diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c | 2500 |
1 files changed, 2500 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e7efebf81 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c @@ -0,0 +1,2500 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver + * + * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com + * + * Authors: Keerthy + * Vitaly Andrianov + * Tero Kristo + */ +#include <linux/bitfield.h> +#include <linux/clk.h> +#include <linux/dma-mapping.h> +#include <linux/dmaengine.h> +#include <linux/dmapool.h> +#include <linux/kernel.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/of_device.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/pm_runtime.h> + +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/authenc.h> +#include <crypto/des.h> +#include <crypto/internal/aead.h> +#include <crypto/internal/hash.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> +#include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/sha2.h> + +#include "sa2ul.h" + +/* Byte offset for key in encryption security context */ +#define SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4) +/* Byte offset for Aux-1 in encryption security context */ +#define SC_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4 + 32) + +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC 0x0001 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH 0x0002 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV 0x0004 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV 0x0008 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY 0x0010 + +#define SA_AUTH_SUBKEY_LEN 16 +#define SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK 0xFFFF +#define SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK 0xFF000000 + +#define MODE_CONTROL_BYTES 27 +#define SA_HASH_PROCESSING 0 +#define SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING 0 +#define SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR BIT(6) + +#define SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK 0xF0000 +#define SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK 0x1F00000 +#define SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT BIT(4) +#define SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK 0x3E000000 +#define SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT BIT(30) +#define SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH 0xFF000000 +#define SA_BASIC_HASH 0x10 + +#define SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS 8 +/* Make 32-bit word from 4 bytes */ +#define SA_MK_U32(b0, b1, b2, b3) (((b0) << 24) | ((b1) << 16) | \ + ((b2) << 8) | (b3)) + +/* size of SCCTL structure in bytes */ +#define SA_SCCTL_SZ 16 + +/* Max Authentication tag size */ +#define SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ 64 + +enum sa_algo_id { + SA_ALG_CBC_AES = 0, + SA_ALG_EBC_AES, + SA_ALG_CBC_DES3, + SA_ALG_ECB_DES3, + SA_ALG_SHA1, + SA_ALG_SHA256, + SA_ALG_SHA512, + SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES, + SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES, +}; + +struct sa_match_data { + u8 priv; + u8 priv_id; + u32 supported_algos; +}; + +static struct device *sa_k3_dev; + +/** + * struct sa_cmdl_cfg - Command label configuration descriptor + * @aalg: authentication algorithm ID + * @enc_eng_id: Encryption Engine ID supported by the SA hardware + * @auth_eng_id: Authentication Engine ID + * @iv_size: Initialization Vector size + * @akey: Authentication key + * @akey_len: Authentication key length + * @enc: True, if this is an encode request + */ +struct sa_cmdl_cfg { + int aalg; + u8 enc_eng_id; + u8 auth_eng_id; + u8 iv_size; + const u8 *akey; + u16 akey_len; + bool enc; +}; + +/** + * struct algo_data - Crypto algorithm specific data + * @enc_eng: Encryption engine info structure + * @auth_eng: Authentication engine info structure + * @auth_ctrl: Authentication control word + * @hash_size: Size of digest + * @iv_idx: iv index in psdata + * @iv_out_size: iv out size + * @ealg_id: Encryption Algorithm ID + * @aalg_id: Authentication algorithm ID + * @mci_enc: Mode Control Instruction for Encryption algorithm + * @mci_dec: Mode Control Instruction for Decryption + * @inv_key: Whether the encryption algorithm demands key inversion + * @ctx: Pointer to the algorithm context + * @keyed_mac: Whether the authentication algorithm has key + * @prep_iopad: Function pointer to generate intermediate ipad/opad + */ +struct algo_data { + struct sa_eng_info enc_eng; + struct sa_eng_info auth_eng; + u8 auth_ctrl; + u8 hash_size; + u8 iv_idx; + u8 iv_out_size; + u8 ealg_id; + u8 aalg_id; + u8 *mci_enc; + u8 *mci_dec; + bool inv_key; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx; + bool keyed_mac; + void (*prep_iopad)(struct algo_data *algo, const u8 *key, + u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad); +}; + +/** + * struct sa_alg_tmpl: A generic template encompassing crypto/aead algorithms + * @type: Type of the crypto algorithm. + * @alg: Union of crypto algorithm definitions. + * @registered: Flag indicating if the crypto algorithm is already registered + */ +struct sa_alg_tmpl { + u32 type; /* CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE from <linux/crypto.h> */ + union { + struct skcipher_alg skcipher; + struct ahash_alg ahash; + struct aead_alg aead; + } alg; + bool registered; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_mapped_sg: scatterlist information for tx and rx + * @mapped: Set to true if the @sgt is mapped + * @dir: mapping direction used for @sgt + * @split_sg: Set if the sg is split and needs to be freed up + * @static_sg: Static scatterlist entry for overriding data + * @sgt: scatterlist table for DMA API use + */ +struct sa_mapped_sg { + bool mapped; + enum dma_data_direction dir; + struct scatterlist static_sg; + struct scatterlist *split_sg; + struct sg_table sgt; +}; +/** + * struct sa_rx_data: RX Packet miscellaneous data place holder + * @req: crypto request data pointer + * @ddev: pointer to the DMA device + * @tx_in: dma_async_tx_descriptor pointer for rx channel + * @mapped_sg: Information on tx (0) and rx (1) scatterlist DMA mapping + * @enc: Flag indicating either encryption or decryption + * @enc_iv_size: Initialisation vector size + * @iv_idx: Initialisation vector index + */ +struct sa_rx_data { + void *req; + struct device *ddev; + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in; + struct sa_mapped_sg mapped_sg[2]; + u8 enc; + u8 enc_iv_size; + u8 iv_idx; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_req: SA request definition + * @dev: device for the request + * @size: total data to the xmitted via DMA + * @enc_offset: offset of cipher data + * @enc_size: data to be passed to cipher engine + * @enc_iv: cipher IV + * @auth_offset: offset of the authentication data + * @auth_size: size of the authentication data + * @auth_iv: authentication IV + * @type: algorithm type for the request + * @cmdl: command label pointer + * @base: pointer to the base request + * @ctx: pointer to the algorithm context data + * @enc: true if this is an encode request + * @src: source data + * @dst: destination data + * @callback: DMA callback for the request + * @mdata_size: metadata size passed to DMA + */ +struct sa_req { + struct device *dev; + u16 size; + u8 enc_offset; + u16 enc_size; + u8 *enc_iv; + u8 auth_offset; + u16 auth_size; + u8 *auth_iv; + u32 type; + u32 *cmdl; + struct crypto_async_request *base; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx; + bool enc; + struct scatterlist *src; + struct scatterlist *dst; + dma_async_tx_callback callback; + u16 mdata_size; +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_enc_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_dec_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for encryption + */ +static u8 mci_ecb_enc_array[3][27] = { + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for decryption + */ +static u8 mci_ecb_dec_array[3][27] = { + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for DES algorithm + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode and ECB mode + * encryption and for decryption respectively + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_cbc_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x70, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_ecb_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_ecb_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +/* + * Perform 