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-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c679
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h120
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c758
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h85
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/constraint.h63
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.c32
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/context.h199
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c564
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h154
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c192
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h148
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c660
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h116
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h52
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c3731
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h391
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c4072
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.h38
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c628
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h159
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.c54
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/symtab.h27
22 files changed, 12922 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8480ec6c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,679 @@
+/*
+ * Implementation of the access vector table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
+ * public domain.
+ */
+static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
+{
+ static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
+ static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
+ static const u32 r1 = 15;
+ static const u32 r2 = 13;
+ static const u32 m = 5;
+ static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
+
+ u32 hash = 0;
+
+#define mix(input) do { \
+ u32 v = input; \
+ v *= c1; \
+ v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
+ v *= c2; \
+ hash ^= v; \
+ hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
+ hash = hash * m + n; \
+ } while (0)
+
+ mix(keyp->target_class);
+ mix(keyp->target_type);
+ mix(keyp->source_type);
+
+#undef mix
+
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+ hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
+ hash ^= hash >> 13;
+ hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
+ hash ^= hash >> 16;
+
+ return hash & mask;
+}
+
+static struct avtab_node*
+avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
+ struct avtab_node *prev,
+ const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *newnode;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+ newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (newnode == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ newnode->key = *key;
+
+ if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (xperms == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ *xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
+ newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
+ } else {
+ newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
+ }
+
+ if (prev) {
+ newnode->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = newnode;
+ } else {
+ struct avtab_node **n = &h->htable[hvalue];
+
+ newnode->next = *n;
+ *n = newnode;
+ }
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return newnode;
+}
+
+static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified)) {
+ /* extended perms may not be unique */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ break;
+ return -EEXIST;
+ }
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+ if (!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
+ * key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
+ * It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot)
+ return NULL;
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (prev = NULL, cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ cur;
+ prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum);
+}
+
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ return &cur->datum;
+
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
+ * conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
+ */
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key)
+{
+ int hvalue;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+
+ if (!h || !h->nslot)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
+ for (cur = h->htable[hvalue]; cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+struct avtab_node*
+avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return NULL;
+
+ specified &= ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
+ for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
+ (specified & cur->key.specified))
+ return cur;
+
+ if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
+ break;
+ if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
+ node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
+ node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
+ break;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ if (!h)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
+ temp->datum.u.xperms);
+ kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+ }
+ kvfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+{
+ h->htable = NULL;
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->nslot = 0;
+ h->mask = 0;
+}
+
+static int avtab_alloc_common(struct avtab *h, u32 nslot)
+{
+ if (!nslot)
+ return 0;
+
+ h->htable = kvcalloc(nslot, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!h->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ h->nslot = nslot;
+ h->mask = nslot - 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 nslot = 0;
+
+ if (nrules != 0) {
+ u32 shift = 1;
+ u32 work = nrules >> 3;
+ while (work) {
+ work >>= 1;
+ shift++;
+ }
+ nslot = 1 << shift;
+ if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
+ nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc_common(h, nslot);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n", nslot, nrules);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig)
+{
+ return avtab_alloc_common(new, orig->nslot);
+}
+
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
+{
+ int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ chain2_len_sum = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
+ "longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
+ tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
+ chain2_len_sum);
+}
+
+static const uint16_t spec_order[] = {
+ AVTAB_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
+ AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ AVTAB_CHANGE,
+ AVTAB_MEMBER,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
+};
+
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+ int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+ void *p)
+{
+ __le16 buf16[4];
+ u16 enabled;
+ u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
+ int i, rc;
+ unsigned set;
+
+ memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
+ memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
+
+ if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
+ if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ items = 0;
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.source_type = (u16)val;
+ if (key.source_type != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.target_type = (u16)val;
+ if (key.target_type != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ key.target_class = (u16)val;
+ if (key.target_class != val) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
+
+ if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
+ (val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+ if (val & spec_order[i]) {
+ key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
+ rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (items != items2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n",
+ items2, items);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ items = 0;
+ key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+ key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
+
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ set = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
+ if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
+ set++;
+ }
+ if (!set || set > 1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
+ (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
+ "support extended permissions rules and one "
+ "was specified\n", vers);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
+ xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
+ datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
+ } else {
+ rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
+ }
+ if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
+}
+
+static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p)
+{
+ return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
+}
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 nel, i;
+
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (!nel) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (rc == -ENOMEM)
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
+ else if (rc == -EEXIST)
+ pr_err("SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
+
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+bad:
+ avtab_destroy(a);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
+{
+ __le16 buf16[4];
+ __le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
+ int rc;
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
+ buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
+ buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
+ buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
+ rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
+ buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
+ ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
+ } else {
+ buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
+ rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct avtab_node *cur;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
+ for (cur = a->htable[i]; cur;
+ cur = cur->next) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+ avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+ avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
+ sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3ebea8d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * An access vector table (avtab) is a hash table
+ * of access vectors and transition types indexed
+ * by a type pair and a class. An access vector
+ * table is used to represent the type enforcement
+ * tables.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ *
+ * Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_AVTAB_H_
+#define _SS_AVTAB_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+
+struct avtab_key {
+ u16 source_type; /* source type */
+ u16 target_type; /* target type */
+ u16 target_class; /* target object class */
+#define AVTAB_ALLOWED 0x0001
+#define AVTAB_AUDITALLOW 0x0002
+#define AVTAB_AUDITDENY 0x0004
+#define AVTAB_AV (AVTAB_ALLOWED | AVTAB_AUDITALLOW | AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+#define AVTAB_TRANSITION 0x0010
+#define AVTAB_MEMBER 0x0020
+#define AVTAB_CHANGE 0x0040
+#define AVTAB_TYPE (AVTAB_TRANSITION | AVTAB_MEMBER | AVTAB_CHANGE)
+/* extended permissions */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED 0x0100
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 0x0200
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 0x0400
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS (AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW | \
+ AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD 0x80000000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+#define AVTAB_ENABLED 0x8000 /* reserved for used in cond_avtab */
+ u16 specified; /* what field is specified */
+};
+
+/*
+ * For operations that require more than the 32 permissions provided by the avc
+ * extended permissions may be used to provide 256 bits of permissions.
+ */
+struct avtab_extended_perms {
+/* These are not flags. All 256 values may be used */
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION 0x01
+#define AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER 0x02
+ /* extension of the avtab_key specified */
+ u8 specified; /* ioctl, netfilter, ... */
+ /*
+ * if 256 bits is not adequate as is often the case with ioctls, then
+ * multiple extended perms may be used and the driver field
+ * specifies which permissions are included.
+ */
+ u8 driver;
+ /* 256 bits of permissions */
+ struct extended_perms_data perms;
+};
+
+struct avtab_datum {
+ union {
+ u32 data; /* access vector or type value */
+ struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
+ } u;
+};
+
+struct avtab_node {
+ struct avtab_key key;
+ struct avtab_datum datum;
+ struct avtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct avtab {
+ struct avtab_node **htable;
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements */
+ u32 nslot; /* number of hash slots */
+ u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
+};
+
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
+int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
+int avtab_alloc_dup(struct avtab *new, const struct avtab *orig);
+struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *k);
+void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
+void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag);
+
+struct policydb;
+int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
+ int (*insert)(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
+ void *p);
+
+int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol);
+int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, const struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp);
+int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key,
+ const struct avtab_datum *datum);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h,
+ const struct avtab_key *key);
+
+struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
+
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
+#define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+#endif /* _SS_AVTAB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e11219fdf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -0,0 +1,758 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * cond_evaluate_expr evaluates a conditional expr
+ * in reverse polish notation. It returns true (1), false (0),
+ * or undefined (-1). Undefined occurs when the expression
+ * exceeds the stack depth of COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH.
+ */
+static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ if (expr->len == 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
+
+ switch (node->expr_type) {
+ case COND_BOOL:
+ if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -1;
+ sp++;
+ s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->bool - 1]->state;
+ break;
+ case COND_NOT:
+ if (sp < 0)
+ return -1;
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case COND_OR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_AND:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_XOR:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] ^= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case COND_EQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] == s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ case COND_NEQ:
+ if (sp < 1)
+ return -1;
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] = (s[sp] != s[sp + 1]);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * evaluate_cond_node evaluates the conditional stored in
+ * a struct cond_node and if the result is different than the
+ * current state of the node it sets the rules in the true/false
+ * list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
+ * all of the rules are disabled for safety.
+ */
+static void evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *avnode;
+ int new_state;
+ u32 i;
+
+ new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, &node->expr);
+ if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
+ node->cur_state = new_state;
+ if (new_state == -1)
+ pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
+ /* turn the rules on or off */
+ for (i = 0; i < node->true_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->true_list.nodes[i];
+ if (new_state <= 0)
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ else
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < node->false_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->false_list.nodes[i];
+ /* -1 or 1 */
+ if (new_state)
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ else
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ evaluate_cond_node(p, &p->cond_list[i]);
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ p->cond_list_len = 0;
+
+ avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+}
+
+static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
+{
+ kfree(node->expr.nodes);
+ /* the avtab_ptr_t nodes are destroyed by the avtab */
+ kfree(node->true_list.nodes);
+ kfree(node->false_list.nodes);
+}
+
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]);
+ kfree(p->cond_list);
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ p->cond_list_len = 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->bool_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+
+ booldatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!booldatum->value || booldatum->value > p->p_bools.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_BOOLS][booldatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->bool_val_to_struct[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int bool_isvalid(struct cond_bool_datum *b)
+{
+ if (!(b->state == 0 || b->state == 1))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!booldatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ booldatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ booldatum->state = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!bool_isvalid(booldatum))
+ goto err;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1)))
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ key = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto err;
+ rc = next_entry(key, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ key[len] = '\0';
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, booldatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_destroy_bool(key, booldatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct cond_insertf_data {
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct avtab_node **dst;
+ struct cond_av_list *other;
+};
+
+static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, const struct avtab_key *k,
+ const struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = data->p;
+ struct cond_av_list *other = data->other;
+ struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
+ u32 i;
+ bool found;
+
+ /*
+ * For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
+ * conflicting rules by searching the te_avtab and the
+ * cond_te_avtab.
+ */
+ if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
+ if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
+ * the true list. We can have duplicate entries if there is only
+ * 1 other entry and it is in our true list.
+ *
+ * If we are reading the true list (other == NULL) there shouldn't
+ * be any other entries.
+ */
+ if (other) {
+ node_ptr = avtab_search_node(&p->te_cond_avtab, k);
+ if (node_ptr) {
+ if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ found = false;
+ for (i = 0; i < other->len; i++) {
+ if (other->nodes[i] == node_ptr) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
+ if (!node_ptr) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ *data->dst = node_ptr;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
+ struct cond_av_list *list,
+ struct cond_av_list *other)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i, len;
+ struct cond_insertf_data data;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (len == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ list->nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*list->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!list->nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ data.p = p;
+ data.other = other;
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ data.dst = &list->nodes[i];
+ rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
+ &data);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(list->nodes);
+ list->nodes = NULL;
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ list->len = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
+{
+ if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (expr->bool > p->p_bools.nprim) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown bool.\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 i, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* expr */
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ node->expr.nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*node->expr.nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!node->expr.nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ node->expr.len = len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *expr = &node->expr.nodes[i];
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
+}
+
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->cond_list)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+ p->cond_list_len = len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_read_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+err:
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int cond_write_bool(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->value);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(booldatum->state);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cond_write_cond_av_list doesn't write out the av_list nodes.
+ * Instead it writes out the key/value pairs from the avtab. This
+ * is necessary because there is no way to uniquely identifying rules
+ * in the avtab so it is not possible to associate individual rules
+ * in the avtab with a conditional without saving them as part of
+ * the conditional. This means that the avtab with the conditional
+ * rules will not be saved but will be rebuilt on policy load.
+ */
+static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
+ struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(list->len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < list->len; i++) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, list->nodes[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
+ struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].bool);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->true_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->false_list, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->cond_list_len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_write_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !xpermd)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED)
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+ }
+}
+/* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional
+ * av table, and if so, add them to the result
+ */
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+
+ if (!ctab || !key || !avd)
+ return;
+
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(ctab, key); node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, key->specified)) {
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_ALLOWED|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITDENY|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ /* Since a '0' in an auditdeny mask represents a
+ * permission we do NOT want to audit (dontaudit), we use
+ * the '&' operand to ensure that all '0's in the mask
+ * are retained (much unlike the allow and auditallow cases).
+ */
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ if ((u16)(AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED) ==
+ (node->key.specified & (AVTAB_AUDITALLOW|AVTAB_ENABLED)))
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) &&
+ (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+ }
+}
+
+static int cond_dup_av_list(struct cond_av_list *new,
+ struct cond_av_list *orig,
+ struct avtab *avtab)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+ new->nodes = kcalloc(orig->len, sizeof(*new->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < orig->len; i++) {
+ new->nodes[i] = avtab_insert_nonunique(avtab,
+ &orig->nodes[i]->key,
+ &orig->nodes[i]->datum);
+ if (!new->nodes[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new->len++;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_cond_list(struct policydb *newp,
+ struct policydb *origp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ rc = avtab_alloc_dup(&newp->te_cond_avtab, &origp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ newp->cond_list_len = 0;
+ newp->cond_list = kcalloc(origp->cond_list_len,
+ sizeof(*newp->cond_list),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newp->cond_list)
+ goto error;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < origp->cond_list_len; i++) {
+ struct cond_node *newn = &newp->cond_list[i];
+ struct cond_node *orign = &origp->cond_list[i];
+
+ newp->cond_list_len++;
+
+ newn->cur_state = orign->cur_state;
+ newn->expr.nodes = kmemdup(orign->expr.nodes,
+ orign->expr.len * sizeof(*orign->expr.nodes),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newn->expr.nodes)
+ goto error;
+
+ newn->expr.len = orign->expr.len;
+
+ rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->true_list, &orign->true_list,
+ &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ goto error;
+
+ rc = cond_dup_av_list(&newn->false_list, &orign->false_list,
+ &newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ if (rc)
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+error:
+ avtab_destroy(&newp->te_cond_avtab);
+ cond_list_destroy(newp);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+ /* key was not copied so no need to free here */
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_copy(struct hashtab_node *new, struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum *datum;
+
+ datum = kmemdup(orig->datum, sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->key = orig->key; /* No need to copy, never modified */
+ new->datum = datum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cond_bools_index(void *key, void *datum, void *args)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum, **cond_bool_array;
+
+ booldatum = datum;
+ cond_bool_array = args;
+ cond_bool_array[booldatum->value - 1] = booldatum;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int duplicate_policydb_bools(struct policydb *newdb,
+ struct policydb *orig)
+{
+ struct cond_bool_datum **cond_bool_array;
+ int rc;
+
+ cond_bool_array = kmalloc_array(orig->p_bools.nprim,
+ sizeof(*orig->bool_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cond_bool_array)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = hashtab_duplicate(&newdb->p_bools.table, &orig->p_bools.table,
+ cond_bools_copy, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(cond_bool_array);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ hashtab_map(&newdb->p_bools.table, cond_bools_index, cond_bool_array);
+ newdb->bool_val_to_struct = cond_bool_array;
+
+ newdb->p_bools.nprim = orig->p_bools.nprim;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ hashtab_map(&p->p_bools.table, cond_bools_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->p_bools.table);
+ cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+}
+
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig)
+{
+ cond_policydb_init(new);
+
+ if (duplicate_policydb_bools(new, orig))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (duplicate_policydb_cond_list(new, orig)) {
+ cond_policydb_destroy_dup(new);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e47ec6dde
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/* Authors: Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONDITIONAL_H_
+#define _CONDITIONAL_H_
+
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "../include/conditional.h"
+
+#define COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH 10
+
+/*
+ * A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
+ * in reverse polish notation.
+ */
+struct cond_expr_node {
+#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
+#define COND_NOT 2 /* !bool */
+#define COND_OR 3 /* bool || bool */
+#define COND_AND 4 /* bool && bool */
+#define COND_XOR 5 /* bool ^ bool */
+#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
+#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
+#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
+ u32 expr_type;
+ u32 bool;
+};
+
+struct cond_expr {
+ struct cond_expr_node *nodes;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Each cond_node contains a list of rules to be enabled/disabled
+ * depending on the current value of the conditional expression. This
+ * struct is for that list.
+ */
+struct cond_av_list {
+ struct avtab_node **nodes;
+ u32 len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * A cond node represents a conditional block in a policy. It
+ * contains a conditional expression, the current state of the expression,
+ * two lists of rules to enable/disable depending on the value of the
+ * expression (the true list corresponds to if and the false list corresponds
+ * to else)..
+ */
+struct cond_node {
+ int cur_state;
+ struct cond_expr expr;
+ struct cond_av_list true_list;
+ struct cond_av_list false_list;
+};
+
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+
+int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_destroy_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *p);
+
+int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
+
+int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp);
+int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
+void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_destroy_dup(struct policydb *p);
+int cond_policydb_dup(struct policydb *new, struct policydb *orig);
+
+#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4e563be9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in
+ * order for one or more permissions to be granted.
+ * Constraints are used to impose additional restrictions
+ * beyond the type-based rules in `te' or the role-based
+ * transition rules in `rbac'. Constraints are typically
+ * used to prevent a process from transitioning to a new user
+ * identity or role unless it is in a privileged type.
+ * Constraints are likewise typically used to prevent a
+ * process from labeling an object with a different user
+ * identity.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+#define _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+#define CEXPR_MAXDEPTH 5
+
+struct constraint_expr {
+#define CEXPR_NOT 1 /* not expr */
+#define CEXPR_AND 2 /* expr and expr */
+#define CEXPR_OR 3 /* expr or expr */
+#define CEXPR_ATTR 4 /* attr op attr */
+#define CEXPR_NAMES 5 /* attr op names */
+ u32 expr_type; /* expression type */
+
+#define CEXPR_USER 1 /* user */
+#define CEXPR_ROLE 2 /* role */
+#define CEXPR_TYPE 4 /* type */
+#define CEXPR_TARGET 8 /* target if set, source otherwise */
+#define CEXPR_XTARGET 16 /* special 3rd target for validatetrans rule */
+#define CEXPR_L1L2 32 /* low level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H2 64 /* low level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1L2 128 /* high level 1 vs. low level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_H1H2 256 /* high level 1 vs. high level 2 */
+#define CEXPR_L1H1 512 /* low level 1 vs. high level 1 */
+#define CEXPR_L2H2 1024 /* low level 2 vs. high level 2 */
+ u32 attr; /* attribute */
+
+#define CEXPR_EQ 1 /* == or eq */
+#define CEXPR_NEQ 2 /* != */
+#define CEXPR_DOM 3 /* dom */
+#define CEXPR_DOMBY 4 /* domby */
+#define CEXPR_INCOMP 5 /* incomp */
+ u32 op; /* operator */
+
+ struct ebitmap names; /* names */
+ struct type_set *type_names;
+
+ struct constraint_expr *next; /* next expression */
+};
+
+struct constraint_node {
+ u32 permissions; /* constrained permissions */
+ struct constraint_expr *expr; /* constraint on permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *next; /* next constraint */
+};
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONSTRAINT_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.c b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..38bc0aa52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementations of the security context functions.
