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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h | 248 |
1 files changed, 248 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6229ba9c5 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/s390/crypto/zcrypt_cca_key.h @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ +/* + * Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2006 + * Author(s): Robert Burroughs + * Eric Rossman (edrossma@us.ibm.com) + * + * Hotplug & misc device support: Jochen Roehrig (roehrig@de.ibm.com) + * Major cleanup & driver split: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> + */ + +#ifndef _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ +#define _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ + +struct t6_keyblock_hdr { + unsigned short blen; + unsigned short ulen; + unsigned short flags; +}; + +/** + * mapping for the cca private ME key token. + * Three parts of interest here: the header, the private section and + * the public section. + * + * mapping for the cca key token header + */ +struct cca_token_hdr { + unsigned char token_identifier; + unsigned char version; + unsigned short token_length; + unsigned char reserved[4]; +} __packed; + +#define CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT 0x1E + +#define CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL 0x80 + +/** + * mapping for the cca public section + * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public + * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be + * used, for a section length of 0x0F always. + */ +struct cca_public_sec { + unsigned char section_identifier; + unsigned char version; + unsigned short section_length; + unsigned char reserved[2]; + unsigned short exponent_len; + unsigned short modulus_bit_len; + unsigned short modulus_byte_len; /* In a private key, this is 0 */ +} __packed; + +/** + * mapping for the cca private CRT key 'token' + * The first three parts (the only parts considered in this release) + * are: the header, the private section and the public section. + * The header and public section are the same as for the + * struct cca_private_ext_ME + * + * Following the structure are the quantities p, q, dp, dq, u, pad, + * and modulus, in that order, where pad_len is the modulo 8 + * complement of the residue modulo 8 of the sum of + * (p_len + q_len + dp_len + dq_len + u_len). + */ +struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec { + unsigned char section_identifier; + unsigned char version; + unsigned short section_length; + unsigned char private_key_hash[20]; + unsigned char reserved1[4]; + unsigned char key_format; + unsigned char reserved2; + unsigned char key_name_hash[20]; + unsigned char key_use_flags[4]; + unsigned short p_len; + unsigned short q_len; + unsigned short dp_len; + unsigned short dq_len; + unsigned short u_len; + unsigned short mod_len; + unsigned char reserved3[4]; + unsigned short pad_len; + unsigned char reserved4[52]; + unsigned char confounder[8]; +} __packed; + +#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT 0x08 +#define CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL 0x40 + +/** + * Set up private key fields of a type6 MEX message. The _pad variant + * strips leading zeroes from the b_key. + * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, + * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. + * + * @mex: pointer to user input data + * @p: pointer to memory area for the key + * + * Returns the size of the key area or negative errno value. + */ +static inline int zcrypt_type6_mex_key_en(struct ica_rsa_modexpo *mex, void *p) +{ + static struct cca_token_hdr static_pub_hdr = { + .token_identifier = 0x1E, + }; + static struct cca_public_sec static_pub_sec = { + .section_identifier = 0x04, + }; + struct { + struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr; + struct cca_token_hdr pubhdr; + struct cca_public_sec pubsec; + char exponent[0]; + } __packed *key = p; + unsigned char *temp; + int i; + + /* + * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching + * function zcrypt_rsa_modexpo(). However, do a plausibility check + * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized + * to compromise the system. