From 2c3c1048746a4622d8c89a29670120dc8fab93c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 20:49:45 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 6.1.76. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- mm/kfence/core.c | 1164 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 1164 insertions(+) create mode 100644 mm/kfence/core.c (limited to 'mm/kfence/core.c') diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c597cfebb --- /dev/null +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c @@ -0,0 +1,1164 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * KFENCE guarded object allocator and fault handling. + * + * Copyright (C) 2020, Google LLC. + */ + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "kfence: " fmt + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#include "kfence.h" + +/* Disables KFENCE on the first warning assuming an irrecoverable error. */ +#define KFENCE_WARN_ON(cond) \ + ({ \ + const bool __cond = WARN_ON(cond); \ + if (unlikely(__cond)) { \ + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); \ + disabled_by_warn = true; \ + } \ + __cond; \ + }) + +/* === Data ================================================================= */ + +static bool kfence_enabled __read_mostly; +static bool disabled_by_warn __read_mostly; + +unsigned long kfence_sample_interval __read_mostly = CONFIG_KFENCE_SAMPLE_INTERVAL; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kfence_sample_interval); /* Export for test modules. */ + +#ifdef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX +#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX +#endif +#define MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX "kfence." + +static int kfence_enable_late(void); +static int param_set_sample_interval(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + unsigned long num; + int ret = kstrtoul(val, 0, &num); + + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* Using 0 to indicate KFENCE is disabled. */ + if (!num && READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) { + pr_info("disabled\n"); + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, false); + } + + *((unsigned long *)kp->arg) = num; + + if (num && !READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled) && system_state != SYSTEM_BOOTING) + return disabled_by_warn ? -EINVAL : kfence_enable_late(); + return 0; +} + +static int param_get_sample_interval(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) +{ + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return sprintf(buffer, "0\n"); + + return param_get_ulong(buffer, kp); +} + +static const struct kernel_param_ops sample_interval_param_ops = { + .set = param_set_sample_interval, + .get = param_get_sample_interval, +}; +module_param_cb(sample_interval, &sample_interval_param_ops, &kfence_sample_interval, 0600); + +/* Pool usage% threshold when currently covered allocations are skipped. */ +static unsigned long kfence_skip_covered_thresh __read_mostly = 75; +module_param_named(skip_covered_thresh, kfence_skip_covered_thresh, ulong, 0644); + +/* If true, use a deferrable timer. */ +static bool kfence_deferrable __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_DEFERRABLE); +module_param_named(deferrable, kfence_deferrable, bool, 0444); + +/* If true, check all canary bytes on panic. */ +static bool kfence_check_on_panic __read_mostly; +module_param_named(check_on_panic, kfence_check_on_panic, bool, 0444); + +/* The pool of pages used for guard pages and objects. */ +char *__kfence_pool __read_mostly; +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__kfence_pool); /* Export for test modules. */ + +/* + * Per-object metadata, with one-to-one mapping of object metadata to + * backing pages (in __kfence_pool). + */ +static_assert(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS > 0); +struct kfence_metadata kfence_metadata[CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS]; + +/* Freelist with available objects. */ +static struct list_head kfence_freelist = LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist); +static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */ + +/* + * The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not used + * to gate allocations, to avoid a load and compare if KFENCE is disabled. + */ +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(kfence_allocation_key); + +/* Gates the allocation, ensuring only one succeeds in a given period. */ +atomic_t kfence_allocation_gate = ATOMIC_INIT(1); + +/* + * A Counting Bloom filter of allocation coverage: limits currently covered + * allocations of the same source filling up the pool. + * + * Assuming a range of 15%-85% unique allocations in the pool at any point in + * time, the below parameters provide a probablity of 0.02-0.33 for false + * positive hits respectively: + * + * P(alloc_traces) = (1 - e^(-HNUM * (alloc_traces / SIZE)) ^ HNUM + */ +#define ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM 2 +#define ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER (const_ilog2(CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + 2) +#define ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE (1 << ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) +#define ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(h) hash_32(h, ALLOC_COVERED_ORDER) +#define ALLOC_COVERED_MASK (ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE - 1) +static atomic_t alloc_covered[ALLOC_COVERED_SIZE]; + +/* Stack