summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 16:37:15 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 16:37:15 +0000
commitae5d181b854d3ccb373b6bc01b4869e44ff4d87a (patch)
tree91f59efb48c56a84cc798e012fccb667b63d3fee /WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadlynx-upstream.tar.xz
lynx-upstream.zip
Adding upstream version 2.9.0dev.12.upstream/2.9.0dev.12upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c2838
1 files changed, 2838 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c b/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3c5a4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/WWW/Library/Implementation/HTTP.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2838 @@
+/*
+ * $LynxId: HTTP.c,v 1.183 2022/04/01 00:10:19 tom Exp $
+ *
+ * HyperText Transfer Protocol - Client implementation HTTP.c
+ * ===========================
+ * Modified:
+ * 27 Jan 1994 PDM Added Ari Luotonen's Fix for Reload when using proxy
+ * servers.
+ * 28 Apr 1997 AJL,FM Do Proxy Authorisation.
+ */
+
+#include <HTUtils.h>
+#include <HTTP.h>
+#include <LYUtils.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+#include <HTNews.h>
+#endif
+
+#define HTTP_PORT 80
+#define HTTPS_PORT 443
+#define SNEWS_PORT 563
+
+#define INIT_LINE_SIZE 1536 /* Start with line buffer this big */
+#define LINE_EXTEND_THRESH 256 /* Minimum read size */
+#define VERSION_LENGTH 20 /* for returned protocol version */
+
+#include <HTParse.h>
+#include <HTTCP.h>
+#include <HTFormat.h>
+#include <HTFile.h>
+#include <HTAlert.h>
+#include <HTMIME.h>
+#include <HTML.h>
+#include <HTInit.h>
+#include <HTAABrow.h>
+#include <HTAccess.h> /* Are we using an HTTP gateway? */
+
+#include <LYCookie.h>
+#include <LYGlobalDefs.h>
+#include <GridText.h>
+#include <LYStrings.h>
+#include <LYUtils.h>
+#include <LYrcFile.h>
+#include <LYLeaks.h>
+#include <LYCurses.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_INCL
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+/* OpenSSL and LibreSSL version numbers do not correspond */
+
+#if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x2060100fL
+#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_min_proto_version(handle, TLS1_1_VERSION)
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
+
+#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+#undef SSL_load_error_strings
+#undef SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms
+#define ASN1_STRING_data ASN1_STRING_get0_data
+#define TLS_client_method() SSLv23_client_method()
+#define SSL_load_error_strings() /* nothing */
+#define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() /* nothing */
+#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_min_proto_version(handle, TLS1_1_VERSION)
+
+#elif defined(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER)
+
+#define TLS_client_method() SSLv23_client_method()
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SSL_set_no_TLSV1
+#define SSL_set_no_TLSV1() SSL_set_options(handle, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+#include <gnutls/x509.h>
+#endif
+
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+BOOLEAN reloading = FALSE; /* Reloading => send no-cache pragma to proxy */
+char *redirecting_url = NULL; /* Location: value. */
+BOOL permanent_redirection = FALSE; /* Got 301 status? */
+BOOL redirect_post_content = FALSE; /* Don't convert to GET? */
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL; /* SSL ctx */
+SSL *SSL_handle = NULL;
+static int ssl_okay;
+
+static void free_ssl_ctx(void)
+{
+ if (ssl_ctx != NULL)
+ SSL_CTX_free(ssl_ctx);
+}
+
+static BOOL needs_limit(const char *actual)
+{
+ return ((int) strlen(actual) > LYcols - 7) ? TRUE : FALSE;
+}
+
+static char *limited_string(const char *source, const char *actual)
+{
+ int limit = ((int) strlen(source)
+ - ((int) strlen(actual) - (LYcols - 10)));
+ char *temp = NULL;
+
+ StrAllocCopy(temp, source);
+ if (limit < 0)
+ limit = 0;
+ strcpy(temp + limit, "...");
+ return temp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the error message is too long to fit in the line, truncate that to fit
+ * within the limits for prompting.
+ */
+static void SSL_single_prompt(char **target, const char *source)
+{
+ HTSprintf0(target, SSL_FORCED_PROMPT, source);
+ if (needs_limit(*target)) {
+ char *temp = limited_string(source, *target);
+
+ *target = NULL;
+ HTSprintf0(target, SSL_FORCED_PROMPT, temp);
+ free(temp);
+ }
+}
+
+static void SSL_double_prompt(char **target, const char *format, const char
+ *arg1, const char *arg2)
+{
+ HTSprintf0(target, format, arg1, arg2);
+ if (needs_limit(*target)) {
+ char *parg2 = limited_string(arg2, *target);
+
+ *target = NULL;
+ HTSprintf0(target, format, arg1, parg2);
+ if (needs_limit(*target)) {
+ char *parg1 = limited_string(arg1, *target);
+
+ *target = NULL;
+ HTSprintf0(target, format, parg1, parg2);
+ free(parg1);
+ }
+ free(parg2);
+ }
+}
+
+static int HTSSLCallback(int preverify_ok, X509_STORE_CTX * x509_ctx GCC_UNUSED)
+{
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int result = 1;
+
+#ifdef USE_X509_SUPPORT
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("SSL callback:%s, preverify_ok=%d, ssl_okay=%d"),
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string((long) X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509_ctx)),
+ preverify_ok, ssl_okay);
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef USE_NSS_COMPAT_INCL
+ if (!(preverify_ok || ssl_okay || ssl_noprompt)) {
+#ifdef USE_X509_SUPPORT
+ SSL_single_prompt(&msg,
+ X509_verify_cert_error_string((long)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(x509_ctx)));
+ if (HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO))
+ ssl_okay = 1;
+ else
+ result = 0;
+#endif
+
+ FREE(msg);
+ }
+#endif
+ return result;
+}
+
+SSL *HTGetSSLHandle(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ static char *certfile = NULL;
+#endif
+ static char *client_keyfile = NULL;
+ static char *client_certfile = NULL;
+
+ if (ssl_ctx == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * First time only.
+ */
+#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0800
+ if ((ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new()) != NULL) {
+ X509_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx->cert);
+ }
+#else
+ SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms();
+ if ((ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method())) != NULL) {
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ALL | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+#else
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_ALL);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+ SSL_CTX_set_options(ssl_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
+ SSL_CTX_set_mode(ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
+#endif
+ SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ssl_ctx);
+ SSL_CTX_set_verify(ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, HTSSLCallback);
+ }
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0800 */
+#if defined(USE_PROGRAM_DIR) & !defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL)
+ if (ssl_ctx != NULL) {
+ X509_LOOKUP *lookup;
+
+ lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ssl_ctx->cert_store,
+ X509_LOOKUP_file());
+ if (lookup != NULL) {
+ char *certfile = NULL;
+
+ HTSprintf0(&certfile, "%s\\cert.pem", program_dir);
+ X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, certfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ FREE(certfile);
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ if ((certfile = LYGetEnv("SSL_CERT_FILE")) != NULL) {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by SSL_CERT_FILE\n",
+ certfile));
+ } else {
+ if (non_empty(SSL_cert_file)) {
+ certfile = SSL_cert_file;
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by config SSL_CERT_FILE\n",
+ certfile));
+ }
+#if defined(USE_PROGRAM_DIR)
+ else {
+ HTSprintf0(&(certfile), "%s\\cert.pem", program_dir);
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTGetSSLHandle: certfile is set to %s by installed directory\n", certfile));
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+#endif
+ atexit(free_ssl_ctx);
+ }
+
+ if (non_empty(SSL_client_key_file)) {
+ client_keyfile = SSL_client_key_file;
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTGetSSLHandle: client key file is set to %s by config SSL_CLIENT_KEY_FILE\n",
+ client_keyfile));
+ }
+
+ if (non_empty(SSL_client_cert_file)) {
+ client_certfile = SSL_client_cert_file;
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTGetSSLHandle: client cert file is set to %s by config SSL_CLIENT_CERT_FILE\n",
+ client_certfile));
+ }
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ ssl_ctx->certfile = certfile;
+ ssl_ctx->certfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM;
+ ssl_ctx->client_keyfile = client_keyfile;
+ ssl_ctx->client_keyfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM;
+ ssl_ctx->client_certfile = client_certfile;
+ ssl_ctx->client_certfile_type = GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM;
+#elif SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0930
+ if (client_certfile != NULL) {
+ if (client_keyfile == NULL) {
+ client_keyfile = client_certfile;
+ }
+ SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ssl_ctx, client_certfile);
+ SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl_ctx, client_keyfile, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+ }
+#endif
+ ssl_okay = 0;
+ return (SSL_new(ssl_ctx));
+}
+
+void HTSSLInitPRNG(void)
+{
+#if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905100
+ if (RAND_status() == 0) {
+ char rand_file[256];
+ time_t t;
+ long l, seed;
+
+#ifndef _WINDOWS