+ *
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c)
+{
+ u32 hash = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If a context is invalid, it will always be represented by a
+ * context struct with only the len & str set (and vice versa)
+ * under a given policy. Since context structs from different
+ * policies should never meet, it is safe to hash valid and
+ * invalid contexts differently. The context_cmp() function
+ * already operates under the same assumption.
+ */
+ if (c->len)
+ return full_name_hash(NULL, c->str, c->len);
+
+ hash = jhash_3words(c->user, c->role, c->type, hash);
+ hash = mls_range_hash(&c->range, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eda32c3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security context is a set of security attributes
+ * associated with each subject and object controlled
+ * by the security policy. Security contexts are
+ * externally represented as variable-length strings
+ * that can be interpreted by a user or application
+ * with an understanding of the security policy.
+ * Internally, the security server uses a simple
+ * structure. This structure is private to the
+ * security server and can be changed without affecting
+ * clients of the security server.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+#define _SS_CONTEXT_H_
+
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+/*
+ * A security context consists of an authenticated user
+ * identity, a role, a type and a MLS range.
+ */
+struct context {
+ u32 user;
+ u32 role;
+ u32 type;
+ u32 len; /* length of string in bytes */
+ struct mls_range range;
+ char *str; /* string representation if context cannot be mapped. */
+};
+
+static inline void mls_context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(&c->range, 0, sizeof(c->range));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the low level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_low(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets both levels in the MLS range of 'dst' to the high level of 'src'.
+ */
+static inline int mls_context_cpy_high(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->range.level[0].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[0].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ dst->range.level[1].sens = src->range.level[1].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&dst->range.level[1].cat, &src->range.level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&dst->range.level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static inline int mls_context_glblub(struct context *dst,
+ const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ struct mls_range *dr = &dst->range;
+ const struct mls_range *r1 = &c1->range, *r2 = &c2->range;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (r1->level[1].sens < r2->level[0].sens ||
+ r2->level[1].sens < r1->level[0].sens)
+ /* These ranges have no common sensitivities */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Take the greatest of the low */
+ dr->level[0].sens = max(r1->level[0].sens, r2->level[0].sens);
+
+ /* Take the least of the high */
+ dr->level[1].sens = min(r1->level[1].sens, r2->level[1].sens);
+
+ rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[0].cat,
+ &r1->level[0].cat, &r2->level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_and(&dr->level[1].cat,
+ &r1->level[1].cat, &r2->level[1].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static inline int mls_context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ return ((c1->range.level[0].sens == c2->range.level[0].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[0].cat, &c2->range.level[0].cat) &&
+ (c1->range.level[1].sens == c2->range.level[1].sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&c1->range.level[1].cat, &c2->range.level[1].cat));
+}
+
+static inline void mls_context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&c->range.level[1].cat);
+ mls_context_init(c);
+}
+
+static inline void context_init(struct context *c)
+{
+ memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+static inline int context_cpy(struct context *dst, const struct context *src)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ dst->user = src->user;
+ dst->role = src->role;
+ dst->type = src->type;
+ if (src->str) {
+ dst->str = kstrdup(src->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!dst->str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ dst->len = src->len;
+ } else {
+ dst->str = NULL;
+ dst->len = 0;
+ }
+ rc = mls_context_cpy(dst, src);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(dst->str);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void context_destroy(struct context *c)
+{
+ c->user = c->role = c->type = 0;
+ kfree(c->str);
+ c->str = NULL;
+ c->len = 0;
+ mls_context_destroy(c);
+}
+
+static inline int context_cmp(const struct context *c1, const struct context *c2)
+{
+ if (c1->len && c2->len)
+ return (c1->len == c2->len && !strcmp(c1->str, c2->str));
+ if (c1->len || c2->len)
+ return 0;
+ return ((c1->user == c2->user) &&
+ (c1->role == c2->role) &&
+ (c1->type == c2->type) &&
+ mls_context_cmp(c1, c2));
+}
+
+u32 context_compute_hash(const struct context *c);
+
+#endif /* _SS_CONTEXT_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d31b87be9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ * Applied standard bit operations to improve bitmap scanning.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+#define BITS_PER_U64 (sizeof(u64) * 8)
+
+static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+
+ if (e1->highbit != e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+ while (n1 && n2 &&
+ (n1->startbit == n2->startbit) &&
+ !memcmp(n1->maps, n2->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8)) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n1 || n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *new, *prev;
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+ ebitmap_init(dst);
+ n = src->node;
+ prev = NULL;
+ while (n) {
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(dst);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ new->startbit = n->startbit;
+ memcpy(new->maps, n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE / 8);
+ new->next = NULL;
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = new;
+ else
+ dst->node = new;
+ prev = new;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ dst->highbit = src->highbit;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+ int bit, rc;
+
+ ebitmap_init(dst);
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e1, n, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(e2, bit)) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(dst, bit, 1);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_export - Export an ebitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to export
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Export a SELinux extensibile bitmap into a NetLabel category bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = ebmap->node;
+ unsigned long e_map;
+ u32 offset;
+ unsigned int iter;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (e_iter == NULL) {
+ *catmap = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (*catmap != NULL)
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ *catmap = NULL;
+
+ while (e_iter) {
+ offset = e_iter->startbit;
+ for (iter = 0; iter < EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS; iter++) {
+ e_map = e_iter->maps[iter];
+ if (e_map != 0) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setlong(catmap,
+ offset,
+ e_map,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto netlbl_export_failure;
+ }
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
+ e_iter = e_iter->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+netlbl_export_failure:
+ netlbl_catmap_free(*catmap);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ebitmap_netlbl_import - Import a NetLabel category bitmap into an ebitmap
+ * @ebmap: the ebitmap to import
+ * @catmap: the NetLabel category bitmap
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Import a NetLabel category bitmap into a SELinux extensibile bitmap.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on error.
+ *
+ */
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_iter = NULL;
+ struct ebitmap_node *e_prev = NULL;
+ u32 offset = 0, idx;
+ unsigned long bitmap;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_getlong(catmap, &offset, &bitmap);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ if (offset == (u32)-1)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* don't waste ebitmap space if the netlabel bitmap is empty */
+ if (bitmap == 0) {
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (e_iter == NULL ||
+ offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ e_prev = e_iter;
+ e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (e_iter == NULL)
+ goto netlbl_import_failure;
+ e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (e_prev == NULL)
+ ebmap->node = e_iter;
+ else
+ e_prev->next = e_iter;
+ ebmap->highbit = e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* offset will always be aligned to an unsigned long */
+ idx = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(e_iter, offset);
+ e_iter->maps[idx] = bitmap;
+
+ /* next */
+ offset += EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* NOTE: we should never reach this return */
+ return 0;
+
+netlbl_import_failure:
+ ebitmap_destroy(ebmap);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/*
+ * Check to see if all the bits set in e2 are also set in e1. Optionally,
+ * if last_e2bit is non-zero, the highest set bit in e2 cannot exceed
+ * last_e2bit.
+ */
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
+ int i;
+
+ if (e1->highbit < e2->highbit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n1 = e1->node;
+ n2 = e2->node;
+
+ while (n1 && n2 && (n1->startbit <= n2->startbit)) {
+ if (n1->startbit < n2->startbit) {
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (i = EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS - 1; (i >= 0) && !n2->maps[i]; )
+ i--; /* Skip trailing NULL map entries */
+ if (last_e2bit && (i >= 0)) {
+ u32 lastsetbit = n2->startbit + i * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE +
+ __fls(n2->maps[i]);
+ if (lastsetbit > last_e2bit)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ while (i >= 0) {
+ if ((n1->maps[i] & n2->maps[i]) != n2->maps[i])
+ return 0;
+ i--;
+ }
+
+ n1 = n1->next;
+ n2 = n2->next;
+ }
+
+ if (n2)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit)
+{
+ const struct ebitmap_node *n;
+
+ if (e->highbit < bit)
+ return 0;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && (n->startbit <= bit)) {
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit)
+ return ebitmap_node_get_bit(n, bit);
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *prev, *new;
+
+ prev = NULL;
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n && n->startbit <= bit) {
+ if ((n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) > bit) {
+ if (value) {
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(n, bit);
+ } else {
+ unsigned int s;
+
+ ebitmap_node_clr_bit(n, bit);
+
+ s = find_first_bit(n->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (s < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* drop this node from the bitmap */
+ if (!n->next) {
+ /*
+ * this was the highest map
+ * within the bitmap
+ */
+ if (prev)
+ e->highbit = prev->startbit
+ + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+ else
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ }
+ if (prev)
+ prev->next = n->next;
+ else
+ e->node = n->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, n);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ prev = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ }
+
+ if (!value)
+ return 0;
+
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->startbit = bit - (bit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ ebitmap_node_set_bit(new, bit);
+
+ if (!n)
+ /* this node will be the highest map within the bitmap */
+ e->highbit = new->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE;
+
+ if (prev) {
+ new->next = prev->next;
+ prev->next = new;
+ } else {
+ new->next = e->node;
+ e->node = new;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n, *temp;
+
+ if (!e)
+ return;
+
+ n = e->node;
+ while (n) {
+ temp = n;
+ n = n->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+
+ e->highbit = 0;
+ e->node = NULL;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n = NULL;
+ u32 mapunit, count, startbit, index;
+ __le32 ebitmap_start;
+ u64 map;
+ __le64 mapbits;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ ebitmap_init(e);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ mapunit = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->highbit = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ count = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if (mapunit != BITS_PER_U64) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: map size %u does not "
+ "match my size %zd (high bit was %d)\n",
+ mapunit, BITS_PER_U64, e->highbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* round up e->highbit */
+ e->highbit += EBITMAP_SIZE - 1;
+ e->highbit -= (e->highbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+
+ if (!e->highbit) {
+ e->node = NULL;
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
+ if (e->highbit && !count)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(&ebitmap_start, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ startbit = le32_to_cpu(ebitmap_start);
+
+ if (startbit & (mapunit - 1)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "not a multiple of the map unit size (%u)\n",
+ startbit, mapunit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ if (startbit > e->highbit - mapunit) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap start bit (%d) is "
+ "beyond the end of the bitmap (%u)\n",
+ startbit, (e->highbit - mapunit));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
+ tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* round down */
+ tmp->startbit = startbit - (startbit % EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (n)
+ n->next = tmp;
+ else
+ e->node = tmp;
+ n = tmp;
+ } else if (startbit <= n->startbit) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: start bit %d"
+ " comes after start bit %d\n",
+ startbit, n->startbit);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(&mapbits, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: ebitmap: truncated map\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ map = le64_to_cpu(mapbits);
+
+ index = (startbit - n->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE;
+ while (map) {
+ n->maps[index++] = map & (-1UL);
+ map = EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(map);
+ }
+ }
+ok:
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ebitmap_destroy(e);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *n;
+ u32 count;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u64 map;
+ int bit, last_bit, last_startbit, rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(BITS_PER_U64);
+
+ count = 0;
+ last_bit = 0;
+ last_startbit = -1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ count++;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ last_bit = roundup(bit + 1, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(last_bit);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(count);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = INT_MIN;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) {
+ if (rounddown(bit, (int)BITS_PER_U64) > last_startbit) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* this is the very first bit */
+ if (!map) {
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ map = (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* set up for the next node */
+ map = 0;
+ last_startbit = rounddown(bit, BITS_PER_U64);
+ }
+ map |= (u64)1 << (bit - last_startbit);
+ }
+ /* write the last node */
+ if (map) {
+ __le64 buf64[1];
+
+ /* write the last node */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(last_startbit);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf64[0] = cpu_to_le64(map);
+ rc = put_entry(buf64, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash)
+{
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ /* need to change hash even if ebitmap is empty */
+ hash = jhash_1word(e->highbit, hash);
+ for (node = e->node; node; node = node->next) {
+ hash = jhash_1word(node->startbit, hash);
+ hash = jhash(node->maps, sizeof(node->maps), hash);
+ }
+ return hash;
+}
+
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+{
+ ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
+ sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e5b57dc3f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an
+ * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are
+ * used to represent sets of values, such as types,
+ * roles, categories, and classes.
+ *
+ * Each extensible bitmap is implemented as a linked
+ * list of bitmap nodes, where each bitmap node has
+ * an explicitly specified starting bit position within
+ * the total bitmap.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+#define _SS_EBITMAP_H_
+
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 64
+#else
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE 32
+#endif
+
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS ((EBITMAP_NODE_SIZE-sizeof(void *)-sizeof(u32))\
+ / sizeof(unsigned long))
+#define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG
+#define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL
+#define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \
+ (((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2)
+
+struct ebitmap_node {
+ struct ebitmap_node *next;
+ unsigned long maps[EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS];
+ u32 startbit;
+};
+
+struct ebitmap {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node; /* first node in the bitmap */
+ u32 highbit; /* highest position in the total bitmap */
+};
+
+#define ebitmap_length(e) ((e)->highbit)
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_start_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n)
+{
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ for (*n = e->node; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return (*n)->startbit + ofs;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_init(struct ebitmap *e)
+{
+ memset(e, 0, sizeof(*e));
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int ebitmap_next_positive(const struct ebitmap *e,
+ struct ebitmap_node **n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int ofs;
+
+ ofs = find_next_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE, bit - (*n)->startbit + 1);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+
+ for (*n = (*n)->next; *n; *n = (*n)->next) {
+ ofs = find_first_bit((*n)->maps, EBITMAP_SIZE);
+ if (ofs < EBITMAP_SIZE)
+ return ofs + (*n)->startbit;
+ }
+ return ebitmap_length(e);
+}
+
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) / EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+#define EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(node, bit) \
+ (((bit) - (node)->startbit) % EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE)
+
+static inline int ebitmap_node_get_bit(const struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ if ((n->maps[index] & (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs)))
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_set_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] |= (EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n,
+ unsigned int bit)
+{
+ unsigned int index = EBITMAP_NODE_INDEX(n, bit);
+ unsigned int ofs = EBITMAP_NODE_OFFSET(n, bit);
+
+ BUG_ON(index >= EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS);
+ n->maps[index] &= ~(EBITMAP_BIT << ofs);
+}
+
+#define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) \
+ for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n)); \
+ (bit) < ebitmap_length(e); \
+ (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit)) \
+
+int ebitmap_cmp(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *src);
+int ebitmap_and(struct ebitmap *dst, const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2);
+int ebitmap_contains(const struct ebitmap *e1, const struct ebitmap *e2, u32 last_e2bit);
+int ebitmap_get_bit(const struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit);
+int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value);
+void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
+int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+int ebitmap_write(const struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
+int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap);
+#else
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *catmap)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SS_EBITMAP_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3fb8f9026
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the hash table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "hashtab.h"
+#include "security.h"
+
+static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
+
+/*
+ * Here we simply round the number of elements up to the nearest power of two.
+ * I tried also other options like rounding down or rounding to the closest
+ * power of two (up or down based on which is closer), but I was unable to
+ * find any significant difference in lookup/insert performance that would
+ * justify switching to a different (less intuitive) formula. It could be that
+ * a different formula is actually more optimal, but any future changes here
+ * should be supported with performance/memory usage data.
+ *
+ * The total memory used by the htable arrays (only) with Fedora policy loaded
+ * is approximately 163 KB at the time of writing.
+ */
+static u32 hashtab_compute_size(u32 nel)
+{
+ return nel == 0 ? 0 : roundup_pow_of_two(nel);
+}
+
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint)
+{
+ u32 size = hashtab_compute_size(nel_hint);
+
+ /* should already be zeroed, but better be safe */
+ h->nel = 0;
+ h->size = 0;
+ h->htable = NULL;
+
+ if (size) {
+ h->htable = kcalloc(size, sizeof(*h->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!h->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ h->size = size;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
+ void *key, void *datum)
+{
+ struct hashtab_node *newnode;
+
+ newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ newnode->key = key;
+ newnode->datum = datum;
+ newnode->next = *dst;
+ *dst = newnode;
+
+ h->nel++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur, *temp;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ temp = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, temp);
+ }
+ h->htable[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ kfree(h->htable);
+ h->htable = NULL;
+}
+
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ u32 i;
+ int ret;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ while (cur) {
+ ret = apply(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
+{
+ u32 i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ slots_used = 0;
+ max_chain_len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < h->size; i++) {
+ cur = h->htable[i];
+ if (cur) {
+ slots_used++;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ while (cur) {
+ chain_len++;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ }
+ }
+
+ info->slots_used = slots_used;
+ info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
+}
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
+ int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+ struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+ int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args)
+{
+ struct hashtab_node *cur, *tmp, *tail;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+
+ new->htable = kcalloc(orig->size, sizeof(*new->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new->htable)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ new->size = orig->size;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < orig->size; i++) {
+ tail = NULL;
+ for (cur = orig->htable[i]; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(hashtab_node_cachep,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmp)
+ goto error;
+ rc = copy(tmp, cur, args);
+ if (rc) {
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, tmp);
+ goto error;
+ }
+ tmp->next = NULL;
+ if (!tail)
+ new->htable[i] = tmp;
+ else
+ tail->next = tmp;
+ tail = tmp;
+ new->nel++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ error:
+ for (i = 0; i < new->size; i++) {
+ for (cur = new->htable[i]; cur; cur = tmp) {
+ tmp = cur->next;
+ destroy(cur->key, cur->datum, args);
+ kmem_cache_free(hashtab_node_cachep, cur);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(new->htable);
+ memset(new, 0, sizeof(*new));
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
+{
+ hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
+ sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..043a773bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between
+ * key values and datum values. The type of the key values
+ * and the type of the datum values is arbitrary. The
+ * functions for hash computation and key comparison are
+ * provided by the creator of the table.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+#define _SS_HASHTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+
+#define HASHTAB_MAX_NODES U32_MAX
+
+struct hashtab_key_params {
+ u32 (*hash)(const void *key); /* hash function */
+ int (*cmp)(const void *key1, const void *key2);
+ /* key comparison function */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_node {
+ void *key;
+ void *datum;
+ struct hashtab_node *next;
+};
+
+struct hashtab {
+ struct hashtab_node **htable; /* hash table */
+ u32 size; /* number of slots in hash table */
+ u32 nel; /* number of elements in hash table */
+};
+
+struct hashtab_info {
+ u32 slots_used;
+ u32 max_chain_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializes a new hash table with the specified characteristics.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM if insufficient space is available or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int hashtab_init(struct hashtab *h, u32 nel_hint);
+
+int __hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_node **dst,
+ void *key, void *datum);
+
+/*
+ * Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns -ENOMEM on memory allocation error,
+ * -EEXIST if there is already an entry with the same key,
+ * -EINVAL for general errors or
+ 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static inline int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum,
+ struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *prev, *cur;
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ if (!h->size || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+ prev = NULL;
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur) {
+ int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+ if (cmp == 0)
+ return -EEXIST;
+ if (cmp < 0)
+ break;
+ prev = cur;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+
+ return __hashtab_insert(h, prev ? &prev->next : &h->htable[hvalue],
+ key, datum);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Searches for the entry with the specified key in the hash table.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL if no entry has the specified key or
+ * the datum of the entry otherwise.