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mex->inputdatalength > 512)) + return -EINVAL; + + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); + + key->pubhdr = static_pub_hdr; + key->pubsec = static_pub_sec; + + /* key parameter block */ + temp = key->exponent; + if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->b_key, mex->inputdatalength)) + return -EFAULT; + /* Strip leading zeroes from b_key. */ + for (i = 0; i < mex->inputdatalength; i++) + if (temp[i]) + break; + if (i >= mex->inputdatalength) + return -EINVAL; + memmove(temp, temp + i, mex->inputdatalength - i); + temp += mex->inputdatalength - i; + /* modulus */ + if (copy_from_user(temp, mex->n_modulus, mex->inputdatalength)) + return -EFAULT; + + key->pubsec.modulus_bit_len = 8 * mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubsec.modulus_byte_len = mex->inputdatalength; + key->pubsec.exponent_len = mex->inputdatalength - i; + key->pubsec.section_length = sizeof(key->pubsec) + + 2 * mex->inputdatalength - i; + key->pubhdr.token_length = + key->pubsec.section_length + sizeof(key->pubhdr); + key->t6_hdr.ulen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 4; + key->t6_hdr.blen = key->pubhdr.token_length + 6; + return sizeof(*key) + 2 * mex->inputdatalength - i; +} + +/** + * Set up private key fields of a type6 CRT message. + * Note that all numerics in the key token are big-endian, + * while the entries in the key block header are little-endian. + * + * @mex: pointer to user input data + * @p: pointer to memory area for the key + * + * Returns the size of the key area or -EFAULT + */ +static inline int zcrypt_type6_crt_key(struct ica_rsa_modexpo_crt *crt, void *p) +{ + static struct cca_public_sec static_cca_pub_sec = { + .section_identifier = 4, + .section_length = 0x000f, + .exponent_len = 0x0003, + }; + static char pk_exponent[3] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; + struct { + struct t6_keyblock_hdr t6_hdr; + struct cca_token_hdr token; + struct cca_pvt_ext_crt_sec pvt; + char key_parts[0]; + } __packed *key = p; + struct cca_public_sec *pub; + int short_len, long_len, pad_len, key_len, size; + + /* + * The inputdatalength was a selection criteria in the dispatching + * function zcrypt_rsa_crt(). However, do a plausibility check + * here to make sure the following copy_from_user() can't be utilized + * to compromise the system. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(crt->inputdatalength > 512)) + return -EINVAL; + + memset(key, 0, sizeof(*key)); + + short_len = (crt->inputdatalength + 1) / 2; + long_len = short_len + 8; + pad_len = -(3 * long_len + 2 * short_len) & 7; + key_len = 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len + crt->inputdatalength; + size = sizeof(*key) + key_len + sizeof(*pub) + 3; + + /* parameter block.key block */ + key->t6_hdr.blen = size; + key->t6_hdr.ulen = size - 2; + + /* key token header */ + key->token.token_identifier = CCA_TKN_HDR_ID_EXT; + key->token.token_length = size - 6; + + /* private section */ + key->pvt.section_identifier = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_ID_PVT; + key->pvt.section_length = sizeof(key->pvt) + key_len; + key->pvt.key_format = CCA_PVT_EXT_CRT_SEC_FMT_CL; + key->pvt.key_use_flags[0] = CCA_PVT_USAGE_ALL; + key->pvt.p_len = key->pvt.dp_len = key->pvt.u_len = long_len; + key->pvt.q_len = key->pvt.dq_len = short_len; + key->pvt.mod_len = crt->inputdatalength; + key->pvt.pad_len = pad_len; + + /* key parts */ + if (copy_from_user(key->key_parts, crt->np_prime, long_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len, + crt->nq_prime, short_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + long_len + short_len, + crt->bp_key, long_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + short_len, + crt->bq_key, short_len) || + copy_from_user(key->key_parts + 2 * long_len + 2 * short_len, + crt->u_mult_inv, long_len)) + return -EFAULT; + memset(key->key_parts + 3 * long_len + 2 * short_len + pad_len, + 0xff, crt->inputdatalength); + pub = (struct cca_public_sec *)(key->key_parts + key_len); + *pub = static_cca_pub_sec; + pub->modulus_bit_len = 8 * crt->inputdatalength; + /* + * In a private key, the modulus doesn't appear in the public + * section. So, an arbitrary public exponent of 0x010001 will be + * used. + */ + memcpy((char *)(pub + 1), pk_exponent, 3); + return size; +} + +#endif /* _ZCRYPT_CCA_KEY_H_ */ |