+ pid_t pid;
+
+#else
+ DWORD pid;
+#endif
+
+ t = time(NULL);
+
+#ifndef _WINDOWS
+ pid = getpid();
+#else
+ pid = GetCurrentThreadId();
+#endif
+
+ RAND_file_name(rand_file, 256L);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Seeding PRNG\n"));
+ /* Seed as much as 1024 bytes from RAND_file_name */
+ RAND_load_file(rand_file, 1024L);
+ /* Seed in time (mod_ssl does this) */
+ RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &t, (int) sizeof(time_t));
+
+ /* Seed in pid (mod_ssl does this) */
+ RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &pid, (int) sizeof(pid));
+ /* Initialize system's random number generator */
+ RAND_bytes((unsigned char *) &seed, (int) sizeof(long));
+
+ lynx_srand((unsigned) seed);
+ while (RAND_status() == 0) {
+ /* Repeatedly seed the PRNG using the system's random number generator until it has been seeded with enough data */
+ l = (long) lynx_rand();
+ RAND_seed((unsigned char *) &l, (int) sizeof(long));
+ }
+ /* Write a rand_file */
+ RAND_write_file(rand_file);
+ }
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00905100 */
+ return;
+}
+
+#define HTTP_NETREAD(sock, buff, size, handle) \
+ (handle \
+ ? SSL_read(handle, buff, size) \
+ : NETREAD(sock, buff, size))
+
+#define HTTP_NETWRITE(sock, buff, size, handle) \
+ (handle \
+ ? SSL_write(handle, buff, size) \
+ : NETWRITE(sock, buff, size))
+
+#define HTTP_NETCLOSE(sock, handle) \
+ { (void)NETCLOSE(sock); \
+ if (handle) \
+ SSL_free(handle); \
+ SSL_handle = handle = NULL; \
+ }
+
+#else
+#define HTTP_NETREAD(a, b, c, d) NETREAD(a, b, c)
+#define HTTP_NETWRITE(a, b, c, d) NETWRITE(a, b, c)
+#define HTTP_NETCLOSE(a, b) (void)NETCLOSE(a)
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+#ifdef _WINDOWS /* 1997/11/06 (Thu) 13:00:08 */
+
+#define BOX_TITLE "Lynx " __FILE__
+#define BOX_FLAG (MB_ICONINFORMATION | MB_SETFOREGROUND)
+
+typedef struct {
+ int fd;
+ char *buf;
+ int len;
+} recv_data_t;
+
+int ws_read_per_sec = 0;
+static int ws_errno = 0;
+
+static DWORD g_total_times = 0;
+static DWORD g_total_bytes = 0;
+
+/* The same like read, but takes care of EINTR and uses select to
+ timeout the stale connections. */
+
+static int ws_read(int fd, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int res;
+ int retry = 3;
+
+ do {
+ res = recv(fd, buf, len, 0);
+ if (WSAEWOULDBLOCK == WSAGetLastError()) {
+ Sleep(100);
+ if (retry-- > 0)
+ continue;
+ }
+ } while (res == SOCKET_ERROR && SOCKET_ERRNO == EINTR);
+
+ return res;
+}
+
+#define DWORD_ERR ((DWORD)-1)
+
+static DWORD __stdcall _thread_func(void *p)
+{
+ DWORD result;
+ int i, val;
+ recv_data_t *q = (recv_data_t *) p;
+
+ i = 0;
+ i++;
+ val = ws_read(q->fd, q->buf, q->len);
+
+ if (val == SOCKET_ERROR) {
+ ws_errno = WSAGetLastError();
+#if 0
+ char buff[256];
+
+ sprintf(buff, "Thread read: %d, error (%ld), fd = %d, len = %d",
+ i, ws_errno, q->fd, q->len);
+ MessageBox(NULL, buff, BOX_TITLE, BOX_FLAG);
+#endif
+ result = DWORD_ERR;
+ } else {
+ result = val;
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* The same like read, but takes care of EINTR and uses select to
+ timeout the stale connections. */
+
+int ws_netread(int fd, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ int i;
+ char buff[256];
+
+ /* 1998/03/30 (Mon) 09:01:21 */
+ HANDLE hThread;
+ DWORD dwThreadID;
+ DWORD exitcode = 0;
+ DWORD ret_val = DWORD_ERR;
+ DWORD val, process_time, now_TickCount, save_TickCount;
+
+ static recv_data_t para;
+
+#define TICK 5
+#define STACK_SIZE 0x2000uL
+
+ EnterCriticalSection(&critSec_READ);
+
+ para.fd = fd;
+ para.buf = buf;
+ para.len = len;
+
+ ws_read_per_sec = 0;
+ save_TickCount = GetTickCount();
+
+ hThread = CreateThread(NULL, STACK_SIZE,
+ _thread_func,
+ (void *) &para, 0UL, &dwThreadID);
+
+ if (hThread == 0) {
+ HTInfoMsg("CreateThread Failed (read)");
+ goto read_exit;
+ }
+
+ i = 0;
+ while (1) {
+ val = WaitForSingleObject(hThread, 1000 / TICK);
+ i++;
+ if (val == WAIT_FAILED) {
+ HTInfoMsg("Wait Failed");
+ ret_val = DWORD_ERR;
+ break;
+ } else if (val == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
+ i++;
+ if (i / TICK > (AlertSecs + 2)) {
+ sprintf(buff, "Read Waiting (%2d.%01d) for %d Bytes",
+ i / TICK, (i % TICK) * 10 / TICK, len);
+ SetConsoleTitle(buff);
+ }
+ if (win32_check_interrupt() || ((i / TICK) > lynx_timeout)) {
+ if (CloseHandle(hThread) == FALSE) {
+ HTInfoMsg("Thread terminate Failed");
+ }
+ WSASetLastError(ETIMEDOUT);
+ ret_val = HT_INTERRUPTED;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (val == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
+ if (GetExitCodeThread(hThread, &exitcode) == FALSE) {
+ exitcode = DWORD_ERR;
+ }
+ if (CloseHandle(hThread) == FALSE) {
+ HTInfoMsg("Thread terminate Failed");
+ }
+ now_TickCount = GetTickCount();
+ if (now_TickCount >= save_TickCount)
+ process_time = now_TickCount - save_TickCount;
+ else
+ process_time = now_TickCount + (0xffffffff - save_TickCount);
+
+ if (process_time == 0)
+ process_time = 1;
+ g_total_times += process_time;
+
+ /*
+ * DWORD is unsigned, and could be an error code which is signed.
+ */
+ if ((long) exitcode > 0)
+ g_total_bytes += exitcode;
+
+ ws_read_per_sec = g_total_bytes;
+ if (ws_read_per_sec > 2000000) {
+ if (g_total_times > 1000)
+ ws_read_per_sec /= (g_total_times / 1000);
+ } else {
+ ws_read_per_sec *= 1000;
+ ws_read_per_sec /= g_total_times;
+ }
+
+ ret_val = exitcode;
+ break;
+ }
+ } /* end while(1) */
+
+ read_exit:
+ LeaveCriticalSection(&critSec_READ);
+ return ret_val;
+}
+#endif /* _WINDOWS */
+
+/*
+ * RFC-1738 says we can have user/password using these ASCII characters
+ * safe = "$" | "-" | "_" | "." | "+"
+ * extra = "!" | "*" | "'" | "(" | ")" | ","
+ * hex = digit | "A" | "B" | "C" | "D" | "E" | "F" |
+ * "a" | "b" | "c" | "d" | "e" | "f"
+ * escape = "%" hex hex
+ * unreserved = alpha | digit | safe | extra
+ * uchar = unreserved | escape
+ * user = *[ uchar | ";" | "?" | "&" | "=" ]
+ * password = *[ uchar | ";" | "?" | "&" | "=" ]
+ * and we cannot have a password without user, i.e., no leading ":"
+ * and ":", "@", "/" must be encoded, i.e., will not appear as such.
+ *
+ * However, in a URL
+ * //<user>:<password>@<host>:<port>/<url-path>
+ * valid characters in the host are different, not allowing most of those
+ * punctuation characters.
+ *
+ * RFC-3986 amends this, using
+ * userinfo = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" )
+ * unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
+ * reserved = gen-delims / sub-delims
+ * gen-delims = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@"
+ * sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
+ * / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
+ * and
+ * host = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name
+ * reg-name = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims )
+ */
+char *HTSkipToAt(char *host, int *gen_delims)
+{
+ char *result = 0;
+ char *s = host;
+ int pass = 0;
+ int ch;
+ int last = -1;
+
+ *gen_delims = 0;
+ while ((ch = UCH(*s)) != '\0') {
+ if (ch == ':') {
+ if (pass++)
+ break;
+ } else if (ch == '@') {
+ if (s != host && last != ':')
+ result = s;
+ break;
+ } else if (RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(ch)) {
+ *gen_delims += 1;
+ if (!RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(s[1]))
+ break;
+ } else if (ch == '%') {
+ if (!(isxdigit(UCH(s[1])) && isxdigit(UCH(s[2]))))
+ break;
+ } else if (!(RFC_3986_UNRESERVED(ch) ||
+ RFC_3986_SUB_DELIMS(ch))) {
+ break;
+ }
+ ++s;
+ last = ch;
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+static char *fake_hostname(char *auth)
+{
+ char *result = NULL;
+ char *colon = NULL;
+
+ StrAllocCopy(result, auth);
+ if ((colon = strchr(result, ':')) != 0)
+ *colon = '\0';
+ if (strchr(result, '.') == 0)
+ FREE(result);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Strip any username from the given string so we retain only the host.
+ */
+void strip_userid(char *host, int parse_only)
+{
+ int gen_delims = 0;
+ char *p1 = host;
+ char *p2 = HTSkipToAt(host, &gen_delims);
+
+ if (p2 != 0) {
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ char *auth = NULL;
+ char *fake = NULL;
+ char *p3 = p2;
+ int sub_delims = 0;
+ int my_delimit = UCH(*p2);
+ int do_trimming = (my_delimit == '@');
+
+ *p2++ = '\0';
+
+ StrAllocCopy(auth, host);
+
+ /*
+ * Trailing "gen-delims" demonstrates that there is no user/password.
+ */
+ while ((p3 != host) && RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(p3[-1])) {
+ *(--p3) = '\0';
+ }
+ /*
+ * While legal, punctuation-only user/password is questionable.
+ */
+ while ((p3 != host) && RFC_3986_SUB_DELIMS(p3[-1])) {
+ ++sub_delims;
+ *(--p3) = '\0';
+ }
+ /*
+ * Trim trailing "gen-delims" from the real hostname.
+ */
+ for (p3 = p2; *p3 != '\0'; ++p3) {
+ if (RFC_3986_GEN_DELIMS(*p3)) {
+ *p3 = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ CTRACE((tfp, "trim auth: result:`%s'\n", host));
+
+ if (gen_delims || strcmp(host, auth)) {
+ do_trimming = !gen_delims;
+ }
+ if (*host == '\0' && sub_delims) {
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("User/password contains only punctuation: %s"),
+ auth);
+ } else if ((fake = fake_hostname(host)) != NULL) {
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("User/password may be confused with hostname: '%s' (e.g, '%s')"),
+ auth, fake);
+ }
+ if (msg != 0 && !parse_only)
+ HTAlert(msg);
+ if (do_trimming) {
+ while ((*p1++ = *p2++) != '\0') {
+ ;
+ }
+ CTRACE((tfp, "trim host: result:`%s'\n", host));
+ }
+ FREE(fake);
+ FREE(auth);
+ FREE(msg);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user's options specified to use the given encoding. Normally
+ * all encodings with compiled-in support are specified (encodingALL).