+ */
+static inline void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key,
+ struct hashtab_key_params key_params)
+{
+ u32 hvalue;
+ struct hashtab_node *cur;
+
+ if (!h->size)
+ return NULL;
+
+ hvalue = key_params.hash(key) & (h->size - 1);
+ cur = h->htable[hvalue];
+ while (cur) {
+ int cmp = key_params.cmp(key, cur->key);
+
+ if (cmp == 0)
+ return cur->datum;
+ if (cmp < 0)
+ break;
+ cur = cur->next;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Destroys the specified hash table.
+ */
+void hashtab_destroy(struct hashtab *h);
+
+/*
+ * Applies the specified apply function to (key,datum,args)
+ * for each entry in the specified hash table.
+ *
+ * The order in which the function is applied to the entries
+ * is dependent upon the internal structure of the hash table.
+ *
+ * If apply returns a non-zero status, then hashtab_map will cease
+ * iterating through the hash table and will propagate the error
+ * return to its caller.
+ */
+int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
+ int (*apply)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+int hashtab_duplicate(struct hashtab *new, struct hashtab *orig,
+ int (*copy)(struct hashtab_node *new,
+ struct hashtab_node *orig, void *args),
+ int (*destroy)(void *k, void *d, void *args),
+ void *args);
+
+/* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
+void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
+
+#endif /* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99571b19d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -0,0 +1,660 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+/*
+ * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
+ * security context string representation of `context'.
+ */
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
+{
+ int i, l, len, head, prev;
+ char *nm;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
+ len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (head != prev) {
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ head = i;
+ }
+ prev = i;
+ }
+ if (prev != head) {
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ len += strlen(nm) + 1;
+ }
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else
+ len++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
+ * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
+ */
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext)
+{
+ char *scontextp, *nm;
+ int i, l, head, prev;
+ struct ebitmap *e;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ scontextp = *scontext;
+
+ *scontextp = ':';
+ scontextp++;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
+ context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
+ scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
+
+ /* categories */
+ head = -2;
+ prev = -2;
+ e = &context->range.level[l].cat;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, node, i) {
+ if (i - prev > 1) {
+ /* one or more negative bits are skipped */
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ }
+ if (prev < 0)
+ *scontextp++ = ':';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ head = i;
+ }
+ prev = i;
+ }
+
+ if (prev != head) {
+ if (prev - head > 1)
+ *scontextp++ = '.';
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = ',';
+ nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
+ strcpy(scontextp, nm);
+ scontextp += strlen(nm);
+ }
+
+ if (l == 0) {
+ if (mls_level_eq(&context->range.level[0],
+ &context->range.level[1]))
+ break;
+ else
+ *scontextp++ = '-';
+ }
+ }
+
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+}
+
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ if (!l->sens || l->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_levels,
+ sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, l->sens - 1));
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Return 1 iff all the bits set in l->cat are also be set in
+ * levdatum->level->cat and no bit in l->cat is larger than
+ * p->p_cats.nprim.
+ */
+ return ebitmap_contains(&levdatum->level->cat, &l->cat,
+ p->p_cats.nprim);
+}
+
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r)
+{
+ return (mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[0]) &&
+ mls_level_isvalid(p, &r->level[1]) &&
+ mls_level_dom(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, &c->range))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->role == OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the MLS range.
+ */
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!mls_range_contains(usrdatum->range, c->range))
+ return 0; /* user may not be associated with range */
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `scontext'.
+ *
+ * This function modifies the string in place, inserting
+ * NULL characters to terminate the MLS fields.
+ *
+ * If a def_sid is provided and no MLS field is present,
+ * copy the MLS field of the associated default context.
+ * Used for upgraded to MLS systems where objects may lack
+ * MLS fields.
+ *
+ * Policy read-lock must be held for sidtab lookup.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *pol,
+ char oldc,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct sidtab *s,
+ u32 def_sid)
+{
+ char *sensitivity, *cur_cat, *next_cat, *rngptr;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum, *rngdatum;
+ int l, rc, i;
+ char *rangep[2];
+
+ if (!pol->mls_enabled) {
+ /*
+ * With no MLS, only return -EINVAL if there is a MLS field
+ * and it did not come from an xattr.
+ */
+ if (oldc && def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * No MLS component to the security context, try and map to
+ * default if provided.
+ */
+ if (!oldc) {
+ struct context *defcon;
+
+ if (def_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ defcon = sidtab_search(s, def_sid);
+ if (!defcon)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return mls_context_cpy(context, defcon);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're dealing with a range, figure out where the two parts
+ * of the range begin.
+ */
+ rangep[0] = scontext;
+ rangep[1] = strchr(scontext, '-');
+ if (rangep[1]) {
+ rangep[1][0] = '\0';
+ rangep[1]++;
+ }
+
+ /* For each part of the range: */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ /* Split sensitivity and category set. */
+ sensitivity = rangep[l];
+ if (sensitivity == NULL)
+ break;
+ next_cat = strchr(sensitivity, ':');
+ if (next_cat)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Parse sensitivity. */
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_levels, sensitivity);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ context->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ /* Extract category set. */
+ while (next_cat != NULL) {
+ cur_cat = next_cat;
+ next_cat = strchr(next_cat, ',');
+ if (next_cat != NULL)
+ *(next_cat++) = '\0';
+
+ /* Separate into range if exists */
+ rngptr = strchr(cur_cat, '.');
+ if (rngptr != NULL) {
+ /* Remove '.' */
+ *rngptr++ = '\0';
+ }
+
+ catdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, cur_cat);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* If range, set all categories in range */
+ if (rngptr == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ rngdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_cats, rngptr);
+ if (!rngdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (catdatum->value >= rngdatum->value)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = catdatum->value; i < rngdatum->value; i++) {
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&context->range.level[l].cat, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we didn't see a '-', the range start is also the range end. */
+ if (rangep[1] == NULL) {
+ context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[1].cat,
+ &context->range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ char *tmpstr;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tmpstr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+ if (!tmpstr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', tmpstr, context,
+ NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+ kfree(tmpstr);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copies the MLS range `range' into `context'.
+ */
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
+ struct mls_range *range)
+{
+ int l, rc = 0;
+
+ /* Copy the MLS range into the context */
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ context->range.level[l].sens = range->level[l].sens;
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&context->range.level[l].cat,
+ &range->level[l].cat);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon)
+{
+ if (p->mls_enabled) {
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *user_clr = &(user->range.level[1]);
+ struct mls_level *user_def = &(user->dfltlevel);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_sen = &(usercon->range.level[0]);
+ struct mls_level *usercon_clr = &(usercon->range.level[1]);
+
+ /* Honor the user's default level if we can */
+ if (mls_level_between(user_def, fromcon_sen, fromcon_clr))
+ *usercon_sen = *user_def;
+ else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_sen, user_def, user_clr))
+ *usercon_sen = *fromcon_sen;
+ else if (mls_level_between(fromcon_clr, user_low, user_def))
+ *usercon_sen = *user_low;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Lower the clearance of available contexts
+ if the clearance of "fromcon" is lower than
+ that of the user's default clearance (but
+ only if the "fromcon" clearance dominates
+ the user's computed sensitivity level) */
+ if (mls_level_dom(user_clr, fromcon_clr))
+ *usercon_clr = *fromcon_clr;
+ else if (mls_level_dom(fromcon_clr, user_clr))
+ *usercon_clr = *user_clr;
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the MLS fields in the security context
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified in the
+ * policy `oldp' to the values specified in the policy `newp',
+ * storing the resulting context in `newc'.
+ */
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ int l, i;
+
+ if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
+ char *name = sym_name(oldp, SYM_LEVELS,
+ oldc->range.level[l].sens - 1);
+
+ levdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_levels, name);
+
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ newc->range.level[l].sens = levdatum->level->sens;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&oldc->range.level[l].cat,
+ node, i) {
+ int rc;
+
+ catdatum = symtab_search(&newp->p_cats,
+ sym_name(oldp, SYM_CATS, i));
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&newc->range.level[l].cat,
+ catdatum->value - 1, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock)
+{
+ struct range_trans rtr;
+ struct mls_range *r;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ int default_range = 0;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ /* Look for a range transition rule. */
+ rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
+ rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ rtr.target_class = tclass;
+ r = policydb_rangetr_search(p, &rtr);
+ if (r)
+ return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
+
+ if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+ cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ if (cladatum)
+ default_range = cladatum->default_range;
+ }
+
+ switch (default_range) {
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW:
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW:
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy_high(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH:
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, tcontext);
+ case DEFAULT_GLBLUB:
+ return mls_context_glblub(newcontext,
+ scontext, tcontext);
+ }
+
+ fallthrough;
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if ((tclass == p->process_class) || sock)
+ /* Use the process MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
+ else
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the process effective MLS attributes. */
+ return mls_context_cpy_low(newcontext, scontext);
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS sensitivity level into the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context and the NetLabel security attributes, copy the
+ * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
+ *
+ */
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
+ context->range.level[1].sens = context->range.level[0].sens;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Given the security context copy the low MLS categories into the NetLabel
+ * MLS category field. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+ &secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ if (rc == 0 && secattr->attr.mls.cat != NULL)
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
+ * @context: the security context
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Copy the NetLabel security attributes into the SELinux context; since the
+ * NetLabel security attribute only contains a single MLS category use it for
+ * both the low and high categories of the context. Returns zero on success,
+ * negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!p->mls_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
+ secattr->attr.mls.cat);
+ if (rc)
+ goto import_netlbl_cat_failure;
+ memcpy(&context->range.level[1].cat, &context->range.level[0].cat,
+ sizeof(context->range.level[0].cat));
+
+ return 0;
+
+import_netlbl_cat_failure:
+ ebitmap_destroy(&context->range.level[0].cat);
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..15cacde0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support to import/export the MLS label from NetLabel
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P., 2006
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_H_
+
+#include <linux/jhash.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+ char **scontext);
+int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
+int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
+
+int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ char oldc,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct sidtab *s,
+ u32 def_sid);
+
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+ gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
+int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
+
+int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
+ struct policydb *newp,
+ struct context *oldc,
+ struct context *newc);
+
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ bool sock);
+
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+ struct context *usercon);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
+#else
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return;
+}
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline u32 mls_range_hash(const struct mls_range *r, u32 hash)
+{
+ hash = jhash_2words(r->level[0].sens, r->level[1].sens, hash);
+ hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[0].cat, hash);
+ hash = ebitmap_hash(&r->level[1].cat, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_H */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7d48d5e52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+#define _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+
+struct mls_level {
+ u32 sens; /* sensitivity */
+ struct ebitmap cat; /* category set */
+};
+
+struct mls_range {
+ struct mls_level level[2]; /* low == level[0], high == level[1] */
+};
+
+static inline int mls_level_eq(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ return ((l1->sens == l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_cmp(&l1->cat, &l2->cat));
+}
+
+static inline int mls_level_dom(const struct mls_level *l1, const struct mls_level *l2)
+{
+ return ((l1->sens >= l2->sens) &&
+ ebitmap_contains(&l1->cat, &l2->cat, 0));
+}
+
+#define mls_level_incomp(l1, l2) \
+(!mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && !mls_level_dom((l2), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_level_between(l1, l2, l3) \
+(mls_level_dom((l1), (l2)) && mls_level_dom((l3), (l1)))
+
+#define mls_range_contains(r1, r2) \
+(mls_level_dom(&(r2).level[0], &(r1).level[0]) && \
+ mls_level_dom(&(r1).level[1], &(r2).level[1]))
+
+#endif /* _SS_MLS_TYPES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6f9ff4643
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3731 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the policy database.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
+ *
+ * Added Infiniband support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "security.h"
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "services.h"
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
+ "common prefixes",
+ "classes",
+ "roles",
+ "types",
+ "users",
+ "bools",
+ "levels",
+ "categories",
+};
+#endif
+
+struct policydb_compat_info {
+ int version;
+ int sym_num;
+ int ocon_num;
+};
+
+/* These need to be updated if SYM_NUM or OCON_NUM changes */
+static const struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_GLBLUB,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ },
+};
+
+static const struct policydb_compat_info *policydb_lookup_compat(int version)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(policydb_compat); i++) {
+ if (policydb_compat[i].version == version)
+ return &policydb_compat[i];
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_destroy functions are used to
+ * free any memory allocated for each kind of
+ * symbol data in the policy database.
+ */
+
+static int perm_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ comdatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&comdatum->permissions.table);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void constraint_expr_destroy(struct constraint_expr *expr)
+{
+ if (expr) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->names);
+ if (expr->type_names) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->types);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&expr->type_names->negset);
+ kfree(expr->type_names);
+ }
+ kfree(expr);
+ }
+}
+
+static int cls_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint, *ctemp;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *etmp;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ cladatum = datum;
+ hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&cladatum->permissions.table);
+ constraint = cladatum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+
+ constraint = cladatum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ e = constraint->expr;
+ while (e) {
+ etmp = e;
+ e = e->next;
+ constraint_expr_destroy(etmp);
+ }
+ ctemp = constraint;
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ kfree(ctemp);
+ }
+ kfree(cladatum->comkey);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ role = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->dominates);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&role->types);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->roles);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->range.level[1].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&usrdatum->dfltlevel.cat);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ if (datum) {
+ levdatum = datum;
+ if (levdatum->level)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&levdatum->level->cat);
+ kfree(levdatum->level);
+ }
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_destroy,
+ cls_destroy,
+ role_destroy,
+ type_destroy,
+ user_destroy,
+ cond_destroy_bool,
+ sens_destroy,
+ cat_destroy,
+};
+
+static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next, *d = datum;
+
+ kfree(ft->name);
+ kfree(key);
+ do {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&d->stypes);
+ next = d->next;
+ kfree(d);
+ d = next;
+ } while (unlikely(d));
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ struct mls_range *rt = datum;
+
+ kfree(key);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[0].cat);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&rt->level[1].cat);
+ kfree(datum);
+ cond_resched();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_tr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
+{
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void ocontext_destroy(struct ocontext *c, int i)
+{
+ if (!c)
+ return;
+
+ context_destroy(&c->context[0]);
+ context_destroy(&c->context[1]);
+ if (i == OCON_ISID || i == OCON_FS ||
+ i == OCON_NETIF || i == OCON_FSUSE)
+ kfree(c->u.name);
+ kfree(c);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the role table.
+ */
+static int roles_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ int rc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim;
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ key = kstrdup(OBJECT_R, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!key)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(&p->p_roles, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ kfree(key);
+ kfree(role);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static u32 filenametr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft = k;
+ unsigned long hash;
+ unsigned int byte_num;
+ unsigned char focus;
+
+ hash = ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+
+ byte_num = 0;
+ while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
+ hash = partial_name_hash(focus, hash);
+ return hash;
+}
+
+static int filenametr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft1 = k1;
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = ft1->tclass - ft2->tclass;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ return strcmp(ft1->name, ft2->name);
+
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params filenametr_key_params = {
+ .hash = filenametr_hash,
+ .cmp = filenametr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->filename_trans, key, filenametr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 rangetr_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct range_trans *key = k;
+
+ return key->source_type + (key->target_type << 3) +
+ (key->target_class << 5);
+}
+
+static int rangetr_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct range_trans *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = key1->source_type - key2->source_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_type - key2->target_type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->target_class - key2->target_class;
+
+ return v;
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params rangetr_key_params = {
+ .hash = rangetr_hash,
+ .cmp = rangetr_cmp,
+};
+
+struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(struct policydb *p,
+ struct range_trans *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->range_tr, key, rangetr_key_params);
+}
+
+static u32 role_trans_hash(const void *k)
+{
+ const struct role_trans_key *key = k;
+
+ return key->role + (key->type << 3) + (key->tclass << 5);
+}
+
+static int role_trans_cmp(const void *k1, const void *k2)
+{
+ const struct role_trans_key *key1 = k1, *key2 = k2;
+ int v;
+
+ v = key1->role - key2->role;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ v = key1->type - key2->type;
+ if (v)
+ return v;
+
+ return key1->tclass - key2->tclass;
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params roletr_key_params = {
+ .hash = role_trans_hash,
+ .cmp = role_trans_cmp,
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(struct policydb *p,
+ struct role_trans_key *key)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&p->role_tr, key, roletr_key_params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize a policy database structure.
+ */
+static void policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+
+ avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+ cond_policydb_init(p);
+
+ ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+ ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_index functions are used to
+ * define the val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure. The val_to_name
+ * arrays are used when converting security context
+ * structures into string representations. The
+ * val_to_struct arrays are used when the attributes
+ * of a class, role, or user are needed.
