+ }
+}
+
+static int mce_inject_raise(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long val,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+
+ if (!m)
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+
+ mutex_lock(&mce_inject_mutex);
+ raise_mce(m);
+ mutex_unlock(&mce_inject_mutex);
+
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block inject_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = mce_inject_raise,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Caller needs to be make sure this cpu doesn't disappear
+ * from under us, i.e.: get_cpu/put_cpu.
+ */
+static int toggle_hw_mce_inject(unsigned int cpu, bool enable)
+{
+ u32 l, h;
+ int err;
+
+ err = rdmsr_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_K7_HWCR, &l, &h);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s: error reading HWCR\n", __func__);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ enable ? (l |= BIT(18)) : (l &= ~BIT(18));
+
+ err = wrmsr_on_cpu(cpu, MSR_K7_HWCR, l, h);
+ if (err)
+ pr_err("%s: error writing HWCR\n", __func__);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int __set_inj(const char *buf)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < N_INJ_TYPES; i++) {
+ if (!strncmp(flags_options[i], buf, strlen(flags_options[i]))) {
+ if (i > SW_INJ && !hw_injection_possible)
+ continue;
+ inj_type = i;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static ssize_t flags_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char buf[MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE];
+ int n;
+
+ n = sprintf(buf, "%s\n", flags_options[inj_type]);
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, cnt, ppos, buf, n);
+}
+
+static ssize_t flags_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char buf[MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE], *__buf;
+ int err;
+
+ if (!cnt || cnt > MAX_FLAG_OPT_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&buf, ubuf, cnt))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[cnt - 1] = 0;
+
+ /* strip whitespace */
+ __buf = strstrip(buf);
+
+ err = __set_inj(__buf);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid flags value: %s\n", __func__, __buf);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ *ppos += cnt;
+
+ return cnt;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations flags_fops = {
+ .read = flags_read,
+ .write = flags_write,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * On which CPU to inject?
+ */
+MCE_INJECT_GET(extcpu);
+
+static int inj_extcpu_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+
+ if (val >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(val)) {
+ pr_err("%s: Invalid CPU: %llu\n", __func__, val);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ m->extcpu = val;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(extcpu_fops, inj_extcpu_get, inj_extcpu_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static void trigger_mce(void *info)
+{
+ asm volatile("int $18");
+}
+
+static void trigger_dfr_int(void *info)
+{
+ asm volatile("int %0" :: "i" (DEFERRED_ERROR_VECTOR));
+}
+
+static void trigger_thr_int(void *info)
+{
+ asm volatile("int %0" :: "i" (THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR));
+}
+
+static u32 get_nbc_for_node(int node_id)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ u32 cores_per_node;
+
+ cores_per_node = (c->x86_max_cores * smp_num_siblings) / amd_get_nodes_per_socket();
+
+ return cores_per_node * node_id;
+}
+
+static void toggle_nb_mca_mst_cpu(u16 nid)
+{
+ struct amd_northbridge *nb;
+ struct pci_dev *F3;
+ u32 val;
+ int err;
+
+ nb = node_to_amd_nb(nid);
+ if (!nb)
+ return;
+
+ F3 = nb->misc;
+ if (!F3)
+ return;
+
+ err = pci_read_config_dword(F3, NBCFG, &val);
+ if (err) {
+ pr_err("%s: Error reading F%dx%03x.\n",
+ __func__, PCI_FUNC(F3->devfn), NBCFG);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (val & BIT(27))
+ return;
+
+ pr_err("%s: Set D18F3x44[NbMcaToMstCpuEn] which BIOS hasn't done.\n",
+ __func__);
+
+ val |= BIT(27);
+ err = pci_write_config_dword(F3, NBCFG, val);
+ if (err)
+ pr_err("%s: Error writing F%dx%03x.\n",
+ __func__, PCI_FUNC(F3->devfn), NBCFG);
+}
+
+static void prepare_msrs(void *info)
+{
+ struct mce m = *(struct mce *)info;
+ u8 b = m.bank;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_STATUS, m.mcgstatus);
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) {
+ if (m.inject_flags == DFR_INT_INJ) {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_DESTAT(b), m.status);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_DEADDR(b), m.addr);
+ } else {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_STATUS(b), m.status);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_ADDR(b), m.addr);
+ }
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(b), m.misc);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_SYND(b), m.synd);
+ } else {
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(b), m.status);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(b), m.addr);
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(b), m.misc);
+ }
+}
+
+static void do_inject(void)
+{
+ u64 mcg_status = 0;
+ unsigned int cpu = i_mce.extcpu;
+ u8 b = i_mce.bank;
+
+ i_mce.tsc = rdtsc_ordered();
+
+ i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_VAL;
+
+ if (i_mce.misc)
+ i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_MISCV;
+
+ if (i_mce.synd)
+ i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_SYNDV;
+
+ if (inj_type == SW_INJ) {
+ mce_log(&i_mce);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* prep MCE global settings for the injection */
+ mcg_status = MCG_STATUS_MCIP | MCG_STATUS_EIPV;
+
+ if (!(i_mce.status & MCI_STATUS_PCC))
+ mcg_status |= MCG_STATUS_RIPV;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure necessary status bits for deferred errors:
+ * - MCx_STATUS[Deferred]: make sure it is a deferred error
+ * - MCx_STATUS[UC] cleared: deferred errors are _not_ UC
+ */
+ if (inj_type == DFR_INT_INJ) {
+ i_mce.status |= MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED;
+ i_mce.status &= ~MCI_STATUS_UC;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For multi node CPUs, logging and reporting of bank 4 errors happens
+ * only on the node base core. Refer to D18F3x44[NbMcaToMstCpuEn] for
+ * Fam10h and later BKDGs.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_DCM) &&
+ b == 4 &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x17) {
+ toggle_nb_mca_mst_cpu(topology_die_id(cpu));
+ cpu = get_nbc_for_node(topology_die_id(cpu));
+ }
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ if (!cpu_online(cpu))
+ goto err;
+
+ toggle_hw_mce_inject(cpu, true);
+
+ i_mce.mcgstatus = mcg_status;
+ i_mce.inject_flags = inj_type;
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, prepare_msrs, &i_mce, 0);
+
+ toggle_hw_mce_inject(cpu, false);
+
+ switch (inj_type) {
+ case DFR_INT_INJ:
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, trigger_dfr_int, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+ case THR_INT_INJ:
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, trigger_thr_int, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ smp_call_function_single(cpu, trigger_mce, NULL, 0);
+ }
+
+err:
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * This denotes into which bank we're injecting and triggers
+ * the injection, at the same time.
+ */
+static int inj_bank_set(void *data, u64 val)
+{
+ struct mce *m = (struct mce *)data;
+ u8 n_banks;
+ u64 cap;
+
+ /* Get bank count on target CPU so we can handle non-uniform values. */
+ rdmsrl_on_cpu(m->extcpu, MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, &cap);
+ n_banks = cap & MCG_BANKCNT_MASK;
+
+ if (val >= n_banks) {
+ pr_err("MCA bank %llu non-existent on CPU%d\n", val, m->extcpu);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ m->bank = val;
+
+ /*
+ * sw-only injection allows to write arbitrary values into the MCA
+ * registers because it tests only the decoding paths.
+ */
+ if (inj_type == SW_INJ)
+ goto inject;
+
+ /*
+ * Read IPID value to determine if a bank is populated on the target
+ * CPU.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) {
+ u64 ipid;
+
+ if (rdmsrl_on_cpu(m->extcpu, MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(val), &ipid)) {
+ pr_err("Error reading IPID on CPU%d\n", m->extcpu);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ipid) {
+ pr_err("Cannot inject into unpopulated bank %llu\n", val);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ }
+
+inject:
+ do_inject();
+
+ /* Reset injection struct */
+ setup_inj_struct(&i_mce);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+MCE_INJECT_GET(bank);
+
+DEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(bank_fops, inj_bank_get, inj_bank_set, "%llu\n");
+
+static const char readme_msg[] =
+"Description of the files and their usages:\n"
+"\n"
+"Note1: i refers to the bank number below.\n"
+"Note2: See respective BKDGs for the exact bit definitions of the files below\n"
+"as they mirror the hardware registers.\n"
+"\n"
+"status:\t Set MCi_STATUS: the bits in that MSR control the error type and\n"
+"\t attributes of the error which caused the MCE.\n"
+"\n"
+"misc:\t Set MCi_MISC: provide auxiliary info about the error. It is mostly\n"
+"\t used for error thresholding purposes and its validity is indicated by\n"
+"\t MCi_STATUS[MiscV].\n"
+"\n"
+"synd:\t Set MCi_SYND: provide syndrome info about the error. Only valid on\n"
+"\t Scalable MCA systems, and its validity is indicated by MCi_STATUS[SyndV].\n"
+"\n"
+"addr:\t Error address value to be written to MCi_ADDR. Log address information\n"
+"\t associated with the error.\n"
+"\n"
+"cpu:\t The CPU to inject the error on.\n"
+"\n"
+"bank:\t Specify the bank you want to inject the error into: the number of\n"
+"\t banks in a processor varies and is family/model-specific, therefore, the\n"
+"\t supplied value is sanity-checked. Setting the bank value also triggers the\n"
+"\t injection.\n"
+"\n"
+"flags:\t Injection type to be performed. Writing to this file will trigger a\n"
+"\t real machine check, an APIC interrupt or invoke the error decoder routines\n"
+"\t for AMD processors.\n"
+"\n"
+"\t Allowed error injection types:\n"
+"\t - \"sw\": Software error injection. Decode error to a human-readable \n"
+"\t format only. Safe to use.\n"
+"\t - \"hw\": Hardware error injection. Causes the #MC exception handler to \n"
+"\t handle the error. Be warned: might cause system panic if MCi_STATUS[PCC] \n"
+"\t is set. Therefore, consider setting (debugfs_mountpoint)/mce/fake_panic \n"
+"\t before injecting.\n"
+"\t - \"df\": Trigger APIC interrupt for Deferred error. Causes deferred \n"
+"\t error APIC interrupt handler to handle the error if the feature is \n"
+"\t is present in hardware. \n"
+"\t - \"th\": Trigger APIC interrupt for Threshold errors. Causes threshold \n"
+"\t APIC interrupt handler to handle the error. \n"
+"\n"
+"ipid:\t IPID (AMD-specific)\n"
+"\n";
+
+static ssize_t
+inj_readme_read(struct file *filp, char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t cnt, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(ubuf, cnt, ppos,
+ readme_msg, strlen(readme_msg));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations readme_fops = {
+ .read = inj_readme_read,
+};
+
+static struct dfs_node {
+ char *name;
+ const struct file_operations *fops;
+ umode_t perm;
+} dfs_fls[] = {
+ { .name = "status", .fops = &status_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "misc", .fops = &misc_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "addr", .fops = &addr_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "synd", .fops = &synd_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "ipid", .fops = &ipid_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "bank", .fops = &bank_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "flags", .fops = &flags_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "cpu", .fops = &extcpu_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR },
+ { .name = "README", .fops = &readme_fops, .perm = S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH },
+};
+
+static void __init debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ dfs_inj = debugfs_create_dir("mce-inject", NULL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(dfs_fls); i++)
+ debugfs_create_file(dfs_fls[i].name, dfs_fls[i].perm, dfs_inj,
+ &i_mce, dfs_fls[i].fops);
+}
+
+static void check_hw_inj_possible(void)
+{
+ int cpu;
+ u8 bank;
+
+ /*
+ * This behavior exists only on SMCA systems though its not directly
+ * related to SMCA.
+ */
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA))
+ return;
+
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+
+ for (bank = 0; bank < MAX_NR_BANKS; ++bank) {
+ u64 status = MCI_STATUS_VAL, ipid;
+
+ /* Check whether bank is populated */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_IPID(bank), ipid);
+ if (!ipid)
+ continue;
+
+ toggle_hw_mce_inject(cpu, true);
+
+ wrmsrl_safe(mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS), status);
+ rdmsrl_safe(mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS), &status);
+ wrmsrl_safe(mca_msr_reg(bank, MCA_STATUS), 0);
+
+ if (!status) {
+ hw_injection_possible = false;
+ pr_warn("Platform does not allow *hardware* error injection."
+ "Try using APEI EINJ instead.\n");
+ }
+
+ toggle_hw_mce_inject(cpu, false);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ put_cpu();
+}
+
+static int __init inject_init(void)
+{
+ if (!alloc_cpumask_var(&mce_inject_cpumask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ check_hw_inj_possible();
+
+ debugfs_init();
+
+ register_nmi_handler(NMI_LOCAL, mce_raise_notify, 0, "mce_notify");
+ mce_register_injector_chain(&inject_nb);
+
+ setup_inj_struct(&i_mce);
+
+ pr_info("Machine check injector initialized\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit inject_exit(void)
+{
+
+ mce_unregister_injector_chain(&inject_nb);
+ unregister_nmi_handler(NMI_LOCAL, "mce_notify");
+
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(dfs_inj);
+ dfs_inj = NULL;
+
+ memset(&dfs_fls, 0, sizeof(dfs_fls));
+
+ free_cpumask_var(mce_inject_cpumask);
+}
+
+module_init(inject_init);
+module_exit(inject_exit);
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..95275a5e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/intel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,521 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel specific MCE features.
+ * Copyright 2004 Zwane Mwaikambo <zwane@linuxpower.ca>
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 Intel Corporation
+ * Author: Andi Kleen
+ */
+
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Support for Intel Correct Machine Check Interrupts. This allows
+ * the CPU to raise an interrupt when a corrected machine check happened.
+ * Normally we pick those up using a regular polling timer.
+ * Also supports reliable discovery of shared banks.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * CMCI can be delivered to multiple cpus that share a machine check bank
+ * so we need to designate a single cpu to process errors logged in each bank
+ * in the interrupt handler (otherwise we would have many races and potential
+ * double reporting of the same error).
+ * Note that this can change when a cpu is offlined or brought online since
+ * some MCA banks are shared across cpus. When a cpu is offlined, cmci_clear()
+ * disables CMCI on all banks owned by the cpu and clears this bitfield. At
+ * this point, cmci_rediscover() kicks in and a different cpu may end up
+ * taking ownership of some of the shared MCA banks that were previously
+ * owned by the offlined cpu.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(mce_banks_t, mce_banks_owned);
+
+/*
+ * CMCI storm detection backoff counter
+ *
+ * During storm, we reset this counter to INITIAL_CHECK_INTERVAL in case we've
+ * encountered an error. If not, we decrement it by one. We signal the end of
+ * the CMCI storm when it reaches 0.
+ */
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, cmci_backoff_cnt);
+
+/*
+ * cmci_discover_lock protects against parallel discovery attempts
+ * which could race against each other.
+ */
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(cmci_discover_lock);
+
+#define CMCI_THRESHOLD 1
+#define CMCI_POLL_INTERVAL (30 * HZ)
+#define CMCI_STORM_INTERVAL (HZ)
+#define CMCI_STORM_THRESHOLD 15
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, cmci_time_stamp);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, cmci_storm_cnt);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, cmci_storm_state);
+
+enum {
+ CMCI_STORM_NONE,
+ CMCI_STORM_ACTIVE,
+ CMCI_STORM_SUBSIDED,
+};
+
+static atomic_t cmci_storm_on_cpus;
+
+static int cmci_supported(int *banks)
+{
+ u64 cap;
+
+ if (mca_cfg.cmci_disabled || mca_cfg.ignore_ce)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Vendor check is not strictly needed, but the initial
+ * initialization is vendor keyed and this
+ * makes sure none of the backdoors are entered otherwise.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_APIC) || lapic_get_maxlvt() < 6)
+ return 0;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, cap);
+ *banks = min_t(unsigned, MAX_NR_BANKS, cap & 0xff);
+ return !!(cap & MCG_CMCI_P);
+}
+
+static bool lmce_supported(void)
+{
+ u64 tmp;
+
+ if (mca_cfg.lmce_disabled)
+ return false;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_CAP, tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * LMCE depends on recovery support in the processor. Hence both
+ * MCG_SER_P and MCG_LMCE_P should be present in MCG_CAP.
+ */
+ if ((tmp & (MCG_SER_P | MCG_LMCE_P)) !=
+ (MCG_SER_P | MCG_LMCE_P))
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * BIOS should indicate support for LMCE by setting bit 20 in
+ * IA32_FEAT_CTL without which touching MCG_EXT_CTL will generate a #GP
+ * fault. The MSR must also be locked for LMCE_ENABLED to take effect.
+ * WARN if the MSR isn't locked as init_ia32_feat_ctl() unconditionally
+ * locks the MSR in the event that it wasn't already locked by BIOS.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, tmp);
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(tmp & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)))
+ return false;
+
+ return tmp & FEAT_CTL_LMCE_ENABLED;
+}
+
+bool mce_intel_cmci_poll(void)
+{
+ if (__this_cpu_read(cmci_storm_state) == CMCI_STORM_NONE)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * Reset the counter if we've logged an error in the last poll
+ * during the storm.
+ */
+ if (machine_check_poll(0, this_cpu_ptr(&mce_banks_owned)))
+ this_cpu_write(cmci_backoff_cnt, INITIAL_CHECK_INTERVAL);
+ else
+ this_cpu_dec(cmci_backoff_cnt);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+void mce_intel_hcpu_update(unsigned long cpu)
+{
+ if (per_cpu(cmci_storm_state, cpu) == CMCI_STORM_ACTIVE)
+ atomic_dec(&cmci_storm_on_cpus);
+
+ per_cpu(cmci_storm_state, cpu) = CMCI_STORM_NONE;
+}
+
+static void cmci_toggle_interrupt_mode(bool on)
+{
+ unsigned long flags, *owned;
+ int bank;
+ u64 val;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+ owned = this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_owned);
+ for_each_set_bit(bank, owned, MAX_NR_BANKS) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank), val);
+
+ if (on)
+ val |= MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN;
+ else
+ val &= ~MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank), val);
+ }
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+}
+
+unsigned long cmci_intel_adjust_timer(unsigned long interval)
+{
+ if ((this_cpu_read(cmci_backoff_cnt) > 0) &&
+ (__this_cpu_read(cmci_storm_state) == CMCI_STORM_ACTIVE)) {
+ mce_notify_irq();
+ return CMCI_STORM_INTERVAL;
+ }
+
+ switch (__this_cpu_read(cmci_storm_state)) {
+ case CMCI_STORM_ACTIVE:
+
+ /*
+ * We switch back to interrupt mode once the poll timer has
+ * silenced itself. That means no events recorded and the timer
+ * interval is back to our poll interval.
+ */
+ __this_cpu_write(cmci_storm_state, CMCI_STORM_SUBSIDED);
+ if (!atomic_sub_return(1, &cmci_storm_on_cpus))
+ pr_notice("CMCI storm subsided: switching to interrupt mode\n");
+
+ fallthrough;
+
+ case CMCI_STORM_SUBSIDED:
+ /*
+ * We wait for all CPUs to go back to SUBSIDED state. When that
+ * happens we switch back to interrupt mode.
+ */
+ if (!atomic_read(&cmci_storm_on_cpus)) {
+ __this_cpu_write(cmci_storm_state, CMCI_STORM_NONE);
+ cmci_toggle_interrupt_mode(true);
+ cmci_recheck();
+ }
+ return CMCI_POLL_INTERVAL;
+ default:
+
+ /* We have shiny weather. Let the poll do whatever it thinks. */
+ return interval;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool cmci_storm_detect(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cnt = __this_cpu_read(cmci_storm_cnt);
+ unsigned long ts = __this_cpu_read(cmci_time_stamp);
+ unsigned long now = jiffies;
+ int r;
+
+ if (__this_cpu_read(cmci_storm_state) != CMCI_STORM_NONE)
+ return true;
+
+ if (time_before_eq(now, ts + CMCI_STORM_INTERVAL)) {
+ cnt++;
+ } else {
+ cnt = 1;
+ __this_cpu_write(cmci_time_stamp, now);
+ }
+ __this_cpu_write(cmci_storm_cnt, cnt);
+
+ if (cnt <= CMCI_STORM_THRESHOLD)
+ return false;
+
+ cmci_toggle_interrupt_mode(false);
+ __this_cpu_write(cmci_storm_state, CMCI_STORM_ACTIVE);
+ r = atomic_add_return(1, &cmci_storm_on_cpus);
+ mce_timer_kick(CMCI_STORM_INTERVAL);
+ this_cpu_write(cmci_backoff_cnt, INITIAL_CHECK_INTERVAL);
+
+ if (r == 1)
+ pr_notice("CMCI storm detected: switching to poll mode\n");
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The interrupt handler. This is called on every event.
+ * Just call the poller directly to log any events.
+ * This could in theory increase the threshold under high load,
+ * but doesn't for now.
+ */
+static void intel_threshold_interrupt(void)
+{
+ if (cmci_storm_detect())
+ return;
+
+ machine_check_poll(MCP_TIMESTAMP, this_cpu_ptr(&mce_banks_owned));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enable CMCI (Corrected Machine Check Interrupt) for available MCE banks
+ * on this CPU. Use the algorithm recommended in the SDM to discover shared
+ * banks.
+ */
+static void cmci_discover(int banks)
+{
+ unsigned long *owned = (void *)this_cpu_ptr(&mce_banks_owned);
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
+ int bios_wrong_thresh = 0;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < banks; i++) {
+ u64 val;
+ int bios_zero_thresh = 0;
+
+ if (test_bit(i, owned))
+ continue;
+
+ /* Skip banks in firmware first mode */
+ if (test_bit(i, mce_banks_ce_disabled))
+ continue;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(i), val);
+
+ /* Already owned by someone else? */
+ if (val & MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN) {
+ clear_bit(i, owned);
+ __clear_bit(i, this_cpu_ptr(mce_poll_banks));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!mca_cfg.bios_cmci_threshold) {
+ val &= ~MCI_CTL2_CMCI_THRESHOLD_MASK;
+ val |= CMCI_THRESHOLD;
+ } else if (!(val & MCI_CTL2_CMCI_THRESHOLD_MASK)) {
+ /*
+ * If bios_cmci_threshold boot option was specified
+ * but the threshold is zero, we'll try to initialize
+ * it to 1.
+ */
+ bios_zero_thresh = 1;
+ val |= CMCI_THRESHOLD;
+ }
+
+ val |= MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(i), val);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(i), val);
+
+ /* Did the enable bit stick? -- the bank supports CMCI */
+ if (val & MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN) {
+ set_bit(i, owned);
+ __clear_bit(i, this_cpu_ptr(mce_poll_banks));
+ /*
+ * We are able to set thresholds for some banks that
+ * had a threshold of 0. This means the BIOS has not
+ * set the thresholds properly or does not work with
+ * this boot option. Note down now and report later.
+ */
+ if (mca_cfg.bios_cmci_threshold && bios_zero_thresh &&
+ (val & MCI_CTL2_CMCI_THRESHOLD_MASK))
+ bios_wrong_thresh = 1;
+ } else {
+ WARN_ON(!test_bit(i, this_cpu_ptr(mce_poll_banks)));
+ }
+ }
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+ if (mca_cfg.bios_cmci_threshold && bios_wrong_thresh) {
+ pr_info_once(
+ "bios_cmci_threshold: Some banks do not have valid thresholds set\n");
+ pr_info_once(
+ "bios_cmci_threshold: Make sure your BIOS supports this boot option\n");
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Just in case we missed an event during initialization check
+ * all the CMCI owned banks.
+ */
+void cmci_recheck(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int banks;
+
+ if (!mce_available(raw_cpu_ptr(&cpu_info)) || !cmci_supported(&banks))
+ return;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ machine_check_poll(0, this_cpu_ptr(&mce_banks_owned));
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+/* Caller must hold the lock on cmci_discover_lock */
+static void __cmci_disable_bank(int bank)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!test_bit(bank, this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_owned)))
+ return;
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank), val);
+ val &= ~MCI_CTL2_CMCI_EN;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL2(bank), val);
+ __clear_bit(bank, this_cpu_ptr(mce_banks_owned));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disable CMCI on this CPU for all banks it owns when it goes down.
+ * This allows other CPUs to claim the banks on rediscovery.
+ */
+void cmci_clear(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int i;
+ int banks;
+
+ if (!cmci_supported(&banks))
+ return;
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0; i < banks; i++)
+ __cmci_disable_bank(i);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static void cmci_rediscover_work_func(void *arg)
+{
+ int banks;
+
+ /* Recheck banks in case CPUs don't all have the same */
+ if (cmci_supported(&banks))
+ cmci_discover(banks);
+}
+
+/* After a CPU went down cycle through all the others and rediscover */
+void cmci_rediscover(void)
+{
+ int banks;
+
+ if (!cmci_supported(&banks))
+ return;
+
+ on_each_cpu(cmci_rediscover_work_func, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reenable CMCI on this CPU in case a CPU down failed.
+ */
+void cmci_reenable(void)
+{
+ int banks;
+ if (cmci_supported(&banks))
+ cmci_discover(banks);
+}
+
+void cmci_disable_bank(int bank)
+{
+ int banks;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (!cmci_supported(&banks))
+ return;
+
+ raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+ __cmci_disable_bank(bank);
+ raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&cmci_discover_lock, flags);
+}
+
+void intel_init_cmci(void)
+{
+ int banks;
+
+ if (!cmci_supported(&banks))
+ return;
+
+ mce_threshold_vector = intel_threshold_interrupt;
+ cmci_discover(banks);
+ /*
+ * For CPU #0 this runs with still disabled APIC, but that's
+ * ok because only the vector is set up. We still do another
+ * check for the banks later for CPU #0 just to make sure
+ * to not miss any events.
+ */
+ apic_write(APIC_LVTCMCI, THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR|APIC_DM_FIXED);
+ cmci_recheck();
+}
+
+void intel_init_lmce(void)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!lmce_supported())
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL, val);
+
+ if (!(val & MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL, val | MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN);
+}
+
+void intel_clear_lmce(void)
+{
+ u64 val;
+
+ if (!lmce_supported())
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL, val);
+ val &= ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL, val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enable additional error logs from the integrated
+ * memory controller on processors that support this.
+ */
+static void intel_imc_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 error_control;
+
+ switch (c->x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X:
+ if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_ERROR_CONTROL, &error_control))
+ return;
+ error_control |= 2;
+ wrmsrl_safe(MSR_ERROR_CONTROL, error_control);
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+void mce_intel_feature_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ intel_init_cmci();
+ intel_init_lmce();
+ intel_imc_init(c);
+}
+
+void mce_intel_feature_clear(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ intel_clear_lmce();
+}
+
+bool intel_filter_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ /* MCE errata HSD131, HSM142, HSW131, BDM48, HSM142 and SKX37 */
+ if ((c->x86 == 6) &&
+ ((c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL) ||
+ (c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_L) ||
+ (c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL) ||
+ (c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_G) ||
+ (c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X)) &&
+ (m->bank == 0) &&
+ ((m->status & 0xa0000000ffffffff) == 0x80000000000f0005))
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0bed57ac8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__
+#define __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "mce: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+
+enum severity_level {
+ MCE_NO_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_UCNA_SEVERITY = MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_SOME_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_AO_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_UC_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_AR_SEVERITY,
+ MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY,
+};
+
+extern struct blocking_notifier_head x86_mce_decoder_chain;
+
+#define INITIAL_CHECK_INTERVAL 5 * 60 /* 5 minutes */
+
+struct mce_evt_llist {
+ struct llist_node llnode;
+ struct mce mce;
+};
+
+void mce_gen_pool_process(struct work_struct *__unused);
+bool mce_gen_pool_empty(void);
+int mce_gen_pool_add(struct mce *mce);
+int mce_gen_pool_init(void);
+struct llist_node *mce_gen_pool_prepare_records(void);
+
+int mce_severity(struct mce *a, struct pt_regs *regs, char **msg, bool is_excp);
+struct dentry *mce_get_debugfs_dir(void);
+
+extern mce_banks_t mce_banks_ce_disabled;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_INTEL
+unsigned long cmci_intel_adjust_timer(unsigned long interval);
+bool mce_intel_cmci_poll(void);
+void mce_intel_hcpu_update(unsigned long cpu);
+void cmci_disable_bank(int bank);
+void intel_init_cmci(void);
+void intel_init_lmce(void);
+void intel_clear_lmce(void);
+bool intel_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+#else
+# define cmci_intel_adjust_timer mce_adjust_timer_default
+static inline bool mce_intel_cmci_poll(void) { return false; }
+static inline void mce_intel_hcpu_update(unsigned long cpu) { }
+static inline void cmci_disable_bank(int bank) { }
+static inline void intel_init_cmci(void) { }
+static inline void intel_init_lmce(void) { }
+static inline void intel_clear_lmce(void) { }
+static inline bool intel_filter_mce(struct mce *m) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+void mce_timer_kick(unsigned long interval);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_APEI
+int apei_write_mce(struct mce *m);
+ssize_t apei_read_mce(struct mce *m, u64 *record_id);
+int apei_check_mce(void);
+int apei_clear_mce(u64 record_id);
+#else
+static inline int apei_write_mce(struct mce *m)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+static inline ssize_t apei_read_mce(struct mce *m, u64 *record_id)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int apei_check_mce(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+static inline int apei_clear_mce(u64 record_id)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We consider records to be equivalent if bank+status+addr+misc all match.
+ * This is only used when the system is going down because of a fatal error
+ * to avoid cluttering the console log with essentially repeated information.
+ * In normal processing all errors seen are logged.
+ */
+static inline bool mce_cmp(struct mce *m1, struct mce *m2)
+{
+ return m1->bank != m2->bank ||
+ m1->status != m2->status ||
+ m1->addr != m2->addr ||
+ m1->misc != m2->misc;
+}
+
+extern struct device_attribute dev_attr_trigger;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCELOG_LEGACY
+void mce_work_trigger(void);
+void mce_register_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb);
+void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb);
+#else
+static inline void mce_work_trigger(void) { }
+static inline void mce_register_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb) { }
+static inline void mce_unregister_injector_chain(struct notifier_block *nb) { }
+#endif
+
+struct mca_config {
+ __u64 lmce_disabled : 1,
+ disabled : 1,
+ ser : 1,
+ recovery : 1,
+ bios_cmci_threshold : 1,
+ /* Proper #MC exception handler is set */
+ initialized : 1,
+ __reserved : 58;
+
+ bool dont_log_ce;
+ bool cmci_disabled;
+ bool ignore_ce;
+ bool print_all;
+
+ int monarch_timeout;
+ int panic_timeout;
+ u32 rip_msr;
+ s8 bootlog;
+};
+
+extern struct mca_config mca_cfg;
+DECLARE_PER_CPU_READ_MOSTLY(unsigned int, mce_num_banks);
+
+struct mce_vendor_flags {
+ /*
+ * Indicates that overflow conditions are not fatal, when set.
+ */
+ __u64 overflow_recov : 1,
+
+ /*
+ * (AMD) SUCCOR stands for S/W UnCorrectable error COntainment and
+ * Recovery. It indicates support for data poisoning in HW and deferred
+ * error interrupts.
+ */
+ succor : 1,
+
+ /*
+ * (AMD) SMCA: This bit indicates support for Scalable MCA which expands
+ * the register space for each MCA bank and also increases number of
+ * banks. Also, to accommodate the new banks and registers, the MCA
+ * register space is moved to a new MSR range.
+ */
+ smca : 1,
+
+ /* Zen IFU quirk */
+ zen_ifu_quirk : 1,
+
+ /* AMD-style error thresholding banks present. */
+ amd_threshold : 1,
+
+ /* Pentium, family 5-style MCA */
+ p5 : 1,
+
+ /* Centaur Winchip C6-style MCA */
+ winchip : 1,
+
+ /* SandyBridge IFU quirk */
+ snb_ifu_quirk : 1,
+
+ /* Skylake, Cascade Lake, Cooper Lake REP;MOVS* quirk */
+ skx_repmov_quirk : 1,
+
+ __reserved_0 : 55;
+};
+
+extern struct mce_vendor_flags mce_flags;
+
+enum mca_msr {
+ MCA_CTL,
+ MCA_STATUS,
+ MCA_ADDR,
+ MCA_MISC,
+};
+
+/* Decide whether to add MCE record to MCE event pool or filter it out. */
+extern bool filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD
+extern bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m);
+#else
+static inline bool amd_filter_mce(struct mce *m) { return false; }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ANCIENT_MCE
+void intel_p5_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+void winchip_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c);
+noinstr void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs);
+noinstr void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs);
+static inline void enable_p5_mce(void) { mce_p5_enabled = 1; }
+#else
+static inline void intel_p5_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
+static inline void winchip_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) {}
+static inline void enable_p5_mce(void) {}
+static inline void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
+static inline void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs) {}
+#endif
+
+noinstr u64 mce_rdmsrl(u32 msr);
+
+static __always_inline u32 mca_msr_reg(int bank, enum mca_msr reg)
+{
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SMCA)) {
+ switch (reg) {
+ case MCA_CTL: return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_CTL(bank);
+ case MCA_ADDR: return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_ADDR(bank);
+ case MCA_MISC: return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_MISC(bank);
+ case MCA_STATUS: return MSR_AMD64_SMCA_MCx_STATUS(bank);
+ }
+ }
+
+ switch (reg) {
+ case MCA_CTL: return MSR_IA32_MCx_CTL(bank);
+ case MCA_ADDR: return MSR_IA32_MCx_ADDR(bank);
+ case MCA_MISC: return MSR_IA32_MCx_MISC(bank);
+ case MCA_STATUS: return MSR_IA32_MCx_STATUS(bank);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* __X86_MCE_INTERNAL_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/p5.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/p5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2272ad53f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/p5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * P5 specific Machine Check Exception Reporting
+ * (C) Copyright 2002 Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+ */
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* By default disabled */
+int mce_p5_enabled __read_mostly;
+
+/* Machine check handler for Pentium class Intel CPUs: */
+noinstr void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ u32 loaddr, hi, lotype;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR, loaddr, hi);
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE, lotype, hi);
+
+ pr_emerg("CPU#%d: Machine Check Exception: 0x%8X (type 0x%8X).\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), loaddr, lotype);
+
+ if (lotype & (1<<5)) {
+ pr_emerg("CPU#%d: Possible thermal failure (CPU on fire ?).\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+ }
+
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+/* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */
+void intel_p5_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 l, h;
+
+ /* Default P5 to off as its often misconnected: */
+ if (!mce_p5_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ /* Check for MCE support: */
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MCE))
+ return;
+
+ /* Read registers before enabling: */
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_P5_MC_ADDR, l, h);
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_P5_MC_TYPE, l, h);
+ pr_info("Intel old style machine check architecture supported.\n");
+
+ /* Enable MCE: */
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_MCE);
+ pr_info("Intel old style machine check reporting enabled on CPU#%d.\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00483d1c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/severity.c
@@ -0,0 +1,477 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * MCE grading rules.
+ * Copyright 2008, 2009 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Author: Andi Kleen
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
+#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Grade an mce by severity. In general the most severe ones are processed
+ * first. Since there are quite a lot of combinations test the bits in a
+ * table-driven way. The rules are simply processed in order, first
+ * match wins.
+ *
+ * Note this is only used for machine check exceptions, the corrected
+ * errors use much simpler rules. The exceptions still check for the corrected
+ * errors, but only to leave them alone for the CMCI handler (except for
+ * panic situations)
+ */
+
+enum context { IN_KERNEL = 1, IN_USER = 2, IN_KERNEL_RECOV = 3 };
+enum ser { SER_REQUIRED = 1, NO_SER = 2 };
+enum exception { EXCP_CONTEXT = 1, NO_EXCP = 2 };
+
+static struct severity {
+ u64 mask;
+ u64 result;
+ unsigned char sev;
+ unsigned char mcgmask;
+ unsigned char mcgres;
+ unsigned char ser;
+ unsigned char context;
+ unsigned char excp;
+ unsigned char covered;
+ unsigned char cpu_model;
+ unsigned char cpu_minstepping;
+ unsigned char bank_lo, bank_hi;
+ char *msg;
+} severities[] = {
+#define MCESEV(s, m, c...) { .sev = MCE_ ## s ## _SEVERITY, .msg = m, ## c }
+#define BANK_RANGE(l, h) .bank_lo = l, .bank_hi = h
+#define MODEL_STEPPING(m, s) .cpu_model = m, .cpu_minstepping = s
+#define KERNEL .context = IN_KERNEL
+#define USER .context = IN_USER
+#define KERNEL_RECOV .context = IN_KERNEL_RECOV
+#define SER .ser = SER_REQUIRED
+#define NOSER .ser = NO_SER
+#define EXCP .excp = EXCP_CONTEXT
+#define NOEXCP .excp = NO_EXCP
+#define BITCLR(x) .mask = x, .result = 0
+#define BITSET(x) .mask = x, .result = x
+#define MCGMASK(x, y) .mcgmask = x, .mcgres = y
+#define MASK(x, y) .mask = x, .result = y
+#define MCI_UC_S (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S)
+#define MCI_UC_AR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
+#define MCI_UC_SAR (MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_S|MCI_STATUS_AR)
+#define MCI_ADDR (MCI_STATUS_ADDRV|MCI_STATUS_MISCV)
+
+ MCESEV(
+ NO, "Invalid",
+ BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_VAL)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ NO, "Not enabled",
+ EXCP, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_EN)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Processor context corrupt",
+ BITSET(MCI_STATUS_PCC)
+ ),
+ /* When MCIP is not set something is very confused */
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "MCIP not set in MCA handler",
+ EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_MCIP, 0)
+ ),
+ /* Neither return not error IP -- no chance to recover -> PANIC */
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Neither restart nor error IP",
+ EXCP, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, 0)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
+ EXCP, KERNEL, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "In kernel and no restart IP",
+ EXCP, KERNEL_RECOV, MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV, 0)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ KEEP, "Corrected error",
+ NOSER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ ),
+ /*
+ * known AO MCACODs reported via MCE or CMC:
+ *
+ * SRAO could be signaled either via a machine check exception or
+ * CMCI with the corresponding bit S 1 or 0. So we don't need to
+ * check bit S for SRAO.
+ */
+ MCESEV(
+ AO, "Action optional: memory scrubbing error",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD_SCRUBMSK, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_SCRUB)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ AO, "Action optional: last level cache writeback error",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_UC_AR|MCACOD, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCACOD_L3WB)
+ ),
+ /*
+ * Quirk for Skylake/Cascade Lake. Patrol scrubber may be configured
+ * to report uncorrected errors using CMCI with a special signature.
+ * UC=0, MSCOD=0x0010, MCACOD=binary(000X 0000 1100 XXXX) reported
+ * in one of the memory controller banks.
+ * Set severity to "AO" for same action as normal patrol scrub error.
+ */
+ MCESEV(
+ AO, "Uncorrected Patrol Scrub Error",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_ADDR|0xffffeff0, MCI_ADDR|0x001000c0),
+ MODEL_STEPPING(INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X, 4), BANK_RANGE(13, 18)
+ ),
+
+ /* ignore OVER for UCNA */
+ MCESEV(
+ UCNA, "Uncorrected no action required",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Illegal combination (UCNA with AR=1)",
+ SER,
+ MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_UC|MCI_STATUS_AR)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ KEEP, "Non signaled machine check",
+ SER, BITCLR(MCI_STATUS_S)
+ ),
+
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Action required with lost events",
+ SER, BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR)
+ ),
+
+ /* known AR MCACODs: */
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE
+ MCESEV(
+ KEEP, "Action required but unaffected thread is continuable",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR),
+ MCGMASK(MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV, MCG_STATUS_RIPV)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ AR, "Action required: data load in error recoverable area of kernel",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
+ KERNEL_RECOV
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ AR, "Action required: data load error in a user process",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
+ USER
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ AR, "Action required: instruction fetch error in a user process",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR),
+ USER
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Data load in unrecoverable area of kernel",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_DATA),
+ KERNEL
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Instruction fetch error in kernel",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD, MCI_UC_SAR|MCI_ADDR|MCACOD_INSTR),
+ KERNEL
+ ),
+#endif
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Action required: unknown MCACOD",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_SAR)
+ ),
+
+ MCESEV(
+ SOME, "Action optional: unknown MCACOD",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_UC_S)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ SOME, "Action optional with lost events",
+ SER, MASK(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_SAR, MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_UC_S)
+ ),
+
+ MCESEV(
+ PANIC, "Overflowed uncorrected",
+ BITSET(MCI_STATUS_OVER|MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ UC, "Uncorrected",
+ BITSET(MCI_STATUS_UC)
+ ),
+ MCESEV(
+ SOME, "No match",
+ BITSET(0)
+ ) /* always matches. keep at end */
+};
+
+#define mc_recoverable(mcg) (((mcg) & (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV)) == \
+ (MCG_STATUS_RIPV|MCG_STATUS_EIPV))
+
+static bool is_copy_from_user(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ u8 insn_buf[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+ unsigned long addr;
+ struct insn insn;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!regs)
+ return false;
+
+ if (copy_from_kernel_nofault(insn_buf, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE))
+ return false;
+
+ ret = insn_decode_kernel(&insn, insn_buf);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return false;
+
+ switch (insn.opcode.value) {
+ /* MOV mem,reg */
+ case 0x8A: case 0x8B:
+ /* MOVZ mem,reg */
+ case 0xB60F: case 0xB70F:
+ addr = (unsigned long)insn_get_addr_ref(&insn, regs);
+ break;
+ /* REP MOVS */
+ case 0xA4: case 0xA5:
+ addr = regs->si;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (fault_in_kernel_space(addr))
+ return false;
+
+ current->mce_vaddr = (void __user *)addr;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If mcgstatus indicated that ip/cs on the stack were
+ * no good, then "m->cs" will be zero and we will have
+ * to assume the worst case (IN_KERNEL) as we actually
+ * have no idea what we were executing when the machine
+ * check hit.
+ * If we do have a good "m->cs" (or a faked one in the
+ * case we were executing in VM86 mode) we can use it to
+ * distinguish an exception taken in user from from one
+ * taken in the kernel.
+ */
+static noinstr int error_context(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ int fixup_type;
+ bool copy_user;
+
+ if ((m->cs & 3) == 3)
+ return IN_USER;
+
+ if (!mc_recoverable(m->mcgstatus))
+ return IN_KERNEL;
+
+ /* Allow instrumentation around external facilities usage. */
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ fixup_type = ex_get_fixup_type(m->ip);
+ copy_user = is_copy_from_user(regs);
+ instrumentation_end();
+
+ switch (fixup_type) {
+ case EX_TYPE_UACCESS:
+ case EX_TYPE_COPY:
+ if (!copy_user)
+ return IN_KERNEL;
+ m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_COPYIN;
+ fallthrough;
+
+ case EX_TYPE_FAULT_MCE_SAFE:
+ case EX_TYPE_DEFAULT_MCE_SAFE:
+ m->kflags |= MCE_IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+ return IN_KERNEL_RECOV;
+
+ default:
+ return IN_KERNEL;
+ }
+}
+
+/* See AMD PPR(s) section Machine Check Error Handling. */
+static noinstr int mce_severity_amd(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, char **msg, bool is_excp)
+{
+ char *panic_msg = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Default return value: Action required, the error must be handled
+ * immediately.
+ */
+ ret = MCE_AR_SEVERITY;
+
+ /* Processor Context Corrupt, no need to fumble too much, die! */
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_PCC) {
+ panic_msg = "Processor Context Corrupt";
+ ret = MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (m->status & MCI_STATUS_DEFERRED) {
+ ret = MCE_DEFERRED_SEVERITY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the UC bit is not set, the system either corrected or deferred
+ * the error. No action will be required after logging the error.
+ */
+ if (!(m->status & MCI_STATUS_UC)) {
+ ret = MCE_KEEP_SEVERITY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * On MCA overflow, without the MCA overflow recovery feature the
+ * system will not be able to recover, panic.
+ */
+ if ((m->status & MCI_STATUS_OVER) && !mce_flags.overflow_recov) {
+ panic_msg = "Overflowed uncorrected error without MCA Overflow Recovery";
+ ret = MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!mce_flags.succor) {
+ panic_msg = "Uncorrected error without MCA Recovery";
+ ret = MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (error_context(m, regs) == IN_KERNEL) {
+ panic_msg = "Uncorrected unrecoverable error in kernel context";
+ ret = MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+ }
+
+out:
+ if (msg && panic_msg)
+ *msg = panic_msg;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static noinstr int mce_severity_intel(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, char **msg, bool is_excp)
+{
+ enum exception excp = (is_excp ? EXCP_CONTEXT : NO_EXCP);
+ enum context ctx = error_context(m, regs);
+ struct severity *s;
+
+ for (s = severities;; s++) {
+ if ((m->status & s->mask) != s->result)
+ continue;
+ if ((m->mcgstatus & s->mcgmask) != s->mcgres)
+ continue;
+ if (s->ser == SER_REQUIRED && !mca_cfg.ser)
+ continue;
+ if (s->ser == NO_SER && mca_cfg.ser)
+ continue;
+ if (s->context && ctx != s->context)
+ continue;
+ if (s->excp && excp != s->excp)
+ continue;
+ if (s->cpu_model && boot_cpu_data.x86_model != s->cpu_model)
+ continue;
+ if (s->cpu_minstepping && boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping < s->cpu_minstepping)
+ continue;
+ if (s->bank_lo && (m->bank < s->bank_lo || m->bank > s->bank_hi))
+ continue;
+ if (msg)
+ *msg = s->msg;
+ s->covered = 1;
+
+ if (s->sev >= MCE_UC_SEVERITY && ctx == IN_KERNEL)
+ return MCE_PANIC_SEVERITY;
+
+ return s->sev;
+ }
+}
+
+int noinstr mce_severity(struct mce *m, struct pt_regs *regs, char **msg, bool is_excp)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ return mce_severity_amd(m, regs, msg, is_excp);
+ else
+ return mce_severity_intel(m, regs, msg, is_excp);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS
+static void *s_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ if (*pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
+ return NULL;
+ return &severities[*pos];
+}
+
+static void *s_next(struct seq_file *f, void *data, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ if (++(*pos) >= ARRAY_SIZE(severities))
+ return NULL;
+ return &severities[*pos];
+}
+
+static void s_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
+{
+}
+
+static int s_show(struct seq_file *f, void *data)
+{
+ struct severity *ser = data;
+ seq_printf(f, "%d\t%s\n", ser->covered, ser->msg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations severities_seq_ops = {
+ .start = s_start,
+ .next = s_next,
+ .stop = s_stop,
+ .show = s_show,
+};
+
+static int severities_coverage_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &severities_seq_ops);
+}
+
+static ssize_t severities_coverage_write(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(severities); i++)
+ severities[i].covered = 0;
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations severities_coverage_fops = {
+ .open = severities_coverage_open,
+ .release = seq_release,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .write = severities_coverage_write,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+};
+
+static int __init severities_debugfs_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *dmce;
+
+ dmce = mce_get_debugfs_dir();
+
+ debugfs_create_file("severities-coverage", 0444, dmce, NULL,
+ &severities_coverage_fops);
+ return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(severities_debugfs_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/threshold.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/threshold.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a059a035
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/threshold.c
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Common corrected MCE threshold handler code:
+ */
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+
+#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/trace/irq_vectors.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+static void default_threshold_interrupt(void)
+{
+ pr_err("Unexpected threshold interrupt at vector %x\n",
+ THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR);
+}
+
+void (*mce_threshold_vector)(void) = default_threshold_interrupt;
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_threshold)
+{
+ trace_threshold_apic_entry(THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR);
+ inc_irq_stat(irq_threshold_count);
+ mce_threshold_vector();
+ trace_threshold_apic_exit(THRESHOLD_APIC_VECTOR);
+ ack_APIC_irq();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/winchip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/winchip.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6c99f2941
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/winchip.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * IDT Winchip specific Machine Check Exception Reporting
+ * (C) Copyright 2002 Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
+ */
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/mce.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* Machine check handler for WinChip C6: */
+noinstr void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ pr_emerg("CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
+ instrumentation_end();
+}
+
+/* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */
+void winchip_mcheck_init(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IDT_FCR1, lo, hi);
+ lo |= (1<<2); /* Enable EIERRINT (int 18 MCE) */
+ lo &= ~(1<<4); /* Enable MCE */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IDT_FCR1, lo, hi);
+
+ cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_MCE);
+
+ pr_info("Winchip machine check reporting enabled on CPU#0.\n");
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..34098d48c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+microcode-y := core.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE) += microcode.o
+microcode-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL) += intel.o
+microcode-$(CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD) += amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9a3092ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/amd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,972 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * AMD CPU Microcode Update Driver for Linux
+ *
+ * This driver allows to upgrade microcode on F10h AMD
+ * CPUs and later.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008-2011 Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
+ * 2013-2018 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+ *
+ * Author: Peter Oruba <peter.oruba@amd.com>
+ *
+ * Based on work by:
+ * Tigran Aivazian <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * early loader:
+ * Copyright (C) 2013 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Jacob Shin <jacob.shin@amd.com>
+ * Fixes: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "microcode: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/earlycpio.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/initrd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+
+#include <asm/microcode_amd.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+static struct equiv_cpu_table {
+ unsigned int num_entries;
+ struct equiv_cpu_entry *entry;
+} equiv_table;
+
+/*
+ * This points to the current valid container of microcode patches which we will
+ * save from the initrd/builtin before jettisoning its contents. @mc is the
+ * microcode patch we found to match.
+ */
+struct cont_desc {
+ struct microcode_amd *mc;
+ u32 cpuid_1_eax;
+ u32 psize;
+ u8 *data;
+ size_t size;
+};
+
+static u32 ucode_new_rev;
+
+/* One blob per node. */
+static u8 amd_ucode_patch[MAX_NUMNODES][PATCH_MAX_SIZE];
+
+/*
+ * Microcode patch container file is prepended to the initrd in cpio
+ * format. See Documentation/x86/microcode.rst
+ */
+static const char
+ucode_path[] __maybe_unused = "kernel/x86/microcode/AuthenticAMD.bin";
+
+static u16 find_equiv_id(struct equiv_cpu_table *et, u32 sig)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (!et || !et->num_entries)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < et->num_entries; i++) {
+ struct equiv_cpu_entry *e = &et->entry[i];
+
+ if (sig == e->installed_cpu)
+ return e->equiv_cpu;
+
+ e++;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is a valid microcode container file at the beginning
+ * of @buf of size @buf_size. Set @early to use this function in the early path.
+ */
+static bool verify_container(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, bool early)
+{
+ u32 cont_magic;
+
+ if (buf_size <= CONTAINER_HDR_SZ) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Truncated microcode container header.\n");
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ cont_magic = *(const u32 *)buf;
+ if (cont_magic != UCODE_MAGIC) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Invalid magic value (0x%08x).\n", cont_magic);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is a valid, non-truncated CPU equivalence table at the
+ * beginning of @buf of size @buf_size. Set @early to use this function in the
+ * early path.
+ */
+static bool verify_equivalence_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, bool early)
+{
+ const u32 *hdr = (const u32 *)buf;
+ u32 cont_type, equiv_tbl_len;
+
+ if (!verify_container(buf, buf_size, early))
+ return false;
+
+ cont_type = hdr[1];
+ if (cont_type != UCODE_EQUIV_CPU_TABLE_TYPE) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Wrong microcode container equivalence table type: %u.\n",
+ cont_type);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ buf_size -= CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
+
+ equiv_tbl_len = hdr[2];
+ if (equiv_tbl_len < sizeof(struct equiv_cpu_entry) ||
+ buf_size < equiv_tbl_len) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Truncated equivalence table.\n");
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether there is a valid, non-truncated microcode patch section at the
+ * beginning of @buf of size @buf_size. Set @early to use this function in the
+ * early path.
+ *
+ * On success, @sh_psize returns the patch size according to the section header,
+ * to the caller.
+ */
+static bool
+__verify_patch_section(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *sh_psize, bool early)
+{
+ u32 p_type, p_size;
+ const u32 *hdr;
+
+ if (buf_size < SECTION_HDR_SIZE) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Truncated patch section.\n");
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ hdr = (const u32 *)buf;
+ p_type = hdr[0];
+ p_size = hdr[1];
+
+ if (p_type != UCODE_UCODE_TYPE) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Invalid type field (0x%x) in container file section header.\n",
+ p_type);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (p_size < sizeof(struct microcode_header_amd)) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Patch of size %u too short.\n", p_size);
+
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *sh_psize = p_size;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the passed remaining file @buf_size is large enough to contain
+ * a patch of the indicated @sh_psize (and also whether this size does not
+ * exceed the per-family maximum). @sh_psize is the size read from the section
+ * header.
+ */
+static unsigned int __verify_patch_size(u8 family, u32 sh_psize, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ u32 max_size;
+
+ if (family >= 0x15)
+ return min_t(u32, sh_psize, buf_size);
+
+#define F1XH_MPB_MAX_SIZE 2048
+#define F14H_MPB_MAX_SIZE 1824
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case 0x10 ... 0x12:
+ max_size = F1XH_MPB_MAX_SIZE;
+ break;
+ case 0x14:
+ max_size = F14H_MPB_MAX_SIZE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN(1, "%s: WTF family: 0x%x\n", __func__, family);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sh_psize > min_t(u32, buf_size, max_size))
+ return 0;
+
+ return sh_psize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the patch in @buf.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * negative: on error
+ * positive: patch is not for this family, skip it
+ * 0: success
+ */
+static int
+verify_patch(u8 family, const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size, u32 *patch_size, bool early)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_amd *mc_hdr;
+ unsigned int ret;
+ u32 sh_psize;
+ u16 proc_id;
+ u8 patch_fam;
+
+ if (!__verify_patch_section(buf, buf_size, &sh_psize, early))
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * The section header length is not included in this indicated size
+ * but is present in the leftover file length so we need to subtract
+ * it before passing this value to the function below.
+ */
+ buf_size -= SECTION_HDR_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the remaining buffer is big enough to contain a patch of
+ * size sh_psize, as the section claims.
+ */
+ if (buf_size < sh_psize) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Patch of size %u truncated.\n", sh_psize);
+
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = __verify_patch_size(family, sh_psize, buf_size);
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_debug("Per-family patch size mismatch.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ *patch_size = sh_psize;
+
+ mc_hdr = (struct microcode_header_amd *)(buf + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
+ if (mc_hdr->nb_dev_id || mc_hdr->sb_dev_id) {
+ if (!early)
+ pr_err("Patch-ID 0x%08x: chipset-specific code unsupported.\n", mc_hdr->patch_id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ proc_id = mc_hdr->processor_rev_id;
+ patch_fam = 0xf + (proc_id >> 12);
+ if (patch_fam != family)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This scans the ucode blob for the proper container as we can have multiple
+ * containers glued together. Returns the equivalence ID from the equivalence
+ * table or 0 if none found.
+ * Returns the amount of bytes consumed while scanning. @desc contains all the
+ * data we're going to use in later stages of the application.
+ */
+static size_t parse_container(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
+{
+ struct equiv_cpu_table table;
+ size_t orig_size = size;
+ u32 *hdr = (u32 *)ucode;
+ u16 eq_id;
+ u8 *buf;
+
+ if (!verify_equivalence_table(ucode, size, true))
+ return 0;
+
+ buf = ucode;
+
+ table.entry = (struct equiv_cpu_entry *)(buf + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ);
+ table.num_entries = hdr[2] / sizeof(struct equiv_cpu_entry);
+
+ /*
+ * Find the equivalence ID of our CPU in this table. Even if this table
+ * doesn't contain a patch for the CPU, scan through the whole container
+ * so that it can be skipped in case there are other containers appended.
+ */
+ eq_id = find_equiv_id(&table, desc->cpuid_1_eax);
+
+ buf += hdr[2] + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
+ size -= hdr[2] + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
+
+ /*
+ * Scan through the rest of the container to find where it ends. We do
+ * some basic sanity-checking too.
+ */
+ while (size > 0) {
+ struct microcode_amd *mc;
+ u32 patch_size;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_patch(x86_family(desc->cpuid_1_eax), buf, size, &patch_size, true);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * Patch verification failed, skip to the next
+ * container, if there's one:
+ */
+ goto out;
+ } else if (ret > 0) {
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ mc = (struct microcode_amd *)(buf + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
+ if (eq_id == mc->hdr.processor_rev_id) {
+ desc->psize = patch_size;
+ desc->mc = mc;
+ }
+
+skip:
+ /* Skip patch section header too: */
+ buf += patch_size + SECTION_HDR_SIZE;
+ size -= patch_size + SECTION_HDR_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we have found a patch (desc->mc), it means we're looking at the
+ * container which has a patch for this CPU so return 0 to mean, @ucode
+ * already points to the proper container. Otherwise, we return the size
+ * we scanned so that we can advance to the next container in the
+ * buffer.
+ */
+ if (desc->mc) {
+ desc->data = ucode;
+ desc->size = orig_size - size;
+
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return orig_size - size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Scan the ucode blob for the proper container as we can have multiple
+ * containers glued together.
+ */
+static void scan_containers(u8 *ucode, size_t size, struct cont_desc *desc)
+{
+ while (size) {
+ size_t s = parse_container(ucode, size, desc);
+ if (!s)
+ return;
+
+ /* catch wraparound */
+ if (size >= s) {
+ ucode += s;
+ size -= s;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int __apply_microcode_amd(struct microcode_amd *mc)
+{
+ u32 rev, dummy;
+
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LOADER, (u64)(long)&mc->hdr.data_code);
+
+ /* verify patch application was successful */
+ native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+ if (rev != mc->hdr.patch_id)
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Early load occurs before we can vmalloc(). So we look for the microcode
+ * patch container file in initrd, traverse equivalent cpu table, look for a
+ * matching microcode patch, and update, all in initrd memory in place.
+ * When vmalloc() is available for use later -- on 64-bit during first AP load,
+ * and on 32-bit during save_microcode_in_initrd_amd() -- we can call
+ * load_microcode_amd() to save equivalent cpu table and microcode patches in
+ * kernel heap memory.
+ *
+ * Returns true if container found (sets @desc), false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool
+apply_microcode_early_amd(u32 cpuid_1_eax, void *ucode, size_t size, bool save_patch)
+{
+ struct cont_desc desc = { 0 };
+ u8 (*patch)[PATCH_MAX_SIZE];
+ struct microcode_amd *mc;
+ u32 rev, dummy, *new_rev;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ new_rev = (u32 *)__pa_nodebug(&ucode_new_rev);
+ patch = (u8 (*)[PATCH_MAX_SIZE])__pa_nodebug(&amd_ucode_patch);
+#else
+ new_rev = &ucode_new_rev;
+ patch = &amd_ucode_patch[0];
+#endif
+
+ desc.cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax;
+
+ scan_containers(ucode, size, &desc);
+
+ mc = desc.mc;
+ if (!mc)
+ return ret;
+
+ native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow application of the same revision to pick up SMT-specific
+ * changes even if the revision of the other SMT thread is already
+ * up-to-date.
+ */
+ if (rev > mc->hdr.patch_id)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc)) {
+ *new_rev = mc->hdr.patch_id;
+ ret = true;
+
+ if (save_patch)
+ memcpy(patch, mc, min_t(u32, desc.psize, PATCH_MAX_SIZE));
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static bool get_builtin_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp, unsigned int family)
+{
+ char fw_name[36] = "amd-ucode/microcode_amd.bin";
+ struct firmware fw;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ return false;
+
+ if (family >= 0x15)
+ snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name),
+ "amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam%.2xh.bin", family);
+
+ if (firmware_request_builtin(&fw, fw_name)) {
+ cp->size = fw.size;
+ cp->data = (void *)fw.data;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static void __load_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax, struct cpio_data *ret)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci;
+ struct cpio_data cp;
+ const char *path;
+ bool use_pa;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+ uci = (struct ucode_cpu_info *)__pa_nodebug(ucode_cpu_info);
+ path = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(ucode_path);
+ use_pa = true;
+ } else {
+ uci = ucode_cpu_info;
+ path = ucode_path;
+ use_pa = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!get_builtin_microcode(&cp, x86_family(cpuid_1_eax)))
+ cp = find_microcode_in_initrd(path, use_pa);
+
+ /* Needed in load_microcode_amd() */
+ uci->cpu_sig.sig = cpuid_1_eax;
+
+ *ret = cp;
+}
+
+void __init load_ucode_amd_bsp(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax)
+{
+ struct cpio_data cp = { };
+
+ __load_ucode_amd(cpuid_1_eax, &cp);
+ if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+ return;
+
+ apply_microcode_early_amd(cpuid_1_eax, cp.data, cp.size, true);
+}
+
+void load_ucode_amd_ap(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax)
+{
+ struct microcode_amd *mc;
+ struct cpio_data cp;
+ u32 *new_rev, rev, dummy;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+ mc = (struct microcode_amd *)__pa_nodebug(amd_ucode_patch);
+ new_rev = (u32 *)__pa_nodebug(&ucode_new_rev);
+ } else {
+ mc = (struct microcode_amd *)amd_ucode_patch;
+ new_rev = &ucode_new_rev;
+ }
+
+ native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether a new patch has been saved already. Also, allow application of
+ * the same revision in order to pick up SMT-thread-specific configuration even
+ * if the sibling SMT thread already has an up-to-date revision.
+ */
+ if (*new_rev && rev <= mc->hdr.patch_id) {
+ if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc)) {
+ *new_rev = mc->hdr.patch_id;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ __load_ucode_amd(cpuid_1_eax, &cp);
+ if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+ return;
+
+ apply_microcode_early_amd(cpuid_1_eax, cp.data, cp.size, false);
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size);
+
+int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(unsigned int cpuid_1_eax)
+{
+ struct cont_desc desc = { 0 };
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+ struct cpio_data cp;
+
+ cp = find_microcode_in_initrd(ucode_path, false);
+ if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ desc.cpuid_1_eax = cpuid_1_eax;
+
+ scan_containers(cp.data, cp.size, &desc);
+ if (!desc.mc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = load_microcode_amd(x86_family(cpuid_1_eax), desc.data, desc.size);
+ if (ret > UCODE_UPDATED)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void reload_ucode_amd(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u32 rev, dummy __always_unused;
+ struct microcode_amd *mc;
+
+ mc = (struct microcode_amd *)amd_ucode_patch[cpu_to_node(cpu)];
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+
+ if (rev < mc->hdr.patch_id) {
+ if (!__apply_microcode_amd(mc)) {
+ ucode_new_rev = mc->hdr.patch_id;
+ pr_info("reload patch_level=0x%08x\n", ucode_new_rev);
+ }
+ }
+}
+static u16 __find_equiv_id(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+ return find_equiv_id(&equiv_table, uci->cpu_sig.sig);
+}
+
+/*
+ * a small, trivial cache of per-family ucode patches
+ */
+static struct ucode_patch *cache_find_patch(u16 equiv_cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist)
+ if (p->equiv_cpu == equiv_cpu)
+ return p;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void update_cache(struct ucode_patch *new_patch)
+{
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist) {
+ if (p->equiv_cpu == new_patch->equiv_cpu) {
+ if (p->patch_id >= new_patch->patch_id) {
+ /* we already have the latest patch */
+ kfree(new_patch->data);
+ kfree(new_patch);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_replace(&p->plist, &new_patch->plist);
+ kfree(p->data);
+ kfree(p);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ /* no patch found, add it */
+ list_add_tail(&new_patch->plist, &microcode_cache);
+}
+
+static void free_cache(void)
+{
+ struct ucode_patch *p, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &microcode_cache, plist) {
+ __list_del(p->plist.prev, p->plist.next);
+ kfree(p->data);
+ kfree(p);
+ }
+}
+
+static struct ucode_patch *find_patch(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ u16 equiv_id;
+
+ equiv_id = __find_equiv_id(cpu);
+ if (!equiv_id)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return cache_find_patch(equiv_id);
+}
+
+static int collect_cpu_info_amd(int cpu, struct cpu_signature *csig)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+
+ csig->sig = cpuid_eax(0x00000001);
+ csig->rev = c->microcode;
+
+ /*
+ * a patch could have been loaded early, set uci->mc so that
+ * mc_bp_resume() can call apply_microcode()
+ */
+ p = find_patch(cpu);
+ if (p && (p->patch_id == csig->rev))
+ uci->mc = p->data;
+
+ pr_info("CPU%d: patch_level=0x%08x\n", cpu, csig->rev);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state apply_microcode_amd(int cpu)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ struct microcode_amd *mc_amd;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci;
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+ u32 rev, dummy __always_unused;
+
+ BUG_ON(raw_smp_processor_id() != cpu);
+
+ uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+
+ p = find_patch(cpu);
+ if (!p)
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
+ mc_amd = p->data;
+ uci->mc = p->data;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, rev, dummy);
+
+ /* need to apply patch? */
+ if (rev > mc_amd->hdr.patch_id) {
+ ret = UCODE_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (__apply_microcode_amd(mc_amd)) {
+ pr_err("CPU%d: update failed for patch_level=0x%08x\n",
+ cpu, mc_amd->hdr.patch_id);
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ rev = mc_amd->hdr.patch_id;
+ ret = UCODE_UPDATED;
+
+ pr_info("CPU%d: new patch_level=0x%08x\n", cpu, rev);
+
+out:
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev = rev;
+ c->microcode = rev;
+
+ /* Update boot_cpu_data's revision too, if we're on the BSP: */
+ if (c->cpu_index == boot_cpu_data.cpu_index)
+ boot_cpu_data.microcode = rev;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static size_t install_equiv_cpu_table(const u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)
+{
+ u32 equiv_tbl_len;
+ const u32 *hdr;
+
+ if (!verify_equivalence_table(buf, buf_size, false))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr = (const u32 *)buf;
+ equiv_tbl_len = hdr[2];
+
+ equiv_table.entry = vmalloc(equiv_tbl_len);
+ if (!equiv_table.entry) {
+ pr_err("failed to allocate equivalent CPU table\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(equiv_table.entry, buf + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ, equiv_tbl_len);
+ equiv_table.num_entries = equiv_tbl_len / sizeof(struct equiv_cpu_entry);
+
+ /* add header length */
+ return equiv_tbl_len + CONTAINER_HDR_SZ;
+}
+
+static void free_equiv_cpu_table(void)
+{
+ vfree(equiv_table.entry);
+ memset(&equiv_table, 0, sizeof(equiv_table));
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ free_equiv_cpu_table();
+ free_cache();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return a non-negative value even if some of the checks failed so that
+ * we can skip over the next patch. If we return a negative value, we
+ * signal a grave error like a memory allocation has failed and the
+ * driver cannot continue functioning normally. In such cases, we tear
+ * down everything we've used up so far and exit.
+ */
+static int verify_and_add_patch(u8 family, u8 *fw, unsigned int leftover,
+ unsigned int *patch_size)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_amd *mc_hdr;
+ struct ucode_patch *patch;
+ u16 proc_id;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_patch(family, fw, leftover, patch_size, false);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ patch = kzalloc(sizeof(*patch), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!patch) {
+ pr_err("Patch allocation failure.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ patch->data = kmemdup(fw + SECTION_HDR_SIZE, *patch_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!patch->data) {
+ pr_err("Patch data allocation failure.\n");
+ kfree(patch);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ patch->size = *patch_size;
+
+ mc_hdr = (struct microcode_header_amd *)(fw + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
+ proc_id = mc_hdr->processor_rev_id;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&patch->plist);
+ patch->patch_id = mc_hdr->patch_id;
+ patch->equiv_cpu = proc_id;
+
+ pr_debug("%s: Added patch_id: 0x%08x, proc_id: 0x%04x\n",
+ __func__, patch->patch_id, proc_id);
+
+ /* ... and add to cache. */
+ update_cache(patch);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state __load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ u8 *fw = (u8 *)data;
+ size_t offset;
+
+ offset = install_equiv_cpu_table(data, size);
+ if (!offset)
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+
+ fw += offset;
+ size -= offset;
+
+ if (*(u32 *)fw != UCODE_UCODE_TYPE) {
+ pr_err("invalid type field in container file section header\n");
+ free_equiv_cpu_table();
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ while (size > 0) {
+ unsigned int crnt_size = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = verify_and_add_patch(family, fw, size, &crnt_size);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+
+ fw += crnt_size + SECTION_HDR_SIZE;
+ size -= (crnt_size + SECTION_HDR_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ return UCODE_OK;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state load_microcode_amd(u8 family, const u8 *data, size_t size)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
+ unsigned int nid, cpu;
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+
+ /* free old equiv table */
+ free_equiv_cpu_table();
+
+ ret = __load_microcode_amd(family, data, size);
+ if (ret != UCODE_OK) {
+ cleanup();
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ for_each_node(nid) {
+ cpu = cpumask_first(cpumask_of_node(nid));
+ c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+ p = find_patch(cpu);
+ if (!p)
+ continue;
+
+ if (c->microcode >= p->patch_id)
+ continue;
+
+ ret = UCODE_NEW;
+
+ memset(&amd_ucode_patch[nid], 0, PATCH_MAX_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&amd_ucode_patch[nid], p->data, min_t(u32, p->size, PATCH_MAX_SIZE));
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * AMD microcode firmware naming convention, up to family 15h they are in
+ * the legacy file:
+ *
+ * amd-ucode/microcode_amd.bin
+ *
+ * This legacy file is always smaller than 2K in size.
+ *
+ * Beginning with family 15h, they are in family-specific firmware files:
+ *
+ * amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam15h.bin
+ * amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam16h.bin
+ * ...
+ *
+ * These might be larger than 2K.
+ */
+static enum ucode_state request_microcode_amd(int cpu, struct device *device,
+ bool refresh_fw)
+{
+ char fw_name[36] = "amd-ucode/microcode_amd.bin";
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ enum ucode_state ret = UCODE_NFOUND;
+ const struct firmware *fw;
+
+ /* reload ucode container only on the boot cpu */
+ if (!refresh_fw)
+ return UCODE_OK;
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x15)
+ snprintf(fw_name, sizeof(fw_name), "amd-ucode/microcode_amd_fam%.2xh.bin", c->x86);
+
+ if (request_firmware_direct(&fw, (const char *)fw_name, device)) {
+ pr_debug("failed to load file %s\n", fw_name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = UCODE_ERROR;
+ if (!verify_container(fw->data, fw->size, false))
+ goto fw_release;
+
+ ret = load_microcode_amd(c->x86, fw->data, fw->size);
+
+ fw_release:
+ release_firmware(fw);
+
+ out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void microcode_fini_cpu_amd(int cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+
+ uci->mc = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct microcode_ops microcode_amd_ops = {
+ .request_microcode_fw = request_microcode_amd,
+ .collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info_amd,
+ .apply_microcode = apply_microcode_amd,
+ .microcode_fini_cpu = microcode_fini_cpu_amd,
+};
+
+struct microcode_ops * __init init_amd_microcode(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD || c->x86 < 0x10) {
+ pr_warn("AMD CPU family 0x%x not supported\n", c->x86);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (ucode_new_rev)
+ pr_info_once("microcode updated early to new patch_level=0x%08x\n",
+ ucode_new_rev);
+
+ return &microcode_amd_ops;
+}
+
+void __exit exit_amd_microcode(void)
+{
+ cleanup();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9e02648e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,810 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * CPU Microcode Update Driver for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2006 Tigran Aivazian <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
+ * 2006 Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
+ * 2013-2016 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+ *
+ * X86 CPU microcode early update for Linux:
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+ * H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
+ * (C) 2015 Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
+ *
+ * This driver allows to upgrade microcode on x86 processors.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "microcode: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/microcode_amd.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+#include <asm/microcode.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+
+#define DRIVER_VERSION "2.2"
+
+static struct microcode_ops *microcode_ops;
+static bool dis_ucode_ldr = true;
+
+bool initrd_gone;
+
+LIST_HEAD(microcode_cache);
+
+/*
+ * Synchronization.