+ */
+static BOOL acceptEncoding(int code)
+{
+ BOOL result = FALSE;
+
+ if ((code & LYAcceptEncoding) != 0) {
+ const char *program = 0;
+
+ switch (code) {
+ case encodingGZIP:
+ program = HTGetProgramPath(ppGZIP);
+ break;
+ case encodingDEFLATE:
+ program = HTGetProgramPath(ppINFLATE);
+ break;
+ case encodingCOMPRESS:
+ program = HTGetProgramPath(ppCOMPRESS);
+ break;
+ case encodingBZIP2:
+ program = HTGetProgramPath(ppBZIP2);
+ break;
+ case encodingBROTLI:
+ program = HTGetProgramPath(ppBROTLI);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * FIXME: if lynx did not rely upon external programs to decompress
+ * files for external viewers, this check could be relaxed.
+ */
+ result = (BOOL) (program != 0);
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static void show_cert_issuer(X509 * peer_cert GCC_UNUSED)
+{
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_INCL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS)
+ char ssl_dn[1024];
+ char *msg = NULL;
+
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer_cert), ssl_dn, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn));
+ HTSprintf0(&msg, gettext("Certificate issued by: %s"), ssl_dn);
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL)
+ /* the OpenSSL "compat" code compiles but dumps core with GNU TLS */
+#endif
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Remove IPv6 brackets (and any port-number) from the given host-string.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static char *StripIpv6Brackets(char *host)
+{
+ int port_number;
+ char *p;
+
+ if ((p = HTParsePort(host, &port_number)) != 0)
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ if (*host == '[') {
+ p = host + strlen(host) - 1;
+ if (*p == ']') {
+ *p = '\0';
+ for (p = host; (p[0] = p[1]) != '\0'; ++p) {
+ ; /* EMPTY */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return host;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Remove user/password, if any, from the given host-string.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+static char *StripUserAuthents(char *host)
+{
+ char *p = strchr(host, '@');
+
+ if (p != NULL) {
+ char *q = host;
+
+ while ((*q++ = *++p) != '\0') ;
+ }
+ return host;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Load Document from HTTP Server HTLoadHTTP()
+ * ==============================
+ *
+ * Given a hypertext address, this routine loads a document.
+ *
+ *
+ * On entry,
+ * arg is the hypertext reference of the article to be loaded.
+ *
+ * On exit,
+ * returns >=0 If no error, a good socket number
+ * <0 Error.
+ *
+ * The socket must be closed by the caller after the document has been
+ * read.
+ *
+ */
+static int HTLoadHTTP(const char *arg,
+ HTParentAnchor *anAnchor,
+ HTFormat format_out,
+ HTStream *sink)
+{
+ static char empty[1];
+ int s; /* Socket number for returned data */
+ const char *url = arg; /* The URL which get_physical() returned */
+ bstring *command = NULL; /* The whole command */
+ char *eol; /* End of line if found */
+ char *start_of_data; /* Start of body of reply */
+ int status; /* tcp return */
+ off_t bytes_already_read;
+ char crlf[3]; /* A CR LF equivalent string */
+ HTStream *target; /* Unconverted data */
+ HTFormat format_in; /* Format arriving in the message */
+ BOOL do_head = FALSE; /* Whether or not we should do a head */
+ BOOL do_post = FALSE; /* ARE WE posting ? */
+ const char *METHOD;
+
+ char *line_buffer = NULL;
+ char *line_kept_clean = NULL;
+
+#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */
+ int real_length_of_line = 0;
+#endif
+ BOOL extensions; /* Assume good HTTP server */
+ char *linebuf = NULL;
+ char temp[80];
+ BOOL first_Accept = TRUE;
+ BOOL show_401 = FALSE;
+ BOOL show_407 = FALSE;
+ BOOL auth_proxy = NO; /* Generate a proxy authorization. - AJL */
+
+ int length, rawlength, rv;
+ int server_status = 0;
+ BOOL doing_redirect, already_retrying = FALSE;
+ int len = 0;
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ unsigned long SSLerror;
+ BOOL do_connect = FALSE; /* ARE WE going to use a proxy tunnel ? */
+ BOOL did_connect = FALSE; /* ARE WE actually using a proxy tunnel ? */
+ const char *connect_url = NULL; /* The URL being proxied */
+ char *connect_host = NULL; /* The host being proxied */
+ SSL *handle = NULL; /* The SSL handle */
+ X509 *peer_cert; /* The peer certificate */
+ char ssl_dn[1024];
+ char *cert_host;
+ char *ssl_host;
+ char *p;
+ char *msg = NULL;
+ int status_sslcertcheck;
+ char *ssl_dn_start;
+ char *ssl_all_cns = NULL;
+
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ int ret;
+ unsigned tls_status;
+#endif
+
+#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900) && !defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS)
+ BOOL try_tls = TRUE;
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */
+ SSL_handle = NULL;
+#else
+ void *handle = NULL;
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+ if (anAnchor->isHEAD)
+ do_head = TRUE;
+ else if (anAnchor->post_data)
+ do_post = TRUE;
+
+ if (!url) {
+ status = -3;
+ _HTProgress(BAD_REQUEST);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (!*url) {
+ status = -2;
+ _HTProgress(BAD_REQUEST);
+ goto done;
+ }
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (using_proxy && !StrNCmp(url, "http://", 7)) {
+ int portnumber;
+
+ if ((connect_url = strstr((url + 7), "https://"))) {
+ do_connect = TRUE;
+ connect_host = HTParse(connect_url, "https", PARSE_HOST);
+ if (!HTParsePort(connect_host, &portnumber)) {
+ sprintf(temp, ":%d", HTTPS_PORT);
+ StrAllocCat(connect_host, temp);
+ }
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_url = '%s'\n", connect_url));
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_host = '%s'\n", connect_host));
+ } else if ((connect_url = strstr((url + 7), "snews://"))) {
+ do_connect = TRUE;
+ connect_host = HTParse(connect_url, "snews", PARSE_HOST);
+ if (!HTParsePort(connect_host, &portnumber)) {
+ sprintf(temp, ":%d", SNEWS_PORT);
+ StrAllocCat(connect_host, temp);
+ }
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_url = '%s'\n", connect_url));
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: connect_host = '%s'\n", connect_host));
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+ sprintf(crlf, "%c%c", CR, LF);
+
+ /*
+ * At this point, we're talking HTTP/1.0.
+ */
+ extensions = YES;
+
+ try_again:
+ /*
+ * All initializations are moved down here from up above, so we can start
+ * over here...
+ */
+ eol = 0;
+ length = 0;
+ doing_redirect = FALSE;
+ permanent_redirection = FALSE;
+ redirect_post_content = FALSE;
+ target = NULL;
+ line_buffer = NULL;
+ line_kept_clean = NULL;
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (!StrNCmp(url, "https", 5))
+ status = HTDoConnect(url, "HTTPS", HTTPS_PORT, &s);
+ else
+ status = HTDoConnect(url, "HTTP", HTTP_PORT, &s);
+#else
+ if (!StrNCmp(url, "https", 5)) {
+ HTAlert(gettext("This client does not contain support for HTTPS URLs."));
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ status = HTDoConnect(arg, "HTTP", HTTP_PORT, &s);
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ if (status == HT_INTERRUPTED) {
+ /*
+ * Interrupt cleanly.
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted on connect; recovering cleanly.\n"));
+ _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED);
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (status < 0) {
+#ifdef _WINDOWS
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Unable to connect to remote host for `%s'\n"
+ " (status = %d, sock_errno = %d).\n",
+ url, status, SOCKET_ERRNO));
+#else
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Unable to connect to remote host for `%s' (errno = %d).\n",
+ url, SOCKET_ERRNO));
+#endif
+ HTAlert(gettext("Unable to connect to remote host."));
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ use_tunnel:
+ /*
+ * If this is an https document, then do the SSL stuff here.