+ */
+
+static int common_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ comdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!comdatum->value || comdatum->value > p->p_commons.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_COMMONS][comdatum->value - 1] = key;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+ cladatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!cladatum->value || cladatum->value > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CLASSES][cladatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->class_val_to_struct[cladatum->value - 1] = cladatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+
+ role = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!role->value
+ || role->value > p->p_roles.nprim
+ || role->bounds > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_ROLES][role->value - 1] = key;
+ p->role_val_to_struct[role->value - 1] = role;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+
+ typdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary) {
+ if (!typdatum->value
+ || typdatum->value > p->p_types.nprim
+ || typdatum->bounds > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_TYPES][typdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->type_val_to_struct[typdatum->value - 1] = typdatum;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ usrdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+ if (!usrdatum->value
+ || usrdatum->value > p->p_users.nprim
+ || usrdatum->bounds > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_USERS][usrdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ p->user_val_to_struct[usrdatum->value - 1] = usrdatum;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+
+ levdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!levdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!levdatum->level->sens ||
+ levdatum->level->sens > p->p_levels.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_LEVELS][levdatum->level->sens - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_index(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+
+ catdatum = datum;
+ p = datap;
+
+ if (!catdatum->isalias) {
+ if (!catdatum->value || catdatum->value > p->p_cats.nprim)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ p->sym_val_to_name[SYM_CATS][catdatum->value - 1] = key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const index_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_index,
+ class_index,
+ role_index,
+ type_index,
+ user_index,
+ cond_index_bool,
+ sens_index,
+ cat_index,
+};
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+static void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
+{
+ struct hashtab_info info;
+
+ hashtab_stat(h, &info);
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, longest chain length %d\n",
+ hash_name, h->nel, info.slots_used, h->size,
+ info.max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ hash_eval(&s[i].table, symtab_name[i]);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define the other val_to_name and val_to_struct arrays
+ * in a policy database structure.
+ *
+ * Caller must clean up on failure.
+ */
+static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int i, rc;
+
+ if (p->mls_enabled)
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools, %d sens, %d cats\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim, p->p_levels.nprim, p->p_cats.nprim);
+ else
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d users, %d roles, %d types, %d bools\n",
+ p->p_users.nprim, p->p_roles.nprim, p->p_types.nprim,
+ p->p_bools.nprim);
+
+ pr_debug("SELinux: %d classes, %d rules\n",
+ p->p_classes.nprim, p->te_avtab.nel);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_HASHES
+ avtab_hash_eval(&p->te_avtab, "rules");
+ symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
+#endif
+
+ p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ p->type_val_to_struct = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->type_val_to_struct),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->type_val_to_struct)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = cond_init_bool_indexes(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ p->sym_val_to_name[i] = kvcalloc(p->symtab[i].nprim,
+ sizeof(char *),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, index_f[i], p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free any memory allocated by a policy database structure.
+ */
+void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c, *ctmp;
+ struct genfs *g, *gtmp;
+ int i;
+ struct role_allow *ra, *lra = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
+ hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->symtab[i].table);
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++)
+ kvfree(p->sym_val_to_name[i]);
+
+ kfree(p->class_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->role_val_to_struct);
+ kfree(p->user_val_to_struct);
+ kvfree(p->type_val_to_struct);
+
+ avtab_destroy(&p->te_avtab);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OCON_NUM; i++) {
+ cond_resched();
+ c = p->ocontexts[i];
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, i);
+ }
+ p->ocontexts[i] = NULL;
+ }
+
+ g = p->genfs;
+ while (g) {
+ cond_resched();
+ kfree(g->fstype);
+ c = g->head;
+ while (c) {
+ ctmp = c;
+ c = c->next;
+ ocontext_destroy(ctmp, OCON_FSUSE);
+ }
+ gtmp = g;
+ g = g->next;
+ kfree(gtmp);
+ }
+ p->genfs = NULL;
+
+ cond_policydb_destroy(p);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_tr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->role_tr);
+
+ for (ra = p->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ cond_resched();
+ kfree(lra);
+ lra = ra;
+ }
+ kfree(lra);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filenametr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->filename_trans);
+
+ hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_tr_destroy, NULL);
+ hashtab_destroy(&p->range_tr);
+
+ if (p->type_attr_map_array) {
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+ kvfree(p->type_attr_map_array);
+ }
+
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load the initial SIDs specified in a policy database
+ * structure into a SID table.
+ */
+int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ struct ocontext *head, *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = sidtab_init(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: out of memory on SID table init\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
+ u32 sid = c->sid[0];
+ const char *name = security_get_initial_sid_context(sid);
+
+ if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: SID 0 was assigned a context.\n");
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Ignore initial SIDs unused by this kernel. */
+ if (!name)
+ continue;
+
+ rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
+ name);
+ sidtab_destroy(s);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class)
+{
+ if (!class || class > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role)
+{
+ if (!role || role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type)
+{
+ if (!type || type > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if the fields in the security context
+ * structure `c' are valid. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+
+ if (!c->role || c->role > p->p_roles.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->user || c->user > p->p_users.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!c->type || c->type > p->p_types.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (c->role != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ /*
+ * Role must be authorized for the type.
+ */
+ role = p->role_val_to_struct[c->role - 1];
+ if (!role || !ebitmap_get_bit(&role->types, c->type - 1))
+ /* role may not be associated with type */
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * User must be authorized for the role.
+ */
+ usrdatum = p->user_val_to_struct[c->user - 1];
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&usrdatum->roles, c->role - 1))
+ /* user may not be associated with role */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(p, c))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS range structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 items;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ items = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: range overflow\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * items);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ r->level[0].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (items > 1)
+ r->level[1].sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ else
+ r->level[1].sens = r->level[0].sens;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading low categories\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (items > 1) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading high categories\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = ebitmap_cpy(&r->level[1].cat, &r->level[0].cat);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: out of memory\n");
+ goto bad_high;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad_high:
+ ebitmap_destroy(&r->level[0].cat);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read and validate a security context structure
+ * from a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_read_and_validate(struct context *c,
+ struct policydb *p,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: context truncated\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ c->user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: error reading MLS range of context\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(p, c)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: invalid security context\n");
+ context_destroy(c);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_read functions are used to
+ * read the symbol data from a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int str_read(char **strp, gfp_t flags, void *fp, u32 len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *str;
+
+ if ((len == 0) || (len == (u32)-1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ str = kmalloc(len + 1, flags | __GFP_NOWARN);
+ if (!str)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(str, fp, len);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ str[len] = '\0';
+ *strp = str;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 len;
+
+ perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ perdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, perdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ perm_destroy(key, perdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 len, nel;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!comdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, &comdatum->permissions, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, comdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ common_destroy(key, comdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void type_set_init(struct type_set *t)
+{
+ ebitmap_init(&t->types);
+ ebitmap_init(&t->negset);
+}
+
+static int type_set_read(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_read(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ t->flags = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
+ struct constraint_node **nodep,
+ int ncons, int allowxtarget, void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c, *lc;
+ struct constraint_expr *e, *le;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nexpr;
+ int rc, i, j, depth;
+
+ lc = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < ncons; i++) {
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (lc)
+ lc->next = c;
+ else
+ *nodep = c;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ c->permissions = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nexpr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ le = NULL;
+ depth = -1;
+ for (j = 0; j < nexpr; j++) {
+ e = kzalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (le)
+ le->next = e;
+ else
+ c->expr = e;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 3));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ e->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ e->attr = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ e->op = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ if (depth < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ if (depth < 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth--;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (!allowxtarget && (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (depth == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ depth++;
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
+ (*e->type_names), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!e->type_names)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ type_set_init(e->type_names);
+ rc = type_set_read(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ le = e;
+ }
+ if (depth != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ lc = c;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ __le32 buf[6];
+ u32 len, len2, ncons, nel;
+ int i, rc;
+
+ cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cladatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (len2) {
+ rc = str_read(&cladatum->comkey, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ cladatum->comdatum = symtab_search(&p->p_commons,
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ if (!cladatum->comdatum) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unknown common %s\n",
+ cladatum->comkey);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = perm_read(p, &cladatum->permissions, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->constraints, ncons, 0, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_VALIDATETRANS) {
+ /* grab the validatetrans rules */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = read_cons_helper(p, &cladatum->validatetrans,
+ ncons, 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ cladatum->default_user = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ cladatum->default_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ cladatum->default_range = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ cladatum->default_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, cladatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ cls_destroy(key, cladatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ int rc, to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!role)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ role->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ role->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (strcmp(key, OBJECT_R) == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (role->value != OBJECT_R_VAL) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: Role %s has wrong value %d\n",
+ OBJECT_R, role->value);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, role);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ role_destroy(key, role, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ int rc, to_read = 3;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 len;
+
+ typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!typdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 4;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ typdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+ u32 prop = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY)
+ typdatum->primary = 1;
+ if (prop & TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE)
+ typdatum->attribute = 1;
+
+ typdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ } else {
+ typdatum->primary = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ }
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, typdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ type_destroy(key, typdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Read a MLS level structure from a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_read_level(struct mls_level *lp, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ memset(lp, 0, sizeof(*lp));
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: truncated level\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ lp->sens = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&lp->cat, fp);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: mls: error reading level categories\n");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ int rc, to_read = 2;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ to_read = 3;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * to_read);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ usrdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ usrdatum->bounds = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rc = mls_read_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, usrdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ user_destroy(key, usrdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 len;
+
+ levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!levdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ levdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!levdatum->level)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = mls_read_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, levdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ sens_destroy(key, levdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct symtab *s, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = NULL;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 len;
+
+ catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!catdatum)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ catdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ catdatum->isalias = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&key, GFP_ATOMIC, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = symtab_insert(s, key, catdatum);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ cat_destroy(key, catdatum, NULL);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int (*const read_f[SYM_NUM]) (struct policydb *p,
+ struct symtab *s, void *fp) = {
+ common_read,
+ class_read,
+ role_read,
+ type_read,
+ user_read,
+ cond_read_bool,
+ sens_read,
+ cat_read,
+};
+
+static int user_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct user_datum *upper, *user;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = user = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ unsigned long bit;
+
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: user %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->user_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, node, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->roles, bit))
+ continue;
+
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ "user=%s role=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, user->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, upper->value - 1));
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct role_datum *upper, *role;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = role = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ unsigned long bit;
+
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: role %s: "
+ "too deep or looped bounds\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->role_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, node, bit) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&upper->types, bit))
+ continue;
+
+ pr_err("SELinux: boundary violated policy: "
+ "role=%s type=%s bounds=%s\n",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, role->value - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, bit),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, upper->value - 1));
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_bounds_sanity_check(void *key, void *datum, void *datap)
+{
+ struct type_datum *upper;
+ struct policydb *p = datap;
+ int depth = 0;
+
+ upper = datum;
+ while (upper->bounds) {
+ if (++depth == POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+ "too deep or looped boundary\n",
+ (char *) key);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ upper = p->type_val_to_struct[upper->bounds - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!upper);
+
+ if (upper->attribute) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: type %s: "
+ "bounded by attribute %s",
+ (char *) key,
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, upper->value - 1));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int policydb_bounds_sanity_check(struct policydb *p)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_users.table, user_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_roles.table, role_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->p_types.table, type_bounds_sanity_check, p);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+
+ cladatum = symtab_search(&p->p_classes, name);
+ if (!cladatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ return cladatum->value;
+}
+
+u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name)
+{
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum = NULL;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > p->p_classes.nprim)
+ return 0;
+
+ cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass-1];
+ comdatum = cladatum->comdatum;
+ if (comdatum)
+ perdatum = symtab_search(&comdatum->permissions, name);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ perdatum = symtab_search(&cladatum->permissions, name);
+ if (!perdatum)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1U << (perdatum->value-1);
+}
+
+static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct range_trans *rt = NULL;
+ struct mls_range *r = NULL;
+ int i, rc;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ u32 nel;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->range_tr, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rt)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, (sizeof(u32) * 2));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt->source_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rt->target_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rt->target_class = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rt->target_class = p->process_class;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->source_type) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rt->target_type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rt->target_class))
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ r = kzalloc(sizeof(*r), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!r)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = mls_read_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!mls_range_isvalid(p, r)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: rangetrans: invalid range\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->range_tr, rt, r, rangetr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rt = NULL;
+ r = NULL;
+ }
+ hash_eval(&p->range_tr, "rangetr");
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ kfree(rt);
+ kfree(r);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper_compat(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u32 len, stype, otype;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+
+ /* length of the path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ key.name = name;
+
+ otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+
+ last = NULL;
+ datum = policydb_filenametr_search(p, &key);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (unlikely(ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1))) {
+ /* conflicting/duplicate rules are ignored */
+ datum = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (likely(datum->otype == otype))
+ break;
+ last = datum;
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+ if (!datum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ datum = kmalloc(sizeof(*datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ goto out;
+
+ ebitmap_init(&datum->stypes);
+ datum->otype = otype;
+ datum->next = NULL;
+
+ if (unlikely(last)) {
+ last->next = datum;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kmemdup(&key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, datum,
+ filenametr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ name = NULL;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes,
+ key.ttype, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(name);
+ return ebitmap_set_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1, 1);
+
+out:
+ kfree(ft);
+ kfree(name);
+ kfree(datum);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read_helper(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans_datum **dst, *datum, *first = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u32 len, ttype, tclass, ndatum, i;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ /* length of the path component string */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ ndatum = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (ndatum == 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: Filename transition key with no datum\n");
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ dst = &first;
+ for (i = 0; i < ndatum; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ datum = kmalloc(sizeof(*datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
+ goto out;
+
+ datum->next = NULL;
+ *dst = datum;
+
+ /* ebitmap_read() will at least init the bitmap */
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&datum->stypes, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ datum->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ dst = &datum->next;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kmalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
+
+ ft->ttype = ttype;
+ ft->tclass = tclass;
+ ft->name = name;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->filename_trans, ft, first,
+ filenametr_key_params);
+ if (rc == -EEXIST)
+ pr_err("SELinux: Duplicate filename transition key\n");
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ return ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype, 1);
+
+out:
+ kfree(ft);
+ kfree(name);
+ while (first) {
+ datum = first;
+ first = first->next;
+
+ ebitmap_destroy(&datum->stypes);
+ kfree(datum);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 nel;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+ p->compat_filename_trans_count = nel;
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, (1 << 11));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = filename_trans_read_helper_compat(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ } else {
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->filename_trans, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = filename_trans_read_helper(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ hash_eval(&p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ int i, j, rc;
+ u32 nel, nel2, len, len2;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ struct ocontext *newc = NULL;
+ struct genfs *genfs_p, *genfs;
+ struct genfs *newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newgenfs = kzalloc(sizeof(*newgenfs), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newgenfs)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = str_read(&newgenfs->fstype, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (genfs_p = NULL, genfs = p->genfs; genfs;
+ genfs_p = genfs, genfs = genfs->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) == 0) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs fstype %s\n",
+ newgenfs->fstype);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(newgenfs->fstype, genfs->fstype) < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ newgenfs->next = genfs;
+ if (genfs_p)
+ genfs_p->next = newgenfs;
+ else
+ p->genfs = newgenfs;
+ genfs = newgenfs;
+ newgenfs = NULL;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ nel2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ for (j = 0; j < nel2; j++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ newc = kzalloc(sizeof(*newc), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = str_read(&newc->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ newc->v.sclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&newc->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ for (l = NULL, c = genfs->head; c;
+ l = c, c = c->next) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!strcmp(newc->u.name, c->u.name) &&
+ (!c->v.sclass || !newc->v.sclass ||
+ newc->v.sclass == c->v.sclass)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: dup genfs entry (%s,%s)\n",
+ genfs->fstype, c->u.name);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ len = strlen(newc->u.name);
+ len2 = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if (len > len2)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ newc->next = c;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = newc;
+ else
+ genfs->head = newc;
+ newc = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (newgenfs) {
+ kfree(newgenfs->fstype);
+ kfree(newgenfs);
+ }
+ ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int i, j, rc;
+ u32 nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ struct ocontext *l, *c;
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ l = NULL;
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ c = kzalloc(sizeof(*c), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!c)
+ goto out;
+ if (l)
+ l->next = c;
+ else
+ p->ocontexts[i] = c;
+ l = c;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ c->sid[0] = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[1], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.port.protocol = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ c->u.port.low_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ c->u.port.high_port = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ c->u.node.addr = nodebuf[0]; /* network order */
+ c->u.node.mask = nodebuf[1]; /* network order */
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ c->v.behavior = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ /* Determined at runtime, not in policy DB. */
+ if (c->v.behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ goto out;
+ if (c->v.behavior > SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX)
+ goto out;
+
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6: {
+ int k;
+
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 8);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.addr[k] = nodebuf[k];
+ for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
+ c->u.node6.mask[k] = nodebuf[k+4];
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0], p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ case OCON_IBPKEY: {
+ u32 pkey_lo, pkey_hi;
+
+ rc = next_entry(prefixbuf, fp, sizeof(u64));
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* we need to have subnet_prefix in CPU order */
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(prefixbuf[0]);
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ pkey_lo = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ pkey_hi = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ if (pkey_lo > U16_MAX || pkey_hi > U16_MAX) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = pkey_lo;
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = pkey_hi;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT: {
+ u32 port;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (port > U8_MAX || port == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibendport.port = port;
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ } /* end case */
+ } /* end switch */
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read the configuration data from a policy database binary
+ * representation file into a policy database structure.