+ *
+ * All non cpu-hotplug-callback call sites use:
+ *
+ * - microcode_mutex to synchronize with each other;
+ * - cpus_read_lock/unlock() to synchronize with
+ * the cpu-hotplug-callback call sites.
+ *
+ * We guarantee that only a single cpu is being
+ * updated at any particular moment of time.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(microcode_mutex);
+
+struct ucode_cpu_info ucode_cpu_info[NR_CPUS];
+
+struct cpu_info_ctx {
+ struct cpu_signature *cpu_sig;
+ int err;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Those patch levels cannot be updated to newer ones and thus should be final.
+ */
+static u32 final_levels[] = {
+ 0x01000098,
+ 0x0100009f,
+ 0x010000af,
+ 0, /* T-101 terminator */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Check the current patch level on this CPU.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * - true: if update should stop
+ * - false: otherwise
+ */
+static bool amd_check_current_patch_level(void)
+{
+ u32 lvl, dummy, i;
+ u32 *levels;
+
+ native_rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_PATCH_LEVEL, lvl, dummy);
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ levels = (u32 *)__pa_nodebug(&final_levels);
+ else
+ levels = final_levels;
+
+ for (i = 0; levels[i]; i++) {
+ if (lvl == levels[i])
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool __init check_loader_disabled_bsp(void)
+{
+ static const char *__dis_opt_str = "dis_ucode_ldr";
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ const char *cmdline = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(boot_command_line);
+ const char *option = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(__dis_opt_str);
+ bool *res = (bool *)__pa_nodebug(&dis_ucode_ldr);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+ const char *cmdline = boot_command_line;
+ const char *option = __dis_opt_str;
+ bool *res = &dis_ucode_ldr;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * CPUID(1).ECX[31]: reserved for hypervisor use. This is still not
+ * completely accurate as xen pv guests don't see that CPUID bit set but
+ * that's good enough as they don't land on the BSP path anyway.
+ */
+ if (native_cpuid_ecx(1) & BIT(31))
+ return *res;
+
+ if (x86_cpuid_vendor() == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
+ if (amd_check_current_patch_level())
+ return *res;
+ }
+
+ if (cmdline_find_option_bool(cmdline, option) <= 0)
+ *res = false;
+
+ return *res;
+}
+
+void __init load_ucode_bsp(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cpuid_1_eax;
+ bool intel = true;
+
+ if (!have_cpuid_p())
+ return;
+
+ cpuid_1_eax = native_cpuid_eax(1);
+
+ switch (x86_cpuid_vendor()) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (x86_family(cpuid_1_eax) < 6)
+ return;
+ break;
+
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (x86_family(cpuid_1_eax) < 0x10)
+ return;
+ intel = false;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (check_loader_disabled_bsp())
+ return;
+
+ if (intel)
+ load_ucode_intel_bsp();
+ else
+ load_ucode_amd_bsp(cpuid_1_eax);
+}
+
+static bool check_loader_disabled_ap(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ return *((bool *)__pa_nodebug(&dis_ucode_ldr));
+#else
+ return dis_ucode_ldr;
+#endif
+}
+
+void load_ucode_ap(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cpuid_1_eax;
+
+ if (check_loader_disabled_ap())
+ return;
+
+ cpuid_1_eax = native_cpuid_eax(1);
+
+ switch (x86_cpuid_vendor()) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (x86_family(cpuid_1_eax) >= 6)
+ load_ucode_intel_ap();
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (x86_family(cpuid_1_eax) >= 0x10)
+ load_ucode_amd_ap(cpuid_1_eax);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init save_microcode_in_initrd(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ switch (c->x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (c->x86 >= 6)
+ ret = save_microcode_in_initrd_intel();
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x10)
+ ret = save_microcode_in_initrd_amd(cpuid_eax(1));
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ initrd_gone = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct cpio_data find_microcode_in_initrd(const char *path, bool use_pa)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD
+ unsigned long start = 0;
+ size_t size;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ struct boot_params *params;
+
+ if (use_pa)
+ params = (struct boot_params *)__pa_nodebug(&boot_params);
+ else
+ params = &boot_params;
+
+ size = params->hdr.ramdisk_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Set start only if we have an initrd image. We cannot use initrd_start
+ * because it is not set that early yet.
+ */
+ if (size)
+ start = params->hdr.ramdisk_image;
+
+# else /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
+ size = (unsigned long)boot_params.ext_ramdisk_size << 32;
+ size |= boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_size;
+
+ if (size) {
+ start = (unsigned long)boot_params.ext_ramdisk_image << 32;
+ start |= boot_params.hdr.ramdisk_image;
+
+ start += PAGE_OFFSET;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * Fixup the start address: after reserve_initrd() runs, initrd_start
+ * has the virtual address of the beginning of the initrd. It also
+ * possibly relocates the ramdisk. In either case, initrd_start contains
+ * the updated address so use that instead.
+ *
+ * initrd_gone is for the hotplug case where we've thrown out initrd
+ * already.
+ */
+ if (!use_pa) {
+ if (initrd_gone)
+ return (struct cpio_data){ NULL, 0, "" };
+ if (initrd_start)
+ start = initrd_start;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The picture with physical addresses is a bit different: we
+ * need to get the *physical* address to which the ramdisk was
+ * relocated, i.e., relocated_ramdisk (not initrd_start) and
+ * since we're running from physical addresses, we need to access
+ * relocated_ramdisk through its *physical* address too.
+ */
+ u64 *rr = (u64 *)__pa_nodebug(&relocated_ramdisk);
+ if (*rr)
+ start = *rr;
+ }
+
+ return find_cpio_data(path, (void *)start, size, NULL);
+#else /* !CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD */
+ return (struct cpio_data){ NULL, 0, "" };
+#endif
+}
+
+void reload_early_microcode(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ int vendor, family;
+
+ vendor = x86_cpuid_vendor();
+ family = x86_cpuid_family();
+
+ switch (vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (family >= 6)
+ reload_ucode_intel();
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (family >= 0x10)
+ reload_ucode_amd(cpu);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static void collect_cpu_info_local(void *arg)
+{
+ struct cpu_info_ctx *ctx = arg;
+
+ ctx->err = microcode_ops->collect_cpu_info(smp_processor_id(),
+ ctx->cpu_sig);
+}
+
+static int collect_cpu_info_on_target(int cpu, struct cpu_signature *cpu_sig)
+{
+ struct cpu_info_ctx ctx = { .cpu_sig = cpu_sig, .err = 0 };
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu, collect_cpu_info_local, &ctx, 1);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = ctx.err;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int collect_cpu_info(int cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(uci, 0, sizeof(*uci));
+
+ ret = collect_cpu_info_on_target(cpu, &uci->cpu_sig);
+ if (!ret)
+ uci->valid = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void apply_microcode_local(void *arg)
+{
+ enum ucode_state *err = arg;
+
+ *err = microcode_ops->apply_microcode(smp_processor_id());
+}
+
+static int apply_microcode_on_target(int cpu)
+{
+ enum ucode_state err;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = smp_call_function_single(cpu, apply_microcode_local, &err, 1);
+ if (!ret) {
+ if (err == UCODE_ERROR)
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* fake device for request_firmware */
+static struct platform_device *microcode_pdev;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
+/*
+ * Late loading dance. Why the heavy-handed stomp_machine effort?
+ *
+ * - HT siblings must be idle and not execute other code while the other sibling
+ * is loading microcode in order to avoid any negative interactions caused by
+ * the loading.
+ *
+ * - In addition, microcode update on the cores must be serialized until this
+ * requirement can be relaxed in the future. Right now, this is conservative
+ * and good.
+ */
+#define SPINUNIT 100 /* 100 nsec */
+
+static int check_online_cpus(void)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure all CPUs are online. It's fine for SMT to be disabled if
+ * all the primary threads are still online.
+ */
+ for_each_present_cpu(cpu) {
+ if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu) && !cpu_online(cpu)) {
+ pr_err("Not all CPUs online, aborting microcode update.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static atomic_t late_cpus_in;
+static atomic_t late_cpus_out;
+
+static int __wait_for_cpus(atomic_t *t, long long timeout)
+{
+ int all_cpus = num_online_cpus();
+
+ atomic_inc(t);
+
+ while (atomic_read(t) < all_cpus) {
+ if (timeout < SPINUNIT) {
+ pr_err("Timeout while waiting for CPUs rendezvous, remaining: %d\n",
+ all_cpus - atomic_read(t));
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ndelay(SPINUNIT);
+ timeout -= SPINUNIT;
+
+ touch_nmi_watchdog();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns:
+ * < 0 - on error
+ * 0 - success (no update done or microcode was updated)
+ */
+static int __reload_late(void *info)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ enum ucode_state err;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Wait for all CPUs to arrive. A load will not be attempted unless all
+ * CPUs show up.
+ * */
+ if (__wait_for_cpus(&late_cpus_in, NSEC_PER_SEC))
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * On an SMT system, it suffices to load the microcode on one sibling of
+ * the core because the microcode engine is shared between the threads.
+ * Synchronization still needs to take place so that no concurrent
+ * loading attempts happen on multiple threads of an SMT core. See
+ * below.
+ */
+ if (cpumask_first(topology_sibling_cpumask(cpu)) == cpu)
+ apply_microcode_local(&err);
+ else
+ goto wait_for_siblings;
+
+ if (err >= UCODE_NFOUND) {
+ if (err == UCODE_ERROR)
+ pr_warn("Error reloading microcode on CPU %d\n", cpu);
+
+ ret = -1;
+ }
+
+wait_for_siblings:
+ if (__wait_for_cpus(&late_cpus_out, NSEC_PER_SEC))
+ panic("Timeout during microcode update!\n");
+
+ /*
+ * At least one thread has completed update on each core.
+ * For others, simply call the update to make sure the
+ * per-cpu cpuinfo can be updated with right microcode
+ * revision.
+ */
+ if (cpumask_first(topology_sibling_cpumask(cpu)) != cpu)
+ apply_microcode_local(&err);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reload microcode late on all CPUs. Wait for a sec until they
+ * all gather together.
+ */
+static int microcode_reload_late(void)
+{
+ int old = boot_cpu_data.microcode, ret;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 prev_info;
+
+ pr_err("Attempting late microcode loading - it is dangerous and taints the kernel.\n");
+ pr_err("You should switch to early loading, if possible.\n");
+
+ atomic_set(&late_cpus_in, 0);
+ atomic_set(&late_cpus_out, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Take a snapshot before the microcode update in order to compare and
+ * check whether any bits changed after an update.
+ */
+ store_cpu_caps(&prev_info);
+
+ ret = stop_machine_cpuslocked(__reload_late, NULL, cpu_online_mask);
+ if (!ret) {
+ pr_info("Reload succeeded, microcode revision: 0x%x -> 0x%x\n",
+ old, boot_cpu_data.microcode);
+ microcode_check(&prev_info);
+ } else {
+ pr_info("Reload failed, current microcode revision: 0x%x\n",
+ boot_cpu_data.microcode);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t reload_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+ enum ucode_state tmp_ret = UCODE_OK;
+ int bsp = boot_cpu_data.cpu_index;
+ unsigned long val;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+
+ ret = kstrtoul(buf, 0, &val);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (val != 1)
+ return size;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+
+ ret = check_online_cpus();
+ if (ret)
+ goto put;
+
+ tmp_ret = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(bsp, &microcode_pdev->dev, true);
+ if (tmp_ret != UCODE_NEW)
+ goto put;
+
+ mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
+ ret = microcode_reload_late();
+ mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
+
+put:
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = size;
+
+ add_taint(TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR_WO(reload);
+#endif
+
+static ssize_t version_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + dev->id;
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", uci->cpu_sig.rev);
+}
+
+static ssize_t pf_show(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + dev->id;
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "0x%x\n", uci->cpu_sig.pf);
+}
+
+static DEVICE_ATTR(version, 0444, version_show, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(processor_flags, 0444, pf_show, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *mc_default_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_version.attr,
+ &dev_attr_processor_flags.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group mc_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = mc_default_attrs,
+ .name = "microcode",
+};
+
+static void microcode_fini_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+ if (microcode_ops->microcode_fini_cpu)
+ microcode_ops->microcode_fini_cpu(cpu);
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state microcode_resume_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+ if (apply_microcode_on_target(cpu))
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+
+ pr_debug("CPU%d updated upon resume\n", cpu);
+
+ return UCODE_OK;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state microcode_init_cpu(int cpu, bool refresh_fw)
+{
+ enum ucode_state ustate;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+
+ if (uci->valid)
+ return UCODE_OK;
+
+ if (collect_cpu_info(cpu))
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+
+ /* --dimm. Trigger a delayed update? */
+ if (system_state != SYSTEM_RUNNING)
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
+ ustate = microcode_ops->request_microcode_fw(cpu, &microcode_pdev->dev, refresh_fw);
+ if (ustate == UCODE_NEW) {
+ pr_debug("CPU%d updated upon init\n", cpu);
+ apply_microcode_on_target(cpu);
+ }
+
+ return ustate;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state microcode_update_cpu(int cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+
+ /* Refresh CPU microcode revision after resume. */
+ collect_cpu_info(cpu);
+
+ if (uci->valid)
+ return microcode_resume_cpu(cpu);
+
+ return microcode_init_cpu(cpu, false);
+}
+
+static int mc_device_add(struct device *dev, struct subsys_interface *sif)
+{
+ int err, cpu = dev->id;
+
+ if (!cpu_online(cpu))
+ return 0;
+
+ pr_debug("CPU%d added\n", cpu);
+
+ err = sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &mc_attr_group);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (microcode_init_cpu(cpu, true) == UCODE_ERROR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void mc_device_remove(struct device *dev, struct subsys_interface *sif)
+{
+ int cpu = dev->id;
+
+ if (!cpu_online(cpu))
+ return;
+
+ pr_debug("CPU%d removed\n", cpu);
+ microcode_fini_cpu(cpu);
+ sysfs_remove_group(&dev->kobj, &mc_attr_group);
+}
+
+static struct subsys_interface mc_cpu_interface = {
+ .name = "microcode",
+ .subsys = &cpu_subsys,
+ .add_dev = mc_device_add,
+ .remove_dev = mc_device_remove,
+};
+
+/**
+ * microcode_bsp_resume - Update boot CPU microcode during resume.
+ */
+void microcode_bsp_resume(void)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+
+ if (uci->valid && uci->mc)
+ microcode_ops->apply_microcode(cpu);
+ else if (!uci->mc)
+ reload_early_microcode(cpu);
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops mc_syscore_ops = {
+ .resume = microcode_bsp_resume,
+};
+
+static int mc_cpu_starting(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ microcode_update_cpu(cpu);
+ pr_debug("CPU%d added\n", cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mc_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+ if (sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &mc_attr_group))
+ pr_err("Failed to create group for CPU%d\n", cpu);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mc_cpu_down_prep(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *dev;
+
+ dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+ /* Suspend is in progress, only remove the interface */
+ sysfs_remove_group(&dev->kobj, &mc_attr_group);
+ pr_debug("CPU%d removed\n", cpu);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct attribute *cpu_root_microcode_attrs[] = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_MICROCODE_LATE_LOADING
+ &dev_attr_reload.attr,
+#endif
+ NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpu_root_microcode_group = {
+ .name = "microcode",
+ .attrs = cpu_root_microcode_attrs,
+};
+
+static int __init microcode_init(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+ int error;
+
+ if (dis_ucode_ldr)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ microcode_ops = init_intel_microcode();
+ else if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ microcode_ops = init_amd_microcode();
+ else
+ pr_err("no support for this CPU vendor\n");
+
+ if (!microcode_ops)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ microcode_pdev = platform_device_register_simple("microcode", -1,
+ NULL, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(microcode_pdev))
+ return PTR_ERR(microcode_pdev);
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
+ error = subsys_interface_register(&mc_cpu_interface);
+ mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+ if (error)
+ goto out_pdev;
+
+ error = sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+ &cpu_root_microcode_group);
+
+ if (error) {
+ pr_err("Error creating microcode group!\n");
+ goto out_driver;
+ }
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&mc_syscore_ops);
+ cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_MICROCODE_LOADER, "x86/microcode:starting",
+ mc_cpu_starting, NULL);
+ cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/microcode:online",
+ mc_cpu_online, mc_cpu_down_prep);
+
+ pr_info("Microcode Update Driver: v%s.", DRIVER_VERSION);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ out_driver:
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&microcode_mutex);
+
+ subsys_interface_unregister(&mc_cpu_interface);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&microcode_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+
+ out_pdev:
+ platform_device_unregister(microcode_pdev);
+ return error;
+
+}
+fs_initcall(save_microcode_in_initrd);
+late_initcall(microcode_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1def66118
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/microcode/intel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Intel CPU Microcode Update Driver for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2006 Tigran Aivazian <aivazian.tigran@gmail.com>
+ * 2006 Shaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
+ *
+ * Intel CPU microcode early update for Linux
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+ * H Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This needs to be before all headers so that pr_debug in printk.h doesn't turn
+ * printk calls into no_printk().
+ *
+ *#define DEBUG
+ */
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "microcode: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/earlycpio.h>
+#include <linux/firmware.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/initrd.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/microcode_intel.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+static const char ucode_path[] = "kernel/x86/microcode/GenuineIntel.bin";
+
+/* Current microcode patch used in early patching on the APs. */
+static struct microcode_intel *intel_ucode_patch;
+
+/* last level cache size per core */
+static int llc_size_per_core;
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if update has been found, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int find_matching_signature(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr = mc;
+ struct extended_sigtable *ext_hdr;
+ struct extended_signature *ext_sig;
+ int i;
+
+ if (intel_cpu_signatures_match(csig, cpf, mc_hdr->sig, mc_hdr->pf))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* Look for ext. headers: */
+ if (get_totalsize(mc_hdr) <= get_datasize(mc_hdr) + MC_HEADER_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+
+ ext_hdr = mc + get_datasize(mc_hdr) + MC_HEADER_SIZE;
+ ext_sig = (void *)ext_hdr + EXT_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ext_hdr->count; i++) {
+ if (intel_cpu_signatures_match(csig, cpf, ext_sig->sig, ext_sig->pf))
+ return 1;
+ ext_sig++;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if update has been found, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int has_newer_microcode(void *mc, unsigned int csig, int cpf, int new_rev)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr = mc;
+
+ if (mc_hdr->rev <= new_rev)
+ return 0;
+
+ return find_matching_signature(mc, csig, cpf);
+}
+
+static struct ucode_patch *memdup_patch(void *data, unsigned int size)
+{
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+
+ p = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ucode_patch), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ return NULL;
+
+ p->data = kmemdup(data, size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->data) {
+ kfree(p);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return p;
+}
+
+static void save_microcode_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, void *data, unsigned int size)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_hdr, *mc_saved_hdr;
+ struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp, *p = NULL;
+ bool prev_found = false;
+ unsigned int sig, pf;
+
+ mc_hdr = (struct microcode_header_intel *)data;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(iter, tmp, &microcode_cache, plist) {
+ mc_saved_hdr = (struct microcode_header_intel *)iter->data;
+ sig = mc_saved_hdr->sig;
+ pf = mc_saved_hdr->pf;
+
+ if (find_matching_signature(data, sig, pf)) {
+ prev_found = true;
+
+ if (mc_hdr->rev <= mc_saved_hdr->rev)
+ continue;
+
+ p = memdup_patch(data, size);
+ if (!p)
+ pr_err("Error allocating buffer %p\n", data);
+ else {
+ list_replace(&iter->plist, &p->plist);
+ kfree(iter->data);
+ kfree(iter);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * There weren't any previous patches found in the list cache; save the
+ * newly found.
+ */
+ if (!prev_found) {
+ p = memdup_patch(data, size);
+ if (!p)
+ pr_err("Error allocating buffer for %p\n", data);
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&p->plist, &microcode_cache);
+ }
+
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+
+ if (!find_matching_signature(p->data, uci->cpu_sig.sig, uci->cpu_sig.pf))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Save for early loading. On 32-bit, that needs to be a physical
+ * address as the APs are running from physical addresses, before
+ * paging has been enabled.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ intel_ucode_patch = (struct microcode_intel *)__pa_nodebug(p->data);
+ else
+ intel_ucode_patch = p->data;
+}
+
+static int microcode_sanity_check(void *mc, int print_err)
+{
+ unsigned long total_size, data_size, ext_table_size;
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header = mc;
+ struct extended_sigtable *ext_header = NULL;
+ u32 sum, orig_sum, ext_sigcount = 0, i;
+ struct extended_signature *ext_sig;
+
+ total_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
+ data_size = get_datasize(mc_header);
+
+ if (data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE > total_size) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Error: bad microcode data file size.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (mc_header->ldrver != 1 || mc_header->hdrver != 1) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Error: invalid/unknown microcode update format.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ext_table_size = total_size - (MC_HEADER_SIZE + data_size);
+ if (ext_table_size) {
+ u32 ext_table_sum = 0;
+ u32 *ext_tablep;
+
+ if ((ext_table_size < EXT_HEADER_SIZE)
+ || ((ext_table_size - EXT_HEADER_SIZE) % EXT_SIGNATURE_SIZE)) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Error: truncated extended signature table.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ext_header = mc + MC_HEADER_SIZE + data_size;
+ if (ext_table_size != exttable_size(ext_header)) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Error: extended signature table size mismatch.\n");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ ext_sigcount = ext_header->count;
+
+ /*
+ * Check extended table checksum: the sum of all dwords that
+ * comprise a valid table must be 0.
+ */
+ ext_tablep = (u32 *)ext_header;
+
+ i = ext_table_size / sizeof(u32);
+ while (i--)
+ ext_table_sum += ext_tablep[i];
+
+ if (ext_table_sum) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_warn("Bad extended signature table checksum, aborting.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate the checksum of update data and header. The checksum of
+ * valid update data and header including the extended signature table
+ * must be 0.
+ */
+ orig_sum = 0;
+ i = (MC_HEADER_SIZE + data_size) / sizeof(u32);
+ while (i--)
+ orig_sum += ((u32 *)mc)[i];
+
+ if (orig_sum) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Bad microcode data checksum, aborting.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!ext_table_size)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Check extended signature checksum: 0 => valid.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ext_sigcount; i++) {
+ ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE +
+ EXT_SIGNATURE_SIZE * i;
+
+ sum = (mc_header->sig + mc_header->pf + mc_header->cksum) -
+ (ext_sig->sig + ext_sig->pf + ext_sig->cksum);
+ if (sum) {
+ if (print_err)
+ pr_err("Bad extended signature checksum, aborting.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get microcode matching with BSP's model. Only CPUs with the same model as
+ * BSP can stay in the platform.
+ */
+static struct microcode_intel *
+scan_microcode(void *data, size_t size, struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool save)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_header;
+ struct microcode_intel *patch = NULL;
+ unsigned int mc_size;
+
+ while (size) {
+ if (size < sizeof(struct microcode_header_intel))
+ break;
+
+ mc_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)data;
+
+ mc_size = get_totalsize(mc_header);
+ if (!mc_size ||
+ mc_size > size ||
+ microcode_sanity_check(data, 0) < 0)
+ break;
+
+ size -= mc_size;
+
+ if (!find_matching_signature(data, uci->cpu_sig.sig,
+ uci->cpu_sig.pf)) {
+ data += mc_size;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (save) {
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, data, mc_size);
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+
+ if (!patch) {
+ if (!has_newer_microcode(data,
+ uci->cpu_sig.sig,
+ uci->cpu_sig.pf,
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev))
+ goto next;
+
+ } else {
+ struct microcode_header_intel *phdr = &patch->hdr;
+
+ if (!has_newer_microcode(data,
+ phdr->sig,
+ phdr->pf,
+ phdr->rev))
+ goto next;
+ }
+
+ /* We have a newer patch, save it. */
+ patch = data;
+
+next:
+ data += mc_size;
+ }
+
+ if (size)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return patch;
+}
+
+static void show_saved_mc(void)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+ int i = 0, j;
+ unsigned int sig, pf, rev, total_size, data_size, date;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+ struct ucode_patch *p;
+
+ if (list_empty(&microcode_cache)) {
+ pr_debug("no microcode data saved.\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ intel_cpu_collect_info(&uci);
+
+ sig = uci.cpu_sig.sig;
+ pf = uci.cpu_sig.pf;
+ rev = uci.cpu_sig.rev;
+ pr_debug("CPU: sig=0x%x, pf=0x%x, rev=0x%x\n", sig, pf, rev);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(p, &microcode_cache, plist) {
+ struct microcode_header_intel *mc_saved_header;
+ struct extended_sigtable *ext_header;
+ struct extended_signature *ext_sig;
+ int ext_sigcount;
+
+ mc_saved_header = (struct microcode_header_intel *)p->data;
+
+ sig = mc_saved_header->sig;
+ pf = mc_saved_header->pf;
+ rev = mc_saved_header->rev;
+ date = mc_saved_header->date;
+
+ total_size = get_totalsize(mc_saved_header);
+ data_size = get_datasize(mc_saved_header);
+
+ pr_debug("mc_saved[%d]: sig=0x%x, pf=0x%x, rev=0x%x, total size=0x%x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",
+ i++, sig, pf, rev, total_size,
+ date & 0xffff,
+ date >> 24,
+ (date >> 16) & 0xff);
+
+ /* Look for ext. headers: */
+ if (total_size <= data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE)
+ continue;
+
+ ext_header = (void *)mc_saved_header + data_size + MC_HEADER_SIZE;
+ ext_sigcount = ext_header->count;
+ ext_sig = (void *)ext_header + EXT_HEADER_SIZE;
+
+ for (j = 0; j < ext_sigcount; j++) {
+ sig = ext_sig->sig;
+ pf = ext_sig->pf;
+
+ pr_debug("\tExtended[%d]: sig=0x%x, pf=0x%x\n",
+ j, sig, pf);
+
+ ext_sig++;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Save this microcode patch. It will be loaded early when a CPU is
+ * hot-added or resumes.
+ */
+static void save_mc_for_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, u8 *mc, unsigned int size)
+{
+ /* Synchronization during CPU hotplug. */
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
+
+ mutex_lock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
+
+ save_microcode_patch(uci, mc, size);
+ show_saved_mc();
+
+ mutex_unlock(&x86_cpu_microcode_mutex);
+}
+
+static bool load_builtin_intel_microcode(struct cpio_data *cp)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = 1, ebx, ecx = 0, edx;
+ struct firmware fw;
+ char name[30];
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ return false;
+
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ sprintf(name, "intel-ucode/%02x-%02x-%02x",
+ x86_family(eax), x86_model(eax), x86_stepping(eax));
+
+ if (firmware_request_builtin(&fw, name)) {
+ cp->size = fw.size;
+ cp->data = (void *)fw.data;
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print ucode update info.
+ */
+static void
+print_ucode_info(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, unsigned int date)
+{
+ pr_info_once("microcode updated early to revision 0x%x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev,
+ date & 0xffff,
+ date >> 24,
+ (date >> 16) & 0xff);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+
+static int delay_ucode_info;
+static int current_mc_date;
+
+/*
+ * Print early updated ucode info after printk works. This is delayed info dump.
+ */
+void show_ucode_info_early(void)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+
+ if (delay_ucode_info) {
+ intel_cpu_collect_info(&uci);
+ print_ucode_info(&uci, current_mc_date);
+ delay_ucode_info = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * At this point, we can not call printk() yet. Delay printing microcode info in
+ * show_ucode_info_early() until printk() works.
+ */
+static void print_ucode(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *mc;
+ int *delay_ucode_info_p;
+ int *current_mc_date_p;
+
+ mc = uci->mc;
+ if (!mc)
+ return;
+
+ delay_ucode_info_p = (int *)__pa_nodebug(&delay_ucode_info);
+ current_mc_date_p = (int *)__pa_nodebug(&current_mc_date);
+
+ *delay_ucode_info_p = 1;
+ *current_mc_date_p = mc->hdr.date;
+}
+#else
+
+static inline void print_ucode(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *mc;
+
+ mc = uci->mc;
+ if (!mc)
+ return;
+
+ print_ucode_info(uci, mc->hdr.date);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int apply_microcode_early(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci, bool early)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *mc;
+ u32 rev;
+
+ mc = uci->mc;
+ if (!mc)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Save us the MSR write below - which is a particular expensive
+ * operation - when the other hyperthread has updated the microcode
+ * already.
+ */
+ rev = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+ if (rev >= mc->hdr.rev) {
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev = rev;
+ return UCODE_OK;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Writeback and invalidate caches before updating microcode to avoid
+ * internal issues depending on what the microcode is updating.
+ */
+ native_wbinvd();
+
+ /* write microcode via MSR 0x79 */
+ native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE, (unsigned long)mc->bits);
+
+ rev = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+ if (rev != mc->hdr.rev)
+ return -1;
+
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev = rev;
+
+ if (early)
+ print_ucode(uci);
+ else
+ print_ucode_info(uci, mc->hdr.date);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __init save_microcode_in_initrd_intel(void)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+ struct cpio_data cp;
+
+ /*
+ * initrd is going away, clear patch ptr. We will scan the microcode one
+ * last time before jettisoning and save a patch, if found. Then we will
+ * update that pointer too, with a stable patch address to use when
+ * resuming the cores.
+ */
+ intel_ucode_patch = NULL;
+
+ if (!load_builtin_intel_microcode(&cp))
+ cp = find_microcode_in_initrd(ucode_path, false);
+
+ if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+ return 0;
+
+ intel_cpu_collect_info(&uci);
+
+ scan_microcode(cp.data, cp.size, &uci, true);
+
+ show_saved_mc();
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * @res_patch, output: a pointer to the patch we found.
+ */
+static struct microcode_intel *__load_ucode_intel(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
+{
+ static const char *path;
+ struct cpio_data cp;
+ bool use_pa;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32)) {
+ path = (const char *)__pa_nodebug(ucode_path);
+ use_pa = true;
+ } else {
+ path = ucode_path;
+ use_pa = false;
+ }
+
+ /* try built-in microcode first */
+ if (!load_builtin_intel_microcode(&cp))
+ cp = find_microcode_in_initrd(path, use_pa);
+
+ if (!(cp.data && cp.size))
+ return NULL;
+
+ intel_cpu_collect_info(uci);
+
+ return scan_microcode(cp.data, cp.size, uci, false);
+}
+
+void __init load_ucode_intel_bsp(void)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *patch;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+
+ patch = __load_ucode_intel(&uci);
+ if (!patch)
+ return;
+
+ uci.mc = patch;
+
+ apply_microcode_early(&uci, true);
+}
+
+void load_ucode_intel_ap(void)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *patch, **iup;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))
+ iup = (struct microcode_intel **) __pa_nodebug(&intel_ucode_patch);
+ else
+ iup = &intel_ucode_patch;
+
+ if (!*iup) {
+ patch = __load_ucode_intel(&uci);
+ if (!patch)
+ return;
+
+ *iup = patch;
+ }
+
+ uci.mc = *iup;
+
+ apply_microcode_early(&uci, true);
+}
+
+static struct microcode_intel *find_patch(struct ucode_cpu_info *uci)
+{
+ struct microcode_header_intel *phdr;
+ struct ucode_patch *iter, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(iter, tmp, &microcode_cache, plist) {
+
+ phdr = (struct microcode_header_intel *)iter->data;
+
+ if (phdr->rev <= uci->cpu_sig.rev)
+ continue;
+
+ if (!find_matching_signature(phdr,
+ uci->cpu_sig.sig,
+ uci->cpu_sig.pf))
+ continue;
+
+ return iter->data;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void reload_ucode_intel(void)
+{
+ struct microcode_intel *p;
+ struct ucode_cpu_info uci;
+
+ intel_cpu_collect_info(&uci);
+
+ p = find_patch(&uci);
+ if (!p)
+ return;
+
+ uci.mc = p;
+
+ apply_microcode_early(&uci, false);
+}
+
+static int collect_cpu_info(int cpu_num, struct cpu_signature *csig)
+{
+ static struct cpu_signature prev;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu_num);
+ unsigned int val[2];
+
+ memset(csig, 0, sizeof(*csig));
+
+ csig->sig = cpuid_eax(0x00000001);
+
+ if ((c->x86_model >= 5) || (c->x86 > 6)) {
+ /* get processor flags from MSR 0x17 */
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_PLATFORM_ID, val[0], val[1]);
+ csig->pf = 1 << ((val[1] >> 18) & 7);
+ }
+
+ csig->rev = c->microcode;
+
+ /* No extra locking on prev, races are harmless. */
+ if (csig->sig != prev.sig || csig->pf != prev.pf || csig->rev != prev.rev) {
+ pr_info("sig=0x%x, pf=0x%x, revision=0x%x\n",
+ csig->sig, csig->pf, csig->rev);
+ prev = *csig;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state apply_microcode_intel(int cpu)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ bool bsp = c->cpu_index == boot_cpu_data.cpu_index;
+ struct microcode_intel *mc;
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+ static int prev_rev;
+ u32 rev;
+
+ /* We should bind the task to the CPU */
+ if (WARN_ON(raw_smp_processor_id() != cpu))
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+
+ /* Look for a newer patch in our cache: */
+ mc = find_patch(uci);
+ if (!mc) {
+ mc = uci->mc;
+ if (!mc)
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Save us the MSR write below - which is a particular expensive
+ * operation - when the other hyperthread has updated the microcode
+ * already.
+ */
+ rev = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+ if (rev >= mc->hdr.rev) {
+ ret = UCODE_OK;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Writeback and invalidate caches before updating microcode to avoid
+ * internal issues depending on what the microcode is updating.
+ */
+ native_wbinvd();
+
+ /* write microcode via MSR 0x79 */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_UCODE_WRITE, (unsigned long)mc->bits);
+
+ rev = intel_get_microcode_revision();
+
+ if (rev != mc->hdr.rev) {
+ pr_err("CPU%d update to revision 0x%x failed\n",
+ cpu, mc->hdr.rev);
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (bsp && rev != prev_rev) {
+ pr_info("updated to revision 0x%x, date = %04x-%02x-%02x\n",
+ rev,
+ mc->hdr.date & 0xffff,
+ mc->hdr.date >> 24,
+ (mc->hdr.date >> 16) & 0xff);
+ prev_rev = rev;
+ }
+
+ ret = UCODE_UPDATED;
+
+out:
+ uci->cpu_sig.rev = rev;
+ c->microcode = rev;
+
+ /* Update boot_cpu_data's revision too, if we're on the BSP: */
+ if (bsp)
+ boot_cpu_data.microcode = rev;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state generic_load_microcode(int cpu, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ struct ucode_cpu_info *uci = ucode_cpu_info + cpu;
+ unsigned int curr_mc_size = 0, new_mc_size = 0;
+ enum ucode_state ret = UCODE_OK;
+ int new_rev = uci->cpu_sig.rev;
+ u8 *new_mc = NULL, *mc = NULL;
+ unsigned int csig, cpf;
+
+ while (iov_iter_count(iter)) {
+ struct microcode_header_intel mc_header;
+ unsigned int mc_size, data_size;
+ u8 *data;
+
+ if (!copy_from_iter_full(&mc_header, sizeof(mc_header), iter)) {
+ pr_err("error! Truncated or inaccessible header in microcode data file\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ mc_size = get_totalsize(&mc_header);
+ if (mc_size < sizeof(mc_header)) {
+ pr_err("error! Bad data in microcode data file (totalsize too small)\n");
+ break;
+ }
+ data_size = mc_size - sizeof(mc_header);
+ if (data_size > iov_iter_count(iter)) {
+ pr_err("error! Bad data in microcode data file (truncated file?)\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* For performance reasons, reuse mc area when possible */
+ if (!mc || mc_size > curr_mc_size) {
+ vfree(mc);
+ mc = vmalloc(mc_size);
+ if (!mc)
+ break;
+ curr_mc_size = mc_size;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(mc, &mc_header, sizeof(mc_header));
+ data = mc + sizeof(mc_header);
+ if (!copy_from_iter_full(data, data_size, iter) ||
+ microcode_sanity_check(mc, 1) < 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ csig = uci->cpu_sig.sig;
+ cpf = uci->cpu_sig.pf;
+ if (has_newer_microcode(mc, csig, cpf, new_rev)) {
+ vfree(new_mc);
+ new_rev = mc_header.rev;
+ new_mc = mc;
+ new_mc_size = mc_size;
+ mc = NULL; /* trigger new vmalloc */
+ ret = UCODE_NEW;
+ }
+ }
+
+ vfree(mc);
+
+ if (iov_iter_count(iter)) {
+ vfree(new_mc);
+ return UCODE_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if (!new_mc)
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
+ vfree(uci->mc);
+ uci->mc = (struct microcode_intel *)new_mc;
+
+ /*
+ * If early loading microcode is supported, save this mc into
+ * permanent memory. So it will be loaded early when a CPU is hot added
+ * or resumes.
+ */
+ save_mc_for_early(uci, new_mc, new_mc_size);
+
+ pr_debug("CPU%d found a matching microcode update with version 0x%x (current=0x%x)\n",
+ cpu, new_rev, uci->cpu_sig.rev);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static bool is_blacklisted(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+
+ /*
+ * Late loading on model 79 with microcode revision less than 0x0b000021
+ * and LLC size per core bigger than 2.5MB may result in a system hang.
+ * This behavior is documented in item BDF90, #334165 (Intel Xeon
+ * Processor E7-8800/4800 v4 Product Family).
+ */
+ if (c->x86 == 6 &&
+ c->x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X &&
+ c->x86_stepping == 0x01 &&
+ llc_size_per_core > 2621440 &&
+ c->microcode < 0x0b000021) {
+ pr_err_once("Erratum BDF90: late loading with revision < 0x0b000021 (0x%x) disabled.\n", c->microcode);
+ pr_err_once("Please consider either early loading through initrd/built-in or a potential BIOS update.\n");
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static enum ucode_state request_microcode_fw(int cpu, struct device *device,
+ bool refresh_fw)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ const struct firmware *firmware;
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ enum ucode_state ret;
+ struct kvec kvec;
+ char name[30];
+
+ if (is_blacklisted(cpu))
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+
+ sprintf(name, "intel-ucode/%02x-%02x-%02x",
+ c->x86, c->x86_model, c->x86_stepping);
+
+ if (request_firmware_direct(&firmware, name, device)) {
+ pr_debug("data file %s load failed\n", name);
+ return UCODE_NFOUND;
+ }
+
+ kvec.iov_base = (void *)firmware->data;
+ kvec.iov_len = firmware->size;
+ iov_iter_kvec(&iter, ITER_SOURCE, &kvec, 1, firmware->size);
+ ret = generic_load_microcode(cpu, &iter);
+
+ release_firmware(firmware);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct microcode_ops microcode_intel_ops = {
+ .request_microcode_fw = request_microcode_fw,
+ .collect_cpu_info = collect_cpu_info,
+ .apply_microcode = apply_microcode_intel,
+};
+
+static int __init calc_llc_size_per_core(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u64 llc_size = c->x86_cache_size * 1024ULL;
+
+ do_div(llc_size, c->x86_max_cores);
+
+ return (int)llc_size;
+}
+
+struct microcode_ops * __init init_intel_microcode(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL || c->x86 < 6 ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_IA64)) {
+ pr_err("Intel CPU family 0x%x not supported\n", c->x86);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ llc_size_per_core = calc_llc_size_per_core(c);
+
+ return &microcode_intel_ops;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1db560ed2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mkcapflags.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Generate the x86_cap/bug_flags[] arrays from include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+#
+
+set -e
+
+OUT=$1
+
+dump_array()
+{
+ ARRAY=$1
+ SIZE=$2
+ PFX=$3
+ POSTFIX=$4
+ IN=$5
+
+ PFX_SZ=$(echo $PFX | wc -c)
+ TABS="$(printf '\t\t\t\t\t')"
+
+ echo "const char * const $ARRAY[$SIZE] = {"
+
+ # Iterate through any input lines starting with #define $PFX
+ sed -n -e 's/\t/ /g' -e "s/^ *# *define *$PFX//p" $IN |
+ while read i
+ do
+ # Name is everything up to the first whitespace
+ NAME="$(echo "$i" | sed 's/ .*//')"
+
+ # If the /* comment */ starts with a quote string, grab that.
+ VALUE="$(echo "$i" | sed -n 's@.*/\* *\("[^"]*"\).*\*/@\1@p')"
+ [ -z "$VALUE" ] && VALUE="\"$NAME\""
+ [ "$VALUE" = '""' ] && continue
+
+ # Name is uppercase, VALUE is all lowercase
+ VALUE="$(echo "$VALUE" | tr A-Z a-z)"
+
+ if [ -n "$POSTFIX" ]; then
+ T=$(( $PFX_SZ + $(echo $POSTFIX | wc -c) + 2 ))
+ TABS="$(printf '\t\t\t\t\t\t')"
+ TABCOUNT=$(( ( 6*8 - ($T + 1) - $(echo "$NAME" | wc -c) ) / 8 ))
+ printf "\t[%s - %s]%.*s = %s,\n" "$PFX$NAME" "$POSTFIX" "$TABCOUNT" "$TABS" "$VALUE"
+ else
+ TABCOUNT=$(( ( 5*8 - ($PFX_SZ + 1) - $(echo "$NAME" | wc -c) ) / 8 ))
+ printf "\t[%s]%.*s = %s,\n" "$PFX$NAME" "$TABCOUNT" "$TABS" "$VALUE"
+ fi
+ done
+ echo "};"
+}
+
+trap 'rm "$OUT"' EXIT
+
+(
+ echo "#ifndef _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H"
+ echo "#include <asm/cpufeatures.h>"
+ echo "#endif"
+ echo ""
+
+ dump_array "x86_cap_flags" "NCAPINTS*32" "X86_FEATURE_" "" $2
+ echo ""
+
+ dump_array "x86_bug_flags" "NBUGINTS*32" "X86_BUG_" "NCAPINTS*32" $2
+ echo ""
+
+ echo "#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES"
+ echo "#ifndef _ASM_X86_VMXFEATURES_H"
+ echo "#include <asm/vmxfeatures.h>"
+ echo "#endif"
+ dump_array "x86_vmx_flags" "NVMXINTS*32" "VMX_FEATURE_" "" $3
+ echo "#endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */"
+) > $OUT
+
+trap - EXIT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..34d9e899e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * HyperV Detection code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2010, Novell, Inc.
+ * Author : K. Y. Srinivasan <ksrinivasan@novell.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/clocksource.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/kexec.h>
+#include <linux/i8253.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
+#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
+#include <asm/desc.h>
+#include <asm/idtentry.h>
+#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
+#include <asm/i8259.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/timer.h>
+#include <asm/reboot.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
+#include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
+#include <asm/numa.h>
+#include <asm/coco.h>
+
+/* Is Linux running as the root partition? */
+bool hv_root_partition;
+struct ms_hyperv_info ms_hyperv;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+static void (*vmbus_handler)(void);
+static void (*hv_stimer0_handler)(void);
+static void (*hv_kexec_handler)(void);
+static void (*hv_crash_handler)(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_callback)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
+
+ inc_irq_stat(irq_hv_callback_count);
+ if (vmbus_handler)
+ vmbus_handler();
+
+ if (ms_hyperv.hints & HV_DEPRECATING_AEOI_RECOMMENDED)
+ ack_APIC_irq();
+
+ set_irq_regs(old_regs);
+}
+
+void hv_setup_vmbus_handler(void (*handler)(void))
+{
+ vmbus_handler = handler;
+}
+
+void hv_remove_vmbus_handler(void)
+{
+ /* We have no way to deallocate the interrupt gate */
+ vmbus_handler = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Routines to do per-architecture handling of stimer0
+ * interrupts when in Direct Mode
+ */
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_stimer0)
+{
+ struct pt_regs *old_regs = set_irq_regs(regs);
+
+ inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
+ if (hv_stimer0_handler)
+ hv_stimer0_handler();
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
+ ack_APIC_irq();
+
+ set_irq_regs(old_regs);
+}
+
+/* For x86/x64, override weak placeholders in hyperv_timer.c */
+void hv_setup_stimer0_handler(void (*handler)(void))
+{
+ hv_stimer0_handler = handler;
+}
+
+void hv_remove_stimer0_handler(void)
+{
+ /* We have no way to deallocate the interrupt gate */
+ hv_stimer0_handler = NULL;
+}
+
+void hv_setup_kexec_handler(void (*handler)(void))
+{
+ hv_kexec_handler = handler;
+}
+
+void hv_remove_kexec_handler(void)
+{
+ hv_kexec_handler = NULL;
+}
+
+void hv_setup_crash_handler(void (*handler)(struct pt_regs *regs))
+{
+ hv_crash_handler = handler;
+}
+
+void hv_remove_crash_handler(void)
+{
+ hv_crash_handler = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
+static void hv_machine_shutdown(void)
+{
+ if (kexec_in_progress && hv_kexec_handler)
+ hv_kexec_handler();
+
+ /*
+ * Call hv_cpu_die() on all the CPUs, otherwise later the hypervisor
+ * corrupts the old VP Assist Pages and can crash the kexec kernel.
+ */
+ if (kexec_in_progress && hyperv_init_cpuhp > 0)
+ cpuhp_remove_state(hyperv_init_cpuhp);
+
+ /* The function calls stop_other_cpus(). */
+ native_machine_shutdown();
+
+ /* Disable the hypercall page when there is only 1 active CPU. */
+ if (kexec_in_progress)
+ hyperv_cleanup();
+}
+
+static void hv_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (hv_crash_handler)
+ hv_crash_handler(regs);
+
+ /* The function calls crash_smp_send_stop(). */
+ native_machine_crash_shutdown(regs);
+
+ /* Disable the hypercall page when there is only 1 active CPU. */
+ hyperv_cleanup();
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
+
+static uint32_t __init ms_hyperv_platform(void)
+{
+ u32 eax;
+ u32 hyp_signature[3];
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))
+ return 0;
+
+ cpuid(HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS,
+ &eax, &hyp_signature[0], &hyp_signature[1], &hyp_signature[2]);
+
+ if (eax < HYPERV_CPUID_MIN || eax > HYPERV_CPUID_MAX ||
+ memcmp("Microsoft Hv", hyp_signature, 12))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* HYPERCALL and VP_INDEX MSRs are mandatory for all features. */
+ eax = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES);
+ if (!(eax & HV_MSR_HYPERCALL_AVAILABLE)) {
+ pr_warn("x86/hyperv: HYPERCALL MSR not available.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!(eax & HV_MSR_VP_INDEX_AVAILABLE)) {
+ pr_warn("x86/hyperv: VP_INDEX MSR not available.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS;
+}
+
+static unsigned char hv_get_nmi_reason(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+/*
+ * Prior to WS2016 Debug-VM sends NMIs to all CPUs which makes
+ * it difficult to process CHANNELMSG_UNLOAD in case of crash. Handle
+ * unknown NMI on the first CPU which gets it.
+ */
+static int hv_nmi_unknown(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ static atomic_t nmi_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(-1);
+
+ if (!unknown_nmi_panic)
+ return NMI_DONE;
+
+ if (atomic_cmpxchg(&nmi_cpu, -1, raw_smp_processor_id()) != -1)
+ return NMI_HANDLED;
+
+ return NMI_DONE;
+}
+#endif
+
+static unsigned long hv_get_tsc_khz(void)
+{
+ unsigned long freq;
+
+ rdmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_FREQUENCY, freq);
+
+ return freq / 1000;
+}
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+static void __init hv_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
+{
+ native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS)
+ hv_init_spinlocks();
+#endif
+}
+
+static void __init hv_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ int i;
+ int ret;
+#endif
+
+ native_smp_prepare_cpus(max_cpus);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ for_each_present_cpu(i) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ continue;
+ ret = hv_call_add_logical_proc(numa_cpu_node(i), i, cpu_physical_id(i));
+ BUG_ON(ret);
+ }
+
+ for_each_present_cpu(i) {
+ if (i == 0)
+ continue;
+ ret = hv_call_create_vp(numa_cpu_node(i), hv_current_partition_id, i, i);
+ BUG_ON(ret);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)
+{
+ int hv_max_functions_eax;
+ int hv_host_info_eax;
+ int hv_host_info_ebx;
+ int hv_host_info_ecx;
+ int hv_host_info_edx;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
+ pv_info.name = "Hyper-V";
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Extract the features and hints
+ */
+ ms_hyperv.features = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES);
+ ms_hyperv.priv_high = cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES);
+ ms_hyperv.misc_features = cpuid_edx(HYPERV_CPUID_FEATURES);
+ ms_hyperv.hints = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_ENLIGHTMENT_INFO);
+
+ hv_max_functions_eax = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_VENDOR_AND_MAX_FUNCTIONS);
+
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: privilege flags low 0x%x, high 0x%x, hints 0x%x, misc 0x%x\n",
+ ms_hyperv.features, ms_hyperv.priv_high, ms_hyperv.hints,
+ ms_hyperv.misc_features);
+
+ ms_hyperv.max_vp_index = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_IMPLEMENT_LIMITS);
+ ms_hyperv.max_lp_index = cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_IMPLEMENT_LIMITS);
+
+ pr_debug("Hyper-V: max %u virtual processors, %u logical processors\n",
+ ms_hyperv.max_vp_index, ms_hyperv.max_lp_index);
+
+ /*
+ * Check CPU management privilege.
+ *
+ * To mirror what Windows does we should extract CPU management
+ * features and use the ReservedIdentityBit to detect if Linux is the
+ * root partition. But that requires negotiating CPU management
+ * interface (a process to be finalized). For now, use the privilege
+ * flag as the indicator for running as root.
+ *
+ * Hyper-V should never specify running as root and as a Confidential
+ * VM. But to protect against a compromised/malicious Hyper-V trying
+ * to exploit root behavior to expose Confidential VM memory, ignore
+ * the root partition setting if also a Confidential VM.
+ */
+ if ((ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_CPU_MANAGEMENT) &&
+ !(ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION)) {
+ hv_root_partition = true;
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: running as root partition\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Extract host information.
+ */
+ if (hv_max_functions_eax >= HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION) {
+ hv_host_info_eax = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION);
+ hv_host_info_ebx = cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION);
+ hv_host_info_ecx = cpuid_ecx(HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION);
+ hv_host_info_edx = cpuid_edx(HYPERV_CPUID_VERSION);
+
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: Host Build %d.%d.%d.%d-%d-%d\n",
+ hv_host_info_ebx >> 16, hv_host_info_ebx & 0xFFFF,
+ hv_host_info_eax, hv_host_info_edx & 0xFFFFFF,
+ hv_host_info_ecx, hv_host_info_edx >> 24);
+ }
+
+ if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS &&
+ ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_FREQUENCY_MSRS_AVAILABLE) {
+ x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = hv_get_tsc_khz;
+ x86_platform.calibrate_cpu = hv_get_tsc_khz;
+ }
+
+ if (ms_hyperv.priv_high & HV_ISOLATION) {
+ ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_ISOLATION_CONFIG);
+ ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b = cpuid_ebx(HYPERV_CPUID_ISOLATION_CONFIG);
+ ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary =
+ BIT_ULL(ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary_bits);
+
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: Isolation Config: Group A 0x%x, Group B 0x%x\n",
+ ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b);
+
+ if (hv_get_isolation_type() == HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP) {
+ static_branch_enable(&isolation_type_snp);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB
+ swiotlb_unencrypted_base = ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;
+#endif
+ }
+ /* Isolation VMs are unenlightened SEV-based VMs, thus this check: */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
+ if (hv_get_isolation_type() != HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE)
+ cc_set_vendor(CC_VENDOR_HYPERV);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hv_max_functions_eax >= HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES) {
+ ms_hyperv.nested_features =
+ cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES);
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: Nested features: 0x%x\n",
+ ms_hyperv.nested_features);
+ }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+ if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_FREQUENCY_MSRS &&
+ ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_FEATURE_FREQUENCY_MSRS_AVAILABLE) {
+ /*
+ * Get the APIC frequency.
+ */
+ u64 hv_lapic_frequency;
+
+ rdmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_APIC_FREQUENCY, hv_lapic_frequency);
+ hv_lapic_frequency = div_u64(hv_lapic_frequency, HZ);
+ lapic_timer_period = hv_lapic_frequency;
+ pr_info("Hyper-V: LAPIC Timer Frequency: %#x\n",
+ lapic_timer_period);
+ }
+
+ register_nmi_handler(NMI_UNKNOWN, hv_nmi_unknown, NMI_FLAG_FIRST,
+ "hv_nmi_unknown");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
+ no_timer_check = 1;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) && defined(CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE)
+ machine_ops.shutdown = hv_machine_shutdown;
+ machine_ops.crash_shutdown = hv_machine_crash_shutdown;
+#endif
+ if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT) {
+ /*
+ * Writing to synthetic MSR 0x40000118 updates/changes the
+ * guest visible CPUIDs. Setting bit 0 of this MSR enables
+ * guests to report invariant TSC feature through CPUID
+ * instruction, CPUID 0x800000007/EDX, bit 8. See code in
+ * early_init_intel() where this bit is examined. The
+ * setting of this MSR bit should happen before init_intel()
+ * is called.
+ */
+ wrmsrl(HV_X64_MSR_TSC_INVARIANT_CONTROL, 0x1);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generation 2 instances don't support reading the NMI status from
+ * 0x61 port.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = hv_get_nmi_reason;
+
+ /*
+ * Hyper-V VMs have a PIT emulation quirk such that zeroing the
+ * counter register during PIT shutdown restarts the PIT. So it
+ * continues to interrupt @18.2 HZ. Setting i8253_clear_counter
+ * to false tells pit_shutdown() not to zero the counter so that
+ * the PIT really is shutdown. Generation 2 VMs don't have a PIT,
+ * and setting this value has no effect.
+ */
+ i8253_clear_counter_on_shutdown = false;
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
+ /*
+ * Setup the hook to get control post apic initialization.
+ */
+ x86_platform.apic_post_init = hyperv_init;
+ hyperv_setup_mmu_ops();
+ /* Setup the IDT for hypervisor callback */
+ alloc_intr_gate(HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR, asm_sysvec_hyperv_callback);
+
+ /* Setup the IDT for reenlightenment notifications */
+ if (ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_REENLIGHTENMENT) {
+ alloc_intr_gate(HYPERV_REENLIGHTENMENT_VECTOR,
+ asm_sysvec_hyperv_reenlightenment);
+ }
+
+ /* Setup the IDT for stimer0 */
+ if (ms_hyperv.misc_features & HV_STIMER_DIRECT_MODE_AVAILABLE) {
+ alloc_intr_gate(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR,
+ asm_sysvec_hyperv_stimer0);
+ }
+
+# ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ smp_ops.smp_prepare_boot_cpu = hv_smp_prepare_boot_cpu;
+ if (hv_root_partition)
+ smp_ops.smp_prepare_cpus = hv_smp_prepare_cpus;
+# endif
+
+ /*
+ * Hyper-V doesn't provide irq remapping for IO-APIC. To enable x2apic,
+ * set x2apic destination mode to physical mode when x2apic is available
+ * and Hyper-V IOMMU driver makes sure cpus assigned with IO-APIC irqs
+ * have 8-bit APIC id.
+ */
+# ifdef CONFIG_X86_X2APIC
+ if (x2apic_supported())
+ x2apic_phys = 1;
+# endif
+
+ /* Register Hyper-V specific clocksource */
+ hv_init_clocksource();
+#endif
+ /*
+ * TSC should be marked as unstable only after Hyper-V
+ * clocksource has been initialized. This ensures that the
+ * stability of the sched_clock is not altered.
+ */
+ if (!(ms_hyperv.features & HV_ACCESS_TSC_INVARIANT))
+ mark_tsc_unstable("running on Hyper-V");
+
+ hardlockup_detector_disable();
+}
+
+static bool __init ms_hyperv_x2apic_available(void)
+{
+ return x2apic_supported();
+}
+
+/*
+ * If ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id() returns true, hyperv_prepare_irq_remapping()
+ * returns -ENODEV and the Hyper-V IOMMU driver is not used; instead, the
+ * generic support of the 15-bit APIC ID is used: see __irq_msi_compose_msg().
+ *
+ * Note: for a VM on Hyper-V, the I/O-APIC is the only device which
+ * (logically) generates MSIs directly to the system APIC irq domain.
+ * There is no HPET, and PCI MSI/MSI-X interrupts are remapped by the
+ * pci-hyperv host bridge.
+ */
+static bool __init ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id(void)
+{
+ u32 eax;
+
+ eax = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_VIRT_STACK_INTERFACE);
+ if (eax != HYPERV_VS_INTERFACE_EAX_SIGNATURE)
+ return false;
+
+ eax = cpuid_eax(HYPERV_CPUID_VIRT_STACK_PROPERTIES);
+ return eax & HYPERV_VS_PROPERTIES_EAX_EXTENDED_IOAPIC_RTE;
+}
+
+const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_ms_hyperv = {
+ .name = "Microsoft Hyper-V",
+ .detect = ms_hyperv_platform,
+ .type = X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV,
+ .init.x2apic_available = ms_hyperv_x2apic_available,
+ .init.msi_ext_dest_id = ms_hyperv_msi_ext_dest_id,
+ .init.init_platform = ms_hyperv_init_platform,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cc4f9f1cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+obj-y := mtrr.o if.o generic.o cleanup.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_32) += amd.o cyrix.o centaur.o
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/amd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a65a02720
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/amd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+static void
+amd_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ unsigned long *size, mtrr_type *type)
+{
+ unsigned long low, high;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_K6_UWCCR, low, high);
+ /* Upper dword is region 1, lower is region 0 */
+ if (reg == 1)
+ low = high;
+ /* The base masks off on the right alignment */
+ *base = (low & 0xFFFE0000) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ *type = 0;
+ if (low & 1)
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ if (low & 2)
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB;
+ if (!(low & 3)) {
+ *size = 0;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * This needs a little explaining. The size is stored as an
+ * inverted mask of bits of 128K granularity 15 bits long offset
+ * 2 bits.
+ *
+ * So to get a size we do invert the mask and add 1 to the lowest
+ * mask bit (4 as its 2 bits in). This gives us a size we then shift
+ * to turn into 128K blocks.
+ *
+ * eg 111 1111 1111 1100 is 512K
+ *
+ * invert 000 0000 0000 0011
+ * +1 000 0000 0000 0100
+ * *128K ...
+ */
+ low = (~low) & 0x1FFFC;
+ *size = (low + 4) << (15 - PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * amd_set_mtrr - Set variable MTRR register on the local CPU.
+ *
+ * @reg The register to set.
+ * @base The base address of the region.
+ * @size The size of the region. If this is 0 the region is disabled.
+ * @type The type of the region.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void
+amd_set_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base, unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ u32 regs[2];
+
+ /*
+ * Low is MTRR0, High MTRR 1
+ */
+ rdmsr(MSR_K6_UWCCR, regs[0], regs[1]);
+ /*
+ * Blank to disable
+ */
+ if (size == 0) {
+ regs[reg] = 0;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Set the register to the base, the type (off by one) and an
+ * inverted bitmask of the size The size is the only odd
+ * bit. We are fed say 512K We invert this and we get 111 1111
+ * 1111 1011 but if you subtract one and invert you get the
+ * desired 111 1111 1111 1100 mask
+ *
+ * But ~(x - 1) == ~x + 1 == -x. Two's complement rocks!
+ */
+ regs[reg] = (-size >> (15 - PAGE_SHIFT) & 0x0001FFFC)
+ | (base << PAGE_SHIFT) | (type + 1);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The writeback rule is quite specific. See the manual. Its
+ * disable local interrupts, write back the cache, set the mtrr
+ */
+ wbinvd();
+ wrmsr(MSR_K6_UWCCR, regs[0], regs[1]);
+}
+
+static int
+amd_validate_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, unsigned int type)
+{
+ /*
+ * Apply the K6 block alignment and size rules
+ * In order
+ * o Uncached or gathering only
+ * o 128K or bigger block
+ * o Power of 2 block
+ * o base suitably aligned to the power
+ */
+ if (type > MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB || size < (1 << (17 - PAGE_SHIFT))
+ || (size & ~(size - 1)) - size || (base & (size - 1)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct mtrr_ops amd_mtrr_ops = {
+ .vendor = X86_VENDOR_AMD,
+ .set = amd_set_mtrr,
+ .get = amd_get_mtrr,
+ .get_free_region = generic_get_free_region,
+ .validate_add_page = amd_validate_add_page,
+ .have_wrcomb = positive_have_wrcomb,
+};
+
+int __init amd_init_mtrr(void)
+{
+ set_mtrr_ops(&amd_mtrr_ops);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/centaur.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/centaur.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f27177816
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/centaur.c
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+static struct {
+ unsigned long high;
+ unsigned long low;
+} centaur_mcr[8];
+
+static u8 centaur_mcr_reserved;
+static u8 centaur_mcr_type; /* 0 for winchip, 1 for winchip2 */
+
+/**
+ * centaur_get_free_region - Get a free MTRR.
+ *
+ * @base: The starting (base) address of the region.
+ * @size: The size (in bytes) of the region.
+ *
+ * Returns: the index of the region on success, else -1 on error.
+ */
+static int
+centaur_get_free_region(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, int replace_reg)
+{
+ unsigned long lbase, lsize;
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+ int i, max;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ if (replace_reg >= 0 && replace_reg < max)
+ return replace_reg;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
+ if (centaur_mcr_reserved & (1 << i))
+ continue;
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lsize == 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Report boot time MCR setups
+ */
+void mtrr_centaur_report_mcr(int mcr, u32 lo, u32 hi)
+{
+ centaur_mcr[mcr].low = lo;
+ centaur_mcr[mcr].high = hi;
+}
+
+static void
+centaur_get_mcr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ unsigned long *size, mtrr_type * type)
+{
+ *base = centaur_mcr[reg].high >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ *size = -(centaur_mcr[reg].low & 0xfffff000) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB; /* write-combining */
+
+ if (centaur_mcr_type == 1 && ((centaur_mcr[reg].low & 31) & 2))
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ if (centaur_mcr_type == 1 && (centaur_mcr[reg].low & 31) == 25)
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+ if (centaur_mcr_type == 0 && (centaur_mcr[reg].low & 31) == 31)
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+}
+
+static void
+centaur_set_mcr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ unsigned long low, high;
+
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /* Disable */
+ high = low = 0;
+ } else {
+ high = base << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (centaur_mcr_type == 0) {
+ /* Only support write-combining... */
+ low = -size << PAGE_SHIFT | 0x1f;
+ } else {
+ if (type == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE)
+ low = -size << PAGE_SHIFT | 0x02; /* NC */
+ else
+ low = -size << PAGE_SHIFT | 0x09; /* WWO, WC */
+ }
+ }
+ centaur_mcr[reg].high = high;
+ centaur_mcr[reg].low = low;
+ wrmsr(MSR_IDT_MCR0 + reg, low, high);
+}
+
+static int
+centaur_validate_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, unsigned int type)
+{
+ /*
+ * FIXME: Winchip2 supports uncached
+ */
+ if (type != MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB &&
+ (centaur_mcr_type == 0 || type != MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE)) {
+ pr_warn("mtrr: only write-combining%s supported\n",
+ centaur_mcr_type ? " and uncacheable are" : " is");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct mtrr_ops centaur_mtrr_ops = {
+ .vendor = X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR,
+ .set = centaur_set_mcr,
+ .get = centaur_get_mcr,
+ .get_free_region = centaur_get_free_region,
+ .validate_add_page = centaur_validate_add_page,
+ .have_wrcomb = positive_have_wrcomb,
+};
+
+int __init centaur_init_mtrr(void)
+{
+ set_mtrr_ops(&centaur_mtrr_ops);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cleanup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cleanup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b5f43049f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cleanup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,987 @@
+/*
+ * MTRR (Memory Type Range Register) cleanup
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Yinghai Lu
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ * License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ * version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Library General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free
+ * Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+ */
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
+#include <linux/range.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+struct var_mtrr_range_state {
+ unsigned long base_pfn;
+ unsigned long size_pfn;
+ mtrr_type type;
+};
+
+struct var_mtrr_state {
+ unsigned long range_startk;
+ unsigned long range_sizek;
+ unsigned long chunk_sizek;
+ unsigned long gran_sizek;
+ unsigned int reg;
+};
+
+/* Should be related to MTRR_VAR_RANGES nums */
+#define RANGE_NUM 256
+
+static struct range __initdata range[RANGE_NUM];
+static int __initdata nr_range;
+
+static struct var_mtrr_range_state __initdata range_state[RANGE_NUM];
+
+static int __initdata debug_print;
+#define Dprintk(x...) do { if (debug_print) pr_debug(x); } while (0)
+
+#define BIOS_BUG_MSG \
+ "WARNING: BIOS bug: VAR MTRR %d contains strange UC entry under 1M, check with your system vendor!\n"
+
+static int __init
+x86_get_mtrr_mem_range(struct range *range, int nr_range,
+ unsigned long extra_remove_base,
+ unsigned long extra_remove_size)
+{
+ unsigned long base, size;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+ if (type != MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK)
+ continue;
+ base = range_state[i].base_pfn;
+ size = range_state[i].size_pfn;
+ nr_range = add_range_with_merge(range, RANGE_NUM, nr_range,
+ base, base + size);
+ }
+ if (debug_print) {
+ pr_debug("After WB checking\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_range; i++)
+ pr_debug("MTRR MAP PFN: %016llx - %016llx\n",
+ range[i].start, range[i].end);
+ }
+
+ /* Take out UC ranges: */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+ if (type != MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE &&
+ type != MTRR_TYPE_WRPROT)
+ continue;
+ size = range_state[i].size_pfn;
+ if (!size)
+ continue;
+ base = range_state[i].base_pfn;
+ if (base < (1<<(20-PAGE_SHIFT)) && mtrr_state.have_fixed &&
+ (mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED) &&
+ (mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_FIXED_ENABLED)) {
+ /* Var MTRR contains UC entry below 1M? Skip it: */
+ pr_warn(BIOS_BUG_MSG, i);
+ if (base + size <= (1<<(20-PAGE_SHIFT)))
+ continue;
+ size -= (1<<(20-PAGE_SHIFT)) - base;
+ base = 1<<(20-PAGE_SHIFT);
+ }
+ subtract_range(range, RANGE_NUM, base, base + size);
+ }
+ if (extra_remove_size)
+ subtract_range(range, RANGE_NUM, extra_remove_base,
+ extra_remove_base + extra_remove_size);
+
+ if (debug_print) {
+ pr_debug("After UC checking\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < RANGE_NUM; i++) {
+ if (!range[i].end)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("MTRR MAP PFN: %016llx - %016llx\n",
+ range[i].start, range[i].end);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* sort the ranges */
+ nr_range = clean_sort_range(range, RANGE_NUM);
+ if (debug_print) {
+ pr_debug("After sorting\n");
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_range; i++)
+ pr_debug("MTRR MAP PFN: %016llx - %016llx\n",
+ range[i].start, range[i].end);
+ }
+
+ return nr_range;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER
+
+static unsigned long __init sum_ranges(struct range *range, int nr_range)
+{
+ unsigned long sum = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_range; i++)
+ sum += range[i].end - range[i].start;
+
+ return sum;
+}
+
+static int enable_mtrr_cleanup __initdata =
+ CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER_ENABLE_DEFAULT;
+
+static int __init disable_mtrr_cleanup_setup(char *str)
+{
+ enable_mtrr_cleanup = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("disable_mtrr_cleanup", disable_mtrr_cleanup_setup);
+
+static int __init enable_mtrr_cleanup_setup(char *str)
+{
+ enable_mtrr_cleanup = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("enable_mtrr_cleanup", enable_mtrr_cleanup_setup);
+
+static int __init mtrr_cleanup_debug_setup(char *str)
+{
+ debug_print = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mtrr_cleanup_debug", mtrr_cleanup_debug_setup);
+
+static void __init
+set_var_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long basek, unsigned long sizek,
+ unsigned char type, unsigned int address_bits)
+{
+ u32 base_lo, base_hi, mask_lo, mask_hi;
+ u64 base, mask;
+
+ if (!sizek) {
+ fill_mtrr_var_range(reg, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mask = (1ULL << address_bits) - 1;
+ mask &= ~((((u64)sizek) << 10) - 1);
+
+ base = ((u64)basek) << 10;
+
+ base |= type;
+ mask |= 0x800;
+
+ base_lo = base & ((1ULL<<32) - 1);
+ base_hi = base >> 32;
+
+ mask_lo = mask & ((1ULL<<32) - 1);
+ mask_hi = mask >> 32;
+
+ fill_mtrr_var_range(reg, base_lo, base_hi, mask_lo, mask_hi);
+}
+
+static void __init
+save_var_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long basek, unsigned long sizek,
+ unsigned char type)
+{
+ range_state[reg].base_pfn = basek >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ range_state[reg].size_pfn = sizek >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ range_state[reg].type = type;
+}
+
+static void __init set_var_mtrr_all(unsigned int address_bits)
+{
+ unsigned long basek, sizek;
+ unsigned char type;
+ unsigned int reg;
+
+ for (reg = 0; reg < num_var_ranges; reg++) {
+ basek = range_state[reg].base_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ sizek = range_state[reg].size_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ type = range_state[reg].type;
+
+ set_var_mtrr(reg, basek, sizek, type, address_bits);
+ }
+}
+
+static unsigned long to_size_factor(unsigned long sizek, char *factorp)
+{
+ unsigned long base = sizek;
+ char factor;
+
+ if (base & ((1<<10) - 1)) {
+ /* Not MB-aligned: */
+ factor = 'K';
+ } else if (base & ((1<<20) - 1)) {
+ factor = 'M';
+ base >>= 10;
+ } else {
+ factor = 'G';
+ base >>= 20;
+ }
+
+ *factorp = factor;
+
+ return base;
+}
+
+static unsigned int __init
+range_to_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long range_startk,
+ unsigned long range_sizek, unsigned char type)
+{
+ if (!range_sizek || (reg >= num_var_ranges))
+ return reg;
+
+ while (range_sizek) {
+ unsigned long max_align, align;
+ unsigned long sizek;
+
+ /* Compute the maximum size with which we can make a range: */
+ if (range_startk)
+ max_align = __ffs(range_startk);
+ else
+ max_align = BITS_PER_LONG - 1;
+
+ align = __fls(range_sizek);
+ if (align > max_align)
+ align = max_align;
+
+ sizek = 1UL << align;
+ if (debug_print) {
+ char start_factor = 'K', size_factor = 'K';
+ unsigned long start_base, size_base;
+
+ start_base = to_size_factor(range_startk, &start_factor);
+ size_base = to_size_factor(sizek, &size_factor);
+
+ Dprintk("Setting variable MTRR %d, "
+ "base: %ld%cB, range: %ld%cB, type %s\n",
+ reg, start_base, start_factor,
+ size_base, size_factor,
+ (type == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE) ? "UC" :
+ ((type == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK) ? "WB" : "Other")
+ );
+ }
+ save_var_mtrr(reg++, range_startk, sizek, type);
+ range_startk += sizek;
+ range_sizek -= sizek;
+ if (reg >= num_var_ranges)
+ break;
+ }
+ return reg;
+}
+
+static unsigned __init
+range_to_mtrr_with_hole(struct var_mtrr_state *state, unsigned long basek,
+ unsigned long sizek)
+{
+ unsigned long hole_basek, hole_sizek;
+ unsigned long second_sizek;
+ unsigned long range0_basek, range0_sizek;
+ unsigned long range_basek, range_sizek;
+ unsigned long chunk_sizek;
+ unsigned long gran_sizek;
+
+ hole_basek = 0;
+ hole_sizek = 0;
+ second_sizek = 0;
+ chunk_sizek = state->chunk_sizek;
+ gran_sizek = state->gran_sizek;
+
+ /* Align with gran size, prevent small block used up MTRRs: */
+ range_basek = ALIGN(state->range_startk, gran_sizek);
+ if ((range_basek > basek) && basek)
+ return second_sizek;
+
+ state->range_sizek -= (range_basek - state->range_startk);
+ range_sizek = ALIGN(state->range_sizek, gran_sizek);
+
+ while (range_sizek > state->range_sizek) {
+ range_sizek -= gran_sizek;
+ if (!range_sizek)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ state->range_sizek = range_sizek;
+
+ /* Try to append some small hole: */
+ range0_basek = state->range_startk;
+ range0_sizek = ALIGN(state->range_sizek, chunk_sizek);
+
+ /* No increase: */
+ if (range0_sizek == state->range_sizek) {
+ Dprintk("rangeX: %016lx - %016lx\n",
+ range0_basek<<10,
+ (range0_basek + state->range_sizek)<<10);
+ state->reg = range_to_mtrr(state->reg, range0_basek,
+ state->range_sizek, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Only cut back when it is not the last: */
+ if (sizek) {
+ while (range0_basek + range0_sizek > (basek + sizek)) {
+ if (range0_sizek >= chunk_sizek)
+ range0_sizek -= chunk_sizek;
+ else
+ range0_sizek = 0;
+
+ if (!range0_sizek)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+second_try:
+ range_basek = range0_basek + range0_sizek;
+
+ /* One hole in the middle: */
+ if (range_basek > basek && range_basek <= (basek + sizek))
+ second_sizek = range_basek - basek;
+
+ if (range0_sizek > state->range_sizek) {
+
+ /* One hole in middle or at the end: */
+ hole_sizek = range0_sizek - state->range_sizek - second_sizek;
+
+ /* Hole size should be less than half of range0 size: */
+ if (hole_sizek >= (range0_sizek >> 1) &&
+ range0_sizek >= chunk_sizek) {
+ range0_sizek -= chunk_sizek;
+ second_sizek = 0;
+ hole_sizek = 0;
+
+ goto second_try;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (range0_sizek) {
+ Dprintk("range0: %016lx - %016lx\n",
+ range0_basek<<10,
+ (range0_basek + range0_sizek)<<10);
+ state->reg = range_to_mtrr(state->reg, range0_basek,
+ range0_sizek, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (range0_sizek < state->range_sizek) {
+ /* Need to handle left over range: */
+ range_sizek = state->range_sizek - range0_sizek;
+
+ Dprintk("range: %016lx - %016lx\n",
+ range_basek<<10,
+ (range_basek + range_sizek)<<10);
+
+ state->reg = range_to_mtrr(state->reg, range_basek,
+ range_sizek, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
+ }
+
+ if (hole_sizek) {
+ hole_basek = range_basek - hole_sizek - second_sizek;
+ Dprintk("hole: %016lx - %016lx\n",
+ hole_basek<<10,
+ (hole_basek + hole_sizek)<<10);
+ state->reg = range_to_mtrr(state->reg, hole_basek,
+ hole_sizek, MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE);
+ }
+
+ return second_sizek;
+}
+
+static void __init
+set_var_mtrr_range(struct var_mtrr_state *state, unsigned long base_pfn,
+ unsigned long size_pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long basek, sizek;
+ unsigned long second_sizek = 0;
+
+ if (state->reg >= num_var_ranges)
+ return;
+
+ basek = base_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ sizek = size_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+
+ /* See if I can merge with the last range: */
+ if ((basek <= 1024) ||
+ (state->range_startk + state->range_sizek == basek)) {
+ unsigned long endk = basek + sizek;
+ state->range_sizek = endk - state->range_startk;
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Write the range mtrrs: */
+ if (state->range_sizek != 0)
+ second_sizek = range_to_mtrr_with_hole(state, basek, sizek);
+
+ /* Allocate an msr: */
+ state->range_startk = basek + second_sizek;
+ state->range_sizek = sizek - second_sizek;
+}
+
+/* Minimum size of mtrr block that can take hole: */
+static u64 mtrr_chunk_size __initdata = (256ULL<<20);
+
+static int __init parse_mtrr_chunk_size_opt(char *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ mtrr_chunk_size = memparse(p, &p);
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mtrr_chunk_size", parse_mtrr_chunk_size_opt);
+
+/* Granularity of mtrr of block: */
+static u64 mtrr_gran_size __initdata;
+
+static int __init parse_mtrr_gran_size_opt(char *p)
+{
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ mtrr_gran_size = memparse(p, &p);
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mtrr_gran_size", parse_mtrr_gran_size_opt);
+
+static unsigned long nr_mtrr_spare_reg __initdata =
+ CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER_SPARE_REG_NR_DEFAULT;
+
+static int __init parse_mtrr_spare_reg(char *arg)
+{
+ if (arg)
+ nr_mtrr_spare_reg = simple_strtoul(arg, NULL, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("mtrr_spare_reg_nr", parse_mtrr_spare_reg);
+
+static int __init
+x86_setup_var_mtrrs(struct range *range, int nr_range,
+ u64 chunk_size, u64 gran_size)
+{
+ struct var_mtrr_state var_state;
+ int num_reg;
+ int i;
+
+ var_state.range_startk = 0;
+ var_state.range_sizek = 0;
+ var_state.reg = 0;
+ var_state.chunk_sizek = chunk_size >> 10;
+ var_state.gran_sizek = gran_size >> 10;
+
+ memset(range_state, 0, sizeof(range_state));
+
+ /* Write the range: */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_range; i++) {
+ set_var_mtrr_range(&var_state, range[i].start,
+ range[i].end - range[i].start);
+ }
+
+ /* Write the last range: */
+ if (var_state.range_sizek != 0)
+ range_to_mtrr_with_hole(&var_state, 0, 0);
+
+ num_reg = var_state.reg;
+ /* Clear out the extra MTRR's: */
+ while (var_state.reg < num_var_ranges) {
+ save_var_mtrr(var_state.reg, 0, 0, 0);
+ var_state.reg++;
+ }
+
+ return num_reg;
+}
+
+struct mtrr_cleanup_result {
+ unsigned long gran_sizek;
+ unsigned long chunk_sizek;
+ unsigned long lose_cover_sizek;
+ unsigned int num_reg;
+ int bad;
+};
+
+/*
+ * gran_size: 64K, 128K, 256K, 512K, 1M, 2M, ..., 2G
+ * chunk size: gran_size, ..., 2G
+ * so we need (1+16)*8
+ */
+#define NUM_RESULT 136
+#define PSHIFT (PAGE_SHIFT - 10)
+
+static struct mtrr_cleanup_result __initdata result[NUM_RESULT];
+static unsigned long __initdata min_loss_pfn[RANGE_NUM];
+
+static void __init print_out_mtrr_range_state(void)
+{
+ char start_factor = 'K', size_factor = 'K';
+ unsigned long start_base, size_base;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+
+ size_base = range_state[i].size_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ if (!size_base)
+ continue;
+
+ size_base = to_size_factor(size_base, &size_factor);
+ start_base = range_state[i].base_pfn << (PAGE_SHIFT - 10);
+ start_base = to_size_factor(start_base, &start_factor);
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+
+ pr_debug("reg %d, base: %ld%cB, range: %ld%cB, type %s\n",
+ i, start_base, start_factor,
+ size_base, size_factor,
+ (type == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE) ? "UC" :
+ ((type == MTRR_TYPE_WRPROT) ? "WP" :
+ ((type == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK) ? "WB" : "Other"))
+ );
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init mtrr_need_cleanup(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ unsigned long size;
+ /* Extra one for all 0: */
+ int num[MTRR_NUM_TYPES + 1];
+
+ /* Check entries number: */
+ memset(num, 0, sizeof(num));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+ size = range_state[i].size_pfn;
+ if (type >= MTRR_NUM_TYPES)
+ continue;
+ if (!size)
+ type = MTRR_NUM_TYPES;
+ num[type]++;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we got UC entries: */
+ if (!num[MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE])
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if we only had WB and UC */
+ if (num[MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK] + num[MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE] !=
+ num_var_ranges - num[MTRR_NUM_TYPES])
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static unsigned long __initdata range_sums;
+
+static void __init
+mtrr_calc_range_state(u64 chunk_size, u64 gran_size,
+ unsigned long x_remove_base,
+ unsigned long x_remove_size, int i)
+{
+ /*
+ * range_new should really be an automatic variable, but
+ * putting 4096 bytes on the stack is frowned upon, to put it
+ * mildly. It is safe to make it a static __initdata variable,
+ * since mtrr_calc_range_state is only called during init and
+ * there's no way it will call itself recursively.
