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Diffstat (limited to 'security/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 264 |
1 files changed, 264 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e6db09a77 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# +# Security configuration +# + +menu "Security options" + +source "security/keys/Kconfig" + +config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT + bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" + default n + help + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel + syslog via dmesg(8). + + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced + unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY + bool "Enable different security models" + depends on SYSFS + depends on MULTIUSER + help + This allows you to choose different security modules to be + configured into your kernel. + + If this option is not selected, the default Linux security + model will be used. + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS + depends on SECURITY + bool + default n + +config SECURITYFS + bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" + help + This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by + various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM). + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_NETWORK + bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the socket and networking security hooks. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement socket and networking access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_INFINIBAND + bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" + depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND + help + This enables the Infiniband security hooks. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement Infiniband access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM + bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" + depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK + help + This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement per-packet access controls based on labels + derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are + designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized + to communicate unlabelled data can send without using + IPSec. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config SECURITY_PATH + bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" + depends on SECURITY + help + This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. + If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to + implement pathname based access controls. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. + +config INTEL_TXT + bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" + depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT + help + This option enables support for booting the kernel with the + Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize + Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch + of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this + will have no effect. + + Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and + initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to + create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which + helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning + correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside + of the kernel itself. + + Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having + confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that + it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for + providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. + + See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information + about Intel(R) TXT. + See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. + See Documentation/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable + Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. + + If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. + +config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR + int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" + depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX + default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) + default 65536 + help + This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected + from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages + can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. + + For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space + a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. + On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. + Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map + this low address space will need the permission specific to the + systems running LSM. + +config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + bool + help + The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for + validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in + support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. + +config HARDENED_USERCOPY + bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" + depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR + imply STRICT_DEVMEM + help + This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when + copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and + copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that + are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple + separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack, + or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes + of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. + +config FORTIFY_SOURCE + bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows" + depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE + # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 120001 + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32 + help + Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions + where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes. + +config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER + bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary" + help + By default, the kernel can call many different userspace + binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel + interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined + either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration + option. However, some of these are dynamically created at + runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up. + To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these + calls through a single executable that can not have its name + changed. + + Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant + "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument + passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick + and choose what real programs are called. + + If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be + disabled, choose this option and then set + STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. + +config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH + string "Path to the static usermode helper binary" + depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER + default "/sbin/usermode-helper" + help + The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper + program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will + be in the first argument passed to this program on the command + line. + + If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled, + specify an empty string here (i.e. ""). + +source "security/selinux/Kconfig" +source "security/smack/Kconfig" +source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig" +source "security/apparmor/Kconfig" +source "security/loadpin/Kconfig" +source "security/yama/Kconfig" +source "security/safesetid/Kconfig" +source "security/lockdown/Kconfig" +source "security/landlock/Kconfig" + +source "security/integrity/Kconfig" + +choice + prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized" + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR + default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + + help + This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY + in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't + change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config, + for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set. + + Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be + initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM. + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX + bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y + + config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" + +endchoice + +config LSM + string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs" + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC + default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" + help + A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order. + Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be + controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter. + + If unsure, leave this as the default. + +source "security/Kconfig.hardening" + +endmenu + |