+ */
+int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra, *lra;
+ struct role_trans_key *rtk = NULL;
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd = NULL;
+ int i, j, rc;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 len, nprim, nel, perm;
+
+ char *policydb_str;
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+ policydb_init(p);
+
+ /* Read the magic number and string length. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(buf[0]) != POLICYDB_MAGIC) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb magic number 0x%x does "
+ "not match expected magic number 0x%x\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (len != strlen(POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string length %d does not "
+ "match expected length %zu\n",
+ len, strlen(POLICYDB_STRING));
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ policydb_str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!policydb_str) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to allocate memory for policydb "
+ "string of length %d\n", len);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(policydb_str, fp, len);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: truncated policydb string identifier\n");
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ policydb_str[len] = '\0';
+ if (strcmp(policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb string %s does not match "
+ "my string %s\n", policydb_str, POLICYDB_STRING);
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* Done with policydb_str. */
+ kfree(policydb_str);
+ policydb_str = NULL;
+
+ /* Read the version and table sizes. */
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ p->policyvers = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN ||
+ p->policyvers > POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb version %d does not match "
+ "my version range %d-%d\n",
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[0]), POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN, POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if ((le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS)) {
+ p->mls_enabled = 1;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: security policydb version %d "
+ "(MLS) not backwards compatible\n",
+ p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ }
+ p->reject_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & REJECT_UNKNOWN);
+ p->allow_unknown = !!(le32_to_cpu(buf[1]) & ALLOW_UNKNOWN);
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to find policy compat info "
+ "for version %d\n", p->policyvers);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (le32_to_cpu(buf[2]) != info->sym_num ||
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]) != info->ocon_num) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: policydb table sizes (%d,%d) do "
+ "not match mine (%d,%d)\n", le32_to_cpu(buf[2]),
+ le32_to_cpu(buf[3]),
+ info->sym_num, info->ocon_num);
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < info->sym_num; i++) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (i == SYM_ROLES) {
+ rc = roles_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
+ rc = read_f[i](p, &p->symtab[i], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ p->symtab[i].nprim = nprim;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ p->process_class = string_to_security_class(p, "process");
+ if (!p->process_class) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process class is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_read(&p->te_avtab, fp, p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL) {
+ rc = cond_read_list(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = hashtab_init(&p->role_tr, nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rtk = kmalloc(sizeof(*rtk), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rtk)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ rtd = kmalloc(sizeof(*rtd), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rtd)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*3);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rtk->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ rtk->type = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ rtd->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ rtk->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ } else
+ rtk->tclass = p->process_class;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtk->role) ||
+ !policydb_type_isvalid(p, rtk->type) ||
+ !policydb_class_isvalid(p, rtk->tclass) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, rtd->new_role))
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = hashtab_insert(&p->role_tr, rtk, rtd, roletr_key_params);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rtk = NULL;
+ rtd = NULL;
+ }
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ lra = NULL;
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ra = kzalloc(sizeof(*ra), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ra)
+ goto bad;
+ if (lra)
+ lra->next = ra;
+ else
+ p->role_allow = ra;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ ra->role = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ ra->new_role = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ if (!policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->role) ||
+ !policydb_role_isvalid(p, ra->new_role))
+ goto bad;
+ lra = ra;
+ }
+
+ rc = filename_trans_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = policydb_index(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "transition");
+ if (!perm) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process transition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ p->process_trans_perms = perm;
+ perm = string_to_av_perm(p, p->process_class, "dyntransition");
+ if (!perm) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: process dyntransition permission is required, not defined in policy\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ p->process_trans_perms |= perm;
+
+ rc = ocontext_read(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = genfs_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = range_read(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ p->type_attr_map_array = kvcalloc(p->p_types.nprim,
+ sizeof(*p->type_attr_map_array),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->type_attr_map_array)
+ goto bad;
+
+ /* just in case ebitmap_init() becomes more than just a memset(0): */
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++)
+ ebitmap_init(&p->type_attr_map_array[i]);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ rc = ebitmap_read(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ /* add the type itself as the degenerate case */
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(e, i, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_bounds_sanity_check(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+bad:
+ kfree(rtk);
+ kfree(rtd);
+ policydb_destroy(p);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS level structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_level(struct mls_level *l, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(l->sens);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&l->cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a MLS range structure to a policydb binary
+ * representation file.
+ */
+static int mls_write_range_helper(struct mls_range *r, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items;
+ int rc, eq;
+
+ eq = mls_level_eq(&r->level[1], &r->level[0]);
+
+ if (eq)
+ items = 2;
+ else
+ items = 3;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(items-1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[0].sens);
+ if (!eq)
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(r->level[1].sens);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[0].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (!eq) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&r->level[1].cat, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sens_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct level_datum *levdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(levdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(levdatum->level, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cat_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct cat_datum *catdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(catdatum->isalias);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write_one(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct role_trans_key *rtk = key;
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->type);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(rtd->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rtk->tclass);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct policy_data pd = { .p = p, .fp = fp };
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->role_tr.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return hashtab_map(&p->role_tr, role_trans_write_one, &pd);
+}
+
+static int role_allow_write(struct role_allow *r, void *fp)
+{
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ nel = 0;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (ra = r; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ra->role);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ra->new_role);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write a security context structure
+ * to a policydb binary representation file.
+ */
+static int context_write(struct policydb *p, struct context *c,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->user);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->role);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->type);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&c->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following *_write functions are used to
+ * write the symbol data to a policy database
+ * binary representation file.
+ */
+
+static int perm_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *fp)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct perm_datum *perdatum = datum;
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(perdatum->value);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int common_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct common_datum *comdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ size_t len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->value);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.nprim);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(comdatum->permissions.table.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&comdatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_set_write(struct type_set *t, void *fp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->types, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (ebitmap_write(&t->negset, fp))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(t->flags);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int write_cons_helper(struct policydb *p, struct constraint_node *node,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nel;
+ int rc;
+
+ for (c = node; c; c = c->next) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->permissions);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (e = c->expr; e; e = e->next) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(e->expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(e->attr);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(e->op);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&e->names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >=
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ rc = type_set_write(e->type_names, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int class_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ struct constraint_node *c;
+ __le32 buf[6];
+ u32 ncons;
+ size_t len, len2;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ if (cladatum->comkey)
+ len2 = strlen(cladatum->comkey);
+ else
+ len2 = 0;
+
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->constraints; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len2);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->value);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.nprim);
+ buf[4] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->permissions.table.nel);
+ buf[5] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 6, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (cladatum->comkey) {
+ rc = put_entry(cladatum->comkey, 1, len2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&cladatum->permissions.table, perm_write, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->constraints, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* write out the validatetrans rule */
+ ncons = 0;
+ for (c = cladatum->validatetrans; c; c = c->next)
+ ncons++;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncons);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = write_cons_helper(p, cladatum->validatetrans, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_user);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_role);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_range);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cladatum->default_type);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(uint32_t), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int role_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct role_datum *role = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(role->bounds);
+
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->dominates, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&role->types, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int type_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+ size_t items, len;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) {
+ u32 properties = 0;
+
+ if (typdatum->primary)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_PRIMARY;
+
+ if (typdatum->attribute)
+ properties |= TYPEDATUM_PROPERTY_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(properties);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->bounds);
+ } else {
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(typdatum->primary);
+ }
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int user_write(void *vkey, void *datum, void *ptr)
+{
+ char *key = vkey;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum = datum;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ size_t items, len;
+ int rc;
+
+ len = strlen(key);
+ items = 0;
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->value);
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY)
+ buf[items++] = cpu_to_le32(usrdatum->bounds);
+ BUG_ON(items > ARRAY_SIZE(buf));
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), items, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(key, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&usrdatum->roles, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(&usrdatum->range, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = mls_write_level(&usrdatum->dfltlevel, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int (*const write_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) = {
+ common_write,
+ class_write,
+ role_write,
+ type_write,
+ user_write,
+ cond_write_bool,
+ sens_write,
+ cat_write,
+};
+
+static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, const struct policydb_compat_info *info,
+ void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i, j, rc;
+ size_t nel, len;
+ __be64 prefixbuf[1];
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ u32 nodebuf[8];
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ for (i = 0; i < info->ocon_num; i++) {
+ nel = 0;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next)
+ nel++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = p->ocontexts[i]; c; c = c->next) {
+ switch (i) {
+ case OCON_ISID:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->sid[0]);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FS:
+ case OCON_NETIF:
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[1], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_PORT:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.protocol);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.low_port);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.port.high_port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE:
+ nodebuf[0] = c->u.node.addr; /* network order */
+ nodebuf[1] = c->u.node.mask; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_FSUSE:
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.behavior);
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_NODE6:
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j] = c->u.node6.addr[j]; /* network order */
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
+ nodebuf[j + 4] = c->u.node6.mask[j]; /* network order */
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 8, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBPKEY:
+ /* subnet_prefix is in CPU order */
+ prefixbuf[0] = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+
+ rc = put_entry(prefixbuf, sizeof(u64), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+ len = strlen(c->u.ibendport.dev_name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibendport.port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int genfs_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ size_t len;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ len = 0;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (genfs = p->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ len = strlen(genfs->fstype);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(genfs->fstype, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ len = 0;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next)
+ len++;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(c->v.sclass);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ __le32 buf[2];
+ struct range_trans *rt = key;
+ struct mls_range *r = data;
+ struct policy_data *pd = ptr;
+ void *fp = pd->fp;
+ struct policydb *p = pd->p;
+ int rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->source_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_type);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(rt->target_class);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ rc = mls_write_range_helper(r, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.p = p;
+ pd.fp = fp;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->range_tr.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* actually write all of the entries */
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->range_tr, range_write_helper, &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper_compat(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum = data;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+ void *fp = ptr;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ int rc;
+ u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+ do {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(bit + 1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+ void *fp = ptr;
+ __le32 buf[3];
+ int rc;
+ u32 ndatum, len = strlen(ft->name);
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ ndatum = 0;
+ datum = data;
+ do {
+ ndatum++;
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ndatum);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 3, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ datum = data;
+ do {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&datum->stypes, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->compat_filename_trans_count);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans,
+ filename_write_helper_compat, fp);
+ } else {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->filename_trans.nel);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->filename_trans, filename_write_helper, fp);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the configuration data in a policy database
+ * structure to a policy database binary representation
+ * file.
+ */
+int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ unsigned int i, num_syms;
+ int rc;
+ __le32 buf[4];
+ u32 config;
+ size_t len;
+ const struct policydb_compat_info *info;
+
+ /*
+ * refuse to write policy older than compressed avtab
+ * to simplify the writer. There are other tests dropped
+ * since we assume this throughout the writer code. Be
+ * careful if you ever try to remove this restriction
+ */
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: refusing to write policy version %d."
+ " Because it is less than version %d\n", p->policyvers,
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ config = 0;
+ if (p->mls_enabled)
+ config |= POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS;
+
+ if (p->reject_unknown)
+ config |= REJECT_UNKNOWN;
+ if (p->allow_unknown)
+ config |= ALLOW_UNKNOWN;
+
+ /* Write the magic number and string identifiers. */
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(POLICYDB_MAGIC);
+ len = strlen(POLICYDB_STRING);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(POLICYDB_STRING, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Write the version, config, and table sizes. */
+ info = policydb_lookup_compat(p->policyvers);
+ if (!info) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: compatibility lookup failed for policy "
+ "version %d", p->policyvers);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->policyvers);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(config);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(info->sym_num);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(info->ocon_num);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->policycaps, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE) {
+ rc = ebitmap_write(&p->permissive_map, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ num_syms = info->sym_num;
+ for (i = 0; i < num_syms; i++) {
+ struct policy_data pd;
+
+ pd.fp = fp;
+ pd.p = p;
+
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].nprim);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(p->symtab[i].table.nel);
+
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = hashtab_map(&p->symtab[i].table, write_f[i], &pd);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = avtab_write(p, &p->te_avtab, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = cond_write_list(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_trans_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = role_allow_write(p->role_allow, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = filename_trans_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = ocontext_write(p, info, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = genfs_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = range_write(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < p->p_types.nprim; i++) {
+ struct ebitmap *e = &p->type_attr_map_array[i];
+
+ rc = ebitmap_write(e, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ffc4e7bad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * A policy database (policydb) specifies the
+ * configuration data for the security policy.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+#define _SS_POLICYDB_H_
+
+#include "symtab.h"
+#include "avtab.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "mls_types.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "constraint.h"
+
+/*
+ * A datum type is defined for each kind of symbol
+ * in the configuration data: individual permissions,
+ * common prefixes for access vectors, classes,
+ * users, roles, types, sensitivities, categories, etc.
+ */
+
+/* Permission attributes */
+struct perm_datum {
+ u32 value; /* permission bit + 1 */
+};
+
+/* Attributes of a common prefix for access vectors */
+struct common_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal common value */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* common permissions */
+};
+
+/* Class attributes */
+struct class_datum {
+ u32 value; /* class value */
+ char *comkey; /* common name */
+ struct common_datum *comdatum; /* common datum */
+ struct symtab permissions; /* class-specific permission symbol table */
+ struct constraint_node *constraints; /* constraints on class permissions */
+ struct constraint_node *validatetrans; /* special transition rules */
+/* Options how a new object user, role, and type should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE 1
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET 2
+ char default_user;
+ char default_role;
+ char default_type;
+/* Options how a new object range should be decided */
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW 1
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_HIGH 2
+#define DEFAULT_SOURCE_LOW_HIGH 3
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW 4
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_HIGH 5
+#define DEFAULT_TARGET_LOW_HIGH 6
+#define DEFAULT_GLBLUB 7
+ char default_range;
+};
+
+/* Role attributes */
+struct role_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal role value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of role */
+ struct ebitmap dominates; /* set of roles dominated by this role */
+ struct ebitmap types; /* set of authorized types for role */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_key {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 type; /* program executable type, or new object type */
+ u32 tclass; /* process class, or new object class */
+};
+
+struct role_trans_datum {
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_key {
+ u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
+ u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
+ const char *name; /* last path component */
+};
+
+struct filename_trans_datum {
+ struct ebitmap stypes; /* bitmap of source types for this otype */
+ u32 otype; /* resulting type of new object */
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next; /* record for next otype*/
+};
+
+struct role_allow {
+ u32 role; /* current role */
+ u32 new_role; /* new role */
+ struct role_allow *next;
+};
+
+/* Type attributes */
+struct type_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ u32 bounds; /* boundary of type */
+ unsigned char primary; /* primary name? */
+ unsigned char attribute;/* attribute ?*/
+};
+
+/* User attributes */
+struct user_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal user value */
+ u32 bounds; /* bounds of user */
+ struct ebitmap roles; /* set of authorized roles for user */
+ struct mls_range range; /* MLS range (min - max) for user */
+ struct mls_level dfltlevel; /* default login MLS level for user */
+};
+
+
+/* Sensitivity attributes */
+struct level_datum {
+ struct mls_level *level; /* sensitivity and associated categories */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this sensitivity an alias for another? */
+};
+
+/* Category attributes */
+struct cat_datum {
+ u32 value; /* internal category bit + 1 */
+ unsigned char isalias; /* is this category an alias for another? */
+};
+
+struct range_trans {
+ u32 source_type;
+ u32 target_type;
+ u32 target_class;
+};
+
+/* Boolean data type */
+struct cond_bool_datum {
+ __u32 value; /* internal type value */
+ int state;
+};
+
+struct cond_node;
+
+/*
+ * type set preserves data needed to determine constraint info from
+ * policy source. This is not used by the kernel policy but allows
+ * utilities such as audit2allow to determine constraint denials.
+ */
+struct type_set {
+ struct ebitmap types;
+ struct ebitmap negset;
+ u32 flags;
+};
+
+/*
+ * The configuration data includes security contexts for
+ * initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems, TCP and UDP port numbers,
+ * network interfaces, and nodes. This structure stores the
+ * relevant data for one such entry. Entries of the same kind
+ * (e.g. all initial SIDs) are linked together into a list.
+ */
+struct ocontext {
+ union {
+ char *name; /* name of initial SID, fs, netif, fstype, path */
+ struct {
+ u8 protocol;
+ u16 low_port;
+ u16 high_port;
+ } port; /* TCP or UDP port information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr;
+ u32 mask;
+ } node; /* node information */
+ struct {
+ u32 addr[4];
+ u32 mask[4];
+ } node6; /* IPv6 node information */
+ struct {
+ u64 subnet_prefix;
+ u16 low_pkey;
+ u16 high_pkey;
+ } ibpkey;
+ struct {
+ char *dev_name;
+ u8 port;
+ } ibendport;
+ } u;
+ union {
+ u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
+ u32 behavior; /* labeling behavior for fs_use */
+ } v;
+ struct context context[2]; /* security context(s) */
+ u32 sid[2]; /* SID(s) */
+ struct ocontext *next;
+};
+
+struct genfs {
+ char *fstype;
+ struct ocontext *head;
+ struct genfs *next;
+};
+
+/* symbol table array indices */
+#define SYM_COMMONS 0
+#define SYM_CLASSES 1
+#define SYM_ROLES 2
+#define SYM_TYPES 3
+#define SYM_USERS 4
+#define SYM_BOOLS 5
+#define SYM_LEVELS 6
+#define SYM_CATS 7
+#define SYM_NUM 8
+
+/* object context array indices */
+#define OCON_ISID 0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS 1 /* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT 2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE 4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY 7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT 8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM 9
+
+/* The policy database */
+struct policydb {
+ int mls_enabled;
+
+ /* symbol tables */
+ struct symtab symtab[SYM_NUM];
+#define p_commons symtab[SYM_COMMONS]
+#define p_classes symtab[SYM_CLASSES]
+#define p_roles symtab[SYM_ROLES]
+#define p_types symtab[SYM_TYPES]
+#define p_users symtab[SYM_USERS]
+#define p_bools symtab[SYM_BOOLS]
+#define p_levels symtab[SYM_LEVELS]
+#define p_cats symtab[SYM_CATS]
+
+ /* symbol names indexed by (value - 1) */
+ char **sym_val_to_name[SYM_NUM];
+
+ /* class, role, and user attributes indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct class_datum **class_val_to_struct;
+ struct role_datum **role_val_to_struct;
+ struct user_datum **user_val_to_struct;
+ struct type_datum **type_val_to_struct;
+
+ /* type enforcement access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_avtab;
+
+ /* role transitions */
+ struct hashtab role_tr;
+
+ /* file transitions with the last path component */
+ /* quickly exclude lookups when parent ttype has no rules */
+ struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
+ /* actual set of filename_trans rules */
+ struct hashtab filename_trans;
+ /* only used if policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_COMP_FTRANS */
+ u32 compat_filename_trans_count;
+
+ /* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
+ struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
+ /* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
+ struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
+ /* array indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+ struct cond_node *cond_list;
+ u32 cond_list_len;
+
+ /* role allows */
+ struct role_allow *role_allow;
+
+ /* security contexts of initial SIDs, unlabeled file systems,
+ TCP or UDP port numbers, network interfaces and nodes */
+ struct ocontext *ocontexts[OCON_NUM];
+
+ /* security contexts for files in filesystems that cannot support
+ a persistent label mapping or use another
+ fixed labeling behavior. */
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+
+ /* range transitions table (range_trans_key -> mls_range) */
+ struct hashtab range_tr;
+
+ /* type -> attribute reverse mapping */
+ struct ebitmap *type_attr_map_array;
+
+ struct ebitmap policycaps;
+
+ struct ebitmap permissive_map;
+
+ /* length of this policy when it was loaded */
+ size_t len;
+
+ unsigned int policyvers;
+
+ unsigned int reject_unknown : 1;
+ unsigned int allow_unknown : 1;
+
+ u16 process_class;
+ u32 process_trans_perms;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+extern void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
+extern int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s);
+extern int policydb_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
+extern int policydb_class_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int class);
+extern int policydb_type_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int type);
+extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
+extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
+
+extern struct filename_trans_datum *policydb_filenametr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct filename_trans_key *key);
+
+extern struct mls_range *policydb_rangetr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct range_trans *key);
+
+extern struct role_trans_datum *policydb_roletr_search(
+ struct policydb *p, struct role_trans_key *key);
+
+#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
+
+/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
+#define REJECT_UNKNOWN 0x00000002
+#define ALLOW_UNKNOWN 0x00000004
+
+#define OBJECT_R "object_r"
+#define OBJECT_R_VAL 1
+
+#define POLICYDB_MAGIC SELINUX_MAGIC
+#define POLICYDB_STRING "SE Linux"
+
+struct policy_file {
+ char *data;
+ size_t len;
+};
+
+struct policy_data {
+ struct policydb *p;
+ void *fp;
+};
+
+static inline int next_entry(void *buf, struct policy_file *fp, size_t bytes)
+{
+ if (bytes > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memcpy(buf, fp->data, bytes);
+ fp->data += bytes;
+ fp->len -= bytes;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int put_entry(const void *buf, size_t bytes, int num, struct policy_file *fp)
+{
+ size_t len = bytes * num;
+
+ if (len > fp->len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ memcpy(fp->data, buf, len);
+ fp->data += len;
+ fp->len -= len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline char *sym_name(struct policydb *p, unsigned int sym_num, unsigned int element_nr)
+{
+ return p->sym_val_to_name[sym_num][element_nr];
+}
+
+extern u16 string_to_security_class(struct policydb *p, const char *name);
+extern u32 string_to_av_perm(struct policydb *p, u16 tclass, const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _SS_POLICYDB_H_ */
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64a6a37dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4072 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ *
+ * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ * Support for context based audit filters.