+ */
+ static struct range range_new[RANGE_NUM] __initdata;
+ unsigned long range_sums_new;
+ int nr_range_new;
+ int num_reg;
+
+ /* Convert ranges to var ranges state: */
+ num_reg = x86_setup_var_mtrrs(range, nr_range, chunk_size, gran_size);
+
+ /* We got new setting in range_state, check it: */
+ memset(range_new, 0, sizeof(range_new));
+ nr_range_new = x86_get_mtrr_mem_range(range_new, 0,
+ x_remove_base, x_remove_size);
+ range_sums_new = sum_ranges(range_new, nr_range_new);
+
+ result[i].chunk_sizek = chunk_size >> 10;
+ result[i].gran_sizek = gran_size >> 10;
+ result[i].num_reg = num_reg;
+
+ if (range_sums < range_sums_new) {
+ result[i].lose_cover_sizek = (range_sums_new - range_sums) << PSHIFT;
+ result[i].bad = 1;
+ } else {
+ result[i].lose_cover_sizek = (range_sums - range_sums_new) << PSHIFT;
+ }
+
+ /* Double check it: */
+ if (!result[i].bad && !result[i].lose_cover_sizek) {
+ if (nr_range_new != nr_range || memcmp(range, range_new, sizeof(range)))
+ result[i].bad = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!result[i].bad && (range_sums - range_sums_new < min_loss_pfn[num_reg]))
+ min_loss_pfn[num_reg] = range_sums - range_sums_new;
+}
+
+static void __init mtrr_print_out_one_result(int i)
+{
+ unsigned long gran_base, chunk_base, lose_base;
+ char gran_factor, chunk_factor, lose_factor;
+
+ gran_base = to_size_factor(result[i].gran_sizek, &gran_factor);
+ chunk_base = to_size_factor(result[i].chunk_sizek, &chunk_factor);
+ lose_base = to_size_factor(result[i].lose_cover_sizek, &lose_factor);
+
+ pr_info("%sgran_size: %ld%c \tchunk_size: %ld%c \t",
+ result[i].bad ? "*BAD*" : " ",
+ gran_base, gran_factor, chunk_base, chunk_factor);
+ pr_cont("num_reg: %d \tlose cover RAM: %s%ld%c\n",
+ result[i].num_reg, result[i].bad ? "-" : "",
+ lose_base, lose_factor);
+}
+
+static int __init mtrr_search_optimal_index(void)
+{
+ int num_reg_good;
+ int index_good;
+ int i;
+
+ if (nr_mtrr_spare_reg >= num_var_ranges)
+ nr_mtrr_spare_reg = num_var_ranges - 1;
+
+ num_reg_good = -1;
+ for (i = num_var_ranges - nr_mtrr_spare_reg; i > 0; i--) {
+ if (!min_loss_pfn[i])
+ num_reg_good = i;
+ }
+
+ index_good = -1;
+ if (num_reg_good != -1) {
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RESULT; i++) {
+ if (!result[i].bad &&
+ result[i].num_reg == num_reg_good &&
+ !result[i].lose_cover_sizek) {
+ index_good = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return index_good;
+}
+
+int __init mtrr_cleanup(unsigned address_bits)
+{
+ unsigned long x_remove_base, x_remove_size;
+ unsigned long base, size, def, dummy;
+ u64 chunk_size, gran_size;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ int index_good;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!is_cpu(INTEL) || enable_mtrr_cleanup < 1)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, def, dummy);
+ def &= 0xff;
+ if (def != MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get it and store it aside: */
+ memset(range_state, 0, sizeof(range_state));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &base, &size, &type);
+ range_state[i].base_pfn = base;
+ range_state[i].size_pfn = size;
+ range_state[i].type = type;
+ }
+
+ /* Check if we need handle it and can handle it: */
+ if (!mtrr_need_cleanup())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Print original var MTRRs at first, for debugging: */
+ pr_debug("original variable MTRRs\n");
+ print_out_mtrr_range_state();
+
+ memset(range, 0, sizeof(range));
+ x_remove_size = 0;
+ x_remove_base = 1 << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT);
+ if (mtrr_tom2)
+ x_remove_size = (mtrr_tom2 >> PAGE_SHIFT) - x_remove_base;
+
+ /*
+ * [0, 1M) should always be covered by var mtrr with WB
+ * and fixed mtrrs should take effect before var mtrr for it:
+ */
+ nr_range = add_range_with_merge(range, RANGE_NUM, 0, 0,
+ 1ULL<<(20 - PAGE_SHIFT));
+ /* add from var mtrr at last */
+ nr_range = x86_get_mtrr_mem_range(range, nr_range,
+ x_remove_base, x_remove_size);
+
+ range_sums = sum_ranges(range, nr_range);
+ pr_info("total RAM covered: %ldM\n",
+ range_sums >> (20 - PAGE_SHIFT));
+
+ if (mtrr_chunk_size && mtrr_gran_size) {
+ i = 0;
+ mtrr_calc_range_state(mtrr_chunk_size, mtrr_gran_size,
+ x_remove_base, x_remove_size, i);
+
+ mtrr_print_out_one_result(i);
+
+ if (!result[i].bad) {
+ set_var_mtrr_all(address_bits);
+ pr_debug("New variable MTRRs\n");
+ print_out_mtrr_range_state();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ pr_info("invalid mtrr_gran_size or mtrr_chunk_size, will find optimal one\n");
+ }
+
+ i = 0;
+ memset(min_loss_pfn, 0xff, sizeof(min_loss_pfn));
+ memset(result, 0, sizeof(result));
+ for (gran_size = (1ULL<<16); gran_size < (1ULL<<32); gran_size <<= 1) {
+
+ for (chunk_size = gran_size; chunk_size < (1ULL<<32);
+ chunk_size <<= 1) {
+
+ if (i >= NUM_RESULT)
+ continue;
+
+ mtrr_calc_range_state(chunk_size, gran_size,
+ x_remove_base, x_remove_size, i);
+ if (debug_print) {
+ mtrr_print_out_one_result(i);
+ pr_info("\n");
+ }
+
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Try to find the optimal index: */
+ index_good = mtrr_search_optimal_index();
+
+ if (index_good != -1) {
+ pr_info("Found optimal setting for mtrr clean up\n");
+ i = index_good;
+ mtrr_print_out_one_result(i);
+
+ /* Convert ranges to var ranges state: */
+ chunk_size = result[i].chunk_sizek;
+ chunk_size <<= 10;
+ gran_size = result[i].gran_sizek;
+ gran_size <<= 10;
+ x86_setup_var_mtrrs(range, nr_range, chunk_size, gran_size);
+ set_var_mtrr_all(address_bits);
+ pr_debug("New variable MTRRs\n");
+ print_out_mtrr_range_state();
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* print out all */
+ for (i = 0; i < NUM_RESULT; i++)
+ mtrr_print_out_one_result(i);
+ }
+
+ pr_info("mtrr_cleanup: can not find optimal value\n");
+ pr_info("please specify mtrr_gran_size/mtrr_chunk_size\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+int __init mtrr_cleanup(unsigned address_bits)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int disable_mtrr_trim;
+
+static int __init disable_mtrr_trim_setup(char *str)
+{
+ disable_mtrr_trim = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("disable_mtrr_trim", disable_mtrr_trim_setup);
+
+/*
+ * Newer AMD K8s and later CPUs have a special magic MSR way to force WB
+ * for memory >4GB. Check for that here.
+ * Note this won't check if the MTRRs < 4GB where the magic bit doesn't
+ * apply to are wrong, but so far we don't know of any such case in the wild.
+ */
+#define Tom2Enabled (1U << 21)
+#define Tom2ForceMemTypeWB (1U << 22)
+
+int __init amd_special_default_mtrr(void)
+{
+ u32 l, h;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
+ return 0;
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0xf)
+ return 0;
+ /* In case some hypervisor doesn't pass SYSCFG through: */
+ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, &l, &h) < 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Memory between 4GB and top of mem is forced WB by this magic bit.
+ * Reserved before K8RevF, but should be zero there.
+ */
+ if ((l & (Tom2Enabled | Tom2ForceMemTypeWB)) ==
+ (Tom2Enabled | Tom2ForceMemTypeWB))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u64 __init
+real_trim_memory(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long limit_pfn)
+{
+ u64 trim_start, trim_size;
+
+ trim_start = start_pfn;
+ trim_start <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ trim_size = limit_pfn;
+ trim_size <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ trim_size -= trim_start;
+
+ return e820__range_update(trim_start, trim_size, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED);
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_trim_uncached_memory - trim RAM not covered by MTRRs
+ * @end_pfn: ending page frame number
+ *
+ * Some buggy BIOSes don't setup the MTRRs properly for systems with certain
+ * memory configurations. This routine checks that the highest MTRR matches
+ * the end of memory, to make sure the MTRRs having a write back type cover
+ * all of the memory the kernel is intending to use. If not, it'll trim any
+ * memory off the end by adjusting end_pfn, removing it from the kernel's
+ * allocation pools, warning the user with an obnoxious message.
+ */
+int __init mtrr_trim_uncached_memory(unsigned long end_pfn)
+{
+ unsigned long i, base, size, highest_pfn = 0, def, dummy;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ u64 total_trim_size;
+ /* extra one for all 0 */
+ int num[MTRR_NUM_TYPES + 1];
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure we only trim uncachable memory on machines that
+ * support the Intel MTRR architecture:
+ */
+ if (!is_cpu(INTEL) || disable_mtrr_trim)
+ return 0;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, def, dummy);
+ def &= 0xff;
+ if (def != MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get it and store it aside: */
+ memset(range_state, 0, sizeof(range_state));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &base, &size, &type);
+ range_state[i].base_pfn = base;
+ range_state[i].size_pfn = size;
+ range_state[i].type = type;
+ }
+
+ /* Find highest cached pfn: */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+ if (type != MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK)
+ continue;
+ base = range_state[i].base_pfn;
+ size = range_state[i].size_pfn;
+ if (highest_pfn < base + size)
+ highest_pfn = base + size;
+ }
+
+ /* kvm/qemu doesn't have mtrr set right, don't trim them all: */
+ if (!highest_pfn) {
+ pr_info("CPU MTRRs all blank - virtualized system.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check entries number: */
+ memset(num, 0, sizeof(num));
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ type = range_state[i].type;
+ if (type >= MTRR_NUM_TYPES)
+ continue;
+ size = range_state[i].size_pfn;
+ if (!size)
+ type = MTRR_NUM_TYPES;
+ num[type]++;
+ }
+
+ /* No entry for WB? */
+ if (!num[MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK])
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check if we only had WB and UC: */
+ if (num[MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK] + num[MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE] !=
+ num_var_ranges - num[MTRR_NUM_TYPES])
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(range, 0, sizeof(range));
+ nr_range = 0;
+ if (mtrr_tom2) {
+ range[nr_range].start = (1ULL<<(32 - PAGE_SHIFT));
+ range[nr_range].end = mtrr_tom2 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ if (highest_pfn < range[nr_range].end)
+ highest_pfn = range[nr_range].end;
+ nr_range++;
+ }
+ nr_range = x86_get_mtrr_mem_range(range, nr_range, 0, 0);
+
+ /* Check the head: */
+ total_trim_size = 0;
+ if (range[0].start)
+ total_trim_size += real_trim_memory(0, range[0].start);
+
+ /* Check the holes: */
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_range - 1; i++) {
+ if (range[i].end < range[i+1].start)
+ total_trim_size += real_trim_memory(range[i].end,
+ range[i+1].start);
+ }
+
+ /* Check the top: */
+ i = nr_range - 1;
+ if (range[i].end < end_pfn)
+ total_trim_size += real_trim_memory(range[i].end,
+ end_pfn);
+
+ if (total_trim_size) {
+ pr_warn("WARNING: BIOS bug: CPU MTRRs don't cover all of memory, losing %lluMB of RAM.\n",
+ total_trim_size >> 20);
+
+ if (!changed_by_mtrr_cleanup)
+ WARN_ON(1);
+
+ pr_info("update e820 for mtrr\n");
+ e820__update_table_print();
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca670919b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/cyrix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor-cyrix.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+static void
+cyrix_get_arr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ unsigned long *size, mtrr_type * type)
+{
+ unsigned char arr, ccr3, rcr, shift;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ arr = CX86_ARR_BASE + (reg << 1) + reg; /* avoid multiplication by 3 */
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10); /* enable MAPEN */
+ ((unsigned char *)base)[3] = getCx86(arr);
+ ((unsigned char *)base)[2] = getCx86(arr + 1);
+ ((unsigned char *)base)[1] = getCx86(arr + 2);
+ rcr = getCx86(CX86_RCR_BASE + reg);
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3); /* disable MAPEN */
+
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ shift = ((unsigned char *) base)[1] & 0x0f;
+ *base >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ /*
+ * Power of two, at least 4K on ARR0-ARR6, 256K on ARR7
+ * Note: shift==0xf means 4G, this is unsupported.
+ */
+ if (shift)
+ *size = (reg < 7 ? 0x1UL : 0x40UL) << (shift - 1);
+ else
+ *size = 0;
+
+ /* Bit 0 is Cache Enable on ARR7, Cache Disable on ARR0-ARR6 */
+ if (reg < 7) {
+ switch (rcr) {
+ case 1:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+ break;
+ case 9:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB;
+ break;
+ case 24:
+ default:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (rcr) {
+ case 0:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ break;
+ case 8:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB;
+ break;
+ case 9:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+ break;
+ case 25:
+ default:
+ *type = MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * cyrix_get_free_region - get a free ARR.
+ *
+ * @base: the starting (base) address of the region.
+ * @size: the size (in bytes) of the region.
+ *
+ * Returns: the index of the region on success, else -1 on error.
+*/
+static int
+cyrix_get_free_region(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, int replace_reg)
+{
+ unsigned long lbase, lsize;
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+ int i;
+
+ switch (replace_reg) {
+ case 7:
+ if (size < 0x40)
+ break;
+ fallthrough;
+ case 6:
+ case 5:
+ case 4:
+ return replace_reg;
+ case 3:
+ case 2:
+ case 1:
+ case 0:
+ return replace_reg;
+ }
+ /* If we are to set up a region >32M then look at ARR7 immediately */
+ if (size > 0x2000) {
+ cyrix_get_arr(7, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lsize == 0)
+ return 7;
+ /* Else try ARR0-ARR6 first */
+ } else {
+ for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+ cyrix_get_arr(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lsize == 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+ /*
+ * ARR0-ARR6 isn't free
+ * try ARR7 but its size must be at least 256K
+ */
+ cyrix_get_arr(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if ((lsize == 0) && (size >= 0x40))
+ return i;
+ }
+ return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+static u32 cr4, ccr3;
+
+static void prepare_set(void)
+{
+ u32 cr0;
+
+ /* Save value of CR4 and clear Page Global Enable (bit 7) */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
+ cr4 = __read_cr4();
+ __write_cr4(cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PGE);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Disable and flush caches.
+ * Note that wbinvd flushes the TLBs as a side-effect
+ */
+ cr0 = read_cr0() | X86_CR0_CD;
+ wbinvd();
+ write_cr0(cr0);
+ wbinvd();
+
+ /* Cyrix ARRs - everything else was excluded at the top */
+ ccr3 = getCx86(CX86_CCR3);
+
+ /* Cyrix ARRs - everything else was excluded at the top */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, (ccr3 & 0x0f) | 0x10);
+}
+
+static void post_set(void)
+{
+ /* Flush caches and TLBs */
+ wbinvd();
+
+ /* Cyrix ARRs - everything else was excluded at the top */
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR3, ccr3);
+
+ /* Enable caches */
+ write_cr0(read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_CD);
+
+ /* Restore value of CR4 */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
+ __write_cr4(cr4);
+}
+
+static void cyrix_set_arr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ unsigned char arr, arr_type, arr_size;
+
+ arr = CX86_ARR_BASE + (reg << 1) + reg; /* avoid multiplication by 3 */
+
+ /* count down from 32M (ARR0-ARR6) or from 2G (ARR7) */
+ if (reg >= 7)
+ size >>= 6;
+
+ size &= 0x7fff; /* make sure arr_size <= 14 */
+ for (arr_size = 0; size; arr_size++, size >>= 1)
+ ;
+
+ if (reg < 7) {
+ switch (type) {
+ case MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE:
+ arr_type = 1;
+ break;
+ case MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB:
+ arr_type = 9;
+ break;
+ case MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH:
+ arr_type = 24;
+ break;
+ default:
+ arr_type = 8;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (type) {
+ case MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE:
+ arr_type = 0;
+ break;
+ case MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB:
+ arr_type = 8;
+ break;
+ case MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH:
+ arr_type = 25;
+ break;
+ default:
+ arr_type = 9;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ prepare_set();
+
+ base <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ setCx86(arr + 0, ((unsigned char *)&base)[3]);
+ setCx86(arr + 1, ((unsigned char *)&base)[2]);
+ setCx86(arr + 2, (((unsigned char *)&base)[1]) | arr_size);
+ setCx86(CX86_RCR_BASE + reg, arr_type);
+
+ post_set();
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+ unsigned long base;
+ unsigned long size;
+ mtrr_type type;
+} arr_state_t;
+
+static arr_state_t arr_state[8] = {
+ {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL},
+ {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}, {0UL, 0UL, 0UL}
+};
+
+static unsigned char ccr_state[7] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+
+static void cyrix_set_all(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ prepare_set();
+
+ /* the CCRs are not contiguous */
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR0 + i, ccr_state[i]);
+ for (; i < 7; i++)
+ setCx86(CX86_CCR4 + i, ccr_state[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ cyrix_set_arr(i, arr_state[i].base,
+ arr_state[i].size, arr_state[i].type);
+ }
+
+ post_set();
+}
+
+static const struct mtrr_ops cyrix_mtrr_ops = {
+ .vendor = X86_VENDOR_CYRIX,
+ .set_all = cyrix_set_all,
+ .set = cyrix_set_arr,
+ .get = cyrix_get_arr,
+ .get_free_region = cyrix_get_free_region,
+ .validate_add_page = generic_validate_add_page,
+ .have_wrcomb = positive_have_wrcomb,
+};
+
+int __init cyrix_init_mtrr(void)
+{
+ set_mtrr_ops(&cyrix_mtrr_ops);
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..558108296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * This only handles 32bit MTRR on 32bit hosts. This is strictly wrong
+ * because MTRRs can span up to 40 bits (36bits on most modern x86)
+ */
+
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+struct fixed_range_block {
+ int base_msr; /* start address of an MTRR block */
+ int ranges; /* number of MTRRs in this block */
+};
+
+static struct fixed_range_block fixed_range_blocks[] = {
+ { MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000, 1 }, /* one 64k MTRR */
+ { MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000, 2 }, /* two 16k MTRRs */
+ { MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000, 8 }, /* eight 4k MTRRs */
+ {}
+};
+
+static unsigned long smp_changes_mask;
+static int mtrr_state_set;
+u64 mtrr_tom2;
+
+struct mtrr_state_type mtrr_state;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mtrr_state);
+
+/*
+ * BIOS is expected to clear MtrrFixDramModEn bit, see for example
+ * "BIOS and Kernel Developer's Guide for the AMD Athlon 64 and AMD
+ * Opteron Processors" (26094 Rev. 3.30 February 2006), section
+ * "13.2.1.2 SYSCFG Register": "The MtrrFixDramModEn bit should be set
+ * to 1 during BIOS initialization of the fixed MTRRs, then cleared to
+ * 0 for operation."
+ */
+static inline void k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en(void)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ if (!((boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86 >= 0x0f)))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, lo, hi);
+ if (lo & K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY) {
+ pr_err(FW_WARN "MTRR: CPU %u: SYSCFG[MtrrFixDramModEn]"
+ " not cleared by BIOS, clearing this bit\n",
+ smp_processor_id());
+ lo &= ~K8_MTRRFIXRANGE_DRAM_MODIFY;
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, lo, hi);
+ }
+}
+
+/* Get the size of contiguous MTRR range */
+static u64 get_mtrr_size(u64 mask)
+{
+ u64 size;
+
+ mask >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ mask |= size_or_mask;
+ size = -mask;
+ size <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and return the effective type for MTRR-MTRR type overlap.
+ * Returns 1 if the effective type is UNCACHEABLE, else returns 0
+ */
+static int check_type_overlap(u8 *prev, u8 *curr)
+{
+ if (*prev == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE || *curr == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE) {
+ *prev = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ *curr = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((*prev == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK && *curr == MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH) ||
+ (*prev == MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH && *curr == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK)) {
+ *prev = MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH;
+ *curr = MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH;
+ }
+
+ if (*prev != *curr) {
+ *prev = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ *curr = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_type_lookup_fixed - look up memory type in MTRR fixed entries
+ *
+ * Return the MTRR fixed memory type of 'start'.
+ *
+ * MTRR fixed entries are divided into the following ways:
+ * 0x00000 - 0x7FFFF : This range is divided into eight 64KB sub-ranges
+ * 0x80000 - 0xBFFFF : This range is divided into sixteen 16KB sub-ranges
+ * 0xC0000 - 0xFFFFF : This range is divided into sixty-four 4KB sub-ranges
+ *
+ * Return Values:
+ * MTRR_TYPE_(type) - Matched memory type
+ * MTRR_TYPE_INVALID - Unmatched
+ */
+static u8 mtrr_type_lookup_fixed(u64 start, u64 end)
+{
+ int idx;
+
+ if (start >= 0x100000)
+ return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
+
+ /* 0x0 - 0x7FFFF */
+ if (start < 0x80000) {
+ idx = 0;
+ idx += (start >> 16);
+ return mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[idx];
+ /* 0x80000 - 0xBFFFF */
+ } else if (start < 0xC0000) {
+ idx = 1 * 8;
+ idx += ((start - 0x80000) >> 14);
+ return mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[idx];
+ }
+
+ /* 0xC0000 - 0xFFFFF */
+ idx = 3 * 8;
+ idx += ((start - 0xC0000) >> 12);
+ return mtrr_state.fixed_ranges[idx];
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_type_lookup_variable - look up memory type in MTRR variable entries
+ *
+ * Return Value:
+ * MTRR_TYPE_(type) - Matched memory type or default memory type (unmatched)
+ *
+ * Output Arguments:
+ * repeat - Set to 1 when [start:end] spanned across MTRR range and type
+ * returned corresponds only to [start:*partial_end]. Caller has
+ * to lookup again for [*partial_end:end].
+ *
+ * uniform - Set to 1 when an MTRR covers the region uniformly, i.e. the
+ * region is fully covered by a single MTRR entry or the default
+ * type.
+ */
+static u8 mtrr_type_lookup_variable(u64 start, u64 end, u64 *partial_end,
+ int *repeat, u8 *uniform)
+{
+ int i;
+ u64 base, mask;
+ u8 prev_match, curr_match;
+
+ *repeat = 0;
+ *uniform = 1;
+
+ prev_match = MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
+ unsigned short start_state, end_state, inclusive;
+
+ if (!(mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_lo & (1 << 11)))
+ continue;
+
+ base = (((u64)mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_hi) << 32) +
+ (mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_lo & PAGE_MASK);
+ mask = (((u64)mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_hi) << 32) +
+ (mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_lo & PAGE_MASK);
+
+ start_state = ((start & mask) == (base & mask));
+ end_state = ((end & mask) == (base & mask));
+ inclusive = ((start < base) && (end > base));
+
+ if ((start_state != end_state) || inclusive) {
+ /*
+ * We have start:end spanning across an MTRR.
+ * We split the region into either
+ *
+ * - start_state:1
+ * (start:mtrr_end)(mtrr_end:end)
+ * - end_state:1
+ * (start:mtrr_start)(mtrr_start:end)
+ * - inclusive:1
+ * (start:mtrr_start)(mtrr_start:mtrr_end)(mtrr_end:end)
+ *
+ * depending on kind of overlap.
+ *
+ * Return the type of the first region and a pointer
+ * to the start of next region so that caller will be
+ * advised to lookup again after having adjusted start
+ * and end.
+ *
+ * Note: This way we handle overlaps with multiple
+ * entries and the default type properly.
+ */
+ if (start_state)
+ *partial_end = base + get_mtrr_size(mask);
+ else
+ *partial_end = base;
+
+ if (unlikely(*partial_end <= start)) {
+ WARN_ON(1);
+ *partial_end = start + PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ end = *partial_end - 1; /* end is inclusive */
+ *repeat = 1;
+ *uniform = 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((start & mask) != (base & mask))
+ continue;
+
+ curr_match = mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_lo & 0xff;
+ if (prev_match == MTRR_TYPE_INVALID) {
+ prev_match = curr_match;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ *uniform = 0;
+ if (check_type_overlap(&prev_match, &curr_match))
+ return curr_match;
+ }
+
+ if (prev_match != MTRR_TYPE_INVALID)
+ return prev_match;
+
+ return mtrr_state.def_type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_type_lookup - look up memory type in MTRR
+ *
+ * Return Values:
+ * MTRR_TYPE_(type) - The effective MTRR type for the region
+ * MTRR_TYPE_INVALID - MTRR is disabled
+ *
+ * Output Argument:
+ * uniform - Set to 1 when an MTRR covers the region uniformly, i.e. the
+ * region is fully covered by a single MTRR entry or the default
+ * type.
+ */
+u8 mtrr_type_lookup(u64 start, u64 end, u8 *uniform)
+{
+ u8 type, prev_type, is_uniform = 1, dummy;
+ int repeat;
+ u64 partial_end;
+
+ /* Make end inclusive instead of exclusive */
+ end--;
+
+ if (!mtrr_state_set)
+ return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
+
+ if (!(mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED))
+ return MTRR_TYPE_INVALID;
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the fixed ranges first, which take priority over
+ * the variable ranges.
+ */
+ if ((start < 0x100000) &&
+ (mtrr_state.have_fixed) &&
+ (mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_FIXED_ENABLED)) {
+ is_uniform = 0;
+ type = mtrr_type_lookup_fixed(start, end);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Look up the variable ranges. Look of multiple ranges matching
+ * this address and pick type as per MTRR precedence.
+ */
+ type = mtrr_type_lookup_variable(start, end, &partial_end,
+ &repeat, &is_uniform);
+
+ /*
+ * Common path is with repeat = 0.
+ * However, we can have cases where [start:end] spans across some
+ * MTRR ranges and/or the default type. Do repeated lookups for
+ * that case here.
+ */
+ while (repeat) {
+ prev_type = type;
+ start = partial_end;
+ is_uniform = 0;
+ type = mtrr_type_lookup_variable(start, end, &partial_end,
+ &repeat, &dummy);
+
+ if (check_type_overlap(&prev_type, &type))
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (mtrr_tom2 && (start >= (1ULL<<32)) && (end < mtrr_tom2))
+ type = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
+
+out:
+ *uniform = is_uniform;
+ return type;
+}
+
+/* Get the MSR pair relating to a var range */
+static void
+get_mtrr_var_range(unsigned int index, struct mtrr_var_range *vr)
+{
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(index), vr->base_lo, vr->base_hi);
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(index), vr->mask_lo, vr->mask_hi);
+}
+
+/* Fill the MSR pair relating to a var range */
+void fill_mtrr_var_range(unsigned int index,
+ u32 base_lo, u32 base_hi, u32 mask_lo, u32 mask_hi)
+{
+ struct mtrr_var_range *vr;
+
+ vr = mtrr_state.var_ranges;
+
+ vr[index].base_lo = base_lo;
+ vr[index].base_hi = base_hi;
+ vr[index].mask_lo = mask_lo;
+ vr[index].mask_hi = mask_hi;
+}
+
+static void get_fixed_ranges(mtrr_type *frs)
+{
+ unsigned int *p = (unsigned int *)frs;
+ int i;
+
+ k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en();
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRfix64K_00000, p[0], p[1]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRfix16K_80000 + i, p[2 + i * 2], p[3 + i * 2]);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRfix4K_C0000 + i, p[6 + i * 2], p[7 + i * 2]);
+}
+
+void mtrr_save_fixed_ranges(void *info)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MTRR))
+ get_fixed_ranges(mtrr_state.fixed_ranges);
+}
+
+static unsigned __initdata last_fixed_start;
+static unsigned __initdata last_fixed_end;
+static mtrr_type __initdata last_fixed_type;
+
+static void __init print_fixed_last(void)
+{
+ if (!last_fixed_end)
+ return;
+
+ pr_debug(" %05X-%05X %s\n", last_fixed_start,
+ last_fixed_end - 1, mtrr_attrib_to_str(last_fixed_type));
+
+ last_fixed_end = 0;
+}
+
+static void __init update_fixed_last(unsigned base, unsigned end,
+ mtrr_type type)
+{
+ last_fixed_start = base;
+ last_fixed_end = end;
+ last_fixed_type = type;
+}
+
+static void __init
+print_fixed(unsigned base, unsigned step, const mtrr_type *types)
+{
+ unsigned i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i, ++types, base += step) {
+ if (last_fixed_end == 0) {
+ update_fixed_last(base, base + step, *types);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (last_fixed_end == base && last_fixed_type == *types) {
+ last_fixed_end = base + step;
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* new segments: gap or different type */
+ print_fixed_last();
+ update_fixed_last(base, base + step, *types);
+ }
+}
+
+static void prepare_set(void);
+static void post_set(void);
+
+static void __init print_mtrr_state(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int high_width;
+
+ pr_debug("MTRR default type: %s\n",
+ mtrr_attrib_to_str(mtrr_state.def_type));
+ if (mtrr_state.have_fixed) {
+ pr_debug("MTRR fixed ranges %sabled:\n",
+ ((mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED) &&
+ (mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_FIXED_ENABLED)) ?
+ "en" : "dis");
+ print_fixed(0x00000, 0x10000, mtrr_state.fixed_ranges + 0);
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; ++i)
+ print_fixed(0x80000 + i * 0x20000, 0x04000,
+ mtrr_state.fixed_ranges + (i + 1) * 8);
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
+ print_fixed(0xC0000 + i * 0x08000, 0x01000,
+ mtrr_state.fixed_ranges + (i + 3) * 8);
+
+ /* tail */
+ print_fixed_last();
+ }
+ pr_debug("MTRR variable ranges %sabled:\n",
+ mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED ? "en" : "dis");
+ high_width = (__ffs64(size_or_mask) - (32 - PAGE_SHIFT) + 3) / 4;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
+ if (mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_lo & (1 << 11))
+ pr_debug(" %u base %0*X%05X000 mask %0*X%05X000 %s\n",
+ i,
+ high_width,
+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_hi,
+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_lo >> 12,
+ high_width,
+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_hi,
+ mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].mask_lo >> 12,
+ mtrr_attrib_to_str(mtrr_state.var_ranges[i].base_lo & 0xff));
+ else
+ pr_debug(" %u disabled\n", i);
+ }
+ if (mtrr_tom2)
+ pr_debug("TOM2: %016llx aka %lldM\n", mtrr_tom2, mtrr_tom2>>20);
+}
+
+/* PAT setup for BP. We need to go through sync steps here */
+void __init mtrr_bp_pat_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ prepare_set();
+
+ pat_init();
+
+ post_set();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+/* Grab all of the MTRR state for this CPU into *state */
+bool __init get_mtrr_state(void)
+{
+ struct mtrr_var_range *vrs;
+ unsigned lo, dummy;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ vrs = mtrr_state.var_ranges;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap, lo, dummy);
+ mtrr_state.have_fixed = (lo >> 8) & 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++)
+ get_mtrr_var_range(i, &vrs[i]);
+ if (mtrr_state.have_fixed)
+ get_fixed_ranges(mtrr_state.fixed_ranges);
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, lo, dummy);
+ mtrr_state.def_type = (lo & 0xff);
+ mtrr_state.enabled = (lo & 0xc00) >> 10;
+
+ if (amd_special_default_mtrr()) {
+ unsigned low, high;
+
+ /* TOP_MEM2 */
+ rdmsr(MSR_K8_TOP_MEM2, low, high);
+ mtrr_tom2 = high;
+ mtrr_tom2 <<= 32;
+ mtrr_tom2 |= low;
+ mtrr_tom2 &= 0xffffff800000ULL;
+ }
+
+ print_mtrr_state();
+
+ mtrr_state_set = 1;
+
+ return !!(mtrr_state.enabled & MTRR_STATE_MTRR_ENABLED);
+}
+
+/* Some BIOS's are messed up and don't set all MTRRs the same! */
+void __init mtrr_state_warn(void)
+{
+ unsigned long mask = smp_changes_mask;
+
+ if (!mask)
+ return;
+ if (mask & MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_FIXED)
+ pr_warn("mtrr: your CPUs had inconsistent fixed MTRR settings\n");
+ if (mask & MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_VARIABLE)
+ pr_warn("mtrr: your CPUs had inconsistent variable MTRR settings\n");
+ if (mask & MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_DEFTYPE)
+ pr_warn("mtrr: your CPUs had inconsistent MTRRdefType settings\n");
+
+ pr_info("mtrr: probably your BIOS does not setup all CPUs.\n");
+ pr_info("mtrr: corrected configuration.\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Doesn't attempt to pass an error out to MTRR users
+ * because it's quite complicated in some cases and probably not
+ * worth it because the best error handling is to ignore it.
+ */
+void mtrr_wrmsr(unsigned msr, unsigned a, unsigned b)
+{
+ if (wrmsr_safe(msr, a, b) < 0) {
+ pr_err("MTRR: CPU %u: Writing MSR %x to %x:%x failed\n",
+ smp_processor_id(), msr, a, b);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * set_fixed_range - checks & updates a fixed-range MTRR if it
+ * differs from the value it should have
+ * @msr: MSR address of the MTTR which should be checked and updated
+ * @changed: pointer which indicates whether the MTRR needed to be changed
+ * @msrwords: pointer to the MSR values which the MSR should have
+ */
+static void set_fixed_range(int msr, bool *changed, unsigned int *msrwords)
+{
+ unsigned lo, hi;
+
+ rdmsr(msr, lo, hi);
+
+ if (lo != msrwords[0] || hi != msrwords[1]) {
+ mtrr_wrmsr(msr, msrwords[0], msrwords[1]);
+ *changed = true;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * generic_get_free_region - Get a free MTRR.
+ * @base: The starting (base) address of the region.
+ * @size: The size (in bytes) of the region.
+ * @replace_reg: mtrr index to be replaced; set to invalid value if none.
+ *
+ * Returns: The index of the region on success, else negative on error.
+ */
+int
+generic_get_free_region(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, int replace_reg)
+{
+ unsigned long lbase, lsize;
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+ int i, max;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ if (replace_reg >= 0 && replace_reg < max)
+ return replace_reg;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lsize == 0)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOSPC;
+}
+
+static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ unsigned long *size, mtrr_type *type)
+{
+ u32 mask_lo, mask_hi, base_lo, base_hi;
+ unsigned int hi;
+ u64 tmp, mask;
+
+ /*
+ * get_mtrr doesn't need to update mtrr_state, also it could be called
+ * from any cpu, so try to print it out directly.
+ */
+ get_cpu();
+
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(reg), mask_lo, mask_hi);
+
+ if ((mask_lo & 0x800) == 0) {
+ /* Invalid (i.e. free) range */
+ *base = 0;
+ *size = 0;
+ *type = 0;
+ goto out_put_cpu;
+ }
+
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(reg), base_lo, base_hi);
+
+ /* Work out the shifted address mask: */
+ tmp = (u64)mask_hi << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT) | mask_lo >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ mask = size_or_mask | tmp;
+
+ /* Expand tmp with high bits to all 1s: */
+ hi = fls64(tmp);
+ if (hi > 0) {
+ tmp |= ~((1ULL<<(hi - 1)) - 1);
+
+ if (tmp != mask) {
+ pr_warn("mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n");
+ add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ mask = tmp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This works correctly if size is a power of two, i.e. a
+ * contiguous range:
+ */
+ *size = -mask;
+ *base = (u64)base_hi << (32 - PAGE_SHIFT) | base_lo >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ *type = base_lo & 0xff;
+
+out_put_cpu:
+ put_cpu();
+}
+
+/**
+ * set_fixed_ranges - checks & updates the fixed-range MTRRs if they
+ * differ from the saved set
+ * @frs: pointer to fixed-range MTRR values, saved by get_fixed_ranges()
+ */
+static int set_fixed_ranges(mtrr_type *frs)
+{
+ unsigned long long *saved = (unsigned long long *)frs;
+ bool changed = false;
+ int block = -1, range;
+
+ k8_check_syscfg_dram_mod_en();
+
+ while (fixed_range_blocks[++block].ranges) {
+ for (range = 0; range < fixed_range_blocks[block].ranges; range++)
+ set_fixed_range(fixed_range_blocks[block].base_msr + range,
+ &changed, (unsigned int *)saved++);
+ }
+
+ return changed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MSR pair relating to a var range.
+ * Returns true if changes are made.
+ */
+static bool set_mtrr_var_ranges(unsigned int index, struct mtrr_var_range *vr)
+{
+ unsigned int lo, hi;
+ bool changed = false;
+
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(index), lo, hi);
+ if ((vr->base_lo & 0xfffff0ffUL) != (lo & 0xfffff0ffUL)
+ || (vr->base_hi & (size_and_mask >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT))) !=
+ (hi & (size_and_mask >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT)))) {
+
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(index), vr->base_lo, vr->base_hi);
+ changed = true;
+ }
+
+ rdmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(index), lo, hi);
+
+ if ((vr->mask_lo & 0xfffff800UL) != (lo & 0xfffff800UL)
+ || (vr->mask_hi & (size_and_mask >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT))) !=
+ (hi & (size_and_mask >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT)))) {
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(index), vr->mask_lo, vr->mask_hi);
+ changed = true;
+ }
+ return changed;
+}
+
+static u32 deftype_lo, deftype_hi;
+
+/**
+ * set_mtrr_state - Set the MTRR state for this CPU.
+ *
+ * NOTE: The CPU must already be in a safe state for MTRR changes.
+ * RETURNS: 0 if no changes made, else a mask indicating what was changed.
+ */
+static unsigned long set_mtrr_state(void)
+{
+ unsigned long change_mask = 0;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ if (set_mtrr_var_ranges(i, &mtrr_state.var_ranges[i]))
+ change_mask |= MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_VARIABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (mtrr_state.have_fixed && set_fixed_ranges(mtrr_state.fixed_ranges))
+ change_mask |= MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_FIXED;
+
+ /*
+ * Set_mtrr_restore restores the old value of MTRRdefType,
+ * so to set it we fiddle with the saved value:
+ */
+ if ((deftype_lo & 0xff) != mtrr_state.def_type
+ || ((deftype_lo & 0xc00) >> 10) != mtrr_state.enabled) {
+
+ deftype_lo = (deftype_lo & ~0xcff) | mtrr_state.def_type |
+ (mtrr_state.enabled << 10);
+ change_mask |= MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_DEFTYPE;
+ }
+
+ return change_mask;
+}
+
+
+static unsigned long cr4;
+static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(set_atomicity_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Since we are disabling the cache don't allow any interrupts,
+ * they would run extremely slow and would only increase the pain.
+ *
+ * The caller must ensure that local interrupts are disabled and
+ * are reenabled after post_set() has been called.
+ */
+static void prepare_set(void) __acquires(set_atomicity_lock)
+{
+ unsigned long cr0;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that this is not ideal
+ * since the cache is only flushed/disabled for this CPU while the
+ * MTRRs are changed, but changing this requires more invasive
+ * changes to the way the kernel boots
+ */
+
+ raw_spin_lock(&set_atomicity_lock);
+
+ /* Enter the no-fill (CD=1, NW=0) cache mode and flush caches. */
+ cr0 = read_cr0() | X86_CR0_CD;
+ write_cr0(cr0);
+
+ /*
+ * Cache flushing is the most time-consuming step when programming
+ * the MTRRs. Fortunately, as per the Intel Software Development
+ * Manual, we can skip it if the processor supports cache self-
+ * snooping.
+ */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP))
+ wbinvd();
+
+ /* Save value of CR4 and clear Page Global Enable (bit 7) */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE)) {
+ cr4 = __read_cr4();
+ __write_cr4(cr4 & ~X86_CR4_PGE);
+ }
+
+ /* Flush all TLBs via a mov %cr3, %reg; mov %reg, %cr3 */
+ count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
+ flush_tlb_local();
+
+ /* Save MTRR state */
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, deftype_lo, deftype_hi);
+
+ /* Disable MTRRs, and set the default type to uncached */
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, deftype_lo & ~0xcff, deftype_hi);
+
+ /* Again, only flush caches if we have to. */
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP))
+ wbinvd();
+}
+
+static void post_set(void) __releases(set_atomicity_lock)
+{
+ /* Flush TLBs (no need to flush caches - they are disabled) */
+ count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
+ flush_tlb_local();
+
+ /* Intel (P6) standard MTRRs */
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MSR_MTRRdefType, deftype_lo, deftype_hi);
+
+ /* Enable caches */
+ write_cr0(read_cr0() & ~X86_CR0_CD);
+
+ /* Restore value of CR4 */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PGE))
+ __write_cr4(cr4);
+ raw_spin_unlock(&set_atomicity_lock);
+}
+
+static void generic_set_all(void)
+{
+ unsigned long mask, count;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ prepare_set();
+
+ /* Actually set the state */
+ mask = set_mtrr_state();
+
+ /* also set PAT */
+ pat_init();
+
+ post_set();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+
+ /* Use the atomic bitops to update the global mask */
+ for (count = 0; count < sizeof(mask) * 8; ++count) {
+ if (mask & 0x01)
+ set_bit(count, &smp_changes_mask);
+ mask >>= 1;
+ }
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * generic_set_mtrr - set variable MTRR register on the local CPU.
+ *
+ * @reg: The register to set.
+ * @base: The base address of the region.
+ * @size: The size of the region. If this is 0 the region is disabled.
+ * @type: The type of the region.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void generic_set_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct mtrr_var_range *vr;
+
+ vr = &mtrr_state.var_ranges[reg];
+
+ local_irq_save(flags);
+ prepare_set();
+
+ if (size == 0) {
+ /*
+ * The invalid bit is kept in the mask, so we simply
+ * clear the relevant mask register to disable a range.
+ */
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(reg), 0, 0);
+ memset(vr, 0, sizeof(struct mtrr_var_range));
+ } else {
+ vr->base_lo = base << PAGE_SHIFT | type;
+ vr->base_hi = (base & size_and_mask) >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT);
+ vr->mask_lo = -size << PAGE_SHIFT | 0x800;
+ vr->mask_hi = (-size & size_and_mask) >> (32 - PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MTRRphysBase_MSR(reg), vr->base_lo, vr->base_hi);
+ mtrr_wrmsr(MTRRphysMask_MSR(reg), vr->mask_lo, vr->mask_hi);
+ }
+
+ post_set();
+ local_irq_restore(flags);
+}
+
+int generic_validate_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned int type)
+{
+ unsigned long lbase, last;
+
+ /*
+ * For Intel PPro stepping <= 7
+ * must be 4 MiB aligned and not touch 0x70000000 -> 0x7003FFFF
+ */
+ if (is_cpu(INTEL) && boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 1 &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 7) {
+ if (base & ((1 << (22 - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1)) {
+ pr_warn("mtrr: base(0x%lx000) is not 4 MiB aligned\n", base);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!(base + size < 0x70000 || base > 0x7003F) &&
+ (type == MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB
+ || type == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK)) {
+ pr_warn("mtrr: writable mtrr between 0x70000000 and 0x7003FFFF may hang the CPU.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check upper bits of base and last are equal and lower bits are 0
+ * for base and 1 for last
+ */
+ last = base + size - 1;
+ for (lbase = base; !(lbase & 1) && (last & 1);
+ lbase = lbase >> 1, last = last >> 1)
+ ;
+ if (lbase != last) {
+ pr_warn("mtrr: base(0x%lx000) is not aligned on a size(0x%lx000) boundary\n", base, size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int generic_have_wrcomb(void)
+{
+ unsigned long config, dummy;
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap, config, dummy);
+ return config & (1 << 10);
+}
+
+int positive_have_wrcomb(void)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic structure...
+ */
+const struct mtrr_ops generic_mtrr_ops = {
+ .use_intel_if = 1,
+ .set_all = generic_set_all,
+ .get = generic_get_mtrr,
+ .get_free_region = generic_get_free_region,
+ .set = generic_set_mtrr,
+ .validate_add_page = generic_validate_add_page,
+ .have_wrcomb = generic_have_wrcomb,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a5c506f6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/if.c
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#define LINE_SIZE 80
+
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+#define FILE_FCOUNT(f) (((struct seq_file *)((f)->private_data))->private)
+
+static const char *const mtrr_strings[MTRR_NUM_TYPES] =
+{
+ "uncachable", /* 0 */
+ "write-combining", /* 1 */
+ "?", /* 2 */
+ "?", /* 3 */
+ "write-through", /* 4 */
+ "write-protect", /* 5 */
+ "write-back", /* 6 */
+};
+
+const char *mtrr_attrib_to_str(int x)
+{
+ return (x <= 6) ? mtrr_strings[x] : "?";
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+
+static int
+mtrr_file_add(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned int type, bool increment, struct file *file, int page)
+{
+ unsigned int *fcount = FILE_FCOUNT(file);
+ int reg, max;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ if (fcount == NULL) {
+ fcount = kcalloc(max, sizeof(*fcount), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fcount)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ FILE_FCOUNT(file) = fcount;
+ }
+ if (!page) {
+ if ((base & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || (size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ base >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ }
+ reg = mtrr_add_page(base, size, type, true);
+ if (reg >= 0)
+ ++fcount[reg];
+ return reg;
+}
+
+static int
+mtrr_file_del(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ struct file *file, int page)
+{
+ unsigned int *fcount = FILE_FCOUNT(file);
+ int reg;
+
+ if (!page) {
+ if ((base & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || (size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ base >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ }
+ reg = mtrr_del_page(-1, base, size);
+ if (reg < 0)
+ return reg;
+ if (fcount == NULL)
+ return reg;
+ if (fcount[reg] < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ --fcount[reg];
+ return reg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * seq_file can seek but we ignore it.
+ *
+ * Format of control line:
+ * "base=%Lx size=%Lx type=%s" or "disable=%d"
+ */
+static ssize_t
+mtrr_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t * ppos)
+{
+ int i, err;
+ unsigned long reg;
+ unsigned long long base, size;
+ char *ptr;
+ char line[LINE_SIZE];
+ int length;
+ size_t linelen;
+
+ memset(line, 0, LINE_SIZE);
+
+ len = min_t(size_t, len, LINE_SIZE - 1);
+ length = strncpy_from_user(line, buf, len);
+ if (length < 0)
+ return length;
+
+ linelen = strlen(line);
+ ptr = line + linelen - 1;
+ if (linelen && *ptr == '\n')
+ *ptr = '\0';
+
+ if (!strncmp(line, "disable=", 8)) {
+ reg = simple_strtoul(line + 8, &ptr, 0);
+ err = mtrr_del_page(reg, 0, 0);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ return len;
+ }
+
+ if (strncmp(line, "base=", 5))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ base = simple_strtoull(line + 5, &ptr, 0);
+ ptr = skip_spaces(ptr);
+
+ if (strncmp(ptr, "size=", 5))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = simple_strtoull(ptr + 5, &ptr, 0);
+ if ((base & 0xfff) || (size & 0xfff))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ptr = skip_spaces(ptr);
+
+ if (strncmp(ptr, "type=", 5))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ptr = skip_spaces(ptr + 5);
+
+ i = match_string(mtrr_strings, MTRR_NUM_TYPES, ptr);
+ if (i < 0)
+ return i;
+
+ base >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ size >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+ err = mtrr_add_page((unsigned long)base, (unsigned long)size, i, true);
+ if (err < 0)
+ return err;
+ return len;
+}
+
+static long
+mtrr_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long __arg)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ unsigned long base;
+ unsigned long size;
+ struct mtrr_sentry sentry;
+ struct mtrr_gentry gentry;
+ void __user *arg = (void __user *) __arg;
+
+ memset(&gentry, 0, sizeof(gentry));
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_SET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_DEL_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_KILL_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_SET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ if (copy_from_user(&sentry, arg, sizeof(sentry)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ if (copy_from_user(&gentry, arg, sizeof(gentry)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_ADD_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_SET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_DEL_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_KILL_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_SET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY: {
+ struct mtrr_sentry32 __user *s32;
+
+ s32 = (struct mtrr_sentry32 __user *)__arg;
+ err = get_user(sentry.base, &s32->base);
+ err |= get_user(sentry.size, &s32->size);
+ err |= get_user(sentry.type, &s32->type);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ break;
+ }
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_PAGE_ENTRY: {
+ struct mtrr_gentry32 __user *g32;
+
+ g32 = (struct mtrr_gentry32 __user *)__arg;
+ err = get_user(gentry.regnum, &g32->regnum);
+ err |= get_user(gentry.base, &g32->base);
+ err |= get_user(gentry.size, &g32->size);
+ err |= get_user(gentry.type, &g32->type);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ default:
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ case MTRRIOC_ADD_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_ADD_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err =
+ mtrr_file_add(sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true,
+ file, 0);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_SET_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_SET_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err = mtrr_add(sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_DEL_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_DEL_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err = mtrr_file_del(sentry.base, sentry.size, file, 0);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_KILL_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_KILL_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err = mtrr_del(-1, sentry.base, sentry.size);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ if (gentry.regnum >= num_var_ranges)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ mtrr_if->get(gentry.regnum, &base, &size, &type);
+
+ /* Hide entries that go above 4GB */
+ if (base + size - 1 >= (1UL << (8 * sizeof(gentry.size) - PAGE_SHIFT))
+ || size >= (1UL << (8 * sizeof(gentry.size) - PAGE_SHIFT)))
+ gentry.base = gentry.size = gentry.type = 0;
+ else {
+ gentry.base = base << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ gentry.size = size << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ gentry.type = type;
+ }
+
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_ADD_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err =
+ mtrr_file_add(sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, true,
+ file, 1);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_SET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_SET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err =
+ mtrr_add_page(sentry.base, sentry.size, sentry.type, false);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_DEL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err = mtrr_file_del(sentry.base, sentry.size, file, 1);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_KILL_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ err = mtrr_del_page(-1, sentry.base, sentry.size);
+ break;
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+#endif
+ if (gentry.regnum >= num_var_ranges)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ mtrr_if->get(gentry.regnum, &base, &size, &type);
+ /* Hide entries that would overflow */
+ if (size != (__typeof__(gentry.size))size)
+ gentry.base = gentry.size = gentry.type = 0;
+ else {
+ gentry.base = base;
+ gentry.size = size;
+ gentry.type = type;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC_GET_PAGE_ENTRY:
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &gentry, sizeof(gentry)))
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_ENTRY:
+ case MTRRIOC32_GET_PAGE_ENTRY: {
+ struct mtrr_gentry32 __user *g32;
+
+ g32 = (struct mtrr_gentry32 __user *)__arg;
+ err = put_user(gentry.base, &g32->base);
+ err |= put_user(gentry.size, &g32->size);
+ err |= put_user(gentry.regnum, &g32->regnum);
+ err |= put_user(gentry.type, &g32->type);
+ break;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int mtrr_close(struct inode *ino, struct file *file)
+{
+ unsigned int *fcount = FILE_FCOUNT(file);
+ int i, max;
+
+ if (fcount != NULL) {
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
+ while (fcount[i] > 0) {
+ mtrr_del(i, 0, 0);
+ --fcount[i];
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(fcount);
+ FILE_FCOUNT(file) = NULL;
+ }
+ return single_release(ino, file);
+}
+
+static int mtrr_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *offset)
+{
+ char factor;
+ int i, max;
+ mtrr_type type;
+ unsigned long base, size;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &base, &size, &type);
+ if (size == 0) {
+ mtrr_usage_table[i] = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (size < (0x100000 >> PAGE_SHIFT)) {
+ /* less than 1MB */
+ factor = 'K';
+ size <<= PAGE_SHIFT - 10;
+ } else {
+ factor = 'M';
+ size >>= 20 - PAGE_SHIFT;
+ }
+ /* Base can be > 32bit */
+ seq_printf(seq, "reg%02i: base=0x%06lx000 (%5luMB), size=%5lu%cB, count=%d: %s\n",
+ i, base, base >> (20 - PAGE_SHIFT),
+ size, factor,
+ mtrr_usage_table[i], mtrr_attrib_to_str(type));
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int mtrr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_if)
+ return -EIO;
+ if (!mtrr_if->get)
+ return -ENXIO;
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ return single_open(file, mtrr_seq_show, NULL);
+}
+
+static const struct proc_ops mtrr_proc_ops = {
+ .proc_open = mtrr_open,
+ .proc_read = seq_read,
+ .proc_lseek = seq_lseek,
+ .proc_write = mtrr_write,
+ .proc_ioctl = mtrr_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .proc_compat_ioctl = mtrr_ioctl,
+#endif
+ .proc_release = mtrr_close,
+};
+
+static int __init mtrr_if_init(void)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = &boot_cpu_data;
+
+ if ((!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_MTRR)) &&
+ (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR)) &&
+ (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR)) &&
+ (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR)))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ proc_create("mtrr", S_IWUSR | S_IRUGO, NULL, &mtrr_proc_ops);
+ return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(mtrr_if_init);
+#endif /* CONFIG_PROC_FS */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2746cac9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,887 @@
+/* Generic MTRR (Memory Type Range Register) driver.
+
+ Copyright (C) 1997-2000 Richard Gooch
+ Copyright (c) 2002 Patrick Mochel
+
+ This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ modify it under the terms of the GNU Library General Public
+ License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
+ version 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+
+ This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ Library General Public License for more details.
+
+ You should have received a copy of the GNU Library General Public
+ License along with this library; if not, write to the Free
+ Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
+
+ Richard Gooch may be reached by email at rgooch@atnf.csiro.au
+ The postal address is:
+ Richard Gooch, c/o ATNF, P. O. Box 76, Epping, N.S.W., 2121, Australia.
+
+ Source: "Pentium Pro Family Developer's Manual, Volume 3:
+ Operating System Writer's Guide" (Intel document number 242692),
+ section 11.11.7
+
+ This was cleaned and made readable by Patrick Mochel <mochel@osdl.org>
+ on 6-7 March 2002.
+ Source: Intel Architecture Software Developers Manual, Volume 3:
+ System Programming Guide; Section 9.11. (1997 edition - PPro).
+*/
+
+#include <linux/types.h> /* FIXME: kvm_para.h needs this */
+
+#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
+#include <linux/kvm_para.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/sort.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/pci.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/e820/api.h>
+#include <asm/mtrr.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+
+#include "mtrr.h"
+
+/* arch_phys_wc_add returns an MTRR register index plus this offset. */
+#define MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET 1000
+
+u32 num_var_ranges;
+static bool __mtrr_enabled;
+
+static bool mtrr_enabled(void)
+{
+ return __mtrr_enabled;
+}
+
+unsigned int mtrr_usage_table[MTRR_MAX_VAR_RANGES];
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(mtrr_mutex);
+
+u64 size_or_mask, size_and_mask;
+static bool mtrr_aps_delayed_init;
+
+static const struct mtrr_ops *mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_NUM] __ro_after_init;
+
+const struct mtrr_ops *mtrr_if;
+
+static void set_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type);
+
+void __init set_mtrr_ops(const struct mtrr_ops *ops)
+{
+ if (ops->vendor && ops->vendor < X86_VENDOR_NUM)
+ mtrr_ops[ops->vendor] = ops;
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if we have the write-combining memory type */
+static int have_wrcomb(void)
+{
+ struct pci_dev *dev;
+
+ dev = pci_get_class(PCI_CLASS_BRIDGE_HOST << 8, NULL);
+ if (dev != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * ServerWorks LE chipsets < rev 6 have problems with
+ * write-combining. Don't allow it and leave room for other
+ * chipsets to be tagged
+ */
+ if (dev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_SERVERWORKS &&
+ dev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_SERVERWORKS_LE &&
+ dev->revision <= 5) {
+ pr_info("Serverworks LE rev < 6 detected. Write-combining disabled.\n");
+ pci_dev_put(dev);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Intel 450NX errata # 23. Non ascending cacheline evictions to
+ * write combining memory may resulting in data corruption
+ */
+ if (dev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL &&
+ dev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_82451NX) {
+ pr_info("Intel 450NX MMC detected. Write-combining disabled.\n");
+ pci_dev_put(dev);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pci_dev_put(dev);
+ }
+ return mtrr_if->have_wrcomb ? mtrr_if->have_wrcomb() : 0;
+}
+
+/* This function returns the number of variable MTRRs */
+static void __init set_num_var_ranges(void)
+{
+ unsigned long config = 0, dummy;
+
+ if (use_intel())
+ rdmsr(MSR_MTRRcap, config, dummy);
+ else if (is_cpu(AMD) || is_cpu(HYGON))
+ config = 2;
+ else if (is_cpu(CYRIX) || is_cpu(CENTAUR))
+ config = 8;
+
+ num_var_ranges = config & 0xff;
+}
+
+static void __init init_table(void)
+{
+ int i, max;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+ mtrr_usage_table[i] = 1;
+}
+
+struct set_mtrr_data {
+ unsigned long smp_base;
+ unsigned long smp_size;
+ unsigned int smp_reg;
+ mtrr_type smp_type;
+};
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_rendezvous_handler - Work done in the synchronization handler. Executed
+ * by all the CPUs.
+ * @info: pointer to mtrr configuration data
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static int mtrr_rendezvous_handler(void *info)
+{
+ struct set_mtrr_data *data = info;
+
+ /*
+ * We use this same function to initialize the mtrrs during boot,
+ * resume, runtime cpu online and on an explicit request to set a
+ * specific MTRR.
+ *
+ * During boot or suspend, the state of the boot cpu's mtrrs has been
+ * saved, and we want to replicate that across all the cpus that come
+ * online (either at the end of boot or resume or during a runtime cpu
+ * online). If we're doing that, @reg is set to something special and on
+ * all the cpu's we do mtrr_if->set_all() (On the logical cpu that
+ * started the boot/resume sequence, this might be a duplicate
+ * set_all()).
+ */
+ if (data->smp_reg != ~0U) {
+ mtrr_if->set(data->smp_reg, data->smp_base,
+ data->smp_size, data->smp_type);
+ } else if (mtrr_aps_delayed_init || !cpu_online(smp_processor_id())) {
+ mtrr_if->set_all();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int types_compatible(mtrr_type type1, mtrr_type type2)
+{
+ return type1 == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE ||
+ type2 == MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE ||
+ (type1 == MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH && type2 == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK) ||
+ (type1 == MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK && type2 == MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH);
+}
+
+/**
+ * set_mtrr - update mtrrs on all processors
+ * @reg: mtrr in question
+ * @base: mtrr base
+ * @size: mtrr size
+ * @type: mtrr type
+ *
+ * This is kinda tricky, but fortunately, Intel spelled it out for us cleanly:
+ *
+ * 1. Queue work to do the following on all processors:
+ * 2. Disable Interrupts
+ * 3. Wait for all procs to do so
+ * 4. Enter no-fill cache mode
+ * 5. Flush caches
+ * 6. Clear PGE bit
+ * 7. Flush all TLBs
+ * 8. Disable all range registers
+ * 9. Update the MTRRs
+ * 10. Enable all range registers
+ * 11. Flush all TLBs and caches again
+ * 12. Enter normal cache mode and reenable caching
+ * 13. Set PGE
+ * 14. Wait for buddies to catch up
+ * 15. Enable interrupts.
+ *
+ * What does that mean for us? Well, stop_machine() will ensure that
+ * the rendezvous handler is started on each CPU. And in lockstep they
+ * do the state transition of disabling interrupts, updating MTRR's
+ * (the CPU vendors may each do it differently, so we call mtrr_if->set()
+ * callback and let them take care of it.) and enabling interrupts.
+ *
+ * Note that the mechanism is the same for UP systems, too; all the SMP stuff
+ * becomes nops.
+ */
+static void
+set_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base, unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ struct set_mtrr_data data = { .smp_reg = reg,
+ .smp_base = base,
+ .smp_size = size,
+ .smp_type = type
+ };
+
+ stop_machine(mtrr_rendezvous_handler, &data, cpu_online_mask);
+}
+
+static void set_mtrr_cpuslocked(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ struct set_mtrr_data data = { .smp_reg = reg,
+ .smp_base = base,
+ .smp_size = size,
+ .smp_type = type
+ };
+
+ stop_machine_cpuslocked(mtrr_rendezvous_handler, &data, cpu_online_mask);
+}
+
+static void set_mtrr_from_inactive_cpu(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type)
+{
+ struct set_mtrr_data data = { .smp_reg = reg,
+ .smp_base = base,
+ .smp_size = size,
+ .smp_type = type
+ };
+
+ stop_machine_from_inactive_cpu(mtrr_rendezvous_handler, &data,
+ cpu_callout_mask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_add_page - Add a memory type region
+ * @base: Physical base address of region in pages (in units of 4 kB!)
+ * @size: Physical size of region in pages (4 kB)
+ * @type: Type of MTRR desired
+ * @increment: If this is true do usage counting on the region
+ *
+ * Memory type region registers control the caching on newer Intel and
+ * non Intel processors. This function allows drivers to request an
+ * MTRR is added. The details and hardware specifics of each processor's
+ * implementation are hidden from the caller, but nevertheless the
+ * caller should expect to need to provide a power of two size on an
+ * equivalent power of two boundary.
+ *
+ * If the region cannot be added either because all regions are in use
+ * or the CPU cannot support it a negative value is returned. On success
+ * the register number for this entry is returned, but should be treated
+ * as a cookie only.
+ *
+ * On a multiprocessor machine the changes are made to all processors.
+ * This is required on x86 by the Intel processors.
+ *
+ * The available types are
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE - No caching
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK - Write data back in bursts whenever
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB - Write data back soon but allow bursts
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH - Cache reads but not writes
+ *
+ * BUGS: Needs a quiet flag for the cases where drivers do not mind
+ * failures and do not wish system log messages to be sent.