16 byte or 128 bit swizzling + * The SA2UL Expects the security context to + * be in little Endian and the bus width is 128 bits or 16 bytes + * Hence swap 16 bytes at a time from higher to lower address + */ +static void sa_swiz_128(u8 *in, u16 len) +{ + u8 data[16]; + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + memcpy(data, &in[i], 16); + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) + in[i + j] = data[15 - j]; + } +} + +/* Prepare the ipad and opad from key as per SHA algorithm step 1*/ +static void prepare_kipad(u8 *k_ipad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++) + k_ipad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x36; + + /* Instead of XOR with 0 */ + for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + k_ipad[i] = 0x36; +} + +static void prepare_kopad(u8 *k_opad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < key_sz; i++) + k_opad[i] = key[i] ^ 0x5c; + + /* Instead of XOR with 0 */ + for (; i < SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) + k_opad[i] = 0x5c; +} + +static void sa_export_shash(void *state, struct shash_desc *hash, + int digest_size, __be32 *out) +{ + struct sha1_state *sha1; + struct sha256_state *sha256; + u32 *result; + + switch (digest_size) { + case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE: + sha1 = state; + result = sha1->state; + break; + case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE: + sha256 = state; + result = sha256->state; + break; + default: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad digest_size=%d\n", __func__, + digest_size); + return; + } + + crypto_shash_export(hash, state); + + cpu_to_be32_array(out, result, digest_size / 4); +} + +static void sa_prepare_iopads(struct algo_data *data, const u8 *key, + u16 key_sz, __be32 *ipad, __be32 *opad) +{ + SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, data->ctx->shash); + int block_size = crypto_shash_blocksize(data->ctx->shash); + int digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(data->ctx->shash); + union { + struct sha1_state sha1; + struct sha256_state sha256; + u8 k_pad[SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE]; + } sha; + + shash->tfm = data->ctx->shash; + + prepare_kipad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz); + + crypto_shash_init(shash); + crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size); + sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, ipad); + + prepare_kopad(sha.k_pad, key, key_sz); + + crypto_shash_init(shash); + crypto_shash_update(shash, sha.k_pad, block_size); + + sa_export_shash(&sha, shash, digest_size, opad); + + memzero_explicit(&sha, sizeof(sha)); +} + +/* Derive the inverse key used in AES-CBC decryption operation */ +static inline int sa_aes_inv_key(u8 *inv_key, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz) +{ + struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; + int key_pos; + + if (aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_sz)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* work around to get the right inverse for AES_KEYSIZE_192 size keys */ + if (key_sz == AES_KEYSIZE_192) { + ctx.key_enc[52] = ctx.key_enc[51] ^ ctx.key_enc[46]; + ctx.key_enc[53] = ctx.key_enc[52] ^ ctx.key_enc[47]; + } + + /* Based crypto_aes_expand_key logic */ + switch (key_sz) { + case AES_KEYSIZE_128: + case AES_KEYSIZE_192: + key_pos = key_sz + 24; + break; + + case AES_KEYSIZE_256: + key_pos = key_sz + 24 - 4; + break; + + default: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz); + return -EINVAL; + } + + memcpy(inv_key, &ctx.key_enc[key_pos], key_sz); + return 0; +} + +/* Set Security context for the encryption engine */ +static int sa_set_sc_enc(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz, + u8 enc, u8 *sc_buf) +{ + const u8 *mci = NULL; + + /* Set Encryption mode selector to crypto processing */ + sc_buf[0] = SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING; + + if (enc) + mci = ad->mci_enc; + else + mci = ad->mci_dec; + /* Set the mode control instructions in security context */ + if (mci) + memcpy(&sc_buf[1], mci, MODE_CONTROL_BYTES); + + /* For AES-CBC decryption get the inverse key */ + if (ad->inv_key && !enc) { + if (sa_aes_inv_key(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz)) + return -EINVAL; + /* For all other cases: key is used */ + } else { + memcpy(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Set Security context for the authentication engine */ +static void sa_set_sc_auth(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz, + u8 *sc_buf) +{ + __be32 *ipad = (void *)(sc_buf + 32); + __be32 *opad = (void *)(sc_buf + 64); + + /* Set Authentication mode selector to hash processing */ + sc_buf[0] = SA_HASH_PROCESSING; + /* Auth SW ctrl word: bit[6]=1 (upload computed hash to TLR section) */ + sc_buf[1] = SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR; + sc_buf[1] |= ad->auth_ctrl; + + /* Copy the keys or ipad/opad */ + if (ad->keyed_mac) + ad->prep_iopad(ad, key, key_sz, ipad, opad); + else { + /* basic hash */ + sc_buf[1] |= SA_BASIC_HASH; + } +} + +static inline void sa_copy_iv(__be32 *out, const u8 *iv, bool size16) +{ + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < ((size16) ? 4 : 2); j++) { + *out = cpu_to_be32(*((u32 *)iv)); + iv += 4; + out++; + } +} + +/* Format general command label */ +static int sa_format_cmdl_gen(struct sa_cmdl_cfg *cfg, u8 *cmdl, + struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info) +{ + u8 enc_offset = 0, auth_offset = 0, total = 0; + u8 enc_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2; + u8 auth_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2; + u32 *word_ptr = (u32 *)cmdl; + int i; + + /* Clear the command label */ + memzero_explicit(cmdl, (SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))); + + /* Iniialize the command update structure */ + memzero_explicit(upd_info, sizeof(*upd_info)); + + if (cfg->enc_eng_id && cfg->auth_eng_id) { + if (cfg->enc) { + auth_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + enc_next_eng = cfg->auth_eng_id; + + if (cfg->iv_size) + auth_offset += cfg->iv_size; + } else { + enc_offset = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + auth_next_eng = cfg->enc_eng_id; + } + } + + if (cfg->enc_eng_id) { + upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC; + upd_info->enc_size.index = enc_offset >> 2; + upd_info->enc_offset.index = upd_info->enc_size.index + 1; + /* Encryption command label */ + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = enc_next_eng; + + /* Encryption modes requiring IV */ + if (cfg->iv_size) { + upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV; + upd_info->enc_iv.index = + (enc_offset + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES) >> 2; + upd_info->enc_iv.size = cfg->iv_size; + + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] = + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size; + + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL1] = + (SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET | (cfg->iv_size >> 3)); + total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size; + } else { + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] = + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + } + } + + if (cfg->auth_eng_id) { + upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH; + upd_info->auth_size.index = auth_offset >> 2; + upd_info->auth_offset.index = upd_info->auth_size.index + 1; + cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = auth_next_eng; + cmdl[auth_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] = + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + total += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + } + + total = roundup(total, 8); + + for (i = 0; i < total / 4; i++) + word_ptr[i] = swab32(word_ptr[i]); + + return total; +} + +/* Update Command label */ +static inline void sa_update_cmdl(struct sa_req *req, u32 *cmdl, + struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info) +{ + int i = 0, j; + + if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC)) { + cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] |= req->enc_size; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] &= + ~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] |= + FIELD_PREP(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK, + req->enc_offset); + + if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV)) { + __be32 *data = (__be32 *)&cmdl[upd_info->enc_iv.index]; + u32 *enc_iv = (u32 *)req->enc_iv; + + for (j = 0; i < upd_info->enc_iv.size; i += 4, j++) { + data[j] = cpu_to_be32(*enc_iv); + enc_iv++; + } + } + } + + if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH)) { + cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->auth_size.index] |= req->auth_size; + cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] &= + ~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->auth_offset.index] |= + FIELD_PREP(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK, + req->auth_offset); + if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV) { + sa_copy_iv((void *)&cmdl[upd_info->auth_iv.index], + req->auth_iv, + (upd_info->auth_iv.size > 8)); + } + if (upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY) { + int offset = (req->auth_size & 0xF) ? 