depth used to determine uniqueness of an allocation. */ +#define UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH ((size_t)8) + +/* + * Randomness for stack hashes, making the same collisions across reboots and + * different machines less likely. + */ +static u32 stack_hash_seed __ro_after_init; + +/* Statistics counters for debugfs. */ +enum kfence_counter_id { + KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED, + KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS, + KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES, + KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES, + KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS, + KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT, + KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY, + KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED, + KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT, +}; +static atomic_long_t counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT]; +static const char *const counter_names[] = { + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED] = "currently allocated", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS] = "total allocations", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES] = "total frees", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES] = "zombie allocations", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS] = "total bugs", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT] = "skipped allocations (incompatible)", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY] = "skipped allocations (capacity)", + [KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED] = "skipped allocations (covered)", +}; +static_assert(ARRAY_SIZE(counter_names) == KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT); + +/* === Internals ============================================================ */ + +static inline bool should_skip_covered(void) +{ + unsigned long thresh = (CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS * kfence_skip_covered_thresh) / 100; + + return atomic_long_read(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]) > thresh; +} + +static u32 get_alloc_stack_hash(unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_entries) +{ + num_entries = min(num_entries, UNIQUE_ALLOC_STACK_DEPTH); + num_entries = filter_irq_stacks(stack_entries, num_entries); + return jhash(stack_entries, num_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0]), stack_hash_seed); +} + +/* + * Adds (or subtracts) count @val for allocation stack trace hash + * @alloc_stack_hash from Counting Bloom filter. + */ +static void alloc_covered_add(u32 alloc_stack_hash, int val) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { + atomic_add(val, &alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK]); + alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if the allocation stack trace hash @alloc_stack_hash is + * currently contained (non-zero count) in Counting Bloom filter. + */ +static bool alloc_covered_contains(u32 alloc_stack_hash) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ALLOC_COVERED_HNUM; i++) { + if (!atomic_read(&alloc_covered[alloc_stack_hash & ALLOC_COVERED_MASK])) + return false; + alloc_stack_hash = ALLOC_COVERED_HNEXT(alloc_stack_hash); + } + + return true; +} + +static bool kfence_protect(unsigned long addr) +{ + return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), true)); +} + +static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr) +{ + return !KFENCE_WARN_ON(!kfence_protect_page(ALIGN_DOWN(addr, PAGE_SIZE), false)); +} + +static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metadata *meta) +{ + unsigned long offset = (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2; + unsigned long pageaddr = (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset]; + + /* The checks do not affect performance; only called from slow-paths. */ + + /* Only call with a pointer into kfence_metadata. */ + if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta < kfence_metadata || + meta >= kfence_metadata + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS)) + return 0; + + /* + * This metadata object only ever maps to 1 page; verify that the stored + * address is in the expected range. + */ + if (KFENCE_WARN_ON(ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE) != pageaddr)) + return 0; + + return pageaddr; +} + +/* + * Update the object's metadata state, including updating the alloc/free stacks + * depending on the state transition. + */ +static noinline void +metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_state next, + unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries) +{ + struct kfence_track *track = + next == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED ? &meta->free_track : &meta->alloc_track; + + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); + + if (stack_entries) { + memcpy(track->stack_entries, stack_entries, + num_stack_entries * sizeof(stack_entries[0])); + } else { + /* + * Skip over 1 (this) functions; noinline ensures we do not + * accidentally skip over the caller by never inlining. + */ + num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(track->stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 1); + } + track->num_stack_entries = num_stack_entries; + track->pid = task_pid_nr(current); + track->cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(); + track->ts_nsec = local_clock(); /* Same