+ */
+ if (did_connect || !StrNCmp(url, "https", 5)) {
+ SSL_handle = handle = HTGetSSLHandle();
+ SSL_set_fd(handle, s);
+ /* get host we're connecting to */
+ ssl_host = HTParse(url, "", PARSE_HOST);
+ ssl_host = StripIpv6Brackets(ssl_host);
+ ssl_host = StripUserAuthents(ssl_host);
+#if defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS)
+ ret = gnutls_server_name_set(handle->gnutls_state,
+ GNUTLS_NAME_DNS,
+ ssl_host, strlen(ssl_host));
+ CTRACE((tfp, "...called gnutls_server_name_set(%s) ->%d\n", ssl_host, ret));
+#elif SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900
+#ifndef USE_NSS_COMPAT_INCL
+ if (!try_tls) {
+ SSL_set_no_TLSV1();
+ CTRACE((tfp, "...adding SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1\n"));
+ }
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090806fL && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
+ else {
+ int ret = (int) SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(handle, ssl_host);
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "...called SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(%s) ->%d\n",
+ ssl_host, ret));
+ }
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */
+ HTSSLInitPRNG();
+ status = SSL_connect(handle);
+
+ if (status <= 0) {
+#if (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900)
+#if !defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS)
+ if (try_tls) {
+ _HTProgress(gettext("Retrying connection without TLS."));
+ try_tls = FALSE;
+ if (did_connect)
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ goto try_again;
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Unable to complete SSL handshake for '%s', SSL_connect=%d, SSL error stack dump follows\n",
+ url, status));
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ while ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: SSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL)));
+ }
+ HTAlert("Unable to make secure connection to remote host.");
+ if (did_connect)
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+#else
+ unsigned long SSLerror;
+
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Unable to complete SSL handshake for '%s', SSL_connect=%d, SSL error stack dump follows\n",
+ url, status));
+ SSL_load_error_strings();
+ while ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: SSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL)));
+ }
+ HTAlert("Unable to make secure connection to remote host.");
+ if (did_connect)
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0900 */
+ }
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ gnutls_certificate_set_verify_flags(handle->gnutls_cred,
+ GNUTLS_VERIFY_DO_NOT_ALLOW_SAME |
+ GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT);
+ ret = gnutls_certificate_verify_peers2(handle->gnutls_state, &tls_status);
+ if (ret < 0 || tls_status != 0) {
+ int flag_continue = 1;
+
+#if GNUTLS_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x030104
+ int type;
+ gnutls_datum_t out;
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ SSL_single_prompt(&msg,
+ gettext("GnuTLS error when trying to verify certificate."));
+ } else {
+ type = gnutls_certificate_type_get(handle->gnutls_state);
+ (void) gnutls_certificate_verification_status_print(tls_status,
+ type,
+ &out, 0);
+ SSL_single_prompt(&msg, (const char *) out.data);
+ gnutls_free(out.data);
+ }
+#else
+ char *msg2;
+
+ if (ret == 0 && tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND) {
+ msg2 = gettext("the certificate has no known issuer");
+ } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_FOUND) {
+ msg2 = gettext("no issuer was found");
+ } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_SIGNER_NOT_CA) {
+ msg2 = gettext("issuer is not a CA");
+ } else if (tls_status & GNUTLS_CERT_REVOKED) {
+ msg2 = gettext("the certificate has been revoked");
+ } else {
+ msg2 = gettext("the certificate is not trusted");
+ }
+ SSL_single_prompt(&msg, msg2);
+#endif
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTLoadHTTP: %s\n", msg));
+ if (!ssl_noprompt) {
+ if (!HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO)) {
+ flag_continue = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (ssl_noprompt == FORCE_PROMPT_NO) {
+ flag_continue = 0;
+ }
+ FREE(msg);
+ if (flag_continue == 0) {
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ FREE(msg);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ peer_cert = (X509 *) SSL_get_peer_certificate(handle);
+#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_INCL) || defined(USE_GNUTLS_FUNCS)
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ ssl_dn, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn));
+#elif defined(USE_GNUTLS_INCL)
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert),
+ ssl_dn + 1, (int) sizeof(ssl_dn) - 1);
+
+ /* Iterate over DN in incompatible GnuTLS format to bring it into OpenSSL format */
+ ssl_dn[0] = '/';
+ ssl_dn_start = ssl_dn;
+ while (*ssl_dn_start) {
+ if ((*ssl_dn_start == ',') && (*(ssl_dn_start + 1) == ' ')) {
+ *ssl_dn_start++ = '/';
+ if (*(p = ssl_dn_start) != 0) {
+ while ((p[0] = p[1]) != 0)
+ ++p;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ssl_dn_start++;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * X.509 DN validation taking ALL CN fields into account
+ * (c) 2006 Thorsten Glaser <tg@mirbsd.de>
+ */
+
+ /* initialise status information */
+ status_sslcertcheck = 0; /* 0 = no CN found in DN */
+ ssl_dn_start = ssl_dn;
+
+ /* validate all CNs found in DN */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "Validating CNs in '%s'\n", ssl_dn_start));
+ while ((cert_host = strstr(ssl_dn_start, "/CN=")) != NULL) {
+ status_sslcertcheck = 1; /* 1 = could not verify CN */
+ /* start of CommonName */
+ cert_host += 4;
+ /* find next part of DistinguishedName */
+ if ((p = StrChr(cert_host, '/')) != NULL) {
+ *p = '\0';
+ ssl_dn_start = p; /* yes this points to the NUL byte */
+ } else
+ ssl_dn_start = NULL;
+ cert_host = StripIpv6Brackets(cert_host);
+
+ /* verify this CN */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "Matching\n\tssl_host '%s'\n\tcert_host '%s'\n",
+ ssl_host, cert_host));
+ if (!strcasecomp_asterisk(ssl_host, cert_host)) {
+ status_sslcertcheck = 2; /* 2 = verified peer */
+ /* I think this is cool to have in the logs -TG */
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("Verified connection to %s (cert=%s)"),
+ ssl_host, cert_host);
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+ /* no need to continue the verification loop */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* add this CN to list of failed CNs */
+ if (ssl_all_cns == NULL)
+ StrAllocCopy(ssl_all_cns, "CN<");
+ else
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ":CN<");
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, cert_host);
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ">");
+ /* if we cannot retry, don't try it */
+ if (ssl_dn_start == NULL)
+ break;
+ /* now retry next CN found in DN */
+ *ssl_dn_start = '/'; /* formerly NUL byte */
+ }
+
+ /* check the X.509v3 Subject Alternative Name */
+#ifdef USE_GNUTLS_INCL
+ if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) {
+ int i;
+ size_t size;
+ gnutls_x509_crt_t cert;
+ static char buf[2048];
+
+ /* import the certificate to the x509_crt format */
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_init(&cert) == 0) {
+
+ if (gnutls_x509_crt_import(cert, peer_cert,
+ GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER) < 0) {
+ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(cert);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = 0;
+ for (i = 0; !(ret < 0); i++) {
+ size = sizeof(buf);
+ ret = gnutls_x509_crt_get_subject_alt_name(cert,
+ (unsigned) i,
+ buf, &size,
+ NULL);
+
+ if (strcasecomp_asterisk(ssl_host, buf) == 0) {
+ status_sslcertcheck = 2;
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("Verified connection to %s (subj=%s)"),
+ ssl_host, buf);
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_INCL
+ if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) {
+ STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) * gens;
+ int i, numalts;
+ const GENERAL_NAME *gn;
+
+ gens = (STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *)
+ X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if (gens != NULL) {
+ numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens);
+ for (i = 0; i < numalts; ++i) {
+ gn = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS)
+ cert_host = (char *) ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5);
+ else if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD) {
+ /* XXX untested -TG */
+ size_t j = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(gn->d.ia5);
+
+ cert_host = (char *) malloc(j + 1);
+ MemCpy(cert_host, ASN1_STRING_data(gn->d.ia5), j);
+ cert_host[j] = '\0';
+ } else
+ continue;
+ status_sslcertcheck = 1; /* got at least one */
+ /* verify this SubjectAltName (see above) */
+ cert_host = StripIpv6Brackets(cert_host);
+ if (!(gn->type == GEN_IPADD ? strcasecomp :
+ strcasecomp_asterisk) (ssl_host, cert_host)) {
+ status_sslcertcheck = 2;
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("Verified connection to %s (subj=%s)"),
+ ssl_host, cert_host);
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+ if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ free(cert_host);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* add to list of failed CNs */
+ if (ssl_all_cns == NULL)
+ StrAllocCopy(ssl_all_cns, "SAN<");
+ else
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ":SAN<");
+ if (gn->type == GEN_DNS)
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, "DNS=");
+ else if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, "IP=");
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, cert_host);
+ StrAllocCat(ssl_all_cns, ">");
+ if (gn->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ free(cert_host);
+ }
+ sk_GENERAL_NAME_free(gens);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL_INCL */
+
+ /* if an error occurred, format the appropriate message */
+ if (status_sslcertcheck == 0) {
+ SSL_single_prompt(&msg,
+ gettext("Can't find common name in certificate"));
+ } else if (status_sslcertcheck == 1) {
+ SSL_double_prompt(&msg,
+ gettext("SSL error:host(%s)!=cert(%s)-Continue?"),
+ ssl_host, ssl_all_cns);
+ }
+
+ /* if an error occurred, let the user decide how much he trusts */
+ if (status_sslcertcheck < 2) {
+ if (msg == NULL)
+ StrAllocCopy(msg, gettext("SSL error"));
+ if (!HTForcedPrompt(ssl_noprompt, msg, NO)) {
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ FREE(msg);
+ FREE(ssl_all_cns);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ SSL_double_prompt(&msg,
+ gettext("UNVERIFIED connection to %s (cert=%s)"),
+ ssl_host, ssl_all_cns ? ssl_all_cns : "NONE");
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+ }
+
+ show_cert_issuer(peer_cert);
+
+ HTSprintf0(&msg,
+ gettext("Secure %d-bit %s (%s) HTTP connection"),
+ SSL_get_cipher_bits(handle, NULL),
+ SSL_get_cipher_version(handle),
+ SSL_get_cipher(handle));
+ _HTProgress(msg);
+ FREE(msg);
+ FREE(ssl_all_cns);
+ FREE(ssl_host);
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+
+ /* Ask that node for the document, omitting the host name & anchor
+ */
+ {
+ char *p1 = (HTParse(url, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION));
+
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (do_connect) {
+ METHOD = "CONNECT";
+ BStrCopy0(command, "CONNECT ");
+ } else
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ if (do_post) {
+ METHOD = "POST";
+ BStrCopy0(command, "POST ");
+ } else if (do_head) {
+ METHOD = "HEAD";
+ BStrCopy0(command, "HEAD ");
+ } else {
+ METHOD = "GET";
+ BStrCopy0(command, "GET ");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are using a proxy gateway don't copy in the first slash of
+ * say: /gopher://a;lkdjfl;ajdf;lkj/;aldk/adflj so that just
+ * gopher://.... is sent.
+ */
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (using_proxy && !did_connect) {
+ if (do_connect)
+ BStrCat0(command, connect_host);
+ else
+ BStrCat0(command, p1 + 1);
+ }
+#else
+ if (using_proxy)
+ BStrCat0(command, p1 + 1);
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ else
+ BStrCat0(command, p1);
+ FREE(p1);
+ }
+ if (extensions) {
+ BStrCat0(command, " ");
+ BStrCat0(command, ((HTprotocolLevel == HTTP_1_0)
+ ? "HTTP/1.0"
+ : "HTTP/1.1"));
+ }
+
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* CR LF, as in rfc 977 */
+
+ if (extensions) {
+ int n, i;
+ char *host = NULL;
+
+ if ((host = HTParse(anAnchor->address, "", PARSE_HOST)) != NULL) {
+ strip_userid(host, TRUE);
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Host: %s%c%c", host, CR, LF);
+ FREE(host);
+ }
+ if (HTprotocolLevel >= HTTP_1_1) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Connection: close%c%c", CR, LF);
+ }
+
+ if (!HTPresentations)
+ HTFormatInit();
+ n = HTList_count(HTPresentations);
+
+ first_Accept = TRUE;
+ len = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+ HTPresentation *pres =
+ (HTPresentation *) HTList_objectAt(HTPresentations, i);
+
+ if (pres->get_accept) {
+ if (pres->quality < 1.0) {
+ if (pres->maxbytes > 0) {
+ sprintf(temp, ";q=%4.3f;mxb=%" PRI_off_t "",
+ pres->quality, CAST_off_t (pres->maxbytes));
+ } else {
+ sprintf(temp, ";q=%4.3f", pres->quality);
+ }
+ } else if (pres->maxbytes > 0) {
+ sprintf(temp, ";mxb=%" PRI_off_t "", CAST_off_t (pres->maxbytes));
+ } else {
+ temp[0] = '\0';
+ }
+ HTSprintf0(&linebuf, "%s%s%s",
+ (first_Accept ?