+ */
+int mtrr_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned int type, bool increment)
+{
+ unsigned long lbase, lsize;
+ int i, replace, error;
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ error = mtrr_if->validate_add_page(base, size, type);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+
+ if (type >= MTRR_NUM_TYPES) {
+ pr_warn("type: %u invalid\n", type);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* If the type is WC, check that this processor supports it */
+ if ((type == MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB) && !have_wrcomb()) {
+ pr_warn("your processor doesn't support write-combining\n");
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ }
+
+ if (!size) {
+ pr_warn("zero sized request\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((base | (base + size - 1)) >>
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) {
+ pr_warn("base or size exceeds the MTRR width\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ error = -EINVAL;
+ replace = -1;
+
+ /* No CPU hotplug when we change MTRR entries */
+ cpus_read_lock();
+
+ /* Search for existing MTRR */
+ mutex_lock(&mtrr_mutex);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; ++i) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (!lsize || base > lbase + lsize - 1 ||
+ base + size - 1 < lbase)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * At this point we know there is some kind of
+ * overlap/enclosure
+ */
+ if (base < lbase || base + size - 1 > lbase + lsize - 1) {
+ if (base <= lbase &&
+ base + size - 1 >= lbase + lsize - 1) {
+ /* New region encloses an existing region */
+ if (type == ltype) {
+ replace = replace == -1 ? i : -2;
+ continue;
+ } else if (types_compatible(type, ltype))
+ continue;
+ }
+ pr_warn("0x%lx000,0x%lx000 overlaps existing 0x%lx000,0x%lx000\n", base, size, lbase,
+ lsize);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* New region is enclosed by an existing region */
+ if (ltype != type) {
+ if (types_compatible(type, ltype))
+ continue;
+ pr_warn("type mismatch for %lx000,%lx000 old: %s new: %s\n",
+ base, size, mtrr_attrib_to_str(ltype),
+ mtrr_attrib_to_str(type));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (increment)
+ ++mtrr_usage_table[i];
+ error = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Search for an empty MTRR */
+ i = mtrr_if->get_free_region(base, size, replace);
+ if (i >= 0) {
+ set_mtrr_cpuslocked(i, base, size, type);
+ if (likely(replace < 0)) {
+ mtrr_usage_table[i] = 1;
+ } else {
+ mtrr_usage_table[i] = mtrr_usage_table[replace];
+ if (increment)
+ mtrr_usage_table[i]++;
+ if (unlikely(replace != i)) {
+ set_mtrr_cpuslocked(replace, 0, 0, 0);
+ mtrr_usage_table[replace] = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ pr_info("no more MTRRs available\n");
+ }
+ error = i;
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&mtrr_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int mtrr_check(unsigned long base, unsigned long size)
+{
+ if ((base & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) || (size & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))) {
+ pr_warn("size and base must be multiples of 4 kiB\n");
+ pr_debug("size: 0x%lx base: 0x%lx\n", size, base);
+ dump_stack();
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_add - Add a memory type region
+ * @base: Physical base address of region
+ * @size: Physical size of region
+ * @type: Type of MTRR desired
+ * @increment: If this is true do usage counting on the region
+ *
+ * Memory type region registers control the caching on newer Intel and
+ * non Intel processors. This function allows drivers to request an
+ * MTRR is added. The details and hardware specifics of each processor's
+ * implementation are hidden from the caller, but nevertheless the
+ * caller should expect to need to provide a power of two size on an
+ * equivalent power of two boundary.
+ *
+ * If the region cannot be added either because all regions are in use
+ * or the CPU cannot support it a negative value is returned. On success
+ * the register number for this entry is returned, but should be treated
+ * as a cookie only.
+ *
+ * On a multiprocessor machine the changes are made to all processors.
+ * This is required on x86 by the Intel processors.
+ *
+ * The available types are
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE - No caching
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK - Write data back in bursts whenever
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB - Write data back soon but allow bursts
+ *
+ * %MTRR_TYPE_WRTHROUGH - Cache reads but not writes
+ *
+ * BUGS: Needs a quiet flag for the cases where drivers do not mind
+ * failures and do not wish system log messages to be sent.
+ */
+int mtrr_add(unsigned long base, unsigned long size, unsigned int type,
+ bool increment)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return -ENODEV;
+ if (mtrr_check(base, size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return mtrr_add_page(base >> PAGE_SHIFT, size >> PAGE_SHIFT, type,
+ increment);
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_del_page - delete a memory type region
+ * @reg: Register returned by mtrr_add
+ * @base: Physical base address
+ * @size: Size of region
+ *
+ * If register is supplied then base and size are ignored. This is
+ * how drivers should call it.
+ *
+ * Releases an MTRR region. If the usage count drops to zero the
+ * register is freed and the region returns to default state.
+ * On success the register is returned, on failure a negative error
+ * code.
+ */
+int mtrr_del_page(int reg, unsigned long base, unsigned long size)
+{
+ int i, max;
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+ unsigned long lbase, lsize;
+ int error = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ max = num_var_ranges;
+ /* No CPU hotplug when we change MTRR entries */
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&mtrr_mutex);
+ if (reg < 0) {
+ /* Search for existing MTRR */
+ for (i = 0; i < max; ++i) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lbase == base && lsize == size) {
+ reg = i;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reg < 0) {
+ pr_debug("no MTRR for %lx000,%lx000 found\n",
+ base, size);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (reg >= max) {
+ pr_warn("register: %d too big\n", reg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ mtrr_if->get(reg, &lbase, &lsize, &ltype);
+ if (lsize < 1) {
+ pr_warn("MTRR %d not used\n", reg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (mtrr_usage_table[reg] < 1) {
+ pr_warn("reg: %d has count=0\n", reg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (--mtrr_usage_table[reg] < 1)
+ set_mtrr_cpuslocked(reg, 0, 0, 0);
+ error = reg;
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&mtrr_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_del - delete a memory type region
+ * @reg: Register returned by mtrr_add
+ * @base: Physical base address
+ * @size: Size of region
+ *
+ * If register is supplied then base and size are ignored. This is
+ * how drivers should call it.
+ *
+ * Releases an MTRR region. If the usage count drops to zero the
+ * register is freed and the region returns to default state.
+ * On success the register is returned, on failure a negative error
+ * code.
+ */
+int mtrr_del(int reg, unsigned long base, unsigned long size)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return -ENODEV;
+ if (mtrr_check(base, size))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return mtrr_del_page(reg, base >> PAGE_SHIFT, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+/**
+ * arch_phys_wc_add - add a WC MTRR and handle errors if PAT is unavailable
+ * @base: Physical base address
+ * @size: Size of region
+ *
+ * If PAT is available, this does nothing. If PAT is unavailable, it
+ * attempts to add a WC MTRR covering size bytes starting at base and
+ * logs an error if this fails.
+ *
+ * The called should provide a power of two size on an equivalent
+ * power of two boundary.
+ *
+ * Drivers must store the return value to pass to mtrr_del_wc_if_needed,
+ * but drivers should not try to interpret that return value.
+ */
+int arch_phys_wc_add(unsigned long base, unsigned long size)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (pat_enabled() || !mtrr_enabled())
+ return 0; /* Success! (We don't need to do anything.) */
+
+ ret = mtrr_add(base, size, MTRR_TYPE_WRCOMB, true);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ pr_warn("Failed to add WC MTRR for [%p-%p]; performance may suffer.",
+ (void *)base, (void *)(base + size - 1));
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return ret + MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(arch_phys_wc_add);
+
+/*
+ * arch_phys_wc_del - undoes arch_phys_wc_add
+ * @handle: Return value from arch_phys_wc_add
+ *
+ * This cleans up after mtrr_add_wc_if_needed.
+ *
+ * The API guarantees that mtrr_del_wc_if_needed(error code) and
+ * mtrr_del_wc_if_needed(0) do nothing.
+ */
+void arch_phys_wc_del(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle >= 1) {
+ WARN_ON(handle < MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET);
+ mtrr_del(handle - MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET, 0, 0);
+ }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(arch_phys_wc_del);
+
+/*
+ * arch_phys_wc_index - translates arch_phys_wc_add's return value
+ * @handle: Return value from arch_phys_wc_add
+ *
+ * This will turn the return value from arch_phys_wc_add into an mtrr
+ * index suitable for debugging.
+ *
+ * Note: There is no legitimate use for this function, except possibly
+ * in printk line. Alas there is an illegitimate use in some ancient
+ * drm ioctls.
+ */
+int arch_phys_wc_index(int handle)
+{
+ if (handle < MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET)
+ return -1;
+ else
+ return handle - MTRR_TO_PHYS_WC_OFFSET;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_phys_wc_index);
+
+/*
+ * HACK ALERT!
+ * These should be called implicitly, but we can't yet until all the initcall
+ * stuff is done...
+ */
+static void __init init_ifs(void)
+{
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
+ amd_init_mtrr();
+ cyrix_init_mtrr();
+ centaur_init_mtrr();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* The suspend/resume methods are only for CPU without MTRR. CPU using generic
+ * MTRR driver doesn't require this
+ */
+struct mtrr_value {
+ mtrr_type ltype;
+ unsigned long lbase;
+ unsigned long lsize;
+};
+
+static struct mtrr_value mtrr_value[MTRR_MAX_VAR_RANGES];
+
+static int mtrr_save(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ mtrr_if->get(i, &mtrr_value[i].lbase,
+ &mtrr_value[i].lsize,
+ &mtrr_value[i].ltype);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void mtrr_restore(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_var_ranges; i++) {
+ if (mtrr_value[i].lsize) {
+ set_mtrr(i, mtrr_value[i].lbase,
+ mtrr_value[i].lsize,
+ mtrr_value[i].ltype);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+
+static struct syscore_ops mtrr_syscore_ops = {
+ .suspend = mtrr_save,
+ .resume = mtrr_restore,
+};
+
+int __initdata changed_by_mtrr_cleanup;
+
+#define SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(n) (~((1ULL << ((n) - PAGE_SHIFT)) - 1))
+/**
+ * mtrr_bp_init - initialize mtrrs on the boot CPU
+ *
+ * This needs to be called early; before any of the other CPUs are
+ * initialized (i.e. before smp_init()).
+ *
+ */
+void __init mtrr_bp_init(void)
+{
+ u32 phys_addr;
+
+ init_ifs();
+
+ phys_addr = 32;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MTRR)) {
+ mtrr_if = &generic_mtrr_ops;
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(36);
+ size_and_mask = 0x00f00000;
+ phys_addr = 36;
+
+ /*
+ * This is an AMD specific MSR, but we assume(hope?) that
+ * Intel will implement it too when they extend the address
+ * bus of the Xeon.
+ */
+ if (cpuid_eax(0x80000000) >= 0x80000008) {
+ phys_addr = cpuid_eax(0x80000008) & 0xff;
+ /* CPUID workaround for Intel 0F33/0F34 CPU */
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0xF &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3 &&
+ (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x3 ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping == 0x4))
+ phys_addr = 36;
+
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(phys_addr);
+ size_and_mask = ~size_or_mask & 0xfffff00000ULL;
+ } else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR &&
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) {
+ /*
+ * VIA C* family have Intel style MTRRs,
+ * but don't support PAE
+ */
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(32);
+ size_and_mask = 0;
+ phys_addr = 32;
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_K6_MTRR)) {
+ /* Pre-Athlon (K6) AMD CPU MTRRs */
+ mtrr_if = mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_AMD];
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(32);
+ size_and_mask = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CENTAUR_MCR)) {
+ mtrr_if = mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR];
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(32);
+ size_and_mask = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_CYRIX:
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CYRIX_ARR)) {
+ mtrr_if = mtrr_ops[X86_VENDOR_CYRIX];
+ size_or_mask = SIZE_OR_MASK_BITS(32);
+ size_and_mask = 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (mtrr_if) {
+ __mtrr_enabled = true;
+ set_num_var_ranges();
+ init_table();
+ if (use_intel()) {
+ /* BIOS may override */
+ __mtrr_enabled = get_mtrr_state();
+
+ if (mtrr_enabled())
+ mtrr_bp_pat_init();
+
+ if (mtrr_cleanup(phys_addr)) {
+ changed_by_mtrr_cleanup = 1;
+ mtrr_if->set_all();
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!mtrr_enabled()) {
+ pr_info("Disabled\n");
+
+ /*
+ * PAT initialization relies on MTRR's rendezvous handler.
+ * Skip PAT init until the handler can initialize both
+ * features independently.
+ */
+ pat_disable("MTRRs disabled, skipping PAT initialization too.");
+ }
+}
+
+void mtrr_ap_init(void)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ if (!use_intel() || mtrr_aps_delayed_init)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Ideally we should hold mtrr_mutex here to avoid mtrr entries
+ * changed, but this routine will be called in cpu boot time,
+ * holding the lock breaks it.
+ *
+ * This routine is called in two cases:
+ *
+ * 1. very early time of software resume, when there absolutely
+ * isn't mtrr entry changes;
+ *
+ * 2. cpu hotadd time. We let mtrr_add/del_page hold cpuhotplug
+ * lock to prevent mtrr entry changes
+ */
+ set_mtrr_from_inactive_cpu(~0U, 0, 0, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * mtrr_save_state - Save current fixed-range MTRR state of the first
+ * cpu in cpu_online_mask.
+ */
+void mtrr_save_state(void)
+{
+ int first_cpu;
+
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ first_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
+ smp_call_function_single(first_cpu, mtrr_save_fixed_ranges, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+void set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init(void)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return;
+ if (!use_intel())
+ return;
+
+ mtrr_aps_delayed_init = true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delayed MTRR initialization for all AP's
+ */
+void mtrr_aps_init(void)
+{
+ if (!use_intel() || !mtrr_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if someone has requested the delay of AP MTRR initialization,
+ * by doing set_mtrr_aps_delayed_init(), prior to this point. If not,
+ * then we are done.
+ */
+ if (!mtrr_aps_delayed_init)
+ return;
+
+ set_mtrr(~0U, 0, 0, 0);
+ mtrr_aps_delayed_init = false;
+}
+
+void mtrr_bp_restore(void)
+{
+ if (!use_intel() || !mtrr_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ mtrr_if->set_all();
+}
+
+static int __init mtrr_init_finialize(void)
+{
+ if (!mtrr_enabled())
+ return 0;
+
+ if (use_intel()) {
+ if (!changed_by_mtrr_cleanup)
+ mtrr_state_warn();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The CPU has no MTRR and seems to not support SMP. They have
+ * specific drivers, we use a tricky method to support
+ * suspend/resume for them.
+ *
+ * TBD: is there any system with such CPU which supports
+ * suspend/resume? If no, we should remove the code.
+ */
+ register_syscore_ops(&mtrr_syscore_ops);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+subsys_initcall(mtrr_init_finialize);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2ac99e561
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/mtrr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * local MTRR defines.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/stddef.h>
+
+#define MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_FIXED 0x01
+#define MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_VARIABLE 0x02
+#define MTRR_CHANGE_MASK_DEFTYPE 0x04
+
+extern unsigned int mtrr_usage_table[MTRR_MAX_VAR_RANGES];
+
+struct mtrr_ops {
+ u32 vendor;
+ u32 use_intel_if;
+ void (*set)(unsigned int reg, unsigned long base,
+ unsigned long size, mtrr_type type);
+ void (*set_all)(void);
+
+ void (*get)(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
+ unsigned long *size, mtrr_type *type);
+ int (*get_free_region)(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ int replace_reg);
+ int (*validate_add_page)(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned int type);
+ int (*have_wrcomb)(void);
+};
+
+extern int generic_get_free_region(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ int replace_reg);
+extern int generic_validate_add_page(unsigned long base, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned int type);
+
+extern const struct mtrr_ops generic_mtrr_ops;
+
+extern int positive_have_wrcomb(void);
+
+/* library functions for processor-specific routines */
+struct set_mtrr_context {
+ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long cr4val;
+ u32 deftype_lo;
+ u32 deftype_hi;
+ u32 ccr3;
+};
+
+void set_mtrr_done(struct set_mtrr_context *ctxt);
+void set_mtrr_cache_disable(struct set_mtrr_context *ctxt);
+void set_mtrr_prepare_save(struct set_mtrr_context *ctxt);
+
+void fill_mtrr_var_range(unsigned int index,
+ u32 base_lo, u32 base_hi, u32 mask_lo, u32 mask_hi);
+bool get_mtrr_state(void);
+void mtrr_bp_pat_init(void);
+
+extern void __init set_mtrr_ops(const struct mtrr_ops *ops);
+
+extern u64 size_or_mask, size_and_mask;
+extern const struct mtrr_ops *mtrr_if;
+
+#define is_cpu(vnd) (mtrr_if && mtrr_if->vendor == X86_VENDOR_##vnd)
+#define use_intel() (mtrr_if && mtrr_if->use_intel_if == 1)
+
+extern unsigned int num_var_ranges;
+extern u64 mtrr_tom2;
+extern struct mtrr_state_type mtrr_state;
+
+void mtrr_state_warn(void);
+const char *mtrr_attrib_to_str(int x);
+void mtrr_wrmsr(unsigned, unsigned, unsigned);
+
+/* CPU specific mtrr init functions */
+int amd_init_mtrr(void);
+int cyrix_init_mtrr(void);
+int centaur_init_mtrr(void);
+
+extern int changed_by_mtrr_cleanup;
+extern int mtrr_cleanup(unsigned address_bits);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perfctr-watchdog.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perfctr-watchdog.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7aecb2fc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perfctr-watchdog.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * local apic based NMI watchdog for various CPUs.
+ *
+ * This file also handles reservation of performance counters for coordination
+ * with other users.
+ *
+ * Note that these events normally don't tick when the CPU idles. This means
+ * the frequency varies with CPU load.
+ *
+ * Original code for K7/P6 written by Keith Owens
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <asm/nmi.h>
+#include <linux/kprobes.h>
+
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+
+/*
+ * this number is calculated from Intel's MSR_P4_CRU_ESCR5 register and it's
+ * offset from MSR_P4_BSU_ESCR0.
+ *
+ * It will be the max for all platforms (for now)
+ */
+#define NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS 66
+
+/*
+ * perfctr_nmi_owner tracks the ownership of the perfctr registers:
+ * evtsel_nmi_owner tracks the ownership of the event selection
+ * - different performance counters/ event selection may be reserved for
+ * different subsystems this reservation system just tries to coordinate
+ * things a little
+ */
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(perfctr_nmi_owner, NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS);
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(evntsel_nmi_owner, NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS);
+
+/* converts an msr to an appropriate reservation bit */
+static inline unsigned int nmi_perfctr_msr_to_bit(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ /* returns the bit offset of the performance counter register */
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (msr >= MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR)
+ return (msr - MSR_F15H_PERF_CTR) >> 1;
+ return msr - MSR_K7_PERFCTR0;
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON))
+ return msr - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0;
+
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
+ case 6:
+ return msr - MSR_P6_PERFCTR0;
+ case 11:
+ return msr - MSR_KNC_PERFCTR0;
+ case 15:
+ return msr - MSR_P4_BPU_PERFCTR0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN:
+ case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
+ return msr - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_PERFCTR0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * converts an msr to an appropriate reservation bit
+ * returns the bit offset of the event selection register
+ */
+static inline unsigned int nmi_evntsel_msr_to_bit(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ /* returns the bit offset of the event selection register */
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor) {
+ case X86_VENDOR_HYGON:
+ case X86_VENDOR_AMD:
+ if (msr >= MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL)
+ return (msr - MSR_F15H_PERF_CTL) >> 1;
+ return msr - MSR_K7_EVNTSEL0;
+ case X86_VENDOR_INTEL:
+ if (cpu_has(&boot_cpu_data, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON))
+ return msr - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0;
+
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
+ case 6:
+ return msr - MSR_P6_EVNTSEL0;
+ case 11:
+ return msr - MSR_KNC_EVNTSEL0;
+ case 15:
+ return msr - MSR_P4_BSU_ESCR0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN:
+ case X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR:
+ return msr - MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+
+}
+
+int reserve_perfctr_nmi(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ unsigned int counter;
+
+ counter = nmi_perfctr_msr_to_bit(msr);
+ /* register not managed by the allocator? */
+ if (counter > NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(counter, perfctr_nmi_owner))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(reserve_perfctr_nmi);
+
+void release_perfctr_nmi(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ unsigned int counter;
+
+ counter = nmi_perfctr_msr_to_bit(msr);
+ /* register not managed by the allocator? */
+ if (counter > NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS)
+ return;
+
+ clear_bit(counter, perfctr_nmi_owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_perfctr_nmi);
+
+int reserve_evntsel_nmi(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ unsigned int counter;
+
+ counter = nmi_evntsel_msr_to_bit(msr);
+ /* register not managed by the allocator? */
+ if (counter > NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(counter, evntsel_nmi_owner))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(reserve_evntsel_nmi);
+
+void release_evntsel_nmi(unsigned int msr)
+{
+ unsigned int counter;
+
+ counter = nmi_evntsel_msr_to_bit(msr);
+ /* register not managed by the allocator? */
+ if (counter > NMI_MAX_COUNTER_BITS)
+ return;
+
+ clear_bit(counter, evntsel_nmi_owner);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(release_evntsel_nmi);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/powerflags.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/powerflags.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fd6ec2aa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/powerflags.c
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Strings for the various x86 power flags
+ *
+ * This file must not contain any executable code.
+ */
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+const char *const x86_power_flags[32] = {
+ "ts", /* temperature sensor */
+ "fid", /* frequency id control */
+ "vid", /* voltage id control */
+ "ttp", /* thermal trip */
+ "tm", /* hardware thermal control */
+ "stc", /* software thermal control */
+ "100mhzsteps", /* 100 MHz multiplier control */
+ "hwpstate", /* hardware P-state control */
+ "", /* tsc invariant mapped to constant_tsc */
+ "cpb", /* core performance boost */
+ "eff_freq_ro", /* Readonly aperf/mperf */
+ "proc_feedback", /* processor feedback interface */
+ "acc_power", /* accumulated power mechanism */
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..099b6f0d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/proc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/cpufreq.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
+extern const char * const x86_vmx_flags[NVMXINTS*32];
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Get CPU information for use by the procfs.
+ */
+static void show_cpuinfo_core(struct seq_file *m, struct cpuinfo_x86 *c,
+ unsigned int cpu)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ seq_printf(m, "physical id\t: %d\n", c->phys_proc_id);
+ seq_printf(m, "siblings\t: %d\n",
+ cpumask_weight(topology_core_cpumask(cpu)));
+ seq_printf(m, "core id\t\t: %d\n", c->cpu_core_id);
+ seq_printf(m, "cpu cores\t: %d\n", c->booted_cores);
+ seq_printf(m, "apicid\t\t: %d\n", c->apicid);
+ seq_printf(m, "initial apicid\t: %d\n", c->initial_apicid);
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static void show_cpuinfo_misc(struct seq_file *m, struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ seq_printf(m,
+ "fdiv_bug\t: %s\n"
+ "f00f_bug\t: %s\n"
+ "coma_bug\t: %s\n"
+ "fpu\t\t: %s\n"
+ "fpu_exception\t: %s\n"
+ "cpuid level\t: %d\n"
+ "wp\t\t: yes\n",
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_FDIV) ? "yes" : "no",
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_F00F) ? "yes" : "no",
+ boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_COMA) ? "yes" : "no",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) ? "yes" : "no",
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FPU) ? "yes" : "no",
+ c->cpuid_level);
+}
+#else
+static void show_cpuinfo_misc(struct seq_file *m, struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ seq_printf(m,
+ "fpu\t\t: yes\n"
+ "fpu_exception\t: yes\n"
+ "cpuid level\t: %d\n"
+ "wp\t\t: yes\n",
+ c->cpuid_level);
+}
+#endif
+
+static int show_cpuinfo(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = v;
+ unsigned int cpu;
+ int i;
+
+ cpu = c->cpu_index;
+ seq_printf(m, "processor\t: %u\n"
+ "vendor_id\t: %s\n"
+ "cpu family\t: %d\n"
+ "model\t\t: %u\n"
+ "model name\t: %s\n",
+ cpu,
+ c->x86_vendor_id[0] ? c->x86_vendor_id : "unknown",
+ c->x86,
+ c->x86_model,
+ c->x86_model_id[0] ? c->x86_model_id : "unknown");
+
+ if (c->x86_stepping || c->cpuid_level >= 0)
+ seq_printf(m, "stepping\t: %d\n", c->x86_stepping);
+ else
+ seq_puts(m, "stepping\t: unknown\n");
+ if (c->microcode)
+ seq_printf(m, "microcode\t: 0x%x\n", c->microcode);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_TSC)) {
+ unsigned int freq = arch_freq_get_on_cpu(cpu);
+
+ seq_printf(m, "cpu MHz\t\t: %u.%03u\n", freq / 1000, (freq % 1000));
+ }
+
+ /* Cache size */
+ if (c->x86_cache_size)
+ seq_printf(m, "cache size\t: %u KB\n", c->x86_cache_size);
+
+ show_cpuinfo_core(m, c, cpu);
+ show_cpuinfo_misc(m, c);
+
+ seq_puts(m, "flags\t\t:");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32*NCAPINTS; i++)
+ if (cpu_has(c, i) && x86_cap_flags[i] != NULL)
+ seq_printf(m, " %s", x86_cap_flags[i]);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && c->vmx_capability[0]) {
+ seq_puts(m, "\nvmx flags\t:");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32*NVMXINTS; i++) {
+ if (test_bit(i, (unsigned long *)c->vmx_capability) &&
+ x86_vmx_flags[i] != NULL)
+ seq_printf(m, " %s", x86_vmx_flags[i]);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ seq_puts(m, "\nbugs\t\t:");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32*NBUGINTS; i++) {
+ unsigned int bug_bit = 32*NCAPINTS + i;
+
+ if (cpu_has_bug(c, bug_bit) && x86_bug_flags[i])
+ seq_printf(m, " %s", x86_bug_flags[i]);
+ }
+
+ seq_printf(m, "\nbogomips\t: %lu.%02lu\n",
+ c->loops_per_jiffy/(500000/HZ),
+ (c->loops_per_jiffy/(5000/HZ)) % 100);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ if (c->x86_tlbsize > 0)
+ seq_printf(m, "TLB size\t: %d 4K pages\n", c->x86_tlbsize);
+#endif
+ seq_printf(m, "clflush size\t: %u\n", c->x86_clflush_size);
+ seq_printf(m, "cache_alignment\t: %d\n", c->x86_cache_alignment);
+ seq_printf(m, "address sizes\t: %u bits physical, %u bits virtual\n",
+ c->x86_phys_bits, c->x86_virt_bits);
+
+ seq_puts(m, "power management:");
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << i)) {
+ if (i < ARRAY_SIZE(x86_power_flags) &&
+ x86_power_flags[i])
+ seq_printf(m, "%s%s",
+ x86_power_flags[i][0] ? " " : "",
+ x86_power_flags[i]);
+ else
+ seq_printf(m, " [%d]", i);
+ }
+ }
+
+ seq_puts(m, "\n\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void *c_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ *pos = cpumask_next(*pos - 1, cpu_online_mask);
+ if ((*pos) < nr_cpu_ids)
+ return &cpu_data(*pos);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *c_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ (*pos)++;
+ return c_start(m, pos);
+}
+
+static void c_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+const struct seq_operations cpuinfo_op = {
+ .start = c_start,
+ .next = c_next,
+ .stop = c_stop,
+ .show = show_cpuinfo,
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..26a427fa8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/rdrand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * This file is part of the Linux kernel.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2011, Intel Corporation
+ * Authors: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>,
+ * H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/archrandom.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+
+/*
+ * RDRAND has Built-In-Self-Test (BIST) that runs on every invocation.
+ * Run the instruction a few times as a sanity check. Also make sure
+ * it's not outputting the same value over and over, which has happened
+ * as a result of past CPU bugs.
+ *
+ * If it fails, it is simple to disable RDRAND and RDSEED here.
+ */
+
+void x86_init_rdrand(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ enum { SAMPLES = 8, MIN_CHANGE = 5 };
+ unsigned long sample, prev;
+ bool failure = false;
+ size_t i, changed;
+
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND))
+ return;
+
+ for (changed = 0, i = 0; i < SAMPLES; ++i) {
+ if (!rdrand_long(&sample)) {
+ failure = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ changed += i && sample != prev;
+ prev = sample;
+ }
+ if (changed < MIN_CHANGE)
+ failure = true;
+
+ if (failure) {
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
+ clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
+ pr_emerg("RDRAND is not reliable on this platform; disabling.\n");
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a06c37b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += core.o rdtgroup.o monitor.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL) += ctrlmondata.o pseudo_lock.o
+CFLAGS_pseudo_lock.o = -I$(src)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3266ea366
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/core.c
@@ -0,0 +1,950 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Resource Director Technology(RDT)
+ * - Cache Allocation code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+ * Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
+ * Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@intel.com>
+ *
+ * More information about RDT be found in the Intel (R) x86 Architecture
+ * Software Developer Manual June 2016, volume 3, section 17.17.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "resctrl: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <linux/cpuhotplug.h>
+
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/* Mutex to protect rdtgroup access. */
+DEFINE_MUTEX(rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+/*
+ * The cached resctrl_pqr_state is strictly per CPU and can never be
+ * updated from a remote CPU. Functions which modify the state
+ * are called with interrupts disabled and no preemption, which
+ * is sufficient for the protection.
+ */
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct resctrl_pqr_state, pqr_state);
+
+/*
+ * Used to store the max resource name width and max resource data width
+ * to display the schemata in a tabular format
+ */
+int max_name_width, max_data_width;
+
+/*
+ * Global boolean for rdt_alloc which is true if any
+ * resource allocation is enabled.
+ */
+bool rdt_alloc_capable;
+
+static void
+mba_wrmsr_intel(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m,
+ struct rdt_resource *r);
+static void
+cat_wrmsr(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m, struct rdt_resource *r);
+static void
+mba_wrmsr_amd(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m,
+ struct rdt_resource *r);
+
+#define domain_init(id) LIST_HEAD_INIT(rdt_resources_all[id].r_resctrl.domains)
+
+struct rdt_hw_resource rdt_resources_all[] = {
+ [RDT_RESOURCE_L3] =
+ {
+ .r_resctrl = {
+ .rid = RDT_RESOURCE_L3,
+ .name = "L3",
+ .cache_level = 3,
+ .domains = domain_init(RDT_RESOURCE_L3),
+ .parse_ctrlval = parse_cbm,
+ .format_str = "%d=%0*x",
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ .msr_base = MSR_IA32_L3_CBM_BASE,
+ .msr_update = cat_wrmsr,
+ },
+ [RDT_RESOURCE_L2] =
+ {
+ .r_resctrl = {
+ .rid = RDT_RESOURCE_L2,
+ .name = "L2",
+ .cache_level = 2,
+ .domains = domain_init(RDT_RESOURCE_L2),
+ .parse_ctrlval = parse_cbm,
+ .format_str = "%d=%0*x",
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ .msr_base = MSR_IA32_L2_CBM_BASE,
+ .msr_update = cat_wrmsr,
+ },
+ [RDT_RESOURCE_MBA] =
+ {
+ .r_resctrl = {
+ .rid = RDT_RESOURCE_MBA,
+ .name = "MB",
+ .cache_level = 3,
+ .domains = domain_init(RDT_RESOURCE_MBA),
+ .parse_ctrlval = parse_bw,
+ .format_str = "%d=%*u",
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_RES_MB,
+ },
+ },
+};
+
+/*
+ * cache_alloc_hsw_probe() - Have to probe for Intel haswell server CPUs
+ * as they do not have CPUID enumeration support for Cache allocation.
+ * The check for Vendor/Family/Model is not enough to guarantee that
+ * the MSRs won't #GP fault because only the following SKUs support
+ * CAT:
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2658 v3 @ 2.20GHz
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2648L v3 @ 1.80GHz
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2628L v3 @ 2.00GHz
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2618L v3 @ 2.30GHz
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2608L v3 @ 2.00GHz
+ * Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2658A v3 @ 2.20GHz
+ *
+ * Probe by trying to write the first of the L3 cache mask registers
+ * and checking that the bits stick. Max CLOSids is always 4 and max cbm length
+ * is always 20 on hsw server parts. The minimum cache bitmask length
+ * allowed for HSW server is always 2 bits. Hardcode all of them.
+ */
+static inline void cache_alloc_hsw_probe(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3];
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &hw_res->r_resctrl;
+ u32 l, h, max_cbm = BIT_MASK(20) - 1;
+
+ if (wrmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_L3_CBM_BASE, max_cbm, 0))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsr(MSR_IA32_L3_CBM_BASE, l, h);
+
+ /* If all the bits were set in MSR, return success */
+ if (l != max_cbm)
+ return;
+
+ hw_res->num_closid = 4;
+ r->default_ctrl = max_cbm;
+ r->cache.cbm_len = 20;
+ r->cache.shareable_bits = 0xc0000;
+ r->cache.min_cbm_bits = 2;
+ r->alloc_capable = true;
+
+ rdt_alloc_capable = true;
+}
+
+bool is_mba_sc(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ if (!r)
+ return rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl.membw.mba_sc;
+
+ return r->membw.mba_sc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rdt_get_mb_table() - get a mapping of bandwidth(b/w) percentage values
+ * exposed to user interface and the h/w understandable delay values.
+ *
+ * The non-linear delay values have the granularity of power of two
+ * and also the h/w does not guarantee a curve for configured delay
+ * values vs. actual b/w enforced.
+ * Hence we need a mapping that is pre calibrated so the user can
+ * express the memory b/w as a percentage value.
+ */
+static inline bool rdt_get_mb_table(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ /*
+ * There are no Intel SKUs as of now to support non-linear delay.
+ */
+ pr_info("MBA b/w map not implemented for cpu:%d, model:%d",
+ boot_cpu_data.x86, boot_cpu_data.x86_model);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static bool __get_mem_config_intel(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ union cpuid_0x10_3_eax eax;
+ union cpuid_0x10_x_edx edx;
+ u32 ebx, ecx, max_delay;
+
+ cpuid_count(0x00000010, 3, &eax.full, &ebx, &ecx, &edx.full);
+ hw_res->num_closid = edx.split.cos_max + 1;
+ max_delay = eax.split.max_delay + 1;
+ r->default_ctrl = MAX_MBA_BW;
+ r->membw.arch_needs_linear = true;
+ if (ecx & MBA_IS_LINEAR) {
+ r->membw.delay_linear = true;
+ r->membw.min_bw = MAX_MBA_BW - max_delay;
+ r->membw.bw_gran = MAX_MBA_BW - max_delay;
+ } else {
+ if (!rdt_get_mb_table(r))
+ return false;
+ r->membw.arch_needs_linear = false;
+ }
+ r->data_width = 3;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA))
+ r->membw.throttle_mode = THREAD_THROTTLE_PER_THREAD;
+ else
+ r->membw.throttle_mode = THREAD_THROTTLE_MAX;
+ thread_throttle_mode_init();
+
+ r->alloc_capable = true;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ union cpuid_0x10_3_eax eax;
+ union cpuid_0x10_x_edx edx;
+ u32 ebx, ecx;
+
+ cpuid_count(0x80000020, 1, &eax.full, &ebx, &ecx, &edx.full);
+ hw_res->num_closid = edx.split.cos_max + 1;
+ r->default_ctrl = MAX_MBA_BW_AMD;
+
+ /* AMD does not use delay */
+ r->membw.delay_linear = false;
+ r->membw.arch_needs_linear = false;
+
+ /*
+ * AMD does not use memory delay throttle model to control
+ * the allocation like Intel does.
+ */
+ r->membw.throttle_mode = THREAD_THROTTLE_UNDEFINED;
+ r->membw.min_bw = 0;
+ r->membw.bw_gran = 1;
+ /* Max value is 2048, Data width should be 4 in decimal */
+ r->data_width = 4;
+
+ r->alloc_capable = true;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void rdt_get_cache_alloc_cfg(int idx, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ union cpuid_0x10_1_eax eax;
+ union cpuid_0x10_x_edx edx;
+ u32 ebx, ecx;
+
+ cpuid_count(0x00000010, idx, &eax.full, &ebx, &ecx, &edx.full);
+ hw_res->num_closid = edx.split.cos_max + 1;
+ r->cache.cbm_len = eax.split.cbm_len + 1;
+ r->default_ctrl = BIT_MASK(eax.split.cbm_len + 1) - 1;
+ r->cache.shareable_bits = ebx & r->default_ctrl;
+ r->data_width = (r->cache.cbm_len + 3) / 4;
+ r->alloc_capable = true;
+}
+
+static void rdt_get_cdp_config(int level)
+{
+ /*
+ * By default, CDP is disabled. CDP can be enabled by mount parameter
+ * "cdp" during resctrl file system mount time.
+ */
+ rdt_resources_all[level].cdp_enabled = false;
+ rdt_resources_all[level].r_resctrl.cdp_capable = true;
+}
+
+static void rdt_get_cdp_l3_config(void)
+{
+ rdt_get_cdp_config(RDT_RESOURCE_L3);
+}
+
+static void rdt_get_cdp_l2_config(void)
+{
+ rdt_get_cdp_config(RDT_RESOURCE_L2);
+}
+
+static void
+mba_wrmsr_amd(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ for (i = m->low; i < m->high; i++)
+ wrmsrl(hw_res->msr_base + i, hw_dom->ctrl_val[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Map the memory b/w percentage value to delay values
+ * that can be written to QOS_MSRs.
+ * There are currently no SKUs which support non linear delay values.
+ */
+static u32 delay_bw_map(unsigned long bw, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ if (r->membw.delay_linear)
+ return MAX_MBA_BW - bw;
+
+ pr_warn_once("Non Linear delay-bw map not supported but queried\n");
+ return r->default_ctrl;
+}
+
+static void
+mba_wrmsr_intel(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m,
+ struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ /* Write the delay values for mba. */
+ for (i = m->low; i < m->high; i++)
+ wrmsrl(hw_res->msr_base + i, delay_bw_map(hw_dom->ctrl_val[i], r));
+}
+
+static void
+cat_wrmsr(struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ for (i = m->low; i < m->high; i++)
+ wrmsrl(hw_res->msr_base + i, hw_dom->ctrl_val[i]);
+}
+
+struct rdt_domain *get_domain_from_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ /* Find the domain that contains this CPU */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask))
+ return d;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+u32 resctrl_arch_get_num_closid(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ return resctrl_to_arch_res(r)->num_closid;
+}
+
+void rdt_ctrl_update(void *arg)
+{
+ struct msr_param *m = arg;
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(m->res);
+ struct rdt_resource *r = m->res;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ d = get_domain_from_cpu(cpu, r);
+ if (d) {
+ hw_res->msr_update(d, m, r);
+ return;
+ }
+ pr_warn_once("cpu %d not found in any domain for resource %s\n",
+ cpu, r->name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * rdt_find_domain - Find a domain in a resource that matches input resource id
+ *
+ * Search resource r's domain list to find the resource id. If the resource
+ * id is found in a domain, return the domain. Otherwise, if requested by
+ * caller, return the first domain whose id is bigger than the input id.
+ * The domain list is sorted by id in ascending order.
+ */
+struct rdt_domain *rdt_find_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, int id,
+ struct list_head **pos)
+{
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ struct list_head *l;
+
+ if (id < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
+
+ list_for_each(l, &r->domains) {
+ d = list_entry(l, struct rdt_domain, list);
+ /* When id is found, return its domain. */
+ if (id == d->id)
+ return d;
+ /* Stop searching when finding id's position in sorted list. */
+ if (id < d->id)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (pos)
+ *pos = l;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void setup_default_ctrlval(struct rdt_resource *r, u32 *dc)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the Control MSRs to having no control.
+ * For Cache Allocation: Set all bits in cbm
+ * For Memory Allocation: Set b/w requested to 100%
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < hw_res->num_closid; i++, dc++)
+ *dc = r->default_ctrl;
+}
+
+static void domain_free(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom)
+{
+ kfree(hw_dom->arch_mbm_total);
+ kfree(hw_dom->arch_mbm_local);
+ kfree(hw_dom->ctrl_val);
+ kfree(hw_dom);
+}
+
+static int domain_setup_ctrlval(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct msr_param m;
+ u32 *dc;
+
+ dc = kmalloc_array(hw_res->num_closid, sizeof(*hw_dom->ctrl_val),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!dc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ hw_dom->ctrl_val = dc;
+ setup_default_ctrlval(r, dc);
+
+ m.low = 0;
+ m.high = hw_res->num_closid;
+ hw_res->msr_update(d, &m, r);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * arch_domain_mbm_alloc() - Allocate arch private storage for the MBM counters
+ * @num_rmid: The size of the MBM counter array
+ * @hw_dom: The domain that owns the allocated arrays
+ */
+static int arch_domain_mbm_alloc(u32 num_rmid, struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom)
+{
+ size_t tsize;
+
+ if (is_mbm_total_enabled()) {
+ tsize = sizeof(*hw_dom->arch_mbm_total);
+ hw_dom->arch_mbm_total = kcalloc(num_rmid, tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hw_dom->arch_mbm_total)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) {
+ tsize = sizeof(*hw_dom->arch_mbm_local);
+ hw_dom->arch_mbm_local = kcalloc(num_rmid, tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!hw_dom->arch_mbm_local) {
+ kfree(hw_dom->arch_mbm_total);
+ hw_dom->arch_mbm_total = NULL;
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * domain_add_cpu - Add a cpu to a resource's domain list.
+ *
+ * If an existing domain in the resource r's domain list matches the cpu's
+ * resource id, add the cpu in the domain.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, a new domain is allocated and inserted into the right position
+ * in the domain list sorted by id in ascending order.
+ *
+ * The order in the domain list is visible to users when we print entries
+ * in the schemata file and schemata input is validated to have the same order
+ * as this list.
+ */
+static void domain_add_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ int id = get_cpu_cacheinfo_id(cpu, r->cache_level);
+ struct list_head *add_pos = NULL;
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int err;
+
+ d = rdt_find_domain(r, id, &add_pos);
+ if (IS_ERR(d)) {
+ pr_warn("Couldn't find cache id for CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (d) {
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask);
+ if (r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg)
+ rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(r);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hw_dom = kzalloc_node(sizeof(*hw_dom), GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
+ if (!hw_dom)
+ return;
+
+ d = &hw_dom->d_resctrl;
+ d->id = id;
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask);
+
+ rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(r);
+
+ if (r->alloc_capable && domain_setup_ctrlval(r, d)) {
+ domain_free(hw_dom);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (r->mon_capable && arch_domain_mbm_alloc(r->num_rmid, hw_dom)) {
+ domain_free(hw_dom);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_add_tail(&d->list, add_pos);
+
+ err = resctrl_online_domain(r, d);
+ if (err) {
+ list_del(&d->list);
+ domain_free(hw_dom);
+ }
+}
+
+static void domain_remove_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ int id = get_cpu_cacheinfo_id(cpu, r->cache_level);
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ d = rdt_find_domain(r, id, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(d)) {
+ pr_warn("Couldn't find cache id for CPU %d\n", cpu);
+ return;
+ }
+ hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask);
+ if (cpumask_empty(&d->cpu_mask)) {
+ resctrl_offline_domain(r, d);
+ list_del(&d->list);
+
+ /*
+ * rdt_domain "d" is going to be freed below, so clear
+ * its pointer from pseudo_lock_region struct.
+ */
+ if (d->plr)
+ d->plr->d = NULL;
+ domain_free(hw_dom);
+
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (r == &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl) {
+ if (is_mbm_enabled() && cpu == d->mbm_work_cpu) {
+ cancel_delayed_work(&d->mbm_over);
+ mbm_setup_overflow_handler(d, 0);
+ }
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled() && cpu == d->cqm_work_cpu &&
+ has_busy_rmid(r, d)) {
+ cancel_delayed_work(&d->cqm_limbo);
+ cqm_setup_limbo_handler(d, 0);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static void clear_closid_rmid(int cpu)
+{
+ struct resctrl_pqr_state *state = this_cpu_ptr(&pqr_state);
+
+ state->default_closid = 0;
+ state->default_rmid = 0;
+ state->cur_closid = 0;
+ state->cur_rmid = 0;
+ wrmsr(IA32_PQR_ASSOC, 0, 0);
+}
+
+static int resctrl_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ for_each_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ domain_add_cpu(cpu, r);
+ /* The cpu is set in default rdtgroup after online. */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask);
+ clear_closid_rmid(cpu);
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void clear_childcpus(struct rdtgroup *r, unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *cr;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(cr, &r->mon.crdtgrp_list, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ if (cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, &cr->cpu_mask)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int resctrl_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ for_each_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ domain_remove_cpu(cpu, r);
+ list_for_each_entry(rdtgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ if (cpumask_test_and_clear_cpu(cpu, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask)) {
+ clear_childcpus(rdtgrp, cpu);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ clear_closid_rmid(cpu);
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Choose a width for the resource name and resource data based on the
+ * resource that has widest name and cbm.
+ */
+static __init void rdt_init_padding(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ if (r->data_width > max_data_width)
+ max_data_width = r->data_width;
+ }
+}
+
+enum {
+ RDT_FLAG_CMT,
+ RDT_FLAG_MBM_TOTAL,
+ RDT_FLAG_MBM_LOCAL,
+ RDT_FLAG_L3_CAT,
+ RDT_FLAG_L3_CDP,
+ RDT_FLAG_L2_CAT,
+ RDT_FLAG_L2_CDP,
+ RDT_FLAG_MBA,
+};
+
+#define RDT_OPT(idx, n, f) \
+[idx] = { \
+ .name = n, \
+ .flag = f \
+}
+
+struct rdt_options {
+ char *name;
+ int flag;
+ bool force_off, force_on;
+};
+
+static struct rdt_options rdt_options[] __initdata = {
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_CMT, "cmt", X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_MBM_TOTAL, "mbmtotal", X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_MBM_LOCAL, "mbmlocal", X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_L3_CAT, "l3cat", X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_L3_CDP, "l3cdp", X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_L2_CAT, "l2cat", X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_L2_CDP, "l2cdp", X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2),
+ RDT_OPT(RDT_FLAG_MBA, "mba", X86_FEATURE_MBA),
+};
+#define NUM_RDT_OPTIONS ARRAY_SIZE(rdt_options)
+
+static int __init set_rdt_options(char *str)
+{
+ struct rdt_options *o;
+ bool force_off;
+ char *tok;
+
+ if (*str == '=')
+ str++;
+ while ((tok = strsep(&str, ",")) != NULL) {
+ force_off = *tok == '!';
+ if (force_off)
+ tok++;
+ for (o = rdt_options; o < &rdt_options[NUM_RDT_OPTIONS]; o++) {
+ if (strcmp(tok, o->name) == 0) {
+ if (force_off)
+ o->force_off = true;
+ else
+ o->force_on = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("rdt", set_rdt_options);
+
+static bool __init rdt_cpu_has(int flag)
+{
+ bool ret = boot_cpu_has(flag);
+ struct rdt_options *o;
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ for (o = rdt_options; o < &rdt_options[NUM_RDT_OPTIONS]; o++) {
+ if (flag == o->flag) {
+ if (o->force_off)
+ ret = false;
+ if (o->force_on)
+ ret = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static __init bool get_mem_config(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA];
+
+ if (!rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MBA))
+ return false;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ return __get_mem_config_intel(&hw_res->r_resctrl);
+ else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ return __rdt_get_mem_config_amd(&hw_res->r_resctrl);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __init bool get_rdt_alloc_resources(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (rdt_alloc_capable)
+ return true;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDT_A))
+ return false;
+
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3)) {
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ rdt_get_cache_alloc_cfg(1, r);
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3))
+ rdt_get_cdp_l3_config();
+ ret = true;
+ }
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2)) {
+ /* CPUID 0x10.2 fields are same format at 0x10.1 */
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L2].r_resctrl;
+ rdt_get_cache_alloc_cfg(2, r);
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2))
+ rdt_get_cdp_l2_config();
+ ret = true;
+ }
+
+ if (get_mem_config())
+ ret = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static __init bool get_rdt_mon_resources(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC))
+ rdt_mon_features |= (1 << QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID);
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL))
+ rdt_mon_features |= (1 << QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID);
+ if (rdt_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL))
+ rdt_mon_features |= (1 << QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID);
+
+ if (!rdt_mon_features)
+ return false;
+
+ return !rdt_get_mon_l3_config(r);
+}
+
+static __init void __check_quirks_intel(void)
+{
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X:
+ if (!rdt_options[RDT_FLAG_L3_CAT].force_off)
+ cache_alloc_hsw_probe();
+ break;
+ case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X:
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_stepping <= 4)
+ set_rdt_options("!cmt,!mbmtotal,!mbmlocal,!l3cat");
+ else
+ set_rdt_options("!l3cat");
+ fallthrough;
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X:
+ intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk();
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static __init void check_quirks(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ __check_quirks_intel();
+}
+
+static __init bool get_rdt_resources(void)
+{
+ rdt_alloc_capable = get_rdt_alloc_resources();
+ rdt_mon_capable = get_rdt_mon_resources();
+
+ return (rdt_mon_capable || rdt_alloc_capable);
+}
+
+static __init void rdt_init_res_defs_intel(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ for_each_rdt_resource(r) {
+ hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L3 ||
+ r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L2) {
+ r->cache.arch_has_sparse_bitmaps = false;
+ r->cache.arch_has_empty_bitmaps = false;
+ r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg = false;
+ r->cache.min_cbm_bits = 1;
+ } else if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) {
+ hw_res->msr_base = MSR_IA32_MBA_THRTL_BASE;
+ hw_res->msr_update = mba_wrmsr_intel;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static __init void rdt_init_res_defs_amd(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ for_each_rdt_resource(r) {
+ hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L3 ||
+ r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L2) {
+ r->cache.arch_has_sparse_bitmaps = true;
+ r->cache.arch_has_empty_bitmaps = true;
+ r->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg = true;
+ r->cache.min_cbm_bits = 0;
+ } else if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) {
+ hw_res->msr_base = MSR_IA32_MBA_BW_BASE;
+ hw_res->msr_update = mba_wrmsr_amd;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static __init void rdt_init_res_defs(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL)
+ rdt_init_res_defs_intel();
+ else if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD)
+ rdt_init_res_defs_amd();
+}
+
+static enum cpuhp_state rdt_online;
+
+/* Runs once on the BSP during boot. */
+void resctrl_cpu_detect(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC)) {
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = -1;
+ c->x86_cache_occ_scale = -1;
+ c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = -1;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* will be overridden if occupancy monitoring exists */
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = cpuid_ebx(0xf);
+
+ if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL) ||
+ cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL)) {
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ /* QoS sub-leaf, EAX=0Fh, ECX=1 */
+ cpuid_count(0xf, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ c->x86_cache_max_rmid = ecx;
+ c->x86_cache_occ_scale = ebx;
+ c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = eax & 0xff;
+
+ if (c->x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD && !c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset)
+ c->x86_cache_mbm_width_offset = MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_AMD;
+ }
+}
+
+static int __init resctrl_late_init(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ int state, ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize functions(or definitions) that are different
+ * between vendors here.
+ */
+ rdt_init_res_defs();
+
+ check_quirks();
+
+ if (!get_rdt_resources())
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ rdt_init_padding();
+
+ state = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+ "x86/resctrl/cat:online:",
+ resctrl_online_cpu, resctrl_offline_cpu);
+ if (state < 0)
+ return state;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_init();
+ if (ret) {
+ cpuhp_remove_state(state);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ rdt_online = state;
+
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ pr_info("%s allocation detected\n", r->name);
+
+ for_each_mon_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ pr_info("%s monitoring detected\n", r->name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+late_initcall(resctrl_late_init);
+
+static void __exit resctrl_exit(void)
+{
+ cpuhp_remove_state(rdt_online);
+ rdtgroup_exit();
+}
+
+__exitcall(resctrl_exit);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..84f23327c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/ctrlmondata.c
@@ -0,0 +1,587 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Resource Director Technology(RDT)
+ * - Cache Allocation code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+ * Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
+ *
+ * More information about RDT be found in the Intel (R) x86 Architecture
+ * Software Developer Manual June 2016, volume 3, section 17.17.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * Check whether MBA bandwidth percentage value is correct. The value is
+ * checked against the minimum and max bandwidth values specified by the
+ * hardware. The allocated bandwidth percentage is rounded to the next
+ * control step available on the hardware.
+ */
+static bool bw_validate(char *buf, unsigned long *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned long bw;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Only linear delay values is supported for current Intel SKUs.
+ */
+ if (!r->membw.delay_linear && r->membw.arch_needs_linear) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("No support for non-linear MB domains\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ ret = kstrtoul(buf, 10, &bw);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Non-decimal digit in MB value %s\n", buf);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if ((bw < r->membw.min_bw || bw > r->default_ctrl) &&
+ !is_mba_sc(r)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("MB value %ld out of range [%d,%d]\n", bw,
+ r->membw.min_bw, r->default_ctrl);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *data = roundup(bw, (unsigned long)r->membw.bw_gran);
+ return true;
+}
+
+int parse_bw(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ u32 closid = data->rdtgrp->closid;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+ unsigned long bw_val;
+
+ cfg = &d->staged_config[s->conf_type];
+ if (cfg->have_new_ctrl) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!bw_validate(data->buf, &bw_val, r))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (is_mba_sc(r)) {
+ d->mbps_val[closid] = bw_val;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ cfg->new_ctrl = bw_val;
+ cfg->have_new_ctrl = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a cache bit mask is valid.
+ * For Intel the SDM says:
+ * Please note that all (and only) contiguous '1' combinations
+ * are allowed (e.g. FFFFH, 0FF0H, 003CH, etc.).
+ * Additionally Haswell requires at least two bits set.
+ * AMD allows non-contiguous bitmasks.
+ */
+static bool cbm_validate(char *buf, u32 *data, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned long first_bit, zero_bit, val;
+ unsigned int cbm_len = r->cache.cbm_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtoul(buf, 16, &val);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Non-hex character in the mask %s\n", buf);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if ((!r->cache.arch_has_empty_bitmaps && val == 0) ||
+ val > r->default_ctrl) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Mask out of range\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ first_bit = find_first_bit(&val, cbm_len);
+ zero_bit = find_next_zero_bit(&val, cbm_len, first_bit);
+
+ /* Are non-contiguous bitmaps allowed? */
+ if (!r->cache.arch_has_sparse_bitmaps &&
+ (find_next_bit(&val, cbm_len, zero_bit) < cbm_len)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("The mask %lx has non-consecutive 1-bits\n", val);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if ((zero_bit - first_bit) < r->cache.min_cbm_bits) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Need at least %d bits in the mask\n",
+ r->cache.min_cbm_bits);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ *data = val;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read one cache bit mask (hex). Check that it is valid for the current
+ * resource type.
+ */
+int parse_cbm(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp = data->rdtgrp;
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+ u32 cbm_val;
+
+ cfg = &d->staged_config[s->conf_type];
+ if (cfg->have_new_ctrl) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Duplicate domain %d\n", d->id);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cannot set up more than one pseudo-locked region in a cache
+ * hierarchy.
+ */
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP &&
+ rdtgroup_pseudo_locked_in_hierarchy(d)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locked region in hierarchy\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!cbm_validate(data->buf, &cbm_val, r))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE) &&
+ rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps_pseudo_locked(d, cbm_val)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("CBM overlaps with pseudo-locked region\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The CBM may not overlap with the CBM of another closid if
+ * either is exclusive.
+ */
+ if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(s, d, cbm_val, rdtgrp->closid, true)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Overlaps with exclusive group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(s, d, cbm_val, rdtgrp->closid, false)) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Overlaps with other group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ cfg->new_ctrl = cbm_val;
+ cfg->have_new_ctrl = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * For each domain in this resource we expect to find a series of:
+ * id=mask
+ * separated by ";". The "id" is in decimal, and must match one of
+ * the "id"s for this resource.
+ */
+static int parse_line(char *line, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ enum resctrl_conf_type t = s->conf_type;
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+ struct rdt_parse_data data;
+ char *dom = NULL, *id;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ unsigned long dom_id;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP &&
+ r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot pseudo-lock MBA resource\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+next:
+ if (!line || line[0] == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ dom = strsep(&line, ";");
+ id = strsep(&dom, "=");
+ if (!dom || kstrtoul(id, 10, &dom_id)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Missing '=' or non-numeric domain\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ dom = strim(dom);
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (d->id == dom_id) {
+ data.buf = dom;
+ data.rdtgrp = rdtgrp;
+ if (r->parse_ctrlval(&data, s, d))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ cfg = &d->staged_config[t];
+ /*
+ * In pseudo-locking setup mode and just
+ * parsed a valid CBM that should be
+ * pseudo-locked. Only one locked region per
+ * resource group and domain so just do
+ * the required initialization for single
+ * region and return.
+ */
+ rdtgrp->plr->s = s;
+ rdtgrp->plr->d = d;
+ rdtgrp->plr->cbm = cfg->new_ctrl;
+ d->plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ goto next;
+ }
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static u32 get_config_index(u32 closid, enum resctrl_conf_type type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ default:
+ case CDP_NONE:
+ return closid;
+ case CDP_CODE:
+ return closid * 2 + 1;
+ case CDP_DATA:
+ return closid * 2;
+ }
+}
+
+static bool apply_config(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom,
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg, u32 idx,
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_mask)
+{
+ struct rdt_domain *dom = &hw_dom->d_resctrl;
+
+ if (cfg->new_ctrl != hw_dom->ctrl_val[idx]) {
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpumask_any(&dom->cpu_mask), cpu_mask);
+ hw_dom->ctrl_val[idx] = cfg->new_ctrl;
+
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+int resctrl_arch_update_one(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ u32 closid, enum resctrl_conf_type t, u32 cfg_val)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ u32 idx = get_config_index(closid, t);
+ struct msr_param msr_param;
+
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &d->cpu_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hw_dom->ctrl_val[idx] = cfg_val;
+
+ msr_param.res = r;
+ msr_param.low = idx;
+ msr_param.high = idx + 1;
+ hw_res->msr_update(d, &msr_param, r);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int resctrl_arch_update_domains(struct rdt_resource *r, u32 closid)
+{
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom;
+ struct msr_param msr_param;
+ enum resctrl_conf_type t;
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_mask;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int cpu;
+ u32 idx;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ msr_param.res = NULL;
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ for (t = 0; t < CDP_NUM_TYPES; t++) {
+ cfg = &hw_dom->d_resctrl.staged_config[t];
+ if (!cfg->have_new_ctrl)
+ continue;
+
+ idx = get_config_index(closid, t);
+ if (!apply_config(hw_dom, cfg, idx, cpu_mask))
+ continue;
+
+ if (!msr_param.res) {
+ msr_param.low = idx;
+ msr_param.high = msr_param.low + 1;
+ msr_param.res = r;
+ } else {
+ msr_param.low = min(msr_param.low, idx);
+ msr_param.high = max(msr_param.high, idx + 1);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cpumask_empty(cpu_mask))
+ goto done;
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ /* Update resource control msr on this CPU if it's in cpu_mask. */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask))
+ rdt_ctrl_update(&msr_param);
+ /* Update resource control msr on other CPUs. */
+ smp_call_function_many(cpu_mask, rdt_ctrl_update, &msr_param, 1);
+ put_cpu();
+
+done:
+ free_cpumask_var(cpu_mask);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_parse_resource(char *resname, char *tok,
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ if (!strcmp(resname, s->name) && rdtgrp->closid < s->num_closid)
+ return parse_line(tok, s, rdtgrp);
+ }
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Unknown or unsupported resource name '%s'\n", resname);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+ssize_t rdtgroup_schemata_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ char *tok, *resname;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Valid input requires a trailing newline */
+ if (nbytes == 0 || buf[nbytes - 1] != '\n')
+ return -EINVAL;
+ buf[nbytes - 1] = '\0';
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+
+ /*
+ * No changes to pseudo-locked region allowed. It has to be removed
+ * and re-created instead.
+ */
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Resource group is pseudo-locked\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rdt_staged_configs_clear();
+
+ while ((tok = strsep(&buf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+ resname = strim(strsep(&tok, ":"));
+ if (!tok) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Missing ':'\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (tok[0] == '\0') {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Missing '%s' value\n", resname);
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = rdtgroup_parse_resource(resname, tok, rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ r = s->res;
+
+ /*
+ * Writes to mba_sc resources update the software controller,
+ * not the control MSR.
+ */
+ if (is_mba_sc(r))
+ continue;
+
+ ret = resctrl_arch_update_domains(r, rdtgrp->closid);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ /*
+ * If pseudo-locking fails we keep the resource group in
+ * mode RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP with its class of service
+ * active and updated for just the domain the pseudo-locked
+ * region was requested for.
+ */
+ ret = rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(rdtgrp);
+ }
+
+out:
+ rdt_staged_configs_clear();
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return ret ?: nbytes;
+}
+
+u32 resctrl_arch_get_config(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ u32 closid, enum resctrl_conf_type type)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ u32 idx = get_config_index(closid, type);
+
+ return hw_dom->ctrl_val[idx];
+}
+
+static void show_doms(struct seq_file *s, struct resctrl_schema *schema, int closid)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = schema->res;
+ struct rdt_domain *dom;
+ bool sep = false;
+ u32 ctrl_val;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%*s:", max_name_width, schema->name);
+ list_for_each_entry(dom, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (sep)
+ seq_puts(s, ";");
+
+ if (is_mba_sc(r))
+ ctrl_val = dom->mbps_val[closid];
+ else
+ ctrl_val = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, dom, closid,
+ schema->conf_type);
+
+ seq_printf(s, r->format_str, dom->id, max_data_width,
+ ctrl_val);
+ sep = true;
+ }
+ seq_puts(s, "\n");
+}
+
+int rdtgroup_schemata_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *schema;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 closid;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (rdtgrp) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ list_for_each_entry(schema, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ seq_printf(s, "%s:uninitialized\n", schema->name);
+ }
+ } else if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ if (!rdtgrp->plr->d) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cache domain offline\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ } else {
+ seq_printf(s, "%s:%d=%x\n",
+ rdtgrp->plr->s->res->name,
+ rdtgrp->plr->d->id,
+ rdtgrp->plr->cbm);
+ }
+ } else {
+ closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+ list_for_each_entry(schema, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ if (closid < schema->num_closid)
+ show_doms(s, schema, closid);
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void mon_event_read(struct rmid_read *rr, struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdt_domain *d, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp,
+ int evtid, int first)
+{
+ /*
+ * setup the parameters to send to the IPI to read the data.
+ */
+ rr->rgrp = rdtgrp;
+ rr->evtid = evtid;
+ rr->r = r;
+ rr->d = d;
+ rr->val = 0;
+ rr->first = first;
+
+ smp_call_function_any(&d->cpu_mask, mon_event_count, rr, 1);
+}
+
+int rdtgroup_mondata_show(struct seq_file *m, void *arg)
+{
+ struct kernfs_open_file *of = m->private;
+ u32 resid, evtid, domid;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ union mon_data_bits md;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ struct rmid_read rr;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ md.priv = of->kn->priv;
+ resid = md.u.rid;
+ domid = md.u.domid;
+ evtid = md.u.evtid;
+
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[resid].r_resctrl;
+ d = rdt_find_domain(r, domid, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(d)) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mon_event_read(&rr, r, d, rdtgrp, evtid, false);
+
+ if (rr.err == -EIO)
+ seq_puts(m, "Error\n");
+ else if (rr.err == -EINVAL)
+ seq_puts(m, "Unavailable\n");
+ else
+ seq_printf(m, "%llu\n", rr.val);
+
+out:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b5c6c76f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,542 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_INTERNAL_H
+#define _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <linux/resctrl.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_context.h>
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+
+#define MSR_IA32_L3_QOS_CFG 0xc81
+#define MSR_IA32_L2_QOS_CFG 0xc82
+#define MSR_IA32_L3_CBM_BASE 0xc90
+#define MSR_IA32_L2_CBM_BASE 0xd10
+#define MSR_IA32_MBA_THRTL_BASE 0xd50
+#define MSR_IA32_MBA_BW_BASE 0xc0000200
+
+#define MSR_IA32_QM_CTR 0x0c8e
+#define MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL 0x0c8d
+
+#define L3_QOS_CDP_ENABLE 0x01ULL
+
+#define L2_QOS_CDP_ENABLE 0x01ULL
+
+#define CQM_LIMBOCHECK_INTERVAL 1000
+
+#define MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_BASE 24
+#define MBM_OVERFLOW_INTERVAL 1000
+#define MAX_MBA_BW 100u
+#define MBA_IS_LINEAR 0x4
+#define MAX_MBA_BW_AMD 0x800
+#define MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_AMD 20
+
+#define RMID_VAL_ERROR BIT_ULL(63)
+#define RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL BIT_ULL(62)
+/*
+ * With the above fields in use 62 bits remain in MSR_IA32_QM_CTR for
+ * data to be returned. The counter width is discovered from the hardware
+ * as an offset from MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_BASE.
+ */
+#define MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_MAX (62 - MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_BASE)
+
+
+struct rdt_fs_context {
+ struct kernfs_fs_context kfc;
+ bool enable_cdpl2;
+ bool enable_cdpl3;
+ bool enable_mba_mbps;
+};
+
+static inline struct rdt_fs_context *rdt_fc2context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct kernfs_fs_context *kfc = fc->fs_private;
+
+ return container_of(kfc, struct rdt_fs_context, kfc);
+}
+
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_enable_key);
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_mon_enable_key);
+
+/**
+ * struct mon_evt - Entry in the event list of a resource
+ * @evtid: event id
+ * @name: name of the event
+ * @list: entry in &rdt_resource->evt_list
+ */
+struct mon_evt {
+ enum resctrl_event_id evtid;
+ char *name;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * union mon_data_bits - Monitoring details for each event file
+ * @priv: Used to store monitoring event data in @u
+ * as kernfs private data
+ * @rid: Resource id associated with the event file
+ * @evtid: Event id associated with the event file
+ * @domid: The domain to which the event file belongs
+ * @u: Name of the bit fields struct
+ */
+union mon_data_bits {
+ void *priv;
+ struct {
+ unsigned int rid : 10;
+ enum resctrl_event_id evtid : 8;
+ unsigned int domid : 14;
+ } u;
+};
+
+struct rmid_read {
+ struct rdtgroup *rgrp;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ enum resctrl_event_id evtid;
+ bool first;
+ int err;
+ u64 val;
+};
+
+extern bool rdt_alloc_capable;
+extern bool rdt_mon_capable;
+extern unsigned int rdt_mon_features;
+extern struct list_head resctrl_schema_all;
+
+enum rdt_group_type {
+ RDTCTRL_GROUP = 0,
+ RDTMON_GROUP,
+ RDT_NUM_GROUP,
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum rdtgrp_mode - Mode of a RDT resource group
+ * @RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE: This resource group allows sharing of its allocations
+ * @RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE: No sharing of this resource group's allocations allowed
+ * @RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP: Resource group will be used for Pseudo-Locking
+ * @RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED: No sharing of this resource group's allocations
+ * allowed AND the allocations are Cache Pseudo-Locked
+ * @RDT_NUM_MODES: Total number of modes
+ *
+ * The mode of a resource group enables control over the allowed overlap
+ * between allocations associated with different resource groups (classes
+ * of service). User is able to modify the mode of a resource group by
+ * writing to the "mode" resctrl file associated with the resource group.
+ *
+ * The "shareable", "exclusive", and "pseudo-locksetup" modes are set by
+ * writing the appropriate text to the "mode" file. A resource group enters
+ * "pseudo-locked" mode after the schemata is written while the resource
+ * group is in "pseudo-locksetup" mode.
+ */
+enum rdtgrp_mode {
+ RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE = 0,
+ RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE,
+ RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP,
+ RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED,
+
+ /* Must be last */
+ RDT_NUM_MODES,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct mongroup - store mon group's data in resctrl fs.
+ * @mon_data_kn: kernfs node for the mon_data directory
+ * @parent: parent rdtgrp
+ * @crdtgrp_list: child rdtgroup node list
+ * @rmid: rmid for this rdtgroup
+ */
+struct mongroup {
+ struct kernfs_node *mon_data_kn;
+ struct rdtgroup *parent;
+ struct list_head crdtgrp_list;
+ u32 rmid;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct pseudo_lock_region - pseudo-lock region information
+ * @s: Resctrl schema for the resource to which this
+ * pseudo-locked region belongs
+ * @d: RDT domain to which this pseudo-locked region
+ * belongs
+ * @cbm: bitmask of the pseudo-locked region
+ * @lock_thread_wq: waitqueue used to wait on the pseudo-locking thread
+ * completion
+ * @thread_done: variable used by waitqueue to test if pseudo-locking
+ * thread completed
+ * @cpu: core associated with the cache on which the setup code
+ * will be run
+ * @line_size: size of the cache lines
+ * @size: size of pseudo-locked region in bytes
+ * @kmem: the kernel memory associated with pseudo-locked region
+ * @minor: minor number of character device associated with this
+ * region
+ * @debugfs_dir: pointer to this region's directory in the debugfs
+ * filesystem
+ * @pm_reqs: Power management QoS requests related to this region
+ */
+struct pseudo_lock_region {
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ u32 cbm;
+ wait_queue_head_t lock_thread_wq;
+ int thread_done;
+ int cpu;
+ unsigned int line_size;
+ unsigned int size;
+ void *kmem;
+ unsigned int minor;
+ struct dentry *debugfs_dir;
+ struct list_head pm_reqs;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct rdtgroup - store rdtgroup's data in resctrl file system.
+ * @kn: kernfs node
+ * @rdtgroup_list: linked list for all rdtgroups
+ * @closid: closid for this rdtgroup
+ * @cpu_mask: CPUs assigned to this rdtgroup
+ * @flags: status bits
+ * @waitcount: how many cpus expect to find this
+ * group when they acquire rdtgroup_mutex
+ * @type: indicates type of this rdtgroup - either
+ * monitor only or ctrl_mon group
+ * @mon: mongroup related data
+ * @mode: mode of resource group
+ * @plr: pseudo-locked region
+ */
+struct rdtgroup {
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ struct list_head rdtgroup_list;
+ u32 closid;
+ struct cpumask cpu_mask;
+ int flags;
+ atomic_t waitcount;
+ enum rdt_group_type type;
+ struct mongroup mon;
+ enum rdtgrp_mode mode;
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr;
+};
+
+/* rdtgroup.flags */
+#define RDT_DELETED 1
+
+/* rftype.flags */
+#define RFTYPE_FLAGS_CPUS_LIST 1
+
+/*
+ * Define the file type flags for base and info directories.
+ */
+#define RFTYPE_INFO BIT(0)
+#define RFTYPE_BASE BIT(1)
+#define RF_CTRLSHIFT 4
+#define RF_MONSHIFT 5
+#define RF_TOPSHIFT 6
+#define RFTYPE_CTRL BIT(RF_CTRLSHIFT)
+#define RFTYPE_MON BIT(RF_MONSHIFT)
+#define RFTYPE_TOP BIT(RF_TOPSHIFT)
+#define RFTYPE_RES_CACHE BIT(8)
+#define RFTYPE_RES_MB BIT(9)
+#define RF_CTRL_INFO (RFTYPE_INFO | RFTYPE_CTRL)
+#define RF_MON_INFO (RFTYPE_INFO | RFTYPE_MON)
+#define RF_TOP_INFO (RFTYPE_INFO | RFTYPE_TOP)
+#define RF_CTRL_BASE (RFTYPE_BASE | RFTYPE_CTRL)
+
+/* List of all resource groups */
+extern struct list_head rdt_all_groups;
+
+extern int max_name_width, max_data_width;
+
+int __init rdtgroup_init(void);
+void __exit rdtgroup_exit(void);
+
+/**
+ * struct rftype - describe each file in the resctrl file system
+ * @name: File name
+ * @mode: Access mode
+ * @kf_ops: File operations
+ * @flags: File specific RFTYPE_FLAGS_* flags
+ * @fflags: File specific RF_* or RFTYPE_* flags
+ * @seq_show: Show content of the file
+ * @write: Write to the file
+ */
+struct rftype {
+ char *name;
+ umode_t mode;
+ const struct kernfs_ops *kf_ops;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long fflags;
+
+ int (*seq_show)(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *sf, void *v);
+ /*
+ * write() is the generic write callback which maps directly to
+ * kernfs write operation and overrides all other operations.
+ * Maximum write size is determined by ->max_write_len.