+ *
+ * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added conditional policy language extensions
+ *
+ * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for NetLabel
+ * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
+ *
+ * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
+ *
+ * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
+ *
+ * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
+ *
+ * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "avc.h"
+#include "avc_ss.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "context.h"
+#include "policydb.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+#include "services.h"
+#include "conditional.h"
+#include "mls.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+#include "netlabel.h"
+#include "xfrm.h"
+#include "ebitmap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "policycap_names.h"
+#include "ima.h"
+
+struct convert_context_args {
+ struct selinux_state *state;
+ struct policydb *oldp;
+ struct policydb *newp;
+};
+
+struct selinux_policy_convert_data {
+ struct convert_context_args args;
+ struct sidtab_convert_params sidtab_params;
+};
+
+/* Forward declaration. */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len);
+
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms);
+
+static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
+ const struct security_class_mapping *map,
+ struct selinux_map *out_map)
+{
+ u16 i, j;
+ unsigned k;
+ bool print_unknown_handle = false;
+
+ /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
+ if (!map)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ i = 0;
+ while (map[i].name)
+ i++;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
+ out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!out_map->mapping)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Store the raw class and permission values */
+ j = 0;
+ while (map[j].name) {
+ const struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
+ struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
+
+ /* An empty class string skips ahead */
+ if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
+ if (!p_out->value) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ p_out->num_perms = 0;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ k = 0;
+ while (p_in->perms[k]) {
+ /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
+ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
+ k++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
+ p_in->perms[k]);
+ if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
+ pr_info("SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
+ p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
+ if (pol->reject_unknown)
+ goto err;
+ print_unknown_handle = true;
+ }
+
+ k++;
+ }
+ p_out->num_perms = k;
+ }
+
+ if (print_unknown_handle)
+ pr_info("SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
+ pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
+
+ out_map->size = i;
+ return 0;
+err:
+ kfree(out_map->mapping);
+ out_map->mapping = NULL;
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get real, policy values from mapped values
+ */
+
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size)
+ return map->mapping[tclass].value;
+
+ return tclass;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
+ */
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
+{
+ u16 i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+ if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+ return i;
+ }
+
+ return SECCLASS_NULL;
+}
+
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+ u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+ int allow_unknown)
+{
+ if (tclass < map->size) {
+ struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+ unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
+ u32 result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ avd->allowed = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
+ if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ avd->auditallow = result;
+
+ for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ }
+ /*
+ * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
+ * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
+ * should audit that denial
+ */
+ for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
+ result |= 1<<i;
+ avd->auditdeny = result;
+ }
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ int mls_enabled;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ mls_enabled = policy->policydb.mls_enabled;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return mls_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
+ * when it is applied to the specified source and target
+ * security contexts.
+ *
+ * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
+ * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
+ * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
+ * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
+ * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
+ */
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ struct context *xcontext,
+ struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
+{
+ u32 val1, val2;
+ struct context *c;
+ struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
+ struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
+ struct constraint_expr *e;
+ int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
+ int sp = -1;
+
+ for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
+ switch (e->expr_type) {
+ case CEXPR_NOT:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 0);
+ s[sp] = !s[sp];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_AND:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] &= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_OR:
+ BUG_ON(sp < 1);
+ sp--;
+ s[sp] |= s[sp + 1];
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ATTR:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
+ return 0;
+ switch (e->attr) {
+ case CEXPR_USER:
+ val1 = scontext->user;
+ val2 = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_TYPE:
+ val1 = scontext->type;
+ val2 = tcontext->type;
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_ROLE:
+ val1 = scontext->role;
+ val2 = tcontext->role;
+ r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+ r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
+ val2 - 1) &&
+ !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
+ val1 - 1));
+ continue;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_L1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1L2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_H1H2:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L1H1:
+ l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+ case CEXPR_L2H2:
+ l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
+ l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
+ goto mls_ops;
+mls_ops:
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOM:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_DOMBY:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ case CEXPR_INCOMP:
+ s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
+ continue;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NAMES:
+ if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
+ return 0;
+ c = scontext;
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
+ c = tcontext;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
+ c = xcontext;
+ if (!c) {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
+ val1 = c->user;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
+ val1 = c->role;
+ else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
+ val1 = c->type;
+ else {
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (e->op) {
+ case CEXPR_EQ:
+ s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ case CEXPR_NEQ:
+ s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ BUG_ON(sp != 0);
+ return s[0];
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
+ * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
+ */
+static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
+ char **permission_names = args;
+
+ BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
+
+ permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 permissions,
+ const char *reason)
+{
+ struct common_datum *common_dat;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *tclass_name;
+ char *scontext_name = NULL;
+ char *tcontext_name = NULL;
+ char *permission_names[32];
+ int index;
+ u32 length;
+ bool need_comma = false;
+
+ if (!permissions)
+ return;
+
+ tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+ tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+ common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
+
+ /* init permission_names */
+ if (common_dat &&
+ hashtab_map(&common_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (hashtab_map(&tclass_dat->permissions.table,
+ dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
+ &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
+ &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* audit a message */
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
+ "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
+ reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
+
+ for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
+ u32 mask = (1 << index);
+
+ if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
+ need_comma ? "," : "",
+ permission_names[index]
+ ? permission_names[index] : "????");
+ need_comma = true;
+ }
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ /* release scontext/tcontext */
+ kfree(tcontext_name);
+ kfree(scontext_name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
+ * on boundary constraint.
+ */
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct context lo_scontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
+ struct av_decision lo_avd;
+ struct type_datum *source;
+ struct type_datum *target;
+ u32 masked = 0;
+
+ source = policydb->type_val_to_struct[scontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!source);
+
+ if (!source->bounds)
+ return;
+
+ target = policydb->type_val_to_struct[tcontext->type - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!target);
+
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
+
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+
+ if (target->bounds) {
+ memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
+ lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
+ tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
+ tcontextp,
+ tclass,
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
+
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+
+ if (likely(!masked))
+ return; /* no masked permission */
+
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
+}
+
+/*
+ * flag which drivers have permissions
+ * only looking for ioctl based extended permssions
+ */
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
+ struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ /* if one or more driver has all permissions allowed */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms->drivers.p); i++)
+ xperms->drivers.p[i] |= node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ /* if allowing permissions within a driver */
+ security_xperm_set(xperms->drivers.p,
+ node->datum.u.xperms->driver);
+ }
+
+ xperms->len = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
+ * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
+ */
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *scontext,
+ struct context *tcontext,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ struct role_allow *ra;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (xperms) {
+ memset(&xperms->drivers, 0, sizeof(xperms->drivers));
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /*
+ * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
+ * this permission check, then use it.
+ */
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
+ avd->allowed |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
+ avd->auditallow |= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
+ avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.u.data;
+ else if (xperms && (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS))
+ services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node);
+ }
+
+ /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
+ cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+ avd, xperms);
+
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
+ * the MLS policy).
+ */
+ constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
+ !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If checking process transition permission and the
+ * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
+ * pair.
+ */
+ if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+ (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
+ scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
+ for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+ if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
+ tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!ra)
+ avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the given source and target types have boundary
+ * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
+ * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
+ */
+ type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, avd);
+}
+
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ struct policydb *p = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
+ u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, oentry, &o, &olen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, nentry, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(p, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
+ " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+out:
+ kfree(o);
+ kfree(n);
+ kfree(t);
+
+ if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return 0;
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *oentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *nentry;
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry;
+ struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
+ struct constraint_node *constraint;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!user)
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ else
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+
+ if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ oentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, oldsid);
+ if (!oentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, oldsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ nentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, newsid);
+ if (!nentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, newsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tasksid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tasksid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
+ while (constraint) {
+ if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, &oentry->context,
+ &nentry->context, &tentry->context,
+ constraint->expr)) {
+ if (user)
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ else
+ rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+ policy,
+ oentry,
+ nentry,
+ tentry,
+ tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ constraint = constraint->next;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ tclass, true);
+}
+
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+ u16 orig_tclass)
+{
+ return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+ orig_tclass, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
+ * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
+ * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
+ * Otherwise, it returns error code.
+ *
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @oldsid : current security identifier
+ * @newsid : destinated security identifier
+ */
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *old_entry, *new_entry;
+ struct type_datum *type;
+ int index;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ old_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, old_sid);
+ if (!old_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, old_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ new_entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, new_sid);
+ if (!new_entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
+ __func__, new_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+ /* type/domain unchanged */
+ if (old_entry->context.type == new_entry->context.type)
+ goto out;
+
+ index = new_entry->context.type;
+ while (true) {
+ type = policydb->type_val_to_struct[index - 1];
+ BUG_ON(!type);
+
+ /* not bounded anymore */
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ if (!type->bounds)
+ break;
+
+ /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
+ rc = 0;
+ if (type->bounds == old_entry->context.type)
+ break;
+
+ index = type->bounds;
+ }
+
+ if (rc) {
+ char *old_name = NULL;
+ char *new_name = NULL;
+ u32 length;
+
+ if (!sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, old_entry,
+ &old_name, &length) &&
+ !sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, new_entry,
+ &new_name, &length)) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "op=security_bounded_transition "
+ "seresult=denied "
+ "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
+ old_name, new_name);
+ }
+ kfree(new_name);
+ kfree(old_name);
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_policy *policy, struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ avd->allowed = 0;
+ avd->auditallow = 0;
+ avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
+ if (policy)
+ avd->seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+ else
+ avd->seqno = 0;
+ avd->flags = 0;
+}
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ if (xpermd->driver != node->datum.u.xperms->driver)
+ return;
+ } else if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ if (!security_xperm_test(node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p,
+ xpermd->driver))
+ return;
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+
+ if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_ALLOWED;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->allowed->p); i++)
+ xpermd->allowed->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_AUDITALLOW;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->auditallow->p); i++)
+ xpermd->auditallow->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT) {
+ xpermd->used |= XPERMS_DONTAUDIT;
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLDRIVER) {
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0xff,
+ sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+ }
+ if (node->datum.u.xperms->specified == AVTAB_XPERMS_IOCTLFUNCTION) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xpermd->dontaudit->p); i++)
+ xpermd->dontaudit->p[i] |=
+ node->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i];
+ }
+ } else {
+ BUG();
+ }
+}
+
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u8 driver,
+ struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
+ struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
+ unsigned int i, j;
+
+ xpermd->driver = driver;
+ xpermd->used = 0;
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
+ memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
+ sattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[scontext->type - 1];
+ tattr = &policydb->type_attr_map_array[tcontext->type - 1];
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
+ avkey.source_type = i + 1;
+ avkey.target_type = j + 1;
+ for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+ &avkey);
+ node;
+ node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
+ services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
+
+ cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
+ &avkey, xpermd);
+ }
+ }
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
+ * @avd: access vector decisions
+ * @xperms: extended permissions
+ *
+ * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
+ * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
+ */
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd,
+ struct extended_perms *xperms)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ u16 tclass;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ xperms->len = 0;
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ xperms);
+ map_decision(&policy->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+ policydb->allow_unknown);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct av_decision *avd)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ avd_init(policy, avd);
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ goto allow;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!scontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* permissive domain? */
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
+ avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
+
+ tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tcontext) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
+ if (policydb->allow_unknown)
+ goto allow;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+ NULL);
+ out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+allow:
+ avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Write the security context string representation of
+ * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
+ * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
+ * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
+ * the length of the string.
+ */
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct context *context,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ char *scontextp;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (context->len) {
+ *scontext_len = context->len;
+ if (scontext) {
+ *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*scontext))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Compute the size of the context. */
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+ *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
+
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
+ scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
+ */
+ scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
+ sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+ sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+
+ mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
+
+ *scontextp = 0;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_entry_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+ struct sidtab *sidtab,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ int rc = sidtab_sid2str_get(sidtab, entry, scontext, scontext_len);
+
+ if (rc != -ENOENT)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(p, &entry->context, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+ if (!rc && scontext)
+ sidtab_sid2str_put(sidtab, entry, *scontext, *scontext_len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
+
+int security_sidtab_hash_stats(struct selinux_state *state, char *page)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial load_policy\n",
+ __func__);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ rc = sidtab_hash_stats(policy->sidtab, page);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
+{
+ if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
+ return NULL;
+ return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+}
+
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char **scontext,
+ u32 *scontext_len, int force,
+ int only_invalid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (scontext)
+ *scontext = NULL;
+ *scontext_len = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
+ char *scontextp;
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[sid];
+
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1;
+ if (!scontext)
+ return 0;
+ scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *scontext = scontextp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial "
+ "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (force)
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(sidtab, sid);
+ else
+ entry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!entry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (only_invalid && !entry->context.len)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, entry, scontext,
+ scontext_len);
+
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
+ * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 0, 0);
+}
+
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_sid_to_context_inval - Obtain a context for a given SID if it
+ * is invalid.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ *
+ * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
+ * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size, but only if the
+ * context is invalid in the current policy. Set @scontext to point to
+ * this string (or NULL if the context is valid) and set @scontext_len to
+ * the length of the string (or 0 if the context is valid).
+ */
+int security_sid_to_context_inval(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+ char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+{
+ return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+ scontext_len, 1, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
+ */
+static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
+ struct sidtab *sidtabp,
+ char *scontext,
+ struct context *ctx,
+ u32 def_sid)
+{
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ context_init(ctx);
+
+ /* Parse the security context. */
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ scontextp = scontext;
+
+ /* Extract the user. */
+ p = scontextp;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_users, scontextp);
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Extract role. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+
+ if (*p == 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ role = symtab_search(&pol->p_roles, scontextp);
+ if (!role)
+ goto out;
+ ctx->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Extract type. */
+ scontextp = p;
+ while (*p && *p != ':')
+ p++;
+ oldc = *p;
+ *p++ = 0;
+
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&pol->p_types, scontextp);
+ if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
+ goto out;
+
+ ctx->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
+ goto out;
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ if (rc)
+ context_destroy(ctx);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
+ int force)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
+ struct context context;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* An empty security context is never valid. */
+ if (!scontext_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Copy the string to allow changes and ensure a NUL terminator */
+ scontext2 = kmemdup_nul(scontext, scontext_len, gfp_flags);
+ if (!scontext2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+ if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) {
+ *sid = i;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ if (force) {
+ /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
+ if (!str)
+ goto out;
+ }
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
+ &context, def_sid);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
+ context.str = str;
+ context.len = strlen(str) + 1;
+ str = NULL;
+ } else if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (context.str) {
+ str = context.str;
+ context.str = NULL;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ context_destroy(&context);
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+out:
+ kfree(scontext2);
+ kfree(str);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @gfp: context for the allocation
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
+}
+
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+ sid, gfp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
+ * falling back to specified default if needed.
+ *
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @scontext: security context
+ * @scontext_len: length in bytes
+ * @sid: security identifier, SID
+ * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
+ *
+ * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
+ * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
+ * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
+ * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
+ * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
+ * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
+ * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
+ * memory is available, or 0 on success.