+ "Accept: " : ", "),
+ HTAtom_name(pres->rep),
+ temp);
+ len += (int) strlen(linebuf);
+ if (len > 252 && !first_Accept) {
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf);
+ HTSprintf0(&linebuf, "Accept: %s%s",
+ HTAtom_name(pres->rep),
+ temp);
+ len = (int) strlen(linebuf);
+ }
+ BStrCat0(command, linebuf);
+ first_Accept = FALSE;
+ }
+ }
+ HTBprintf(&command, "%s*/*;q=0.01%c%c",
+ (first_Accept ?
+ "Accept: " : ", "), CR, LF);
+
+ /*
+ * FIXME: suppressing the "Accept-Encoding" in this case is done to
+ * work around limitations of the presentation logic used for the
+ * command-line "-base" option. The remote site may transmit the
+ * document gzip'd, but the ensuing logic in HTSaveToFile() would see
+ * the mime-type as gzip rather than text/html, and not prepend the
+ * base URL. This is less efficient than accepting the compressed data
+ * and uncompressing it, adding the base URL but is simpler than
+ * augmenting the dump's presentation logic -TD
+ */
+ if (LYPrependBaseToSource && dump_output_immediately) {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "omit Accept-Encoding to work-around interaction with -source\n"));
+ } else {
+ char *list = 0;
+ int j, k;
+
+ for (j = 1; j < encodingALL; j <<= 1) {
+ if (acceptEncoding(j)) {
+ for (k = 0; tbl_preferred_encoding[k].name != 0; ++k) {
+ if (tbl_preferred_encoding[k].value == j) {
+ if (list != 0)
+ StrAllocCat(list, ", ");
+ StrAllocCat(list, tbl_preferred_encoding[k].name);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (list != 0) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Accept-Encoding: %s%c%c", list, CR, LF);
+ free(list);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (non_empty(language)) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Accept-Language: %s%c%c", language, CR, LF);
+ }
+
+ if (non_empty(pref_charset)) {
+ BStrCat0(command, "Accept-Charset: ");
+ StrAllocCopy(linebuf, pref_charset);
+ if (linebuf[strlen(linebuf) - 1] == ',')
+ linebuf[strlen(linebuf) - 1] = '\0';
+ LYLowerCase(linebuf);
+ if (strstr(linebuf, "iso-8859-1") == NULL)
+ StrAllocCat(linebuf, ", iso-8859-1;q=0.01");
+ if (strstr(linebuf, "us-ascii") == NULL)
+ StrAllocCat(linebuf, ", us-ascii;q=0.01");
+ BStrCat0(command, linebuf);
+ HTBprintf(&command, "%c%c", CR, LF);
+ }
+#if 0
+ /*
+ * Promote 300 (Multiple Choices) replies, if supported, over 406 (Not
+ * Acceptable) replies. - FM
+ *
+ * This used to be done in versions 2.7 and 2.8*, but violates the
+ * specs for transparent content negotiation and has the effect that
+ * servers supporting those specs will send 300 (Multiple Choices)
+ * instead of a normal response (e.g. 200 OK), since they will assume
+ * that the client wants to make the choice. It is not clear whether
+ * there are any servers or sites for which sending this header really
+ * improves anything.
+ *
+ * If there ever is a need to send "Negotiate: trans" and really mean
+ * it, we should send "Negotiate: trans,trans" or similar, since that
+ * is semantically equivalent and some servers may ignore "Negotiate:
+ * trans" as a special case when it comes from Lynx (to work around the
+ * old faulty behavior). - kw
+ *
+ * References:
+ * RFC 2295 (see also RFC 2296), and mail to lynx-dev and
+ * new-httpd@apache.org from Koen Holtman, Jan 1999.
+ */
+ if (!do_post) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Negotiate: trans%c%c", CR, LF);
+ }
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+ /*
+ * When reloading give no-cache pragma to proxy server to make it
+ * refresh its cache. -- Ari L. <luotonen@dxcern.cern.ch>
+ *
+ * Also send it as a Cache-Control header for HTTP/1.1. - FM
+ */
+ if (reloading) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Pragma: no-cache%c%c", CR, LF);
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Cache-Control: no-cache%c%c", CR, LF);
+ }
+
+ if (LYSendUserAgent || no_useragent) {
+ if (non_empty(LYUserAgent)) {
+ char *cp = LYSkipBlanks(LYUserAgent);
+
+ /* Won't send it at all if all blank - kw */
+ if (*cp != '\0')
+ HTBprintf(&command, "User-Agent: %.*s%c%c",
+ INIT_LINE_SIZE - 15, LYUserAgent, CR, LF);
+ } else {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "User-Agent: %s/%s libwww-FM/%s%c%c",
+ HTAppName ? HTAppName : "unknown",
+ HTAppVersion ? HTAppVersion : "0.0",
+ HTLibraryVersion, CR, LF);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (non_empty(personal_mail_address) && !LYNoFromHeader) {
+ HTBprintf(&command, "From: %s%c%c", personal_mail_address, CR, LF);
+ }
+
+ if (!(LYUserSpecifiedURL ||
+ LYNoRefererHeader || LYNoRefererForThis) &&
+ strcmp(HTLoadedDocumentURL(), "")) {
+ const char *cp = LYRequestReferer;
+
+ if (!cp)
+ cp = HTLoadedDocumentURL(); /* @@@ Try both? - kw */
+ BStrCat0(command, "Referer: ");
+ if (isLYNXIMGMAP(cp)) {
+ char *pound = findPoundSelector(cp);
+ int nn = (pound ? (int) (pound - cp) : (int) strlen(cp));
+
+ HTSABCat(&command, cp + LEN_LYNXIMGMAP, nn);
+ } else {
+ BStrCat0(command, cp);
+ }
+ HTBprintf(&command, "%c%c", CR, LF);
+ } {
+ char *abspath;
+ char *docname;
+ char *hostname;
+ char *colon;
+ int portnumber;
+ char *auth, *cookie = NULL;
+ BOOL secure = (BOOL) (StrNCmp(anAnchor->address, "https", 5)
+ ? FALSE
+ : TRUE);
+
+ abspath = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION);
+ docname = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_PATH);
+ hostname = HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_HOST);
+ if (hostname &&
+ NULL != (colon = HTParsePort(hostname, &portnumber))) {
+ *colon = '\0'; /* Chop off port number */
+ } else if (!StrNCmp(arg, "https", 5)) {
+ portnumber = HTTPS_PORT;
+ } else {
+ portnumber = HTTP_PORT;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Add Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, and/or Cookie headers,
+ * if applicable.
+ */
+ if (using_proxy) {
+ /*
+ * If we are using a proxy, first determine if we should
+ * include an Authorization header and/or Cookie header for the
+ * ultimate target of this request. - FM & AJL
+ */
+ char *host2 = NULL, *path2 = NULL;
+ int port2 = (StrNCmp(docname, "https", 5) ?
+ HTTP_PORT : HTTPS_PORT);
+
+ host2 = HTParse(docname, "", PARSE_HOST);
+ path2 = HTParse(docname, "", PARSE_PATH | PARSE_PUNCTUATION);
+ if ((colon = HTParsePort(host2, &port2)) != NULL) {
+ /* Use non-default port number */
+ *colon = '\0';
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This composeAuth() does file access, i.e., for the ultimate
+ * target of the request. - AJL
+ */
+ auth_proxy = NO;
+ auth = HTAA_composeAuth(host2, port2, path2, auth_proxy);
+ if (auth == NULL) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Not sending authorization (yet).\n"));
+ } else if (*auth != '\0') {
+ /*
+ * We have an Authorization header to be included.
+ */
+ HTBprintf(&command, "%s%c%c", auth, CR, LF);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending authorization: %s\n", auth));
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * The user either cancelled or made a mistake with the
+ * username and password prompt.
+ */
+ if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) &&
+ HTConfirm(CONFIRM_WO_PASSWORD)) {
+ show_401 = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ if (traversal || dump_output_immediately)
+ HTAlert(FAILED_NEED_PASSWD);
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (did_connect)
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ BStrFree(command);
+ FREE(hostname);
+ FREE(docname);
+ FREE(abspath);
+ FREE(host2);
+ FREE(path2);
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Add 'Cookie:' header, if it's HTTP or HTTPS document being
+ * proxied.
+ */
+ if (!StrNCmp(docname, "http", 4)) {
+ cookie = LYAddCookieHeader(host2, path2, port2, secure);
+ }
+ FREE(host2);
+ FREE(path2);
+ /*
+ * The next composeAuth() will be for the proxy. - AJL
+ */
+ auth_proxy = YES;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Add cookie for a non-proxied request. - FM
+ */
+ cookie = LYAddCookieHeader(hostname, abspath, portnumber, secure);
+ auth_proxy = NO;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If we do have a cookie set, add it to the request buffer. - FM
+ */
+ if (cookie != NULL) {
+ if (*cookie != '$' && USE_RFC_2965) {
+ /*
+ * It's a historical cookie, so signal to the server that
+ * we support modern cookies. - FM
+ */
+ BStrCat0(command, "Cookie2: $Version=\"1\"");
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending Cookie2: $Version =\"1\"\n"));
+ }
+ if (*cookie != '\0') {
+ /*
+ * It's not a zero-length string, so add the header. Note
+ * that any folding of long strings has been done already
+ * in LYCookie.c. - FM
+ */
+ BStrCat0(command, "Cookie: ");
+ BStrCat0(command, cookie);
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Sending Cookie: %s\n", cookie));
+ }
+ FREE(cookie);
+ }
+ FREE(abspath);
+
+ /*
+ * If we are using a proxy, auth_proxy should be YES, and we check
+ * here whether we want a Proxy-Authorization header for it. If we
+ * are not using a proxy, auth_proxy should still be NO, and we
+ * check here for whether we want an Authorization header. - FM &
+ * AJL
+ */
+ if ((auth = HTAA_composeAuth(hostname,
+ portnumber,
+ docname,
+ auth_proxy)) != NULL &&
+ *auth != '\0') {
+ /*
+ * If auth is not NULL nor zero-length, it's an Authorization
+ * or Proxy-Authorization header to be included. - FM
+ */
+ HTBprintf(&command, "%s%c%c", auth, CR, LF);
+ CTRACE((tfp, (auth_proxy ?