4 : 0; + + memcpy(&cmdl[upd_info->aux_key_info.index], + &upd_info->aux_key[offset], 16); + } + } +} + +/* Format SWINFO words to be sent to SA */ +static +void sa_set_swinfo(u8 eng_id, u16 sc_id, dma_addr_t sc_phys, + u8 cmdl_present, u8 cmdl_offset, u8 flags, + u8 hash_size, u32 *swinfo) +{ + swinfo[0] = sc_id; + swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK, flags); + if (likely(cmdl_present)) + swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK, + cmdl_offset | SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT); + swinfo[0] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK, eng_id); + + swinfo[0] |= SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT; + swinfo[1] = (u32)(sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFFULL); + swinfo[2] = (u32)((sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL) >> 32); + swinfo[2] |= FIELD_PREP(SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH, hash_size); +} + +/* Dump the security context */ +static void sa_dump_sc(u8 *buf, dma_addr_t dma_addr) +{ +#ifdef DEBUG + dev_info(sa_k3_dev, "Security context dump:: 0x%pad\n", &dma_addr); + print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, + 16, 1, buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, false); +#endif +} + +static +int sa_init_sc(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, const struct sa_match_data *match_data, + const u8 *enc_key, u16 enc_key_sz, + const u8 *auth_key, u16 auth_key_sz, + struct algo_data *ad, u8 enc, u32 *swinfo) +{ + int enc_sc_offset = 0; + int auth_sc_offset = 0; + u8 *sc_buf = ctx->sc; + u16 sc_id = ctx->sc_id; + u8 first_engine = 0; + + memzero_explicit(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ); + + if (ad->auth_eng.eng_id) { + if (enc) + first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + else + first_engine = ad->auth_eng.eng_id; + + enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ; + auth_sc_offset = enc_sc_offset + ad->enc_eng.sc_size; + sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_AUTH_ENC; + if (!ad->hash_size) + return -EINVAL; + ad->hash_size = roundup(ad->hash_size, 8); + + } else if (ad->enc_eng.eng_id && !ad->auth_eng.eng_id) { + enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ; + first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_ENC; + ad->hash_size = ad->iv_out_size; + } + + /* SCCTL Owner info: 0=host, 1=CP_ACE */ + sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0; + memcpy(&sc_buf[2], &sc_id, 2); + sc_buf[4] = 0x0; + sc_buf[5] = match_data->priv_id; + sc_buf[6] = match_data->priv; + sc_buf[7] = 0x0; + + /* Prepare context for encryption engine */ + if (ad->enc_eng.sc_size) { + if (sa_set_sc_enc(ad, enc_key, enc_key_sz, enc, + &sc_buf[enc_sc_offset])) + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Prepare context for authentication engine */ + if (ad->auth_eng.sc_size) + sa_set_sc_auth(ad, auth_key, auth_key_sz, + &sc_buf[auth_sc_offset]); + + /* Set the ownership of context to CP_ACE */ + sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0x80; + + /* swizzle the security context */ + sa_swiz_128(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ); + + sa_set_swinfo(first_engine, ctx->sc_id, ctx->sc_phys, 1, 0, + SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_EVICT, ad->hash_size, swinfo); + + sa_dump_sc(sc_buf, ctx->sc_phys); + + return 0; +} + +/* Free the per direction context memory */ +static void sa_free_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, + struct sa_crypto_data *data) +{ + unsigned long bn; + + bn = ctx->sc_id - data->sc_id_start; + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + __clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id--; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + if (ctx->sc) { + dma_pool_free(data->sc_pool, ctx->sc, ctx->sc_phys); + ctx->sc = NULL; + } +} + +static int sa_init_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, + struct sa_crypto_data *data) +{ + unsigned long bn; + int err; + + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + bn = find_first_zero_bit(data->ctx_bm, SA_MAX_NUM_CTX); + __set_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id++; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + ctx->sc_id = (u16)(data->sc_id_start + bn); + + ctx->sc = dma_pool_alloc(data->sc_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &ctx->sc_phys); + if (!ctx->sc) { + dev_err(&data->pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate SC memory\n"); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto scid_rollback; + } + + return 0; + +scid_rollback: + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + __clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id--; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + return err; +} + +static void sa_cipher_cra_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); + + crypto_free_skcipher(ctx->fallback.skcipher); +} + +static int sa_cipher_cra_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base); + struct crypto_skcipher *child; + int ret; + + memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->dev_data = data; + + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); + if (ret) { + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + return ret; + } + + child = crypto_alloc_skcipher(name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + + if (IS_ERR(child)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name); + return PTR_ERR(child); + } + + ctx->fallback.skcipher = child; + crypto_skcipher_set_reqsize(tfm, crypto_skcipher_reqsize(child) + + sizeof(struct skcipher_request)); + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + return 0; +} + +static int sa_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen, struct algo_data *ad) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct crypto_skcipher *child = ctx->fallback.skcipher; + int cmdl_len; + struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg; + int ret; + + if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && + keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) + return -EINVAL; + + ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1; + ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ; + + memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cfg.iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); + + crypto_skcipher_clear_flags(child, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_skcipher_set_flags(child, tfm->base.crt_flags & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + ret = crypto_skcipher_setkey(child, key, keylen); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, key, keylen, NULL, 0, + ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1])) + goto badkey; + + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, + (u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl, + &ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info); + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + goto badkey; + + ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + + /* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, ctx->dev_data->match_data, key, keylen, NULL, 0, + ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1])) + goto badkey; + + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl, + &ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info); + + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + goto badkey; + + ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + ctx->iv_idx = ad->iv_idx; + + return 0; + +badkey: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int sa_aes_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + /* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */ + int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2; + + if (key_idx >= 3) + return -EINVAL; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_array[key_idx]; + ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_array[key_idx]; + ad.inv_key = true; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC; + ad.iv_idx = 4; + ad.iv_out_size = 16; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_aes_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + /* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */ + int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2; + + if (key_idx >= 3) + return -EINVAL; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_enc_array[key_idx]; + ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_dec_array[key_idx]; + ad.inv_key = true; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_ECB; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_3des_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_3des_enc_array; + ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_3des_dec_array; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_3DES_CBC; + ad.iv_idx = 6; + ad.iv_out_size = 8; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_3des_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_3des_enc_array; + ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_3des_dec_array; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static void sa_sync_from_device(struct sa_rx_data *rxd) +{ + struct sg_table *sgt; + + if (rxd->mapped_sg[0].dir == DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL) + sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[0].sgt; + else + sgt = &rxd->mapped_sg[1].sgt; + + dma_sync_sgtable_for_cpu(rxd->ddev, sgt, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); +} + +static void sa_free_sa_rx_data(struct sa_rx_data *rxd) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(rxd->mapped_sg); i++) { + struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[i]; + + if (mapped_sg->mapped) { + dma_unmap_sgtable(rxd->ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, + mapped_sg->dir, 0); + kfree(mapped_sg->split_sg); + } + } + + kfree(rxd); +} + +static void sa_aes_dma_in_callback(void *data) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data; + struct skcipher_request *req; + u32 *result; + __be32 *mdptr; + size_t ml, pl; + int i; + + sa_sync_from_device(rxd); + req = container_of(rxd->req, struct skcipher_request, base); + + if (req->iv) { + mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, + &ml); + result = (u32 *)req->iv; + + for (i = 0; i < (rxd->enc_iv_size / 4); i++) + result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + rxd->iv_idx]); + } + + sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd); + + skcipher_request_complete(req, 0); +} + +static void +sa_prepare_tx_desc(u32 *mdptr, u32 pslen, u32 *psdata, u32 epiblen, u32 *epib) +{ + u32 *out, *in; + int i; + + for (out = mdptr, in = epib, i = 0; i < epiblen / sizeof(u32); i++) + *out++ = *in++; + + mdptr[4] = (0xFFFF << 16); + for (out = &mdptr[5], in = psdata, i = 0; + i < pslen / sizeof(u32); i++) + *out++ = *in++; +} + +static int sa_run(struct sa_req *req) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd; + gfp_t gfp_flags; + u32 cmdl[SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS]; + struct sa_crypto_data *pdata = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + struct device *ddev; + struct dma_chan *dma_rx; + int sg_nents, src_nents, dst_nents; + struct scatterlist *src, *dst; + size_t pl, ml, split_size; + struct sa_ctx_info *sa_ctx = req->enc ? &req->ctx->enc : &req->ctx->dec; + int ret; + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_out; + u32 *mdptr; + bool diff_dst; + enum dma_data_direction dir_src; + struct sa_mapped_sg *mapped_sg; + + gfp_flags = req->base->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? + GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC; + + rxd = kzalloc(sizeof(*rxd), gfp_flags); + if (!rxd) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (req->src != req->dst) { + diff_dst = true; + dir_src = DMA_TO_DEVICE; + } else { + diff_dst = false; + dir_src = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL; + } + + /* + * SA2UL has an interesting feature where the receive DMA channel + * is selected based on the data passed to the engine. Within the + * transition range, there is also a space where it is impossible + * to determine where the data will end up, and this should be + * avoided. This will be handled by the SW fallback mechanism by + * the individual algorithm implementations. + */ + if (req->size >= 256) + dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx2; + else + dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx1; + + ddev = dmaengine_get_dma_device(pdata->dma_tx); + rxd->ddev = ddev; + + memcpy(cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl_size); + + sa_update_cmdl(req, cmdl, &sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info); + + if (req->type != CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) { + if (req->enc) + req->type |= + (SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_ENC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT); + else + req->type |= + (SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_DEC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT); + } + + cmdl[sa_ctx->cmdl_size / sizeof(u32)] = req->type; + + /* + * Map the packets, first we check if the data fits into a single + * sg entry and use that if possible. If it does not fit, we check + * if we need to do sg_split to align the scatterlist data on the + * actual data size being processed by the crypto engine. + */ + src = req->src; + sg_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, req->size); + + split_size = req->size; + + mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[0]; + if (sg_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->src->length) { + src = &mapped_sg->static_sg; + src_nents = 1; + sg_init_table(src, 1); + sg_set_page(src, sg_page(req->src), split_size, + req->src->offset); + + mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = src; + mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = src_nents; + ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0); + if (ret) { + kfree(rxd); + return ret; + } + + mapped_sg->dir = dir_src; + mapped_sg->mapped = true; + } else { + mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->src; + mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = sg_nents; + ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, dir_src, 0); + if (ret) { + kfree(rxd); + return ret; + } + + mapped_sg->dir = dir_src; + mapped_sg->mapped = true; + + ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents, 0, 1, + &split_size, &src, &src_nents, gfp_flags); + if (ret) { + src_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents; + src = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl; + } else { + mapped_sg->split_sg = src; + } + } + + dma_sync_sgtable_for_device(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + + if (!diff_dst) { + dst_nents = src_nents; + dst = src; + } else { + dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->size); + mapped_sg = &rxd->mapped_sg[1]; + + if (dst_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->dst->length) { + dst = &mapped_sg->static_sg; + dst_nents = 1; + sg_init_table(dst, 1); + sg_set_page(dst, sg_page(req->dst), split_size, + req->dst->offset); + + mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = dst; + mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents; + ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0); + if (ret) + goto err_cleanup; + + mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE; + mapped_sg->mapped = true; + } else { + mapped_sg->sgt.sgl = req->dst; + mapped_sg->sgt.orig_nents = dst_nents; + ret = dma_map_sgtable(ddev, &mapped_sg->sgt, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE, 0); + if (ret) + goto err_cleanup; + + mapped_sg->dir = DMA_FROM_DEVICE; + mapped_sg->mapped = true; + + ret = sg_split(mapped_sg->sgt.sgl, mapped_sg->sgt.nents, + 0, 1, &split_size, &dst, &dst_nents, + gfp_flags); + if (ret) { + dst_nents = mapped_sg->sgt.nents; + dst = mapped_sg->sgt.sgl; + } else { + mapped_sg->split_sg = dst; + } + } + } + + rxd->tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(dma_rx, dst, dst_nents, + DMA_DEV_TO_MEM, + DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); + if (!rxd->tx_in) { + dev_err(pdata->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + rxd->req = (void *)req->base; + rxd->enc = req->enc; + rxd->iv_idx = req->ctx->iv_idx; + rxd->enc_iv_size = sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info.enc_iv.size; + rxd->tx_in->callback = req->callback; + rxd->tx_in->callback_param = rxd; + + tx_out = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(pdata->dma_tx, src, + src_nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, + DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); + + if (!tx_out) { + dev_err(pdata->dev, "OUT prep_slave_sg() failed\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + /* + * Prepare metadata for DMA engine. This essentially describes the + * crypto algorithm to be used, data sizes, different keys etc. + */ + mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(tx_out, &pl, &ml); + + sa_prepare_tx_desc(mdptr, (sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * + sizeof(u32))), cmdl, sizeof(sa_ctx->epib), + sa_ctx->epib); + + ml = sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * sizeof(u32)); + dmaengine_desc_set_metadata_len(tx_out, req->mdata_size); + + dmaengine_submit(tx_out); + dmaengine_submit(rxd->tx_in); + + dma_async_issue_pending(dma_rx); + dma_async_issue_pending(pdata->dma_tx); + + return -EINPROGRESS; + +err_cleanup: + sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_cipher_run(struct skcipher_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = + crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req)); + struct crypto_alg *alg = req->base.tfm->__crt_alg; + struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 }; + + if (!req->cryptlen) + return 0; + + if (req->cryptlen % alg->cra_blocksize) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Use SW fallback if the data size is not supported */ + if (req->cryptlen > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ || + (req->cryptlen >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN && + req->cryptlen <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) { + struct skcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_request_ctx(req); + + skcipher_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.skcipher); + skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, + req->base.complete, + req->base.data); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, + req->cryptlen, req->iv); + if (enc) + return crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq); + else + return crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq); + } + + sa_req.size = req->cryptlen; + sa_req.enc_size = req->cryptlen; + sa_req.src = req->src; + sa_req.dst = req->dst; + sa_req.enc_iv = iv; + sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER; + sa_req.enc = enc; + sa_req.callback = sa_aes_dma_in_callback; + sa_req.mdata_size = 44; + sa_req.base = &req->base; + sa_req.ctx = ctx; + + return sa_run(&sa_req); +} + +static int sa_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 1); +} + +static int sa_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 0); +} + +static void sa_sha_dma_in_callback(void *data) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data; + struct ahash_request *req; + struct crypto_ahash *tfm; + unsigned int authsize; + int i; + size_t ml, pl; + u32 *result; + __be32 *mdptr; + + sa_sync_from_device(rxd); + req = container_of(rxd->req, struct ahash_request, base); + tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + authsize = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); + + mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml); + result = (u32 *)req->result; + + for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++) + result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + 4]); + + sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd); + + ahash_request_complete(req, 0); +} + +static int zero_message_process(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + int sa_digest_size = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); + + switch (sa_digest_size) { + case SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE: + memcpy(req->result, sha1_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size); + break; + case SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE: + memcpy(req->result, sha256_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size); + break; + case SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE: + memcpy(req->result, sha512_zero_message_hash, sa_digest_size); + break; + default: + return -EINVAL; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_sha_run(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req)); + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 }; + size_t auth_len; + + auth_len = req->nbytes; + + if (!auth_len) + return zero_message_process(req); + + if (auth_len > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ || + (auth_len >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN && + auth_len <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) { + struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req; + int ret = 0; + + ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash); + subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + crypto_ahash_init(subreq); + + subreq->nbytes = auth_len; + subreq->src = req->src; + subreq->result = req->result; + + ret |= crypto_ahash_update(subreq); + + subreq->nbytes = 0; + + ret |= crypto_ahash_final(subreq); + + return ret; + } + + sa_req.size = auth_len; + sa_req.auth_size = auth_len; + sa_req.src = req->src; + sa_req.dst = req->src; + sa_req.enc = true; + sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH; + sa_req.callback = sa_sha_dma_in_callback; + sa_req.mdata_size = 28; + sa_req.ctx = ctx; + sa_req.base = &req->base; + + return sa_run(&sa_req); +} + +static int sa_sha_setup(struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx, struct algo_data *ad) +{ + int bs = crypto_shash_blocksize(ctx->shash); + int cmdl_len; + struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg; + + ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ; + ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1; + ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ; + + memset(ctx->authkey, 0, bs); + memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id; + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id; + cfg.iv_size = 0; + cfg.akey = NULL; + cfg.akey_len = 0; + + ctx->dev_data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + /* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + ad, 0, &ctx->enc.epib[1])) + goto badkey; + + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, + (u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl, + &ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info); + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + goto badkey; + + ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + + return 0; + +badkey: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int sa_sha_cra_init_alg(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const char *alg_base) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + int ret; + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->dev_data = data; + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + if (alg_base) { + ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(alg_base, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n", + alg_base); + return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash); + } + /* for fallback */ + ctx->fallback.ahash = + crypto_alloc_ahash(alg_base, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash)) { + dev_err(ctx->dev_data->dev, + "Could not load fallback driver\n"); + return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.ahash); + } + } + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + + crypto_ahash_set_reqsize(__crypto_ahash_cast(tfm), + sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) + + crypto_ahash_reqsize(ctx->fallback.ahash)); + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_sha_digest(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + return sa_sha_run(req); +} + +static int sa_sha_init(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "init: digest size: %u, rctx=%p\n", + crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm), rctx); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash); + rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = + req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + return crypto_ahash_init(&rctx->fallback_req); +} + +static int sa_sha_update(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash); + rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = + req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes; + rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src; + + return crypto_ahash_update(&rctx->fallback_req); +} + +static int sa_sha_final(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash); + rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = + req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result; + + return crypto_ahash_final(&rctx->fallback_req); +} + +static int sa_sha_finup(struct ahash_request *req) +{ + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash); + rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = + req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + rctx->fallback_req.nbytes = req->nbytes; + rctx->fallback_req.src = req->src; + rctx->fallback_req.result = req->result; + + return crypto_ahash_finup(&rctx->fallback_req); +} + +static int sa_sha_import(struct ahash_request *req, const void *in) +{ + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + + ahash_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback.ahash); + rctx->fallback_req.base.flags = req->base.flags & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + return crypto_ahash_import(&rctx->fallback_req, in); +} + +static int sa_sha_export(struct ahash_request *req, void *out) +{ + struct sa_sha_req_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req); + struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm); + struct ahash_request *subreq = &rctx->fallback_req; + + ahash_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.ahash); + subreq->base.flags = req->base.flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; + + return crypto_ahash_export(subreq, out); +} + +static int sa_sha1_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha1"); + + ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA1; + ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1; + + sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad); + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_sha256_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha256"); + + ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_256; + ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256; + + sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad); + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_sha512_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + + sa_sha_cra_init_alg(tfm, "sha512"); + + ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_512; + ad.hash_size = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE; + ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA512; + + sa_sha_setup(ctx, &ad); + + return 0; +} + +static void sa_sha_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + + if (crypto_tfm_alg_type(tfm) == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + + crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash); + crypto_free_ahash(ctx->fallback.ahash); +} + +static void sa_aead_dma_in_callback(void *data) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data; + struct aead_request *req; + struct crypto_aead *tfm; + unsigned int start; + unsigned int authsize; + u8 auth_tag[SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ]; + size_t pl, ml; + int i; + int err = 0; + u32 *mdptr; + + sa_sync_from_device(rxd); + req = container_of(rxd->req, struct aead_request, base); + tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + start = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen; + authsize = crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + + mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, &ml); + for (i = 0; i < (authsize / 4); i++) + mdptr[i + 4] = swab32(mdptr[i + 4]); + + if (rxd->enc) { + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(&mdptr[4], req->dst, start, authsize, + 1); + } else { + start -= authsize; + scatterwalk_map_and_copy(auth_tag, req->src, start, authsize, + 0); + + err = memcmp(&mdptr[4], auth_tag, authsize) ? -EBADMSG : 0; + } + + sa_free_sa_rx_data(rxd); + + aead_request_complete(req, err); +} + +static int sa_cra_init_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const char *hash, + const char *fallback) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + int ret; + + memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->dev_data = data; + + ctx->shash = crypto_alloc_shash(hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + if (IS_ERR(ctx->shash)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "base driver %s couldn't be loaded\n", hash); + return PTR_ERR(ctx->shash); + } + + ctx->fallback.aead = crypto_alloc_aead(fallback, 0, + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + + if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "fallback driver %s couldn't be loaded\n", + fallback); + return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.aead); + } + + crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_request) + + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->fallback.aead)); + + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + if (ret) + return ret; + + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); + if (ret) { + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + return ret; + } + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha1(struct crypto_aead *tfm) +{ + return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha1", + "authenc(hmac(sha1-ce),cbc(aes-ce))"); +} + +static int sa_cra_init_aead_sha256(struct crypto_aead *tfm) +{ + return sa_cra_init_aead(tfm, "sha256", + "authenc(hmac(sha256-ce),cbc(aes-ce))"); +} + +static void sa_exit_tfm_aead(struct crypto_aead *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + + crypto_free_shash(ctx->shash); + crypto_free_aead(ctx->fallback.aead); + + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); +} + +/* AEAD algorithm configuration interface function */ +static int sa_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen, + struct algo_data *ad) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc); + struct crypto_authenc_keys keys; + int cmdl_len; + struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg; + int key_idx; + + if (crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&keys, key, keylen) != 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */ + key_idx = (keys.enckeylen >> 3) - 2; + if (key_idx >= 3) + return -EINVAL; + + ad->ctx = ctx; + ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1; + ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ; + ad->auth_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_AM1; + ad->auth_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ; + ad->mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_no_iv_array[key_idx]; + ad->mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_no_iv_array[key_idx]; + ad->inv_key = true; + ad->keyed_mac = true; + ad->ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC; + ad->prep_iopad = sa_prepare_iopads; + + memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.enc = true; + cfg.aalg = ad->aalg_id; + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cfg.auth_eng_id = ad->auth_eng.eng_id; + cfg.iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(authenc); + cfg.akey = keys.authkey; + cfg.akey_len = keys.authkeylen; + + /* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, ctx->dev_data->match_data, keys.enckey, + keys.enckeylen, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, + ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1])) + return -EINVAL; + + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, + (u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl, + &ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info); + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + + ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + + /* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, ctx->dev_data->match_data, keys.enckey, + keys.enckeylen, keys.authkey, keys.authkeylen, + ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1])) + return -EINVAL; + + cfg.enc = false; + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl, + &ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info); + + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + return -EINVAL; + + ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + + crypto_aead_clear_flags(ctx->fallback.aead, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_aead_set_flags(ctx->fallback.aead, + crypto_aead_get_flags(authenc) & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + + return crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->fallback.aead, key, keylen); +} + +static int sa_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)); + + return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->fallback.aead, authsize); +} + +static int sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC; + ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA1; + ad.hash_size = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; + ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA1; + + return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey(struct crypto_aead *authenc, + const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC; + ad.aalg_id = SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA2_256; + ad.hash_size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE; + ad.auth_ctrl = SA_AUTH_SW_CTRL_SHA256; + + return sa_aead_setkey(authenc, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_aead_run(struct aead_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc) +{ + struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req); + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 }; + size_t auth_size, enc_size; + + enc_size = req->cryptlen; + auth_size = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen; + + if (!enc) { + enc_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + auth_size -= crypto_aead_authsize(tfm); + } + + if (auth_size > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ || + (auth_size >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN && + auth_size <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) { + struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req); + int ret; + + aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.aead); + aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, + req->base.complete, req->base.data); + aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, + req->cryptlen, req->iv); + aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen); + + ret = enc ? crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq) : + crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq); + return ret; + } + + sa_req.enc_offset = req->assoclen; + sa_req.enc_size = enc_size; + sa_req.auth_size = auth_size; + sa_req.size = auth_size; + sa_req.enc_iv = iv; + sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD; + sa_req.enc = enc; + sa_req.callback = sa_aead_dma_in_callback; + sa_req.mdata_size = 52; + sa_req.base = &req->base; + sa_req.ctx = ctx; + sa_req.src = req->src; + sa_req.dst = req->dst; + + return sa_run(&sa_req); +} + +/* AEAD algorithm encrypt interface function */ +static int sa_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 1); +} + +/* AEAD algorithm decrypt interface function */ +static int sa_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req) +{ + return sa_aead_run(req, req->iv, 0); +} + +static struct sa_alg_tmpl sa_algs[] = { + [SA_ALG_CBC_AES] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_aes_cbc_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + [SA_ALG_EBC_AES] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_aes_ecb_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + [SA_ALG_CBC_DES3] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_3des_cbc_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + [SA_ALG_ECB_DES3] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_3des_ecb_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + [SA_ALG_SHA1] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, + .alg.ahash = { + .halg.base = { + .cra_name = "sha1", + .cra_driver_name = "sha1-sa2ul", + .cra_priority = 400, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = sa_sha1_cra_init, + .cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit, + }, + .halg.digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + .halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) + + sizeof(struct sha1_state), + .init = sa_sha_init, + .update = sa_sha_update, + .final = sa_sha_final, + .finup = sa_sha_finup, + .digest = sa_sha_digest, + .export = sa_sha_export, + .import = sa_sha_import, + }, + }, + [SA_ALG_SHA256] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, + .alg.ahash = { + .halg.base = { + .cra_name = "sha256", + .cra_driver_name = "sha256-sa2ul", + .cra_priority = 400, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = sa_sha256_cra_init, + .cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit, + }, + .halg.digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + .halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) + + sizeof(struct sha256_state), + .init = sa_sha_init, + .update = sa_sha_update, + .final = sa_sha_final, + .finup = sa_sha_finup, + .digest = sa_sha_digest, + .export = sa_sha_export, + .import = sa_sha_import, + }, + }, + [SA_ALG_SHA512] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH, + .alg.ahash = { + .halg.base = { + .cra_name = "sha512", + .cra_driver_name = "sha512-sa2ul", + .cra_priority = 400, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_blocksize = SHA512_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_init = sa_sha512_cra_init, + .cra_exit = sa_sha_cra_exit, + }, + .halg.digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, + .halg.statesize = sizeof(struct sa_sha_req_ctx) + + sizeof(struct sha512_state), + .init = sa_sha_init, + .update = sa_sha_update, + .final = sa_sha_final, + .finup = sa_sha_finup, + .digest = sa_sha_digest, + .export = sa_sha_export, + .import = sa_sha_import, + }, + }, + [SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, + .alg.aead = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = + "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))-sa2ul", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_priority = 3000, + }, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, + + .init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha1, + .exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead, + .setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha1_setkey, + .setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize, + .encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt, + }, + }, + [SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES] = { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD, + .alg.aead = { + .base = { + .cra_name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))", + .cra_driver_name = + "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))-sa2ul", + .cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .cra_alignmask = 0, + .cra_priority = 3000, + }, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, + + .init = sa_cra_init_aead_sha256, + .exit = sa_exit_tfm_aead, + .setkey = sa_aead_cbc_sha256_setkey, + .setauthsize = sa_aead_setauthsize, + .encrypt = sa_aead_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_aead_decrypt, + }, + }, +}; + +/* Register the algorithms in crypto framework */ +static void sa_register_algos(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data) +{ + const struct sa_match_data *match_data = dev_data->match_data; + struct device *dev = dev_data->dev; + char *alg_name; + u32 type; + int i, err; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) { + /* Skip unsupported algos */ + if (!