source as printk timestamps. */ + + /* + * Pairs with READ_ONCE() in + * kfence_shutdown_cache(), + * kfence_handle_page_fault(). + */ + WRITE_ONCE(meta->state, next); +} + +/* Write canary byte to @addr. */ +static inline bool set_canary_byte(u8 *addr) +{ + *addr = KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr); + return true; +} + +/* Check canary byte at @addr. */ +static inline bool check_canary_byte(u8 *addr) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta; + unsigned long flags; + + if (likely(*addr == KFENCE_CANARY_PATTERN(addr))) + return true; + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + + meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, KFENCE_ERROR_CORRUPTION); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + return false; +} + +/* __always_inline this to ensure we won't do an indirect call to fn. */ +static __always_inline void for_each_canary(const struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool (*fn)(u8 *)) +{ + const unsigned long pageaddr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, PAGE_SIZE); + unsigned long addr; + + /* + * We'll iterate over each canary byte per-side until fn() returns + * false. However, we'll still iterate over the canary bytes to the + * right of the object even if there was an error in the canary bytes to + * the left of the object. Specifically, if check_canary_byte() + * generates an error, showing both sides might give more clues as to + * what the error is about when displaying which bytes were corrupted. + */ + + /* Apply to left of object. */ + for (addr = pageaddr; addr < meta->addr; addr++) { + if (!fn((u8 *)addr)) + break; + } + + /* Apply to right of object. */ + for (addr = meta->addr + meta->size; addr < pageaddr + PAGE_SIZE; addr++) { + if (!fn((u8 *)addr)) + break; + } +} + +static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *cache, size_t size, gfp_t gfp, + unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries, + u32 alloc_stack_hash) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = NULL; + unsigned long flags; + struct slab *slab; + void *addr; + const bool random_right_allocate = prandom_u32_max(2); + const bool random_fault = CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS && + !prandom_u32_max(CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS); + + /* Try to obtain a free object. */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + if (!list_empty(&kfence_freelist)) { + meta = list_entry(kfence_freelist.next, struct kfence_metadata, list); + list_del_init(&meta->list); + } + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + if (!meta) { + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_CAPACITY]); + return NULL; + } + + if (unlikely(!raw_spin_trylock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags))) { + /* + * This is extremely unlikely -- we are reporting on a + * use-after-free, which locked meta->lock, and the reporting + * code via printk calls kmalloc() which ends up in + * kfence_alloc() and tries to grab the same object that we're + * reporting on. While it has never been observed, lockdep does + * report that there is a possibility of deadlock. Fix it by + * using trylock and bailing out gracefully. + */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + /* Put the object back on the freelist. */ + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + + return NULL; + } + + meta->addr = metadata_to_pageaddr(meta); + /* Unprotect if we're reusing this page. */ + if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + kfence_unprotect(meta->addr); + + /* + * Note: for allocations made before RNG initialization, will always + * return zero. We still benefit from enabling KFENCE as early as + * possible, even when the RNG is not yet available, as this will allow + * KFENCE to detect bugs due to earlier allocations. The only downside + * is that the out-of-bounds accesses detected are deterministic for + * such allocations. + */ + if (random_right_allocate) { + /* Allocate on the "right" side, re-calculate address. */ + meta->addr += PAGE_SIZE - size; + meta->addr = ALIGN_DOWN(meta->addr, cache->align); + } + + addr = (void *)meta->addr; + + /* Update remaining metadata. */ + metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED, stack_entries, num_stack_entries); + /* Pairs with READ_ONCE() in kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ + WRITE_ONCE(meta->cache, cache); + meta->size = size; + meta->alloc_stack_hash = alloc_stack_hash; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1); + + /* Set required slab fields. */ + slab = virt_to_slab((void *)meta->addr); + slab->slab_cache = cache; +#if defined(CONFIG_SLUB) + slab->objects = 1; +#elif defined(CONFIG_SLAB) + slab->s_mem = addr; +#endif + + /* Memory initialization. */ + for_each_canary(meta, set_canary_byte); + + /* + * We check slab_want_init_on_alloc() ourselves, rather than letting + * SL*B do the initialization, as otherwise we might overwrite KFENCE's + * redzone. + */ + if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp, cache))) + memzero_explicit(addr, size); + if (cache->ctor) + cache->ctor(addr); + + if (random_fault) + kfence_protect(meta->addr); /* Random "faults" by protecting the object. */ + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCS]); + + return addr; +} + +static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, bool zombie) +{ + struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive; + unsigned long flags; + bool init; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + + if (meta->state != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED || meta->addr != (unsigned long)addr) { + /* Invalid or double-free, bail out. */ + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + kfence_report_error((unsigned long)addr, false, NULL, meta, + KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID_FREE); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + return; + } + + /* Detect racy use-after-free, or incorrect reallocation of this page by KFENCE. */ + kcsan_begin_scoped_access((void *)ALIGN_DOWN((unsigned long)addr, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE, + KCSAN_ACCESS_SCOPED | KCSAN_ACCESS_WRITE | KCSAN_ACCESS_ASSERT, + &assert_page_exclusive); + + if (CONFIG_KFENCE_STRESS_TEST_FAULTS) + kfence_unprotect((unsigned long)addr); /* To check canary bytes. */ + + /* Restore page protection if there was an OOB access. */ + if (meta->unprotected_page) { + memzero_explicit((void *)ALIGN_DOWN(meta->unprotected_page, PAGE_SIZE), PAGE_SIZE); + kfence_protect(meta->unprotected_page); + meta->unprotected_page = 0; + } + + /* Mark the object as freed. */ + metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0); + init = slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1); + + /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */ + for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte); + + /* + * Clear memory if init-on-free is set. While we protect the page, the + * data is still there, and after a use-after-free is detected, we + * unprotect the page, so the data is still accessible. + */ + if (!zombie && unlikely(init)) + memzero_explicit(addr, meta->size); + + /* Protect to detect use-after-frees. */ + kfence_protect((unsigned long)addr); + + kcsan_end_scoped_access(&assert_page_exclusive); + if (!zombie) { + /* Add it to the tail of the freelist for reuse. */ + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + KFENCE_WARN_ON(!list_empty(&meta->list)); + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kfence_freelist_lock, flags); + + atomic_long_dec(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ALLOCATED]); + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_FREES]); + } else { + /* See kfence_shutdown_cache(). */ + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_ZOMBIES]); + } +} + +static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = container_of(h, struct kfence_metadata, rcu_head); + + kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, false); +} + +/* + * Initialization of the KFENCE pool after its allocation. + * Returns 0 on success; otherwise returns the address up to + * which partial initialization succeeded. + */ +static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void) +{ + unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)__kfence_pool; + struct page *pages; + int i; + + if (!arch_kfence_init_pool()) + return addr; + + pages = virt_to_page(__kfence_pool); + + /* + * Set up object pages: they must have PG_slab set, to avoid freeing + * these as real pages. + * + * We also want to avoid inserting kfence_free() in the kfree() + * fast-path in SLUB, and therefore need to ensure kfree() correctly + * enters __slab_free() slow-path. + */ + for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { + struct slab *slab = page_slab(nth_page(pages, i)); + + if (!i || (i % 2)) + continue; + + __folio_set_slab(slab_folio(slab)); +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG + slab->memcg_data = (unsigned long)&kfence_metadata[i / 2 - 1].objcg | + MEMCG_DATA_OBJCGS; +#endif + } + + /* + * Protect the first 2 pages. The first page is mostly unnecessary, and + * merely serves as an extended guard page. However, adding one + * additional page in the beginning gives us an even number of pages, + * which simplifies the mapping of address to metadata index. + */ + for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) { + if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr))) + return addr; + + addr += PAGE_SIZE; + } + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* Initialize metadata. */ + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&meta->list); + raw_spin_lock_init(&meta->lock); + meta->state = KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED; + meta->addr = addr; /* Initialize for validation in metadata_to_pageaddr(). */ + list_add_tail(&meta->list, &kfence_freelist); + + /* Protect the right redzone. */ + if (unlikely(!kfence_protect(addr + PAGE_SIZE))) + goto reset_slab; + + addr += 2 * PAGE_SIZE; + } + + return 0; + +reset_slab: + for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; i++) { + struct slab *slab = page_slab(nth_page(pages, i)); + + if (!i || (i % 2)) + continue; +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG + slab->memcg_data = 0; +#endif + __folio_clear_slab(slab_folio(slab)); + } + + return addr; +} + +static bool __init kfence_init_pool_early(void) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + if (!