+ "HTTP: Sending proxy authorization: %s\n" :
+ "HTTP: Sending authorization: %s\n"),
+ auth));
+ } else if (auth && *auth == '\0') {
+ /*
+ * If auth is a zero-length string, the user either cancelled
+ * or goofed at the username and password prompt. - FM
+ */
+ if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) && HTConfirm(CONFIRM_WO_PASSWORD)) {
+ if (auth_proxy == TRUE) {
+ show_407 = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ show_401 = TRUE;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (traversal || dump_output_immediately)
+ HTAlert(FAILED_NEED_PASSWD);
+ BStrFree(command);
+ FREE(hostname);
+ FREE(docname);
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else {
+ CTRACE((tfp, (auth_proxy ?
+ "HTTP: Not sending proxy authorization (yet).\n" :
+ "HTTP: Not sending authorization (yet).\n")));
+ }
+ FREE(hostname);
+ FREE(docname);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ !do_connect &&
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ do_post) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Doing post, content-type '%s'\n",
+ anAnchor->post_content_type
+ ? anAnchor->post_content_type
+ : "lose"));
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Content-Type: %s%c%c",
+ anAnchor->post_content_type
+ ? anAnchor->post_content_type
+ : "lose",
+ CR, LF);
+
+ HTBprintf(&command, "Content-Length: %d%c%c",
+ !isBEmpty(anAnchor->post_data)
+ ? BStrLen(anAnchor->post_data)
+ : 0,
+ CR, LF);
+
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* Blank line means "end" of headers */
+
+ BStrCat(command, anAnchor->post_data);
+ } else
+ BStrCat0(command, crlf); /* Blank line means "end" of headers */
+
+ if (TRACE) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "Writing:\n"));
+ trace_bstring(command);
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ CTRACE((tfp, "%s",
+ (anAnchor->post_data && !do_connect ? crlf : "")));
+#else
+ CTRACE((tfp, "%s",
+ (anAnchor->post_data ? crlf : "")));
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "----------------------------------\n"));
+ }
+
+ _HTProgress(gettext("Sending HTTP request."));
+
+#ifdef NOT_ASCII /* S/390 -- gil -- 0548 */
+ {
+ char *p2;
+
+ for (p2 = BStrData(command);
+ p2 < BStrData(command) + BStrLen(command);
+ p2++)
+ *p2 = TOASCII(*p2);
+ }
+#endif /* NOT_ASCII */
+ status = (int) HTTP_NETWRITE(s,
+ BStrData(command),
+ BStrLen(command),
+ handle);
+ BStrFree(command);
+ FREE(linebuf);
+ if (status <= 0) {
+ if (status == 0) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Got status 0 in initial write\n"));
+ /* Do nothing. */
+ } else if ((SOCKET_ERRNO == ENOTCONN ||
+ SOCKET_ERRNO == ECONNRESET ||
+ SOCKET_ERRNO == EPIPE) &&
+ !already_retrying &&
+ /* Don't retry if we're posting. */ !do_post) {
+ /*
+ * Arrrrgh, HTTP 0/1 compatibility problem, maybe.
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: BONZO ON WRITE Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n"));
+ _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ extensions = NO;
+ already_retrying = TRUE;
+ goto try_again;
+ } else {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Hit unexpected network WRITE error; aborting connection.\n"));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network write error; connection aborted."));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: WRITE delivered OK\n"));
+ _HTProgress(gettext("HTTP request sent; waiting for response."));
+
+ /* Read the first line of the response
+ * -----------------------------------
+ */
+ {
+ /* Get numeric status etc */
+ BOOL end_of_file = NO;
+ int buffer_length = INIT_LINE_SIZE;
+
+ line_buffer = typecallocn(char, (size_t) buffer_length);
+
+ if (line_buffer == NULL)
+ outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP");
+
+ HTReadProgress(bytes_already_read = 0, (off_t) 0);
+ do { /* Loop to read in the first line */
+ /*
+ * Extend line buffer if necessary for those crazy WAIS URLs ;-)
+ */
+ if (buffer_length - length < LINE_EXTEND_THRESH) {
+ buffer_length = buffer_length + buffer_length;
+ line_buffer =
+ (char *) realloc(line_buffer, ((unsigned) buffer_length *
+ sizeof(char)));
+
+ if (line_buffer == NULL)
+ outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP");
+ }
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Trying to read %d\n", buffer_length - length - 1));
+ status = HTTP_NETREAD(s,
+ line_buffer + length,
+ (buffer_length - length - 1),
+ handle);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Read %d\n", status));
+ if (status <= 0) {
+ /*
+ * Retry if we get nothing back too.
+ * Bomb out if we get nothing twice.
+ */
+ if (status == HT_INTERRUPTED) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted initial read.\n"));
+ _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+ } else if (status < 0 &&
+ (SOCKET_ERRNO == ENOTCONN ||
+#ifdef _WINDOWS /* 1997/11/09 (Sun) 16:59:58 */
+ SOCKET_ERRNO == ETIMEDOUT ||
+#endif
+ SOCKET_ERRNO == ECONNRESET ||
+ SOCKET_ERRNO == EPIPE) &&
+ !already_retrying && !do_post) {
+ /*
+ * Arrrrgh, HTTP 0/1 compatibility problem, maybe.
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: BONZO Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n"));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+
+ extensions = NO;
+ already_retrying = TRUE;
+ _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0);
+ goto try_again;
+ }
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ else if ((SSLerror = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Hit unexpected network read error; aborting connection; status %d:%s.\n",
+ status, ERR_error_string(SSLerror, NULL)));
+ HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network read error; connection aborted."));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+#endif
+ else {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Hit unexpected network read error; aborting connection; status %d.\n",
+ status));
+ HTAlert(gettext("Unexpected network read error; connection aborted."));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef NOT_ASCII /* S/390 -- gil -- 0564 */
+ {
+ char *p2;
+
+ for (p2 = line_buffer + length;
+ p2 < line_buffer + length + status;
+ p2++)
+ *p2 = FROMASCII(*p2);
+ }
+#endif /* NOT_ASCII */
+
+ bytes_already_read += status;
+ HTReadProgress(bytes_already_read, (off_t) 0);
+
+#ifdef UCX /* UCX returns -1 on EOF */
+ if (status == 0 || status == -1)
+#else
+ if (status == 0)
+#endif
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+ line_buffer[length + status] = 0;
+
+ if (line_buffer) {
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+ line_kept_clean = (char *) malloc((unsigned) buffer_length *
+ sizeof(char));
+
+ if (line_kept_clean == NULL)
+ outofmem(__FILE__, "HTLoadHTTP");
+ MemCpy(line_kept_clean, line_buffer, buffer_length);
+#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */
+ real_length_of_line = length + status;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ eol = StrChr(line_buffer + length, LF);
+ /* Do we *really* want to do this? */
+ if (eol && eol != line_buffer && *(eol - 1) == CR)
+ *(eol - 1) = ' ';
+
+ length = length + status;
+
+ /* Do we really want to do *this*? */
+ if (eol)
+ *eol = 0; /* Terminate the line */
+ }
+ /* All we need is the first line of the response. If it's a HTTP/1.0
+ * response, then the first line will be absurdly short and therefore
+ * we can safely gate the number of bytes read through this code (as
+ * opposed to below) to ~1000.
+ *
+ * Well, let's try 100.
+ */
+ while (!eol && !end_of_file && bytes_already_read < 100);
+ } /* Scope of loop variables */
+
+ /* save total length, in case we decide later to show it all - kw */
+ rawlength = length;
+
+ /* We now have a terminated unfolded line. Parse it.
+ * --------------------------------------------------
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Rx: %s\n", line_buffer));
+
+ /*
+ * Kludge to work with old buggy servers and the VMS Help gateway. They
+ * can't handle the third word, so we try again without it.
+ */
+ if (extensions && /* Old buggy server or Help gateway? */
+ (0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "<TITLE>Bad File Request</TITLE>", 31) ||
+ 0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "Address should begin with", 25) ||
+ 0 == StrNCmp(line_buffer, "<TITLE>Help ", 12) ||
+ 0 == strcmp(line_buffer,
+ "Document address invalid or access not authorised"))) {
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+ extensions = NO;
+ already_retrying = TRUE;
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: close socket %d to retry with HTTP0\n", s));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ /* print a progress message */
+ _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0);
+ goto try_again;
+ } {
+ int fields;
+ char server_version[VERSION_LENGTH + 1];
+
+ server_version[0] = 0;
+
+ fields = sscanf(line_buffer, "%20s %d",
+ server_version,
+ &server_status);
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Scanned %d fields from line_buffer\n", fields));
+
+ if (non_empty(http_error_file)) {
+ /* Make the status code externally available */
+ FILE *error_file;
+
+#ifdef SERVER_STATUS_ONLY
+ error_file = fopen(http_error_file, TXT_W);
+ if (error_file) { /* Managed to open the file */
+ fprintf(error_file, "error=%d\n", server_status);
+ fclose(error_file);
+ }
+#else
+ error_file = fopen(http_error_file, TXT_A);
+ if (error_file) { /* Managed to open the file */
+ fprintf(error_file, " URL=%s (%s)\n", url, METHOD);
+ fprintf(error_file, "STATUS=%s\n", line_buffer);
+ fclose(error_file);
+ }
+#endif /* SERVER_STATUS_ONLY */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Rule out a non-HTTP/1.n reply as best we can.