+ */
+ ssize_t (*write)(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off);
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct mbm_state - status for each MBM counter in each domain
+ * @prev_bw_bytes: Previous bytes value read for bandwidth calculation
+ * @prev_bw: The most recent bandwidth in MBps
+ * @delta_bw: Difference between the current and previous bandwidth
+ * @delta_comp: Indicates whether to compute the delta_bw
+ */
+struct mbm_state {
+ u64 prev_bw_bytes;
+ u32 prev_bw;
+ u32 delta_bw;
+ bool delta_comp;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct arch_mbm_state - values used to compute resctrl_arch_rmid_read()s
+ * return value.
+ * @chunks: Total data moved (multiply by rdt_group.mon_scale to get bytes)
+ * @prev_msr: Value of IA32_QM_CTR last time it was read for the RMID used to
+ * find this struct.
+ */
+struct arch_mbm_state {
+ u64 chunks;
+ u64 prev_msr;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct rdt_hw_domain - Arch private attributes of a set of CPUs that share
+ * a resource
+ * @d_resctrl: Properties exposed to the resctrl file system
+ * @ctrl_val: array of cache or mem ctrl values (indexed by CLOSID)
+ * @arch_mbm_total: arch private state for MBM total bandwidth
+ * @arch_mbm_local: arch private state for MBM local bandwidth
+ *
+ * Members of this structure are accessed via helpers that provide abstraction.
+ */
+struct rdt_hw_domain {
+ struct rdt_domain d_resctrl;
+ u32 *ctrl_val;
+ struct arch_mbm_state *arch_mbm_total;
+ struct arch_mbm_state *arch_mbm_local;
+};
+
+static inline struct rdt_hw_domain *resctrl_to_arch_dom(struct rdt_domain *r)
+{
+ return container_of(r, struct rdt_hw_domain, d_resctrl);
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct msr_param - set a range of MSRs from a domain
+ * @res: The resource to use
+ * @low: Beginning index from base MSR
+ * @high: End index
+ */
+struct msr_param {
+ struct rdt_resource *res;
+ u32 low;
+ u32 high;
+};
+
+static inline bool is_llc_occupancy_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (rdt_mon_features & (1 << QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID));
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mbm_total_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (rdt_mon_features & (1 << QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID));
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mbm_local_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (rdt_mon_features & (1 << QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID));
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mbm_enabled(void)
+{
+ return (is_mbm_total_enabled() || is_mbm_local_enabled());
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mbm_event(int e)
+{
+ return (e >= QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID &&
+ e <= QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID);
+}
+
+struct rdt_parse_data {
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ char *buf;
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct rdt_hw_resource - arch private attributes of a resctrl resource
+ * @r_resctrl: Attributes of the resource used directly by resctrl.
+ * @num_closid: Maximum number of closid this hardware can support,
+ * regardless of CDP. This is exposed via
+ * resctrl_arch_get_num_closid() to avoid confusion
+ * with struct resctrl_schema's property of the same name,
+ * which has been corrected for features like CDP.
+ * @msr_base: Base MSR address for CBMs
+ * @msr_update: Function pointer to update QOS MSRs
+ * @mon_scale: cqm counter * mon_scale = occupancy in bytes
+ * @mbm_width: Monitor width, to detect and correct for overflow.
+ * @cdp_enabled: CDP state of this resource
+ *
+ * Members of this structure are either private to the architecture
+ * e.g. mbm_width, or accessed via helpers that provide abstraction. e.g.
+ * msr_update and msr_base.
+ */
+struct rdt_hw_resource {
+ struct rdt_resource r_resctrl;
+ u32 num_closid;
+ unsigned int msr_base;
+ void (*msr_update) (struct rdt_domain *d, struct msr_param *m,
+ struct rdt_resource *r);
+ unsigned int mon_scale;
+ unsigned int mbm_width;
+ bool cdp_enabled;
+};
+
+static inline struct rdt_hw_resource *resctrl_to_arch_res(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ return container_of(r, struct rdt_hw_resource, r_resctrl);
+}
+
+int parse_cbm(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ struct rdt_domain *d);
+int parse_bw(struct rdt_parse_data *data, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ struct rdt_domain *d);
+
+extern struct mutex rdtgroup_mutex;
+
+extern struct rdt_hw_resource rdt_resources_all[];
+extern struct rdtgroup rdtgroup_default;
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_alloc_enable_key);
+
+extern struct dentry *debugfs_resctrl;
+
+enum resctrl_res_level {
+ RDT_RESOURCE_L3,
+ RDT_RESOURCE_L2,
+ RDT_RESOURCE_MBA,
+
+ /* Must be the last */
+ RDT_NUM_RESOURCES,
+};
+
+static inline struct rdt_resource *resctrl_inc(struct rdt_resource *res)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(res);
+
+ hw_res++;
+ return &hw_res->r_resctrl;
+}
+
+static inline bool resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(enum resctrl_res_level l)
+{
+ return rdt_resources_all[l].cdp_enabled;
+}
+
+int resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(enum resctrl_res_level l, bool enable);
+
+/*
+ * To return the common struct rdt_resource, which is contained in struct
+ * rdt_hw_resource, walk the resctrl member of struct rdt_hw_resource.
+ */
+#define for_each_rdt_resource(r) \
+ for (r = &rdt_resources_all[0].r_resctrl; \
+ r <= &rdt_resources_all[RDT_NUM_RESOURCES - 1].r_resctrl; \
+ r = resctrl_inc(r))
+
+#define for_each_capable_rdt_resource(r) \
+ for_each_rdt_resource(r) \
+ if (r->alloc_capable || r->mon_capable)
+
+#define for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r) \
+ for_each_rdt_resource(r) \
+ if (r->alloc_capable)
+
+#define for_each_mon_capable_rdt_resource(r) \
+ for_each_rdt_resource(r) \
+ if (r->mon_capable)
+
+/* CPUID.(EAX=10H, ECX=ResID=1).EAX */
+union cpuid_0x10_1_eax {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int cbm_len:5;
+ } split;
+ unsigned int full;
+};
+
+/* CPUID.(EAX=10H, ECX=ResID=3).EAX */
+union cpuid_0x10_3_eax {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int max_delay:12;
+ } split;
+ unsigned int full;
+};
+
+/* CPUID.(EAX=10H, ECX=ResID).EDX */
+union cpuid_0x10_x_edx {
+ struct {
+ unsigned int cos_max:16;
+ } split;
+ unsigned int full;
+};
+
+void rdt_last_cmd_clear(void);
+void rdt_last_cmd_puts(const char *s);
+__printf(1, 2)
+void rdt_last_cmd_printf(const char *fmt, ...);
+
+void rdt_ctrl_update(void *arg);
+struct rdtgroup *rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(struct kernfs_node *kn);
+void rdtgroup_kn_unlock(struct kernfs_node *kn);
+int rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(struct rdtgroup *r, const char *name);
+int rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(struct rdtgroup *r, const char *name,
+ umode_t mask);
+struct rdt_domain *rdt_find_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, int id,
+ struct list_head **pos);
+ssize_t rdtgroup_schemata_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off);
+int rdtgroup_schemata_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v);
+bool rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(struct resctrl_schema *s, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ unsigned long cbm, int closid, bool exclusive);
+unsigned int rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ unsigned long cbm);
+enum rdtgrp_mode rdtgroup_mode_by_closid(int closid);
+int rdtgroup_tasks_assigned(struct rdtgroup *r);
+int rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp);
+int rdtgroup_locksetup_exit(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp);
+bool rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps_pseudo_locked(struct rdt_domain *d, unsigned long cbm);
+bool rdtgroup_pseudo_locked_in_hierarchy(struct rdt_domain *d);
+int rdt_pseudo_lock_init(void);
+void rdt_pseudo_lock_release(void);
+int rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp);
+void rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp);
+struct rdt_domain *get_domain_from_cpu(int cpu, struct rdt_resource *r);
+int closids_supported(void);
+void closid_free(int closid);
+int alloc_rmid(void);
+void free_rmid(u32 rmid);
+int rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r);
+void mon_event_count(void *info);
+int rdtgroup_mondata_show(struct seq_file *m, void *arg);
+void mon_event_read(struct rmid_read *rr, struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdt_domain *d, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp,
+ int evtid, int first);
+void mbm_setup_overflow_handler(struct rdt_domain *dom,
+ unsigned long delay_ms);
+void mbm_handle_overflow(struct work_struct *work);
+void __init intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk(void);
+bool is_mba_sc(struct rdt_resource *r);
+void cqm_setup_limbo_handler(struct rdt_domain *dom, unsigned long delay_ms);
+void cqm_handle_limbo(struct work_struct *work);
+bool has_busy_rmid(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d);
+void __check_limbo(struct rdt_domain *d, bool force_free);
+void rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(struct rdt_resource *r);
+void __init thread_throttle_mode_init(void);
+void rdt_staged_configs_clear(void);
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_RESCTRL_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..77538abeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/monitor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,822 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Resource Director Technology(RDT)
+ * - Monitoring code
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@intel.com>
+ *
+ * This replaces the cqm.c based on perf but we reuse a lot of
+ * code and datastructures originally from Peter Zijlstra and Matt Fleming.
+ *
+ * More information about RDT be found in the Intel (R) x86 Architecture
+ * Software Developer Manual June 2016, volume 3, section 17.17.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu_device_id.h>
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct rmid_entry {
+ u32 rmid;
+ int busy;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/**
+ * @rmid_free_lru A least recently used list of free RMIDs
+ * These RMIDs are guaranteed to have an occupancy less than the
+ * threshold occupancy
+ */
+static LIST_HEAD(rmid_free_lru);
+
+/**
+ * @rmid_limbo_count count of currently unused but (potentially)
+ * dirty RMIDs.
+ * This counts RMIDs that no one is currently using but that
+ * may have a occupancy value > resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold. User can
+ * change the threshold occupancy value.
+ */
+static unsigned int rmid_limbo_count;
+
+/**
+ * @rmid_entry - The entry in the limbo and free lists.
+ */
+static struct rmid_entry *rmid_ptrs;
+
+/*
+ * Global boolean for rdt_monitor which is true if any
+ * resource monitoring is enabled.
+ */
+bool rdt_mon_capable;
+
+/*
+ * Global to indicate which monitoring events are enabled.
+ */
+unsigned int rdt_mon_features;
+
+/*
+ * This is the threshold cache occupancy in bytes at which we will consider an
+ * RMID available for re-allocation.
+ */
+unsigned int resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold;
+
+/*
+ * This is the maximum value for the reallocation threshold, in bytes.
+ */
+unsigned int resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit;
+
+#define CF(cf) ((unsigned long)(1048576 * (cf) + 0.5))
+
+/*
+ * The correction factor table is documented in Documentation/x86/resctrl.rst.
+ * If rmid > rmid threshold, MBM total and local values should be multiplied
+ * by the correction factor.
+ *
+ * The original table is modified for better code:
+ *
+ * 1. The threshold 0 is changed to rmid count - 1 so don't do correction
+ * for the case.
+ * 2. MBM total and local correction table indexed by core counter which is
+ * equal to (x86_cache_max_rmid + 1) / 8 - 1 and is from 0 up to 27.
+ * 3. The correction factor is normalized to 2^20 (1048576) so it's faster
+ * to calculate corrected value by shifting:
+ * corrected_value = (original_value * correction_factor) >> 20
+ */
+static const struct mbm_correction_factor_table {
+ u32 rmidthreshold;
+ u64 cf;
+} mbm_cf_table[] __initconst = {
+ {7, CF(1.000000)},
+ {15, CF(1.000000)},
+ {15, CF(0.969650)},
+ {31, CF(1.000000)},
+ {31, CF(1.066667)},
+ {31, CF(0.969650)},
+ {47, CF(1.142857)},
+ {63, CF(1.000000)},
+ {63, CF(1.185115)},
+ {63, CF(1.066553)},
+ {79, CF(1.454545)},
+ {95, CF(1.000000)},
+ {95, CF(1.230769)},
+ {95, CF(1.142857)},
+ {95, CF(1.066667)},
+ {127, CF(1.000000)},
+ {127, CF(1.254863)},
+ {127, CF(1.185255)},
+ {151, CF(1.000000)},
+ {127, CF(1.066667)},
+ {167, CF(1.000000)},
+ {159, CF(1.454334)},
+ {183, CF(1.000000)},
+ {127, CF(0.969744)},
+ {191, CF(1.280246)},
+ {191, CF(1.230921)},
+ {215, CF(1.000000)},
+ {191, CF(1.143118)},
+};
+
+static u32 mbm_cf_rmidthreshold __read_mostly = UINT_MAX;
+static u64 mbm_cf __read_mostly;
+
+static inline u64 get_corrected_mbm_count(u32 rmid, unsigned long val)
+{
+ /* Correct MBM value. */
+ if (rmid > mbm_cf_rmidthreshold)
+ val = (val * mbm_cf) >> 20;
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+static inline struct rmid_entry *__rmid_entry(u32 rmid)
+{
+ struct rmid_entry *entry;
+
+ entry = &rmid_ptrs[rmid];
+ WARN_ON(entry->rmid != rmid);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+static int __rmid_read(u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
+{
+ u64 msr_val;
+
+ /*
+ * As per the SDM, when IA32_QM_EVTSEL.EvtID (bits 7:0) is configured
+ * with a valid event code for supported resource type and the bits
+ * IA32_QM_EVTSEL.RMID (bits 41:32) are configured with valid RMID,
+ * IA32_QM_CTR.data (bits 61:0) reports the monitored data.
+ * IA32_QM_CTR.Error (bit 63) and IA32_QM_CTR.Unavailable (bit 62)
+ * are error bits.
+ */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_QM_EVTSEL, eventid, rmid);
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_QM_CTR, msr_val);
+
+ if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_ERROR)
+ return -EIO;
+ if (msr_val & RMID_VAL_UNAVAIL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *val = msr_val;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct arch_mbm_state *get_arch_mbm_state(struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom,
+ u32 rmid,
+ enum resctrl_event_id eventid)
+{
+ switch (eventid) {
+ case QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID:
+ return NULL;
+ case QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID:
+ return &hw_dom->arch_mbm_total[rmid];
+ case QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID:
+ return &hw_dom->arch_mbm_local[rmid];
+ }
+
+ /* Never expect to get here */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void resctrl_arch_reset_rmid(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct arch_mbm_state *am;
+
+ am = get_arch_mbm_state(hw_dom, rmid, eventid);
+ if (am) {
+ memset(am, 0, sizeof(*am));
+
+ /* Record any initial, non-zero count value. */
+ __rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &am->prev_msr);
+ }
+}
+
+static u64 mbm_overflow_count(u64 prev_msr, u64 cur_msr, unsigned int width)
+{
+ u64 shift = 64 - width, chunks;
+
+ chunks = (cur_msr << shift) - (prev_msr << shift);
+ return chunks >> shift;
+}
+
+int resctrl_arch_rmid_read(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ u32 rmid, enum resctrl_event_id eventid, u64 *val)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ struct arch_mbm_state *am;
+ u64 msr_val, chunks;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), &d->cpu_mask))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = __rmid_read(rmid, eventid, &msr_val);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ am = get_arch_mbm_state(hw_dom, rmid, eventid);
+ if (am) {
+ am->chunks += mbm_overflow_count(am->prev_msr, msr_val,
+ hw_res->mbm_width);
+ chunks = get_corrected_mbm_count(rmid, am->chunks);
+ am->prev_msr = msr_val;
+ } else {
+ chunks = msr_val;
+ }
+
+ *val = chunks * hw_res->mon_scale;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the RMIDs that are marked as busy for this domain. If the
+ * reported LLC occupancy is below the threshold clear the busy bit and
+ * decrement the count. If the busy count gets to zero on an RMID, we
+ * free the RMID
+ */
+void __check_limbo(struct rdt_domain *d, bool force_free)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ struct rmid_entry *entry;
+ u32 crmid = 1, nrmid;
+ bool rmid_dirty;
+ u64 val = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip RMID 0 and start from RMID 1 and check all the RMIDs that
+ * are marked as busy for occupancy < threshold. If the occupancy
+ * is less than the threshold decrement the busy counter of the
+ * RMID and move it to the free list when the counter reaches 0.
+ */
+ for (;;) {
+ nrmid = find_next_bit(d->rmid_busy_llc, r->num_rmid, crmid);
+ if (nrmid >= r->num_rmid)
+ break;
+
+ entry = __rmid_entry(nrmid);
+
+ if (resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, d, entry->rmid,
+ QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID, &val)) {
+ rmid_dirty = true;
+ } else {
+ rmid_dirty = (val >= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold);
+ }
+
+ if (force_free || !rmid_dirty) {
+ clear_bit(entry->rmid, d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ if (!--entry->busy) {
+ rmid_limbo_count--;
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &rmid_free_lru);
+ }
+ }
+ crmid = nrmid + 1;
+ }
+}
+
+bool has_busy_rmid(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ return find_first_bit(d->rmid_busy_llc, r->num_rmid) != r->num_rmid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * As of now the RMIDs allocation is global.
+ * However we keep track of which packages the RMIDs
+ * are used to optimize the limbo list management.
+ */
+int alloc_rmid(void)
+{
+ struct rmid_entry *entry;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (list_empty(&rmid_free_lru))
+ return rmid_limbo_count ? -EBUSY : -ENOSPC;
+
+ entry = list_first_entry(&rmid_free_lru,
+ struct rmid_entry, list);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+
+ return entry->rmid;
+}
+
+static void add_rmid_to_limbo(struct rmid_entry *entry)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int cpu, err;
+ u64 val = 0;
+
+ entry->busy = 0;
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask)) {
+ err = resctrl_arch_rmid_read(r, d, entry->rmid,
+ QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID,
+ &val);
+ if (err || val <= resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold)
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * For the first limbo RMID in the domain,
+ * setup up the limbo worker.
+ */
+ if (!has_busy_rmid(r, d))
+ cqm_setup_limbo_handler(d, CQM_LIMBOCHECK_INTERVAL);
+ set_bit(entry->rmid, d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ entry->busy++;
+ }
+ put_cpu();
+
+ if (entry->busy)
+ rmid_limbo_count++;
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &rmid_free_lru);
+}
+
+void free_rmid(u32 rmid)
+{
+ struct rmid_entry *entry;
+
+ if (!rmid)
+ return;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ entry = __rmid_entry(rmid);
+
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled())
+ add_rmid_to_limbo(entry);
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &rmid_free_lru);
+}
+
+static int __mon_event_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
+{
+ struct mbm_state *m;
+ u64 tval = 0;
+
+ if (rr->first)
+ resctrl_arch_reset_rmid(rr->r, rr->d, rmid, rr->evtid);
+
+ rr->err = resctrl_arch_rmid_read(rr->r, rr->d, rmid, rr->evtid, &tval);
+ if (rr->err)
+ return rr->err;
+
+ switch (rr->evtid) {
+ case QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID:
+ rr->val += tval;
+ return 0;
+ case QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID:
+ m = &rr->d->mbm_total[rmid];
+ break;
+ case QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID:
+ m = &rr->d->mbm_local[rmid];
+ break;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Code would never reach here because an invalid
+ * event id would fail in resctrl_arch_rmid_read().
+ */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rr->first) {
+ memset(m, 0, sizeof(struct mbm_state));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rr->val += tval;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * mbm_bw_count() - Update bw count from values previously read by
+ * __mon_event_count().
+ * @rmid: The rmid used to identify the cached mbm_state.
+ * @rr: The struct rmid_read populated by __mon_event_count().
+ *
+ * Supporting function to calculate the memory bandwidth
+ * and delta bandwidth in MBps. The chunks value previously read by
+ * __mon_event_count() is compared with the chunks value from the previous
+ * invocation. This must be called once per second to maintain values in MBps.
+ */
+static void mbm_bw_count(u32 rmid, struct rmid_read *rr)
+{
+ struct mbm_state *m = &rr->d->mbm_local[rmid];
+ u64 cur_bw, bytes, cur_bytes;
+
+ cur_bytes = rr->val;
+ bytes = cur_bytes - m->prev_bw_bytes;
+ m->prev_bw_bytes = cur_bytes;
+
+ cur_bw = bytes / SZ_1M;
+
+ if (m->delta_comp)
+ m->delta_bw = abs(cur_bw - m->prev_bw);
+ m->delta_comp = false;
+ m->prev_bw = cur_bw;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called via IPI to read the CQM/MBM counters
+ * on a domain.
+ */
+void mon_event_count(void *info)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *entry;
+ struct rmid_read *rr = info;
+ struct list_head *head;
+ int ret;
+
+ rdtgrp = rr->rgrp;
+
+ ret = __mon_event_count(rdtgrp->mon.rmid, rr);
+
+ /*
+ * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups and
+ * add them together. Count events which are read successfully.
+ * Discard the rmid_read's reporting errors.
+ */
+ head = &rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ if (__mon_event_count(entry->mon.rmid, rr) == 0)
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * __mon_event_count() calls for newly created monitor groups may
+ * report -EINVAL/Unavailable if the monitor hasn't seen any traffic.
+ * Discard error if any of the monitor event reads succeeded.
+ */
+ if (ret == 0)
+ rr->err = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Feedback loop for MBA software controller (mba_sc)
+ *
+ * mba_sc is a feedback loop where we periodically read MBM counters and
+ * adjust the bandwidth percentage values via the IA32_MBA_THRTL_MSRs so
+ * that:
+ *
+ * current bandwidth(cur_bw) < user specified bandwidth(user_bw)
+ *
+ * This uses the MBM counters to measure the bandwidth and MBA throttle
+ * MSRs to control the bandwidth for a particular rdtgrp. It builds on the
+ * fact that resctrl rdtgroups have both monitoring and control.
+ *
+ * The frequency of the checks is 1s and we just tag along the MBM overflow
+ * timer. Having 1s interval makes the calculation of bandwidth simpler.
+ *
+ * Although MBA's goal is to restrict the bandwidth to a maximum, there may
+ * be a need to increase the bandwidth to avoid unnecessarily restricting
+ * the L2 <-> L3 traffic.
+ *
+ * Since MBA controls the L2 external bandwidth where as MBM measures the
+ * L3 external bandwidth the following sequence could lead to such a
+ * situation.
+ *
+ * Consider an rdtgroup which had high L3 <-> memory traffic in initial
+ * phases -> mba_sc kicks in and reduced bandwidth percentage values -> but
+ * after some time rdtgroup has mostly L2 <-> L3 traffic.
+ *
+ * In this case we may restrict the rdtgroup's L2 <-> L3 traffic as its
+ * throttle MSRs already have low percentage values. To avoid
+ * unnecessarily restricting such rdtgroups, we also increase the bandwidth.
+ */
+static void update_mba_bw(struct rdtgroup *rgrp, struct rdt_domain *dom_mbm)
+{
+ u32 closid, rmid, cur_msr_val, new_msr_val;
+ struct mbm_state *pmbm_data, *cmbm_data;
+ u32 cur_bw, delta_bw, user_bw;
+ struct rdt_resource *r_mba;
+ struct rdt_domain *dom_mba;
+ struct list_head *head;
+ struct rdtgroup *entry;
+
+ if (!is_mbm_local_enabled())
+ return;
+
+ r_mba = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl;
+
+ closid = rgrp->closid;
+ rmid = rgrp->mon.rmid;
+ pmbm_data = &dom_mbm->mbm_local[rmid];
+
+ dom_mba = get_domain_from_cpu(smp_processor_id(), r_mba);
+ if (!dom_mba) {
+ pr_warn_once("Failure to get domain for MBA update\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ cur_bw = pmbm_data->prev_bw;
+ user_bw = dom_mba->mbps_val[closid];
+ delta_bw = pmbm_data->delta_bw;
+
+ /* MBA resource doesn't support CDP */
+ cur_msr_val = resctrl_arch_get_config(r_mba, dom_mba, closid, CDP_NONE);
+
+ /*
+ * For Ctrl groups read data from child monitor groups.
+ */
+ head = &rgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ cmbm_data = &dom_mbm->mbm_local[entry->mon.rmid];
+ cur_bw += cmbm_data->prev_bw;
+ delta_bw += cmbm_data->delta_bw;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Scale up/down the bandwidth linearly for the ctrl group. The
+ * bandwidth step is the bandwidth granularity specified by the
+ * hardware.
+ *
+ * The delta_bw is used when increasing the bandwidth so that we
+ * dont alternately increase and decrease the control values
+ * continuously.
+ *
+ * For ex: consider cur_bw = 90MBps, user_bw = 100MBps and if
+ * bandwidth step is 20MBps(> user_bw - cur_bw), we would keep
+ * switching between 90 and 110 continuously if we only check
+ * cur_bw < user_bw.
+ */
+ if (cur_msr_val > r_mba->membw.min_bw && user_bw < cur_bw) {
+ new_msr_val = cur_msr_val - r_mba->membw.bw_gran;
+ } else if (cur_msr_val < MAX_MBA_BW &&
+ (user_bw > (cur_bw + delta_bw))) {
+ new_msr_val = cur_msr_val + r_mba->membw.bw_gran;
+ } else {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ resctrl_arch_update_one(r_mba, dom_mba, closid, CDP_NONE, new_msr_val);
+
+ /*
+ * Delta values are updated dynamically package wise for each
+ * rdtgrp every time the throttle MSR changes value.
+ *
+ * This is because (1)the increase in bandwidth is not perfectly
+ * linear and only "approximately" linear even when the hardware
+ * says it is linear.(2)Also since MBA is a core specific
+ * mechanism, the delta values vary based on number of cores used
+ * by the rdtgrp.
+ */
+ pmbm_data->delta_comp = true;
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ cmbm_data = &dom_mbm->mbm_local[entry->mon.rmid];
+ cmbm_data->delta_comp = true;
+ }
+}
+
+static void mbm_update(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d, int rmid)
+{
+ struct rmid_read rr;
+
+ rr.first = false;
+ rr.r = r;
+ rr.d = d;
+
+ /*
+ * This is protected from concurrent reads from user
+ * as both the user and we hold the global mutex.
+ */
+ if (is_mbm_total_enabled()) {
+ rr.evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID;
+ rr.val = 0;
+ __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
+ }
+ if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) {
+ rr.evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID;
+ rr.val = 0;
+ __mon_event_count(rmid, &rr);
+
+ /*
+ * Call the MBA software controller only for the
+ * control groups and when user has enabled
+ * the software controller explicitly.
+ */
+ if (is_mba_sc(NULL))
+ mbm_bw_count(rmid, &rr);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handler to scan the limbo list and move the RMIDs
+ * to free list whose occupancy < threshold_occupancy.
+ */
+void cqm_handle_limbo(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ unsigned long delay = msecs_to_jiffies(CQM_LIMBOCHECK_INTERVAL);
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ d = container_of(work, struct rdt_domain, cqm_limbo.work);
+
+ __check_limbo(d, false);
+
+ if (has_busy_rmid(r, d))
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(cpu, &d->cqm_limbo, delay);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+}
+
+void cqm_setup_limbo_handler(struct rdt_domain *dom, unsigned long delay_ms)
+{
+ unsigned long delay = msecs_to_jiffies(delay_ms);
+ int cpu;
+
+ cpu = cpumask_any(&dom->cpu_mask);
+ dom->cqm_work_cpu = cpu;
+
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(cpu, &dom->cqm_limbo, delay);
+}
+
+void mbm_handle_overflow(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ unsigned long delay = msecs_to_jiffies(MBM_OVERFLOW_INTERVAL);
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp, *crgrp;
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct list_head *head;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&rdt_mon_enable_key))
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ d = container_of(work, struct rdt_domain, mbm_over.work);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(prgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ mbm_update(r, d, prgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ head = &prgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, head, mon.crdtgrp_list)
+ mbm_update(r, d, crgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ if (is_mba_sc(NULL))
+ update_mba_bw(prgrp, d);
+ }
+
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(cpu, &d->mbm_over, delay);
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+}
+
+void mbm_setup_overflow_handler(struct rdt_domain *dom, unsigned long delay_ms)
+{
+ unsigned long delay = msecs_to_jiffies(delay_ms);
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&rdt_mon_enable_key))
+ return;
+ cpu = cpumask_any(&dom->cpu_mask);
+ dom->mbm_work_cpu = cpu;
+ schedule_delayed_work_on(cpu, &dom->mbm_over, delay);
+}
+
+static int dom_data_init(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rmid_entry *entry = NULL;
+ int i, nr_rmids;
+
+ nr_rmids = r->num_rmid;
+ rmid_ptrs = kcalloc(nr_rmids, sizeof(struct rmid_entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rmid_ptrs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_rmids; i++) {
+ entry = &rmid_ptrs[i];
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+ entry->rmid = i;
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &rmid_free_lru);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * RMID 0 is special and is always allocated. It's used for all
+ * tasks that are not monitored.
+ */
+ entry = __rmid_entry(0);
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct mon_evt llc_occupancy_event = {
+ .name = "llc_occupancy",
+ .evtid = QOS_L3_OCCUP_EVENT_ID,
+};
+
+static struct mon_evt mbm_total_event = {
+ .name = "mbm_total_bytes",
+ .evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_TOTAL_EVENT_ID,
+};
+
+static struct mon_evt mbm_local_event = {
+ .name = "mbm_local_bytes",
+ .evtid = QOS_L3_MBM_LOCAL_EVENT_ID,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the event list for the resource.
+ *
+ * Note that MBM events are also part of RDT_RESOURCE_L3 resource
+ * because as per the SDM the total and local memory bandwidth
+ * are enumerated as part of L3 monitoring.
+ */
+static void l3_mon_evt_init(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&r->evt_list);
+
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled())
+ list_add_tail(&llc_occupancy_event.list, &r->evt_list);
+ if (is_mbm_total_enabled())
+ list_add_tail(&mbm_total_event.list, &r->evt_list);
+ if (is_mbm_local_enabled())
+ list_add_tail(&mbm_local_event.list, &r->evt_list);
+}
+
+int rdt_get_mon_l3_config(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned int mbm_offset = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_mbm_width_offset;
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ unsigned int threshold;
+ int ret;
+
+ resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_size * 1024;
+ hw_res->mon_scale = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_occ_scale;
+ r->num_rmid = boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_max_rmid + 1;
+ hw_res->mbm_width = MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_BASE;
+
+ if (mbm_offset > 0 && mbm_offset <= MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_MAX)
+ hw_res->mbm_width += mbm_offset;
+ else if (mbm_offset > MBM_CNTR_WIDTH_OFFSET_MAX)
+ pr_warn("Ignoring impossible MBM counter offset\n");
+
+ /*
+ * A reasonable upper limit on the max threshold is the number
+ * of lines tagged per RMID if all RMIDs have the same number of
+ * lines tagged in the LLC.
+ *
+ * For a 35MB LLC and 56 RMIDs, this is ~1.8% of the LLC.
+ */
+ threshold = resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit / r->num_rmid;
+
+ /*
+ * Because num_rmid may not be a power of two, round the value
+ * to the nearest multiple of hw_res->mon_scale so it matches a
+ * value the hardware will measure. mon_scale may not be a power of 2.
+ */
+ resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold = resctrl_arch_round_mon_val(threshold);
+
+ ret = dom_data_init(r);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ l3_mon_evt_init(r);
+
+ r->mon_capable = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void __init intel_rdt_mbm_apply_quirk(void)
+{
+ int cf_index;
+
+ cf_index = (boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_max_rmid + 1) / 8 - 1;
+ if (cf_index >= ARRAY_SIZE(mbm_cf_table)) {
+ pr_info("No MBM correction factor available\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ mbm_cf_rmidthreshold = mbm_cf_table[cf_index].rmidthreshold;
+ mbm_cf = mbm_cf_table[cf_index].cf;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d961ae3ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1600 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Resource Director Technology (RDT)
+ *
+ * Pseudo-locking support built on top of Cache Allocation Technology (CAT)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/pm_qos.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/intel-family.h>
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include <asm/perf_event.h>
+
+#include "../../events/perf_event.h" /* For X86_CONFIG() */
+#include "internal.h"
+
+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include "pseudo_lock_event.h"
+
+/*
+ * The bits needed to disable hardware prefetching varies based on the
+ * platform. During initialization we will discover which bits to use.
+ */
+static u64 prefetch_disable_bits;
+
+/*
+ * Major number assigned to and shared by all devices exposing
+ * pseudo-locked regions.
+ */
+static unsigned int pseudo_lock_major;
+static unsigned long pseudo_lock_minor_avail = GENMASK(MINORBITS, 0);
+static struct class *pseudo_lock_class;
+
+/**
+ * get_prefetch_disable_bits - prefetch disable bits of supported platforms
+ * @void: It takes no parameters.
+ *
+ * Capture the list of platforms that have been validated to support
+ * pseudo-locking. This includes testing to ensure pseudo-locked regions
+ * with low cache miss rates can be created under variety of load conditions
+ * as well as that these pseudo-locked regions can maintain their low cache
+ * miss rates under variety of load conditions for significant lengths of time.
+ *
+ * After a platform has been validated to support pseudo-locking its
+ * hardware prefetch disable bits are included here as they are documented
+ * in the SDM.
+ *
+ * When adding a platform here also add support for its cache events to
+ * measure_cycles_perf_fn()
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * If platform is supported, the bits to disable hardware prefetchers, 0
+ * if platform is not supported.
+ */
+static u64 get_prefetch_disable_bits(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL ||
+ boot_cpu_data.x86 != 6)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X:
+ /*
+ * SDM defines bits of MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL register
+ * as:
+ * 0 L2 Hardware Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 1 L2 Adjacent Cache Line Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 2 DCU Hardware Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 3 DCU IP Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 63:4 Reserved
+ */
+ return 0xF;
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS:
+ /*
+ * SDM defines bits of MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL register
+ * as:
+ * 0 L2 Hardware Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 1 Reserved
+ * 2 DCU Hardware Prefetcher Disable (R/W)
+ * 63:3 Reserved
+ */
+ return 0x5;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_minor_get - Obtain available minor number
+ * @minor: Pointer to where new minor number will be stored
+ *
+ * A bitmask is used to track available minor numbers. Here the next free
+ * minor number is marked as unavailable and returned.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure.
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_minor_get(unsigned int *minor)
+{
+ unsigned long first_bit;
+
+ first_bit = find_first_bit(&pseudo_lock_minor_avail, MINORBITS);
+
+ if (first_bit == MINORBITS)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+
+ __clear_bit(first_bit, &pseudo_lock_minor_avail);
+ *minor = first_bit;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_minor_release - Return minor number to available
+ * @minor: The minor number made available
+ */
+static void pseudo_lock_minor_release(unsigned int minor)
+{
+ __set_bit(minor, &pseudo_lock_minor_avail);
+}
+
+/**
+ * region_find_by_minor - Locate a pseudo-lock region by inode minor number
+ * @minor: The minor number of the device representing pseudo-locked region
+ *
+ * When the character device is accessed we need to determine which
+ * pseudo-locked region it belongs to. This is done by matching the minor
+ * number of the device to the pseudo-locked region it belongs.
+ *
+ * Minor numbers are assigned at the time a pseudo-locked region is associated
+ * with a cache instance.
+ *
+ * Return: On success return pointer to resource group owning the pseudo-locked
+ * region, NULL on failure.
+ */
+static struct rdtgroup *region_find_by_minor(unsigned int minor)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *rdtgrp_match = NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(rdtgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ if (rdtgrp->plr && rdtgrp->plr->minor == minor) {
+ rdtgrp_match = rdtgrp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rdtgrp_match;
+}
+
+/**
+ * struct pseudo_lock_pm_req - A power management QoS request list entry
+ * @list: Entry within the @pm_reqs list for a pseudo-locked region
+ * @req: PM QoS request
+ */
+struct pseudo_lock_pm_req {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct dev_pm_qos_request req;
+};
+
+static void pseudo_lock_cstates_relax(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_pm_req *pm_req, *next;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pm_req, next, &plr->pm_reqs, list) {
+ dev_pm_qos_remove_request(&pm_req->req);
+ list_del(&pm_req->list);
+ kfree(pm_req);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_cstates_constrain - Restrict cores from entering C6
+ * @plr: Pseudo-locked region
+ *
+ * To prevent the cache from being affected by power management entering
+ * C6 has to be avoided. This is accomplished by requesting a latency
+ * requirement lower than lowest C6 exit latency of all supported
+ * platforms as found in the cpuidle state tables in the intel_idle driver.
+ * At this time it is possible to do so with a single latency requirement
+ * for all supported platforms.
+ *
+ * Since Goldmont is supported, which is affected by X86_BUG_MONITOR,
+ * the ACPI latencies need to be considered while keeping in mind that C2
+ * may be set to map to deeper sleep states. In this case the latency
+ * requirement needs to prevent entering C2 also.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_cstates_constrain(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_pm_req *pm_req;
+ int cpu;
+ int ret;
+
+ for_each_cpu(cpu, &plr->d->cpu_mask) {
+ pm_req = kzalloc(sizeof(*pm_req), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pm_req) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Failure to allocate memory for PM QoS\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ ret = dev_pm_qos_add_request(get_cpu_device(cpu),
+ &pm_req->req,
+ DEV_PM_QOS_RESUME_LATENCY,
+ 30);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Failed to add latency req CPU%d\n",
+ cpu);
+ kfree(pm_req);
+ ret = -1;
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ list_add(&pm_req->list, &plr->pm_reqs);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_err:
+ pseudo_lock_cstates_relax(plr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_region_clear - Reset pseudo-lock region data
+ * @plr: pseudo-lock region
+ *
+ * All content of the pseudo-locked region is reset - any memory allocated
+ * freed.
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+static void pseudo_lock_region_clear(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
+{
+ plr->size = 0;
+ plr->line_size = 0;
+ kfree(plr->kmem);
+ plr->kmem = NULL;
+ plr->s = NULL;
+ if (plr->d)
+ plr->d->plr = NULL;
+ plr->d = NULL;
+ plr->cbm = 0;
+ plr->debugfs_dir = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_region_init - Initialize pseudo-lock region information
+ * @plr: pseudo-lock region
+ *
+ * Called after user provided a schemata to be pseudo-locked. From the
+ * schemata the &struct pseudo_lock_region is on entry already initialized
+ * with the resource, domain, and capacity bitmask. Here the information
+ * required for pseudo-locking is deduced from this data and &struct
+ * pseudo_lock_region initialized further. This information includes:
+ * - size in bytes of the region to be pseudo-locked
+ * - cache line size to know the stride with which data needs to be accessed
+ * to be pseudo-locked
+ * - a cpu associated with the cache instance on which the pseudo-locking
+ * flow can be executed
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure. Descriptive error will be written
+ * to last_cmd_status buffer.
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_region_init(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
+{
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Pick the first cpu we find that is associated with the cache. */
+ plr->cpu = cpumask_first(&plr->d->cpu_mask);
+
+ if (!cpu_online(plr->cpu)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("CPU %u associated with cache not online\n",
+ plr->cpu);
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_region;
+ }
+
+ ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(plr->cpu);
+
+ plr->size = rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(plr->s->res, plr->d, plr->cbm);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
+ if (ci->info_list[i].level == plr->s->res->cache_level) {
+ plr->line_size = ci->info_list[i].coherency_line_size;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = -1;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to determine cache line size\n");
+out_region:
+ pseudo_lock_region_clear(plr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_init - Initialize a pseudo-lock region
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to which new pseudo-locked region will belong
+ *
+ * A pseudo-locked region is associated with a resource group. When this
+ * association is created the pseudo-locked region is initialized. The
+ * details of the pseudo-locked region are not known at this time so only
+ * allocation is done and association established.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_init(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr;
+
+ plr = kzalloc(sizeof(*plr), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ init_waitqueue_head(&plr->lock_thread_wq);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&plr->pm_reqs);
+ rdtgrp->plr = plr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_region_alloc - Allocate kernel memory that will be pseudo-locked
+ * @plr: pseudo-lock region
+ *
+ * Initialize the details required to set up the pseudo-locked region and
+ * allocate the contiguous memory that will be pseudo-locked to the cache.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure. Descriptive error will be written
+ * to last_cmd_status buffer.
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_region_alloc(struct pseudo_lock_region *plr)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pseudo_lock_region_init(plr);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ /*
+ * We do not yet support contiguous regions larger than
+ * KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE.
+ */
+ if (plr->size > KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Requested region exceeds maximum size\n");
+ ret = -E2BIG;
+ goto out_region;
+ }
+
+ plr->kmem = kzalloc(plr->size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!plr->kmem) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to allocate memory\n");
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out_region;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+out_region:
+ pseudo_lock_region_clear(plr);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_free - Free a pseudo-locked region
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to which pseudo-locked region belonged
+ *
+ * The pseudo-locked region's resources have already been released, or not
+ * yet created at this point. Now it can be freed and disassociated from the
+ * resource group.
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+static void pseudo_lock_free(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ pseudo_lock_region_clear(rdtgrp->plr);
+ kfree(rdtgrp->plr);
+ rdtgrp->plr = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_fn - Load kernel memory into cache
+ * @_rdtgrp: resource group to which pseudo-lock region belongs
+ *
+ * This is the core pseudo-locking flow.
+ *
+ * First we ensure that the kernel memory cannot be found in the cache.
+ * Then, while taking care that there will be as little interference as
+ * possible, the memory to be loaded is accessed while core is running
+ * with class of service set to the bitmask of the pseudo-locked region.
+ * After this is complete no future CAT allocations will be allowed to
+ * overlap with this bitmask.
+ *
+ * Local register variables are utilized to ensure that the memory region
+ * to be locked is the only memory access made during the critical locking
+ * loop.
+ *
+ * Return: 0. Waiter on waitqueue will be woken on completion.
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_fn(void *_rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp = _rdtgrp;
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+ u32 rmid_p, closid_p;
+ unsigned long i;
+ u64 saved_msr;
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+ /*
+ * The registers used for local register variables are also used
+ * when KASAN is active. When KASAN is active we use a regular
+ * variable to ensure we always use a valid pointer, but the cost
+ * is that this variable will enter the cache through evicting the
+ * memory we are trying to lock into the cache. Thus expect lower
+ * pseudo-locking success rate when KASAN is active.
+ */
+ unsigned int line_size;
+ unsigned int size;
+ void *mem_r;
+#else
+ register unsigned int line_size asm("esi");
+ register unsigned int size asm("edi");
+ register void *mem_r asm(_ASM_BX);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KASAN */
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure none of the allocated memory is cached. If it is we
+ * will get a cache hit in below loop from outside of pseudo-locked
+ * region.
+ * wbinvd (as opposed to clflush/clflushopt) is required to
+ * increase likelihood that allocated cache portion will be filled
+ * with associated memory.
+ */
+ native_wbinvd();
+
+ /*
+ * Always called with interrupts enabled. By disabling interrupts
+ * ensure that we will not be preempted during this critical section.
+ */
+ local_irq_disable();
+
+ /*
+ * Call wrmsr and rdmsr as directly as possible to avoid tracing
+ * clobbering local register variables or affecting cache accesses.
+ *
+ * Disable the hardware prefetcher so that when the end of the memory
+ * being pseudo-locked is reached the hardware will not read beyond
+ * the buffer and evict pseudo-locked memory read earlier from the
+ * cache.
+ */
+ saved_msr = __rdmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL);
+ __wrmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, prefetch_disable_bits, 0x0);
+ closid_p = this_cpu_read(pqr_state.cur_closid);
+ rmid_p = this_cpu_read(pqr_state.cur_rmid);
+ mem_r = plr->kmem;
+ size = plr->size;
+ line_size = plr->line_size;
+ /*
+ * Critical section begin: start by writing the closid associated
+ * with the capacity bitmask of the cache region being
+ * pseudo-locked followed by reading of kernel memory to load it
+ * into the cache.
+ */
+ __wrmsr(IA32_PQR_ASSOC, rmid_p, rdtgrp->closid);
+ /*
+ * Cache was flushed earlier. Now access kernel memory to read it
+ * into cache region associated with just activated plr->closid.
+ * Loop over data twice:
+ * - In first loop the cache region is shared with the page walker
+ * as it populates the paging structure caches (including TLB).
+ * - In the second loop the paging structure caches are used and
+ * cache region is populated with the memory being referenced.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ /*
+ * Add a barrier to prevent speculative execution of this
+ * loop reading beyond the end of the buffer.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ asm volatile("mov (%0,%1,1), %%eax\n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (mem_r), "r" (i)
+ : "%eax", "memory");
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i += line_size) {
+ /*
+ * Add a barrier to prevent speculative execution of this
+ * loop reading beyond the end of the buffer.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ asm volatile("mov (%0,%1,1), %%eax\n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (mem_r), "r" (i)
+ : "%eax", "memory");
+ }
+ /*
+ * Critical section end: restore closid with capacity bitmask that
+ * does not overlap with pseudo-locked region.
+ */
+ __wrmsr(IA32_PQR_ASSOC, rmid_p, closid_p);
+
+ /* Re-enable the hardware prefetcher(s) */
+ wrmsrl(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, saved_msr);
+ local_irq_enable();
+
+ plr->thread_done = 1;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&plr->lock_thread_wq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_monitor_in_progress - Test if monitoring in progress
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group being queried
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if monitor groups have been created for this resource
+ * group, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_monitor_in_progress(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ return !list_empty(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict - Restrict user access to group
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group needing access restricted
+ *
+ * A resource group used for cache pseudo-locking cannot have cpus or tasks
+ * assigned to it. This is communicated to the user by restricting access
+ * to all the files that can be used to make such changes.
+ *
+ * Permissions restored with rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore()
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure. If a failure occurs during the
+ * restriction of access an attempt will be made to restore permissions but
+ * the state of the mode of these files will be uncertain when a failure
+ * occurs.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_tasks;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_cpus;
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "mon_groups");
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_cpus_list;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+err_cpus_list:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus_list", 0777);
+err_cpus:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus", 0777);
+err_tasks:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "tasks", 0777);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore - Restore user access to group
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group needing access restored
+ *
+ * Restore all file access previously removed using
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict()
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure. If a failure occurs during the
+ * restoration of access an attempt will be made to restrict permissions
+ * again but the state of the mode of these files will be uncertain when
+ * a failure occurs.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "tasks", 0777);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus", 0777);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_tasks;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus_list", 0777);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_cpus;
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "mon_groups", 0777);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_cpus_list;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+err_cpus_list:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus_list");
+err_cpus:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "cpus");
+err_tasks:
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(rdtgrp, "tasks");
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_enter - Resource group enters locksetup mode
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group requested to enter locksetup mode
+ *
+ * A resource group enters locksetup mode to reflect that it would be used
+ * to represent a pseudo-locked region and is in the process of being set
+ * up to do so. A resource group used for a pseudo-locked region would
+ * lose the closid associated with it so we cannot allow it to have any
+ * tasks or cpus assigned nor permit tasks or cpus to be assigned in the
+ * future. Monitoring of a pseudo-locked region is not allowed either.
+ *
+ * The above and more restrictions on a pseudo-locked region are checked
+ * for and enforced before the resource group enters the locksetup mode.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 if the resource group successfully entered locksetup mode, <0
+ * on failure. On failure the last_cmd_status buffer is updated with text to
+ * communicate details of failure to the user.
+ */
+int rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * The default resource group can neither be removed nor lose the
+ * default closid associated with it.
+ */
+ if (rdtgrp == &rdtgroup_default) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot pseudo-lock default group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cache Pseudo-locking not supported when CDP is enabled.
+ *
+ * Some things to consider if you would like to enable this
+ * support (using L3 CDP as example):
+ * - When CDP is enabled two separate resources are exposed,
+ * L3DATA and L3CODE, but they are actually on the same cache.
+ * The implication for pseudo-locking is that if a
+ * pseudo-locked region is created on a domain of one
+ * resource (eg. L3CODE), then a pseudo-locked region cannot
+ * be created on that same domain of the other resource
+ * (eg. L3DATA). This is because the creation of a
+ * pseudo-locked region involves a call to wbinvd that will
+ * affect all cache allocations on particular domain.
+ * - Considering the previous, it may be possible to only
+ * expose one of the CDP resources to pseudo-locking and
+ * hide the other. For example, we could consider to only
+ * expose L3DATA and since the L3 cache is unified it is
+ * still possible to place instructions there are execute it.
+ * - If only one region is exposed to pseudo-locking we should
+ * still keep in mind that availability of a portion of cache
+ * for pseudo-locking should take into account both resources.
+ * Similarly, if a pseudo-locked region is created in one
+ * resource, the portion of cache used by it should be made
+ * unavailable to all future allocations from both resources.
+ */
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L3) ||
+ resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L2)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("CDP enabled\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Not knowing the bits to disable prefetching implies that this
+ * platform does not support Cache Pseudo-Locking.
+ */
+ prefetch_disable_bits = get_prefetch_disable_bits();
+ if (prefetch_disable_bits == 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking not supported\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgroup_monitor_in_progress(rdtgrp)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Monitoring in progress\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgroup_tasks_assigned(rdtgrp)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Tasks assigned to resource group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (!cpumask_empty(&rdtgrp->cpu_mask)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("CPUs assigned to resource group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restrict(rdtgrp)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to modify resctrl permissions\n");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ ret = pseudo_lock_init(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to init pseudo-lock region\n");
+ goto out_release;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If this system is capable of monitoring a rmid would have been
+ * allocated when the control group was created. This is not needed
+ * anymore when this group would be used for pseudo-locking. This
+ * is safe to call on platforms not capable of monitoring.
+ */
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_release:
+ rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore(rdtgrp);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_locksetup_exit - resource group exist locksetup mode
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group
+ *
+ * When a resource group exits locksetup mode the earlier restrictions are
+ * lifted.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure
+ */
+int rdtgroup_locksetup_exit(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ ret = alloc_rmid();
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of RMIDs\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ rdtgrp->mon.rmid = ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_locksetup_user_restore(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret) {
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ pseudo_lock_free(rdtgrp);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps_pseudo_locked - Test if CBM or portion is pseudo-locked
+ * @d: RDT domain
+ * @cbm: CBM to test
+ *
+ * @d represents a cache instance and @cbm a capacity bitmask that is
+ * considered for it. Determine if @cbm overlaps with any existing
+ * pseudo-locked region on @d.
+ *
+ * @cbm is unsigned long, even if only 32 bits are used, to make the
+ * bitmap functions work correctly.
+ *
+ * Return: true if @cbm overlaps with pseudo-locked region on @d, false
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+bool rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps_pseudo_locked(struct rdt_domain *d, unsigned long cbm)
+{
+ unsigned int cbm_len;
+ unsigned long cbm_b;
+
+ if (d->plr) {
+ cbm_len = d->plr->s->res->cache.cbm_len;
+ cbm_b = d->plr->cbm;
+ if (bitmap_intersects(&cbm, &cbm_b, cbm_len))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_pseudo_locked_in_hierarchy - Pseudo-locked region in cache hierarchy
+ * @d: RDT domain under test
+ *
+ * The setup of a pseudo-locked region affects all cache instances within
+ * the hierarchy of the region. It is thus essential to know if any
+ * pseudo-locked regions exist within a cache hierarchy to prevent any
+ * attempts to create new pseudo-locked regions in the same hierarchy.
+ *
+ * Return: true if a pseudo-locked region exists in the hierarchy of @d or
+ * if it is not possible to test due to memory allocation issue,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+bool rdtgroup_pseudo_locked_in_hierarchy(struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_with_psl;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *d_i;
+ bool ret = false;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_with_psl, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * First determine which cpus have pseudo-locked regions
+ * associated with them.
+ */
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ list_for_each_entry(d_i, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (d_i->plr)
+ cpumask_or(cpu_with_psl, cpu_with_psl,
+ &d_i->cpu_mask);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Next test if new pseudo-locked region would intersect with
+ * existing region.
+ */
+ if (cpumask_intersects(&d->cpu_mask, cpu_with_psl))
+ ret = true;
+
+ free_cpumask_var(cpu_with_psl);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * measure_cycles_lat_fn - Measure cycle latency to read pseudo-locked memory
+ * @_plr: pseudo-lock region to measure
+ *
+ * There is no deterministic way to test if a memory region is cached. One
+ * way is to measure how long it takes to read the memory, the speed of
+ * access is a good way to learn how close to the cpu the data was. Even
+ * more, if the prefetcher is disabled and the memory is read at a stride
+ * of half the cache line, then a cache miss will be easy to spot since the
+ * read of the first half would be significantly slower than the read of
+ * the second half.
+ *
+ * Return: 0. Waiter on waitqueue will be woken on completion.
+ */
+static int measure_cycles_lat_fn(void *_plr)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = _plr;
+ u32 saved_low, saved_high;
+ unsigned long i;
+ u64 start, end;
+ void *mem_r;
+
+ local_irq_disable();
+ /*
+ * Disable hardware prefetchers.
+ */
+ rdmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, saved_low, saved_high);
+ wrmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, prefetch_disable_bits, 0x0);
+ mem_r = READ_ONCE(plr->kmem);
+ /*
+ * Dummy execute of the time measurement to load the needed
+ * instructions into the L1 instruction cache.
+ */
+ start = rdtsc_ordered();
+ for (i = 0; i < plr->size; i += 32) {
+ start = rdtsc_ordered();
+ asm volatile("mov (%0,%1,1), %%eax\n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (mem_r), "r" (i)
+ : "%eax", "memory");
+ end = rdtsc_ordered();
+ trace_pseudo_lock_mem_latency((u32)(end - start));
+ }
+ wrmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, saved_low, saved_high);
+ local_irq_enable();
+ plr->thread_done = 1;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&plr->lock_thread_wq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a perf_event_attr for the hit and miss perf events that will
+ * be used during the performance measurement. A perf_event maintains
+ * a pointer to its perf_event_attr so a unique attribute structure is
+ * created for each perf_event.
+ *
+ * The actual configuration of the event is set right before use in order
+ * to use the X86_CONFIG macro.
+ */
+static struct perf_event_attr perf_miss_attr = {
+ .type = PERF_TYPE_RAW,
+ .size = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr),
+ .pinned = 1,
+ .disabled = 0,
+ .exclude_user = 1,
+};
+
+static struct perf_event_attr perf_hit_attr = {
+ .type = PERF_TYPE_RAW,
+ .size = sizeof(struct perf_event_attr),
+ .pinned = 1,
+ .disabled = 0,
+ .exclude_user = 1,
+};
+
+struct residency_counts {
+ u64 miss_before, hits_before;
+ u64 miss_after, hits_after;
+};
+
+static int measure_residency_fn(struct perf_event_attr *miss_attr,
+ struct perf_event_attr *hit_attr,
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr,
+ struct residency_counts *counts)
+{
+ u64 hits_before = 0, hits_after = 0, miss_before = 0, miss_after = 0;
+ struct perf_event *miss_event, *hit_event;
+ int hit_pmcnum, miss_pmcnum;
+ u32 saved_low, saved_high;
+ unsigned int line_size;
+ unsigned int size;
+ unsigned long i;
+ void *mem_r;
+ u64 tmp;
+
+ miss_event = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(miss_attr, plr->cpu,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(miss_event))
+ goto out;
+
+ hit_event = perf_event_create_kernel_counter(hit_attr, plr->cpu,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(hit_event))
+ goto out_miss;
+
+ local_irq_disable();
+ /*
+ * Check any possible error state of events used by performing
+ * one local read.
+ */
+ if (perf_event_read_local(miss_event, &tmp, NULL, NULL)) {
+ local_irq_enable();
+ goto out_hit;
+ }
+ if (perf_event_read_local(hit_event, &tmp, NULL, NULL)) {
+ local_irq_enable();
+ goto out_hit;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Disable hardware prefetchers.
+ */
+ rdmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, saved_low, saved_high);
+ wrmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, prefetch_disable_bits, 0x0);
+
+ /* Initialize rest of local variables */
+ /*
+ * Performance event has been validated right before this with
+ * interrupts disabled - it is thus safe to read the counter index.
+ */
+ miss_pmcnum = x86_perf_rdpmc_index(miss_event);
+ hit_pmcnum = x86_perf_rdpmc_index(hit_event);
+ line_size = READ_ONCE(plr->line_size);
+ mem_r = READ_ONCE(plr->kmem);
+ size = READ_ONCE(plr->size);
+
+ /*
+ * Read counter variables twice - first to load the instructions
+ * used in L1 cache, second to capture accurate value that does not
+ * include cache misses incurred because of instruction loads.
+ */
+ rdpmcl(hit_pmcnum, hits_before);
+ rdpmcl(miss_pmcnum, miss_before);
+ /*
+ * From SDM: Performing back-to-back fast reads are not guaranteed
+ * to be monotonic.
+ * Use LFENCE to ensure all previous instructions are retired
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ rdpmcl(hit_pmcnum, hits_before);
+ rdpmcl(miss_pmcnum, miss_before);
+ /*
+ * Use LFENCE to ensure all previous instructions are retired
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i += line_size) {
+ /*
+ * Add a barrier to prevent speculative execution of this
+ * loop reading beyond the end of the buffer.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ asm volatile("mov (%0,%1,1), %%eax\n\t"
+ :
+ : "r" (mem_r), "r" (i)
+ : "%eax", "memory");
+ }
+ /*
+ * Use LFENCE to ensure all previous instructions are retired
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ rdpmcl(hit_pmcnum, hits_after);
+ rdpmcl(miss_pmcnum, miss_after);
+ /*
+ * Use LFENCE to ensure all previous instructions are retired
+ * before proceeding.
+ */
+ rmb();
+ /* Re-enable hardware prefetchers */
+ wrmsr(MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL, saved_low, saved_high);
+ local_irq_enable();
+out_hit:
+ perf_event_release_kernel(hit_event);
+out_miss:
+ perf_event_release_kernel(miss_event);
+out:
+ /*
+ * All counts will be zero on failure.
+ */
+ counts->miss_before = miss_before;
+ counts->hits_before = hits_before;
+ counts->miss_after = miss_after;
+ counts->hits_after = hits_after;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int measure_l2_residency(void *_plr)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = _plr;
+ struct residency_counts counts = {0};
+
+ /*
+ * Non-architectural event for the Goldmont Microarchitecture
+ * from Intel x86 Architecture Software Developer Manual (SDM):
+ * MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED D1H (event number)
+ * Umask values:
+ * L2_HIT 02H
+ * L2_MISS 10H
+ */
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT:
+ case INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS:
+ perf_miss_attr.config = X86_CONFIG(.event = 0xd1,
+ .umask = 0x10);
+ perf_hit_attr.config = X86_CONFIG(.event = 0xd1,
+ .umask = 0x2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ measure_residency_fn(&perf_miss_attr, &perf_hit_attr, plr, &counts);
+ /*
+ * If a failure prevented the measurements from succeeding
+ * tracepoints will still be written and all counts will be zero.
+ */
+ trace_pseudo_lock_l2(counts.hits_after - counts.hits_before,
+ counts.miss_after - counts.miss_before);
+out:
+ plr->thread_done = 1;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&plr->lock_thread_wq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int measure_l3_residency(void *_plr)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = _plr;
+ struct residency_counts counts = {0};
+
+ /*
+ * On Broadwell Microarchitecture the MEM_LOAD_UOPS_RETIRED event
+ * has two "no fix" errata associated with it: BDM35 and BDM100. On
+ * this platform the following events are used instead:
+ * LONGEST_LAT_CACHE 2EH (Documented in SDM)
+ * REFERENCE 4FH
+ * MISS 41H
+ */
+
+ switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
+ case INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X:
+ /* On BDW the hit event counts references, not hits */
+ perf_hit_attr.config = X86_CONFIG(.event = 0x2e,
+ .umask = 0x4f);
+ perf_miss_attr.config = X86_CONFIG(.event = 0x2e,
+ .umask = 0x41);
+ break;
+ default:
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ measure_residency_fn(&perf_miss_attr, &perf_hit_attr, plr, &counts);
+ /*
+ * If a failure prevented the measurements from succeeding
+ * tracepoints will still be written and all counts will be zero.
+ */
+
+ counts.miss_after -= counts.miss_before;
+ if (boot_cpu_data.x86_model == INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X) {
+ /*
+ * On BDW references and misses are counted, need to adjust.
+ * Sometimes the "hits" counter is a bit more than the
+ * references, for example, x references but x + 1 hits.
+ * To not report invalid hit values in this case we treat
+ * that as misses equal to references.
+ */
+ /* First compute the number of cache references measured */
+ counts.hits_after -= counts.hits_before;
+ /* Next convert references to cache hits */
+ counts.hits_after -= min(counts.miss_after, counts.hits_after);
+ } else {
+ counts.hits_after -= counts.hits_before;
+ }
+
+ trace_pseudo_lock_l3(counts.hits_after, counts.miss_after);
+out:
+ plr->thread_done = 1;
+ wake_up_interruptible(&plr->lock_thread_wq);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * pseudo_lock_measure_cycles - Trigger latency measure to pseudo-locked region
+ * @rdtgrp: Resource group to which the pseudo-locked region belongs.
+ * @sel: Selector of which measurement to perform on a pseudo-locked region.
+ *
+ * The measurement of latency to access a pseudo-locked region should be
+ * done from a cpu that is associated with that pseudo-locked region.
+ * Determine which cpu is associated with this region and start a thread on
+ * that cpu to perform the measurement, wait for that thread to complete.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure
+ */
+static int pseudo_lock_measure_cycles(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, int sel)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+ struct task_struct *thread;
+ unsigned int cpu;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!plr->d) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ plr->thread_done = 0;
+ cpu = cpumask_first(&plr->d->cpu_mask);
+ if (!cpu_online(cpu)) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ plr->cpu = cpu;
+
+ if (sel == 1)
+ thread = kthread_create_on_node(measure_cycles_lat_fn, plr,
+ cpu_to_node(cpu),
+ "pseudo_lock_measure/%u",
+ cpu);
+ else if (sel == 2)
+ thread = kthread_create_on_node(measure_l2_residency, plr,
+ cpu_to_node(cpu),
+ "pseudo_lock_measure/%u",
+ cpu);
+ else if (sel == 3)
+ thread = kthread_create_on_node(measure_l3_residency, plr,
+ cpu_to_node(cpu),
+ "pseudo_lock_measure/%u",
+ cpu);
+ else
+ goto out;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(thread)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(thread);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kthread_bind(thread, cpu);
+ wake_up_process(thread);
+
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible(plr->lock_thread_wq,
+ plr->thread_done == 1);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t pseudo_lock_measure_trigger(struct file *file,
+ const char __user *user_buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp = file->private_data;
+ size_t buf_size;
+ char buf[32];
+ int ret;
+ int sel;
+
+ buf_size = min(count, (sizeof(buf) - 1));
+ if (copy_from_user(buf, user_buf, buf_size))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ buf[buf_size] = '\0';
+ ret = kstrtoint(buf, 10, &sel);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ if (sel != 1 && sel != 2 && sel != 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = debugfs_file_get(file->f_path.dentry);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ ret = pseudo_lock_measure_cycles(rdtgrp, sel);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ret = count;
+ debugfs_file_put(file->f_path.dentry);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations pseudo_measure_fops = {
+ .write = pseudo_lock_measure_trigger,
+ .open = simple_open,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create - Create a pseudo-locked region
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to which pseudo-lock region belongs
+ *
+ * Called when a resource group in the pseudo-locksetup mode receives a
+ * valid schemata that should be pseudo-locked. Since the resource group is
+ * in pseudo-locksetup mode the &struct pseudo_lock_region has already been
+ * allocated and initialized with the essential information. If a failure
+ * occurs the resource group remains in the pseudo-locksetup mode with the
+ * &struct pseudo_lock_region associated with it, but cleared from all
+ * information and ready for the user to re-attempt pseudo-locking by
+ * writing the schemata again.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if the pseudo-locked region was successfully pseudo-locked, <0
+ * on failure. Descriptive error will be written to last_cmd_status buffer.
+ */
+int rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+ struct task_struct *thread;
+ unsigned int new_minor;
+ struct device *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pseudo_lock_region_alloc(plr);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = pseudo_lock_cstates_constrain(plr);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_region;
+ }
+
+ plr->thread_done = 0;
+
+ thread = kthread_create_on_node(pseudo_lock_fn, rdtgrp,
+ cpu_to_node(plr->cpu),
+ "pseudo_lock/%u", plr->cpu);
+ if (IS_ERR(thread)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(thread);
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Locking thread returned error %d\n", ret);
+ goto out_cstates;
+ }
+
+ kthread_bind(thread, plr->cpu);
+ wake_up_process(thread);
+
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible(plr->lock_thread_wq,
+ plr->thread_done == 1);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * If the thread does not get on the CPU for whatever
+ * reason and the process which sets up the region is
+ * interrupted then this will leave the thread in runnable
+ * state and once it gets on the CPU it will dereference
+ * the cleared, but not freed, plr struct resulting in an
+ * empty pseudo-locking loop.
+ */
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Locking thread interrupted\n");
+ goto out_cstates;
+ }
+
+ ret = pseudo_lock_minor_get(&new_minor);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unable to obtain a new minor number\n");
+ goto out_cstates;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unlock access but do not release the reference. The
+ * pseudo-locked region will still be here on return.
+ *
+ * The mutex has to be released temporarily to avoid a potential
+ * deadlock with the mm->mmap_lock which is obtained in the
+ * device_create() and debugfs_create_dir() callpath below as well as
+ * before the mmap() callback is called.
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(debugfs_resctrl)) {
+ plr->debugfs_dir = debugfs_create_dir(rdtgrp->kn->name,
+ debugfs_resctrl);
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(plr->debugfs_dir))
+ debugfs_create_file("pseudo_lock_measure", 0200,
+ plr->debugfs_dir, rdtgrp,
+ &pseudo_measure_fops);
+ }
+
+ dev = device_create(pseudo_lock_class, NULL,
+ MKDEV(pseudo_lock_major, new_minor),
+ rdtgrp, "%s", rdtgrp->kn->name);
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(dev)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(dev);
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("Failed to create character device: %d\n",
+ ret);
+ goto out_debugfs;
+ }
+
+ /* We released the mutex - check if group was removed while we did so */
+ if (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_device;
+ }
+
+ plr->minor = new_minor;
+
+ rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED;
+ closid_free(rdtgrp->closid);
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus", 0444);
+ rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(rdtgrp, "cpus_list", 0444);
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_device:
+ device_destroy(pseudo_lock_class, MKDEV(pseudo_lock_major, new_minor));
+out_debugfs:
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(plr->debugfs_dir);
+ pseudo_lock_minor_release(new_minor);
+out_cstates:
+ pseudo_lock_cstates_relax(plr);
+out_region:
+ pseudo_lock_region_clear(plr);
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove - Remove a pseudo-locked region
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to which the pseudo-locked region belongs
+ *
+ * The removal of a pseudo-locked region can be initiated when the resource
+ * group is removed from user space via a "rmdir" from userspace or the
+ * unmount of the resctrl filesystem. On removal the resource group does
+ * not go back to pseudo-locksetup mode before it is removed, instead it is
+ * removed directly. There is thus asymmetry with the creation where the
+ * &struct pseudo_lock_region is removed here while it was not created in
+ * rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_create().
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+void rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ /*
+ * Default group cannot be a pseudo-locked region so we can
+ * free closid here.
+ */
+ closid_free(rdtgrp->closid);
+ goto free;
+ }
+
+ pseudo_lock_cstates_relax(plr);
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(rdtgrp->plr->debugfs_dir);
+ device_destroy(pseudo_lock_class, MKDEV(pseudo_lock_major, plr->minor));
+ pseudo_lock_minor_release(plr->minor);
+
+free:
+ pseudo_lock_free(rdtgrp);
+}
+
+static int pseudo_lock_dev_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ rdtgrp = region_find_by_minor(iminor(inode));
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ filp->private_data = rdtgrp;
+ atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
+ /* Perform a non-seekable open - llseek is not supported */
+ filp->f_mode &= ~(FMODE_LSEEK | FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pseudo_lock_dev_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ rdtgrp = filp->private_data;
+ WARN_ON(!rdtgrp);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+ filp->private_data = NULL;
+ atomic_dec(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pseudo_lock_dev_mremap(struct vm_area_struct *area)
+{
+ /* Not supported */
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct pseudo_mmap_ops = {
+ .mremap = pseudo_lock_dev_mremap,
+};
+
+static int pseudo_lock_dev_mmap(struct file *filp, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ unsigned long vsize = vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start;
+ unsigned long off = vma->vm_pgoff << PAGE_SHIFT;
+ struct pseudo_lock_region *plr;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ unsigned long physical;
+ unsigned long psize;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ rdtgrp = filp->private_data;
+ WARN_ON(!rdtgrp);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ plr = rdtgrp->plr;
+
+ if (!plr->d) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Task is required to run with affinity to the cpus associated
+ * with the pseudo-locked region. If this is not the case the task
+ * may be scheduled elsewhere and invalidate entries in the
+ * pseudo-locked region.
+ */
+ if (!cpumask_subset(current->cpus_ptr, &plr->d->cpu_mask)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ physical = __pa(plr->kmem) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ psize = plr->size - off;
+
+ if (off > plr->size) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure changes are carried directly to the memory being mapped,
+ * do not allow copy-on-write mapping.
+ */
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (vsize > psize) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+
+ memset(plr->kmem + off, 0, vsize);
+
+ if (remap_pfn_range(vma, vma->vm_start, physical + vma->vm_pgoff,
+ vsize, vma->vm_page_prot)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ }
+ vma->vm_ops = &pseudo_mmap_ops;
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations pseudo_lock_dev_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_llseek,
+ .read = NULL,
+ .write = NULL,
+ .open = pseudo_lock_dev_open,
+ .release = pseudo_lock_dev_release,
+ .mmap = pseudo_lock_dev_mmap,
+};
+
+static char *pseudo_lock_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+
+ rdtgrp = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+ if (mode)
+ *mode = 0600;
+ return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "pseudo_lock/%s", rdtgrp->kn->name);
+}
+
+int rdt_pseudo_lock_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = register_chrdev(0, "pseudo_lock", &pseudo_lock_dev_fops);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ pseudo_lock_major = ret;
+
+ pseudo_lock_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "pseudo_lock");
+ if (IS_ERR(pseudo_lock_class)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(pseudo_lock_class);
+ unregister_chrdev(pseudo_lock_major, "pseudo_lock");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ pseudo_lock_class->devnode = pseudo_lock_devnode;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void rdt_pseudo_lock_release(void)
+{
+ class_destroy(pseudo_lock_class);
+ pseudo_lock_class = NULL;
+ unregister_chrdev(pseudo_lock_major, "pseudo_lock");
+ pseudo_lock_major = 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock_event.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock_event.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..428ebbd42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/pseudo_lock_event.h
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM resctrl
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_PSEUDO_LOCK_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_PSEUDO_LOCK_H
+
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+
+TRACE_EVENT(pseudo_lock_mem_latency,
+ TP_PROTO(u32 latency),
+ TP_ARGS(latency),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(u32, latency)),
+ TP_fast_assign(__entry->latency = latency),
+ TP_printk("latency=%u", __entry->latency)
+ );
+
+TRACE_EVENT(pseudo_lock_l2,
+ TP_PROTO(u64 l2_hits, u64 l2_miss),
+ TP_ARGS(l2_hits, l2_miss),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(u64, l2_hits)
+ __field(u64, l2_miss)),
+ TP_fast_assign(__entry->l2_hits = l2_hits;
+ __entry->l2_miss = l2_miss;),
+ TP_printk("hits=%llu miss=%llu",
+ __entry->l2_hits, __entry->l2_miss));
+
+TRACE_EVENT(pseudo_lock_l3,
+ TP_PROTO(u64 l3_hits, u64 l3_miss),
+ TP_ARGS(l3_hits, l3_miss),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(u64, l3_hits)
+ __field(u64, l3_miss)),
+ TP_fast_assign(__entry->l3_hits = l3_hits;
+ __entry->l3_miss = l3_miss;),
+ TP_printk("hits=%llu miss=%llu",
+ __entry->l3_hits, __entry->l3_miss));
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_PSEUDO_LOCK_H */
+
+#undef TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_PATH .