__kfence_pool) + return false; + + addr = kfence_init_pool(); + + if (!addr) { + /* + * The pool is live and will never be deallocated from this point on. + * Ignore the pool object from the kmemleak phys object tree, as it would + * otherwise overlap with allocations returned by kfence_alloc(), which + * are registered with kmemleak through the slab post-alloc hook. + */ + kmemleak_ignore_phys(__pa(__kfence_pool)); + return true; + } + + /* + * Only release unprotected pages, and do not try to go back and change + * page attributes due to risk of failing to do so as well. If changing + * page attributes for some pages fails, it is very likely that it also + * fails for the first page, and therefore expect addr==__kfence_pool in + * most failure cases. + */ + memblock_free_late(__pa(addr), KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool)); + __kfence_pool = NULL; + return false; +} + +static bool kfence_init_pool_late(void) +{ + unsigned long addr, free_size; + + addr = kfence_init_pool(); + + if (!addr) + return true; + + /* Same as above. */ + free_size = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE - (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool); +#ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC + free_contig_range(page_to_pfn(virt_to_page((void *)addr)), free_size / PAGE_SIZE); +#else + free_pages_exact((void *)addr, free_size); +#endif + __kfence_pool = NULL; + return false; +} + +/* === DebugFS Interface ==================================================== */ + +static int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + int i; + + seq_printf(seq, "enabled: %i\n", READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)); + for (i = 0; i < KFENCE_COUNTER_COUNT; i++) + seq_printf(seq, "%s: %ld\n", counter_names[i], atomic_long_read(&counters[i])); + + return 0; +} +DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(stats); + +/* + * debugfs seq_file operations for /sys/kernel/debug/kfence/objects. + * start_object() and next_object() return the object index + 1, because NULL is used + * to stop iteration. + */ +static void *start_object(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos) +{ + if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); + return NULL; +} + +static void stop_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ +} + +static void *next_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos) +{ + ++*pos; + if (*pos < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS) + return (void *)((long)*pos + 1); + return NULL; +} + +static int show_object(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[(long)v - 1]; + unsigned long flags; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + kfence_print_object(seq, meta); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + seq_puts(seq, "---------------------------------\n"); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct seq_operations objects_sops = { + .start = start_object, + .next = next_object, + .stop = stop_object, + .show = show_object, +}; +DEFINE_SEQ_ATTRIBUTE(objects); + +static int kfence_debugfs_init(void) +{ + struct dentry *kfence_dir; + + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return 0; + + kfence_dir = debugfs_create_dir("kfence", NULL); + debugfs_create_file("stats", 0444, kfence_dir, NULL, &stats_fops); + debugfs_create_file("objects", 0400, kfence_dir, NULL, &objects_fops); + return 0; +} + +late_initcall(kfence_debugfs_init); + +/* === Panic Notifier ====================================================== */ + +static void kfence_check_all_canary(void) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + struct kfence_metadata *meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + if (meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) + for_each_canary(meta, check_canary_byte); + } +} + +static int kfence_check_canary_callback(struct notifier_block *nb, + unsigned long reason, void *arg) +{ + kfence_check_all_canary(); + return NOTIFY_OK; +} + +static struct notifier_block kfence_check_canary_notifier = { + .notifier_call = kfence_check_canary_callback, +}; + +/* === Allocation Gate Timer ================================================ */ + +static struct delayed_work kfence_timer; + +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS +/* Wait queue to wake up allocation-gate timer task. */ +static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(allocation_wait); + +static void wake_up_kfence_timer(struct irq_work *work) +{ + wake_up(&allocation_wait); +} +static DEFINE_IRQ_WORK(wake_up_kfence_timer_work, wake_up_kfence_timer); +#endif + +/* + * Set up delayed work, which will enable and disable the static key. We need to + * use a work queue (rather than a simple timer), since enabling and disabling a + * static key cannot be done from an interrupt. + * + * Note: Toggling a static branch currently causes IPIs, and here we'll end up + * with a total of 2 IPIs to all CPUs. If this ends up a problem in future (with + * more aggressive sampling intervals), we could get away with a variant that + * avoids IPIs, at the cost of not immediately capturing allocations if the + * instructions remain cached. + */ +static void toggle_allocation_gate(struct work_struct *work) +{ + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return; + + atomic_set(&kfence_allocation_gate, 0); +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS + /* Enable static key, and await allocation to happen. */ + static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); + + if (sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs) { + /* + * During low activity with no allocations we might wait a + * while; let's avoid the hung task warning. + */ + wait_event_idle_timeout(allocation_wait, atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate), + sysctl_hung_task_timeout_secs * HZ / 2); + } else { + wait_event_idle(allocation_wait, atomic_read(&kfence_allocation_gate)); + } + + /* Disable static key and reset timer. */ + static_branch_disable(&kfence_allocation_key); +#endif + queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, + msecs_to_jiffies(kfence_sample_interval)); +} + +/* === Public interface ===================================================== */ + +void __init kfence_alloc_pool(void) +{ + if (!kfence_sample_interval) + return; + + /* if the pool has already been initialized by arch, skip the below. */ + if (__kfence_pool) + return; + + __kfence_pool = memblock_alloc(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE); + + if (!