+ */
+ if (fields < 2 || !server_version[0] || server_version[0] != 'H' ||
+ server_version[1] != 'T' || server_version[2] != 'T' ||
+ server_version[3] != 'P' || server_version[4] != '/' ||
+ server_version[6] != '.') {
+ /*
+ * Ugh! An HTTP0 reply,
+ */
+ HTAtom *encoding;
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "--- Talking HTTP0.\n"));
+
+ format_in = HTFileFormat(url, &encoding, NULL);
+ /*
+ * Treat all plain text as HTML. This sucks but its the only
+ * solution without without looking at content.
+ */
+ if (!StrNCmp(HTAtom_name(format_in), STR_PLAINTEXT, 10)) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: format_in being changed to text/HTML\n"));
+ format_in = WWW_HTML;
+ }
+ if (!IsUnityEnc(encoding)) {
+ /*
+ * Change the format to that for "www/compressed".
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: format_in is '%s',\n", HTAtom_name(format_in)));
+ StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_type, HTAtom_name(format_in));
+ StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_encoding, HTAtom_name(encoding));
+ format_in = HTAtom_for("www/compressed");
+ CTRACE((tfp, " Treating as '%s' with encoding '%s'\n",
+ "www/compressed", HTAtom_name(encoding)));
+ }
+
+ start_of_data = line_kept_clean;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Set up to decode full HTTP/1.n response. - FM
+ */
+ format_in = HTAtom_for("www/mime");
+ CTRACE((tfp, "--- Talking HTTP1.\n"));
+
+ /*
+ * We set start_of_data to "" when !eol here because there will be
+ * a put_block done below; we do *not* use the value of
+ * start_of_data (as a pointer) in the computation of length (or
+ * anything else) when !eol. Otherwise, set the value of length to
+ * what we have beyond eol (i.e., beyond the status line). - FM
+ */
+ if (eol != 0) {
+ start_of_data = (eol + 1);
+ } else {
+ start_of_data = empty;
+ }
+ length = (eol
+ ? length - (int) (start_of_data - line_buffer)
+ : 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Trim trailing spaces in line_buffer so that we can use it in
+ * messages which include the status line. - FM
+ */
+ while (line_buffer[strlen(line_buffer) - 1] == ' ')
+ line_buffer[strlen(line_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ /*
+ * Take appropriate actions based on the status. - FM
+ */
+ switch (server_status / 100) {
+ case 1:
+ /*
+ * HTTP/1.1 Informational statuses.
+ * 100 Continue.
+ * 101 Switching Protocols.
+ * > 101 is unknown.
+ * We should never get these, and they have only the status
+ * line and possibly other headers, so we'll deal with them by
+ * showing the full header to the user as text/plain. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(gettext("Got unexpected Informational Status."));
+ do_head = TRUE;
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ /*
+ * Good: Got MIME object! (Successful) - FM
+ */
+ if (do_head) {
+ /*
+ * If HEAD was requested, show headers (and possibly bogus
+ * body) for all 2xx status codes as text/plain - KW
+ */
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ break;
+ }
+ switch (server_status) {
+ case 204:
+ /*
+ * No Content.
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ HTNoDataOK = 1;
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+
+ case 205:
+ /*
+ * Reset Content. The server has fulfilled the request but
+ * nothing is returned and we should reset any form
+ * content. We'll instruct the user to do that, and
+ * restore the current document. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(gettext("Request fulfilled. Reset Content."));
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+
+ case 206:
+ /*
+ * Partial Content. We didn't send a Range so something
+ * went wrong somewhere. Show the status message and
+ * restore the current document. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * 200 OK.
+ * 201 Created.
+ * 202 Accepted.
+ * 203 Non-Authoritative Information.
+ * > 206 is unknown.
+ * All should return something to display.
+ */
+#if defined(USE_SSL) /* && !defined(DISABLE_NEWS) _H */
+ if (do_connect) {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Proxy tunnel to '%s' established.\n",
+ connect_host));
+ do_connect = FALSE;
+ url = connect_url;
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+#ifndef DISABLE_NEWS
+ if (!StrNCmp(connect_url, "snews", 5)) {
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ " Will attempt handshake and snews connection.\n"));
+ status = HTNewsProxyConnect(s, url, anAnchor,
+ format_out, sink);
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif /* DISABLE_NEWS */
+ did_connect = TRUE;
+ already_retrying = TRUE;
+ eol = 0;
+ length = 0;
+ doing_redirect = FALSE;
+ permanent_redirection = FALSE;
+ target = NULL;
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ " Will attempt handshake and resubmit headers.\n"));
+ goto use_tunnel;
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ } /* case 2 switch */
+ break;
+
+ case 3:
+ /*
+ * Various forms of Redirection. - FM
+ * 300 Multiple Choices.
+ * 301 Moved Permanently.
+ * 302 Found (temporary; we can, and do, use GET).
+ * 303 See Other (temporary; always use GET).
+ * 304 Not Modified.
+ * 305 Use Proxy.
+ * 306 Set Proxy.
+ * 307 Temporary Redirect with method retained.
+ * > 308 is unknown.
+ */
+ if (no_url_redirection || do_head || keep_mime_headers) {
+ /*
+ * If any of these flags are set, we do not redirect, but
+ * instead show what was returned to the user as
+ * text/plain. - FM
+ */
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (server_status == 300) { /* Multiple Choices */
+ /*
+ * For client driven content negotiation. The server
+ * should be sending some way for the user-agent to make a
+ * selection, so we'll show the user whatever the server
+ * returns. There might be a Location: header with the
+ * server's preference present, but the choice should be up
+ * to the user, someday based on an Alternates: header,
+ * and a body always should be present with descriptions
+ * and links for the choices (i.e., we use the latter, for
+ * now). - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ if (traversal) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request
+ * for interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (server_status == 304) { /* Not Modified */
+ /*
+ * We didn't send an "If-Modified-Since" header, so this
+ * status is inappropriate. We'll deal with it by showing
+ * the full header to the user as text/plain. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(gettext("Got unexpected 304 Not Modified status."));
+ do_head = TRUE;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (server_status == 305 ||
+ server_status == 306 ||
+ server_status > 307) {
+ /*
+ * Show user the content, if any, for 305, 306, or unknown
+ * status. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ if (traversal) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request
+ * for interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We do not load the file, but read the headers for the
+ * "Location:", check out that redirecting_url and if it's
+ * acceptable (e.g., not a telnet URL when we have that
+ * disabled), initiate a new fetch. If that's another
+ * redirecting_url, we'll repeat the checks, and fetch
+ * initiations if acceptable, until we reach the actual URL, or
+ * the redirection limit set in HTAccess.c is exceeded. If the
+ * status was 301 indicating that the relocation is permanent,
+ * we set the permanent_redirection flag to make it permanent
+ * for the current anchor tree (i.e., will persist until the
+ * tree is freed or the client exits). If the redirection
+ * would include POST content, we seek confirmation from an
+ * interactive user, with option to use 303 for 301 (but not
+ * for 307), and otherwise refuse the redirection. We also
+ * don't allow permanent redirection if we keep POST content.
+ * If we don't find the Location header or it's value is
+ * zero-length, we display whatever the server returned, and
+ * the user should RELOAD that to try again, or make a
+ * selection from it if it contains links, or Left-Arrow to the
+ * previous document. - FM
+ */
+ {
+ if ((dump_output_immediately || traversal) &&
+ do_post &&
+ server_status != 303 &&
+ server_status != 302 &&
+ server_status != 301) {
+ /*
+ * Don't redirect POST content without approval from an
+ * interactive user. - FM
+ */
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ HTAlert(gettext("Redirection of POST content requires user approval."));
+ if (traversal)
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ if (server_status == 301) { /* Moved Permanently */
+ if (do_post) {
+ /*
+ * Don't make the redirection permanent if we have
+ * POST content. - FM
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp,
+ "HTTP: Have POST content. Treating 301 (Permanent) as Temporary.\n"));
+ HTAlert(gettext("Have POST content. Treating Permanent Redirection as Temporary.\n"));
+ } else {
+ permanent_redirection = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ doing_redirect = TRUE;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ case 4:
+ /*
+ * "I think I goofed!" (Client Error) - FM
+ */
+ switch (server_status) {
+ case 401: /* Unauthorized */
+ /*
+ * Authorization for origin server required. If show_401
+ * is set, proceed to showing the 401 body. Otherwise, if
+ * we can set up authorization based on the
+ * WWW-Authenticate header, and the user provides a
+ * username and password, try again. Otherwise, check
+ * whether to show the 401 body or restore the current
+ * document - FM
+ */
+ if (show_401)
+ break;
+ if (HTAA_shouldRetryWithAuth(start_of_data, (size_t)
+ length, s, NO)) {
+
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ if (dump_output_immediately &&
+ !HTAA_HaveUserinfo(HTParse(arg, "", PARSE_HOST)) &&
+ !authentication_info[0]) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "HTTP: Access authorization required.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " Use the -auth=id:pw parameter.\n");
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "%s %d %s\n",
+ "HTTP: close socket", s,
+ "to retry with Access Authorization"));
+
+ _HTProgress(gettext("Retrying with access authorization information."));
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ if (using_proxy && !StrNCmp(url, "https://", 8)) {
+ url = arg;
+ do_connect = TRUE;
+ did_connect = FALSE;
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ goto try_again;
+ } else if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) &&
+ HTConfirm(gettext("Show the 401 message body?"))) {
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (traversal || dump_output_immediately)
+ HTAlert(FAILED_RETRY_WITH_AUTH);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ case 407:
+ /*
+ * Authorization for proxy server required. If we are not
+ * in fact using a proxy, or show_407 is set, proceed to
+ * showing the 407 body. Otherwise, if we can set up
+ * authorization based on the Proxy-Authenticate header,
+ * and the user provides a username and password, try
+ * again. Otherwise, check whether to show the 401 body or
+ * restore the current document. - FM & AJL
+ */
+ if (!using_proxy || show_407)
+ break;
+ if (HTAA_shouldRetryWithAuth(start_of_data, (size_t)
+ length, s, YES)) {
+
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ if (dump_output_immediately && !proxyauth_info[0]) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "HTTP: Proxy authorization required.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ " Use the -pauth=id:pw parameter.\n");
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ CTRACE((tfp, "%s %d %s\n",
+ "HTTP: close socket", s,
+ "to retry with Proxy Authorization"));
+
+ _HTProgress(HTTP_RETRY_WITH_PROXY);
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+ goto try_again;
+ } else if (!(traversal || dump_output_immediately) &&
+ HTConfirm(gettext("Show the 407 message body?"))) {
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation
+ * request for interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (traversal || dump_output_immediately)
+ HTAlert(FAILED_RETRY_WITH_PROXY);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ case 408:
+ /*
+ * Request Timeout. Show the status message and restore
+ * the current document. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * 400 Bad Request.