+#define TRACE_INCLUDE_FILE pseudo_lock_event
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15ee89ce8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3480 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * User interface for Resource Allocation in Resource Director Technology(RDT)
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
+ *
+ * More information about RDT be found in the Intel (R) x86 Architecture
+ * Software Developer Manual.
+ */
+
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
+
+#include <linux/cacheinfo.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
+
+#include <asm/resctrl.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_enable_key);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_mon_enable_key);
+DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(rdt_alloc_enable_key);
+static struct kernfs_root *rdt_root;
+struct rdtgroup rdtgroup_default;
+LIST_HEAD(rdt_all_groups);
+
+/* list of entries for the schemata file */
+LIST_HEAD(resctrl_schema_all);
+
+/* Kernel fs node for "info" directory under root */
+static struct kernfs_node *kn_info;
+
+/* Kernel fs node for "mon_groups" directory under root */
+static struct kernfs_node *kn_mongrp;
+
+/* Kernel fs node for "mon_data" directory under root */
+static struct kernfs_node *kn_mondata;
+
+static struct seq_buf last_cmd_status;
+static char last_cmd_status_buf[512];
+
+struct dentry *debugfs_resctrl;
+
+void rdt_last_cmd_clear(void)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ seq_buf_clear(&last_cmd_status);
+}
+
+void rdt_last_cmd_puts(const char *s)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ seq_buf_puts(&last_cmd_status, s);
+}
+
+void rdt_last_cmd_printf(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ seq_buf_vprintf(&last_cmd_status, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+}
+
+void rdt_staged_configs_clear(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *dom;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ list_for_each_entry(dom, &r->domains, list)
+ memset(dom->staged_config, 0, sizeof(dom->staged_config));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Trivial allocator for CLOSIDs. Since h/w only supports a small number,
+ * we can keep a bitmap of free CLOSIDs in a single integer.
+ *
+ * Using a global CLOSID across all resources has some advantages and
+ * some drawbacks:
+ * + We can simply set "current->closid" to assign a task to a resource
+ * group.
+ * + Context switch code can avoid extra memory references deciding which
+ * CLOSID to load into the PQR_ASSOC MSR
+ * - We give up some options in configuring resource groups across multi-socket
+ * systems.
+ * - Our choices on how to configure each resource become progressively more
+ * limited as the number of resources grows.
+ */
+static int closid_free_map;
+static int closid_free_map_len;
+
+int closids_supported(void)
+{
+ return closid_free_map_len;
+}
+
+static void closid_init(void)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ u32 rdt_min_closid = 32;
+
+ /* Compute rdt_min_closid across all resources */
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list)
+ rdt_min_closid = min(rdt_min_closid, s->num_closid);
+
+ closid_free_map = BIT_MASK(rdt_min_closid) - 1;
+
+ /* CLOSID 0 is always reserved for the default group */
+ closid_free_map &= ~1;
+ closid_free_map_len = rdt_min_closid;
+}
+
+static int closid_alloc(void)
+{
+ u32 closid = ffs(closid_free_map);
+
+ if (closid == 0)
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ closid--;
+ closid_free_map &= ~(1 << closid);
+
+ return closid;
+}
+
+void closid_free(int closid)
+{
+ closid_free_map |= 1 << closid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * closid_allocated - test if provided closid is in use
+ * @closid: closid to be tested
+ *
+ * Return: true if @closid is currently associated with a resource group,
+ * false if @closid is free
+ */
+static bool closid_allocated(unsigned int closid)
+{
+ return (closid_free_map & (1 << closid)) == 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_mode_by_closid - Return mode of resource group with closid
+ * @closid: closid if the resource group
+ *
+ * Each resource group is associated with a @closid. Here the mode
+ * of a resource group can be queried by searching for it using its closid.
+ *
+ * Return: mode as &enum rdtgrp_mode of resource group with closid @closid
+ */
+enum rdtgrp_mode rdtgroup_mode_by_closid(int closid)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(rdtgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ if (rdtgrp->closid == closid)
+ return rdtgrp->mode;
+ }
+
+ return RDT_NUM_MODES;
+}
+
+static const char * const rdt_mode_str[] = {
+ [RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE] = "shareable",
+ [RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE] = "exclusive",
+ [RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP] = "pseudo-locksetup",
+ [RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED] = "pseudo-locked",
+};
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_mode_str - Return the string representation of mode
+ * @mode: the resource group mode as &enum rdtgroup_mode
+ *
+ * Return: string representation of valid mode, "unknown" otherwise
+ */
+static const char *rdtgroup_mode_str(enum rdtgrp_mode mode)
+{
+ if (mode < RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE || mode >= RDT_NUM_MODES)
+ return "unknown";
+
+ return rdt_mode_str[mode];
+}
+
+/* set uid and gid of rdtgroup dirs and files to that of the creator */
+static int rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ struct iattr iattr = { .ia_valid = ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID,
+ .ia_uid = current_fsuid(),
+ .ia_gid = current_fsgid(), };
+
+ if (uid_eq(iattr.ia_uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
+ gid_eq(iattr.ia_gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
+ return 0;
+
+ return kernfs_setattr(kn, &iattr);
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_add_file(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, struct rftype *rft)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ int ret;
+
+ kn = __kernfs_create_file(parent_kn, rft->name, rft->mode,
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
+ 0, rft->kf_ops, rft, NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
+ if (ret) {
+ kernfs_remove(kn);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_seqfile_show(struct seq_file *m, void *arg)
+{
+ struct kernfs_open_file *of = m->private;
+ struct rftype *rft = of->kn->priv;
+
+ if (rft->seq_show)
+ return rft->seq_show(of, m, arg);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t rdtgroup_file_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of, char *buf,
+ size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ struct rftype *rft = of->kn->priv;
+
+ if (rft->write)
+ return rft->write(of, buf, nbytes, off);
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static const struct kernfs_ops rdtgroup_kf_single_ops = {
+ .atomic_write_len = PAGE_SIZE,
+ .write = rdtgroup_file_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_seqfile_show,
+};
+
+static const struct kernfs_ops kf_mondata_ops = {
+ .atomic_write_len = PAGE_SIZE,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_mondata_show,
+};
+
+static bool is_cpu_list(struct kernfs_open_file *of)
+{
+ struct rftype *rft = of->kn->priv;
+
+ return rft->flags & RFTYPE_FLAGS_CPUS_LIST;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_cpus_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct cpumask *mask;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+
+ if (rdtgrp) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ if (!rdtgrp->plr->d) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cache domain offline\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ } else {
+ mask = &rdtgrp->plr->d->cpu_mask;
+ seq_printf(s, is_cpu_list(of) ?
+ "%*pbl\n" : "%*pb\n",
+ cpumask_pr_args(mask));
+ }
+ } else {
+ seq_printf(s, is_cpu_list(of) ? "%*pbl\n" : "%*pb\n",
+ cpumask_pr_args(&rdtgrp->cpu_mask));
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ }
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is safe against resctrl_sched_in() called from __switch_to()
+ * because __switch_to() is executed with interrupts disabled. A local call
+ * from update_closid_rmid() is protected against __switch_to() because
+ * preemption is disabled.
+ */
+static void update_cpu_closid_rmid(void *info)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *r = info;
+
+ if (r) {
+ this_cpu_write(pqr_state.default_closid, r->closid);
+ this_cpu_write(pqr_state.default_rmid, r->mon.rmid);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We cannot unconditionally write the MSR because the current
+ * executing task might have its own closid selected. Just reuse
+ * the context switch code.
+ */
+ resctrl_sched_in(current);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the PGR_ASSOC MSR on all cpus in @cpu_mask,
+ *
+ * Per task closids/rmids must have been set up before calling this function.
+ */
+static void
+update_closid_rmid(const struct cpumask *cpu_mask, struct rdtgroup *r)
+{
+ int cpu = get_cpu();
+
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask))
+ update_cpu_closid_rmid(r);
+ smp_call_function_many(cpu_mask, update_cpu_closid_rmid, r, 1);
+ put_cpu();
+}
+
+static int cpus_mon_write(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t newmask,
+ cpumask_var_t tmpmask)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp = rdtgrp->mon.parent, *crgrp;
+ struct list_head *head;
+
+ /* Check whether cpus belong to parent ctrl group */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, &prgrp->cpu_mask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can only add CPUs to mongroup that belong to parent\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Check whether cpus are dropped from this group */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask, newmask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ /* Give any dropped cpus to parent rdtgroup */
+ cpumask_or(&prgrp->cpu_mask, &prgrp->cpu_mask, tmpmask);
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, prgrp);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we added cpus, remove them from previous group that owned them
+ * and update per-cpu rmid
+ */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ head = &prgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ if (crgrp == rdtgrp)
+ continue;
+ cpumask_andnot(&crgrp->cpu_mask, &crgrp->cpu_mask,
+ tmpmask);
+ }
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, rdtgrp);
+ }
+
+ /* Done pushing/pulling - update this group with new mask */
+ cpumask_copy(&rdtgrp->cpu_mask, newmask);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cpumask_rdtgrp_clear(struct rdtgroup *r, struct cpumask *m)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *crgrp;
+
+ cpumask_andnot(&r->cpu_mask, &r->cpu_mask, m);
+ /* update the child mon group masks as well*/
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, &r->mon.crdtgrp_list, mon.crdtgrp_list)
+ cpumask_and(&crgrp->cpu_mask, &r->cpu_mask, &crgrp->cpu_mask);
+}
+
+static int cpus_ctrl_write(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t newmask,
+ cpumask_var_t tmpmask, cpumask_var_t tmpmask1)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *r, *crgrp;
+ struct list_head *head;
+
+ /* Check whether cpus are dropped from this group */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask, newmask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ /* Can't drop from default group */
+ if (rdtgrp == &rdtgroup_default) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't drop CPUs from default group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Give any dropped cpus to rdtgroup_default */
+ cpumask_or(&rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask,
+ &rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask, tmpmask);
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, &rdtgroup_default);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we added cpus, remove them from previous group and
+ * the prev group's child groups that owned them
+ * and update per-cpu closid/rmid.
+ */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ list_for_each_entry(r, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ if (r == rdtgrp)
+ continue;
+ cpumask_and(tmpmask1, &r->cpu_mask, tmpmask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask1))
+ cpumask_rdtgrp_clear(r, tmpmask1);
+ }
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, rdtgrp);
+ }
+
+ /* Done pushing/pulling - update this group with new mask */
+ cpumask_copy(&rdtgrp->cpu_mask, newmask);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear child mon group masks since there is a new parent mask
+ * now and update the rmid for the cpus the child lost.
+ */
+ head = &rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ cpumask_and(tmpmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask, &crgrp->cpu_mask);
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, rdtgrp);
+ cpumask_clear(&crgrp->cpu_mask);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t rdtgroup_cpus_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ cpumask_var_t tmpmask, newmask, tmpmask1;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&tmpmask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&newmask, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ free_cpumask_var(tmpmask);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&tmpmask1, GFP_KERNEL)) {
+ free_cpumask_var(tmpmask);
+ free_cpumask_var(newmask);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (is_cpu_list(of))
+ ret = cpulist_parse(buf, newmask);
+ else
+ ret = cpumask_parse(buf, newmask);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Bad CPU list/mask\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* check that user didn't specify any offline cpus */
+ cpumask_andnot(tmpmask, newmask, cpu_online_mask);
+ if (!cpumask_empty(tmpmask)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can only assign online CPUs\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP)
+ ret = cpus_ctrl_write(rdtgrp, newmask, tmpmask, tmpmask1);
+ else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP)
+ ret = cpus_mon_write(rdtgrp, newmask, tmpmask);
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+unlock:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ free_cpumask_var(tmpmask);
+ free_cpumask_var(newmask);
+ free_cpumask_var(tmpmask1);
+
+ return ret ?: nbytes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_remove - the helper to remove resource group safely
+ * @rdtgrp: resource group to remove
+ *
+ * On resource group creation via a mkdir, an extra kernfs_node reference is
+ * taken to ensure that the rdtgroup structure remains accessible for the
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock() calls where it is removed.
+ *
+ * Drop the extra reference here, then free the rdtgroup structure.
+ *
+ * Return: void
+ */
+static void rdtgroup_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
+ kfree(rdtgrp);
+}
+
+static void _update_task_closid_rmid(void *task)
+{
+ /*
+ * If the task is still current on this CPU, update PQR_ASSOC MSR.
+ * Otherwise, the MSR is updated when the task is scheduled in.
+ */
+ if (task == current)
+ resctrl_sched_in(task);
+}
+
+static void update_task_closid_rmid(struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && task_curr(t))
+ smp_call_function_single(task_cpu(t), _update_task_closid_rmid, t, 1);
+ else
+ _update_task_closid_rmid(t);
+}
+
+static int __rdtgroup_move_task(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ /* If the task is already in rdtgrp, no need to move the task. */
+ if ((rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP && tsk->closid == rdtgrp->closid &&
+ tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid) ||
+ (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP && tsk->rmid == rdtgrp->mon.rmid &&
+ tsk->closid == rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the task's closid/rmid before the PQR_ASSOC MSR can be
+ * updated by them.
+ *
+ * For ctrl_mon groups, move both closid and rmid.
+ * For monitor groups, can move the tasks only from
+ * their parent CTRL group.
+ */
+
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(tsk->closid, rdtgrp->closid);
+ WRITE_ONCE(tsk->rmid, rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+ } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mon.parent->closid == tsk->closid) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(tsk->rmid, rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+ } else {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Can't move task to different control group\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the task's closid and rmid are written before determining if
+ * the task is current that will decide if it will be interrupted.
+ * This pairs with the full barrier between the rq->curr update and
+ * resctrl_sched_in() during context switch.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+
+ /*
+ * By now, the task's closid and rmid are set. If the task is current
+ * on a CPU, the PQR_ASSOC MSR needs to be updated to make the resource
+ * group go into effect. If the task is not current, the MSR will be
+ * updated when the task is scheduled in.
+ */
+ update_task_closid_rmid(tsk);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool is_closid_match(struct task_struct *t, struct rdtgroup *r)
+{
+ return (rdt_alloc_capable &&
+ (r->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP) && (t->closid == r->closid));
+}
+
+static bool is_rmid_match(struct task_struct *t, struct rdtgroup *r)
+{
+ return (rdt_mon_capable &&
+ (r->type == RDTMON_GROUP) && (t->rmid == r->mon.rmid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_tasks_assigned - Test if tasks have been assigned to resource group
+ * @r: Resource group
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if tasks have been assigned to @r, 0 otherwise
+ */
+int rdtgroup_tasks_assigned(struct rdtgroup *r)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p, *t;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for_each_process_thread(p, t) {
+ if (is_closid_match(t, r) || is_rmid_match(t, r)) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_task_write_permission(struct task_struct *task,
+ struct kernfs_open_file *of)
+{
+ const struct cred *tcred = get_task_cred(task);
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Even if we're attaching all tasks in the thread group, we only
+ * need to check permissions on one of them.
+ */
+ if (!uid_eq(cred->euid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID) &&
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, tcred->suid)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("No permission to move task %d\n", task->pid);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ }
+
+ put_cred(tcred);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_move_task(pid_t pid, struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp,
+ struct kernfs_open_file *of)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+ int ret;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (pid) {
+ tsk = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (!tsk) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("No task %d\n", pid);
+ return -ESRCH;
+ }
+ } else {
+ tsk = current;
+ }
+
+ get_task_struct(tsk);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_task_write_permission(tsk, of);
+ if (!ret)
+ ret = __rdtgroup_move_task(tsk, rdtgrp);
+
+ put_task_struct(tsk);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t rdtgroup_tasks_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ int ret = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (kstrtoint(strstrip(buf), 0, &pid) || pid < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_move_task(pid, rdtgrp, of);
+
+unlock:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+
+ return ret ?: nbytes;
+}
+
+static void show_rdt_tasks(struct rdtgroup *r, struct seq_file *s)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p, *t;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for_each_process_thread(p, t) {
+ if (is_closid_match(t, r) || is_rmid_match(t, r)) {
+ pid = task_pid_vnr(t);
+ if (pid)
+ seq_printf(s, "%d\n", pid);
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_tasks_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (rdtgrp)
+ show_rdt_tasks(rdtgrp, s);
+ else
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_CPU_RESCTRL
+
+/*
+ * A task can only be part of one resctrl control group and of one monitor
+ * group which is associated to that control group.
+ *
+ * 1) res:
+ * mon:
+ *
+ * resctrl is not available.
+ *
+ * 2) res:/
+ * mon:
+ *
+ * Task is part of the root resctrl control group, and it is not associated
+ * to any monitor group.
+ *
+ * 3) res:/
+ * mon:mon0
+ *
+ * Task is part of the root resctrl control group and monitor group mon0.
+ *
+ * 4) res:group0
+ * mon:
+ *
+ * Task is part of resctrl control group group0, and it is not associated
+ * to any monitor group.
+ *
+ * 5) res:group0
+ * mon:mon1
+ *
+ * Task is part of resctrl control group group0 and monitor group mon1.
+ */
+int proc_resctrl_show(struct seq_file *s, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *tsk)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtg;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ /* Return empty if resctrl has not been mounted. */
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_enable_key)) {
+ seq_puts(s, "res:\nmon:\n");
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry(rdtg, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ struct rdtgroup *crg;
+
+ /*
+ * Task information is only relevant for shareable
+ * and exclusive groups.
+ */
+ if (rdtg->mode != RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE &&
+ rdtg->mode != RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE)
+ continue;
+
+ if (rdtg->closid != tsk->closid)
+ continue;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "res:%s%s\n", (rdtg == &rdtgroup_default) ? "/" : "",
+ rdtg->kn->name);
+ seq_puts(s, "mon:");
+ list_for_each_entry(crg, &rdtg->mon.crdtgrp_list,
+ mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ if (tsk->rmid != crg->mon.rmid)
+ continue;
+ seq_printf(s, "%s", crg->kn->name);
+ break;
+ }
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+ goto unlock;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The above search should succeed. Otherwise return
+ * with an error.
+ */
+ ret = -ENOENT;
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int rdt_last_cmd_status_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ len = seq_buf_used(&last_cmd_status);
+ if (len)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%.*s", len, last_cmd_status_buf);
+ else
+ seq_puts(seq, "ok\n");
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_num_closids_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", s->num_closid);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_default_ctrl_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%x\n", r->default_ctrl);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_min_cbm_bits_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", r->cache.min_cbm_bits);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_shareable_bits_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%x\n", r->cache.shareable_bits);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdt_bit_usage_show - Display current usage of resources
+ *
+ * A domain is a shared resource that can now be allocated differently. Here
+ * we display the current regions of the domain as an annotated bitmask.
+ * For each domain of this resource its allocation bitmask
+ * is annotated as below to indicate the current usage of the corresponding bit:
+ * 0 - currently unused
+ * X - currently available for sharing and used by software and hardware
+ * H - currently used by hardware only but available for software use
+ * S - currently used and shareable by software only
+ * E - currently used exclusively by one resource group
+ * P - currently pseudo-locked by one resource group
+ */
+static int rdt_bit_usage_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ /*
+ * Use unsigned long even though only 32 bits are used to ensure
+ * test_bit() is used safely.
+ */
+ unsigned long sw_shareable = 0, hw_shareable = 0;
+ unsigned long exclusive = 0, pseudo_locked = 0;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+ struct rdt_domain *dom;
+ int i, hwb, swb, excl, psl;
+ enum rdtgrp_mode mode;
+ bool sep = false;
+ u32 ctrl_val;
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ hw_shareable = r->cache.shareable_bits;
+ list_for_each_entry(dom, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (sep)
+ seq_putc(seq, ';');
+ sw_shareable = 0;
+ exclusive = 0;
+ seq_printf(seq, "%d=", dom->id);
+ for (i = 0; i < closids_supported(); i++) {
+ if (!closid_allocated(i))
+ continue;
+ ctrl_val = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, dom, i,
+ s->conf_type);
+ mode = rdtgroup_mode_by_closid(i);
+ switch (mode) {
+ case RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE:
+ sw_shareable |= ctrl_val;
+ break;
+ case RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE:
+ exclusive |= ctrl_val;
+ break;
+ case RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP:
+ /*
+ * RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP is possible
+ * here but not included since the CBM
+ * associated with this CLOSID in this mode
+ * is not initialized and no task or cpu can be
+ * assigned this CLOSID.
+ */
+ break;
+ case RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED:
+ case RDT_NUM_MODES:
+ WARN(1,
+ "invalid mode for closid %d\n", i);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = r->cache.cbm_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ pseudo_locked = dom->plr ? dom->plr->cbm : 0;
+ hwb = test_bit(i, &hw_shareable);
+ swb = test_bit(i, &sw_shareable);
+ excl = test_bit(i, &exclusive);
+ psl = test_bit(i, &pseudo_locked);
+ if (hwb && swb)
+ seq_putc(seq, 'X');
+ else if (hwb && !swb)
+ seq_putc(seq, 'H');
+ else if (!hwb && swb)
+ seq_putc(seq, 'S');
+ else if (excl)
+ seq_putc(seq, 'E');
+ else if (psl)
+ seq_putc(seq, 'P');
+ else /* Unused bits remain */
+ seq_putc(seq, '0');
+ }
+ sep = true;
+ }
+ seq_putc(seq, '\n');
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_min_bw_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", r->membw.min_bw);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_num_rmids_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = of->kn->parent->priv;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%d\n", r->num_rmid);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_mon_features_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct mon_evt *mevt;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(mevt, &r->evt_list, list)
+ seq_printf(seq, "%s\n", mevt->name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_bw_gran_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", r->membw.bw_gran);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_delay_linear_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", r->membw.delay_linear);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int max_threshold_occ_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ seq_printf(seq, "%u\n", resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdt_thread_throttle_mode_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s = of->kn->parent->priv;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ if (r->membw.throttle_mode == THREAD_THROTTLE_PER_THREAD)
+ seq_puts(seq, "per-thread\n");
+ else
+ seq_puts(seq, "max\n");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static ssize_t max_threshold_occ_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ unsigned int bytes;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtouint(buf, 0, &bytes);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (bytes > resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold = resctrl_arch_round_mon_val(bytes);
+
+ return nbytes;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rdtgroup_mode_show - Display mode of this resource group
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_mode_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s\n", rdtgroup_mode_str(rdtgrp->mode));
+
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static enum resctrl_conf_type resctrl_peer_type(enum resctrl_conf_type my_type)
+{
+ switch (my_type) {
+ case CDP_CODE:
+ return CDP_DATA;
+ case CDP_DATA:
+ return CDP_CODE;
+ default:
+ case CDP_NONE:
+ return CDP_NONE;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * __rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps - Does CBM for intended closid overlap with other
+ * @r: Resource to which domain instance @d belongs.
+ * @d: The domain instance for which @closid is being tested.
+ * @cbm: Capacity bitmask being tested.
+ * @closid: Intended closid for @cbm.
+ * @exclusive: Only check if overlaps with exclusive resource groups
+ *
+ * Checks if provided @cbm intended to be used for @closid on domain
+ * @d overlaps with any other closids or other hardware usage associated
+ * with this domain. If @exclusive is true then only overlaps with
+ * resource groups in exclusive mode will be considered. If @exclusive
+ * is false then overlaps with any resource group or hardware entities
+ * will be considered.
+ *
+ * @cbm is unsigned long, even if only 32 bits are used, to make the
+ * bitmap functions work correctly.
+ *
+ * Return: false if CBM does not overlap, true if it does.
+ */
+static bool __rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ unsigned long cbm, int closid,
+ enum resctrl_conf_type type, bool exclusive)
+{
+ enum rdtgrp_mode mode;
+ unsigned long ctrl_b;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Check for any overlap with regions used by hardware directly */
+ if (!exclusive) {
+ ctrl_b = r->cache.shareable_bits;
+ if (bitmap_intersects(&cbm, &ctrl_b, r->cache.cbm_len))
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /* Check for overlap with other resource groups */
+ for (i = 0; i < closids_supported(); i++) {
+ ctrl_b = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, d, i, type);
+ mode = rdtgroup_mode_by_closid(i);
+ if (closid_allocated(i) && i != closid &&
+ mode != RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ if (bitmap_intersects(&cbm, &ctrl_b, r->cache.cbm_len)) {
+ if (exclusive) {
+ if (mode == RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE)
+ return true;
+ continue;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps - Does CBM overlap with other use of hardware
+ * @s: Schema for the resource to which domain instance @d belongs.
+ * @d: The domain instance for which @closid is being tested.
+ * @cbm: Capacity bitmask being tested.
+ * @closid: Intended closid for @cbm.
+ * @exclusive: Only check if overlaps with exclusive resource groups
+ *
+ * Resources that can be allocated using a CBM can use the CBM to control
+ * the overlap of these allocations. rdtgroup_cmb_overlaps() is the test
+ * for overlap. Overlap test is not limited to the specific resource for
+ * which the CBM is intended though - when dealing with CDP resources that
+ * share the underlying hardware the overlap check should be performed on
+ * the CDP resource sharing the hardware also.
+ *
+ * Refer to description of __rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps() for the details of the
+ * overlap test.
+ *
+ * Return: true if CBM overlap detected, false if there is no overlap
+ */
+bool rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(struct resctrl_schema *s, struct rdt_domain *d,
+ unsigned long cbm, int closid, bool exclusive)
+{
+ enum resctrl_conf_type peer_type = resctrl_peer_type(s->conf_type);
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+
+ if (__rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(r, d, cbm, closid, s->conf_type,
+ exclusive))
+ return true;
+
+ if (!resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(r->rid))
+ return false;
+ return __rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(r, d, cbm, closid, peer_type, exclusive);
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_mode_test_exclusive - Test if this resource group can be exclusive
+ *
+ * An exclusive resource group implies that there should be no sharing of
+ * its allocated resources. At the time this group is considered to be
+ * exclusive this test can determine if its current schemata supports this
+ * setting by testing for overlap with all other resource groups.
+ *
+ * Return: true if resource group can be exclusive, false if there is overlap
+ * with allocations of other resource groups and thus this resource group
+ * cannot be exclusive.
+ */
+static bool rdtgroup_mode_test_exclusive(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ int closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ bool has_cache = false;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ u32 ctrl;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ r = s->res;
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA)
+ continue;
+ has_cache = true;
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ ctrl = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, d, closid,
+ s->conf_type);
+ if (rdtgroup_cbm_overlaps(s, d, ctrl, closid, false)) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Schemata overlaps\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!has_cache) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot be exclusive without CAT/CDP\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_mode_write - Modify the resource group's mode
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t rdtgroup_mode_write(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ char *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t off)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ enum rdtgrp_mode mode;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ /* Valid input requires a trailing newline */
+ if (nbytes == 0 || buf[nbytes - 1] != '\n')
+ return -EINVAL;
+ buf[nbytes - 1] = '\0';
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+
+ mode = rdtgrp->mode;
+
+ if ((!strcmp(buf, "shareable") && mode == RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE) ||
+ (!strcmp(buf, "exclusive") && mode == RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE) ||
+ (!strcmp(buf, "pseudo-locksetup") &&
+ mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) ||
+ (!strcmp(buf, "pseudo-locked") && mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED))
+ goto out;
+
+ if (mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cannot change pseudo-locked group\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!strcmp(buf, "shareable")) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_locksetup_exit(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(buf, "exclusive")) {
+ if (!rdtgroup_mode_test_exclusive(rdtgrp)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_locksetup_exit(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_EXCLUSIVE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(buf, "pseudo-locksetup")) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_locksetup_enter(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP;
+ } else {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Unknown or unsupported mode\n");
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return ret ?: nbytes;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_cbm_to_size - Translate CBM to size in bytes
+ * @r: RDT resource to which @d belongs.
+ * @d: RDT domain instance.
+ * @cbm: bitmask for which the size should be computed.
+ *
+ * The bitmask provided associated with the RDT domain instance @d will be
+ * translated into how many bytes it represents. The size in bytes is
+ * computed by first dividing the total cache size by the CBM length to
+ * determine how many bytes each bit in the bitmask represents. The result
+ * is multiplied with the number of bits set in the bitmask.
+ *
+ * @cbm is unsigned long, even if only 32 bits are used to make the
+ * bitmap functions work correctly.
+ */
+unsigned int rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdt_domain *d, unsigned long cbm)
+{
+ struct cpu_cacheinfo *ci;
+ unsigned int size = 0;
+ int num_b, i;
+
+ num_b = bitmap_weight(&cbm, r->cache.cbm_len);
+ ci = get_cpu_cacheinfo(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask));
+ for (i = 0; i < ci->num_leaves; i++) {
+ if (ci->info_list[i].level == r->cache_level) {
+ size = ci->info_list[i].size / r->cache.cbm_len * num_b;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_size_show - Display size in bytes of allocated regions
+ *
+ * The "size" file mirrors the layout of the "schemata" file, printing the
+ * size in bytes of each region instead of the capacity bitmask.
+ *
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_size_show(struct kernfs_open_file *of,
+ struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *schema;
+ enum resctrl_conf_type type;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ unsigned int size;
+ int ret = 0;
+ u32 closid;
+ bool sep;
+ u32 ctrl;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(of->kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ if (!rdtgrp->plr->d) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Cache domain offline\n");
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ } else {
+ seq_printf(s, "%*s:", max_name_width,
+ rdtgrp->plr->s->name);
+ size = rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(rdtgrp->plr->s->res,
+ rdtgrp->plr->d,
+ rdtgrp->plr->cbm);
+ seq_printf(s, "%d=%u\n", rdtgrp->plr->d->id, size);
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ closid = rdtgrp->closid;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(schema, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ r = schema->res;
+ type = schema->conf_type;
+ sep = false;
+ seq_printf(s, "%*s:", max_name_width, schema->name);
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (sep)
+ seq_putc(s, ';');
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP) {
+ size = 0;
+ } else {
+ if (is_mba_sc(r))
+ ctrl = d->mbps_val[closid];
+ else
+ ctrl = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, d,
+ closid,
+ type);
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA)
+ size = ctrl;
+ else
+ size = rdtgroup_cbm_to_size(r, d, ctrl);
+ }
+ seq_printf(s, "%d=%u", d->id, size);
+ sep = true;
+ }
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+ }
+
+out:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(of->kn);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* rdtgroup information files for one cache resource. */
+static struct rftype res_common_files[] = {
+ {
+ .name = "last_cmd_status",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_last_cmd_status_show,
+ .fflags = RF_TOP_INFO,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "num_closids",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_num_closids_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "mon_features",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_mon_features_show,
+ .fflags = RF_MON_INFO,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "num_rmids",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_num_rmids_show,
+ .fflags = RF_MON_INFO,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "cbm_mask",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_default_ctrl_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "min_cbm_bits",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_min_cbm_bits_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "shareable_bits",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_shareable_bits_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "bit_usage",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_bit_usage_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "min_bandwidth",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_min_bw_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_MB,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "bandwidth_gran",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_bw_gran_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_MB,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "delay_linear",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_delay_linear_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_MB,
+ },
+ /*
+ * Platform specific which (if any) capabilities are provided by
+ * thread_throttle_mode. Defer "fflags" initialization to platform
+ * discovery.
+ */
+ {
+ .name = "thread_throttle_mode",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdt_thread_throttle_mode_show,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "max_threshold_occupancy",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = max_threshold_occ_write,
+ .seq_show = max_threshold_occ_show,
+ .fflags = RF_MON_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_CACHE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "cpus",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = rdtgroup_cpus_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_cpus_show,
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_BASE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "cpus_list",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = rdtgroup_cpus_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_cpus_show,
+ .flags = RFTYPE_FLAGS_CPUS_LIST,
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_BASE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "tasks",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = rdtgroup_tasks_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_tasks_show,
+ .fflags = RFTYPE_BASE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "schemata",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = rdtgroup_schemata_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_schemata_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_BASE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "mode",
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .write = rdtgroup_mode_write,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_mode_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_BASE,
+ },
+ {
+ .name = "size",
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .kf_ops = &rdtgroup_kf_single_ops,
+ .seq_show = rdtgroup_size_show,
+ .fflags = RF_CTRL_BASE,
+ },
+
+};
+
+static int rdtgroup_add_files(struct kernfs_node *kn, unsigned long fflags)
+{
+ struct rftype *rfts, *rft;
+ int ret, len;
+
+ rfts = res_common_files;
+ len = ARRAY_SIZE(res_common_files);
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ for (rft = rfts; rft < rfts + len; rft++) {
+ if (rft->fflags && ((fflags & rft->fflags) == rft->fflags)) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_add_file(kn, rft);
+ if (ret)
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+error:
+ pr_warn("Failed to add %s, err=%d\n", rft->name, ret);
+ while (--rft >= rfts) {
+ if ((fflags & rft->fflags) == rft->fflags)
+ kernfs_remove_by_name(kn, rft->name);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct rftype *rdtgroup_get_rftype_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+ struct rftype *rfts, *rft;
+ int len;
+
+ rfts = res_common_files;
+ len = ARRAY_SIZE(res_common_files);
+
+ for (rft = rfts; rft < rfts + len; rft++) {
+ if (!strcmp(rft->name, name))
+ return rft;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void __init thread_throttle_mode_init(void)
+{
+ struct rftype *rft;
+
+ rft = rdtgroup_get_rftype_by_name("thread_throttle_mode");
+ if (!rft)
+ return;
+
+ rft->fflags = RF_CTRL_INFO | RFTYPE_RES_MB;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict - Restrict user access to named resctrl file
+ * @r: The resource group with which the file is associated.
+ * @name: Name of the file
+ *
+ * The permissions of named resctrl file, directory, or link are modified
+ * to not allow read, write, or execute by any user.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function is intended to communicate to the user that the
+ * resctrl file has been locked down - that it is not relevant to the
+ * particular state the system finds itself in. It should not be relied
+ * on to protect from user access because after the file's permissions
+ * are restricted the user can still change the permissions using chmod
+ * from the command line.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure.
+ */
+int rdtgroup_kn_mode_restrict(struct rdtgroup *r, const char *name)
+{
+ struct iattr iattr = {.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,};
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ kn = kernfs_find_and_get_ns(r->kn, name, NULL);
+ if (!kn)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ switch (kernfs_type(kn)) {
+ case KERNFS_DIR:
+ iattr.ia_mode = S_IFDIR;
+ break;
+ case KERNFS_FILE:
+ iattr.ia_mode = S_IFREG;
+ break;
+ case KERNFS_LINK:
+ iattr.ia_mode = S_IFLNK;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = kernfs_setattr(kn, &iattr);
+ kernfs_put(kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore - Restore user access to named resctrl file
+ * @r: The resource group with which the file is associated.
+ * @name: Name of the file
+ * @mask: Mask of permissions that should be restored
+ *
+ * Restore the permissions of the named file. If @name is a directory the
+ * permissions of its parent will be used.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, <0 on failure.
+ */
+int rdtgroup_kn_mode_restore(struct rdtgroup *r, const char *name,
+ umode_t mask)
+{
+ struct iattr iattr = {.ia_valid = ATTR_MODE,};
+ struct kernfs_node *kn, *parent;
+ struct rftype *rfts, *rft;
+ int ret, len;
+
+ rfts = res_common_files;
+ len = ARRAY_SIZE(res_common_files);
+
+ for (rft = rfts; rft < rfts + len; rft++) {
+ if (!strcmp(rft->name, name))
+ iattr.ia_mode = rft->mode & mask;
+ }
+
+ kn = kernfs_find_and_get_ns(r->kn, name, NULL);
+ if (!kn)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ switch (kernfs_type(kn)) {
+ case KERNFS_DIR:
+ parent = kernfs_get_parent(kn);
+ if (parent) {
+ iattr.ia_mode |= parent->mode;
+ kernfs_put(parent);
+ }
+ iattr.ia_mode |= S_IFDIR;
+ break;
+ case KERNFS_FILE:
+ iattr.ia_mode |= S_IFREG;
+ break;
+ case KERNFS_LINK:
+ iattr.ia_mode |= S_IFLNK;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = kernfs_setattr(kn, &iattr);
+ kernfs_put(kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(void *priv, char *name,
+ unsigned long fflags)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *kn_subdir;
+ int ret;
+
+ kn_subdir = kernfs_create_dir(kn_info, name,
+ kn_info->mode, priv);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn_subdir))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn_subdir);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_subdir);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn_subdir, fflags);
+ if (!ret)
+ kernfs_activate(kn_subdir);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_create_info_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ unsigned long fflags;
+ char name[32];
+ int ret;
+
+ /* create the directory */
+ kn_info = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, "info", parent_kn->mode, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn_info))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn_info);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn_info, RF_TOP_INFO);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+
+ /* loop over enabled controls, these are all alloc_capable */
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ r = s->res;
+ fflags = r->fflags | RF_CTRL_INFO;
+ ret = rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(s, s->name, fflags);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ for_each_mon_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ fflags = r->fflags | RF_MON_INFO;
+ sprintf(name, "%s_MON", r->name);
+ ret = rdtgroup_mkdir_info_resdir(r, name, fflags);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn_info);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+
+ kernfs_activate(kn_info);
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_destroy:
+ kernfs_remove(kn_info);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mongroup_create_dir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
+ char *name, struct kernfs_node **dest_kn)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* create the directory */
+ kn = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, name, parent_kn->mode, prgrp);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+
+ if (dest_kn)
+ *dest_kn = kn;
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+
+ kernfs_activate(kn);
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_destroy:
+ kernfs_remove(kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void l3_qos_cfg_update(void *arg)
+{
+ bool *enable = arg;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_L3_QOS_CFG, *enable ? L3_QOS_CDP_ENABLE : 0ULL);
+}
+
+static void l2_qos_cfg_update(void *arg)
+{
+ bool *enable = arg;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_L2_QOS_CFG, *enable ? L2_QOS_CDP_ENABLE : 0ULL);
+}
+
+static inline bool is_mba_linear(void)
+{
+ return rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl.membw.delay_linear;
+}
+
+static int set_cache_qos_cfg(int level, bool enable)
+{
+ void (*update)(void *arg);
+ struct rdt_resource *r_l;
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_mask;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int cpu;
+
+ if (level == RDT_RESOURCE_L3)
+ update = l3_qos_cfg_update;
+ else if (level == RDT_RESOURCE_L2)
+ update = l2_qos_cfg_update;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ r_l = &rdt_resources_all[level].r_resctrl;
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r_l->domains, list) {
+ if (r_l->cache.arch_has_per_cpu_cfg)
+ /* Pick all the CPUs in the domain instance */
+ for_each_cpu(cpu, &d->cpu_mask)
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask);
+ else
+ /* Pick one CPU from each domain instance to update MSR */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask), cpu_mask);
+ }
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ /* Update QOS_CFG MSR on this cpu if it's in cpu_mask. */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask))
+ update(&enable);
+ /* Update QOS_CFG MSR on all other cpus in cpu_mask. */
+ smp_call_function_many(cpu_mask, update, &enable, 1);
+ put_cpu();
+
+ free_cpumask_var(cpu_mask);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Restore the qos cfg state when a domain comes online */
+void rdt_domain_reconfigure_cdp(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+
+ if (!r->cdp_capable)
+ return;
+
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L2)
+ l2_qos_cfg_update(&hw_res->cdp_enabled);
+
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_L3)
+ l3_qos_cfg_update(&hw_res->cdp_enabled);
+}
+
+static int mba_sc_domain_allocate(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ u32 num_closid = resctrl_arch_get_num_closid(r);
+ int cpu = cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask);
+ int i;
+
+ d->mbps_val = kcalloc_node(num_closid, sizeof(*d->mbps_val),
+ GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(cpu));
+ if (!d->mbps_val)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_closid; i++)
+ d->mbps_val[i] = MBA_MAX_MBPS;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void mba_sc_domain_destroy(struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ kfree(d->mbps_val);
+ d->mbps_val = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * MBA software controller is supported only if
+ * MBM is supported and MBA is in linear scale.
+ */
+static bool supports_mba_mbps(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl;
+
+ return (is_mbm_local_enabled() &&
+ r->alloc_capable && is_mba_linear());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enable or disable the MBA software controller
+ * which helps user specify bandwidth in MBps.
+ */
+static int set_mba_sc(bool mba_sc)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl;
+ u32 num_closid = resctrl_arch_get_num_closid(r);
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!supports_mba_mbps() || mba_sc == is_mba_sc(r))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ r->membw.mba_sc = mba_sc;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ for (i = 0; i < num_closid; i++)
+ d->mbps_val[i] = MBA_MAX_MBPS;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cdp_enable(int level)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r_l = &rdt_resources_all[level].r_resctrl;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!r_l->alloc_capable)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = set_cache_qos_cfg(level, true);
+ if (!ret)
+ rdt_resources_all[level].cdp_enabled = true;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void cdp_disable(int level)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *r_hw = &rdt_resources_all[level];
+
+ if (r_hw->cdp_enabled) {
+ set_cache_qos_cfg(level, false);
+ r_hw->cdp_enabled = false;
+ }
+}
+
+int resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(enum resctrl_res_level l, bool enable)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = &rdt_resources_all[l];
+
+ if (!hw_res->r_resctrl.cdp_capable)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (enable)
+ return cdp_enable(l);
+
+ cdp_disable(l);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void cdp_disable_all(void)
+{
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L3))
+ resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L3, false);
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L2))
+ resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L2, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * We don't allow rdtgroup directories to be created anywhere
+ * except the root directory. Thus when looking for the rdtgroup
+ * structure for a kernfs node we are either looking at a directory,
+ * in which case the rdtgroup structure is pointed at by the "priv"
+ * field, otherwise we have a file, and need only look to the parent
+ * to find the rdtgroup.
+ */
+static struct rdtgroup *kernfs_to_rdtgroup(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ if (kernfs_type(kn) == KERNFS_DIR) {
+ /*
+ * All the resource directories use "kn->priv"
+ * to point to the "struct rdtgroup" for the
+ * resource. "info" and its subdirectories don't
+ * have rdtgroup structures, so return NULL here.
+ */
+ if (kn == kn_info || kn->parent == kn_info)
+ return NULL;
+ else
+ return kn->priv;
+ } else {
+ return kn->parent->priv;
+ }
+}
+
+struct rdtgroup *rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp = kernfs_to_rdtgroup(kn);
+
+ if (!rdtgrp)
+ return NULL;
+
+ atomic_inc(&rdtgrp->waitcount);
+ kernfs_break_active_protection(kn);
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ /* Was this group deleted while we waited? */
+ if (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return rdtgrp;
+}
+
+void rdtgroup_kn_unlock(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp = kernfs_to_rdtgroup(kn);
+
+ if (!rdtgrp)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&rdtgrp->waitcount) &&
+ (rdtgrp->flags & RDT_DELETED)) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)
+ rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(rdtgrp);
+ kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
+ } else {
+ kernfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
+ }
+}
+
+static int mkdir_mondata_all(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
+ struct kernfs_node **mon_data_kn);
+
+static int rdt_enable_ctx(struct rdt_fs_context *ctx)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (ctx->enable_cdpl2)
+ ret = resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L2, true);
+
+ if (!ret && ctx->enable_cdpl3)
+ ret = resctrl_arch_set_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L3, true);
+
+ if (!ret && ctx->enable_mba_mbps)
+ ret = set_mba_sc(true);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int schemata_list_add(struct rdt_resource *r, enum resctrl_conf_type type)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ const char *suffix = "";
+ int ret, cl;
+
+ s = kzalloc(sizeof(*s), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ s->res = r;
+ s->num_closid = resctrl_arch_get_num_closid(r);
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(r->rid))
+ s->num_closid /= 2;
+
+ s->conf_type = type;
+ switch (type) {
+ case CDP_CODE:
+ suffix = "CODE";
+ break;
+ case CDP_DATA:
+ suffix = "DATA";
+ break;
+ case CDP_NONE:
+ suffix = "";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ ret = snprintf(s->name, sizeof(s->name), "%s%s", r->name, suffix);
+ if (ret >= sizeof(s->name)) {
+ kfree(s);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ cl = strlen(s->name);
+
+ /*
+ * If CDP is supported by this resource, but not enabled,
+ * include the suffix. This ensures the tabular format of the
+ * schemata file does not change between mounts of the filesystem.
+ */
+ if (r->cdp_capable && !resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(r->rid))
+ cl += 4;
+
+ if (cl > max_name_width)
+ max_name_width = cl;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->list);
+ list_add(&s->list, &resctrl_schema_all);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int schemata_list_create(void)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(r->rid)) {
+ ret = schemata_list_add(r, CDP_CODE);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+
+ ret = schemata_list_add(r, CDP_DATA);
+ } else {
+ ret = schemata_list_add(r, CDP_NONE);
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s, *tmp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(s, tmp, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ list_del(&s->list);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+}
+
+static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
+ struct rdt_domain *dom;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ int ret;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ /*
+ * resctrl file system can only be mounted once.
+ */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_enable_key)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = rdt_enable_ctx(ctx);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_cdp;
+
+ ret = schemata_list_create();
+ if (ret) {
+ schemata_list_destroy();
+ goto out_mba;
+ }
+
+ closid_init();
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_create_info_dir(rdtgroup_default.kn);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_schemata_free;
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ ret = mongroup_create_dir(rdtgroup_default.kn,
+ &rdtgroup_default, "mon_groups",
+ &kn_mongrp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_info;
+
+ ret = mkdir_mondata_all(rdtgroup_default.kn,
+ &rdtgroup_default, &kn_mondata);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_mongrp;
+ rdtgroup_default.mon.mon_data_kn = kn_mondata;
+ }
+
+ ret = rdt_pseudo_lock_init();
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_mondata;
+
+ ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_psl;
+
+ if (rdt_alloc_capable)
+ static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&rdt_alloc_enable_key);
+ if (rdt_mon_capable)
+ static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&rdt_mon_enable_key);
+
+ if (rdt_alloc_capable || rdt_mon_capable)
+ static_branch_enable_cpuslocked(&rdt_enable_key);
+
+ if (is_mbm_enabled()) {
+ r = &rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_L3].r_resctrl;
+ list_for_each_entry(dom, &r->domains, list)
+ mbm_setup_overflow_handler(dom, MBM_OVERFLOW_INTERVAL);
+ }
+
+ goto out;
+
+out_psl:
+ rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
+out_mondata:
+ if (rdt_mon_capable)
+ kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
+out_mongrp:
+ if (rdt_mon_capable)
+ kernfs_remove(kn_mongrp);
+out_info:
+ kernfs_remove(kn_info);
+out_schemata_free:
+ schemata_list_destroy();
+out_mba:
+ if (ctx->enable_mba_mbps)
+ set_mba_sc(false);
+out_cdp:
+ cdp_disable_all();
+out:
+ rdt_last_cmd_clear();
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+enum rdt_param {
+ Opt_cdp,
+ Opt_cdpl2,
+ Opt_mba_mbps,
+ nr__rdt_params
+};
+
+static const struct fs_parameter_spec rdt_fs_parameters[] = {
+ fsparam_flag("cdp", Opt_cdp),
+ fsparam_flag("cdpl2", Opt_cdpl2),
+ fsparam_flag("mba_MBps", Opt_mba_mbps),
+ {}
+};
+
+static int rdt_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
+ struct fs_parse_result result;
+ int opt;
+
+ opt = fs_parse(fc, rdt_fs_parameters, param, &result);
+ if (opt < 0)
+ return opt;
+
+ switch (opt) {
+ case Opt_cdp:
+ ctx->enable_cdpl3 = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_cdpl2:
+ ctx->enable_cdpl2 = true;
+ return 0;
+ case Opt_mba_mbps:
+ if (!supports_mba_mbps())
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ctx->enable_mba_mbps = true;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static void rdt_fs_context_free(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
+
+ kernfs_free_fs_context(fc);
+ kfree(ctx);
+}
+
+static const struct fs_context_operations rdt_fs_context_ops = {
+ .free = rdt_fs_context_free,
+ .parse_param = rdt_parse_param,
+ .get_tree = rdt_get_tree,
+};
+
+static int rdt_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
+{
+ struct rdt_fs_context *ctx;
+
+ ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rdt_fs_context), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ctx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ctx->kfc.root = rdt_root;
+ ctx->kfc.magic = RDTGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC;
+ fc->fs_private = &ctx->kfc;
+ fc->ops = &rdt_fs_context_ops;
+ put_user_ns(fc->user_ns);
+ fc->user_ns = get_user_ns(&init_user_ns);
+ fc->global = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int reset_all_ctrls(struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ struct rdt_hw_resource *hw_res = resctrl_to_arch_res(r);
+ struct rdt_hw_domain *hw_dom;
+ struct msr_param msr_param;
+ cpumask_var_t cpu_mask;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int i, cpu;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_mask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ msr_param.res = r;
+ msr_param.low = 0;
+ msr_param.high = hw_res->num_closid;
+
+ /*
+ * Disable resource control for this resource by setting all
+ * CBMs in all domains to the maximum mask value. Pick one CPU
+ * from each domain to update the MSRs below.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ hw_dom = resctrl_to_arch_dom(d);
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpumask_any(&d->cpu_mask), cpu_mask);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < hw_res->num_closid; i++)
+ hw_dom->ctrl_val[i] = r->default_ctrl;
+ }
+ cpu = get_cpu();
+ /* Update CBM on this cpu if it's in cpu_mask. */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, cpu_mask))
+ rdt_ctrl_update(&msr_param);
+ /* Update CBM on all other cpus in cpu_mask. */
+ smp_call_function_many(cpu_mask, rdt_ctrl_update, &msr_param, 1);
+ put_cpu();
+
+ free_cpumask_var(cpu_mask);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Move tasks from one to the other group. If @from is NULL, then all tasks
+ * in the systems are moved unconditionally (used for teardown).
+ *
+ * If @mask is not NULL the cpus on which moved tasks are running are set
+ * in that mask so the update smp function call is restricted to affected
+ * cpus.
+ */
+static void rdt_move_group_tasks(struct rdtgroup *from, struct rdtgroup *to,
+ struct cpumask *mask)
+{
+ struct task_struct *p, *t;
+
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ for_each_process_thread(p, t) {
+ if (!from || is_closid_match(t, from) ||
+ is_rmid_match(t, from)) {
+ WRITE_ONCE(t->closid, to->closid);
+ WRITE_ONCE(t->rmid, to->mon.rmid);
+
+ /*
+ * Order the closid/rmid stores above before the loads
+ * in task_curr(). This pairs with the full barrier
+ * between the rq->curr update and resctrl_sched_in()
+ * during context switch.
+ */
+ smp_mb();
+
+ /*
+ * If the task is on a CPU, set the CPU in the mask.
+ * The detection is inaccurate as tasks might move or
+ * schedule before the smp function call takes place.
+ * In such a case the function call is pointless, but
+ * there is no other side effect.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) && mask && task_curr(t))
+ cpumask_set_cpu(task_cpu(t), mask);
+ }
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+}
+
+static void free_all_child_rdtgrp(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *sentry, *stmp;
+ struct list_head *head;
+
+ head = &rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(sentry, stmp, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ free_rmid(sentry->mon.rmid);
+ list_del(&sentry->mon.crdtgrp_list);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&sentry->waitcount) != 0)
+ sentry->flags = RDT_DELETED;
+ else
+ rdtgroup_remove(sentry);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Forcibly remove all of subdirectories under root.
+ */
+static void rmdir_all_sub(void)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *tmp;
+
+ /* Move all tasks to the default resource group */
+ rdt_move_group_tasks(NULL, &rdtgroup_default, NULL);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(rdtgrp, tmp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ /* Free any child rmids */
+ free_all_child_rdtgrp(rdtgrp);
+
+ /* Remove each rdtgroup other than root */
+ if (rdtgrp == &rdtgroup_default)
+ continue;
+
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)
+ rdtgroup_pseudo_lock_remove(rdtgrp);
+
+ /*
+ * Give any CPUs back to the default group. We cannot copy
+ * cpu_online_mask because a CPU might have executed the
+ * offline callback already, but is still marked online.
+ */
+ cpumask_or(&rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask,
+ &rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
+ list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list);
+
+ if (atomic_read(&rdtgrp->waitcount) != 0)
+ rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
+ else
+ rdtgroup_remove(rdtgrp);
+ }
+ /* Notify online CPUs to update per cpu storage and PQR_ASSOC MSR */
+ update_closid_rmid(cpu_online_mask, &rdtgroup_default);
+
+ kernfs_remove(kn_info);
+ kernfs_remove(kn_mongrp);
+ kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
+}
+
+static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ set_mba_sc(false);
+
+ /*Put everything back to default values. */
+ for_each_alloc_capable_rdt_resource(r)
+ reset_all_ctrls(r);
+ cdp_disable_all();
+ rmdir_all_sub();
+ rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
+ rdtgroup_default.mode = RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE;
+ schemata_list_destroy();
+ static_branch_disable_cpuslocked(&rdt_alloc_enable_key);
+ static_branch_disable_cpuslocked(&rdt_mon_enable_key);
+ static_branch_disable_cpuslocked(&rdt_enable_key);
+ kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
+ .name = "resctrl",
+ .init_fs_context = rdt_init_fs_context,
+ .parameters = rdt_fs_parameters,
+ .kill_sb = rdt_kill_sb,
+};
+
+static int mon_addfile(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name,
+ void *priv)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ kn = __kernfs_create_file(parent_kn, name, 0444,
+ GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, 0,
+ &kf_mondata_ops, priv, NULL, NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
+ if (ret) {
+ kernfs_remove(kn);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove all subdirectories of mon_data of ctrl_mon groups
+ * and monitor groups with given domain id.
+ */
+static void rmdir_mondata_subdir_allrdtgrp(struct rdt_resource *r,
+ unsigned int dom_id)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp, *crgrp;
+ char name[32];
+
+ list_for_each_entry(prgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ sprintf(name, "mon_%s_%02d", r->name, dom_id);
+ kernfs_remove_by_name(prgrp->mon.mon_data_kn, name);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, &prgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list, mon.crdtgrp_list)
+ kernfs_remove_by_name(crgrp->mon.mon_data_kn, name);
+ }
+}
+
+static int mkdir_mondata_subdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ struct rdt_domain *d,
+ struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdtgroup *prgrp)
+{
+ union mon_data_bits priv;
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ struct mon_evt *mevt;
+ struct rmid_read rr;
+ char name[32];
+ int ret;
+
+ sprintf(name, "mon_%s_%02d", r->name, d->id);
+ /* create the directory */
+ kn = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, name, parent_kn->mode, prgrp);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn))
+ return PTR_ERR(kn);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(list_empty(&r->evt_list))) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ priv.u.rid = r->rid;
+ priv.u.domid = d->id;
+ list_for_each_entry(mevt, &r->evt_list, list) {
+ priv.u.evtid = mevt->evtid;
+ ret = mon_addfile(kn, mevt->name, priv.priv);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+
+ if (is_mbm_event(mevt->evtid))
+ mon_event_read(&rr, r, d, prgrp, mevt->evtid, true);
+ }
+ kernfs_activate(kn);
+ return 0;
+
+out_destroy:
+ kernfs_remove(kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add all subdirectories of mon_data for "ctrl_mon" groups
+ * and "monitor" groups with given domain id.
+ */
+static void mkdir_mondata_subdir_allrdtgrp(struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *parent_kn;
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp, *crgrp;
+ struct list_head *head;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(prgrp, &rdt_all_groups, rdtgroup_list) {
+ parent_kn = prgrp->mon.mon_data_kn;
+ mkdir_mondata_subdir(parent_kn, d, r, prgrp);
+
+ head = &prgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list;
+ list_for_each_entry(crgrp, head, mon.crdtgrp_list) {
+ parent_kn = crgrp->mon.mon_data_kn;
+ mkdir_mondata_subdir(parent_kn, d, r, crgrp);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int mkdir_mondata_subdir_alldom(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ struct rdt_resource *r,
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp)
+{
+ struct rdt_domain *dom;
+ int ret;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(dom, &r->domains, list) {
+ ret = mkdir_mondata_subdir(parent_kn, dom, r, prgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This creates a directory mon_data which contains the monitored data.
+ *
+ * mon_data has one directory for each domain which are named
+ * in the format mon_<domain_name>_<domain_id>. For ex: A mon_data
+ * with L3 domain looks as below:
+ * ./mon_data:
+ * mon_L3_00
+ * mon_L3_01
+ * mon_L3_02
+ * ...
+ *
+ * Each domain directory has one file per event:
+ * ./mon_L3_00/:
+ * llc_occupancy
+ *
+ */
+static int mkdir_mondata_all(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ struct rdtgroup *prgrp,
+ struct kernfs_node **dest_kn)
+{
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the mon_data directory first.
+ */
+ ret = mongroup_create_dir(parent_kn, prgrp, "mon_data", &kn);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (dest_kn)
+ *dest_kn = kn;
+
+ /*
+ * Create the subdirectories for each domain. Note that all events
+ * in a domain like L3 are grouped into a resource whose domain is L3
+ */
+ for_each_mon_capable_rdt_resource(r) {
+ ret = mkdir_mondata_subdir_alldom(kn, r, prgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+out_destroy:
+ kernfs_remove(kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * cbm_ensure_valid - Enforce validity on provided CBM
+ * @_val: Candidate CBM
+ * @r: RDT resource to which the CBM belongs
+ *
+ * The provided CBM represents all cache portions available for use. This
+ * may be represented by a bitmap that does not consist of contiguous ones
+ * and thus be an invalid CBM.
+ * Here the provided CBM is forced to be a valid CBM by only considering
+ * the first set of contiguous bits as valid and clearing all bits.
+ * The intention here is to provide a valid default CBM with which a new
+ * resource group is initialized. The user can follow this with a
+ * modification to the CBM if the default does not satisfy the
+ * requirements.
+ */
+static u32 cbm_ensure_valid(u32 _val, struct rdt_resource *r)
+{
+ unsigned int cbm_len = r->cache.cbm_len;
+ unsigned long first_bit, zero_bit;
+ unsigned long val = _val;
+
+ if (!val)
+ return 0;
+
+ first_bit = find_first_bit(&val, cbm_len);
+ zero_bit = find_next_zero_bit(&val, cbm_len, first_bit);
+
+ /* Clear any remaining bits to ensure contiguous region */
+ bitmap_clear(&val, zero_bit, cbm_len - zero_bit);
+ return (u32)val;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize cache resources per RDT domain
+ *
+ * Set the RDT domain up to start off with all usable allocations. That is,
+ * all shareable and unused bits. All-zero CBM is invalid.
+ */
+static int __init_one_rdt_domain(struct rdt_domain *d, struct resctrl_schema *s,
+ u32 closid)
+{
+ enum resctrl_conf_type peer_type = resctrl_peer_type(s->conf_type);
+ enum resctrl_conf_type t = s->conf_type;
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ struct rdt_resource *r = s->res;
+ u32 used_b = 0, unused_b = 0;
+ unsigned long tmp_cbm;
+ enum rdtgrp_mode mode;
+ u32 peer_ctl, ctrl_val;
+ int i;
+
+ cfg = &d->staged_config[t];
+ cfg->have_new_ctrl = false;
+ cfg->new_ctrl = r->cache.shareable_bits;
+ used_b = r->cache.shareable_bits;
+ for (i = 0; i < closids_supported(); i++) {
+ if (closid_allocated(i) && i != closid) {
+ mode = rdtgroup_mode_by_closid(i);
+ if (mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP)
+ /*
+ * ctrl values for locksetup aren't relevant
+ * until the schemata is written, and the mode
+ * becomes RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED.
+ */
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * If CDP is active include peer domain's
+ * usage to ensure there is no overlap
+ * with an exclusive group.
+ */
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(r->rid))
+ peer_ctl = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, d, i,
+ peer_type);
+ else
+ peer_ctl = 0;
+ ctrl_val = resctrl_arch_get_config(r, d, i,
+ s->conf_type);
+ used_b |= ctrl_val | peer_ctl;
+ if (mode == RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE)
+ cfg->new_ctrl |= ctrl_val | peer_ctl;
+ }
+ }
+ if (d->plr && d->plr->cbm > 0)
+ used_b |= d->plr->cbm;
+ unused_b = used_b ^ (BIT_MASK(r->cache.cbm_len) - 1);
+ unused_b &= BIT_MASK(r->cache.cbm_len) - 1;
+ cfg->new_ctrl |= unused_b;
+ /*
+ * Force the initial CBM to be valid, user can
+ * modify the CBM based on system availability.
+ */
+ cfg->new_ctrl = cbm_ensure_valid(cfg->new_ctrl, r);
+ /*
+ * Assign the u32 CBM to an unsigned long to ensure that
+ * bitmap_weight() does not access out-of-bound memory.
+ */
+ tmp_cbm = cfg->new_ctrl;
+ if (bitmap_weight(&tmp_cbm, r->cache.cbm_len) < r->cache.min_cbm_bits) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_printf("No space on %s:%d\n", s->name, d->id);
+ return -ENOSPC;
+ }
+ cfg->have_new_ctrl = true;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize cache resources with default values.
+ *
+ * A new RDT group is being created on an allocation capable (CAT)
+ * supporting system. Set this group up to start off with all usable
+ * allocations.
+ *
+ * If there are no more shareable bits available on any domain then
+ * the entire allocation will fail.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_init_cat(struct resctrl_schema *s, u32 closid)
+{
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+ int ret;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &s->res->domains, list) {
+ ret = __init_one_rdt_domain(d, s, closid);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Initialize MBA resource with default values. */
+static void rdtgroup_init_mba(struct rdt_resource *r, u32 closid)
+{
+ struct resctrl_staged_config *cfg;
+ struct rdt_domain *d;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &r->domains, list) {
+ if (is_mba_sc(r)) {
+ d->mbps_val[closid] = MBA_MAX_MBPS;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ cfg = &d->staged_config[CDP_NONE];
+ cfg->new_ctrl = r->default_ctrl;
+ cfg->have_new_ctrl = true;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Initialize the RDT group's allocations. */
+static int rdtgroup_init_alloc(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ struct resctrl_schema *s;
+ struct rdt_resource *r;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rdt_staged_configs_clear();
+
+ list_for_each_entry(s, &resctrl_schema_all, list) {
+ r = s->res;
+ if (r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA) {
+ rdtgroup_init_mba(r, rdtgrp->closid);
+ if (is_mba_sc(r))
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ ret = rdtgroup_init_cat(s, rdtgrp->closid);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = resctrl_arch_update_domains(r, rdtgrp->closid);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Failed to initialize allocations\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ }
+
+ rdtgrp->mode = RDT_MODE_SHAREABLE;
+
+out:
+ rdt_staged_configs_clear();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int mkdir_rdt_prepare(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ const char *name, umode_t mode,
+ enum rdt_group_type rtype, struct rdtgroup **r)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *prdtgrp, *rdtgrp;
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ uint files = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ prdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(parent_kn);
+ if (!prdtgrp) {
+ ret = -ENODEV;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (rtype == RDTMON_GROUP &&
+ (prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
+ prdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED)) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Pseudo-locking in progress\n");
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /* allocate the rdtgroup. */
+ rdtgrp = kzalloc(sizeof(*rdtgrp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ ret = -ENOSPC;
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Kernel out of memory\n");
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ *r = rdtgrp;
+ rdtgrp->mon.parent = prdtgrp;
+ rdtgrp->type = rtype;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
+
+ /* kernfs creates the directory for rdtgrp */
+ kn = kernfs_create_dir(parent_kn, name, mode, rdtgrp);
+ if (IS_ERR(kn)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(kn);
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernfs create error\n");
+ goto out_free_rgrp;
+ }
+ rdtgrp->kn = kn;
+
+ /*
+ * kernfs_remove() will drop the reference count on "kn" which
+ * will free it. But we still need it to stick around for the
+ * rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn) call. Take one extra reference here,
+ * which will be dropped by kernfs_put() in rdtgroup_remove().
+ */
+ kernfs_get(kn);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_kn_set_ugid(kn);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernfs perm error\n");
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ files = RFTYPE_BASE | BIT(RF_CTRLSHIFT + rtype);
+ ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kn, files);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernfs fill error\n");
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ ret = alloc_rmid();
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of RMIDs\n");
+ goto out_destroy;
+ }
+ rdtgrp->mon.rmid = ret;
+
+ ret = mkdir_mondata_all(kn, rdtgrp, &rdtgrp->mon.mon_data_kn);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernfs subdir error\n");
+ goto out_idfree;
+ }
+ }
+ kernfs_activate(kn);
+
+ /*
+ * The caller unlocks the parent_kn upon success.
+ */
+ return 0;
+
+out_idfree:
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+out_destroy:
+ kernfs_put(rdtgrp->kn);
+ kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
+out_free_rgrp:
+ kfree(rdtgrp);
+out_unlock:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(parent_kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void mkdir_rdt_prepare_clean(struct rdtgroup *rgrp)
+{
+ kernfs_remove(rgrp->kn);
+ free_rmid(rgrp->mon.rmid);
+ rdtgroup_remove(rgrp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create a monitor group under "mon_groups" directory of a control
+ * and monitor group(ctrl_mon). This is a resource group
+ * to monitor a subset of tasks and cpus in its parent ctrl_mon group.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_mkdir_mon(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ const char *name, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, *prgrp;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = mkdir_rdt_prepare(parent_kn, name, mode, RDTMON_GROUP, &rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ prgrp = rdtgrp->mon.parent;
+ rdtgrp->closid = prgrp->closid;
+
+ /*
+ * Add the rdtgrp to the list of rdtgrps the parent
+ * ctrl_mon group has to track.
+ */
+ list_add_tail(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list, &prgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
+
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(parent_kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * These are rdtgroups created under the root directory. Can be used
+ * to allocate and monitor resources.
+ */
+static int rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn,
+ const char *name, umode_t mode)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ struct kernfs_node *kn;
+ u32 closid;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = mkdir_rdt_prepare(parent_kn, name, mode, RDTCTRL_GROUP, &rdtgrp);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ kn = rdtgrp->kn;
+ ret = closid_alloc();
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("Out of CLOSIDs\n");
+ goto out_common_fail;
+ }
+ closid = ret;
+ ret = 0;
+
+ rdtgrp->closid = closid;
+ ret = rdtgroup_init_alloc(rdtgrp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto out_id_free;
+
+ list_add(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list, &rdt_all_groups);
+
+ if (rdt_mon_capable) {
+ /*
+ * Create an empty mon_groups directory to hold the subset
+ * of tasks and cpus to monitor.
+ */
+ ret = mongroup_create_dir(kn, rdtgrp, "mon_groups", NULL);
+ if (ret) {
+ rdt_last_cmd_puts("kernfs subdir error\n");
+ goto out_del_list;
+ }
+ }
+
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+out_del_list:
+ list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list);
+out_id_free:
+ closid_free(closid);
+out_common_fail:
+ mkdir_rdt_prepare_clean(rdtgrp);
+out_unlock:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(parent_kn);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * We allow creating mon groups only with in a directory called "mon_groups"
+ * which is present in every ctrl_mon group. Check if this is a valid
+ * "mon_groups" directory.
+ *
+ * 1. The directory should be named "mon_groups".
+ * 2. The mon group itself should "not" be named "mon_groups".
+ * This makes sure "mon_groups" directory always has a ctrl_mon group
+ * as parent.
+ */
+static bool is_mon_groups(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name)
+{
+ return (!strcmp(kn->name, "mon_groups") &&
+ strcmp(name, "mon_groups"));
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_mkdir(struct kernfs_node *parent_kn, const char *name,
+ umode_t mode)
+{
+ /* Do not accept '\n' to avoid unparsable situation. */
+ if (strchr(name, '\n'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * If the parent directory is the root directory and RDT
+ * allocation is supported, add a control and monitoring
+ * subdirectory
+ */
+ if (rdt_alloc_capable && parent_kn == rdtgroup_default.kn)
+ return rdtgroup_mkdir_ctrl_mon(parent_kn, name, mode);
+
+ /*
+ * If RDT monitoring is supported and the parent directory is a valid
+ * "mon_groups" directory, add a monitoring subdirectory.
+ */
+ if (rdt_mon_capable && is_mon_groups(parent_kn, name))
+ return rdtgroup_mkdir_mon(parent_kn, name, mode);
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t tmpmask)
+{
+ struct rdtgroup *prdtgrp = rdtgrp->mon.parent;
+ int cpu;
+
+ /* Give any tasks back to the parent group */
+ rdt_move_group_tasks(rdtgrp, prdtgrp, tmpmask);
+
+ /* Update per cpu rmid of the moved CPUs first */
+ for_each_cpu(cpu, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask)
+ per_cpu(pqr_state.default_rmid, cpu) = prdtgrp->mon.rmid;
+ /*
+ * Update the MSR on moved CPUs and CPUs which have moved
+ * task running on them.
+ */
+ cpumask_or(tmpmask, tmpmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, NULL);
+
+ rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ /*
+ * Remove the rdtgrp from the parent ctrl_mon group's list
+ */
+ WARN_ON(list_empty(&prdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list));
+ list_del(&rdtgrp->mon.crdtgrp_list);
+
+ kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp)
+{
+ rdtgrp->flags = RDT_DELETED;
+ list_del(&rdtgrp->rdtgroup_list);
+
+ kernfs_remove(rdtgrp->kn);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp, cpumask_var_t tmpmask)
+{
+ int cpu;
+
+ /* Give any tasks back to the default group */
+ rdt_move_group_tasks(rdtgrp, &rdtgroup_default, tmpmask);
+
+ /* Give any CPUs back to the default group */
+ cpumask_or(&rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask,
+ &rdtgroup_default.cpu_mask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+
+ /* Update per cpu closid and rmid of the moved CPUs first */
+ for_each_cpu(cpu, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask) {
+ per_cpu(pqr_state.default_closid, cpu) = rdtgroup_default.closid;
+ per_cpu(pqr_state.default_rmid, cpu) = rdtgroup_default.mon.rmid;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Update the MSR on moved CPUs and CPUs which have moved
+ * task running on them.
+ */
+ cpumask_or(tmpmask, tmpmask, &rdtgrp->cpu_mask);
+ update_closid_rmid(tmpmask, NULL);
+
+ closid_free(rdtgrp->closid);
+ free_rmid(rdtgrp->mon.rmid);
+
+ rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(rdtgrp);
+
+ /*
+ * Free all the child monitor group rmids.
+ */
+ free_all_child_rdtgrp(rdtgrp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_rmdir(struct kernfs_node *kn)
+{
+ struct kernfs_node *parent_kn = kn->parent;
+ struct rdtgroup *rdtgrp;
+ cpumask_var_t tmpmask;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (!zalloc_cpumask_var(&tmpmask, GFP_KERNEL))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rdtgrp = rdtgroup_kn_lock_live(kn);
+ if (!rdtgrp) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the rdtgroup is a ctrl_mon group and parent directory
+ * is the root directory, remove the ctrl_mon group.
+ *
+ * If the rdtgroup is a mon group and parent directory
+ * is a valid "mon_groups" directory, remove the mon group.