__kfence_pool) + pr_err("failed to allocate pool\n"); +} + +static void kfence_init_enable(void) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS)) + static_branch_enable(&kfence_allocation_key); + + if (kfence_deferrable) + INIT_DEFERRABLE_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); + else + INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&kfence_timer, toggle_allocation_gate); + + if (kfence_check_on_panic) + atomic_notifier_chain_register(&panic_notifier_list, &kfence_check_canary_notifier); + + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); + queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); + + pr_info("initialized - using %lu bytes for %d objects at 0x%p-0x%p\n", KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, + CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS, (void *)__kfence_pool, + (void *)(__kfence_pool + KFENCE_POOL_SIZE)); +} + +void __init kfence_init(void) +{ + stack_hash_seed = get_random_u32(); + + /* Setting kfence_sample_interval to 0 on boot disables KFENCE. */ + if (!kfence_sample_interval) + return; + + if (!kfence_init_pool_early()) { + pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + + kfence_init_enable(); +} + +static int kfence_init_late(void) +{ + const unsigned long nr_pages = KFENCE_POOL_SIZE / PAGE_SIZE; +#ifdef CONFIG_CONTIG_ALLOC + struct page *pages; + + pages = alloc_contig_pages(nr_pages, GFP_KERNEL, first_online_node, NULL); + if (!pages) + return -ENOMEM; + __kfence_pool = page_to_virt(pages); +#else + if (nr_pages > MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES) { + pr_warn("KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS too large for buddy allocator\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + __kfence_pool = alloc_pages_exact(KFENCE_POOL_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!__kfence_pool) + return -ENOMEM; +#endif + + if (!kfence_init_pool_late()) { + pr_err("%s failed\n", __func__); + return -EBUSY; + } + + kfence_init_enable(); + kfence_debugfs_init(); + + return 0; +} + +static int kfence_enable_late(void) +{ + if (!__kfence_pool) + return kfence_init_late(); + + WRITE_ONCE(kfence_enabled, true); + queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &kfence_timer, 0); + pr_info("re-enabled\n"); + return 0; +} + +void kfence_shutdown_cache(struct kmem_cache *s) +{ + unsigned long flags; + struct kfence_metadata *meta; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + bool in_use; + + meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* + * If we observe some inconsistent cache and state pair where we + * should have returned false here, cache destruction is racing + * with either kmem_cache_alloc() or kmem_cache_free(). Taking + * the lock will not help, as different critical section + * serialization will have the same outcome. + */ + if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || + READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) + continue; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + in_use = meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + + if (in_use) { + /* + * This cache still has allocations, and we should not + * release them back into the freelist so they can still + * safely be used and retain the kernel's default + * behaviour of keeping the allocations alive (leak the + * cache); however, they effectively become "zombie + * allocations" as the KFENCE objects are the only ones + * still in use and the owning cache is being destroyed. + * + * We mark them freed, so that any subsequent use shows + * more useful error messages that will include stack + * traces of the user of the object, the original + * allocation, and caller to shutdown_cache(). + */ + kfence_guarded_free((void *)meta->addr, meta, /*zombie=*/true); + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < CONFIG_KFENCE_NUM_OBJECTS; i++) { + meta = &kfence_metadata[i]; + + /* See above. */ + if (READ_ONCE(meta->cache) != s || READ_ONCE(meta->state) != KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + continue; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&meta->lock, flags); + if (meta->cache == s && meta->state == KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED) + meta->cache = NULL; + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); + } +} + +void *__kfence_alloc(struct kmem_cache *s, size_t size, gfp_t flags) +{ + unsigned long stack_entries[KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH]; + size_t num_stack_entries; + u32 alloc_stack_hash; + + /* + * Perform size check before switching kfence_allocation_gate, so that + * we don't disable KFENCE without making an allocation. + */ + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) { + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Skip allocations from non-default zones, including DMA. We