+ * 402 Payment Required.
+ * 403 Forbidden.
+ * 404 Not Found.
+ * 405 Method Not Allowed.
+ * 406 Not Acceptable.
+ * 409 Conflict.
+ * 410 Gone.
+ * 411 Length Required.
+ * 412 Precondition Failed.
+ * 413 Request Entity Too Large.
+ * 414 Request-URI Too Long.
+ * 415 Unsupported Media Type.
+ * 416 List Response (for content negotiation).
+ * > 416 is unknown.
+ * Show the status message, and display the returned text
+ * if we are not doing a traversal. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ if (traversal) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request
+ * for interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+ } /* case 4 switch */
+ break;
+
+ case 5:
+ /*
+ * "I think YOU goofed!" (server error)
+ * 500 Internal Server Error
+ * 501 Not Implemented
+ * 502 Bad Gateway
+ * 503 Service Unavailable
+ * 504 Gateway Timeout
+ * 505 HTTP Version Not Supported
+ * > 505 is unknown.
+ * Should always include a message, which we always should
+ * display. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ if (traversal) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request for
+ * interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /*
+ * Bad or unknown server_status number. Take a chance and hope
+ * there is something to display. - FM
+ */
+ HTAlert(gettext("Unknown status reply from server!"));
+ HTAlert(line_buffer);
+ if (traversal) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request for
+ * interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ break;
+ } /* Switch on server_status/100 */
+
+ } /* Full HTTP reply */
+ } /* scope of fields */
+
+ /*
+ * The user may have pressed the 'z'ap key during the pause caused by one
+ * of the HTAlerts above if the server reported an error, to skip loading
+ * of the error response page. Checking here before setting up the stream
+ * stack and feeding it data avoids doing unnecessary work, it also can
+ * avoid unnecessarily pushing a loaded document out of the cache to make
+ * room for the unwanted error page. - kw
+ */
+ if (HTCheckForInterrupt()) {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ if (doing_redirect) {
+ /*
+ * Impatient user. - FM
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted followup read.\n"));
+ _HTProgress(CONNECTION_INTERRUPTED);
+ }
+ status = HT_INTERRUPTED;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Set up the stream stack to handle the body of the message.
+ */
+ if (do_head || keep_mime_headers) {
+ /*
+ * It was a HEAD request, or we want the headers and source.
+ */
+ start_of_data = line_kept_clean;
+#ifdef SH_EX /* FIX BUG by kaz@maczuka.hitachi.ibaraki.jp */
+/* GIF file contains \0, so strlen does not return the data length */
+ length = real_length_of_line;
+#else
+ length = rawlength;
+#endif
+ format_in = HTAtom_for(STR_PLAINTEXT);
+
+ } else if (doing_redirect) {
+
+ format_in = HTAtom_for("message/x-http-redirection");
+ StrAllocCopy(anAnchor->content_type, HTAtom_name(format_in));
+ if (traversal) {
+ format_out = WWW_DEBUG;
+ if (!sink)
+ sink = HTErrorStream();
+ } else if (!dump_output_immediately &&
+ format_out == WWW_DOWNLOAD) {
+ /*
+ * Convert a download request to a presentation request for
+ * interactive users. - FM
+ */
+ format_out = WWW_PRESENT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ target = HTStreamStack(format_in,
+ format_out,
+ sink, anAnchor);
+
+ if (target == NULL) {
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ HTSprintf0(&buffer, CANNOT_CONVERT_I_TO_O,
+ HTAtom_name(format_in), HTAtom_name(format_out));
+ _HTProgress(buffer);
+ FREE(buffer);
+ status = -1;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Recycle the first chunk of data, in all cases.
+ */
+ (*target->isa->put_block) (target, start_of_data, length);
+
+ /*
+ * Go pull the bulk of the data down.
+ */
+ rv = HTCopy(anAnchor, s, (void *) handle, target);
+
+ /*
+ * If we get here with doing_redirect set, it means that we were looking
+ * for a Location header. We either have got it now in redirecting_url -
+ * in that case the stream should not have loaded any data. Or we didn't
+ * get it, in that case the stream may have presented the message body
+ * normally. - kw
+ */
+
+ if (rv == -1) {
+ /*
+ * Intentional interrupt before data were received, not an error
+ */
+ if (doing_redirect && traversal)
+ status = -1;
+ else
+ status = HT_INTERRUPTED;
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+
+ if (rv == -2) {
+ /*
+ * Aw hell, a REAL error, maybe cuz it's a dumb HTTP0 server
+ */
+ (*target->isa->_abort) (target, NULL);
+ if (doing_redirect && redirecting_url) {
+ /*
+ * Got a location before the error occurred? Then consider it an
+ * interrupt but proceed below as normal. - kw
+ */
+ /* do nothing here */
+ } else {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ if (!doing_redirect && !already_retrying && !do_post) {
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Trying again with HTTP0 request.\n"));
+ /*
+ * May as well consider it an interrupt -- right?
+ */
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+ extensions = NO;
+ already_retrying = TRUE;
+ _HTProgress(RETRYING_AS_HTTP0);
+ goto try_again;
+ } else {
+ status = HT_NOT_LOADED;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Free if complete transmission (socket was closed before return). Close
+ * socket if partial transmission (was freed on abort).
+ */
+ if (rv != HT_INTERRUPTED && rv != -2) {
+ (*target->isa->_free) (target);
+ } else {
+ HTTP_NETCLOSE(s, handle);
+ }
+
+ if (doing_redirect) {
+ if (redirecting_url) {
+ /*
+ * Set up for checking redirecting_url in LYGetFile.c for
+ * restrictions before we seek the document at that Location. - FM
+ */
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Picked up location '%s'\n",
+ redirecting_url));
+ if (rv == HT_INTERRUPTED) {
+ /*
+ * Intentional interrupt after data were received, not an error
+ * (probably). We take it as a user request to abandon the
+ * redirection chain.
+ *
+ * This could reasonably be changed (by just removing this
+ * block), it would make sense if there are redirecting
+ * resources that "hang" after sending the headers. - kw
+ */
+ FREE(redirecting_url);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Interrupted followup read.\n"));
+ status = HT_INTERRUPTED;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ HTProgress(line_buffer);
+ if (server_status == 305) { /* Use Proxy */
+ /*
+ * Make sure the proxy field ends with a slash. - FM
+ */
+ if (redirecting_url[strlen(redirecting_url) - 1]
+ != '/')
+ StrAllocCat(redirecting_url, "/");
+ /*
+ * Append our URL. - FM
+ */
+ StrAllocCat(redirecting_url, anAnchor->address);
+ CTRACE((tfp, "HTTP: Proxy URL is '%s'\n",
+ redirecting_url));
+ }
+ if (!do_post ||
+ server_status == 303 ||
+ server_status == 302) {
+ /*
+ * We don't have POST content (nor support PUT or DELETE), or
+ * the status is "See Other" or "General Redirection" and we
+ * can convert to GET, so go back and check out the new URL. -
+ * FM
+ */
+ status = HT_REDIRECTING;
+ goto clean_up;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Make sure the user wants to redirect the POST content, or treat
+ * as GET - FM & DK
+ */
+ switch (HTConfirmPostRedirect(redirecting_url,
+ server_status)) {
+ /*
+ * User failed to confirm. Abort the fetch.
+ */
+ case 0:
+ FREE(redirecting_url);
+ status = HT_NO_DATA;
+ goto clean_up;
+
+ /*
+ * User wants to treat as GET with no content. Go back to
+ * check out the URL.
+ */
+ case 303:
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the flag to retain the POST content and go back to check
+ * out the URL. - FM
+ */
+ default:
+ redirect_post_content = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ /* Lou's old comment: - FM */
+ /* OK, now we've got the redirection URL temporarily stored
+ in external variable redirecting_url, exported from HTMIME.c,
+ since there's no straightforward way to do this in the library
+ currently. Do the right thing. */
+
+ status = HT_REDIRECTING;
+
+ } else {
+ status = traversal ? -1 : HT_LOADED;
+ }
+
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * If any data were received, treat as a complete transmission
+ */
+ status = HT_LOADED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clean up
+ */
+ clean_up:
+ FREE(line_buffer);
+ FREE(line_kept_clean);
+
+ done:
+ /*
+ * Clear out on exit, just in case.
+ */
+ reloading = FALSE;
+#ifdef USE_SSL
+ FREE(connect_host);
+ if (handle) {
+ SSL_free(handle);
+ SSL_handle = handle = NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* USE_SSL */
+ dump_server_status = server_status;
+ return status;
+}
+
+/* Protocol descriptor
+*/
+#ifdef GLOBALDEF_IS_MACRO
+#define _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_1_INIT { "http", HTLoadHTTP, 0}
+GLOBALDEF(HTProtocol, HTTP, _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_1_INIT);
+#define _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_2_INIT { "https", HTLoadHTTP, 0}
+GLOBALDEF(HTProtocol, HTTPS, _HTTP_C_GLOBALDEF_2_INIT);
+#else
+GLOBALDEF HTProtocol HTTP =
+{"http", HTLoadHTTP, 0};
+GLOBALDEF HTProtocol HTTPS =
+{"https", HTLoadHTTP, 0};
+#endif /* GLOBALDEF_IS_MACRO */