+ */
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
+}
+
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
+ sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
+}
+
+static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry,
+ struct sidtab_entry *tentry,
+ u16 tclass,
+ struct context *newcontext)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
+ u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, sentry, &s, &slen))
+ goto out;
+ if (sidtab_entry_to_string(policydb, sidtab, tentry, &t, &tlen))
+ goto out;
+ if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+ goto out;
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ if (!ab)
+ goto out;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=");
+ /* no need to record the NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n, nlen - 1);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s",
+ s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+out:
+ kfree(s);
+ kfree(t);
+ kfree(n);
+ if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return 0;
+ return -EACCES;
+}
+
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *newcontext,
+ u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname)
+{
+ struct filename_trans_key ft;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
+
+ /*
+ * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
+ * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
+ * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
+ */
+ if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+ return;
+
+ ft.ttype = ttype;
+ ft.tclass = tclass;
+ ft.name = objname;
+
+ datum = policydb_filenametr_search(policydb, &ft);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) {
+ newcontext->type = datum->otype;
+ return;
+ }
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 orig_tclass,
+ u32 specified,
+ const char *objname,
+ u32 *out_sid,
+ bool kern)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct class_datum *cladatum;
+ struct context *scontext, *tcontext, newcontext;
+ struct sidtab_entry *sentry, *tentry;
+ struct avtab_key avkey;
+ struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
+ struct avtab_node *node;
+ u16 tclass;
+ int rc = 0;
+ bool sock;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ switch (orig_tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
+ *out_sid = ssid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ *out_sid = tsid;
+ break;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ cladatum = NULL;
+ context_init(&newcontext);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+ if (kern) {
+ tclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_tclass);
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
+ } else {
+ tclass = orig_tclass;
+ sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&policy->map,
+ tclass));
+ }
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ sentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, ssid);
+ if (!sentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, ssid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ tentry = sidtab_search_entry(sidtab, tsid);
+ if (!tentry) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, tsid);
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ scontext = &sentry->context;
+ tcontext = &tentry->context;
+
+ if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+ cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+
+ /* Set the user identity. */
+ switch (specified) {
+ case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
+ case AVTAB_CHANGE:
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ } else {
+ /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
+ /* Use the process user identity. */
+ newcontext.user = scontext->user;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AVTAB_MEMBER:
+ /* Use the related object owner. */
+ newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the role to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock)
+ newcontext.role = scontext->role;
+ else
+ newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the type to default values. */
+ if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ } else {
+ if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) {
+ /* Use the type of process. */
+ newcontext.type = scontext->type;
+ } else {
+ /* Use the type of the related object. */
+ newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
+ avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
+ avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
+ avkey.target_class = tclass;
+ avkey.specified = specified;
+ avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
+
+ /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
+ if (!avdatum) {
+ node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+ for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
+ if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
+ avdatum = &node->datum;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (avdatum) {
+ /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
+ newcontext.type = avdatum->u.data;
+ }
+
+ /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
+ if (objname)
+ filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+ tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
+
+ /* Check for class-specific changes. */
+ if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
+ /* Look for a role transition rule. */
+ struct role_trans_datum *rtd;
+ struct role_trans_key rtk = {
+ .role = scontext->role,
+ .type = tcontext->type,
+ .tclass = tclass,
+ };
+
+ rtd = policydb_roletr_search(policydb, &rtk);
+ if (rtd)
+ newcontext.role = rtd->new_role;
+ }
+
+ /* Set the MLS attributes.
+ This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
+ rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+ &newcontext, sock);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+ rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, policy, sentry,
+ tentry, tclass,
+ &newcontext);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcontext);
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
+ * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
+}
+
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+ objname, out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
+ * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+ AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @ssid: source security identifier
+ * @tsid: target security identifier
+ * @tclass: target security class
+ * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
+ *
+ * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
+ * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
+ * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
+ * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
+ * computed successfully.
+ */
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 ssid,
+ u32 tsid,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ return security_compute_sid(state,
+ ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+ out_sid, false);
+}
+
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+ struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct policydb *policydb,
+ struct context *context)
+{
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (enforcing_enabled(state))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
+ pr_warn("SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n",
+ s);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert the values in the security context
+ * structure `oldc' from the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
+ * in the policy `p->newp', storing the new context
+ * in `newc'. Verify that the context is valid
+ * under the new policy.
+ */
+static int convert_context(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *p,
+ gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ struct convert_context_args *args;
+ struct ocontext *oc;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct type_datum *typdatum;
+ struct user_datum *usrdatum;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ args = p;
+
+ if (oldc->str) {
+ s = kstrdup(oldc->str, gfp_flags);
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
+ newc, SECSID_NULL);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ /*
+ * Retain string representation for later mapping.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: We need to copy the contents of oldc->str
+ * back into s again because string_to_context_struct()
+ * may have garbled it.
+ */
+ memcpy(s, oldc->str, oldc->len);
+ context_init(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = oldc->len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ kfree(s);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
+ pr_err("SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
+ oldc->str, -rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
+ oldc->str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ context_init(newc);
+
+ /* Convert the user. */
+ usrdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_users,
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_USERS, oldc->user - 1));
+ if (!usrdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->user = usrdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the role. */
+ role = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_roles,
+ sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, oldc->role - 1));
+ if (!role)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->role = role->value;
+
+ /* Convert the type. */
+ typdatum = symtab_search(&args->newp->p_types,
+ sym_name(args->oldp,
+ SYM_TYPES, oldc->type - 1));
+ if (!typdatum)
+ goto bad;
+ newc->type = typdatum->value;
+
+ /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
+ if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, oldc, newc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
+ /*
+ * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
+ * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
+ * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
+ * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
+ * initial SIDs.
+ */
+ oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
+ while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
+ oc = oc->next;
+ if (!oc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to look up"
+ " the initial SIDs list\n");
+ goto bad;
+ }
+ rc = mls_range_set(newc, &oc->context[0].range);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, newc)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+ args->oldp,
+ oldc);
+ if (rc)
+ goto bad;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+bad:
+ /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
+ rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, oldc, &s, &len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ context_destroy(newc);
+ newc->str = s;
+ newc->len = len;
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
+ newc->str);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ struct policydb *p;
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
+ p = &policy->policydb;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->policycap[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+ pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
+ selinux_policycap_names[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
+ i);
+ }
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy);
+
+static void selinux_policy_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ if (!policy)
+ return;
+
+ sidtab_destroy(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy->map.mapping);
+ policydb_destroy(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy->sidtab);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+static void selinux_policy_cond_free(struct selinux_policy *policy)
+{
+ cond_policydb_destroy_dup(&policy->policydb);
+ kfree(policy);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ sidtab_cancel_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab);
+ selinux_policy_free(load_state->policy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+}
+
+static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 seqno)
+{
+ /* Flush external caches and notify userspace of policy load */
+ avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
+ selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
+ selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
+ selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
+ selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
+ selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state);
+}
+
+void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy, *newpolicy = load_state->policy;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 seqno;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ if (oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
+ else if (!oldpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicy->policydb.mls_enabled)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
+ }
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy)
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ else
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy. */
+ if (oldpolicy) {
+ sidtab_freeze_begin(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ sidtab_freeze_end(oldpolicy->sidtab, &flags);
+ } else {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+ }
+
+ /* Load the policycaps from the new policy */
+ security_load_policycaps(state, newpolicy);
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ /*
+ * After first policy load, the security server is
+ * marked as initialized and ready to handle requests and
+ * any objects created prior to policy load are then labeled.
+ */
+ selinux_mark_initialized(state);
+ selinux_complete_init();
+ }
+
+ /* Free the old policy */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_free(oldpolicy);
+ kfree(load_state->convert_data);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
+ *
+ * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
+ * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
+ * This function will flush the access vector cache after
+ * loading the new policy.
+ */
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len,
+ struct selinux_load_state *load_state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ struct selinux_policy_convert_data *convert_data;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
+
+ newpolicy = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ newpolicy->sidtab = kzalloc(sizeof(*newpolicy->sidtab), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy->sidtab) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_policy;
+ }
+
+ rc = policydb_read(&newpolicy->policydb, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_sidtab;
+
+ newpolicy->policydb.len = len;
+ rc = selinux_set_mapping(&newpolicy->policydb, secclass_map,
+ &newpolicy->map);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err_policydb;
+
+ rc = policydb_load_isids(&newpolicy->policydb, newpolicy->sidtab);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
+ goto err_mapping;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ /* First policy load, so no need to preserve state from old policy */
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Preserve active boolean values from the old policy */
+ rc = security_preserve_bools(oldpolicy, newpolicy);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ convert_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*convert_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!convert_data) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_free_isids;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Convert the internal representations of contexts
+ * in the new SID table.
+ */
+ convert_data->args.state = state;
+ convert_data->args.oldp = &oldpolicy->policydb;
+ convert_data->args.newp = &newpolicy->policydb;
+
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.func = convert_context;
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.args = &convert_data->args;
+ convert_data->sidtab_params.target = newpolicy->sidtab;
+
+ rc = sidtab_convert(oldpolicy->sidtab, &convert_data->sidtab_params);
+ if (rc) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
+ " representation of contexts in the new SID"
+ " table\n");
+ goto err_free_convert_data;
+ }
+
+ load_state->policy = newpolicy;
+ load_state->convert_data = convert_data;
+ return 0;
+
+err_free_convert_data:
+ kfree(convert_data);
+err_free_isids:
+ sidtab_destroy(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_mapping:
+ kfree(newpolicy->map.mapping);
+err_policydb:
+ policydb_destroy(&newpolicy->policydb);
+err_sidtab:
+ kfree(newpolicy->sidtab);
+err_policy:
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @protocol: protocol number
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
+ c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
+ c->u.port.high_port >= port)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port_num: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+ !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+ dev_name,
+ IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @name: interface name
+ * @if_sid: interface SID
+ */
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else
+ *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
+{
+ int i, fail = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+ if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
+ fail = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return !fail;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @domain: communication domain aka address family
+ * @addrp: address
+ * @addrlen: address length in bytes
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u16 domain,
+ void *addrp,
+ u32 addrlen,
+ u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ switch (domain) {
+ case AF_INET: {
+ u32 addr;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
+ goto out;
+
+ addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case AF_INET6:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
+ goto out;
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+ while (c) {
+ if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
+ c->u.node6.mask))
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rc = 0;
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
+ }
+
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#define SIDS_NEL 25
+
+/**
+ * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @fromsid: starting SID
+ * @username: username
+ * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
+ * @nel: number of elements in @sids
+ *
+ * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
+ * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
+ * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
+ * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
+ * number of elements in the array.
+ */
+
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 fromsid,
+ char *username,
+ u32 **sids,
+ u32 *nel)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *fromcon, usercon;
+ u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
+ u32 i, j, mynel, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
+ struct user_datum *user;
+ struct role_datum *role;
+ struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
+ int rc;
+
+ *sids = NULL;
+ *nel = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+retry:
+ mynel = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ context_init(&usercon);
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
+ if (!fromcon)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ user = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, username);
+ if (!user)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ usercon.user = user->value;
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
+ role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
+ usercon.role = i + 1;
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
+ usercon.type = j + 1;
+
+ if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+ &usercon))
+ continue;
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ if (mynel < maxnel) {
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ maxnel += SIDS_NEL;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!mysids2)
+ goto out_unlock;
+ memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
+ kfree(mysids);
+ mysids = mysids2;
+ mysids[mynel++] = sid;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (rc || !mynel) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!mysids2) {
+ kfree(mysids);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
+ struct av_decision dummy_avd;
+ rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
+ fromsid, mysids[i],
+ SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
+ PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
+ &dummy_avd);
+ if (!rc)
+ mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ kfree(mysids);
+ *sids = mysids2;
+ *nel = j;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
+ * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
+ * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+ int len;
+ u16 sclass;
+ struct genfs *genfs;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int cmp = 0;
+
+ while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
+ path++;
+
+ sclass = unmap_class(&policy->map, orig_sclass);
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+ for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+ cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
+ if (cmp <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!genfs || cmp)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
+ len = strlen(c->u.name);
+ if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
+ (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @fstype: filesystem type
+ * @path: path from root of mount
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
+ * @sid: SID for path
+ *
+ * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
+ * it afterward.
+ */
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ retval = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path,
+ orig_sclass, sid);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ } while (retval == -ESTALE);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ const char *fstype,
+ const char *path,
+ u16 orig_sclass,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ /* no lock required, policy is not yet accessible by other threads */
+ return __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sb: superblock in question
+ */
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
+ const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+ while (c) {
+ if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
+ break;
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
+ SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc) {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+
+ rc = 0;
+ *len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (!*len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*names)
+ goto err;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*values)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
+ (*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ (*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!(*names)[i])
+ goto err;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ return rc;
+err:
+ if (*names) {
+ for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
+ kfree((*names)[i]);
+ kfree(*names);
+ }
+ kfree(*values);
+ *len = 0;
+ *names = NULL;
+ *values = NULL;
+ goto out;
+}
+
+
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy, *oldpolicy;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, seqno = 0;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ oldpolicy = rcu_dereference_protected(state->policy,
+ lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+
+ /* Consistency check on number of booleans, should never fail */
+ if (WARN_ON(len != oldpolicy->policydb.p_bools.nprim))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ newpolicy = kmemdup(oldpolicy, sizeof(*newpolicy), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newpolicy)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Deep copy only the parts of the policydb that might be
+ * modified as a result of changing booleans.
+ */
+ rc = cond_policydb_dup(&newpolicy->policydb, &oldpolicy->policydb);
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(newpolicy);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Update the boolean states in the copy */
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ int new_state = !!values[i];
+ int old_state = newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+
+ if (new_state != old_state) {
+ audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
+ sym_name(&newpolicy->policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+ new_state,
+ old_state,
+ from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ newpolicy->policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = new_state;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Re-evaluate the conditional rules in the copy */
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+ /* Set latest granting seqno for new policy */
+ newpolicy->latest_granting = oldpolicy->latest_granting + 1;
+ seqno = newpolicy->latest_granting;
+
+ /* Install the new policy */
+ rcu_assign_pointer(state->policy, newpolicy);
+
+ /*
+ * Free the conditional portions of the old policydb
+ * that were copied for the new policy, and the oldpolicy
+ * structure itself but not what it references.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ selinux_policy_cond_free(oldpolicy);
+
+ /* Notify others of the policy change */
+ selinux_notify_policy_change(state, seqno);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 index)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ u32 len;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
+ if (index >= len)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_policy *oldpolicy,
+ struct selinux_policy *newpolicy)
+{
+ int rc, *bvalues = NULL;
+ char **bnames = NULL;
+ struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
+ u32 i, nbools = 0;
+
+ rc = security_get_bools(oldpolicy, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
+ booldatum = symtab_search(&newpolicy->policydb.p_bools,
+ bnames[i]);
+ if (booldatum)
+ booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
+ }
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(&newpolicy->policydb);
+
+out:
+ if (bnames) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
+ kfree(bnames[i]);
+ }
+ kfree(bnames);
+ kfree(bvalues);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
+ * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
+ */
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct context *context1;
+ struct context *context2;
+ struct context newcon;
+ char *s;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ context_init(&newcon);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ *new_sid = sid;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
+ if (!context1) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
+ if (!context2) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, mls_sid);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ newcon.user = context1->user;
+ newcon.role = context1->role;
+ newcon.type = context1->type;
+ rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* Check the validity of the new context. */
+ if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+ rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, policydb,
+ &newcon);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+ &len)) {
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
+ GFP_ATOMIC,
+ AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ "op=security_sid_mls_copy invalid_context=");
+ /* don't record NUL with untrusted strings */
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, s, len - 1);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ kfree(s);
+ }
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ }
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ goto retry;
+ }
+out_unlock:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ context_destroy(&newcon);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
+ * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
+ * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
+ * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
+ * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
+ * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
+ *
+ * | function return | @sid
+ * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
+ * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
+ * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
+ * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
+ *
+ */
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+ u32 xfrm_sid,
+ u32 *peer_sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *nlbl_ctx;
+ struct context *xfrm_ctx;
+
+ *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
+ * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
+ * single or absent peer SID/label */
+ if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
+ * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
+ * is present */
+ if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ /*
+ * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
+ * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
+ * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+ */
+ if (!policydb->mls_enabled) {
+ rc = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+ if (!nlbl_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, nlbl_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+ if (!xfrm_ctx) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ __func__, xfrm_sid);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
+ * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
+ * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
+ * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
+ * expressive */
+ *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct class_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **classes = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!classes[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
+ *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*classes)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+ *classes);
+ if (rc) {
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
+ kfree((*classes)[i]);
+ kfree(*classes);
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
+{
+ struct perm_datum *datum = d;
+ char *name = k, **perms = args;
+ int value = datum->value - 1;
+
+ perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!perms[value])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+{
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc, i;
+ struct class_datum *match;
+
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ match = symtab_search(&policydb->p_classes, class);
+ if (!match) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
+ __func__, class);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
+ *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*perms)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (match->comdatum) {
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->comdatum->permissions.table,
+ get_permissions_callback, *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ rc = hashtab_map(&match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
+ *perms);
+ if (rc)
+ goto err;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+
+err:
+ for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
+ kfree((*perms)[i]);
+ kfree(*perms);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.reject_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int value;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ value = policy->policydb.allow_unknown;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return value;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @req_cap: capability
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
+ * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
+ * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
+ *
+ */
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+ unsigned int req_cap)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policy->policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+ u32 au_seqno;
+ struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+
+ if (rule) {
+ context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+ kfree(rule);
+ }
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+ struct role_datum *roledatum;
+ struct type_datum *typedatum;
+ struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ *rule = NULL;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
+ if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* only the above fields are valid */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmprule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ tmprule->au_seqno = policy->latest_granting;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ userdatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_users, rulestr);
+ if (!userdatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ roledatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_roles, rulestr);
+ if (!roledatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ typedatum = symtab_search(&policydb->p_types, rulestr);
+ if (!typedatum)
+ goto out;
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (rc) {
+ selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+ tmprule = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *rule = tmprule;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
+int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct context *ctxt;
+ struct mls_level *level;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
+ int match = 0;
+
+ if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+
+ if (rule->au_seqno < policy->latest_granting) {
+ match = -ESTALE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ sid);
+ match = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+ without a match */
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
+ field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ switch (op) {
+ case Audit_equal:
+ match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_not_equal:
+ match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_lt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
+ break;
+ case Audit_le:
+ match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case Audit_gt:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ break;
+ case Audit_ge:
+ match = mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return match;
+}
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)
+ return audit_update_lsm_rules();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
+ if (err)
+ panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
+ * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
+ * already been initialized.
+ *
+ */
+static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 sid)
+{
+ u32 *sid_cache;
+
+ sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (sid_cache == NULL)
+ return;
+ secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
+ kfree(sid_cache);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ *sid_cache = sid;
+ secattr->cache->free = kfree;
+ secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
+ * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
+ * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
+ * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
+ * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
+ * failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+ struct context ctx_new;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+retry:
+ rc = 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+ sidtab = policy->sidtab;
+
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
+ *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
+ *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
+ else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ context_init(&ctx_new);
+ ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
+ ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
+ ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
+ mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
+ rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = -EIDRM;
+ if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new)) {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+ ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
+ } else
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
+ * @state: SELinux state
+ * @sid: the SELinux SID
+ * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+ u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+ struct policydb *policydb;
+ int rc;
+ struct context *ctx;
+
+ if (!selinux_initialized(state))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ policy = rcu_dereference(state->policy);
+ policydb = &policy->policydb;
+
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ ctx = sidtab_search(policy->sidtab, sid);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (secattr->domain == NULL)
+ goto out;
+
+ secattr->attr.secid = sid;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
+ mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+ rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
+
+/**
+ * __security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @policy: SELinux policy
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+static int __security_read_policy(struct selinux_policy *policy,
+ void *data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct policy_file fp;
+
+ fp.data = data;
+ fp.len = *len;
+
+ rc = policydb_write(&policy->policydb, &fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)data;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_policy - read the policy.