+ */
+ if (rdtgrp->type == RDTCTRL_GROUP && parent_kn == rdtgroup_default.kn &&
+ rdtgrp != &rdtgroup_default) {
+ if (rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKSETUP ||
+ rdtgrp->mode == RDT_MODE_PSEUDO_LOCKED) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_ctrl_remove(rdtgrp);
+ } else {
+ ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_ctrl(rdtgrp, tmpmask);
+ }
+ } else if (rdtgrp->type == RDTMON_GROUP &&
+ is_mon_groups(parent_kn, kn->name)) {
+ ret = rdtgroup_rmdir_mon(rdtgrp, tmpmask);
+ } else {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rdtgroup_kn_unlock(kn);
+ free_cpumask_var(tmpmask);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int rdtgroup_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct kernfs_root *kf)
+{
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L3))
+ seq_puts(seq, ",cdp");
+
+ if (resctrl_arch_get_cdp_enabled(RDT_RESOURCE_L2))
+ seq_puts(seq, ",cdpl2");
+
+ if (is_mba_sc(&rdt_resources_all[RDT_RESOURCE_MBA].r_resctrl))
+ seq_puts(seq, ",mba_MBps");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kernfs_syscall_ops rdtgroup_kf_syscall_ops = {
+ .mkdir = rdtgroup_mkdir,
+ .rmdir = rdtgroup_rmdir,
+ .show_options = rdtgroup_show_options,
+};
+
+static int __init rdtgroup_setup_root(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ rdt_root = kernfs_create_root(&rdtgroup_kf_syscall_ops,
+ KERNFS_ROOT_CREATE_DEACTIVATED |
+ KERNFS_ROOT_EXTRA_OPEN_PERM_CHECK,
+ &rdtgroup_default);
+ if (IS_ERR(rdt_root))
+ return PTR_ERR(rdt_root);
+
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ rdtgroup_default.closid = 0;
+ rdtgroup_default.mon.rmid = 0;
+ rdtgroup_default.type = RDTCTRL_GROUP;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rdtgroup_default.mon.crdtgrp_list);
+
+ list_add(&rdtgroup_default.rdtgroup_list, &rdt_all_groups);
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_add_files(kernfs_root_to_node(rdt_root), RF_CTRL_BASE);
+ if (ret) {
+ kernfs_destroy_root(rdt_root);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rdtgroup_default.kn = kernfs_root_to_node(rdt_root);
+ kernfs_activate(rdtgroup_default.kn);
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void domain_destroy_mon_state(struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ bitmap_free(d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ kfree(d->mbm_total);
+ kfree(d->mbm_local);
+}
+
+void resctrl_offline_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (supports_mba_mbps() && r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA)
+ mba_sc_domain_destroy(r, d);
+
+ if (!r->mon_capable)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * If resctrl is mounted, remove all the
+ * per domain monitor data directories.
+ */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_mon_enable_key))
+ rmdir_mondata_subdir_allrdtgrp(r, d->id);
+
+ if (is_mbm_enabled())
+ cancel_delayed_work(&d->mbm_over);
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled() && has_busy_rmid(r, d)) {
+ /*
+ * When a package is going down, forcefully
+ * decrement rmid->ebusy. There is no way to know
+ * that the L3 was flushed and hence may lead to
+ * incorrect counts in rare scenarios, but leaving
+ * the RMID as busy creates RMID leaks if the
+ * package never comes back.
+ */
+ __check_limbo(d, true);
+ cancel_delayed_work(&d->cqm_limbo);
+ }
+
+ domain_destroy_mon_state(d);
+}
+
+static int domain_setup_mon_state(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ size_t tsize;
+
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled()) {
+ d->rmid_busy_llc = bitmap_zalloc(r->num_rmid, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!d->rmid_busy_llc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ if (is_mbm_total_enabled()) {
+ tsize = sizeof(*d->mbm_total);
+ d->mbm_total = kcalloc(r->num_rmid, tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!d->mbm_total) {
+ bitmap_free(d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ if (is_mbm_local_enabled()) {
+ tsize = sizeof(*d->mbm_local);
+ d->mbm_local = kcalloc(r->num_rmid, tsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!d->mbm_local) {
+ bitmap_free(d->rmid_busy_llc);
+ kfree(d->mbm_total);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int resctrl_online_domain(struct rdt_resource *r, struct rdt_domain *d)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ lockdep_assert_held(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+
+ if (supports_mba_mbps() && r->rid == RDT_RESOURCE_MBA)
+ /* RDT_RESOURCE_MBA is never mon_capable */
+ return mba_sc_domain_allocate(r, d);
+
+ if (!r->mon_capable)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = domain_setup_mon_state(r, d);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ if (is_mbm_enabled()) {
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&d->mbm_over, mbm_handle_overflow);
+ mbm_setup_overflow_handler(d, MBM_OVERFLOW_INTERVAL);
+ }
+
+ if (is_llc_occupancy_enabled())
+ INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&d->cqm_limbo, cqm_handle_limbo);
+
+ /* If resctrl is mounted, add per domain monitor data directories. */
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&rdt_mon_enable_key))
+ mkdir_mondata_subdir_allrdtgrp(r, d);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rdtgroup_init - rdtgroup initialization
+ *
+ * Setup resctrl file system including set up root, create mount point,
+ * register rdtgroup filesystem, and initialize files under root directory.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success or -errno
+ */
+int __init rdtgroup_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ seq_buf_init(&last_cmd_status, last_cmd_status_buf,
+ sizeof(last_cmd_status_buf));
+
+ ret = rdtgroup_setup_root();
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "resctrl");
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup_root;
+
+ ret = register_filesystem(&rdt_fs_type);
+ if (ret)
+ goto cleanup_mountpoint;
+
+ /*
+ * Adding the resctrl debugfs directory here may not be ideal since
+ * it would let the resctrl debugfs directory appear on the debugfs
+ * filesystem before the resctrl filesystem is mounted.
+ * It may also be ok since that would enable debugging of RDT before
+ * resctrl is mounted.
+ * The reason why the debugfs directory is created here and not in
+ * rdt_get_tree() is because rdt_get_tree() takes rdtgroup_mutex and
+ * during the debugfs directory creation also &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key
+ * (the lockdep class of inode->i_rwsem). Other filesystem
+ * interactions (eg. SyS_getdents) have the lock ordering:
+ * &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key --> &mm->mmap_lock
+ * During mmap(), called with &mm->mmap_lock, the rdtgroup_mutex
+ * is taken, thus creating dependency:
+ * &mm->mmap_lock --> rdtgroup_mutex for the latter that can cause
+ * issues considering the other two lock dependencies.
+ * By creating the debugfs directory here we avoid a dependency
+ * that may cause deadlock (even though file operations cannot
+ * occur until the filesystem is mounted, but I do not know how to
+ * tell lockdep that).
+ */
+ debugfs_resctrl = debugfs_create_dir("resctrl", NULL);
+
+ return 0;
+
+cleanup_mountpoint:
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "resctrl");
+cleanup_root:
+ kernfs_destroy_root(rdt_root);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void __exit rdtgroup_exit(void)
+{
+ debugfs_remove_recursive(debugfs_resctrl);
+ unregister_filesystem(&rdt_fs_type);
+ sysfs_remove_mount_point(fs_kobj, "resctrl");
+ kernfs_destroy_root(rdt_root);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fc01f81f6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Routines to identify additional cpu features that are scattered in
+ * cpuid space.
+ */
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+struct cpuid_bit {
+ u16 feature;
+ u8 reg;
+ u8 bit;
+ u32 level;
+ u32 sub_leaf;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Please keep the leaf sorted by cpuid_bit.level for faster search.
+ * X86_FEATURE_MBA is supported by both Intel and AMD. But the CPUID
+ * levels are different and there is a separate entry for each.
+ */
+static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
+ { X86_FEATURE_APERFMPERF, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000006, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_EPB, CPUID_ECX, 3, 0x00000006, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PPIN, CPUID_EBX, 0, 0x00000007, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_RRSBA_CTRL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x00000007, 2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_OCCUP_LLC, CPUID_EDX, 0, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_TOTAL, CPUID_EDX, 1, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CQM_MBM_LOCAL, CPUID_EDX, 2, 0x0000000f, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L3, CPUID_EBX, 1, 0x00000010, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CAT_L2, CPUID_EBX, 2, 0x00000010, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 1 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2, CPUID_ECX, 2, 0x00000010, 2 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 3, 0x00000010, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA, CPUID_ECX, 0, 0x00000010, 3 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SGX1, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x00000012, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_SGX2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x00000012, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE, CPUID_EDX, 7, 0x80000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_CPB, CPUID_EDX, 9, 0x80000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK, CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_MBA, CPUID_EBX, 6, 0x80000008, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2, CPUID_EAX, 0, 0x80000022, 0 },
+ { X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, CPUID_EAX, 1, 0x80000022, 0 },
+ { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+void init_scattered_cpuid_features(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 max_level;
+ u32 regs[4];
+ const struct cpuid_bit *cb;
+
+ for (cb = cpuid_bits; cb->feature; cb++) {
+
+ /* Verify that the level is valid */
+ max_level = cpuid_eax(cb->level & 0xffff0000);
+ if (max_level < cb->level ||
+ max_level > (cb->level | 0xffff))
+ continue;
+
+ cpuid_count(cb->level, cb->sub_leaf, &regs[CPUID_EAX],
+ &regs[CPUID_EBX], &regs[CPUID_ECX],
+ &regs[CPUID_EDX]);
+
+ if (regs[cb->reg] & (1 << cb->bit))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, cb->feature);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9c1656779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+obj-y += \
+ driver.o \
+ encl.o \
+ ioctl.o \
+ main.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM) += virt.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa9b8b868
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <linux/acpi.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+
+u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
+u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~0x3;
+u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask;
+
+static int sgx_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ kref_init(&encl->refcount);
+ xa_init(&encl->page_array);
+ mutex_init(&encl->lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->va_pages);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&encl->mm_list);
+ spin_lock_init(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ ret = init_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(encl);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ file->private_data = encl;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+
+ /*
+ * Drain the remaining mm_list entries. At this point the list contains
+ * entries for processes, which have closed the enclave file but have
+ * not exited yet. The processes, which have exited, are gone from the
+ * list by sgx_mmu_notifier_release().
+ */
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ if (list_empty(&encl->mm_list)) {
+ encl_mm = NULL;
+ } else {
+ encl_mm = list_first_entry(&encl->mm_list,
+ struct sgx_encl_mm, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
+ }
+
+ spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ /* The enclave is no longer mapped by any mm. */
+ if (!encl_mm)
+ break;
+
+ synchronize_srcu(&encl->srcu);
+ mmu_notifier_unregister(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, encl_mm->mm);
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+
+ /* 'encl_mm' is gone, put encl_mm->encl reference: */
+ kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+ }
+
+ kref_put(&encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = file->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_may_map(encl, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end, vma->vm_flags);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vm_ops;
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_IO;
+ vma->vm_private_data = encl;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned long sgx_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long pgoff,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if ((flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_PRIVATE)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ return addr;
+
+ return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static long sgx_compat_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return sgx_ioctl(filep, cmd, arg);
+}
+#endif
+
+static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = sgx_open,
+ .release = sgx_release,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = sgx_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
+ .mmap = sgx_mmap,
+ .get_unmapped_area = sgx_get_unmapped_area,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .name = "sgx_enclave",
+ .nodename = "sgx_enclave",
+ .fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
+};
+
+int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ u64 attr_mask;
+ u64 xfrm_mask;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 0, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (!(eax & 1)) {
+ pr_err("SGX disabled: SGX1 instruction support not available.\n");
+ return -ENODEV;
+ }
+
+ sgx_misc_reserved_mask = ~ebx | SGX_MISC_RESERVED_MASK;
+
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, 1, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ attr_mask = (((u64)ebx) << 32) + (u64)eax;
+ sgx_attributes_reserved_mask = ~attr_mask | SGX_ATTR_RESERVED_MASK;
+
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {
+ xfrm_mask = (((u64)edx) << 32) + (u64)ecx;
+ sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask = ~xfrm_mask;
+ }
+
+ ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_enclave);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4eddb4d57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.h
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+#define __ARCH_SGX_DRIVER_H__
+
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+#define SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT 20
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT 50
+#define SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME 20
+
+extern u64 sgx_attributes_reserved_mask;
+extern u64 sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask;
+extern u32 sgx_misc_reserved_mask;
+
+extern const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops;
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg);
+
+int sgx_drv_init(void);
+
+#endif /* __ARCH_X86_SGX_DRIVER_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d5f76b996
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1323 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <linux/lockdep.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include "encl.h"
+#include "encls.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+static int sgx_encl_lookup_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing);
+
+#define PCMDS_PER_PAGE (PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd))
+/*
+ * 32 PCMD entries share a PCMD page. PCMD_FIRST_MASK is used to
+ * determine the page index associated with the first PCMD entry
+ * within a PCMD page.
+ */
+#define PCMD_FIRST_MASK GENMASK(4, 0)
+
+/**
+ * reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd() - Query if any enclave page associated with
+ * a PCMD page is in process of being reclaimed.
+ * @encl: Enclave to which PCMD page belongs
+ * @start_addr: Address of enclave page using first entry within the PCMD page
+ *
+ * When an enclave page is reclaimed some Paging Crypto MetaData (PCMD) is
+ * stored. The PCMD data of a reclaimed enclave page contains enough
+ * information for the processor to verify the page at the time
+ * it is loaded back into the Enclave Page Cache (EPC).
+ *
+ * The backing storage to which enclave pages are reclaimed is laid out as
+ * follows:
+ * Encrypted enclave pages:SECS page:PCMD pages
+ *
+ * Each PCMD page contains the PCMD metadata of
+ * PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd) enclave pages.
+ *
+ * A PCMD page can only be truncated if it is (a) empty, and (b) not in the
+ * process of getting data (and thus soon being non-empty). (b) is tested with
+ * a check if an enclave page sharing the PCMD page is in the process of being
+ * reclaimed.
+ *
+ * The reclaimer sets the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED flag when it
+ * intends to reclaim that enclave page - it means that the PCMD page
+ * associated with that enclave page is about to get some data and thus
+ * even if the PCMD page is empty, it should not be truncated.
+ *
+ * Context: Enclave mutex (&sgx_encl->lock) must be held.
+ * Return: 1 if the reclaimer is about to write to the PCMD page
+ * 0 if the reclaimer has no intention to write to the PCMD page
+ */
+static int reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long start_addr)
+{
+ int reclaimed = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * PCMD_FIRST_MASK is based on number of PCMD entries within
+ * PCMD page being 32.
+ */
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PCMDS_PER_PAGE != 32);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < PCMDS_PER_PAGE; i++) {
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ unsigned long addr;
+
+ addr = start_addr + i * PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ /*
+ * Stop when reaching the SECS page - it does not
+ * have a page_array entry and its reclaim is
+ * started and completed with enclave mutex held so
+ * it does not use the SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED
+ * flag.
+ */
+ if (addr == encl->base + encl->size)
+ break;
+
+ entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+ if (!entry)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * VA page slot ID uses same bit as the flag so it is important
+ * to ensure that the page is not already in backing store.
+ */
+ if (entry->epc_page &&
+ (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)) {
+ reclaimed = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return reclaimed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate byte offset of a PCMD struct associated with an enclave page. PCMD's
+ * follow right after the EPC data in the backing storage. In addition to the
+ * visible enclave pages, there's one extra page slot for SECS, before PCMD
+ * structs.
+ */
+static inline pgoff_t sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long page_index)
+{
+ pgoff_t epc_end_off = encl->size + sizeof(struct sgx_secs);
+
+ return epc_end_off + page_index * sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a page from the backing storage in the given page index.
+ */
+static inline void sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(encl->backing);
+
+ shmem_truncate_range(inode, PFN_PHYS(page_index), PFN_PHYS(page_index) + PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ELDU: Load an EPC page as unblocked. For more info, see "OS Management of EPC
+ * Pages" in the SDM.
+ */
+static int __sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
+{
+ unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ pgoff_t page_index, page_pcmd_off;
+ unsigned long pcmd_first_page;
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct sgx_backing b;
+ bool pcmd_page_empty;
+ u8 *pcmd_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (secs_page)
+ page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base);
+ else
+ page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->size);
+
+ /*
+ * Address of enclave page using the first entry within the PCMD page.
+ */
+ pcmd_first_page = PFN_PHYS(page_index & ~PCMD_FIRST_MASK) + encl->base;
+
+ page_pcmd_off = sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(encl, page_index);
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_lookup_backing(encl, page_index, &b);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(b.contents);
+ pcmd_page = kmap_atomic(b.pcmd);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)pcmd_page + b.pcmd_offset;
+
+ if (secs_page)
+ pginfo.secs = (u64)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_page);
+ else
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+
+ ret = __eldu(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page),
+ sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl_page->va_page->epc_page) + va_offset);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ELDU");
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ memset(pcmd_page + b.pcmd_offset, 0, sizeof(struct sgx_pcmd));
+ set_page_dirty(b.pcmd);
+
+ /*
+ * The area for the PCMD in the page was zeroed above. Check if the
+ * whole page is now empty meaning that all PCMD's have been zeroed:
+ */
+ pcmd_page_empty = !memchr_inv(pcmd_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
+
+ get_page(b.pcmd);
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(&b);
+
+ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, page_index);
+
+ if (pcmd_page_empty && !reclaimer_writing_to_pcmd(encl, pcmd_first_page)) {
+ sgx_encl_truncate_backing_page(encl, PFN_DOWN(page_pcmd_off));
+ pcmd_page = kmap_atomic(b.pcmd);
+ if (memchr_inv(pcmd_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+ pr_warn("PCMD page not empty after truncate.\n");
+ kunmap_atomic(pcmd_page);
+ }
+
+ put_page(b.pcmd);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_eldu(struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_page)
+{
+
+ unsigned long va_offset = encl_page->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return epc_page;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_eldu(encl_page, epc_page, secs_page);
+ if (ret) {
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ sgx_free_va_slot(encl_page->va_page, va_offset);
+ list_move(&encl_page->va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+ encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+
+ return epc_page;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure the SECS page is not swapped out. Must be called with encl->lock
+ * to protect the enclave states including SECS and ensure the SECS page is
+ * not swapped out again while being used.
+ */
+static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_encl_load_secs(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page = encl->secs.epc_page;
+
+ if (!epc_page)
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(&encl->secs, NULL);
+
+ return epc_page;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_encl_page *__sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+
+ /* Entry successfully located. */
+ if (entry->epc_page) {
+ if (entry->desc & SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+
+ return entry;
+ }
+
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_load_secs(encl);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
+
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_eldu(entry, encl->secs.epc_page);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
+
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+ entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+ if (!entry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that the page has equal or higher build time
+ * permissions than the VMA permissions (i.e. the subset of {VM_READ,
+ * VM_WRITE, VM_EXECUTE} in vma->vm_flags).
+ */
+ if ((entry->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) != vm_prot_bits)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
+}
+
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+ entry = xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr));
+ if (!entry)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+
+ return __sgx_encl_load_page(encl, entry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_eaug_page() - Dynamically add page to initialized enclave
+ * @vma: VMA obtained from fault info from where page is accessed
+ * @encl: enclave accessing the page
+ * @addr: address that triggered the page fault
+ *
+ * When an initialized enclave accesses a page with no backing EPC page
+ * on a SGX2 system then the EPC can be added dynamically via the SGX2
+ * ENCLS[EAUG] instruction.
+ *
+ * Returns: Appropriate vm_fault_t: VM_FAULT_NOPAGE when PTE was installed
+ * successfully, VM_FAULT_SIGBUS or VM_FAULT_OOM as error otherwise.
+ */
+static vm_fault_t sgx_encl_eaug_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
+ struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ vm_fault_t vmret = VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo = {0};
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ unsigned long phys_addr;
+ u64 secinfo_flags;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ /*
+ * Ignore internal permission checking for dynamically added pages.
+ * They matter only for data added during the pre-initialization
+ * phase. The enclave decides the permissions by the means of
+ * EACCEPT, EACCEPTCOPY and EMODPE.
+ */
+ secinfo_flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
+ encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, addr - encl->base, secinfo_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+ return VM_FAULT_OOM;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ epc_page = sgx_encl_load_secs(encl);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(epc_page) == -EBUSY)
+ vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+ goto err_out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(epc_page) == -EBUSY)
+ vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+ goto err_out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+ if (PTR_ERR(va_page) == -EBUSY)
+ vmret = VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+ goto err_out_epc;
+ }
+
+ if (va_page)
+ list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+ ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+ encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+ /*
+ * If ret == -EBUSY then page was created in another flow while
+ * running without encl->lock
+ */
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out_shrink;
+
+ pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+ pginfo.metadata = 0;
+
+ ret = __eaug(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+ encl_page->type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+
+ phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page);
+ /*
+ * Do not undo everything when creating PTE entry fails - next #PF
+ * would find page ready for a PTE.
+ */
+ vmret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+ if (vmret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+err_out:
+ xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_shrink:
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+err_out_epc:
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+err_out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ kfree(encl_page);
+
+ return vmret;
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t sgx_vma_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)vmf->address;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ unsigned long phys_addr;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ vm_fault_t ret;
+
+ encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+ /*
+ * It's very unlikely but possible that allocating memory for the
+ * mm_list entry of a forked process failed in sgx_vma_open(). When
+ * this happens, vm_private_data is set to NULL.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!encl))
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+
+ /*
+ * The page_array keeps track of all enclave pages, whether they
+ * are swapped out or not. If there is no entry for this page and
+ * the system supports SGX2 then it is possible to dynamically add
+ * a new enclave page. This is only possible for an initialized
+ * enclave that will be checked for right away.
+ */
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2) &&
+ (!xa_load(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(addr))))
+ return sgx_encl_eaug_page(vma, encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vma->vm_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY)
+ return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
+
+ phys_addr = sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(entry->epc_page);
+
+ ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, PFN_DOWN(phys_addr));
+ if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+ }
+
+ sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(vma->vm_mm, entry);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+}
+
+static void sgx_vma_open(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+
+ /*
+ * It's possible but unlikely that vm_private_data is NULL. This can
+ * happen in a grandchild of a process, when sgx_encl_mm_add() had
+ * failed to allocate memory in this callback.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(!encl))
+ return;
+
+ if (sgx_encl_mm_add(encl, vma->vm_mm))
+ vma->vm_private_data = NULL;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_may_map() - Check if a requested VMA mapping is allowed
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @start: lower bound of the address range, inclusive
+ * @end: upper bound of the address range, exclusive
+ * @vm_flags: VMA flags
+ *
+ * Iterate through the enclave pages contained within [@start, @end) to verify
+ * that the permissions requested by a subset of {VM_READ, VM_WRITE, VM_EXEC}
+ * do not contain any permissions that are not contained in the build time
+ * permissions of any of the enclave pages within the given address range.
+ *
+ * An enclave creator must declare the strongest permissions that will be
+ * needed for each enclave page. This ensures that mappings have the identical
+ * or weaker permissions than the earlier declared permissions.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, -EACCES otherwise
+ */
+int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ unsigned long vm_prot_bits = vm_flags & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC);
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page;
+ unsigned long count = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(start));
+
+ /* Disallow mapping outside enclave's address range. */
+ if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags) &&
+ (start < encl->base || end > encl->base + encl->size))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * Disallow READ_IMPLIES_EXEC tasks as their VMA permissions might
+ * conflict with the enclave page permissions.
+ */
+ if (current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ xas_lock(&xas);
+ xas_for_each(&xas, page, PFN_DOWN(end - 1)) {
+ if (~page->vm_max_prot_bits & vm_prot_bits) {
+ ret = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Reschedule on every XA_CHECK_SCHED iteration. */
+ if (!(++count % XA_CHECK_SCHED)) {
+ xas_pause(&xas);
+ xas_unlock(&xas);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ xas_lock(&xas);
+ }
+ }
+ xas_unlock(&xas);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vma_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long newflags)
+{
+ return sgx_encl_may_map(vma->vm_private_data, start, end, newflags);
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_debug_read(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+ unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ int ret;
+
+
+ ret = __edbgrd(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_debug_write(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_encl_page *page,
+ unsigned long addr, void *data)
+{
+ unsigned long offset = addr & ~PAGE_MASK;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __edbgwr(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page->epc_page) + offset, data);
+ if (ret)
+ return -EIO;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load an enclave page to EPC if required, and take encl->lock.
+ */
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_reserve_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page_in_vma(encl, addr, vm_flags);
+ if (PTR_ERR(entry) != -EBUSY)
+ break;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ERR(entry))
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vma_access(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
+ void *buf, int len, int write)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = vma->vm_private_data;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry = NULL;
+ char data[sizeof(unsigned long)];
+ unsigned long align;
+ int offset;
+ int cnt;
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * If process was forked, VMA is still there but vm_private_data is set
+ * to NULL.
+ */
+ if (!encl)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += cnt) {
+ entry = sgx_encl_reserve_page(encl, (addr + i) & PAGE_MASK,
+ vma->vm_flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ align = ALIGN_DOWN(addr + i, sizeof(unsigned long));
+ offset = (addr + i) & (sizeof(unsigned long) - 1);
+ cnt = sizeof(unsigned long) - offset;
+ cnt = min(cnt, len - i);
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_debug_read(encl, entry, align, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (write) {
+ memcpy(data + offset, buf + i, cnt);
+ ret = sgx_encl_debug_write(encl, entry, align, data);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ memcpy(buf + i, data + offset, cnt);
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return ret < 0 ? ret : i;
+}
+
+const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
+ .fault = sgx_vma_fault,
+ .mprotect = sgx_vma_mprotect,
+ .open = sgx_vma_open,
+ .access = sgx_vma_access,
+};
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
+ * @ref: address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
+ *
+ * Used together with kref_put(). Frees all the resources associated with the
+ * enclave and the instance itself.
+ */
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = container_of(ref, struct sgx_encl, refcount);
+ unsigned long max_page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl->base + encl->size - 1);
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ unsigned long count = 0;
+
+ XA_STATE(xas, &encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl->base));
+
+ xas_lock(&xas);
+ xas_for_each(&xas, entry, max_page_index) {
+ if (entry->epc_page) {
+ /*
+ * The page and its radix tree entry cannot be freed
+ * if the page is being held by the reclaimer.
+ */
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
+ continue;
+
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+ entry->epc_page = NULL;
+ }
+
+ kfree(entry);
+ /*
+ * Invoke scheduler on every XA_CHECK_SCHED iteration
+ * to prevent soft lockups.
+ */
+ if (!(++count % XA_CHECK_SCHED)) {
+ xas_pause(&xas);
+ xas_unlock(&xas);
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ xas_lock(&xas);
+ }
+ }
+ xas_unlock(&xas);
+
+ xa_destroy(&encl->page_array);
+
+ if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) {
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+ }
+
+ while (!list_empty(&encl->va_pages)) {
+ va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
+ list);
+ list_del(&va_page->list);
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ }
+
+ if (encl->backing)
+ fput(encl->backing);
+
+ cleanup_srcu_struct(&encl->srcu);
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&encl->mm_list));
+
+ /* Detect EPC page leak's. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs_child_cnt);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->secs.epc_page);
+
+ kfree(encl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * 'mm' is exiting and no longer needs mmu notifications.
+ */
+static void sgx_mmu_notifier_release(struct mmu_notifier *mn,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * The enclave itself can remove encl_mm. Note, objects can't be moved
+ * off an RCU protected list, but deletion is ok.
+ */
+ spin_lock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &encl_mm->encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (tmp == encl_mm) {
+ list_del_rcu(&encl_mm->list);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&encl_mm->encl->mm_lock);
+
+ if (tmp == encl_mm) {
+ synchronize_srcu(&encl_mm->encl->srcu);
+ mmu_notifier_put(mn);
+ }
+}
+
+static void sgx_mmu_notifier_free(struct mmu_notifier *mn)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = container_of(mn, struct sgx_encl_mm, mmu_notifier);
+
+ /* 'encl_mm' is going away, put encl_mm->encl reference: */
+ kref_put(&encl_mm->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+}
+
+static const struct mmu_notifier_ops sgx_mmu_notifier_ops = {
+ .release = sgx_mmu_notifier_release,
+ .free_notifier = sgx_mmu_notifier_free,
+};
+
+static struct sgx_encl_mm *sgx_encl_find_mm(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm = NULL;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *tmp;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(tmp, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (tmp->mm == mm) {
+ encl_mm = tmp;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ return encl_mm;
+}
+
+int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Even though a single enclave may be mapped into an mm more than once,
+ * each 'mm' only appears once on encl->mm_list. This is guaranteed by
+ * holding the mm's mmap lock for write before an mm can be added or
+ * remove to an encl->mm_list.
+ */
+ mmap_assert_write_locked(mm);
+
+ /*
+ * It's possible that an entry already exists in the mm_list, because it
+ * is removed only on VFS release or process exit.
+ */
+ if (sgx_encl_find_mm(encl, mm))
+ return 0;
+
+ encl_mm = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_mm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_mm)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Grab a refcount for the encl_mm->encl reference: */
+ kref_get(&encl->refcount);
+ encl_mm->encl = encl;
+ encl_mm->mm = mm;
+ encl_mm->mmu_notifier.ops = &sgx_mmu_notifier_ops;
+
+ ret = __mmu_notifier_register(&encl_mm->mmu_notifier, mm);
+ if (ret) {
+ kfree(encl_mm);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ spin_lock(&encl->mm_lock);
+ list_add_rcu(&encl_mm->list, &encl->mm_list);
+ /* Pairs with smp_rmb() in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(). */
+ smp_wmb();
+ encl->mm_list_version++;
+ spin_unlock(&encl->mm_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_cpumask() - Query which CPUs might be accessing the enclave
+ * @encl: the enclave
+ *
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. For example, ENCLS[EWB]
+ * copies a page from the enclave page cache to regular main memory but
+ * it fails if it cannot ensure that there are no cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings referring to the page.
+ *
+ * SGX hardware flushes all cached linear-to-physical mappings on a CPU
+ * when an enclave is exited via ENCLU[EEXIT] or an Asynchronous Enclave
+ * Exit (AEX). Exiting an enclave will thus ensure cached linear-to-physical
+ * address mappings are cleared but coordination with the tracking done within
+ * the SGX hardware is needed to support the SGX functions that depend on this
+ * cache clearing.
+ *
+ * When the ENCLS[ETRACK] function is issued on an enclave the hardware
+ * tracks threads operating inside the enclave at that time. The SGX
+ * hardware tracking require that all the identified threads must have
+ * exited the enclave in order to flush the mappings before a function such
+ * as ENCLS[EWB] will be permitted
+ *
+ * The following flow is used to support SGX functions that require that
+ * no cached linear-to-physical address mappings are present:
+ * 1) Execute ENCLS[ETRACK] to initiate hardware tracking.
+ * 2) Use this function (sgx_encl_cpumask()) to query which CPUs might be
+ * accessing the enclave.
+ * 3) Send IPI to identified CPUs, kicking them out of the enclave and
+ * thus flushing all locally cached linear-to-physical address mappings.
+ * 4) Execute SGX function.
+ *
+ * Context: It is required to call this function after ENCLS[ETRACK].
+ * This will ensure that if any new mm appears (racing with
+ * sgx_encl_mm_add()) then the new mm will enter into the
+ * enclave with fresh linear-to-physical address mappings.
+ *
+ * It is required that all IPIs are completed before a new
+ * ENCLS[ETRACK] is issued so be sure to protect steps 1 to 3
+ * of the above flow with the enclave's mutex.
+ *
+ * Return: cpumask of CPUs that might be accessing @encl
+ */
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ cpumask_t *cpumask = &encl->cpumask;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ int idx;
+
+ cpumask_clear(cpumask);
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ cpumask_or(cpumask, cpumask, mm_cpumask(encl_mm->mm));
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ return cpumask;
+}
+
+static struct page *sgx_encl_get_backing_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ pgoff_t index)
+{
+ struct address_space *mapping = encl->backing->f_mapping;
+ gfp_t gfpmask = mapping_gfp_mask(mapping);
+
+ return shmem_read_mapping_page_gfp(mapping, index, gfpmask);
+}
+
+/**
+ * __sgx_encl_get_backing() - Pin the backing storage
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @page_index: enclave page index
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ *
+ * Pin the backing storage pages for storing the encrypted contents and Paging
+ * Crypto MetaData (PCMD) of an enclave page.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise.
+ */
+static int __sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ pgoff_t page_pcmd_off = sgx_encl_get_backing_page_pcmd_offset(encl, page_index);
+ struct page *contents;
+ struct page *pcmd;
+
+ contents = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, page_index);
+ if (IS_ERR(contents))
+ return PTR_ERR(contents);
+
+ pcmd = sgx_encl_get_backing_page(encl, PFN_DOWN(page_pcmd_off));
+ if (IS_ERR(pcmd)) {
+ put_page(contents);
+ return PTR_ERR(pcmd);
+ }
+
+ backing->contents = contents;
+ backing->pcmd = pcmd;
+ backing->pcmd_offset = page_pcmd_off & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * When called from ksgxd, returns the mem_cgroup of a struct mm stored
+ * in the enclave's mm_list. When not called from ksgxd, just returns
+ * the mem_cgroup of the current task.
+ */
+static struct mem_cgroup *sgx_encl_get_mem_cgroup(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ int idx;
+
+ /*
+ * If called from normal task context, return the mem_cgroup
+ * of the current task's mm. The remainder of the handling is for
+ * ksgxd.
+ */
+ if (!current_is_ksgxd())
+ return get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(current->mm);
+
+ /*
+ * Search the enclave's mm_list to find an mm associated with
+ * this enclave to charge the allocation to.
+ */
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ memcg = get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ /*
+ * In the rare case that there isn't an mm associated with
+ * the enclave, set memcg to the current active mem_cgroup.
+ * This will be the root mem_cgroup if there is no active
+ * mem_cgroup.
+ */
+ if (!memcg)
+ return get_mem_cgroup_from_mm(NULL);
+
+ return memcg;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_alloc_backing() - create a new backing storage page
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @page_index: enclave page index
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ *
+ * When called from ksgxd, sets the active memcg from one of the
+ * mms in the enclave's mm_list prior to any backing page allocation,
+ * in order to ensure that shmem page allocations are charged to the
+ * enclave. Create a backing page for loading data back into an EPC page with
+ * ELDU. This function takes a reference on a new backing page which
+ * must be dropped with a corresponding call to sgx_encl_put_backing().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise.
+ */
+int sgx_encl_alloc_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct mem_cgroup *encl_memcg = sgx_encl_get_mem_cgroup(encl);
+ struct mem_cgroup *memcg = set_active_memcg(encl_memcg);
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, backing);
+
+ set_active_memcg(memcg);
+ mem_cgroup_put(encl_memcg);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_lookup_backing() - retrieve an existing backing storage page
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @page_index: enclave page index
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ *
+ * Retrieve a backing page for loading data back into an EPC page with ELDU.
+ * It is the caller's responsibility to ensure that it is appropriate to use
+ * sgx_encl_lookup_backing() rather than sgx_encl_alloc_backing(). If lookup is
+ * not used correctly, this will cause an allocation which is not accounted for.
+ * This function takes a reference on an existing backing page which must be
+ * dropped with a corresponding call to sgx_encl_put_backing().
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -errno otherwise.
+ */
+static int sgx_encl_lookup_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ return __sgx_encl_get_backing(encl, page_index, backing);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_put_backing() - Unpin the backing storage
+ * @backing: data for accessing backing storage for the page
+ */
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ put_page(backing->pcmd);
+ put_page(backing->contents);
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb(pte_t *ptep, unsigned long addr,
+ void *data)
+{
+ pte_t pte;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = pte_young(*ptep);
+ if (ret) {
+ pte = pte_mkold(*ptep);
+ set_pte_at((struct mm_struct *)data, addr, ptep, pte);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young() - Test and reset the accessed bit
+ * @mm: mm_struct that is checked
+ * @page: enclave page to be tested for recent access
+ *
+ * Checks the Access (A) bit from the PTE corresponding to the enclave page and
+ * clears it.
+ *
+ * Return: 1 if the page has been recently accessed and 0 if not.
+ */
+int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page)
+{
+ unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_find(mm, addr, &vma);
+ if (ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (encl != vma->vm_private_data)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = apply_to_page_range(vma->vm_mm, addr, PAGE_SIZE,
+ sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young_cb, vma->vm_mm);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ unsigned long prot;
+
+ encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+ * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+ * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+ */
+ if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+
+ /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
+ encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ return encl_page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave
+ * @encl: the enclave
+ * @addr: page aligned pointer to single page for which PTEs will be removed
+ *
+ * Multiple VMAs may have an enclave page mapped. Remove the PTE mapping
+ * @addr from each VMA. Ensure that page fault handler is ready to handle
+ * new mappings of @addr before calling this function.
+ */
+void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long mm_list_version;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ int idx, ret;
+
+ do {
+ mm_list_version = encl->mm_list_version;
+
+ /* Pairs with smp_wmb() in sgx_encl_mm_add(). */
+ smp_rmb();
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_find(encl_mm->mm, addr, &vma);
+ if (!ret && encl == vma->vm_private_data)
+ zap_vma_ptes(vma, addr, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+ } while (unlikely(encl->mm_list_version != mm_list_version));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_va_page() - Allocate a Version Array (VA) page
+ * @reclaim: Reclaim EPC pages directly if none available. Enclave
+ * mutex should not be held if this is set.
+ *
+ * Allocate a free EPC page and convert it to a Version Array (VA) page.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * a VA page,
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(NULL, reclaim);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return ERR_CAST(epc_page);
+
+ ret = __epa(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+ if (ret) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "EPA returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);
+ }
+
+ return epc_page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_va_slot - allocate a VA slot
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ *
+ * Allocates a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
+ *
+ * Return: offset of the slot inside the VA page
+ */
+unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+
+ if (slot < SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)
+ set_bit(slot, va_page->slots);
+
+ return slot << 3;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_free_va_slot - free a VA slot
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ * @offset: offset of the slot inside the VA page
+ *
+ * Frees a slot from a &struct sgx_va_page instance.
+ */
+void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset)
+{
+ clear_bit(offset >> 3, va_page->slots);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_va_page_full - is the VA page full?
+ * @va_page: a &struct sgx_va_page instance
+ *
+ * Return: true if all slots have been taken
+ */
+bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ int slot = find_first_zero_bit(va_page->slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+
+ return slot == SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_free_epc_page - free an EPC page assigned to an enclave
+ * @page: EPC page to be freed
+ *
+ * Free an EPC page assigned to an enclave. It does EREMOVE for the page, and
+ * only upon success, it puts the page back to free page list. Otherwise, it
+ * gives a WARNING to indicate page is leaked.
+ */
+void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+ ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
+ if (WARN_ONCE(ret, EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE, ret, ret))
+ return;
+
+ sgx_free_epc_page(page);
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f94ff14c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/**
+ * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * Contains the software defined data structures for enclaves.
+ */
+#ifndef _X86_ENCL_H
+#define _X86_ENCL_H
+
+#include <linux/cpumask.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/srcu.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/xarray.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+/* 'desc' bits holding the offset in the VA (version array) page. */
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK GENMASK_ULL(11, 3)
+
+/* 'desc' bit marking that the page is being reclaimed. */
+#define SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED BIT(3)
+
+struct sgx_encl_page {
+ unsigned long desc;
+ unsigned long vm_max_prot_bits:8;
+ enum sgx_page_type type:16;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+};
+
+enum sgx_encl_flags {
+ SGX_ENCL_IOCTL = BIT(0),
+ SGX_ENCL_DEBUG = BIT(1),
+ SGX_ENCL_CREATED = BIT(2),
+ SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED = BIT(3),
+};
+
+struct sgx_encl_mm {
+ struct sgx_encl *encl;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct mmu_notifier mmu_notifier;
+};
+
+struct sgx_encl {
+ unsigned long base;
+ unsigned long size;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned int page_cnt;
+ unsigned int secs_child_cnt;
+ struct mutex lock;
+ struct xarray page_array;
+ struct sgx_encl_page secs;
+ unsigned long attributes;
+ unsigned long attributes_mask;
+
+ cpumask_t cpumask;
+ struct file *backing;
+ struct kref refcount;
+ struct list_head va_pages;
+ unsigned long mm_list_version;
+ struct list_head mm_list;
+ spinlock_t mm_lock;
+ struct srcu_struct srcu;
+};
+
+#define SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT 512
+
+struct sgx_va_page {
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ DECLARE_BITMAP(slots, SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sgx_backing {
+ struct page *contents;
+ struct page *pcmd;
+ unsigned long pcmd_offset;
+};
+
+extern const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops;
+
+static inline int sgx_encl_find(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long addr,
+ struct vm_area_struct **vma)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *result;
+
+ result = vma_lookup(mm, addr);
+ if (!result || result->vm_ops != &sgx_vm_ops)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *vma = result;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sgx_encl_may_map(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end, unsigned long vm_flags);
+
+bool current_is_ksgxd(void);
+void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref);
+int sgx_encl_mm_add(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct mm_struct *mm);
+const cpumask_t *sgx_encl_cpumask(struct sgx_encl *encl);
+int sgx_encl_alloc_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing);
+void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing);
+int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags);
+void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr);
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(bool reclaim);
+unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
+void sgx_free_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page, unsigned int offset);
+bool sgx_va_page_full(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
+void sgx_encl_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_load_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long addr);
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool reclaim);
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
+
+#endif /* _X86_ENCL_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99004b02e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _X86_ENCLS_H
+#define _X86_ENCLS_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/traps.h>
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+/* Retrieve the encoded trapnr from the specified return code. */
+#define ENCLS_TRAPNR(r) ((r) & ~SGX_ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+
+/* Issue a WARN() about an ENCLS function. */
+#define ENCLS_WARN(r, name) { \
+ do { \
+ int _r = (r); \
+ WARN_ONCE(_r, "%s returned %d (0x%x)\n", (name), _r, _r); \
+ } while (0); \
+}
+
+/*
+ * encls_faulted() - Check if an ENCLS leaf faulted given an error code
+ * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - true: ENCLS leaf faulted.
+ * - false: Otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_faulted(int ret)
+{
+ return ret & SGX_ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG;
+}
+
+/**
+ * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed
+ * @ret: the return value of an ENCLS function call
+ *
+ * Check if an ENCLS function failed. This happens when the function causes a
+ * fault that is not caused by an EPCM conflict or when the function returns a
+ * non-zero value.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
+{
+ if (encls_faulted(ret))
+ return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF;
+
+ return !!ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __encls_ret_N - encode an ENCLS function that returns an error code in EAX
+ * @rax: function number
+ * @inputs: asm inputs for the function
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that returns an error code, e.g. EREMOVE.
+ * And because SGX isn't complex enough as it is, function that return an error
+ * code also modify flags.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * SGX error code on failure
+ */
+#define __encls_ret_N(rax, inputs...) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_FAULT_SGX) \
+ : "=a"(ret) \
+ : "a"(rax), inputs \
+ : "memory", "cc"); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_1(rax, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_ret_3(rax, rbx, rcx, rdx) \
+ ({ \
+ __encls_ret_N(rax, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx), "d"(rdx)); \
+ })
+
+/**
+ * __encls_N - encode an ENCLS function that doesn't return an error code
+ * @rax: function number
+ * @rbx_out: optional output variable
+ * @inputs: asm inputs for the function
+ *
+ * Emit assembly for an ENCLS function that does not return an error code, e.g.
+ * ECREATE. Leaves without error codes either succeed or fault. @rbx_out is an
+ * optional parameter for use by EDGBRD, which returns the requested value in
+ * RBX.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * trapnr with SGX_ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG set on fault
+ */
+#define __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, inputs...) \
+ ({ \
+ int ret; \
+ asm volatile( \
+ "1: .byte 0x0f, 0x01, 0xcf;\n\t" \
+ " xor %%eax,%%eax;\n" \
+ "2:\n" \
+ _ASM_EXTABLE_TYPE(1b, 2b, EX_TYPE_FAULT_SGX) \
+ : "=a"(ret), "=b"(rbx_out) \
+ : "a"(rax), inputs \
+ : "memory"); \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_2(rax, rbx, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ unsigned long ign_rbx_out; \
+ __encls_N(rax, ign_rbx_out, "b"(rbx), "c"(rcx)); \
+ })
+
+#define __encls_1_1(rax, data, rcx) \
+ ({ \
+ unsigned long rbx_out; \
+ int ret = __encls_N(rax, rbx_out, "c"(rcx)); \
+ if (!ret) \
+ data = rbx_out; \
+ ret; \
+ })
+
+/* Initialize an EPC page into an SGX Enclave Control Structure (SECS) page. */
+static inline int __ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *secs)
+{
+ return __encls_2(ECREATE, pginfo, secs);
+}
+
+/* Hash a 256 byte region of an enclave page to SECS:MRENCLAVE. */
+static inline int __eextend(void *secs, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EEXTEND, secs, addr);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Associate an EPC page to an enclave either as a REG or TCS page
+ * populated with the provided data.
+ */
+static inline int __eadd(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EADD, pginfo, addr);
+}
+
+/* Finalize enclave build, initialize enclave for user code execution. */
+static inline int __einit(void *sigstruct, void *token, void *secs)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(EINIT, sigstruct, secs, token);
+}
+
+/* Disassociate EPC page from its enclave and mark it as unused. */
+static inline int __eremove(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(EREMOVE, addr);
+}
+
+/* Copy data to an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */
+static inline int __edbgwr(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EDGBWR, *data, addr);
+}
+
+/* Copy data from an EPC page belonging to a debug enclave. */
+static inline int __edbgrd(void *addr, unsigned long *data)
+{
+ return __encls_1_1(EDGBRD, *data, addr);
+}
+
+/* Track that software has completed the required TLB address clears. */
+static inline int __etrack(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(ETRACK, addr);
+}
+
+/* Load, verify, and unblock an EPC page. */
+static inline int __eldu(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+ void *va)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(ELDU, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+/* Make EPC page inaccessible to enclave, ready to be written to memory. */
+static inline int __eblock(void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_1(EBLOCK, addr);
+}
+
+/* Initialize an EPC page into a Version Array (VA) page. */
+static inline int __epa(void *addr)
+{
+ unsigned long rbx = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_VA;
+
+ return __encls_2(EPA, rbx, addr);
+}
+
+/* Invalidate an EPC page and write it out to main memory. */
+static inline int __ewb(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr,
+ void *va)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_3(EWB, pginfo, addr, va);
+}
+
+/* Restrict the EPCM permissions of an EPC page. */
+static inline int __emodpr(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_2(EMODPR, secinfo, addr);
+}
+
+/* Change the type of an EPC page. */
+static inline int __emodt(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_ret_2(EMODT, secinfo, addr);
+}
+
+/* Zero a page of EPC memory and add it to an initialized enclave. */
+static inline int __eaug(struct sgx_pageinfo *pginfo, void *addr)
+{
+ return __encls_2(EAUG, pginfo, addr);
+}
+
+#endif /* _X86_ENCLS_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..da8b8ea6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1263 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/delay.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+#include "encls.h"
+
+struct sgx_va_page *sgx_encl_grow(struct sgx_encl *encl, bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page = NULL;
+ void *err;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT !=
+ (SGX_ENCL_PAGE_VA_OFFSET_MASK >> 3) + 1);
+
+ if (!(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT)) {
+ va_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*va_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!va_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ va_page->epc_page = sgx_alloc_va_page(reclaim);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page->epc_page)) {
+ err = ERR_CAST(va_page->epc_page);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encl->page_cnt % SGX_VA_SLOT_COUNT);
+ }
+ encl->page_cnt++;
+ return va_page;
+}
+
+void sgx_encl_shrink(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_va_page *va_page)
+{
+ encl->page_cnt--;
+
+ if (va_page) {
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
+ list_del(&va_page->list);
+ kfree(va_page);
+ }
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_secs *secs)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *secs_epc;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long encl_size;
+ struct file *backing;
+ long ret;
+
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(va_page);
+ else if (va_page)
+ list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+ /* else the tail page of the VA page list had free slots. */
+
+ /* The extra page goes to SECS. */
+ encl_size = secs->size + PAGE_SIZE;
+
+ backing = shmem_file_setup("SGX backing", encl_size + (encl_size >> 5),
+ VM_NORESERVE);
+ if (IS_ERR(backing)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(backing);
+ goto err_out_shrink;
+ }
+
+ encl->backing = backing;
+
+ secs_epc = sgx_alloc_epc_page(&encl->secs, true);
+ if (IS_ERR(secs_epc)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(secs_epc);
+ goto err_out_backing;
+ }
+
+ encl->secs.epc_page = secs_epc;
+
+ pginfo.addr = 0;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)secs;
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)&secinfo;
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+ ret = __ecreate((void *)&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(secs_epc));
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EIO;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ if (secs->attributes & SGX_ATTR_DEBUG)
+ set_bit(SGX_ENCL_DEBUG, &encl->flags);
+
+ encl->secs.encl = encl;
+ encl->secs.type = SGX_PAGE_TYPE_SECS;
+ encl->base = secs->base;
+ encl->size = secs->size;
+ encl->attributes = secs->attributes;
+ encl->attributes_mask = SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT | SGX_ATTR_KSS;
+
+ /* Set only after completion, as encl->lock has not been taken. */
+ set_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags);
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_out:
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+
+err_out_backing:
+ fput(encl->backing);
+ encl->backing = NULL;
+
+err_out_shrink:
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_create() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE
+ * @encl: An enclave pointer.
+ * @arg: The ioctl argument.
+ *
+ * Allocate kernel data structures for the enclave and invoke ECREATE.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -EIO: ECREATE failed.
+ * - -errno: POSIX error.
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_create create_arg;
+ void *secs;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&create_arg, arg, sizeof(create_arg)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ secs = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!secs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(secs, (void __user *)create_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ else
+ ret = sgx_encl_create(encl, secs);
+
+ kfree(secs);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
+{
+ u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+ u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means
+ * that we need to validate it ourselves.
+ */
+ if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src)
+{
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct page *src_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Deny noexec. */
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL);
+ if (ret < 1)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ pginfo.addr = encl_page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page);
+
+ ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents);
+ put_page(src_page);
+
+ return ret ? -EIO : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
+ * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
+ * operation until the entire page is measured."
+ */
+static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ unsigned long offset;
+ int ret;
+
+ for (offset = 0; offset < PAGE_SIZE; offset += SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
+ sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page) + offset);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND");
+
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
+ unsigned long offset, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(encl_page, true);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+ kfree(encl_page);
+ return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ va_page = sgx_encl_grow(encl, true);
+ if (IS_ERR(va_page)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(va_page);
+ goto err_out_free;
+ }
+
+ mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Adding to encl->va_pages must be done under encl->lock. Ditto for
+ * deleting (via sgx_encl_shrink()) in the error path.
+ */
+ if (va_page)
+ list_add(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+ /*
+ * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
+ * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
+ * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs).
+ */
+ ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+ encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out_unlock;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo,
+ src);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add"
+ * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario
+ * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure.
+ */
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+ encl_page->type = (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) >> 8;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+ if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
+ ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(encl_page->epc_page);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+ return ret;
+
+err_out:
+ xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, va_page);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+
+err_out_free:
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ kfree(encl_page);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure user provided offset and length values are valid for
+ * an enclave.
+ */
+static int sgx_validate_offset_length(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ unsigned long length)
+{
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(offset, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!length || !IS_ALIGNED(length, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (offset + length < offset)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (offset + length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask
+ * are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
+ *
+ * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * The function deinitializes kernel data structures for enclave and returns
+ * -EIO in any of the following conditions:
+ *
+ * - Enclave Page Cache (EPC), the physical memory holding enclaves, has
+ * been invalidated. This will cause EADD and EEXTEND to fail.
+ * - If the source address is corrupted somehow when executing EADD.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -EACCES: The source page is located in a noexec partition.
+ * - -ENOMEM: Out of EPC pages.
+ * - -EINTR: The call was interrupted before data was processed.
+ * - -EIO: Either EADD or EEXTEND failed because invalid source address
+ * or power cycle.
+ * - -errno: POSIX error.
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages add_arg;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long c;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) ||
+ test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&add_arg, arg, sizeof(add_arg)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(add_arg.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, add_arg.offset, add_arg.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)add_arg.secinfo,
+ sizeof(secinfo)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < add_arg.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (!c)
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, add_arg.src + c, add_arg.offset + c,
+ &secinfo, add_arg.flags);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ add_arg.count = c;
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &add_arg, sizeof(add_arg)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_get_key_hash(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const void *modulus,
+ void *hash)
+{
+ SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
+
+ shash->tfm = tfm;
+
+ return crypto_shash_digest(shash, modulus, SGX_MODULUS_SIZE, hash);
+}
+
+static int sgx_get_key_hash(const void *modulus, void *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ int ret;
+
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ ret = __sgx_get_key_hash(tfm, modulus, hash);
+
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
+ void *token)
+{
+ u64 mrsigner[4];
+ int i, j;
+ void *addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Deny initializing enclaves with attributes (namely provisioning)
+ * that have not been explicitly allowed.
+ */
+ if (encl->attributes & ~encl->attributes_mask)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /*
+ * Attributes should not be enforced *only* against what's available on
+ * platform (done in sgx_encl_create) but checked and enforced against
+ * the mask for enforcement in sigstruct. For example an enclave could
+ * opt to sign with AVX bit in xfrm, but still be loadable on a platform
+ * without it if the sigstruct->body.attributes_mask does not turn that
+ * bit on.
+ */
+ if (sigstruct->body.attributes & sigstruct->body.attributes_mask &
+ sgx_attributes_reserved_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (sigstruct->body.miscselect & sigstruct->body.misc_mask &
+ sgx_misc_reserved_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (sigstruct->body.xfrm & sigstruct->body.xfrm_mask &
+ sgx_xfrm_reserved_mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_get_key_hash(sigstruct->modulus, mrsigner);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * ENCLS[EINIT] is interruptible because it has such a high latency,
+ * e.g. 50k+ cycles on success. If an IRQ/NMI/SMI becomes pending,
+ * EINIT may fail with SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT so that the event can be
+ * serviced.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_COUNT; i++) {
+ for (j = 0; j < SGX_EINIT_SPIN_COUNT; j++) {
+ addr = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+
+ preempt_disable();
+
+ sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(mrsigner);
+
+ ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr);
+
+ preempt_enable();
+
+ if (ret == SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ continue;
+ else
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret != SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT)
+ break;
+
+ msleep_interruptible(SGX_EINIT_SLEEP_TIME);
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
+
+ ret = -EIO;
+ } else if (ret) {
+ pr_debug("EINIT returned %d\n", ret);
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ } else {
+ set_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags);
+ }
+
+err_out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_init() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_init instance
+ *
+ * Flush any outstanding enqueued EADD operations and perform EINIT. The
+ * Launch Enclave Public Key Hash MSRs are rewritten as necessary to match
+ * the enclave's MRSIGNER, which is caculated from the provided sigstruct.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -EPERM: Invalid SIGSTRUCT.
+ * - -EIO: EINIT failed because of a power cycle.
+ * - -errno: POSIX error.
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct;
+ struct sgx_enclave_init init_arg;
+ void *token;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_CREATED, &encl->flags) ||
+ test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&init_arg, arg, sizeof(init_arg)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * 'sigstruct' must be on a page boundary and 'token' on a 512 byte
+ * boundary. kmalloc() will give this alignment when allocating
+ * PAGE_SIZE bytes.
+ */
+ sigstruct = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sigstruct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ token = (void *)((unsigned long)sigstruct + PAGE_SIZE / 2);
+ memset(token, 0, SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE);
+
+ if (copy_from_user(sigstruct, (void __user *)init_arg.sigstruct,
+ sizeof(*sigstruct))) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A legacy field used with Intel signed enclaves. These used to mean
+ * regular and architectural enclaves. The CPU only accepts these values
+ * but they do not have any other meaning.
+ *
+ * Thus, reject any other values.
+ */
+ if (sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x0000 &&
+ sigstruct->header.vendor != 0x8086) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_init(encl, sigstruct, token);
+
+out:
+ kfree(sigstruct);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_provision instance
+ *
+ * Allow ATTRIBUTE.PROVISION_KEY for an enclave by providing a file handle to
+ * /dev/sgx_provision.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -errno: Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_provision params;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Ensure enclave is ready for SGX2 functions. Readiness is checked
+ * by ensuring the hardware supports SGX2 and the enclave is initialized
+ * and thus able to handle requests to modify pages within it.
+ */
+static int sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ if (!(cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX2)))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Some SGX functions require that no cached linear-to-physical address
+ * mappings are present before they can succeed. Collaborate with
+ * hardware via ENCLS[ETRACK] to ensure that all cached
+ * linear-to-physical address mappings belonging to all threads of
+ * the enclave are cleared. See sgx_encl_cpumask() for details.
+ *
+ * Must be called with enclave's mutex held from the time the
+ * SGX function requiring that no cached linear-to-physical mappings
+ * are present is executed until this ETRACK flow is complete.
+ */
+static int sgx_enclave_etrack(struct sgx_encl *encl)
+{
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+ if (ret) {
+ /*
+ * ETRACK only fails when there is an OS issue. For
+ * example, two consecutive ETRACK was sent without
+ * completed IPI between.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("ETRACK returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+ /*
+ * Send IPIs to kick CPUs out of the enclave and
+ * try ETRACK again.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+ ret = __etrack(epc_virt);
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_err_once("ETRACK repeat returned %d (0x%x)",
+ ret, ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ }
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl), sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions() - Restrict EPCM permissions
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modp: Checked parameters from user on which pages need modifying and
+ * their new permissions.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -errno: Otherwise.
+ */
+static long
+sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions *modp)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = modp->permissions & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < modp->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + modp->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Changing EPCM permissions is only supported on regular
+ * SGX pages. Attempting this change on other pages will
+ * result in #PF.
+ */
+ if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Apart from ensuring that read-access remains, do not verify
+ * the permission bits requested. Kernel has no control over
+ * how EPCM permissions can be relaxed from within the enclave.
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] can only remove existing EPCM permissions,
+ * attempting to set new permissions will be ignored by the
+ * hardware.
+ */
+
+ /* Change EPCM permissions. */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ /*
+ * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+ * parameters have been checked, will only change
+ * permissions of a regular page, and no concurrent
+ * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these
+ * are protected with mutex.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("EMODPR encountered exception %d\n",
+ ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+ modp->result = ret;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ modp->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions() - handler for
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions
+ * instance
+ *
+ * SGX2 distinguishes between relaxing and restricting the enclave page
+ * permissions maintained by the hardware (EPCM permissions) of pages
+ * belonging to an initialized enclave (after SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT).
+ *
+ * EPCM permissions cannot be restricted from within the enclave, the enclave
+ * requires the kernel to run the privileged level 0 instructions ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * and ENCLS[ETRACK]. An attempt to relax EPCM permissions with this call
+ * will be ignored by the hardware.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.permissions & ~SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Fail early if invalid permissions requested to prevent ENCLS[EMODPR]
+ * from faulting later when the CPU does the same check.
+ */
+ if ((params.permissions & SGX_SECINFO_W) &&
+ !(params.permissions & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.result || params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_enclave_modify_types() - Modify type of SGX enclave pages
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong.
+ * @modt: Checked parameters from user about which pages need modifying
+ * and their new page type.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types *modt)
+{
+ unsigned long max_prot_restore;
+ enum sgx_page_type page_type;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long prot;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ page_type = modt->page_type & SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ /*
+ * The only new page types allowed by hardware are PT_TCS and PT_TRIM.
+ */
+ if (page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS && page_type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+
+ secinfo.flags = page_type << 8;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < modt->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + modt->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Borrow the logic from the Intel SDM. Regular pages
+ * (SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) can change type to SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS
+ * or SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM but TCS pages can only be trimmed.
+ * CET pages not supported yet.
+ */
+ if (!(entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG ||
+ (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS &&
+ page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM))) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ max_prot_restore = entry->vm_max_prot_bits;
+
+ /*
+ * Once a regular page becomes a TCS page it cannot be
+ * changed back. So the maximum allowed protection reflects
+ * the TCS page that is always RW from kernel perspective but
+ * will be inaccessible from within enclave. Before doing
+ * so, do make sure that the new page type continues to
+ * respect the originally vetted page permissions.
+ */
+ if (entry->type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG &&
+ page_type == SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) {
+ if (~entry->vm_max_prot_bits & (VM_READ | VM_WRITE)) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ prot = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+ entry->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Prevent page from being reclaimed while mutex
+ * is released.
+ */
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+ ret = -EAGAIN;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+ * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page);
+ }
+
+ /* Change EPC type */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodt(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ /*
+ * All possible faults should be avoidable:
+ * parameters have been checked, will only change
+ * valid page types, and no concurrent
+ * SGX1/SGX2 ENCLS instructions since these are
+ * protected with mutex.
+ */
+ pr_err_once("EMODT encountered exception %d\n",
+ ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret));
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+ if (encls_failed(ret)) {
+ modt->result = ret;
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_entry_changed;
+ }
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_etrack(encl);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ entry->type = page_type;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_entry_changed:
+ entry->vm_max_prot_bits = max_prot_restore;
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ modt->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to a &struct sgx_enclave_modify_types instance
+ *
+ * Ability to change the enclave page type supports the following use cases:
+ *
+ * * It is possible to add TCS pages to an enclave by changing the type of
+ * regular pages (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_REG) to TCS (%SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TCS) pages.
+ * With this support the number of threads supported by an initialized
+ * enclave can be increased dynamically.
+ *
+ * * Regular or TCS pages can dynamically be removed from an initialized
+ * enclave by changing the page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM. Changing the
+ * page type to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM marks the page for removal with actual
+ * removal done by handler of %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() called
+ * after ENCLU[EACCEPT] is run on %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM page from within the
+ * enclave.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_modify_types params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.page_type & ~SGX_PAGE_TYPE_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.result || params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_enclave_modify_types(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_encl_remove_pages() - Remove trimmed pages from SGX enclave
+ * @encl: Enclave to which the pages belong
+ * @params: Checked parameters from user on which pages need to be removed
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success.
+ * - -errno: Otherwise.
+ */
+static long sgx_encl_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages *params)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *entry;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long addr;
+ unsigned long c;
+ void *epc_virt;
+ int ret;
+
+ memset(&secinfo, 0, sizeof(secinfo));
+ secinfo.flags = SGX_SECINFO_R | SGX_SECINFO_W | SGX_SECINFO_X;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < params->length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ addr = encl->base + params->offset + c;
+
+ sgx_reclaim_direct();
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ entry = sgx_encl_load_page(encl, addr);
+ if (IS_ERR(entry)) {
+ ret = PTR_ERR(entry) == -EBUSY ? -EAGAIN : -EFAULT;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (entry->type != SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] is a no-op instruction used to inform if
+ * ENCLU[EACCEPT] was run from within the enclave. If
+ * ENCLS[EMODPR] is run with RWX on a trimmed page that is
+ * not yet accepted then it will return
+ * %SGX_PAGE_NOT_MODIFIABLE, after the trimmed page is
+ * accepted the instruction will encounter a page fault.
+ */
+ epc_virt = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(entry->epc_page);
+ ret = __emodpr(&secinfo, epc_virt);
+ if (!encls_faulted(ret) || ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF) {
+ ret = -EPERM;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page)) {
+ ret = -EBUSY;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not keep encl->lock because of dependency on
+ * mmap_lock acquired in sgx_zap_enclave_ptes().
+ */
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+ entry->epc_page = NULL;
+ xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(entry->desc));
+ sgx_encl_shrink(encl, NULL);
+ kfree(entry);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+
+out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+out:
+ params->count = c;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages() - handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: userspace pointer to &struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages instance
+ *
+ * Final step of the flow removing pages from an initialized enclave. The
+ * complete flow is:
+ *
+ * 1) User changes the type of the pages to be removed to %SGX_PAGE_TYPE_TRIM
+ * using the %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES ioctl().
+ * 2) User approves the page removal by running ENCLU[EACCEPT] from within
+ * the enclave.
+ * 3) User initiates actual page removal using the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES ioctl() that is handled here.
+ *
+ * First remove any page table entries pointing to the page and then proceed
+ * with the actual removal of the enclave page and data in support of it.
+ *
+ * VA pages are not affected by this removal. It is thus possible that the
+ * enclave may end up with more VA pages than needed to support all its
+ * pages.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: Success
+ * - -errno: Otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_remove_pages params;
+ long ret;
+
+ ret = sgx_ioc_sgx2_ready(encl);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_offset_length(encl, params.offset, params.length))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (params.count)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_remove_pages(encl, &params);
+
+ if (copy_to_user(arg, &params, sizeof(params)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (test_and_set_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags))
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_init(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_PROVISION:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_RESTRICT_PERMISSIONS:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_restrict_permissions(encl,
+ (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_MODIFY_TYPES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_modify_types(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_REMOVE_PAGES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_remove_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ clear_bit(SGX_ENCL_IOCTL, &encl->flags);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0aad028f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,963 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
+
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/freezer.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+#include <linux/kthread.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/node.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sysfs.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include "driver.h"
+#include "encl.h"
+#include "encls.h"
+
+struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
+static int sgx_nr_epc_sections;
+static struct task_struct *ksgxd_tsk;
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(ksgxd_waitq);
+static DEFINE_XARRAY(sgx_epc_address_space);
+
+/*
+ * These variables are part of the state of the reclaimer, and must be accessed
+ * with sgx_reclaimer_lock acquired.
+ */
+static LIST_HEAD(sgx_active_page_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+
+static atomic_long_t sgx_nr_free_pages = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0);
+
+/* Nodes with one or more EPC sections. */
+static nodemask_t sgx_numa_mask;
+
+/*
+ * Array with one list_head for each possible NUMA node. Each
+ * list contains all the sgx_epc_section's which are on that
+ * node.
+ */
+static struct sgx_numa_node *sgx_numa_nodes;
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sgx_dirty_page_list);
+
+/*
+ * Reset post-kexec EPC pages to the uninitialized state. The pages are removed
+ * from the input list, and made available for the page allocator. SECS pages
+ * prepending their children in the input list are left intact.
+ *
+ * Return 0 when sanitization was successful or kthread was stopped, and the
+ * number of unsanitized pages otherwise.
+ */
+static unsigned long __sgx_sanitize_pages(struct list_head *dirty_page_list)
+{
+ unsigned long left_dirty = 0;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+ LIST_HEAD(dirty);
+ int ret;
+
+ /* dirty_page_list is thread-local, no need for a lock: */
+ while (!list_empty(dirty_page_list)) {
+ if (kthread_should_stop())
+ return 0;
+
+ page = list_first_entry(dirty_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+
+ /*
+ * Checking page->poison without holding the node->lock
+ * is racy, but losing the race (i.e. poison is set just
+ * after the check) just means __eremove() will be uselessly
+ * called for a page that sgx_free_epc_page() will put onto
+ * the node->sgx_poison_page_list later.
+ */
+ if (page->poison) {
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node = section->node;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+ list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
+ if (!ret) {
+ /*
+ * page is now sanitized. Make it available via the SGX
+ * page allocator:
+ */
+ list_del(&page->list);
+ sgx_free_epc_page(page);
+ } else {
+ /* The page is not yet clean - move to the dirty list. */
+ list_move_tail(&page->list, &dirty);
+ left_dirty++;
+ }
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ list_splice(&dirty, dirty_page_list);
+ return left_dirty;
+}
+
+static bool sgx_reclaimer_age(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ struct sgx_encl_mm *encl_mm;
+ bool ret = true;
+ int idx;
+
+ idx = srcu_read_lock(&encl->srcu);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(encl_mm, &encl->mm_list, list) {
+ if (!mmget_not_zero(encl_mm->mm))
+ continue;
+
+ mmap_read_lock(encl_mm->mm);
+ ret = !sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(encl_mm->mm, page);
+ mmap_read_unlock(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ mmput_async(encl_mm->mm);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ srcu_read_unlock(&encl->srcu, idx);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static void sgx_reclaimer_block(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *page = epc_page->owner;
+ unsigned long addr = page->desc & PAGE_MASK;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = page->encl;
+ int ret;
+
+ sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(encl, addr);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ ret = __eblock(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EBLOCK");
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, void *va_slot,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ int ret;
+
+ pginfo.addr = 0;
+ pginfo.secs = 0;
+
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->contents);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(backing->pcmd) +
+ backing->pcmd_offset;
+
+ ret = __ewb(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page), va_slot);
+ set_page_dirty(backing->pcmd);
+ set_page_dirty(backing->contents);
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)(pginfo.metadata -
+ backing->pcmd_offset));
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)(unsigned long)pginfo.contents);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * Swap page to the regular memory transformed to the blocked state by using
+ * EBLOCK, which means that it can no longer be referenced (no new TLB entries).
+ *
+ * The first trial just tries to write the page assuming that some other thread
+ * has reset the count for threads inside the enclave by using ETRACK, and
+ * previous thread count has been zeroed out. The second trial calls ETRACK
+ * before EWB. If that fails we kick all the HW threads out, and then do EWB,
+ * which should be guaranteed the succeed.
+ */
+static void sgx_encl_ewb(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_va_page *va_page;
+ unsigned int va_offset;
+ void *va_slot;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl_page->desc &= ~SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED;
+
+ va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
+ list);
+ va_offset = sgx_alloc_va_slot(va_page);
+ va_slot = sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(va_page->epc_page) + va_offset;
+ if (sgx_va_page_full(va_page))
+ list_move_tail(&va_page->list, &encl->va_pages);
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) {
+ ret = __etrack(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(encl->secs.epc_page));
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "ETRACK");
+ }
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ if (ret == SGX_NOT_TRACKED) {
+ /*
+ * Slow path, send IPIs to kick cpus out of the
+ * enclave. Note, it's imperative that the cpu
+ * mask is generated *after* ETRACK, else we'll
+ * miss cpus that entered the enclave between
+ * generating the mask and incrementing epoch.
+ */
+ on_each_cpu_mask(sgx_encl_cpumask(encl),
+ sgx_ipi_cb, NULL, 1);
+ ret = __sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, va_slot, backing);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EWB");
+
+ sgx_free_va_slot(va_page, va_offset);
+ } else {
+ encl_page->desc |= va_offset;
+ encl_page->va_page = va_page;
+ }
+}
+
+static void sgx_reclaimer_write(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_backing *backing)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ struct sgx_encl *encl = encl_page->encl;
+ struct sgx_backing secs_backing;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ sgx_encl_ewb(epc_page, backing);
+ encl_page->epc_page = NULL;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt--;
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(backing);
+
+ if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && test_bit(SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED, &encl->flags)) {
+ ret = sgx_encl_alloc_backing(encl, PFN_DOWN(encl->size),
+ &secs_backing);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ sgx_encl_ewb(encl->secs.epc_page, &secs_backing);
+
+ sgx_encl_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
+
+ sgx_encl_put_backing(&secs_backing);
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Take a fixed number of pages from the head of the active page pool and
+ * reclaim them to the enclave's private shmem files. Skip the pages, which have
+ * been accessed since the last scan. Move those pages to the tail of active
+ * page pool so that the pages get scanned in LRU like fashion.
+ *
+ * Batch process a chunk of pages (at the moment 16) in order to degrade amount
+ * of IPI's and ETRACK's potentially required. sgx_encl_ewb() does degrade a bit
+ * among the HW threads with three stage EWB pipeline (EWB, ETRACK + EWB and IPI
+ * + EWB) but not sufficiently. Reclaiming one page at a time would also be
+ * problematic as it would increase the lock contention too much, which would
+ * halt forward progress.