cannot + * guarantee that pages in the KFENCE pool will have the requested + * properties (e.g. reside in DMAable memory). + */ + if ((flags & GFP_ZONEMASK) || + (s->flags & (SLAB_CACHE_DMA | SLAB_CACHE_DMA32))) { + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_INCOMPAT]); + return NULL; + } + + /* + * Skip allocations for this slab, if KFENCE has been disabled for + * this slab. + */ + if (s->flags & SLAB_SKIP_KFENCE) + return NULL; + + if (atomic_inc_return(&kfence_allocation_gate) > 1) + return NULL; +#ifdef CONFIG_KFENCE_STATIC_KEYS + /* + * waitqueue_active() is fully ordered after the update of + * kfence_allocation_gate per atomic_inc_return(). + */ + if (waitqueue_active(&allocation_wait)) { + /* + * Calling wake_up() here may deadlock when allocations happen + * from within timer code. Use an irq_work to defer it. + */ + irq_work_queue(&wake_up_kfence_timer_work); + } +#endif + + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) + return NULL; + + num_stack_entries = stack_trace_save(stack_entries, KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH, 0); + + /* + * Do expensive check for coverage of allocation in slow-path after + * allocation_gate has already become non-zero, even though it might + * mean not making any allocation within a given sample interval. + * + * This ensures reasonable allocation coverage when the pool is almost + * full, including avoiding long-lived allocations of the same source + * filling up the pool (e.g. pagecache allocations). + */ + alloc_stack_hash = get_alloc_stack_hash(stack_entries, num_stack_entries); + if (should_skip_covered() && alloc_covered_contains(alloc_stack_hash)) { + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_SKIP_COVERED]); + return NULL; + } + + return kfence_guarded_alloc(s, size, flags, stack_entries, num_stack_entries, + alloc_stack_hash); +} + +size_t kfence_ksize(const void *addr) +{ + const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + + /* + * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is + * either a use-after-free or invalid access. + */ + return meta ? meta->size : 0; +} + +void *kfence_object_start(const void *addr) +{ + const struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + + /* + * Read locklessly -- if there is a race with __kfence_alloc(), this is + * either a use-after-free or invalid access. + */ + return meta ? (void *)meta->addr : NULL; +} + +void __kfence_free(void *addr) +{ + struct kfence_metadata *meta = addr_to_metadata((unsigned long)addr); + +#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG + KFENCE_WARN_ON(meta->objcg); +#endif + /* + * If the objects of the cache are SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, defer freeing + * the object, as the object page may be recycled for other-typed + * objects once it has been freed. meta->cache may be NULL if the cache + * was destroyed. + */ + if (unlikely(meta->cache && (meta->cache->flags & SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU))) + call_rcu(&meta->rcu_head, rcu_guarded_free); + else + kfence_guarded_free(addr, meta, false); +} + +bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + const int page_index = (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZE; + struct kfence_metadata *to_report = NULL; + enum kfence_error_type error_type; + unsigned long flags; + + if (!is_kfence_address((void *)addr)) + return false; + + if (!READ_ONCE(kfence_enabled)) /* If disabled at runtime ... */ + return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* ... unprotect and proceed. */ + + atomic_long_inc(&counters[KFENCE_COUNTER_BUGS]); + + if (page_index % 2) { + /* This is a redzone, report a buffer overflow. */ + struct kfence_metadata *meta; + int distance = 0; + + meta = addr_to_metadata(addr - PAGE_SIZE); + if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { + to_report = meta; + /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ + distance = addr - data_race(meta->addr + meta->size); + } + + meta = addr_to_metadata(addr + PAGE_SIZE); + if (meta && READ_ONCE(meta->state) == KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED) { + /* Data race ok; distance calculation approximate. */ + if (!to_report || distance > data_race(meta->addr) - addr) + to_report = meta; + } + + if (!to_report) + goto out; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); + to_report->unprotected_page = addr; + error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_OOB; + + /* + * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still + * report this as an OOB -- the report will simply show the + * stacktrace of the free as well. + */ + } else { + to_report = addr_to_metadata(addr); + if (!to_report) + goto out; + + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); + error_type = KFENCE_ERROR_UAF; + /* + * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a + * freed object may be reallocated. We simply report this as a + * use-after-free, with the stack trace showing the place where + * the object was re-allocated. + */ + } + +out: + if (to_report) { + kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type); + raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags); + } else { + /* This may be a UAF or OOB access, but we can't be sure. */ + kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, NULL, KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID); + } + + return kfence_unprotect(addr); /* Unprotect and let access proceed. */ +} -- cgit v1.2.3