+ * @state: selinux_state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ */
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+ void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ return __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_read_state_kernel - read the policy.
+ * @state: selinux_state
+ * @data: binary policy data
+ * @len: length of data in bytes
+ *
+ * Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy.
+ * This function is for internal use only and should not
+ * be used for returning data to user space.
+ *
+ * This function must be called with policy_mutex held.
+ */
+int security_read_state_kernel(struct selinux_state *state,
+ void **data, size_t *len)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct selinux_policy *policy;
+
+ policy = rcu_dereference_protected(
+ state->policy, lockdep_is_held(&state->policy_mutex));
+ if (!policy)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *len = policy->policydb.len;
+ *data = vmalloc(*len);
+ if (!*data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ err = __security_read_policy(policy, *data, len);
+ if (err) {
+ vfree(*data);
+ *data = NULL;
+ *len = 0;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9555ad074
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * Implementation of the security services.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SERVICES_H_
+#define _SS_SERVICES_H_
+
+#include "policydb.h"
+
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+ u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+ unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+ u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+ struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+ u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_policy {
+ struct sidtab *sidtab;
+ struct policydb policydb;
+ struct selinux_map map;
+ u32 latest_granting;
+} __randomize_layout;
+
+void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
+void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
+ struct avtab_node *node);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db5cce385
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the SID table type.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <asm/barrier.h>
+#include "flask.h"
+#include "security.h"
+#include "sidtab.h"
+
+struct sidtab_str_cache {
+ struct rcu_head rcu_member;
+ struct list_head lru_member;
+ struct sidtab_entry *parent;
+ u32 len;
+ char str[];
+};
+
+#define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1)
+#define sid_to_index(sid) ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1))
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ memset(s->roots, 0, sizeof(s->roots));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ s->isids[i].set = 0;
+
+ s->frozen = false;
+ s->count = 0;
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ hash_init(s->context_to_sid);
+
+ spin_lock_init(&s->lock);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ s->cache_free_slots = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->cache_lru_list);
+ spin_lock_init(&s->cache_lock);
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u32 context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 hash)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hash_for_each_possible_rcu(s->context_to_sid, entry, list, hash) {
+ if (entry->hash != hash)
+ continue;
+ if (context_cmp(&entry->context, context)) {
+ sid = entry->sid;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return sid;
+}
+
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
+{
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry *isid;
+ u32 hash;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (sid == 0 || sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ isid = &s->isids[sid - 1];
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&isid->entry.context, context);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ isid->entry.cache = NULL;
+#endif
+ isid->set = 1;
+
+ hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+
+ /*
+ * Multiple initial sids may map to the same context. Check that this
+ * context is not already represented in the context_to_sid hashtable
+ * to avoid duplicate entries and long linked lists upon hash
+ * collision.
+ */
+ if (!context_to_sid(s, context, hash)) {
+ isid->entry.sid = sid;
+ isid->entry.hash = hash;
+ hash_add(s->context_to_sid, &isid->entry.list, hash);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page)
+{
+ int i;
+ int chain_len = 0;
+ int slots_used = 0;
+ int entries = 0;
+ int max_chain_len = 0;
+ int cur_bucket = 0;
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hash_for_each_rcu(sidtab->context_to_sid, i, entry, list) {
+ entries++;
+ if (i == cur_bucket) {
+ chain_len++;
+ if (chain_len == 1)
+ slots_used++;
+ } else {
+ cur_bucket = i;
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+ chain_len = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
+ max_chain_len = chain_len;
+
+ return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
+ "longest chain: %d\n", entries,
+ slots_used, SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS, max_chain_len);
+}
+
+static u32 sidtab_level_from_count(u32 count)
+{
+ u32 capacity = SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+ u32 level = 0;
+
+ while (count > capacity) {
+ capacity <<= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ ++level;
+ }
+ return level;
+}
+
+static int sidtab_alloc_roots(struct sidtab *s, u32 level)
+{
+ u32 l;
+
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf) {
+ s->roots[0].ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[0].ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ for (l = 1; l <= level; ++l)
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner) {
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!s->roots[l].ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ s->roots[l].ptr_inner->entries[0] = s->roots[l - 1];
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_do_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index,
+ int alloc)
+{
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *entry;
+ u32 level, capacity_shift, leaf_index = index / SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES;
+
+ /* find the level of the subtree we need */
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(index + 1);
+ capacity_shift = level * SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+
+ /* allocate roots if needed */
+ if (alloc && sidtab_alloc_roots(s, level) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* lookup inside the subtree */
+ entry = &s->roots[level];
+ while (level != 0) {
+ capacity_shift -= SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT;
+ --level;
+
+ entry = &entry->ptr_inner->entries[leaf_index >> capacity_shift];
+ leaf_index &= ((u32)1 << capacity_shift) - 1;
+
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_inner)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf) {
+ if (alloc)
+ entry->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!entry->ptr_leaf)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return &entry->ptr_leaf->entries[index % SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup(struct sidtab *s, u32 index)
+{
+ /* read entries only after reading count */
+ u32 count = smp_load_acquire(&s->count);
+
+ if (index >= count)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sidtab_do_lookup(s, index, 0);
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_lookup_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return s->isids[sid - 1].set ? &s->isids[sid - 1].entry : NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid,
+ int force)
+{
+ if (sid != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+
+ if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
+ entry = sidtab_lookup(s, sid_to_index(sid));
+ else
+ entry = sidtab_lookup_initial(s, sid);
+ if (entry && (!entry->context.len || force))
+ return entry;
+ }
+
+ return sidtab_lookup_initial(s, SECINITSID_UNLABELED);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 0);
+}
+
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ return sidtab_search_core(s, sid, 1);
+}
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context,
+ u32 *sid)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 count, hash = context_compute_hash(context);
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+ struct sidtab_entry *dst, *dst_convert;
+ int rc;
+
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+ if (*sid)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* lock-free search failed: lock, re-search, and insert if not found */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ rc = 0;
+ *sid = context_to_sid(s, context, hash);
+ if (*sid)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (unlikely(s->frozen)) {
+ /*
+ * This sidtab is now frozen - tell the caller to abort and
+ * get the new one.
+ */
+ rc = -ESTALE;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ count = s->count;
+ convert = s->convert;
+
+ /* bail out if we already reached max entries */
+ rc = -EOVERFLOW;
+ if (count >= SIDTAB_MAX)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /* insert context into new entry */
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst = sidtab_do_lookup(s, count, 1);
+ if (!dst)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ dst->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst->hash = hash;
+
+ rc = context_cpy(&dst->context, context);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ /*
+ * if we are building a new sidtab, we need to convert the context
+ * and insert it there as well
+ */
+ if (convert) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ dst_convert = sidtab_do_lookup(convert->target, count, 1);
+ if (!dst_convert) {
+ context_destroy(&dst->context);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ rc = convert->func(context, &dst_convert->context,
+ convert->args, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc) {
+ context_destroy(&dst->context);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ dst_convert->sid = index_to_sid(count);
+ dst_convert->hash = context_compute_hash(&dst_convert->context);
+ convert->target->count = count + 1;
+
+ hash_add_rcu(convert->target->context_to_sid,
+ &dst_convert->list, dst_convert->hash);
+ }
+
+ if (context->len)
+ pr_info("SELinux: Context %s is not valid (left unmapped).\n",
+ context->str);
+
+ *sid = index_to_sid(count);
+
+ /* write entries before updating count */
+ smp_store_release(&s->count, count + 1);
+ hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &dst->list, dst->hash);
+
+ rc = 0;
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void sidtab_convert_hashtable(struct sidtab *s, u32 count)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry;
+ u32 i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ entry = sidtab_do_lookup(s, i, 0);
+ entry->sid = index_to_sid(i);
+ entry->hash = context_compute_hash(&entry->context);
+
+ hash_add_rcu(s->context_to_sid, &entry->list, entry->hash);
+ }
+}
+
+static int sidtab_convert_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner *edst,
+ union sidtab_entry_inner *esrc,
+ u32 *pos, u32 count, u32 level,
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner) {
+ edst->ptr_inner = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_inner)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&edst->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ &esrc->ptr_inner->entries[i],
+ pos, count, level - 1,
+ convert);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ i++;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf) {
+ edst->ptr_leaf = kzalloc(SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!edst->ptr_leaf)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ i = 0;
+ while (i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES && *pos < count) {
+ rc = convert->func(&esrc->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ &edst->ptr_leaf->entries[i].context,
+ convert->args, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ (*pos)++;
+ i++;
+ }
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u32 count, level, pos;
+ int rc;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ /* concurrent policy loads are not allowed */
+ if (s->convert) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
+
+ count = s->count;
+ level = sidtab_level_from_count(count);
+
+ /* allocate last leaf in the new sidtab (to avoid race with
+ * live convert)
+ */
+ rc = sidtab_do_lookup(params->target, count - 1, 1) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
+ if (rc) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* set count in case no new entries are added during conversion */
+ params->target->count = count;
+
+ /* enable live convert of new entries */
+ s->convert = params;
+
+ /* we can safely convert the tree outside the lock */
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ pr_info("SELinux: Converting %u SID table entries...\n", count);
+
+ /* convert all entries not covered by live convert */
+ pos = 0;
+ rc = sidtab_convert_tree(&params->target->roots[level],
+ &s->roots[level], &pos, count, level, params);
+ if (rc) {
+ /* we need to keep the old table - disable live convert */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The hashtable can also be modified in sidtab_context_to_sid()
+ * so we must re-acquire the lock here.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ sidtab_convert_hashtable(params->target, count);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /* cancelling policy load - disable live convert of sidtab */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, flags);
+ s->convert = NULL;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, flags);
+}
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock)
+{
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->lock, *flags);
+ s->frozen = true;
+ s->convert = NULL;
+}
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock)
+{
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->lock, *flags);
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_entry(struct sidtab_entry *entry)
+{
+ context_destroy(&entry->context);
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ kfree(rcu_dereference_raw(entry->cache));
+#endif
+}
+
+static void sidtab_destroy_tree(union sidtab_entry_inner entry, u32 level)
+{
+ u32 i;
+
+ if (level != 0) {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *node = entry.ptr_inner;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES; i++)
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(node->entries[i], level - 1);
+ kfree(node);
+ } else {
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *node = entry.ptr_leaf;
+
+ if (!node)
+ return;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES; i++)
+ sidtab_destroy_entry(&node->entries[i]);
+ kfree(node);
+ }
+}
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s)
+{
+ u32 i, level;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++)
+ if (s->isids[i].set)
+ sidtab_destroy_entry(&s->isids[i].entry);
+
+ level = SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL;
+ while (level && !s->roots[level].ptr_inner)
+ --level;
+
+ sidtab_destroy_tree(s->roots[level], level);
+ /*
+ * The context_to_sid hashtable's objects are all shared
+ * with the isids array and context tree, and so don't need
+ * to be cleaned up here.
+ */
+}
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+ struct sidtab_str_cache *cache, *victim = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ /* do not cache invalid contexts */
+ if (entry->context.len)
+ return;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+
+ cache = rcu_dereference_protected(entry->cache,
+ lockdep_is_held(&s->cache_lock));
+ if (cache) {
+ /* entry in cache - just bump to the head of LRU list */
+ list_move(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ cache = kmalloc(struct_size(cache, str, str_len), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!cache)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ if (s->cache_free_slots == 0) {
+ /* pop a cache entry from the tail and free it */
+ victim = container_of(s->cache_lru_list.prev,
+ struct sidtab_str_cache, lru_member);
+ list_del(&victim->lru_member);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(victim->parent->cache, NULL);
+ } else {
+ s->cache_free_slots--;
+ }
+ cache->parent = entry;
+ cache->len = str_len;
+ memcpy(cache->str, str, str_len);
+ list_add(&cache->lru_member, &s->cache_lru_list);
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(entry->cache, cache);
+
+out_unlock:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&s->cache_lock, flags);
+ kfree_rcu(victim, rcu_member);
+}
+
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len)
+{
+ struct sidtab_str_cache *cache;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (entry->context.len)
+ return -ENOENT; /* do not cache invalid contexts */
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ cache = rcu_dereference(entry->cache);
+ if (!cache) {
+ rc = -ENOENT;
+ } else {
+ *out_len = cache->len;
+ if (out) {
+ *out = kmemdup(cache->str, cache->len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!*out)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (!rc && out)
+ sidtab_sid2str_put(s, entry, *out, *out_len);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9fce0d553
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a lookup table
+ * of security context structures indexed by SID value.
+ *
+ * Original author: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ * Author: Ondrej Mosnacek, <omosnacek@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 Red Hat, Inc.
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SIDTAB_H_
+
+#include <linux/spinlock_types.h>
+#include <linux/log2.h>
+#include <linux/hashtable.h>
+
+#include "context.h"
+
+struct sidtab_entry {
+ u32 sid;
+ u32 hash;
+ struct context context;
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ struct sidtab_str_cache __rcu *cache;
+#endif
+ struct hlist_node list;
+};
+
+union sidtab_entry_inner {
+ struct sidtab_node_inner *ptr_inner;
+ struct sidtab_node_leaf *ptr_leaf;
+};
+
+/* align node size to page boundary */
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT PAGE_SHIFT
+#define SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE PAGE_SIZE
+
+#define size_to_shift(size) ((size) == 1 ? 1 : (const_ilog2((size) - 1) + 1))
+
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SHIFT - size_to_shift(sizeof(union sidtab_entry_inner)))
+#define SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES ((size_t)1 << SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+#define SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES \
+ (SIDTAB_NODE_ALLOC_SIZE / sizeof(struct sidtab_entry))
+
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_BITS 32
+#define SIDTAB_MAX U32_MAX
+/* ensure enough tree levels for SIDTAB_MAX entries */
+#define SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL \
+ DIV_ROUND_UP(SIDTAB_MAX_BITS - size_to_shift(SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES), \
+ SIDTAB_INNER_SHIFT)
+
+struct sidtab_node_leaf {
+ struct sidtab_entry entries[SIDTAB_LEAF_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_node_inner {
+ union sidtab_entry_inner entries[SIDTAB_INNER_ENTRIES];
+};
+
+struct sidtab_isid_entry {
+ int set;
+ struct sidtab_entry entry;
+};
+
+struct sidtab_convert_params {
+ int (*func)(struct context *oldc, struct context *newc, void *args, gfp_t gfp_flags);
+ void *args;
+ struct sidtab *target;
+};
+
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BITS CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
+#define SIDTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << SIDTAB_HASH_BITS)
+
+struct sidtab {
+ /*
+ * lock-free read access only for as many items as a prior read of
+ * 'count'
+ */
+ union sidtab_entry_inner roots[SIDTAB_MAX_LEVEL + 1];
+ /*
+ * access atomically via {READ|WRITE}_ONCE(); only increment under
+ * spinlock
+ */
+ u32 count;
+ /* access only under spinlock */
+ struct sidtab_convert_params *convert;
+ bool frozen;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+ /* SID -> context string cache */
+ u32 cache_free_slots;
+ struct list_head cache_lru_list;
+ spinlock_t cache_lock;
+#endif
+
+ /* index == SID - 1 (no entry for SECSID_NULL) */
+ struct sidtab_isid_entry isids[SECINITSID_NUM];
+
+ /* Hash table for fast reverse context-to-sid lookups. */
+ DECLARE_HASHTABLE(context_to_sid, SIDTAB_HASH_BITS);
+};
+
+int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s);
+int sidtab_set_initial(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+struct sidtab_entry *sidtab_search_entry_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid);
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry(s, sid);
+
+ return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+static inline struct context *sidtab_search_force(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid)
+{
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry = sidtab_search_entry_force(s, sid);
+
+ return entry ? &entry->context : NULL;
+}
+
+int sidtab_convert(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_convert_params *params);
+
+void sidtab_cancel_convert(struct sidtab *s);
+
+void sidtab_freeze_begin(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __acquires(&s->lock);
+void sidtab_freeze_end(struct sidtab *s, unsigned long *flags) __releases(&s->lock);
+
+int sidtab_context_to_sid(struct sidtab *s, struct context *context, u32 *sid);
+
+void sidtab_destroy(struct sidtab *s);
+
+int sidtab_hash_stats(struct sidtab *sidtab, char *page);
+
+#if CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0
+void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len);
+int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s, struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len);
+#else
+static inline void sidtab_sid2str_put(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ const char *str, u32 str_len)
+{
+}
+static inline int sidtab_sid2str_get(struct sidtab *s,
+ struct sidtab_entry *entry,
+ char **out, u32 *out_len)
+{
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_SID2STR_CACHE_SIZE > 0 */
+
+#endif /* _SS_SIDTAB_H_ */
+
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c42a6648a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Implementation of the symbol table type.
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "symtab.h"
+
+static unsigned int symhash(const void *key)
+{
+ const char *p, *keyp;
+ unsigned int size;
+ unsigned int val;
+
+ val = 0;
+ keyp = key;
+ size = strlen(keyp);
+ for (p = keyp; (p - keyp) < size; p++)
+ val = (val << 4 | (val >> (8*sizeof(unsigned int)-4))) ^ (*p);
+ return val;
+}
+
+static int symcmp(const void *key1, const void *key2)
+{
+ const char *keyp1, *keyp2;
+
+ keyp1 = key1;
+ keyp2 = key2;
+ return strcmp(keyp1, keyp2);
+}
+
+static const struct hashtab_key_params symtab_key_params = {
+ .hash = symhash,
+ .cmp = symcmp,
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size)
+{
+ s->nprim = 0;
+ return hashtab_init(&s->table, size);
+}
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum)
+{
+ return hashtab_insert(&s->table, name, datum, symtab_key_params);
+}
+
+void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name)
+{
+ return hashtab_search(&s->table, name, symtab_key_params);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f2614138d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol
+ * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values
+ * is arbitrary. The symbol table type is implemented
+ * using the hash table type (hashtab).
+ *
+ * Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+ */
+#ifndef _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+#define _SS_SYMTAB_H_
+
+#include "hashtab.h"
+
+struct symtab {
+ struct hashtab table; /* hash table (keyed on a string) */
+ u32 nprim; /* number of primary names in table */
+};
+
+int symtab_init(struct symtab *s, unsigned int size);
+
+int symtab_insert(struct symtab *s, char *name, void *datum);
+void *symtab_search(struct symtab *s, const char *name);
+
+#endif /* _SS_SYMTAB_H_ */
+
+