(match_data->supported_algos & BIT(i))) + continue; + + type = sa_algs[i].type; + if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) { + alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher.base.cra_name; + err = crypto_register_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher); + } else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) { + alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.ahash.halg.base.cra_name; + err = crypto_register_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash); + } else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) { + alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.aead.base.cra_name; + err = crypto_register_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead); + } else { + dev_err(dev, + "un-supported crypto algorithm (%d)", + sa_algs[i].type); + continue; + } + + if (err) + dev_err(dev, "Failed to register '%s'\n", alg_name); + else + sa_algs[i].registered = true; + } +} + +/* Unregister the algorithms in crypto framework */ +static void sa_unregister_algos(const struct device *dev) +{ + u32 type; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) { + type = sa_algs[i].type; + if (!sa_algs[i].registered) + continue; + if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher); + else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) + crypto_unregister_ahash(&sa_algs[i].alg.ahash); + else if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) + crypto_unregister_aead(&sa_algs[i].alg.aead); + + sa_algs[i].registered = false; + } +} + +static int sa_init_mem(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data) +{ + struct device *dev = &dev_data->pdev->dev; + /* Setup dma pool for security context buffers */ + dev_data->sc_pool = dma_pool_create("keystone-sc", dev, + SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, 64, 0); + if (!dev_data->sc_pool) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to create dma pool"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_dma_init(struct sa_crypto_data *dd) +{ + int ret; + struct dma_slave_config cfg; + + dd->dma_rx1 = NULL; + dd->dma_tx = NULL; + dd->dma_rx2 = NULL; + + ret = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dd->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + dd->dma_rx1 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx1"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx1)) + return dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1), + "Unable to request rx1 DMA channel\n"); + + dd->dma_rx2 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx2"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx2)) { + ret = dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx2), + "Unable to request rx2 DMA channel\n"); + goto err_dma_rx2; + } + + dd->dma_tx = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "tx"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_tx)) { + ret = dev_err_probe(dd->dev, PTR_ERR(dd->dma_tx), + "Unable to request tx DMA channel\n"); + goto err_dma_tx; + } + + memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg)); + + cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; + cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; + cfg.src_maxburst = 4; + cfg.dst_maxburst = 4; + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx1, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + goto err_dma_config; + } + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx2, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + goto err_dma_config; + } + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_tx, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure OUT dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + goto err_dma_config; + } + + return 0; + +err_dma_config: + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_tx); +err_dma_tx: + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx2); +err_dma_rx2: + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_link_child(struct device *dev, void *data) +{ + struct device *parent = data; + + device_link_add(dev, parent, DL_FLAG_AUTOPROBE_CONSUMER); + + return 0; +} + +static struct sa_match_data am654_match_data = { + .priv = 1, + .priv_id = 1, + .supported_algos = BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_AES) | + BIT(SA_ALG_EBC_AES) | + BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_DES3) | + BIT(SA_ALG_ECB_DES3) | + BIT(SA_ALG_SHA1) | + BIT(SA_ALG_SHA256) | + BIT(SA_ALG_SHA512) | + BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA1_AES) | + BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES), +}; + +static struct sa_match_data am64_match_data = { + .priv = 0, + .priv_id = 0, + .supported_algos = BIT(SA_ALG_CBC_AES) | + BIT(SA_ALG_EBC_AES) | + BIT(SA_ALG_SHA256) | + BIT(SA_ALG_SHA512) | + BIT(SA_ALG_AUTHENC_SHA256_AES), +}; + +static const struct of_device_id of_match[] = { + { .compatible = "ti,j721e-sa2ul", .data = &am654_match_data, }, + { .compatible = "ti,am654-sa2ul", .data = &am654_match_data, }, + { .compatible = "ti,am64-sa2ul", .data = &am64_match_data, }, + { .compatible = "ti,am62-sa3ul", .data = &am64_match_data, }, + {}, +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_match); + +static int sa_ul_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct device_node *node = dev->of_node; + static void __iomem *saul_base; + struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data; + u32 status, val; + int ret; + + dev_data = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dev_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + dev_data->match_data = of_device_get_match_data(dev); + if (!dev_data->match_data) + return -ENODEV; + + saul_base = devm_platform_ioremap_resource(pdev, 0); + if (IS_ERR(saul_base)) + return PTR_ERR(saul_base); + + sa_k3_dev = dev; + dev_data->dev = dev; + dev_data->pdev = pdev; + dev_data->base = saul_base; + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev_data); + dev_set_drvdata(sa_k3_dev, dev_data); + + pm_runtime_enable(dev); + ret = pm_runtime_resume_and_get(dev); + if (ret < 0) { + dev_err(dev, "%s: failed to get sync: %d\n", __func__, ret); + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + return ret; + } + + sa_init_mem(dev_data); + ret = sa_dma_init(dev_data); + if (ret) + goto destroy_dma_pool; + + spin_lock_init(&dev_data->scid_lock); + + val = SA_EEC_ENCSS_EN | SA_EEC_AUTHSS_EN | SA_EEC_CTXCACH_EN | + SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_IN_EN | SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_OUT_EN | + SA_EEC_TRNG_EN; + status = readl_relaxed(saul_base + SA_ENGINE_STATUS); + /* Only enable engines if all are not already enabled */ + if (val & ~status) + writel_relaxed(val, saul_base + SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL); + + sa_register_algos(dev_data); + + ret = of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, dev); + if (ret) + goto release_dma; + + device_for_each_child(dev, dev, sa_link_child); + + return 0; + +release_dma: + sa_unregister_algos(dev); + + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx); + +destroy_dma_pool: + dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool); + + pm_runtime_put_sync(dev); + pm_runtime_disable(dev); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_ul_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + of_platform_depopulate(&pdev->dev); + + sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev); + + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx); + + dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool); + + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL); + + pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev); + pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); + + return 0; +} + +static struct platform_driver sa_ul_driver = { + .probe = sa_ul_probe, + .remove = sa_ul_remove, + .driver = { + .name = "saul-crypto", + .of_match_table = of_match, + }, +}; +module_platform_driver(sa_ul_driver); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); |