+ */
+static void sgx_reclaim_pages(void)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *chunk[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN];
+ struct sgx_backing backing[SGX_NR_TO_SCAN];
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ pgoff_t page_index;
+ int cnt = 0;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+ for (i = 0; i < SGX_NR_TO_SCAN; i++) {
+ if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list))
+ break;
+
+ epc_page = list_first_entry(&sgx_active_page_list,
+ struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del_init(&epc_page->list);
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+
+ if (kref_get_unless_zero(&encl_page->encl->refcount) != 0)
+ chunk[cnt++] = epc_page;
+ else
+ /* The owner is freeing the page. No need to add the
+ * page back to the list of reclaimable pages.
+ */
+ epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+
+ if (!sgx_reclaimer_age(epc_page))
+ goto skip;
+
+ page_index = PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc - encl_page->encl->base);
+
+ mutex_lock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
+ ret = sgx_encl_alloc_backing(encl_page->encl, page_index, &backing[i]);
+ if (ret) {
+ mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
+ goto skip;
+ }
+
+ encl_page->desc |= SGX_ENCL_PAGE_BEING_RECLAIMED;
+ mutex_unlock(&encl_page->encl->lock);
+ continue;
+
+skip:
+ spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+ list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &sgx_active_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+
+ kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+
+ chunk[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ if (epc_page)
+ sgx_reclaimer_block(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++) {
+ epc_page = chunk[i];
+ if (!epc_page)
+ continue;
+
+ encl_page = epc_page->owner;
+ sgx_reclaimer_write(epc_page, &backing[i]);
+
+ kref_put(&encl_page->encl->refcount, sgx_encl_release);
+ epc_page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
+
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ }
+}
+
+static bool sgx_should_reclaim(unsigned long watermark)
+{
+ return atomic_long_read(&sgx_nr_free_pages) < watermark &&
+ !list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * sgx_reclaim_direct() should be called (without enclave's mutex held)
+ * in locations where SGX memory resources might be low and might be
+ * needed in order to make forward progress.
+ */
+void sgx_reclaim_direct(void)
+{
+ if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES))
+ sgx_reclaim_pages();
+}
+
+static int ksgxd(void *p)
+{
+ set_freezable();
+
+ /*
+ * Sanitize pages in order to recover from kexec(). The 2nd pass is
+ * required for SECS pages, whose child pages blocked EREMOVE.
+ */
+ __sgx_sanitize_pages(&sgx_dirty_page_list);
+ WARN_ON(__sgx_sanitize_pages(&sgx_dirty_page_list));
+
+ while (!kthread_should_stop()) {
+ if (try_to_freeze())
+ continue;
+
+ wait_event_freezable(ksgxd_waitq,
+ kthread_should_stop() ||
+ sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES));
+
+ if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES))
+ sgx_reclaim_pages();
+
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static bool __init sgx_page_reclaimer_init(void)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk;
+
+ tsk = kthread_run(ksgxd, NULL, "ksgxd");
+ if (IS_ERR(tsk))
+ return false;
+
+ ksgxd_tsk = tsk;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool current_is_ksgxd(void)
+{
+ return current == ksgxd_tsk;
+}
+
+static struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(int nid)
+{
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node = &sgx_numa_nodes[nid];
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page = NULL;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+
+ if (list_empty(&node->free_page_list)) {
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ page = list_first_entry(&node->free_page_list, struct sgx_epc_page, list);
+ list_del_init(&page->list);
+ page->flags = 0;
+
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+ atomic_long_dec(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page
+ *
+ * Iterate through NUMA nodes and reserve ia free EPC page to the caller. Start
+ * from the NUMA node, where the caller is executing.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - an EPC page: A borrowed EPC pages were available.
+ * - NULL: Out of EPC pages.
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+ int nid_of_current = numa_node_id();
+ int nid = nid_of_current;
+
+ if (node_isset(nid_of_current, sgx_numa_mask)) {
+ page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(nid_of_current);
+ if (page)
+ return page;
+ }
+
+ /* Fall back to the non-local NUMA nodes: */
+ while (true) {
+ nid = next_node_in(nid, sgx_numa_mask);
+ if (nid == nid_of_current)
+ break;
+
+ page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page_from_node(nid);
+ if (page)
+ return page;
+ }
+
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_mark_page_reclaimable() - Mark a page as reclaimable
+ * @page: EPC page
+ *
+ * Mark a page as reclaimable and add it to the active page list. Pages
+ * are automatically removed from the active list when freed.
+ */
+void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+ page->flags |= SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, &sgx_active_page_list);
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable() - Remove a page from the reclaim list
+ * @page: EPC page
+ *
+ * Clear the reclaimable flag and remove the page from the active page list.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 on success,
+ * -EBUSY if the page is in the process of being reclaimed
+ */
+int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ spin_lock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+ if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED) {
+ /* The page is being reclaimed. */
+ if (list_empty(&page->list)) {
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ list_del(&page->list);
+ page->flags &= ~SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&sgx_reclaimer_lock);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_alloc_epc_page() - Allocate an EPC page
+ * @owner: the owner of the EPC page
+ * @reclaim: reclaim pages if necessary
+ *
+ * Iterate through EPC sections and borrow a free EPC page to the caller. When a
+ * page is no longer needed it must be released with sgx_free_epc_page(). If
+ * @reclaim is set to true, directly reclaim pages when we are out of pages. No
+ * mm's can be locked when @reclaim is set to true.
+ *
+ * Finally, wake up ksgxd when the number of pages goes below the watermark
+ * before returning back to the caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * an EPC page,
+ * -errno on error
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page;
+
+ for ( ; ; ) {
+ page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ if (!IS_ERR(page)) {
+ page->owner = owner;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (list_empty(&sgx_active_page_list))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ if (!reclaim) {
+ page = ERR_PTR(-EBUSY);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ page = ERR_PTR(-ERESTARTSYS);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sgx_reclaim_pages();
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ if (sgx_should_reclaim(SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES))
+ wake_up(&ksgxd_waitq);
+
+ return page;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
+ * @page: an EPC page
+ *
+ * Put the EPC page back to the list of free pages. It's the caller's
+ * responsibility to make sure that the page is in uninitialized state. In other
+ * words, do EREMOVE, EWB or whatever operation is necessary before calling
+ * this function.
+ */
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node = section->node;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+
+ page->owner = NULL;
+ if (page->poison)
+ list_add(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ else
+ list_add_tail(&page->list, &node->free_page_list);
+ page->flags = SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE;
+
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+ atomic_long_inc(&sgx_nr_free_pages);
+}
+
+static bool __init sgx_setup_epc_section(u64 phys_addr, u64 size,
+ unsigned long index,
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section)
+{
+ unsigned long nr_pages = size >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ unsigned long i;
+
+ section->virt_addr = memremap(phys_addr, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ if (!section->virt_addr)
+ return false;
+
+ section->pages = vmalloc(nr_pages * sizeof(struct sgx_epc_page));
+ if (!section->pages) {
+ memunmap(section->virt_addr);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ section->phys_addr = phys_addr;
+ xa_store_range(&sgx_epc_address_space, section->phys_addr,
+ phys_addr + size - 1, section, GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++) {
+ section->pages[i].section = index;
+ section->pages[i].flags = 0;
+ section->pages[i].owner = NULL;
+ section->pages[i].poison = 0;
+ list_add_tail(&section->pages[i].list, &sgx_dirty_page_list);
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool arch_is_platform_page(u64 paddr)
+{
+ return !!xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_is_platform_page);
+
+static struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_paddr_to_page(u64 paddr)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+
+ section = xa_load(&sgx_epc_address_space, paddr);
+ if (!section)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &section->pages[PFN_DOWN(paddr - section->phys_addr)];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called in process context to handle a hardware reported
+ * error in an SGX EPC page.
+ * If the MF_ACTION_REQUIRED bit is set in flags, then the
+ * context is the task that consumed the poison data. Otherwise
+ * this is called from a kernel thread unrelated to the page.
+ */
+int arch_memory_failure(unsigned long pfn, int flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *page = sgx_paddr_to_page(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section;
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node;
+
+ /*
+ * mm/memory-failure.c calls this routine for all errors
+ * where there isn't a "struct page" for the address. But that
+ * includes other address ranges besides SGX.
+ */
+ if (!page)
+ return -ENXIO;
+
+ /*
+ * If poison was consumed synchronously. Send a SIGBUS to
+ * the task. Hardware has already exited the SGX enclave and
+ * will not allow re-entry to an enclave that has a memory
+ * error. The signal may help the task understand why the
+ * enclave is broken.
+ */
+ if (flags & MF_ACTION_REQUIRED)
+ force_sig(SIGBUS);
+
+ section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ node = section->node;
+
+ spin_lock(&node->lock);
+
+ /* Already poisoned? Nothing more to do */
+ if (page->poison)
+ goto out;
+
+ page->poison = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * If the page is on a free list, move it to the per-node
+ * poison page list.
+ */
+ if (page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE) {
+ list_move(&page->list, &node->sgx_poison_page_list);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TBD: Add additional plumbing to enable pre-emptive
+ * action for asynchronous poison notification. Until
+ * then just hope that the poison:
+ * a) is not accessed - sgx_free_epc_page() will deal with it
+ * when the user gives it back
+ * b) results in a recoverable machine check rather than
+ * a fatal one
+ */
+out:
+ spin_unlock(&node->lock);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A section metric is concatenated in a way that @low bits 12-31 define the
+ * bits 12-31 of the metric and @high bits 0-19 define the bits 32-51 of the
+ * metric.
+ */
+static inline u64 __init sgx_calc_section_metric(u64 low, u64 high)
+{
+ return (low & GENMASK_ULL(31, 12)) +
+ ((high & GENMASK_ULL(19, 0)) << 32);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+static ssize_t sgx_total_bytes_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ return sysfs_emit(buf, "%lu\n", sgx_numa_nodes[dev->id].size);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(sgx_total_bytes);
+
+static umode_t arch_node_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj,
+ struct attribute *attr, int idx)
+{
+ /* Make all x86/ attributes invisible when SGX is not initialized: */
+ if (nodes_empty(sgx_numa_mask))
+ return 0;
+
+ return attr->mode;
+}
+
+static struct attribute *arch_node_dev_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_sgx_total_bytes.attr,
+ NULL,
+};
+
+const struct attribute_group arch_node_dev_group = {
+ .name = "x86",
+ .attrs = arch_node_dev_attrs,
+ .is_visible = arch_node_attr_is_visible,
+};
+
+static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid)
+{
+ struct node *node = node_devices[nid];
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = sysfs_update_group(&node->dev.kobj, &arch_node_dev_group);
+
+ if (ret)
+ pr_err("sysfs update failed (%d), files may be invisible", ret);
+}
+#else /* !CONFIG_NUMA */
+static void __init arch_update_sysfs_visibility(int nid) {}
+#endif
+
+static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
+{
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx, type;
+ u64 pa, size;
+ int nid;
+ int i;
+
+ sgx_numa_nodes = kmalloc_array(num_possible_nodes(), sizeof(*sgx_numa_nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sgx_numa_nodes)
+ return false;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sgx_epc_sections); i++) {
+ cpuid_count(SGX_CPUID, i + SGX_CPUID_EPC, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ type = eax & SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK;
+ if (type == SGX_CPUID_EPC_INVALID)
+ break;
+
+ if (type != SGX_CPUID_EPC_SECTION) {
+ pr_err_once("Unknown EPC section type: %u\n", type);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pa = sgx_calc_section_metric(eax, ebx);
+ size = sgx_calc_section_metric(ecx, edx);
+
+ pr_info("EPC section 0x%llx-0x%llx\n", pa, pa + size - 1);
+
+ if (!sgx_setup_epc_section(pa, size, i, &sgx_epc_sections[i])) {
+ pr_err("No free memory for an EPC section\n");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ nid = numa_map_to_online_node(phys_to_target_node(pa));
+ if (nid == NUMA_NO_NODE) {
+ /* The physical address is already printed above. */
+ pr_warn(FW_BUG "Unable to map EPC section to online node. Fallback to the NUMA node 0.\n");
+ nid = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!node_isset(nid, sgx_numa_mask)) {
+ spin_lock_init(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].free_page_list);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sgx_numa_nodes[nid].sgx_poison_page_list);
+ node_set(nid, sgx_numa_mask);
+ sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size = 0;
+
+ /* Make SGX-specific node sysfs files visible: */
+ arch_update_sysfs_visibility(nid);
+ }
+
+ sgx_epc_sections[i].node = &sgx_numa_nodes[nid];
+ sgx_numa_nodes[nid].size += size;
+
+ sgx_nr_epc_sections++;
+ }
+
+ if (!sgx_nr_epc_sections) {
+ pr_err("There are zero EPC sections.\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSRs to the values specified by caller.
+ * Bare-metal driver requires to update them to hash of enclave's signer
+ * before EINIT. KVM needs to update them to guest's virtual MSR values
+ * before doing EINIT from guest.
+ */
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(preemptible());
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .name = "sgx_provision",
+ .nodename = "sgx_provision",
+ .fops = &sgx_provision_fops,
+};
+
+/**
+ * sgx_set_attribute() - Update allowed attributes given file descriptor
+ * @allowed_attributes: Pointer to allowed enclave attributes
+ * @attribute_fd: File descriptor for specific attribute
+ *
+ * Append enclave attribute indicated by file descriptor to allowed
+ * attributes. Currently only SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY indicated by
+ * /dev/sgx_provision is supported.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * -0: SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY is appended to allowed_attributes
+ * -EINVAL: Invalid, or not supported file descriptor
+ */
+int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes,
+ unsigned int attribute_fd)
+{
+ struct file *file;
+
+ file = fget(attribute_fd);
+ if (!file)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
+ fput(file);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ *allowed_attributes |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
+
+ fput(file);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_set_attribute);
+
+static int __init sgx_init(void)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ if (!sgx_page_cache_init())
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!sgx_page_reclaimer_init()) {
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_page_cache;
+ }
+
+ ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_kthread;
+
+ /*
+ * Always try to initialize the native *and* KVM drivers.
+ * The KVM driver is less picky than the native one and
+ * can function if the native one is not supported on the
+ * current system or fails to initialize.
+ *
+ * Error out only if both fail to initialize.
+ */
+ ret = sgx_drv_init();
+
+ if (sgx_vepc_init() && ret)
+ goto err_provision;
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_provision:
+ misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_provision);
+
+err_kthread:
+ kthread_stop(ksgxd_tsk);
+
+err_page_cache:
+ for (i = 0; i < sgx_nr_epc_sections; i++) {
+ vfree(sgx_epc_sections[i].pages);
+ memunmap(sgx_epc_sections[i].virt_addr);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+device_initcall(sgx_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0f2020653
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _X86_SGX_H
+#define _X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/rwsem.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt
+
+#define EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE \
+ "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x) and an EPC page was leaked. SGX may become unusable. " \
+ "Refer to Documentation/x86/sgx.rst for more information."
+
+#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS 8
+#define SGX_EEXTEND_BLOCK_SIZE 256
+#define SGX_NR_TO_SCAN 16
+#define SGX_NR_LOW_PAGES 32
+#define SGX_NR_HIGH_PAGES 64
+
+/* Pages, which are being tracked by the page reclaimer. */
+#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED BIT(0)
+
+/* Pages on free list */
+#define SGX_EPC_PAGE_IS_FREE BIT(1)
+
+struct sgx_epc_page {
+ unsigned int section;
+ u16 flags;
+ u16 poison;
+ struct sgx_encl_page *owner;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Contains the tracking data for NUMA nodes having EPC pages. Most importantly,
+ * the free page list local to the node is stored here.
+ */
+struct sgx_numa_node {
+ struct list_head free_page_list;
+ struct list_head sgx_poison_page_list;
+ unsigned long size;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The firmware can define multiple chunks of EPC to the different areas of the
+ * physical memory e.g. for memory areas of the each node. This structure is
+ * used to store EPC pages for one EPC section and virtual memory area where
+ * the pages have been mapped.
+ */
+struct sgx_epc_section {
+ unsigned long phys_addr;
+ void *virt_addr;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *pages;
+ struct sgx_numa_node *node;
+};
+
+extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
+
+static inline unsigned long sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ unsigned long index;
+
+ index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page);
+
+ return section->phys_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
+static inline void *sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
+ unsigned long index;
+
+ index = ((unsigned long)page - (unsigned long)section->pages) / sizeof(*page);
+
+ return section->virt_addr + index * PAGE_SIZE;
+}
+
+struct sgx_epc_page *__sgx_alloc_epc_page(void);
+void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+
+void sgx_reclaim_direct(void);
+void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
+struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
+
+void sgx_ipi_cb(void *info);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+int __init sgx_vepc_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
+{
+ return -ENODEV;
+}
+#endif
+
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash);
+
+#endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5549704a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,435 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Device driver to expose SGX enclave memory to KVM guests.
+ *
+ * Copyright(c) 2021 Intel Corporation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
+#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/xarray.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <uapi/asm/sgx.h>
+
+#include "encls.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
+
+struct sgx_vepc {
+ struct xarray page_array;
+ struct mutex lock;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Temporary SECS pages that cannot be EREMOVE'd due to having child in other
+ * virtual EPC instances, and the lock to protect it.
+ */
+static struct mutex zombie_secs_pages_lock;
+static struct list_head zombie_secs_pages;
+
+static int __sgx_vepc_fault(struct sgx_vepc *vepc,
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ unsigned long index, pfn;
+ int ret;
+
+ WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&vepc->lock));
+
+ /* Calculate index of EPC page in virtual EPC's page_array */
+ index = vma->vm_pgoff + PFN_DOWN(addr - vma->vm_start);
+
+ epc_page = xa_load(&vepc->page_array, index);
+ if (epc_page)
+ return 0;
+
+ epc_page = sgx_alloc_epc_page(vepc, false);
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+
+ ret = xa_err(xa_store(&vepc->page_array, index, epc_page, GFP_KERNEL));
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ pfn = PFN_DOWN(sgx_get_epc_phys_addr(epc_page));
+
+ ret = vmf_insert_pfn(vma, addr, pfn);
+ if (ret != VM_FAULT_NOPAGE) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto err_delete;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err_delete:
+ xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index);
+err_free:
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static vm_fault_t sgx_vepc_fault(struct vm_fault *vmf)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = vmf->vma;
+ struct sgx_vepc *vepc = vma->vm_private_data;
+ int ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&vepc->lock);
+ ret = __sgx_vepc_fault(vepc, vma, vmf->address);
+ mutex_unlock(&vepc->lock);
+
+ if (!ret)
+ return VM_FAULT_NOPAGE;
+
+ if (ret == -EBUSY && (vmf->flags & FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY)) {
+ mmap_read_unlock(vma->vm_mm);
+ return VM_FAULT_RETRY;
+ }
+
+ return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS;
+}
+
+static const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vepc_vm_ops = {
+ .fault = sgx_vepc_fault,
+};
+
+static int sgx_vepc_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ struct sgx_vepc *vepc = file->private_data;
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ vma->vm_ops = &sgx_vepc_vm_ops;
+ /* Don't copy VMA in fork() */
+ vma->vm_flags |= VM_PFNMAP | VM_IO | VM_DONTDUMP | VM_DONTCOPY;
+ vma->vm_private_data = vepc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vepc_remove_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ /*
+ * Take a previously guest-owned EPC page and return it to the
+ * general EPC page pool.
+ *
+ * Guests can not be trusted to have left this page in a good
+ * state, so run EREMOVE on the page unconditionally. In the
+ * case that a guest properly EREMOVE'd this page, a superfluous
+ * EREMOVE is harmless.
+ */
+ return __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+}
+
+static int sgx_vepc_free_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ int ret = sgx_vepc_remove_page(epc_page);
+ if (ret) {
+ /*
+ * Only SGX_CHILD_PRESENT is expected, which is because of
+ * EREMOVE'ing an SECS still with child, in which case it can
+ * be handled by EREMOVE'ing the SECS again after all pages in
+ * virtual EPC have been EREMOVE'd. See comments in below in
+ * sgx_vepc_release().
+ *
+ * The user of virtual EPC (KVM) needs to guarantee there's no
+ * logical processor is still running in the enclave in guest,
+ * otherwise EREMOVE will get SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT which cannot be
+ * handled here.
+ */
+ WARN_ONCE(ret != SGX_CHILD_PRESENT, EREMOVE_ERROR_MESSAGE,
+ ret, ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long sgx_vepc_remove_all(struct sgx_vepc *vepc)
+{
+ struct sgx_epc_page *entry;
+ unsigned long index;
+ long failures = 0;
+
+ xa_for_each(&vepc->page_array, index, entry) {
+ int ret = sgx_vepc_remove_page(entry);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (ret == SGX_CHILD_PRESENT) {
+ /* The page is a SECS, userspace will retry. */
+ failures++;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Report errors due to #GP or SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT; do not
+ * WARN, as userspace can induce said failures by
+ * calling the ioctl concurrently on multiple vEPCs or
+ * while one or more CPUs is running the enclave. Only
+ * a #PF on EREMOVE indicates a kernel/hardware issue.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(encls_faulted(ret) &&
+ ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_GP);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Return the number of SECS pages that failed to be removed, so
+ * userspace knows that it has to retry.
+ */
+ return failures;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vepc_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_vepc *vepc = file->private_data;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page, *tmp, *entry;
+ unsigned long index;
+
+ LIST_HEAD(secs_pages);
+
+ xa_for_each(&vepc->page_array, index, entry) {
+ /*
+ * Remove all normal, child pages. sgx_vepc_free_page()
+ * will fail if EREMOVE fails, but this is OK and expected on
+ * SECS pages. Those can only be EREMOVE'd *after* all their
+ * child pages. Retries below will clean them up.
+ */
+ if (sgx_vepc_free_page(entry))
+ continue;
+
+ xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index);
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Retry EREMOVE'ing pages. This will clean up any SECS pages that
+ * only had children in this 'epc' area.
+ */
+ xa_for_each(&vepc->page_array, index, entry) {
+ epc_page = entry;
+ /*
+ * An EREMOVE failure here means that the SECS page still
+ * has children. But, since all children in this 'sgx_vepc'
+ * have been removed, the SECS page must have a child on
+ * another instance.
+ */
+ if (sgx_vepc_free_page(epc_page))
+ list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &secs_pages);
+
+ xa_erase(&vepc->page_array, index);
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * SECS pages are "pinned" by child pages, and "unpinned" once all
+ * children have been EREMOVE'd. A child page in this instance
+ * may have pinned an SECS page encountered in an earlier release(),
+ * creating a zombie. Since some children were EREMOVE'd above,
+ * try to EREMOVE all zombies in the hopes that one was unpinned.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&zombie_secs_pages_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(epc_page, tmp, &zombie_secs_pages, list) {
+ /*
+ * Speculatively remove the page from the list of zombies,
+ * if the page is successfully EREMOVE'd it will be added to
+ * the list of free pages. If EREMOVE fails, throw the page
+ * on the local list, which will be spliced on at the end.
+ */
+ list_del(&epc_page->list);
+
+ if (sgx_vepc_free_page(epc_page))
+ list_add_tail(&epc_page->list, &secs_pages);
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ if (!list_empty(&secs_pages))
+ list_splice_tail(&secs_pages, &zombie_secs_pages);
+ mutex_unlock(&zombie_secs_pages_lock);
+
+ xa_destroy(&vepc->page_array);
+ kfree(vepc);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_vepc_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct sgx_vepc *vepc;
+
+ vepc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sgx_vepc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!vepc)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_init(&vepc->lock);
+ xa_init(&vepc->page_array);
+
+ file->private_data = vepc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static long sgx_vepc_ioctl(struct file *file,
+ unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_vepc *vepc = file->private_data;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case SGX_IOC_VEPC_REMOVE_ALL:
+ if (arg)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return sgx_vepc_remove_all(vepc);
+
+ default:
+ return -ENOTTY;
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations sgx_vepc_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .open = sgx_vepc_open,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = sgx_vepc_ioctl,
+ .compat_ioctl = sgx_vepc_ioctl,
+ .release = sgx_vepc_release,
+ .mmap = sgx_vepc_mmap,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice sgx_vepc_dev = {
+ .minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
+ .name = "sgx_vepc",
+ .nodename = "sgx_vepc",
+ .fops = &sgx_vepc_fops,
+};
+
+int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
+{
+ /* SGX virtualization requires KVM to work */
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_VMX))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&zombie_secs_pages);
+ mutex_init(&zombie_secs_pages_lock);
+
+ return misc_register(&sgx_vepc_dev);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_virt_ecreate() - Run ECREATE on behalf of guest
+ * @pageinfo: Pointer to PAGEINFO structure
+ * @secs: Userspace pointer to SECS page
+ * @trapnr: trap number injected to guest in case of ECREATE error
+ *
+ * Run ECREATE on behalf of guest after KVM traps ECREATE for the purpose
+ * of enforcing policies of guest's enclaves, and return the trap number
+ * which should be injected to guest in case of any ECREATE error.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: ECREATE was successful.
+ * - <0: on error.
+ */
+int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,
+ int *trapnr)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * @secs is an untrusted, userspace-provided address. It comes from
+ * KVM and is assumed to be a valid pointer which points somewhere in
+ * userspace. This can fault and call SGX or other fault handlers when
+ * userspace mapping @secs doesn't exist.
+ *
+ * Add a WARN() to make sure @secs is already valid userspace pointer
+ * from caller (KVM), who should already have handled invalid pointer
+ * case (for instance, made by malicious guest). All other checks,
+ * such as alignment of @secs, are deferred to ENCLS itself.
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!access_ok(secs, PAGE_SIZE)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ __uaccess_begin();
+ ret = __ecreate(pageinfo, (void *)secs);
+ __uaccess_end();
+
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ *trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* ECREATE doesn't return an error code, it faults or succeeds. */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ret);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_virt_ecreate);
+
+static int __sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,
+ void __user *secs)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure all userspace pointers from caller (KVM) are valid.
+ * All other checks deferred to ENCLS itself. Also see comment
+ * for @secs in sgx_virt_ecreate().
+ */
+#define SGX_EINITTOKEN_SIZE 304
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!access_ok(sigstruct, sizeof(struct sgx_sigstruct)) ||
+ !access_ok(token, SGX_EINITTOKEN_SIZE) ||
+ !access_ok(secs, PAGE_SIZE)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ __uaccess_begin();
+ ret = __einit((void *)sigstruct, (void *)token, (void *)secs);
+ __uaccess_end();
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_virt_einit() - Run EINIT on behalf of guest
+ * @sigstruct: Userspace pointer to SIGSTRUCT structure
+ * @token: Userspace pointer to EINITTOKEN structure
+ * @secs: Userspace pointer to SECS page
+ * @lepubkeyhash: Pointer to guest's *virtual* SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSR values
+ * @trapnr: trap number injected to guest in case of EINIT error
+ *
+ * Run EINIT on behalf of guest after KVM traps EINIT. If SGX_LC is available
+ * in host, SGX driver may rewrite the hardware values at wish, therefore KVM
+ * needs to update hardware values to guest's virtual MSR values in order to
+ * ensure EINIT is executed with expected hardware values.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - 0: EINIT was successful.
+ * - <0: on error.
+ */
+int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,
+ void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC)) {
+ ret = __sgx_virt_einit(sigstruct, token, secs);
+ } else {
+ preempt_disable();
+
+ sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(lepubkeyhash);
+
+ ret = __sgx_virt_einit(sigstruct, token, secs);
+ preempt_enable();
+ }
+
+ /* Propagate up the error from the WARN_ON_ONCE in __sgx_virt_einit() */
+ if (ret == -EINVAL)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+ *trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sgx_virt_einit);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0270925fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/topology.c
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Check for extended topology enumeration cpuid leaf 0xb and if it
+ * exists, use it for populating initial_apicid and cpu topology
+ * detection.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/memtype.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+/* leaf 0xb SMT level */
+#define SMT_LEVEL 0
+
+/* extended topology sub-leaf types */
+#define INVALID_TYPE 0
+#define SMT_TYPE 1
+#define CORE_TYPE 2
+#define DIE_TYPE 5
+
+#define LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) (((ecx) >> 8) & 0xff)
+#define BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax) ((eax) & 0x1f)
+#define LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx) ((ebx) & 0xffff)
+
+unsigned int __max_die_per_package __read_mostly = 1;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__max_die_per_package);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/*
+ * Check if given CPUID extended topology "leaf" is implemented
+ */
+static int check_extended_topology_leaf(int leaf)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid_count(leaf, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ if (ebx == 0 || (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) != SMT_TYPE))
+ return -1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+/*
+ * Return best CPUID Extended Topology Leaf supported
+ */
+static int detect_extended_topology_leaf(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x1f) {
+ if (check_extended_topology_leaf(0x1f) == 0)
+ return 0x1f;
+ }
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0xb) {
+ if (check_extended_topology_leaf(0xb) == 0)
+ return 0xb;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int detect_extended_topology_early(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ int leaf;
+
+ leaf = detect_extended_topology_leaf(c);
+ if (leaf < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XTOPOLOGY);
+
+ cpuid_count(leaf, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ /*
+ * initial apic id, which also represents 32-bit extended x2apic id.
+ */
+ c->initial_apicid = edx;
+ smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx));
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for extended topology enumeration cpuid leaf, and if it
+ * exists, use it for populating initial_apicid and cpu topology
+ * detection.
+ */
+int detect_extended_topology(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sub_index;
+ unsigned int ht_mask_width, core_plus_mask_width, die_plus_mask_width;
+ unsigned int core_select_mask, core_level_siblings;
+ unsigned int die_select_mask, die_level_siblings;
+ unsigned int pkg_mask_width;
+ bool die_level_present = false;
+ int leaf;
+
+ leaf = detect_extended_topology_leaf(c);
+ if (leaf < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Populate HT related information from sub-leaf level 0.
+ */
+ cpuid_count(leaf, SMT_LEVEL, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ c->initial_apicid = edx;
+ core_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ smp_num_siblings = max_t(int, smp_num_siblings, LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx));
+ core_plus_mask_width = ht_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+ die_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ pkg_mask_width = die_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+
+ sub_index = 1;
+ while (true) {
+ cpuid_count(leaf, sub_index, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for the Core type in the implemented sub leaves.
+ */
+ if (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) == CORE_TYPE) {
+ core_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ core_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+ die_level_siblings = core_level_siblings;
+ die_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+ }
+ if (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) == DIE_TYPE) {
+ die_level_present = true;
+ die_level_siblings = LEVEL_MAX_SIBLINGS(ebx);
+ die_plus_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+ }
+
+ if (LEAFB_SUBTYPE(ecx) != INVALID_TYPE)
+ pkg_mask_width = BITS_SHIFT_NEXT_LEVEL(eax);
+ else
+ break;
+
+ sub_index++;
+ }
+
+ core_select_mask = (~(-1 << pkg_mask_width)) >> ht_mask_width;
+ die_select_mask = (~(-1 << die_plus_mask_width)) >>
+ core_plus_mask_width;
+
+ c->cpu_core_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid,
+ ht_mask_width) & core_select_mask;
+
+ if (die_level_present) {
+ c->cpu_die_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid,
+ core_plus_mask_width) & die_select_mask;
+ }
+
+ c->phys_proc_id = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid,
+ pkg_mask_width);
+ /*
+ * Reinit the apicid, now that we have extended initial_apicid.
+ */
+ c->apicid = apic->phys_pkg_id(c->initial_apicid, 0);
+
+ c->x86_max_cores = (core_level_siblings / smp_num_siblings);
+ __max_die_per_package = (die_level_siblings / core_level_siblings);
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/transmeta.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/transmeta.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..42c939827
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/transmeta.c
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+static void early_init_transmeta(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 xlvl;
+
+ /* Transmeta-defined flags: level 0x80860001 */
+ xlvl = cpuid_eax(0x80860000);
+ if ((xlvl & 0xffff0000) == 0x80860000) {
+ if (xlvl >= 0x80860001)
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_8086_0001_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x80860001);
+ }
+}
+
+static void init_transmeta(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ unsigned int cap_mask, uk, max, dummy;
+ unsigned int cms_rev1, cms_rev2;
+ unsigned int cpu_rev, cpu_freq = 0, cpu_flags, new_cpu_rev;
+ char cpu_info[65];
+
+ early_init_transmeta(c);
+
+ cpu_detect_cache_sizes(c);
+
+ /* Print CMS and CPU revision */
+ max = cpuid_eax(0x80860000);
+ cpu_rev = 0;
+ if (max >= 0x80860001) {
+ cpuid(0x80860001, &dummy, &cpu_rev, &cpu_freq, &cpu_flags);
+ if (cpu_rev != 0x02000000) {
+ pr_info("CPU: Processor revision %u.%u.%u.%u, %u MHz\n",
+ (cpu_rev >> 24) & 0xff,
+ (cpu_rev >> 16) & 0xff,
+ (cpu_rev >> 8) & 0xff,
+ cpu_rev & 0xff,
+ cpu_freq);
+ }
+ }
+ if (max >= 0x80860002) {
+ cpuid(0x80860002, &new_cpu_rev, &cms_rev1, &cms_rev2, &dummy);
+ if (cpu_rev == 0x02000000) {
+ pr_info("CPU: Processor revision %08X, %u MHz\n",
+ new_cpu_rev, cpu_freq);
+ }
+ pr_info("CPU: Code Morphing Software revision %u.%u.%u-%u-%u\n",
+ (cms_rev1 >> 24) & 0xff,
+ (cms_rev1 >> 16) & 0xff,
+ (cms_rev1 >> 8) & 0xff,
+ cms_rev1 & 0xff,
+ cms_rev2);
+ }
+ if (max >= 0x80860006) {
+ cpuid(0x80860003,
+ (void *)&cpu_info[0],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[4],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[8],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[12]);
+ cpuid(0x80860004,
+ (void *)&cpu_info[16],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[20],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[24],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[28]);
+ cpuid(0x80860005,
+ (void *)&cpu_info[32],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[36],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[40],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[44]);
+ cpuid(0x80860006,
+ (void *)&cpu_info[48],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[52],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[56],
+ (void *)&cpu_info[60]);
+ cpu_info[64] = '\0';
+ pr_info("CPU: %s\n", cpu_info);
+ }
+
+ /* Unhide possibly hidden capability flags */
+ rdmsr(0x80860004, cap_mask, uk);
+ wrmsr(0x80860004, ~0, uk);
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_1_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0x00000001);
+ wrmsr(0x80860004, cap_mask, uk);
+
+ /* All Transmeta CPUs have a constant TSC */
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ /*
+ * randomize_va_space slows us down enormously;
+ * it probably triggers retranslation of x86->native bytecode
+ */
+ randomize_va_space = 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static const struct cpu_dev transmeta_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Transmeta",
+ .c_ident = { "GenuineTMx86", "TransmetaCPU" },
+ .c_early_init = early_init_transmeta,
+ .c_init = init_transmeta,
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_TRANSMETA,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(transmeta_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8009c8346
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Intel Transactional Synchronization Extensions (TSX) control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2019-2021 Intel Corporation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "tsx: " fmt
+
+enum tsx_ctrl_states tsx_ctrl_state __ro_after_init = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+static void tsx_disable(void)
+{
+ u64 tsx;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+ /* Force all transactions to immediately abort */
+ tsx |= TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure TSX support is not enumerated in CPUID.
+ * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+ * do not waste resources trying TSX transactions that
+ * will always abort.
+ */
+ tsx |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static void tsx_enable(void)
+{
+ u64 tsx;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+
+ /* Enable the RTM feature in the cpu */
+ tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure TSX support is enumerated in CPUID.
+ * This is visible to userspace and will ensure they
+ * can enumerate and use the TSX feature.
+ */
+ tsx &= ~TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx);
+}
+
+static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA))
+ return TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+
+ return TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disabling TSX is not a trivial business.
+ *
+ * First of all, there's a CPUID bit: X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT
+ * which says that TSX is practically disabled (all transactions are
+ * aborted by default). When that bit is set, the kernel unconditionally
+ * disables TSX.
+ *
+ * In order to do that, however, it needs to dance a bit:
+ *
+ * 1. The first method to disable it is through MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT and
+ * the MSR is present only when *two* CPUID bits are set:
+ *
+ * - X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT
+ * - X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT
+ *
+ * 2. The second method is for CPUs which do not have the above-mentioned
+ * MSR: those use a different MSR - MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL and disable TSX
+ * through that one. Those CPUs can also have the initially mentioned
+ * CPUID bit X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT set and for those the same strategy
+ * applies: TSX gets disabled unconditionally.
+ *
+ * When either of the two methods are present, the kernel disables TSX and
+ * clears the respective RTM and HLE feature flags.
+ *
+ * An additional twist in the whole thing presents late microcode loading
+ * which, when done, may cause for the X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT CPUID
+ * bit to be set after the update.
+ *
+ * A subsequent hotplug operation on any logical CPU except the BSP will
+ * cause for the supported CPUID feature bits to get re-detected and, if
+ * RTM and HLE get cleared all of a sudden, but, userspace did consult
+ * them before the update, then funny explosions will happen. Long story
+ * short: the kernel doesn't modify CPUID feature bits after booting.
+ *
+ * That's why, this function's call in init_intel() doesn't clear the
+ * feature flags.
+ */
+static void tsx_clear_cpuid(void)
+{
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /*
+ * MSR_TFA_TSX_CPUID_CLEAR bit is only present when both CPUID
+ * bits RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT and TSX_FORCE_ABORT are present.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, msr);
+ msr |= MSR_TFA_TSX_CPUID_CLEAR;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, msr);
+ } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL)) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, msr);
+ msr |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, msr);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Disable TSX development mode
+ *
+ * When the microcode released in Feb 2022 is applied, TSX will be disabled by
+ * default on some processors. MSR 0x122 (TSX_CTRL) and MSR 0x123
+ * (IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL) can be used to re-enable TSX for development, doing so is
+ * not recommended for production deployments. In particular, applying MD_CLEAR
+ * flows for mitigation of the Intel TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) transient
+ * execution attack may not be effective on these processors when Intel TSX is
+ * enabled with updated microcode.
+ */
+static void tsx_dev_mode_disable(void)
+{
+ u64 mcu_opt_ctrl;
+
+ /* Check if RTM_ALLOW exists */
+ if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) ||
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL) ||
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL))
+ return;
+
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_opt_ctrl);
+
+ if (mcu_opt_ctrl & RTM_ALLOW) {
+ mcu_opt_ctrl &= ~RTM_ALLOW;
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_opt_ctrl);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT);
+ }
+}
+
+void __init tsx_init(void)
+{
+ char arg[5] = {};
+ int ret;
+
+ tsx_dev_mode_disable();
+
+ /*
+ * Hardware will always abort a TSX transaction when the CPUID bit
+ * RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT is set. In this case, it is better not to enumerate
+ * CPUID.RTM and CPUID.HLE bits. Clear them here.
+ */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT)) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT;
+ tsx_clear_cpuid();
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. However, support for this
+ * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
+ *
+ * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a
+ * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+ * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get
+ * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus,
+ * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without
+ * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support.
+ */
+ if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR) {
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL);
+ } else {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "tsx", arg, sizeof(arg));
+ if (ret >= 0) {
+ if (!strcmp(arg, "on")) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "off")) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ } else if (!strcmp(arg, "auto")) {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+ } else {
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ pr_err("invalid option, defaulting to off\n");
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* tsx= not provided */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO))
+ tsx_ctrl_state = x86_get_tsx_auto_mode();
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF))
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_DISABLE;
+ else
+ tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_ENABLE;
+ }
+
+ if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE) {
+ tsx_disable();
+
+ /*
+ * tsx_disable() will change the state of the RTM and HLE CPUID
+ * bits. Clear them here since they are now expected to be not
+ * set.
+ */
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
+ } else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE) {
+
+ /*
+ * HW defaults TSX to be enabled at bootup.
+ * We may still need the TSX enable support
+ * during init for special cases like
+ * kexec after TSX is disabled.
+ */
+ tsx_enable();
+
+ /*
+ * tsx_enable() will change the state of the RTM and HLE CPUID
+ * bits. Force them here since they are now expected to be set.
+ */
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RTM);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_HLE);
+ }
+}
+
+void tsx_ap_init(void)
+{
+ tsx_dev_mode_disable();
+
+ if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_ENABLE)
+ tsx_enable();
+ else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_DISABLE)
+ tsx_disable();
+ else if (tsx_ctrl_state == TSX_CTRL_RTM_ALWAYS_ABORT)
+ /* See comment over that function for more details. */
+ tsx_clear_cpuid();
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..65a58a390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+/*
+ * UMC chips appear to be only either 386 or 486,
+ * so no special init takes place.
+ */
+
+static const struct cpu_dev umc_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "UMC",
+ .c_ident = { "UMC UMC UMC" },
+ .legacy_models = {
+ { .family = 4, .model_names =
+ {
+ [1] = "U5D",
+ [2] = "U5S",
+ }
+ },
+ },
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_UMC,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(umc_cpu_dev);
+
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ec8064c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/umwait.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
+#include <linux/suspend.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/mwait.h>
+
+#define UMWAIT_C02_ENABLE 0
+
+#define UMWAIT_CTRL_VAL(max_time, c02_disable) \
+ (((max_time) & MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK) | \
+ ((c02_disable) & MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_C02_DISABLE))
+
+/*
+ * Cache IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR. This is a systemwide control. By default,
+ * umwait max time is 100000 in TSC-quanta and C0.2 is enabled
+ */
+static u32 umwait_control_cached = UMWAIT_CTRL_VAL(100000, UMWAIT_C02_ENABLE);
+
+/*
+ * Cache the original IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR value which is configured by
+ * hardware or BIOS before kernel boot.
+ */
+static u32 orig_umwait_control_cached __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Serialize access to umwait_control_cached and IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR in
+ * the sysfs write functions.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(umwait_lock);
+
+static void umwait_update_control_msr(void * unused)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL, READ_ONCE(umwait_control_cached), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The CPU hotplug callback sets the control MSR to the global control
+ * value.
+ *
+ * Disable interrupts so the read of umwait_control_cached and the WRMSR
+ * are protected against a concurrent sysfs write. Otherwise the sysfs
+ * write could update the cached value after it had been read on this CPU
+ * and issue the IPI before the old value had been written. The IPI would
+ * interrupt, write the new value and after return from IPI the previous
+ * value would be written by this CPU.
+ *
+ * With interrupts disabled the upcoming CPU either sees the new control
+ * value or the IPI is updating this CPU to the new control value after
+ * interrupts have been reenabled.
+ */
+static int umwait_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ local_irq_disable();
+ umwait_update_control_msr(NULL);
+ local_irq_enable();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The CPU hotplug callback sets the control MSR to the original control
+ * value.
+ */
+static int umwait_cpu_offline(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ /*
+ * This code is protected by the CPU hotplug already and
+ * orig_umwait_control_cached is never changed after it caches
+ * the original control MSR value in umwait_init(). So there
+ * is no race condition here.
+ */
+ wrmsr(MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL, orig_umwait_control_cached, 0);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * On resume, restore IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR on the boot processor which
+ * is the only active CPU at this time. The MSR is set up on the APs via the
+ * CPU hotplug callback.
+ *
+ * This function is invoked on resume from suspend and hibernation. On
+ * resume from suspend the restore should be not required, but we neither
+ * trust the firmware nor does it matter if the same value is written
+ * again.
+ */
+static void umwait_syscore_resume(void)
+{
+ umwait_update_control_msr(NULL);
+}
+
+static struct syscore_ops umwait_syscore_ops = {
+ .resume = umwait_syscore_resume,
+};
+
+/* sysfs interface */
+
+/*
+ * When bit 0 in IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL MSR is 1, C0.2 is disabled.
+ * Otherwise, C0.2 is enabled.
+ */
+static inline bool umwait_ctrl_c02_enabled(u32 ctrl)
+{
+ return !(ctrl & MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_C02_DISABLE);
+}
+
+static inline u32 umwait_ctrl_max_time(u32 ctrl)
+{
+ return ctrl & MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK;
+}
+
+static inline void umwait_update_control(u32 maxtime, bool c02_enable)
+{
+ u32 ctrl = maxtime & MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK;
+
+ if (!c02_enable)
+ ctrl |= MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_C02_DISABLE;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(umwait_control_cached, ctrl);
+ /* Propagate to all CPUs */
+ on_each_cpu(umwait_update_control_msr, NULL, 1);
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+enable_c02_show(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ u32 ctrl = READ_ONCE(umwait_control_cached);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%d\n", umwait_ctrl_c02_enabled(ctrl));
+}
+
+static ssize_t enable_c02_store(struct device *dev,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ bool c02_enable;
+ u32 ctrl;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtobool(buf, &c02_enable);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ mutex_lock(&umwait_lock);
+
+ ctrl = READ_ONCE(umwait_control_cached);
+ if (c02_enable != umwait_ctrl_c02_enabled(ctrl))
+ umwait_update_control(ctrl, c02_enable);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&umwait_lock);
+
+ return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(enable_c02);
+
+static ssize_t
+max_time_show(struct device *kobj, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+ u32 ctrl = READ_ONCE(umwait_control_cached);
+
+ return sprintf(buf, "%u\n", umwait_ctrl_max_time(ctrl));
+}
+
+static ssize_t max_time_store(struct device *kobj,
+ struct device_attribute *attr,
+ const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+ u32 max_time, ctrl;
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = kstrtou32(buf, 0, &max_time);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ /* bits[1:0] must be zero */
+ if (max_time & ~MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL_TIME_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_lock(&umwait_lock);
+
+ ctrl = READ_ONCE(umwait_control_cached);
+ if (max_time != umwait_ctrl_max_time(ctrl))
+ umwait_update_control(max_time, umwait_ctrl_c02_enabled(ctrl));
+
+ mutex_unlock(&umwait_lock);
+
+ return count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR_RW(max_time);
+
+static struct attribute *umwait_attrs[] = {
+ &dev_attr_enable_c02.attr,
+ &dev_attr_max_time.attr,
+ NULL
+};
+
+static struct attribute_group umwait_attr_group = {
+ .attrs = umwait_attrs,
+ .name = "umwait_control",
+};
+
+static int __init umwait_init(void)
+{
+ struct device *dev;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG))
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ /*
+ * Cache the original control MSR value before the control MSR is
+ * changed. This is the only place where orig_umwait_control_cached
+ * is modified.
+ */
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL, orig_umwait_control_cached);
+
+ ret = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "umwait:online",
+ umwait_cpu_online, umwait_cpu_offline);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ /*
+ * On failure, the control MSR on all CPUs has the
+ * original control value.
+ */
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ register_syscore_ops(&umwait_syscore_ops);
+
+ /*
+ * Add umwait control interface. Ignore failure, so at least the
+ * default values are set up in case the machine manages to boot.
+ */
+ dev = cpu_subsys.dev_root;
+ return sysfs_create_group(&dev->kobj, &umwait_attr_group);
+}
+device_initcall(umwait_init);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..02039ec35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vmware.c
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/*
+ * VMware Detection code.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, VMware, Inc.
+ * Author : Alok N Kataria <akataria@vmware.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, GOOD TITLE or
+ * NON INFRINGEMENT. See the GNU General Public License for more
+ * details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/dmi.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/clocksource.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/reboot.h>
+#include <linux/static_call.h>
+#include <asm/div64.h>
+#include <asm/x86_init.h>
+#include <asm/hypervisor.h>
+#include <asm/timer.h>
+#include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/vmware.h>
+#include <asm/svm.h>
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "vmware: " fmt
+
+#define CPUID_VMWARE_INFO_LEAF 0x40000000
+#define CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_LEAF 0x40000010
+#define CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMMCALL BIT(0)
+#define CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMCALL BIT(1)
+
+#define VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC 0x564D5868
+
+#define VMWARE_CMD_GETVERSION 10
+#define VMWARE_CMD_GETHZ 45
+#define VMWARE_CMD_GETVCPU_INFO 68
+#define VMWARE_CMD_LEGACY_X2APIC 3
+#define VMWARE_CMD_VCPU_RESERVED 31
+#define VMWARE_CMD_STEALCLOCK 91
+
+#define STEALCLOCK_NOT_AVAILABLE (-1)
+#define STEALCLOCK_DISABLED 0
+#define STEALCLOCK_ENABLED 1
+
+#define VMWARE_PORT(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx) \
+ __asm__("inl (%%dx), %%eax" : \
+ "=a"(eax), "=c"(ecx), "=d"(edx), "=b"(ebx) : \
+ "a"(VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC), \
+ "c"(VMWARE_CMD_##cmd), \
+ "d"(VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_PORT), "b"(UINT_MAX) : \
+ "memory")
+
+#define VMWARE_VMCALL(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx) \
+ __asm__("vmcall" : \
+ "=a"(eax), "=c"(ecx), "=d"(edx), "=b"(ebx) : \
+ "a"(VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC), \
+ "c"(VMWARE_CMD_##cmd), \
+ "d"(0), "b"(UINT_MAX) : \
+ "memory")
+
+#define VMWARE_VMMCALL(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx) \
+ __asm__("vmmcall" : \
+ "=a"(eax), "=c"(ecx), "=d"(edx), "=b"(ebx) : \
+ "a"(VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC), \
+ "c"(VMWARE_CMD_##cmd), \
+ "d"(0), "b"(UINT_MAX) : \
+ "memory")
+
+#define VMWARE_CMD(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx) do { \
+ switch (vmware_hypercall_mode) { \
+ case CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMCALL: \
+ VMWARE_VMCALL(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); \
+ break; \
+ case CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMMCALL: \
+ VMWARE_VMMCALL(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); \
+ break; \
+ default: \
+ VMWARE_PORT(cmd, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0)
+
+struct vmware_steal_time {
+ union {
+ uint64_t clock; /* stolen time counter in units of vtsc */
+ struct {
+ /* only for little-endian */
+ uint32_t clock_low;
+ uint32_t clock_high;
+ };
+ };
+ uint64_t reserved[7];
+};
+
+static unsigned long vmware_tsc_khz __ro_after_init;
+static u8 vmware_hypercall_mode __ro_after_init;
+
+static inline int __vmware_platform(void)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ VMWARE_CMD(GETVERSION, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+ return eax != (uint32_t)-1 && ebx == VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC;
+}
+
+static unsigned long vmware_get_tsc_khz(void)
+{
+ return vmware_tsc_khz;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
+static struct cyc2ns_data vmware_cyc2ns __ro_after_init;
+static bool vmw_sched_clock __initdata = true;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED(struct vmware_steal_time, vmw_steal_time) __aligned(64);
+static bool has_steal_clock;
+static bool steal_acc __initdata = true; /* steal time accounting */
+
+static __init int setup_vmw_sched_clock(char *s)
+{
+ vmw_sched_clock = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("no-vmw-sched-clock", setup_vmw_sched_clock);
+
+static __init int parse_no_stealacc(char *arg)
+{
+ steal_acc = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+early_param("no-steal-acc", parse_no_stealacc);
+
+static unsigned long long notrace vmware_sched_clock(void)
+{
+ unsigned long long ns;
+
+ ns = mul_u64_u32_shr(rdtsc(), vmware_cyc2ns.cyc2ns_mul,
+ vmware_cyc2ns.cyc2ns_shift);
+ ns -= vmware_cyc2ns.cyc2ns_offset;
+ return ns;
+}
+
+static void __init vmware_cyc2ns_setup(void)
+{
+ struct cyc2ns_data *d = &vmware_cyc2ns;
+ unsigned long long tsc_now = rdtsc();
+
+ clocks_calc_mult_shift(&d->cyc2ns_mul, &d->cyc2ns_shift,
+ vmware_tsc_khz, NSEC_PER_MSEC, 0);
+ d->cyc2ns_offset = mul_u64_u32_shr(tsc_now, d->cyc2ns_mul,
+ d->cyc2ns_shift);
+
+ pr_info("using clock offset of %llu ns\n", d->cyc2ns_offset);
+}
+
+static int vmware_cmd_stealclock(uint32_t arg1, uint32_t arg2)
+{
+ uint32_t result, info;
+
+ asm volatile (VMWARE_HYPERCALL :
+ "=a"(result),
+ "=c"(info) :
+ "a"(VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_MAGIC),
+ "b"(0),
+ "c"(VMWARE_CMD_STEALCLOCK),
+ "d"(0),
+ "S"(arg1),
+ "D"(arg2) :
+ "memory");
+ return result;
+}
+
+static bool stealclock_enable(phys_addr_t pa)
+{
+ return vmware_cmd_stealclock(upper_32_bits(pa),
+ lower_32_bits(pa)) == STEALCLOCK_ENABLED;
+}
+
+static int __stealclock_disable(void)
+{
+ return vmware_cmd_stealclock(0, 1);
+}
+
+static void stealclock_disable(void)
+{
+ __stealclock_disable();
+}
+
+static bool vmware_is_stealclock_available(void)
+{
+ return __stealclock_disable() != STEALCLOCK_NOT_AVAILABLE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * vmware_steal_clock() - read the per-cpu steal clock
+ * @cpu: the cpu number whose steal clock we want to read
+ *
+ * The function reads the steal clock if we are on a 64-bit system, otherwise
+ * reads it in parts, checking that the high part didn't change in the
+ * meantime.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * The steal clock reading in ns.
+ */
+static uint64_t vmware_steal_clock(int cpu)
+{
+ struct vmware_steal_time *steal = &per_cpu(vmw_steal_time, cpu);
+ uint64_t clock;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT))
+ clock = READ_ONCE(steal->clock);
+ else {
+ uint32_t initial_high, low, high;
+
+ do {
+ initial_high = READ_ONCE(steal->clock_high);
+ /* Do not reorder initial_high and high readings */
+ virt_rmb();
+ low = READ_ONCE(steal->clock_low);
+ /* Keep low reading in between */
+ virt_rmb();
+ high = READ_ONCE(steal->clock_high);
+ } while (initial_high != high);
+
+ clock = ((uint64_t)high << 32) | low;
+ }
+
+ return mul_u64_u32_shr(clock, vmware_cyc2ns.cyc2ns_mul,
+ vmware_cyc2ns.cyc2ns_shift);
+}
+
+static void vmware_register_steal_time(void)
+{
+ int cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ struct vmware_steal_time *st = &per_cpu(vmw_steal_time, cpu);
+
+ if (!has_steal_clock)
+ return;
+
+ if (!stealclock_enable(slow_virt_to_phys(st))) {
+ has_steal_clock = false;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ pr_info("vmware-stealtime: cpu %d, pa %llx\n",
+ cpu, (unsigned long long) slow_virt_to_phys(st));
+}
+
+static void vmware_disable_steal_time(void)
+{
+ if (!has_steal_clock)
+ return;
+
+ stealclock_disable();
+}
+
+static void vmware_guest_cpu_init(void)
+{
+ if (has_steal_clock)
+ vmware_register_steal_time();
+}
+
+static void vmware_pv_guest_cpu_reboot(void *unused)
+{
+ vmware_disable_steal_time();
+}
+
+static int vmware_pv_reboot_notify(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long code, void *unused)
+{
+ if (code == SYS_RESTART)
+ on_each_cpu(vmware_pv_guest_cpu_reboot, NULL, 1);
+ return NOTIFY_DONE;
+}
+
+static struct notifier_block vmware_pv_reboot_nb = {
+ .notifier_call = vmware_pv_reboot_notify,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+static void __init vmware_smp_prepare_boot_cpu(void)
+{
+ vmware_guest_cpu_init();
+ native_smp_prepare_boot_cpu();
+}
+
+static int vmware_cpu_online(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ local_irq_disable();
+ vmware_guest_cpu_init();
+ local_irq_enable();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int vmware_cpu_down_prepare(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ local_irq_disable();
+ vmware_disable_steal_time();
+ local_irq_enable();
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+static __init int activate_jump_labels(void)
+{
+ if (has_steal_clock) {
+ static_key_slow_inc(&paravirt_steal_enabled);
+ if (steal_acc)
+ static_key_slow_inc(&paravirt_steal_rq_enabled);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+arch_initcall(activate_jump_labels);
+
+static void __init vmware_paravirt_ops_setup(void)
+{
+ pv_info.name = "VMware hypervisor";
+ pv_ops.cpu.io_delay = paravirt_nop;
+
+ if (vmware_tsc_khz == 0)
+ return;
+
+ vmware_cyc2ns_setup();
+
+ if (vmw_sched_clock)
+ paravirt_set_sched_clock(vmware_sched_clock);
+
+ if (vmware_is_stealclock_available()) {
+ has_steal_clock = true;
+ static_call_update(pv_steal_clock, vmware_steal_clock);
+
+ /* We use reboot notifier only to disable steal clock */
+ register_reboot_notifier(&vmware_pv_reboot_nb);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+ smp_ops.smp_prepare_boot_cpu =
+ vmware_smp_prepare_boot_cpu;
+ if (cpuhp_setup_state_nocalls(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
+ "x86/vmware:online",
+ vmware_cpu_online,
+ vmware_cpu_down_prepare) < 0)
+ pr_err("vmware_guest: Failed to install cpu hotplug callbacks\n");
+#else
+ vmware_guest_cpu_init();
+#endif
+ }
+}
+#else
+#define vmware_paravirt_ops_setup() do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * VMware hypervisor takes care of exporting a reliable TSC to the guest.
+ * Still, due to timing difference when running on virtual cpus, the TSC can
+ * be marked as unstable in some cases. For example, the TSC sync check at
+ * bootup can fail due to a marginal offset between vcpus' TSCs (though the
+ * TSCs do not drift from each other). Also, the ACPI PM timer clocksource
+ * is not suitable as a watchdog when running on a hypervisor because the
+ * kernel may miss a wrap of the counter if the vcpu is descheduled for a
+ * long time. To skip these checks at runtime we set these capability bits,
+ * so that the kernel could just trust the hypervisor with providing a
+ * reliable virtual TSC that is suitable for timekeeping.
+ */
+static void __init vmware_set_capabilities(void)
+{
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE);
+ if (vmware_tsc_khz)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TSC_KNOWN_FREQ);
+ if (vmware_hypercall_mode == CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMCALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VMCALL);
+ else if (vmware_hypercall_mode == CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMMCALL)
+ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL);
+}
+
+static void __init vmware_platform_setup(void)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ uint64_t lpj, tsc_khz;
+
+ VMWARE_CMD(GETHZ, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+
+ if (ebx != UINT_MAX) {
+ lpj = tsc_khz = eax | (((uint64_t)ebx) << 32);
+ do_div(tsc_khz, 1000);
+ WARN_ON(tsc_khz >> 32);
+ pr_info("TSC freq read from hypervisor : %lu.%03lu MHz\n",
+ (unsigned long) tsc_khz / 1000,
+ (unsigned long) tsc_khz % 1000);
+
+ if (!preset_lpj) {
+ do_div(lpj, HZ);
+ preset_lpj = lpj;
+ }
+
+ vmware_tsc_khz = tsc_khz;
+ x86_platform.calibrate_tsc = vmware_get_tsc_khz;
+ x86_platform.calibrate_cpu = vmware_get_tsc_khz;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
+ /* Skip lapic calibration since we know the bus frequency. */
+ lapic_timer_period = ecx / HZ;
+ pr_info("Host bus clock speed read from hypervisor : %u Hz\n",
+ ecx);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ pr_warn("Failed to get TSC freq from the hypervisor\n");
+ }
+
+ vmware_paravirt_ops_setup();
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC
+ no_timer_check = 1;
+#endif
+
+ vmware_set_capabilities();
+}
+
+static u8 __init vmware_select_hypercall(void)
+{
+ int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid(CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_LEAF, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ return (ecx & (CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMMCALL |
+ CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_ECX_VMCALL));
+}
+
+/*
+ * While checking the dmi string information, just checking the product
+ * serial key should be enough, as this will always have a VMware
+ * specific string when running under VMware hypervisor.
+ * If !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR), vmware_hypercall_mode
+ * intentionally defaults to 0.
+ */
+static uint32_t __init vmware_platform(void)
+{
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+ unsigned int eax;
+ unsigned int hyper_vendor_id[3];
+
+ cpuid(CPUID_VMWARE_INFO_LEAF, &eax, &hyper_vendor_id[0],
+ &hyper_vendor_id[1], &hyper_vendor_id[2]);
+ if (!memcmp(hyper_vendor_id, "VMwareVMware", 12)) {
+ if (eax >= CPUID_VMWARE_FEATURES_LEAF)
+ vmware_hypercall_mode =
+ vmware_select_hypercall();
+
+ pr_info("hypercall mode: 0x%02x\n",
+ (unsigned int) vmware_hypercall_mode);
+
+ return CPUID_VMWARE_INFO_LEAF;
+ }
+ } else if (dmi_available && dmi_name_in_serial("VMware") &&
+ __vmware_platform())
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks if hypervisor supports x2apic without VT-D interrupt remapping. */
+static bool __init vmware_legacy_x2apic_available(void)
+{
+ uint32_t eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ VMWARE_CMD(GETVCPU_INFO, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+ return !(eax & BIT(VMWARE_CMD_VCPU_RESERVED)) &&
+ (eax & BIT(VMWARE_CMD_LEGACY_X2APIC));
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+static void vmware_sev_es_hcall_prepare(struct ghcb *ghcb,
+ struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ /* Copy VMWARE specific Hypercall parameters to the GHCB */
+ ghcb_set_rip(ghcb, regs->ip);
+ ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, regs->bx);
+ ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, regs->cx);
+ ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, regs->dx);
+ ghcb_set_rsi(ghcb, regs->si);
+ ghcb_set_rdi(ghcb, regs->di);
+ ghcb_set_rbp(ghcb, regs->bp);
+}
+
+static bool vmware_sev_es_hcall_finish(struct ghcb *ghcb, struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+ if (!(ghcb_rbx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rsi_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rdi_is_valid(ghcb) &&
+ ghcb_rbp_is_valid(ghcb)))
+ return false;
+
+ regs->bx = ghcb_get_rbx(ghcb);
+ regs->cx = ghcb_get_rcx(ghcb);
+ regs->dx = ghcb_get_rdx(ghcb);
+ regs->si = ghcb_get_rsi(ghcb);
+ regs->di = ghcb_get_rdi(ghcb);
+ regs->bp = ghcb_get_rbp(ghcb);
+
+ return true;
+}
+#endif
+
+const __initconst struct hypervisor_x86 x86_hyper_vmware = {
+ .name = "VMware",
+ .detect = vmware_platform,
+ .type = X86_HYPER_VMWARE,
+ .init.init_platform = vmware_platform_setup,
+ .init.x2apic_available = vmware_legacy_x2apic_available,
+#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_prepare = vmware_sev_es_hcall_prepare,
+ .runtime.sev_es_hcall_finish = vmware_sev_es_hcall_finish,
+#endif
+};
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vortex.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vortex.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e2685470b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/vortex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+/*
+ * No special init required for Vortex processors.
+ */
+
+static const struct cpu_dev vortex_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "Vortex",
+ .c_ident = { "Vortex86 SoC" },
+ .legacy_models = {
+ {
+ .family = 5,
+ .model_names = {
+ [2] = "Vortex86DX",
+ [8] = "Vortex86MX",
+ },
+ },
+ {
+ .family = 6,
+ .model_names = {
+ /*
+ * Both the Vortex86EX and the Vortex86EX2
+ * have the same family and model id.
+ *
+ * However, the -EX2 supports the product name
+ * CPUID call, so this name will only be used
+ * for the -EX, which does not.
+ */
+ [0] = "Vortex86EX",
+ },
+ },
+ },
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_VORTEX,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(vortex_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..05fa4ef63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/zhaoxin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpu.h>
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+
+#include "cpu.h"
+
+#define MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR57 0x00001257
+
+#define ACE_PRESENT (1 << 6)
+#define ACE_ENABLED (1 << 7)
+#define ACE_FCR (1 << 7) /* MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR */
+
+#define RNG_PRESENT (1 << 2)
+#define RNG_ENABLED (1 << 3)
+#define RNG_ENABLE (1 << 8) /* MSR_ZHAOXIN_RNG */
+
+static void init_zhaoxin_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ u32 lo, hi;
+
+ /* Test for Extended Feature Flags presence */
+ if (cpuid_eax(0xC0000000) >= 0xC0000001) {
+ u32 tmp = cpuid_edx(0xC0000001);
+
+ /* Enable ACE unit, if present and disabled */
+ if ((tmp & (ACE_PRESENT | ACE_ENABLED)) == ACE_PRESENT) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR57, lo, hi);
+ /* Enable ACE unit */
+ lo |= ACE_FCR;
+ wrmsr(MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR57, lo, hi);
+ pr_info("CPU: Enabled ACE h/w crypto\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Enable RNG unit, if present and disabled */
+ if ((tmp & (RNG_PRESENT | RNG_ENABLED)) == RNG_PRESENT) {
+ rdmsr(MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR57, lo, hi);
+ /* Enable RNG unit */
+ lo |= RNG_ENABLE;
+ wrmsr(MSR_ZHAOXIN_FCR57, lo, hi);
+ pr_info("CPU: Enabled h/w RNG\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Store Extended Feature Flags as word 5 of the CPU
+ * capability bit array
+ */
+ c->x86_capability[CPUID_C000_0001_EDX] = cpuid_edx(0xC0000001);
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x6)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD);
+}
+
+static void early_init_zhaoxin(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x6)
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32);
+#endif
+ if (c->x86_power & (1 << 8)) {
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC);
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC);
+ }
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000001) {
+ u32 eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ cpuid(0x00000001, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ /*
+ * If HTT (EDX[28]) is set EBX[16:23] contain the number of
+ * apicids which are reserved per package. Store the resulting
+ * shift value for the package management code.
+ */
+ if (edx & (1U << 28))
+ c->x86_coreid_bits = get_count_order((ebx >> 16) & 0xff);
+ }
+
+}
+
+static void init_zhaoxin(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
+{
+ early_init_zhaoxin(c);
+ init_intel_cacheinfo(c);
+ detect_num_cpu_cores(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ detect_ht(c);
+#endif
+
+ if (c->cpuid_level > 9) {
+ unsigned int eax = cpuid_eax(10);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for version and the number of counters
+ * Version(eax[7:0]) can't be 0;
+ * Counters(eax[15:8]) should be greater than 1;
+ */
+ if ((eax & 0xff) && (((eax >> 8) & 0xff) > 1))
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_ARCH_PERFMON);
+ }
+
+ if (c->x86 >= 0x6)
+ init_zhaoxin_cap(c);
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+ set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC);
+#endif
+
+ init_ia32_feat_ctl(c);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+static unsigned int
+zhaoxin_size_cache(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c, unsigned int size)
+{
+ return size;
+}
+#endif
+
+static const struct cpu_dev zhaoxin_cpu_dev = {
+ .c_vendor = "zhaoxin",
+ .c_ident = { " Shanghai " },
+ .c_early_init = early_init_zhaoxin,
+ .c_init = init_zhaoxin,
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
+ .legacy_cache_size = zhaoxin_size_cache,
+#endif
+ .c_x86_vendor = X86_VENDOR_ZHAOXIN,
+};
+
+cpu_dev_register(zhaoxin_cpu_dev);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpuid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f7b8cc1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpuid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- *
+ *
+ * Copyright 2000-2008 H. Peter Anvin - All Rights Reserved
+ *
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/*
+ * x86 CPUID access device
+ *
+ * This device is accessed by lseek() to the appropriate CPUID level
+ * and then read in chunks of 16 bytes. A larger size means multiple
+ * reads of consecutive levels.
+ *
+ * The lower 32 bits of the file position is used as the incoming %eax,
+ * and the upper 32 bits of the file position as the incoming %ecx,
+ * the latter intended for "counting" eax levels like eax=4.
+ *
+ * This driver uses /dev/cpu/%d/cpuid where %d is the minor number, and on
+ * an SMP box will direct the access to CPU %d.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/smp.h>
+#include <linux/major.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/device.h>
+#include <linux/cpu.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/completion.h>
+
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+
+static struct class *cpuid_class;
+static enum cpuhp_state cpuhp_cpuid_state;
+
+struct cpuid_regs_done {
+ struct cpuid_regs regs;
+ struct completion done;
+};
+
+static void cpuid_smp_cpuid(void *cmd_block)
+{
+ struct cpuid_regs_done *cmd = cmd_block;
+
+ cpuid_count(cmd->regs.eax, cmd->regs.ecx,
+ &cmd->regs.eax, &cmd->regs.ebx,
+ &cmd->regs.ecx, &cmd->regs.edx);
+
+ complete(&cmd->done);
+}
+
+static ssize_t cpuid_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char __user *tmp = buf;
+ struct cpuid_regs_done cmd;
+ int cpu = iminor(file_inode(file));
+ u64 pos = *ppos;
+ ssize_t bytes = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (count % 16)
+ return -EINVAL; /* Invalid chunk size */
+
+ init_completion(&cmd.done);
+ for (; count; count -= 16) {
+ call_single_data_t csd;
+
+ INIT_CSD(&csd, cpuid_smp_cpuid, &cmd);
+
+ cmd.regs.eax = pos;
+ cmd.regs.ecx = pos >> 32;
+
+ err = smp_call_function_single_async(cpu, &csd);
+ if (err)
+ break;
+ wait_for_completion(&cmd.done);
+ if (copy_to_user(tmp, &cmd.regs, 16)) {
+ err = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmp += 16;
+ bytes += 16;
+ *ppos = ++pos;
+ reinit_completion(&cmd.done);
+ }
+
+ return bytes ? bytes : err;
+}
+
+static int cpuid_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ unsigned int cpu;
+ struct cpuinfo_x86 *c;
+
+ cpu = iminor(file_inode(file));
+ if (cpu >= nr_cpu_ids || !cpu_online(cpu))
+ return -ENXIO; /* No such CPU */
+
+ c = &cpu_data(cpu);
+ if (c->cpuid_level < 0)
+ return -EIO; /* CPUID not supported */
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File operations we support
+ */
+static const struct file_operations cpuid_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .llseek = no_seek_end_llseek,
+ .read = cpuid_read,
+ .open = cpuid_open,
+};
+
+static int cpuid_device_create(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ struct device *dev;
+
+ dev = device_create(cpuid_class, NULL, MKDEV(CPUID_MAJOR, cpu), NULL,
+ "cpu%d", cpu);
+ return PTR_ERR_OR_ZERO(dev);
+}
+
+static int cpuid_device_destroy(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+ device_destroy(cpuid_class, MKDEV(CPUID_MAJOR, cpu));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static char *cpuid_devnode(struct device *dev, umode_t *mode)
+{
+ return kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "cpu/%u/cpuid", MINOR(dev->devt));
+}
+
+static int __init cpuid_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (__register_chrdev(CPUID_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS,
+ "cpu/cpuid", &cpuid_fops)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "cpuid: unable to get major %d for cpuid\n",
+ CPUID_MAJOR);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+ cpuid_class = class_create(THIS_MODULE, "cpuid");
+ if (IS_ERR(cpuid_class)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(cpuid_class);
+ goto out_chrdev;
+ }
+ cpuid_class->devnode = cpuid_devnode;
+
+ err = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, "x86/cpuid:online",
+ cpuid_device_create, cpuid_device_destroy);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out_class;
+
+ cpuhp_cpuid_state = err;
+ return 0;
+
+out_class:
+ class_destroy(cpuid_class);
+out_chrdev:
+ __unregister_chrdev(CPUID_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/cpuid");
+ return err;
+}
+module_init(cpuid_init);
+
+static void __exit cpuid_exit(void)
+{
+ cpuhp_remove_state(cpuhp_cpuid_state);
+ class_destroy(cpuid_class);
+ __unregister_chrdev(CPUID_MAJOR, 0, NR_CPUS, "cpu/cpuid");
+}
+module_exit(cpuid_exit);
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("x86 generic CPUID driver");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");